University of Southampton,

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A Critical Analysis of UN Reform in the Post-Cold War Era:

A Case Study of Boutros Ghali's Reform Agenda.

By Naglaa Gamil Shalaby.

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ABSTRACT

The principal concern of this thesis is to analyse critically United Nations (UN) reform in the Post-Cold War era. The thesis contends that reform can be explained as a product of shifts in the global power structure as well as global norms. More especially the thesis argues that research on UN reform remains constrained by its tendency to dismiss the significance of shifts in norms. This being so, this study presents a critique of the existing literature on Post-Cold War UN reform, the bulk of which adopts an orthodox realist framework. It attempts to answer the following question: 'How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform? In pursuing an answer, the study considers two versions of realism, namely neorealism and the English School (ES). The aim is to elucidate the way each perspective can shed light on the process of reform and the value each provides as an account of UN reform.

The thesis commences by explaining how international organizations (IOs) and the process of IO change may be understood theoretically. This is important in order to substantiate the distinction the thesis makes between the two approaches (neorealism and the ES) to IOs and the UN in particular. The core of the thesis applies the major assumptions and conceptual tools of neorealism and the ES to Ghali's reform agenda to assess their relative explanatory leverage. It concludes that structural variables alone cannot explain the content, direction and success of reform. Rather, these are better explained by an analysis of changes in the normative structure of international relations. The main conclusion of the thesis, therefore, is that attempts to understand UN reform in the Post-Cold War era require a holistic realist analysis which recognizes the significance of structural power but at the same time links material influences with normative forces. This is an important departure from the neorealist literature, which focuses exclusively on the international distribution of power to account for IO reform. The contribution of the study is that it offers a theoretically complementary explanation of Ghali's reform agenda. It accepts the orthodox account that the initiation of UN reform in the 1990s can be explained by systemic and great power constraints. Unlike the orthodox paradigm, however, this thesis does not derive explanations solely from material structures. Instead, it demonstrates how normative values shaped the content and implementation of reform. In short, this thesis takes norms seriously in its explanation and understanding of Ghali's reform agenda. In doing so, it brings norms back in to the realist analysis of Post-Cold War UN reform and the study of IOs more generally.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACBAQ	Administrative Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions
ACC	Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ASG	Assistant-Secretary-General
CCPC	Committee on Program and Coordination
CCSQ	Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions
CNN	Cable News Network
CSS	Critical Security Studies
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
DPSCA	Department of Political and Security Council Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ES	English School
EU	European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G-77	Group of 77
GA	General Assembly
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IACB	Inter-Agency Consultative Board
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDA	International Development Agency
IGO(s)	Inter-Governmental Organization(s)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO(s)	International Organization(s)
ITC	International Trade Centre
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
LAS	League of Arabs States

NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Service
ORCI	Office of Research and the Collection of Information
P5	Permanent Five
PR(s)	Permanent Representative(s)
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDA	United Nations Development Authority
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Office
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Funds
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WFP	World Food Programme

Chapter One

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This chapter offers an introduction to the key ideas, themes, and theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts by providing a broad overview of the research field. As will be explored in more detail below, the thesis sets out to analyse critically United Nations (UN) reform in the Post-Cold War era. It starts with the conventional understanding that reform is a response to changes in the UN's role and responsibilities: it is necessary to understand the international landscape in which the UN exists in order to best understand the process of reform.

Having argued that UN reform should be understood in this broader context, the thesis will progress to critique the existing literature on Post-Cold War UN reform through a case study of the reform agenda of former Secretary General (SG) Boutros Ghali. This will provide insights into some of the inadequacies of the neorealist accounts that dominate the literature. I do not intend, at this stage, to provide a detailed literature review, as that will be appear in Chapter Six. Instead, I merely wish to give a brief synopsis and to identify some of the gaps in the existing literature. To achieve this, the most dominant theoretical framework found in the literature, that is realism, will be explicated and assessed. The thesis identifies two different realist arguments for understanding change in international organizations (IOs), namely neorealism and the English School (ES). It evaluates and contrasts their usefulness in the context of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. The current chapter will present the main research aims and questions of the thesis, followed by a discussion of the research methodology in which the choice of case study will be defended. I conclude the chapter by outlining the structure of the thesis, very briefly summarizing each of the chapters, and indicating how they address the aims of the thesis.

1.1 Overview

The end of the Cold War brought dramatic changes to world politics, and indeed to the UN. The world economy became more globalized, many internal conflicts intensified, and the authority and legitimacy of some states eroded. The UN was called upon to fulfil new global and institutional mandates. More was expected of the UN, with a sense that, following the inactivity enforced by the Cold War, a great new opportunity had arisen, a position in which the intentions of the UN Charter could at last be realized. In the emerging Post-Cold War era, the UN has been the object of greater expectations. Member states have clearly understood this; as will be discussed in Chapter Four, at the 1992 World Summit Meeting, the Heads of State and Government of all member states recognized these possibilities and invited the new SG, Boutros Ghali, to frame a comprehensive blueprint for change.

The UN's role in the Post-Cold War world has become vastly different from that envisaged at the San Francisco conference more than 60 years ago. Many of the issues that dominated the UN agenda for the first forty-three years still remain: the threat of war, issues of disarmament, development, etc. However, there are new threats to human security that require attention, while other issues have become obsolete. Thus, with a new mandate and reinvigorated organization, the UN could be well placed to fill a variety of roles in the new world order, particularly in the areas of democratization and humanitarian assistance. Since the early 1990s, the UN has undergone dramatic operational expansion in a wide range of fields, from human rights to development. Most notable has been a fourfold increase in the peacekeeping budget. The UN has been asked to settle or avert conflict, encourage peaceful settlement of disputes, promote free and fair elections and foster democratized institutions in particular countries in need of assistance. It has also been a catalyst for decolonization, enhanced international law by means of declarations, conventions and treaties on a wide range of issues, such as human rights, the environment, and humanitarian assistance. Such a vastly expanded and altered range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the UN, its rules, structure, systems and culture. The end of the Cold War opened up possibilities for change and gave way to a climate in

which discussion of reform could flourish. The task of reform was to match the purpose and structure of the UN as closely as possible to the realities, needs and requirements of this changing global context.

This thesis critically analyses UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. It starts from the contention that UN reform is a result of changing expectations and responsibilities. Therefore, to understand reform, it is important to consider the context in which it occurs, in terms of both the distribution of international power and global norms. Yet, most studies of UN reform, in adopting a neorealist framework, give insufficient attention to the changing normative structure of global politics. As the review in Chapter Four makes clear, during the Cold War, traditional accounts of UN reform put issues of power and power politics at the heart of their explanations of institutional change. Accordingly, they assumed that, under bipolarity, the UN carried little weight as it merely reflected key states' calculations of self-interest. One commentator went so far as to claim that 'It was impossible to keep the Cold War out of the UN, and the superpowers, rather than trying to insulate the global forum from the struggle in which they were engaged, turned the UN into a major forum for the struggle'.[1] A similar argument was advanced by Paul Taylor, who asserted that UN reform could be explained exclusively in terms of the structure of power in the international system itself. As he observed, IOs 'are merely instruments of state policy' and therefore change should be seen in the light of a 'doctrine about the underlying structure of power'.[2] Consequently, in the Cold War era, IOs underwent little change, because structural and systemic factors tended to remain stable.[3]

During the Cold War period, neorealism came to be regarded as the orthodox account of IOs and UN politics. The issue of reform or change was explained purely in terms of systemic forces or factors. At the end of the Cold War, the same realist (materialist) accounts informed reflections and studies on the future role of the UN and its reform. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, neorealist scholars argued that the new global power structure - created by the end of the bipolar domination - would have dramatic consequences for the UN's role. Here it is instructive to note that, although the issue of system polarity has occupied the attention of neorealists for many years, no consensus

has emerged over the shape of this new power structure. With the collapse of bipolarity, some acknowledged that America was the only significant player in the international power structure.[4] Others believed that the world was moving towards multipolarity.[5] In general, for neorealists, the end of bipolarity brought significant changes to the international environment in which the UN operated. This meant that, structural changes (as a result of the end of the Cold War) were the key factor that would affect the UN's role and reform in the new era.

Neorealism derived explanations of UN reform from the international distribution of power. Changes in the latter would lead to shifts in UN roles. In this sense, reform is explained solely by reference to the structural context (i.e. competition among major states and/or US hegemony). But the global political and normative structures of today are very different to that of the Cold War, and the UN reflects the context in which it exists. This poses an important question: Can neorealism alone provide a convincing framework for understanding the process of UN reform? Before answering this question, it is necessary to consider the neorealist definition of power. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, Waltz uses the concept of power as a defining characteristic of structure. Accordingly, the distribution of power amongst states and changes in that distribution define the structure of the international system. For him, power is more than the accumulation of military resources and the ability to use this power to coerce and control other states in the system. It is the combined capability of a state in all areas: size of population, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.[6] Waltz, however, does not propose anything to serve as a scorecard.[7] Thus, Waltz actually fails to provide a definition, but he argues, 'what, then, can be substituted for the practically and logically untenable definition? I offer the old and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him'.[8] In Waltz's account, power gives a state a place or position in the international system and shapes state behaviour. Waltz notes: 'To be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities [among agents]; the extent of one's power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get'.[9]

The central argument of this thesis is that the end of the Cold War has also brought some notable shifts in established international norms. Examples include the promotion and protection of human rights, human dignity and human security. Half a century ago, the general presumption was that the international community should not interfere in member state's domestic affairs and that nation-states alone were responsible for the treatment of their citizens. In the Post-Cold War world, a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human atrocities has taken hold. There is a new commitment - expressed in both moral and legal terms - to alleviate human suffering and humanitarian emergencies. The 1990s, therefore, witnessed the development of a new norm of intervention in international society. Nicholas Wheeler, in his book *Saving Strangers,* argues that a new norm of humanitarian intervention is evolving and that a solidarist rather than a pluralist conception of international society is emerging.[10]

The UN was firmly associated with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states for 45 years, i.e. the prohibition of military incursions into states without the consent of the government.[11] In this sense, the UN Charter is widely seen as fundamentally non-interventionist in its approach. Taken as a whole, the Charter essentially limits the right of states to use force internationally to cases of (1) individual or collective self-defence, and (2) assistance in UN-authorized or controlled military operations. The strongest and most frequently-cited prohibitions on intervention are those in Article 2. Article 2 (4) states 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. Article 2 (7) of the Charter provides that 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' At the very least, these provisions create a strong presumption against forcible military intervention by member states. However, that norm is in question, as it may be breached in extreme circumstances of gross violations of human rights. In other words, humanitarian intervention is becoming a norm

of international society. In the Post-Cold War era, and in contrast to what has previously been the norm, the UN became associated with a pattern of interventionism, often but not exclusively on humanitarian grounds. Related to this is the widening recognition that the Westphalian order of sovereign states,[12] assumed to be autonomous with respect to domestic policy, no longer describes the contemporary world, if it ever did.[13] This new interpretation implies limitations on sovereignty and that sovereignty carries with it responsibilities.[14] At the heart of this challenge to sovereignty is an argument, in *Our Global Neighborhood,* that although states are sovereign, they are not free to do whatever they want.[15] From this perspective, humanitarian emergencies within a sovereign state – be they civil war or violations of rights – can lead to a loss of the 'protection afforded them by the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention'.[16] Consequently, it seems evident that the principle of non-interference cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated. Simply put, humanitarian assistance shifts from being a potential violation of sovereign rights to being a safeguard for fundamental human rights.

In the early 1990s, the international environment appeared to have changed irrevocably: human security, human rights, democratization, and development became key issues on the global agenda. This prompted several lines of enquiry, especially since governments could not unilaterally resolve Post-Cold War problems. In addition, given globalization, state boundaries have been eroded in matters of the economy and human rights. These various developments reflect and promote material and moral interdependence. Significantly for this thesis, the spread of global interdependence has encouraged efforts to reform the UN and to upgrade its capacity to monitor and prevent humanitarian emergencies. In short, the principal argument of the thesis is that the end of the Cold War brought a seismic shift in the global normative landscape. Established norms, such as non-intervention in domestic affairs, were in question and new ones, like humanitarian intervention, were emerging. This has required the UN and its member states to reflect on its actual and potential roles. For example, in the new world, the expectation may be that the UN not only has a moral right to intervene to prevent humanitarian emergencies, but has a duty to protect all the citizens of the world from tyranny. This line of thinking

allows Wheeler to assume that humanitarian intervention – when backed by the UN Security Council (SC) – has come to be seen as legally accepted by international society.[17] In an era characterized by increased attention to human rights, and by a renewed focus on the UN to uphold international human rights, efforts to transform the organization reflect evolving norms. Nevertheless, research continues to be dominated by theoretical perspectives which assume that UN reform can be explained solely with reference to material power structures. In other words, despite continued evidence that universal norms, such as standards of human rights articulated at international level, are being neglected, the orthodox neorealist approach continues to assume that reform simply reflects the US and other great powers' priorities.[18] This thesis attempts to question this predominant neorealist materialist explanation. It argues that, while UN reform is undoubtedly bound up with power relations, it also has a normative logic that is not reducible to power politics. Hence it is hard to see how the emergence of a new normative structure of international politics could be excluded from an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform.

Having identified the significance of norms, the task will then be to assess the validity of two realist perspectives, neorealism and the ES, in relation to the most significant attempt at Post-Cold War UN reform, namely the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. In order to accomplish this, the thesis firstly examines the utility of the framework provided by neorealism in accounting for Ghali's reforms. The research presented suggests that the notion of polarity may explain the initiation of reform. Shifts in international power structure similarly can shed light on the timing of the reform agenda. The materialistic approach of neorealism, however, limits its explanatory power. The discussion will show that neorealism alone cannot accommodate questions concerning the content or normative direction of reform. Nor is it able to provide a coherent account of the implementation of Ghali's broad recommendations for improving the UN's capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. This in part is due to the neorealist claim that power politics must always remain at the top of the UN agenda; evidence in Chapters Four and Five demonstrates that this is clearly not the case. Issues such as human rights, development and democracy have all become salient in the period of globalization and

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these issues now dominate the UN agenda. Also, the neorealist approach cannot account for the emergence and significance of new norms regarding universal human rights. In short, since neorealism fails to acknowledge the significance of the global normative structure, it cannot provide, by itself, a convincing framework for analyzing the direction, nature and success of UN reform. The contributions of neorealism are assessed more fully in Chapter Six.

Having argued that neorealism undervalues the role of norms in its understanding of UN reform, this thesis will assess the value of the ES in offering insights into Ghali's reform agenda. As the analysis in Chapter Two makes clear, the ES elevates the status of norms through its approach to IOs and the process of institutional change. In this context, the ES develops the concept of constitutive norms to show that IOs are endogenous rather than exogenous to states' behaviour.[19] This implies that an organization such as the UN, to some extent, can alter the inter-subjective context in which states operate. As for the process of change, ES theorists consider the role of norms to be an impetus for change. Accordingly, states tend to alter institutional arrangements, with shifts in the major norms upon which their mutual relations are based.[20] From this perspective, the end of the Cold War involved not only power transitions but also increased consideration of human rights and human security. As is evident in the work of Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler[21] there is a slowly emerging human rights solidarism. The UN has come to play an important role in legitimizing the expansion of international human rights standards. This is especially so given the belief that peace and security issues are tied up with human rights, economics and ecological issues as well as HIV/AIDS. The implication is that humanitarian conditions within a state, as leading to instability and conflict, may constitute a threat to international stability and merit enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has substantially expanded its role in the promotion of international norms on major global issues. This was reflected in both the formulation and implementation of Ghali's major reforms. The ES includes consideration of normative factors in its explanation of UN reform. It suggests that the content and

direction of Ghali's reform agenda were principally shaped, legitimized and justified by underlying changes in the normative structure of international politics. For example, it was not just changes in the power structure that led to Ghali's recommendations for preventive diplomacy and interventions, rather these were shaped by the emergence of a new norm of humanitarian intervention. International norms therefore helped to establish what constitutes legitimate and acceptable behaviour in relations among sovereign states. Moreover, as states became more interdependent during the Post-Cold War era, they had to conceive of themselves increasingly as members of an international community. That is, a strong expectation has emerged that members of this community decide and act collectively rather than individually. This normative acceptance was inevitably reflected in the implementation of Ghali's reform agenda. In the context of the Post-Cold War world, it is plausible to expect states behaviour towards the UN, and its reform, to be shaped by the international normative context within which they and the UN are situated. This simply means that two factors merit special attention in understanding Ghali's reforms: the international distribution of material capabilities or power and the global normative structure.

This is an important contention as it rectifies a notable omission in most traditional accounts to UN reform. As the discussion in Chapter Six will demonstrate, the existing literature almost exclusively relies on power transition arguments as the significant factor in understanding Ghali's reform agenda. It reduces UN reform to a question of power hierarchy, particularly the primacy of the US. Most of the literature therefore fails to note the importance of newly emerging norms of humanitarian intervention. It also fails to recognize that globalization has led to the emergence of a form of state that is increasingly responsive to humanitarian emergencies, so that perceived national interest has to some degree become suffused with the interests of the international community. The role played by dominant societal forces in drawing states into new relations through membership of key IOs is also largely ignored by the literature. For example, the research shows that international norms supporting the idea that gross violations of human rights are a global responsibility appear to have causal significance in the implementation of

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Ghali's reform agenda. This confirms the view that the ES argument concerning the significance of norms aids the understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform.

In short, my account of Ghali's reform agenda seeks to highlight the explanatory power of both power and norms. In doing so, it enables us to understand that UN reform is more complex than orthodox accounts suggest, and hence cannot be simply explained by the international power structure alone. My account offers a helpful corrective to existing interpretations of Ghali's reform agenda, by affirming that normative forces were important in addition to material factors. To be clear, my argument is that the ES is not so much an alternative to neorealism, but a supplement to it. The ES has the potential to enhance our understanding of reform, without suggesting that it supplants the neorealist approach as the best, or even better, perspective to adopt. The ES simply fills important gaps in our overall understanding, namely the role of norms. The two accounts are complementary, as each makes important contributions to UN reform understanding.

1.2 Research Aims and Principal Research Question

From the initial claim that both power and norms are important to understanding the issue of reform, this thesis contends that existing neorealist accounts are limited in their explanatory scope by failing to give sufficient credence to the role of norms. The key point to emphasize is that, in order to understand the process of UN reform, it is necessary to go beyond just an understanding of the priorities of the great powers. But I suggest that values and norms are not the only factors that help us understand change in IOs. Indeed, as I will show in Chapter Four, the initiation of Ghali's reforms occurred with a shift in international power structure. Rather, my argument is that structural and normative conditions are important – each in part helps us to understand the process of reform. Consequently, the aim of this thesis is two-fold.

1- *To assess the utility of realism - both in its neorealist form, and in the English School interpretation - in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era.*

2-   To critically evaluate orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda through both the neorealist and English School perspectives.

The main concern of this study is how the frameworks provided by neorealism and the ES help us understand change in IOs such as the UN. The concern is to identify the way each perspective sheds light on the issue of reform, given that the existing literature treats UN reform solely as a function of power transition, which is inadequate for understanding UN reform in an era that has witnessed significant changes in underlying norms. The principal research question addressed by the thesis is a theoretical one, namely:

How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform?

The response to this question marks a significant departure from the orthodox literature, because it encourages a normative, not just a power-based, analysis of reform. In sum, given this broad research question and drawing on the specified research aims, this thesis sets out to assume two specific issues. Firstly, explaining Post-Cold War UN reform requires both an understanding of structural change in the international system as well as the changing normative structure of global politics. Secondly, explaining the substantive content, direction and success of UN reform involves both an examination of power and norms.

1.3 The Case Study Selection

The reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali has been selected as a case study for several key reasons. Firstly, of the seven UN Secretaries-General, Ghali was the most determined to thrust the organization in a different direction than *Realpolitik*. He came to office with a vision of the Secretary General's role as 'an impartial figure with a global mandate'.[22] He also focused attention upon new actors and forces, drawing the international community's attention to issues outside the mainstream international agenda. Furthermore, Ghali asserted himself in the SC to a greater extent than his predecessors. This stemmed from his personal style - Ghali was characterized as being

'independent' and 'outspoken'. As Armstrong et al. observe, 'Like Hammarskjöld, he was keen to extend his authority and exercise his independent judgement. But like Lie, he sometimes lacked a realistic appreciation of what the UN can do'.[23]

Secondly, the reform initiatives launched by SG Boutros Ghali in 1992 at the beginning of his term opened the first round of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. As will be explored in more detail in Chapter Four, Ghali made important reform proposals in three major reports to the General Assembly entitled '*An Agenda for Peace*', '*An Agenda for Development*' and '*An Agenda for Democratization*'. These reports, which demonstrated the SG's innovative thinking, continued to influence reforms over the following decade, in such areas as peacekeeping. In addition, Ghali was radical in his approach to UN finance. In the face of US non-payment of dues, and the near-bankruptcy of the UN, he proposed global taxation as a new funding source. Washington, however, reacted with fierce objections, and shortly thereafter vetoed his candidacy for a second term. In short, although his main recommendations were not accepted, they were subsequently reflected in the recent reform initiatives of his successor, Kofi Annan.

Finally, this particular case was selected because it constitutes a test of major assumptions and the conceptual tools of both neorealism and the ES. With regard to the former, neorealism claims to explain UN reform solely by reference to shifts in power structure. If this is a valid claim, neorealism should provide useful insights into the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda. Ghali took over at a moment when there was a significant power transition in the UN and international system; it was the beginning of a new era. Although the shape of the emerging system was not yet clear, for neorealist scholars, the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, or multipolarity, was the key factor that triggered UN reform. Likewise, the choice of Ghali's reform agenda can help to assess the validity of the ES, which emphasizes changes in widely held norms, along with the international distribution of power, to explain UN reform. Given the shifts in enduring norms related to humanitarian intervention during the secretary-generalship of Ghali, then the ES should be able to provide particular insights into the nature, direction and success of Ghali's reform agenda.

1.4 Methodology

This thesis addresses a primary research question, namely: 'How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform?' In order to answer this question, the thesis has relied on a wide range of evidence and research techniques. Firstly, primary source material, such as UN documents and papers, and the SG's statements and Annual Reports on the work of the organization, between 1992 and 1997, have been consulted. Further, secondary material in books and articles on UN institutional reform were surveyed and critically reviewed. The analysis and interpretation of both primary and secondary sources was complemented by a series of in-depth interviews with Boutros Ghali as well as with senior staff who worked with him. With this evidence, it has been possible to 'map' the causes, content and implementation of Ghali's reform agenda.

My decision to use a qualitative approach (literature review and interviews) was informed by certain epistemological and ontological assumptions.[24] These assumptions are important, because they go to the heart of a debate in the Social Sciences regarding ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions. In respect of ontology, the debate centres on whether the world is made up of ideas and/or material factors, and whether there is a 'real' world 'out there' that exists independent of our knowledge of it. In epistemological terms, the question is whether we can objectively know the world, and know it through direct observation (positivism), or whether we can only interpret it. Finally, in methodological terms, 'explaining' the world typically involves adopting a 'scientific' approach to analysis that 'looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative analysis.....and wants to produce 'objective' and generalisable findings'.[25] Understanding the world, on the other hand, involves a hermeneutic (interpretive) approach, focuses on 'meaning' rather than 'reality', looks for constitutive rather than causal relationships, and tends towards qualitative analysis.[26]

In view of the above, I adopt an ontology which assumes that ideational factors such as ideas and norms have the potential to be as important as material factors. Epistemologically, I assume that there is no 'real' world that exists independently of the

meaning that we attach to it, and that the world is not waiting patiently for us to observe it. This suggests a qualitative methodology that assumes that the world is interpreted by actors (rather than observed by them) and that their interpretation is in turn interpreted by the researcher. Thus, my decision to conduct a qualitative analysis is informed by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions. As Mason states:

> If you choose qualitative interviewing it may be because your *ontological* position suggests that people's knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations....are meaningful properties of the social reality which your research questions are designed to explore...If you have chosen qualitative interviewing you should have an *epistemological* position which allows that a legitimate or meaningful way to generate data on those ontological properties is to talk interactively with people, to ask them questions, to listen to them....or to analyse their use of language and construction of discourse.[27]

In short, a qualitative approach has been utilized in this study as it excels at 'telling the story' from the participant's viewpoint, providing more in depth, comprehensive information about the topic. As Maxwell observes, 'qualitative research is the method of inquiry that seeks to understand social phenomena within the context of the participants' perspectives and experiences'.[28]

Primary research: The interviews

As stated above, an important component of my research was a series of interviews with key actors involved in the process of Ghali's reform agenda. I conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews. I then conducted a thematic analysis of the interviews in order to generate primary data to explicate the role of power and norms in Ghali's reforms.

The interviews provided important insights into the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda, and the significance and meanings that key actors attached to global norms. The aim was not to provide a measurement of how important values and norms were, *vis-à-vis* other factors, i.e. power and interests. Rather, the interviews allowed me to make meaningful judgments about the relative significance of both power and international norms. The aims of the interviews were therefore two-fold: firstly, to collect [excavate] data that was

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otherwise not available from primary and secondary textual sources; and secondly, to generate [construct] new data. In Chapters Four and Five I provide a thorough analysis of the narratives produced by respondents. The aim was to assess whether this revealed any new evidence or understanding of the role of power and norms in the reform process. The narratives that emerged from these interviews, and the associated thematic analysis in conjunction with the textual analysis of key primary texts, enabled a better understanding of the importance attached to norms by the key actors.

My interviews combined open-ended [tell me your story] questions and semi-structured questioning. Taken together they can be accurately described as 'conversations with a purpose'.[29] The challenge was to prepare in advance a form of semi-structured questions that neither led nor limited responses.[30] To help with the challenges, I adopted a recognized procedure for preparing interviews.[31] I started by assembling the key research questions, subdivided them into mini-research questions or issue-areas, developed ideas about how to best investigate the issues, formulated a loose structure for the interviews, and finally derived standardized questions to be posed to each interviewee.

I identified those to be interviewed from primary and secondary texts as key players involved in Ghali's reforms and used 'snowball sampling'.[32] I asked interviewees to nominate potential informants and built my sample as my research progressed. Respondents were selected according to their relevance to the research topic [purposive sampling]. For example, in addition to Ghali, the sample included two former US ambassadors, a former UK ambassador, a former Egyptian ambassador, the former USG for administration, the former USG for political affairs, Ghali's Chief of Staff, Ghali's spokesman and spokeswoman, Ghali's political advisors and many senior officials. [See Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees].

In short, by purposive sampling, and by analyzing and cross-referencing answers from all respondents, it was possible to make some generalizations about the conditions of, and influences upon, Ghali's reform agenda.[33]

1.5 The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of seven chapters. Each of these is outlined briefly, to provide an initial overview of the study.

Chapter Two addresses the first of the two theoretical aims of the thesis: to assess the utility of realism - both in its neorealist form, and in the ES interpretation - in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. I begin with an examination of realist theory, separating it into its neorealist and ES variants. I do this to substantiate the distinction I make between the neorealist and ES approaches to IO. At the conclusion of Chapter Two (Section 2.4), I discuss two realist frameworks for explaining the process of change in IOs, which I employ in my subsequent analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. I introduce these frameworks at the end of Chapter Two because they structure my analysis (in Chapter Six) of the case study of Ghali's reform agenda; but also because they provide a means of bringing norms 'back in' to the realist analysis of UN reform. This lays the foundations for the second aim of my thesis: to illustrate the gap in the existing literature as regards orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda.

In Chapter Three, I develop the neorealist and ES accounts of IOs (detailed in Chapter Two). I do this to show how first generation research associated with neorealism and the ES understood the Post-Cold War era context as well as its constraints and opportunities. In Section 3.1, I start with an examination of the neorealist view of the Post-Cold War power structure - the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity and the implications of each for the UN. Having done that, I discuss the ES argument regarding the changing normative structure (Section 3.2). In this context, I focus on the impact that emerging norms regarding human rights and new conceptions of the limits of state sovereignty had on expectations concerning the UN's responsibilities and role. This chapter therefore provides an important bridge between the theoretical chapter (Chapter Two) and the substantive case study chapters (Chapters Four and Five).

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In order to put Ghali's reform agenda in its proper historical context, I offer, in Chapter Four, an historical account of past UN reform, focusing especially on the introduction of reform as a response to new responsibilities and expectations. I begin by providing a review of three key reform attempts: the Capacity study, the Group of 25 Experts and the Report of the Group of 18. Having done that, I then introduce the substantive element of my thesis: the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. Chapter Four is structured to cover three main elements of Ghali's reform agenda - underlying causes, timing and content, drawing on primary and secondary research.

In Chapter Five I build on the previous chapter, which introduced the necessary context and background information on Ghali's reform agenda. This chapter therefore completes the narrative begun in Chapter Four. It takes the form of an analysis of the politics of Ghali's reform agenda. Section 5.1 begins by considering the principal actors involved in Ghali's reforms. Next, an examination of reactions to the reforms. Finally, I provide a more detailed exposition of the implementation and impact of Ghali's reform agenda.

In Chapter Six, I apply the theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapters Two and Three to an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. The intention is to assess the utility of realism in this case study - which is the first aim of the thesis. To do so, I compare and contrast the neorealist and ES approaches to Ghali's reform agenda by looking in more detail at what both approaches tell us about four key factors: the causes, timing, content, and implementation of Ghali's reform agenda. These elements serve as criteria for judging the explanatory capacity of neorealism and the ES. In section 6.3, I provide a detailed analysis of the literature on Ghali's reform agenda. I do this to identify various gaps in orthodox accounts (which is the second aim of my thesis), the most crucial for this thesis being that normative factors are largely absent. This discussion reinforces the limits of existing orthodox accounts of Ghali's reforms and points towards the need for a complementary framework.

Finally, Chapter Seven addresses the principal research question driving the thesis: 'How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform'? In doing so,

I critically assess the principal assertion of my thesis, that both power and norms are important in understanding and explaining UN reform, in the light of the empirical research discussed in the preceding chapters. The chapter also highlights the significant findings of the thesis and its original contribution to the literature on UN reform. It concludes by proposing further areas of research.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an outline of the thesis, its content, rationale and methodology. It commenced by providing an overview of the research field. Section 1.1 demonstrated that orthodox analyses based on neorealism attempt to account for Post-Cold War UN reform by focusing solely on the new international distribution of power. By doing so, much of the existing literature on Ghali's reforms pays insufficient attention to, or undervalues, the role of norms in explaining or understanding his agenda. Instead, the thesis argues that while the UN was conditioned and constrained by power politics, there were normative forces in the 1990s that put pressure on the organization to change in ways not anticipated by its founders.

Having argued that power and norms are important in understanding Post-Cold War UN reform, the chapter went on to identify the research aims and principal research question. Section 1.2 first identified the two main aims of the thesis: 1- to assess the utility of realism - both in its neorealist form, and in the ES interpretation - in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era and 2- to illustrate the gap in the existing literature as regards orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda. The section highlighted the principal research question namely: 'How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform'?

The chapter then proceeded to consider the choice of the case study. Section 1.3 explained why Ghali's reform agenda has been selected as a case study. Section 1.4 provided a discussion of the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, demonstrating that in order to examine the principal research question, this study has

combined theoretical with empirical analyses. It also demonstrated how primary and secondary sources are complemented by a series of in-depth interviews. The chapter finally concluded by outlining the structure and logic of thesis.

In short, the key claim is that power-based accounts of UN reform do not get us very far in understanding the content, direction and success of Ghali's reform agenda, and that the ES helps address these issues. This thesis presents the case for adopting the ES as a suitable complementary account to neorealism. The next chapter will provide a more detailed exposition of the two theoretical and methodological frameworks that are applied in Chapter Six to account for Ghali's reform agenda. It first examines the neorealist account of the structural factors driving or constraining reform in IOs, and then explicates the ES account.

Notes

[1] Robert W. Gregg, About Face? The United States and the United Nations, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 30.
[2] Paul Taylor, 'Prescribing for the reform of international organization: the logic of arguments for change', Review of International Studies, January 1987, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 29.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 23-33; William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security, Summer 1999, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 5-41 and Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.
[5] Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, Autumn 1993, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 44-79; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', International Security, Spring 1993, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 5-51, and Charles Kupchan, 'After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity', International Security, Autumn 1998, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 40-79.
[6] Waltz, 1993, p. 50.
[7] Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand strategy after the Cold War', International Security, 1997, Spring, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 54.
[8] Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 192.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
[11] Non-intervention is the norm in international relations that one state cannot interfere in the internal politics of another state, based upon the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination.
[12] The concept of state sovereignty states that within the territory of a political entity the state is the supreme power, and as such no state from without the territory can intervene, militarily or otherwise, with the internal politics of that state.
[13] See for example Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999.

[14] See for example, Daniel Philpott, <u>Revolutions In Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations,</u> Princeton University Press, 2001, Francis Deng, 'Changing Concepts of Displacement and Sovereignty', in Kevin M. Cahill, Ed., <u>Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping wars before they start</u>, New York, Routledge, 2000, Francis Deng et al., <u>Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa</u>, Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1995, and Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', <u>Political Studies</u>, 1999, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 457-473.

[15] Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal, Co-chaired, <u>Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance</u>, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995.

[16] Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Review Article: Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Emergent Norms, Moral Duty or the Coming Anarchy?' <u>International Affairs</u>, 2001, vol. 77, no. 1, p. 127.

[17] Wheeler, 2000, p. 8, 16, 168-9, 183, 200, 285, and 295.

[18] Please refer to Chapter Six for more detail.

[19] Buzan, Barry, <u>From International to World Society? English School Theory And The Social Structure Of Globalisation</u>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[20] Kalevi J. Holsti, 'The Institutions of International Politics: Continuity, Change, and Transformation', paper presented at the ISA Convention, New Orleans, March 2002, Available on: http://<u>www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/holsti02.htm</u>. Accessed 9-4-05.

[21] Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, Eds., <u>Human Rights in Global Politics</u>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Nicholas J. Wheeler, <u>Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society</u>, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000 and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Review Article: Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Emergent Norms, Moral Duty or the Coming Anarchy?', <u>International Affairs</u>, 2001, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 113-128.

[22] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Global Leadership: After the Cold War', <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, March/April 1996, volume 75, no. 2, pp. 88- 102.

[23] David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd and John Redmond, <u>International Organization in World Politics</u>, Basingstoke, Palgrave, Third Edition, 2004, p. 134.

[24] Mark Blyth, 'Institutions and Ideas', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., <u>Theory and Methods in Political Science</u>, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, p. 294.

[25] David Marsh and Paul Furlong, 'A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., <u>Theory and Methods in Political Science</u>, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, p. 21.

[26] The distinction between explaining and understanding is a familiar one in the Social Sciences, and was introduced to the study of International Relations by Hollis and Smith in their seminal 1990 study. On this see M. Hollis and S. Smith, <u>Explaining and Understanding International Relations</u>, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990.

[27] Jennifer Mason, <u>Qualitative Researching</u>, London, Sage Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 63-64.

[28] Joseph A. Maxwell, <u>Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach</u>, London, Sage Publications, 2005, p. 22.

[29] Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, <u>Designing Qualitative Research</u>, London, Sage Publications, 1999, p. 108. Also see Mason, 2002, p. 67.

[30] Jane Elliot, <u>Using Narrative in Social Research. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches</u>, London, Sage Publications, 2005, p. 21.

[31] Mason, 2002, pp. 69-72.

[32] Fiona Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., <u>Theory and Methods in Political Science</u>, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 205.

[33] David Silverman, <u>Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analyzing talk, text and interaction</u>, London, Sage Publications, 2001, p. 248.

Chapter Two

Realist Explanations of International Organization and Institutional Change

2.0 Introduction

This chapter identifies the core assumptions of realism, and differentiates between the key variants of the theory. The principal aim is to understand the realist view of change in IOs, including instances of institutional reform. In order to understand the causal mechanisms of change, it is necessary to consider the realist interpretation of institutions, in particular IOs. More precisely, we need to specify how the different variants of the theory answer two key interrelated questions. Firstly, why do states select institutionalize their relations in IOs? Secondly, can institutions make a difference? These questions are of considerable importance to any explanation of change in IOs. Thus, the starting point for this chapter is the premise that the explanation of UN reform is first contingent upon establishing a sufficient understanding of the realist arguments concerning the causes of international cooperation and the function of institutions. To address these issues, the chapter will be organized as follows: section one identifies the fundamental assumptions of realist theory; section two distinguishes between the different variants of the theory; section three discusses the intra-realist debate regarding the significance of institutions. It argues that little consensus exists among realists regarding the answer to an important question: Do institutions matter in world politics? As a consequence, section four reviews two different realist arguments for explaining change in IOs: the neorealist account of the structural factors driving or constraining reform in IOs; and the ES normative account.

2.1 Core Assumptions of Realist Theory

Realism is a general approach to international politics, not a single theory. As described in the literature, it is 'a big tent, with room for a number of different theories'.[1] Despite important differences over many aspects of contemporary affairs and foreign policy,

Lynn-Jones and Miller[2] advocate that most realist writers would share six fundamental perspectives or core assumptions regarding the nature of international politics and the forces shaping it. These assumptions are as follows.

First, states are the key actors in world politics

This involves two claims. Firstly, all other actors are of lesser significance, and they operate in an international system whose rules are made by states.[3] Secondly, states have supreme authority nationally and autonomy internationally. Realists thus assume that understanding world politics entails focusing on the behaviour of states, not on the behaviour of individuals, classes, transnational firms or other international actors. As Krasner puts it: 'Students of international relations have multinationalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading'.[4]

Secondly, anarchy (the absence of an over-arching central authority) is the distinguishing feature of the international system

Anarchy shapes both the goals states choose to pursue and the means they elect to achieve them.[5] In an anarchic structure, states are self-help agents. They compete with each other for influence. Realists view the nature of this competition in zero-sum terms: the gain of the gainer(s) exactly equals the loss of the loser(s). The competitive logic of power politics makes agreement on global principles intricate. This does not imply that cooperation is impossible, only that states will approach cooperative ventures with a concern for their impact on relative power positions.[6] It is worth noting that anarchy in the realist framework does not mean lack of order[7], but rather the interests of a dominant great power [8] and the configuration of power in the system [9] imposes order in the context of anarchy. Furthermore, patterns of cooperative behaviour exist in various areas of international relations through a mix of rules, norms, procedures and institutions. [10] This, however, does not mean that institutions and conventions can alter the anarchic structure of international relations.

Thirdly, states seek to maximize their power and/or their security

For some realists,[11] states are principally power maximizers. They pursue power solely for the accumulation of power. In other words, power is a key objective for its own sake. Revisionist states, according to this view, are keen to alter the existing distribution of power, even if such an action may jeopardize their security [power dilemma]. Other realists,[12] however, assume that states first of all wish to survive in an anarchic setting. Status quo states, as a result, only seek the requisite amount of power to assure their survival. Security is obtained through the pursuit of power. In other words, security is the end to which states will give priority. In realist theory, whether states are power or security maximizers is an important issue. It affects their behaviour towards one another and their prospects of cooperation through institutions.

Fourthly, states generally adopt rational policies in their pursuit of power and/or security

Despite the fact that realists diverge in their views regarding states' primary ends; they conceptualize states as 'rational actors whose foreign policy behavior tends to be driven by calculations of national interest'.[13] States' rationality, in the realist account, implies that states are goal-oriented; their preferences are ordered; they devise strategies to achieve their goals, and they are sensitive to costs.[14] Rationality however does not mean success. States, according to realists, may miscalculate, because accurate information is not always available.[15] Realism thus does not imply that states will necessarily behave rationally, but that in order to pursue their interests they should.[16] Keohane articulates the realist assumption that 'world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating the costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, although doing so under conditions of uncertainty'.[17]

Fifthly, states rely ultimately on the threat or use of military force to attain their goals

Since states cannot depend on supranational authority to resolve international disputes, the military power of individual states is the fundamental determining factor of their ability to secure their objectives. 'The greater the military advantage one has over other states, the more secure it is'.[18] Thus, in an anarchic system where states must ultimately look to self-help for their survival, military power is the foremost concern of every

state.[19] On this basis, 'military security matters most in interstate interaction'.[20] Other capabilities, whether economic, organizational or moral, are important in so far as they maintain military capability. In this regard, it is worth noting that, for realists, states use force only where necessary or as a last resort, but while this is legitimate for states, it is not for non-state actors.

<u>Sixthly, the distribution of power among states is the most important cause of state conduct in the international system</u>

According to realism, the international distribution of power (unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity) determines state behaviour. For example, in a bipolar system, the two powers that dominate the system are bound to be antagonists. Weak states have no alternative but to align with one of the dominant powers. On this basis, the realist model posits that state behaviour can be explained without the need to consider domestic politics, because they are narrowly constrained by the polar structure of the international system. Krasner states: 'realism makes no effort to probe the domestic determinants of foreign policy; what counts is state power and external constraints'.[21]

In short, this section identifies the fundamental assumptions of realist theory, the next section will attempt to distinguish between the different variants of realism and how they account for IOs.

2.2 The Main Variants of Realism and IO

The belief that realism is 'a cluster of models, assumptions, hunches, hypotheses, and parameter estimates,'[22] leads to many different ways of categorizing its variants in international relations theory.[23] This thesis adopts the most common and simple of oppositions distinguishing between those that grant theoretical primacy to human nature and those that highlight the importance of international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international system. Categorizing realist scholars into classical and structural branches captures this dichotomy well.

2.2.1 Realism as a Condition of Human Nature: Classical Realism

The most distinctive character of classical realism is its adherents' focus on human nature. Classical realists, like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau assume that it is humans' lust for power that explains the essential features of international politics, such as competition, fear and war. They agree that the human condition leads to a condition of conflict from which there is no escape. Classical realist theory therefore is fundamentally 'a theory of survival'.[24] A common theme among classical realists is the belief that power is not the only criterion that matters in international relations. They also recognize the importance of moral and ethical considerations in world politics. This is perhaps most clearly evident in the realism of E. H. Carr who points out that: 'It is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order'.[25] Some classical realists take this logic a step further and posit that states that act on the basis of self-interest and power, without any consideration of moral or ethical philosophy, frequently suffer from self-defeating policies. In this sense, Thucydides argues that Athens was beaten whilst adhering to the key realist principle of self-interest.[26] However, there is some disagreement within classical realism about the degree of morality that guides states. On the one hand, some classical realists, such as Carr and Morgenthau, advocate a moderate understanding of moral conduct by assuming that international politics should respect a harmonization between power and ethics. On the other hand, some realists are more specific in their treatment of morality and state behaviour. Machiavelli, for instance proposes that states must disregard their obligations and treaties once national security is at risk.

In general, most classical realists maintain that human nature is malleable and can be overcome by many factors, such as ideas, values and institutions. These factors can play an important role in interstate affairs. To make explicit the classical realist view of IOs, this section will concentrate on the work of Hans Morgenthau, who is often credited with presenting the fullest account of classical realism. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* is commonly considered to be the work that altered the field of international relations from 'idealist advocacy to realist analysis'.[27] In relation to this, Stanley Hoffmann wrote

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'If our discipline has any founding father, it is Hans Morgenthau'.[28] Morgenthau's realism presents a distinctive version of the theory. It combines an explanation of the underlying essence of relations among states with the idea of moral dignity being in the national interest. It is to Morgenthau's overall account that we first turn.

2.2.1.. Morgenthau's Classical Realism

Morgenthau's version of realism is grounded in a pessimistic theory of human nature. He treats political events as the result of forces inherent in 'mankind'. For him: 'politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature'.[29] Putting the issue in this way implies an examination of Morgenthau's assumptions about the character of human nature. In this regard Morgenthau writes: 'The element of universality, transcending any particular area and common to all, may be called human nature. However different in its specific manifestations at different times and places, it is the same everywhere and at all times'.[30] Seen from this perspective, human beings are aggressive creatures prone to base behaviour. Morgenthau thus places selfishness and lust for power at the centre of his picture of humankind. As he puts it: 'The drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men'.[31] And since states are human creations, Morgenthau infers that states must possess the same characteristics. In other words, the essentially aggressive impulses in human nature lead Morgenthau to believe that 'whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim'.[32] This informs a political conclusion: states are essentially power seekers. Even if they have enormous power, they will still seek more.

Another central idea in Morgenthau's theory is 'the concept of interest defined in terms of power'.[33] For Morgenthau, the national interest is or should be the sole pursuit of statesmen. Hence Morgenthau believes that state leaders are duty bound to conduct their foreign policies by reference to the national interest, and they may be condemned for failing to do so. According to this view, national interests are permanent conditions, which provide policy-makers with a rational guide to action: they are fixed and always transcend politics.[34] That is what Morgenthau calls the 'rational hypothesis':

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> We put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain
> problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves
> what the rational alternatives are from which a stateman may choose...
> and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under
> these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational
> hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning
> to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible.[35]

It is apparent that power plays a central role in Morgenthau's classical realism. He posits: 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power'.[36] Morgenthau however notes that peace can be preserved by two devices. One is the balance of power. The other is the normative limitation of international law, international morality and world public opinion. Morgenthau thus introduces the notion of international power balances as a way to preserve peace and avoid war: 'The balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable, but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations'.[37] Morgenthau however believes that the balance of power is inherently unstable and therefore 'a perfect balance of power will scarcely be found in reality'.[38] In this regard, he stresses the 'moral and political unity of Europe'- not the balance of power itself - as the foundation for the relative peace of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Without a moral consensus, Morgenthau argues, the balance of power is nothing more than a barbaric battle for power. This leads to an important element in Morgenthau's account: the significance of moral or normative principles in international relations.

As noted earlier, Morgenthau's main concerns are state power and the national interests. This typically leads to a theory of statesmanship with no moral considerations. Morgenthau's theory however is strongly concerned with politics and morality. He first contends that defending the national interest is the highest priority of states. He then holds that national interests must always be subjected to strict moral limitations and statesmen 'are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate national interests of other nations'.[39] The paradox that Morgenthau addresses is how such claims can be reconciled with his theory of politics and statecraft. To solve the problem, Morgenthau acknowledges that state morality differs from individual morality, and therefore, 'universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states'.[40]

Morgenthau thus develops a practical morality. He not only emphasizes the continued application of moral imperatives to action, but also stresses that morals must be applied carefully and always adapted to circumstances. As he puts it, 'there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action'.[41] This concern with morality reflects Morgenthau's vision of a bifurcated human nature. According to him, human nature is fundamentally selfish; however, people are motivated by other admirable desires and goals too. Following this line of thought, Morgenthau argues that the aspiration for power is 'an all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence'.[42] At the same time he maintains that 'to do justice and to receive it is an elemental aspiration of man'.[43] In sum, despite the advocacy of *Realpolitik*, it can be argued that Morgenthau's theory of international politics is fundamentally concerned with a normative morality. This indeed is reflected in his treatment of IOs.

Morgenthau's Account of IOs

As previously noted, Morgenthau's main concerns are the sources and uses of national power in international relations. These issues lead him to focus primarily on power relations between states. As a result, none of Morgenthau's works is devoted to IOs. Even when he touches on the role of IOs in his famous text *Politics among Nations*, Morgenthau emphasizes that they are important only in as far as states use them for the accumulation of power:

> Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity,
> or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious,
> philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal
> will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention,
> or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try
> to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical
> co-operation with other nations or international organizations.[44]

Morgenthau suggests that on the foundations of international law 'an imposing edifice, consisting of thousands of treaties, hundreds of decisions of international tribunals, and innumerable decisions of domestic courts' has been built.[45] These regulated relations between nations arise 'from the multiplicity and variety of international contacts, which

are the result of modern communications, international exchange of goods and services, and the great number of international organizations'.[46] Morgenthau thus acknowledges that a considerable number of IOs have been created. He summarizes their function in the system, however, as places 'in which most nations have co-operated for the furtherance of their common interests'.[47]

Morgenthau also maintains that most international law has been 'scrupulously observed' from the start.[48] Nevertheless, he notes that when rules are violated, they are not always enforced. He then goes on to argue that even when enforcement is undertaken, it is not always effective. Related to this, Morgenthau refers to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter, stating that: 'These instruments are indeed of doubtful efficacy (that is, they are frequently violated), and sometimes even of doubtful validity (that is, they are often not re-enforced in case of violation). They are, however, not typical of the traditional rules of international law'.[49] On this subject, Morgenthau remarks that, since the nineteenth century, each of the three world wars (the Napoleonic War, the First and Second World Wars) have been accompanied by an attempt to establish world government: the Holy Alliance, the League of Nations and the UN. Divergent national interests pursued between the great powers however prevented the first two attempts from exercising the functions of world government. As Morgenthau phrases it:

> Conflict between the British and French conceptions and policies did not,
> however wreck the League of Nations, as the conflict between Great Britain
> and Russia had brought about the dissolution of the Holy Alliance. It rather led
> to a creeping paralysis in the political activities of the League and to inability to
> take determined action against threats to international order and peace.[50]

In such a context, the League of Nations exercised governmental functions in respect of the maintenance of international order and peace, 'only in the rare instances when either the interests of the great powers among its members were not affected or the common interests of the most influential among them seemed to require it'.[51] As for the UN, Morgenthau believes that the organization is based on an uncertain foundation. From its inception it was intended to be the instrument of the permanent members of the SC. The victorious powers 'first created an international government for the purpose of

maintaining the status quo and after that proposed to agree upon the status quo'.[52] Other nations quote its Charter for their own purposes. Thus, for Morgenthau, many powers, great and small, 'are using the Charter as ideological disguise for the reality of international politics'.[53] Drawing on this argument, Morgenthau concludes:

> The erection of a structure of international government upon what proved to be no political foundation at all has been a failure which threatens to come crashing down and bury the peace of the world beneath its ruins. The United Nations is like a building designed by two architects who have agreed upon plans for the second floor, but not upon those for the first.....In consequence not only does the second floor become an unlivable abode, but the whole structure threatens to disintegrate.[54]

In examining the Specialized Agencies associated with the UN, Morgenthau assumes that the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the other agencies present a way forward to create a world community. Such a community is a necessity for world government because it 'presupposes at least the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts so that the interests uniting members of different nations may outweigh the interests separating them'.[55] Accordingly, he believes that: 'the contributions international functional agencies make to the well-being of members of all nations fade into the background. What stands before the eyes of all are the immense political conflicts that divide the great nations of the Earth and threaten the well-being of the loser, if not his existence'.[56] Morgenthau thus acknowledges the importance of functional organizations such as the UN. He writes: 'The Charter...[is] assigning to the permanent members of the Security Council a privileged position amounting to a limited world government'.[57] He points to Dag Hammarskjold's expansion of the office of SG, to become 'a kind of Prime Minister of the United Nations'.[58] He also refers to the office as 'something approaching a supranational political agency'.[59] This however is inconsistent with his assumption that 'the peoples of the world are not willing to accept world government and their over-riding loyalty to the nation erects an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment'.[60] This leads him to point to a 'paralyzed' Security Council, with both the General Assembly and Secretary-General displaying 'weakness',[61] and with the whole organization achieving 'little enough'.[62] In short, while Morgenthau believes that IOs have a place in world politics, he maintains that 'there is no evidence that the United

Nations has prevented any war'.[63] Thus, he does not consider that the UN has any effective power in its own right. He writes: 'Experience has shown that the attempt to use the United Nations for the purpose of forcing agreement upon either of the superpowers is futile and only aggravates the disagreement'.[64] It is only an instrument of the member states. It enables them to co-operate, when it is in their interest to do so. It also enables them to communicate with allies and enemies, when they wish to do so. In this sense, functional institutions can lessen the effects of anarchy, though they are not given any power or determinate role in international relations. This line of thought allows Morgenthau to conceive the UN as 'the new setting for the old techniques of diplomacy'.[65] He therefore acknowledges the importance of the UN; however, he does not see its contemporary practice as being anywhere near to world government. He notes: 'the international government of the United Nations, as envisaged by the Charter, has not become a reality'.[66] Another important element in Morgenthau's interpretation of IOs is that he only focuses on intergovernmental organizations. This stems from his adherence to a state-centric conception of world politics. As a result, Morgenthau limits his analysis to inter-state organizations and excludes from consideration non-governmental organizations, transgovernmental cooperation, and international regimes.

2.2.2 Realism as a Condition of the Anarchical System: Structural Realism

Structural versions of realism highlight systemic characteristics rather than national attributes and motivations as the primary influences on state actions. States, according to this view, are unitary rational actors that must operate within an anarchical environment, where the principal focus is survival. In this context, power and the national interest are the basic unifying theme for all realists. For structural realists, like Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Grieco, it is not human nature, but the anarchical structure and the distribution of power in the international system that compel states to act as they do. Despite the fact that structural realists concur that states are motivated by a desire for security, when it comes to describing the behaviour of states, they divide into two camps: those who believe that states are power maximizers (offensive realists) and those who believe that states are security maximizers (defensive realists). For an offensive realist like John

Mearsheimer: 'States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power relative to other states, in order to maintain the means of self-defense.....They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals'.[67] Defensive realists such as Joseph Grieco, however, argue that security is the principal interest of states which only seek the requisite amount of power to maintain their security and survival.[68] Accordingly it can be argued that 'offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want'.[69] Just as classical realists disagree on the exact relationship between power and morality, structural realists disagree on whether states are primarily motivated by defensive or aggressive impulses. Here, it is important to emphasize that while Mearsheimer provides the preeminent example of an offensive realist and Grieco of a defensive realist, Waltz whose account will be the focus of this section, has been described as having 'a foot in both camps'.[70]

Having argued that there are many structural theories and models, this section will concentrate on one version of structural realism: Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz's analysis - which is most often referred to as neorealism - represents a way of liberating realism from essentialist assumptions about human nature. As a consequence, he shows marginal interest in the ethics of statecraft or the moral dilemmas of foreign policy. For Waltz, the introduction of an ethical theory would defeat the scientific nature of the theoretical enterprise. Waltz's realism thus differs from the realism of Morgenthau, in which morality is a central element. Indeed this will be reflected in his treatment of IOs. In order to explain this point further, it is necessary to first consider Waltz's overall position.

2.2.2.1 Waltz's Neorealism

Waltz's version of neorealism is regarded as an important advance for international relations theory. This stems from the aspiration to move away from or correct classical realism's flaws. For Waltz, unit level theories rely on unobservable laws of human nature to explain behaviour. He highlights instead the systemic constraints of international politics. In Waltz's realism the structure of the system, in particular the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. Actors are less important because

structures compel them to act in certain ways. Structures more or less determine actions.[71] Waltz recognized that: 'structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states that use them'.[72] Instead of the bottom-up perspective of the classical realists, Waltz preferred the top-down analysis of international politics. Waltz thus conceptualizes the structure as a systemic cause. He contends that, at the international systems level, 'Structure operates as a cause...[that] conditions the acts of states and influences outcomes';[73] it also shapes systems processes.[74] He sees structure as a set of constraining conditions.[75] Waltz restricts this set to three elements, defining a political structure in terms of its ordering principle, the distribution of the units' capabilities, and the functional differentiation of the units.[76] Waltz believed that 'state behavior varies more with differences of power than with differences in ideology, in the internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form'.[77] Waltz's uses a third-image theory of constraints and opportunities created by the international system to explain state behaviour.[78] For Waltz, first-image explanations locate the causes of international outcomes in the nature and behaviour of men. Second-image explanations locate causes in the internal structure of the state. He contends that first-and second-image explanations are insufficient.[79] Accordingly, Waltz's formulation of neorealism takes the units' preferences as given.[80] They become inputs into the analysis rather than the subject of analysis.[81] In sum, in an attempt to create a parsimonious theory at the system level, Waltz downplays the explanatory power of state attributes [black-box the state] and gives explanatory weight to the nature of the system, the number of actors, and the distribution of their capabilities.[82] He concludes 'It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states'.[83]

Another central idea in Waltz's account is that anarchy leads to a logic of self-help, in which states seek to maximize their security. Thus, states are power seeking and security conscious, not because of human nature, but rather because the structure of the international system compels them to be that way. From this perspective, anarchy imposes a power-accumulation logic on states.[84] Waltz abandons a reliance on reductionism, preferring to treat the international system as a distinct domain that conditions the behaviour of all states within it. Moreover, rather than viewing power as

an end in itself, Waltz sees power as a possibly useful means for acquiring security, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it.[85] As he puts it: 'Because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it'.[86] Power remains a critical factor, but it is no longer the end.[87] He holds that security is an end and states measure their ability to achieve it in terms of power. Thus, 'In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power'.[88] On this point, Schweller argues that 'Waltz's use of the term security implies not world domination but rather the minimum power needed to ensure the state's survival'.[89]

Another important element in Waltz's neorealism is balance of power theory. He notes: 'If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it'.[90] The belief that power is a means to the end of security allows Waltz to assert that 'States balance power rather than maximize it'.[91] According to this view, great powers will always tend to balance each other. Other states will have a tendency to balance against and not bandwagon[92] towards a rising challenger. Waltz states that:

> If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.[93]

From these assumptions (power as means and states as self-help actors) Waltz infers 'the expected outcomes, namely, the formulation of balances of power'.[94] To sum up, Waltz's theory of neorealism is an attempt to explain international relations by reference to the unequal capabilities of states and the anarchical structure of the state system. He, consequently, pays little attention to moral issues. As Donnelly notes, his book *Theory of International Politics*, 'contains no index entry for ethics, justice, or morality, and his account of the classical theory of Realpolitik fails to mention its opposition to morality in foreign policy'.[95] This lack of attention stems from Waltz's view of the nature of the international system. He maintains, 'states in anarchy cannot afford to be moral. The possibility of moral behavior rests upon the existence of an effective government that can deter and punish illegal actions'.[96] This indeed is reflected in his treatment of IOs.

Waltz's perspective on IOs starts from the premises of autonomous states as the key actors and the prominence of international anarchy. The primary unit of political organization is the sovereign state. He acknowledges that 'States are not and never have been the only international actors'.[97] There are other actors, such as IOs, in the international system. He concludes:

> States set the scene in which they, along with nonstate actors, stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of intercourse.....When the crunch comes, states remark the rules by which other actors operate.[98]

Waltz verifies the key position of states in international politics, stating: 'a theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that'.[99] He goes on to highlight the fact that, in a condition of international anarchy, states will inevitably be self-interested. This does not imply that cooperation between adversaries is impossible. It rather means that cooperation will be infrequent and limited to less important areas. In this regard, he recognizes some cooperation in the field of arms control,[100] but then concludes:

> States, or those who act for them, [will] try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one).[101]

Anarchy thus compels states to rely on themselves to secure their survival and their national interests. Waltz notes: 'States do not even enjoy an imperfect guarantee to their security unless they set out to provide it for themselves. If security is something the state wants, then this desire, together with the conditions in which all states exist, impose certain requirements on foreign policy that pretends to be rational'.[102]

Waltz believes that IOs are irrelevant to how states will behave within this anarchic system. They cannot override the structural effects of anarchy or change the competition for power. That is, IOs are of limited consequence. They merely reflect the hegemony of the most powerful members. As Waltz recognizes, 'strong states use institutions, as they

interpret laws, in ways that suit them'.[103] In general, Waltz views IOs with the same pessimism as Morgenthau. For Waltz, pessimism about institutions is more accurately rooted in the international system. The self-help or anarchic structure of the international system puts more constraints on IOs because, in such a context, the first priority of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state. They are ultimately prisoners of the structure of the state system and its determinist logic dictates their actions. Jackson and Sorensen comment: 'Waltz's image of the role of statesmen comes close to being a mechanical image in which their choices are shaped by the international structural constraints that they face'.[104] In this regard, the anarchical structure of the state system creates strong tendencies towards power politics. It puts more constraints on IOs without the need to make strong assumptions about human nature. Waltz summarizes this well: 'Hierarchic elements within international structures limit and restrain the exercise of sovereignty, but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system. The anarchy of that order strongly affects the likelihood of cooperation, the extent of arms agreements, and the jurisdiction of international organizations'.[105]

Waltz's classic statement of neorealism assigns little significance to the role of IOs in world politics. States however maintain institutions for one reason: 'to serve what powerful states believe to be their interests'.[106] As a result, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* is silent about the UN. Waltz's one comment is to reject from consideration any possible role for the UN as a regular collective security system; it is simply a reflection of powerful states' interests. [107]

Having illustrated how Morgenthau and Waltz differ on many aspects of world politics, especially their accounts of IOs, the task now is to examine this intra-realist debate about the significance of IOs.

2.3 The Intra-Realist Debate about IOs

This section contends that there is no single realist explanation of IOs. It posits that neorealists [Waltz and Mearsheimer] tend to assert that institutions are insignificant. A

variation of their approach is to be found in the arguments of some realists who see institutions as being relatively significant. The main aim is to demonstrate that neorealism is one approach within realism. To accomplish this, the section will first discuss the neorealist interpretation of international institutions and then turn to the arguments of other realist scholars who offer a different analysis of the significance of IOs.

2.3.1 The limited Effects Thesis: The Neorealist Interpretation of IOs

As discussed, neorealist analysis of IOs has been characterized by a certain pessimism, not only regarding their nature and creation but also their role in world politics. According to the *realpolitik* model, dominant states, wishing to pursue national interests and seeking superiority, create and maintain IOs. The plethora of organizations, realists contend, stems from hegemony. Hegemonic stability theory (HST) offers the most parsimonious and widely employed account of the creation and workings of IOs. According to HST, the formation of IOs requires a single dominant state with the capability and will. Only the hegemon can create institutions, because it has an overriding interest in the creation of such organizations and because it is the only state that can finance them. In sum, neorealists tend to see IOs as an extension of hegemonic power. Neorealists deduce that, in a unipolar system where 'a single powerful state controls and dominates lesser states in the system',[108] IOs 'represent the social arrangements among states whereby the interests of the powerful are institutionalized.'[109] And since that is so, the hegemon uses both carrots and sticks to encourage other states to join the organizations they have created. But, if institutions merely reflect the interests of the powerful, why would weaker states accept them? Neorealists believe that 'without an institutional settlement, bargaining will be based simply on power capacities, and the hegemonic state will have the clear advantage'.[110] In other words, weaker states opt to join institutions in order to have a voice, albeit not a strong one, in the existing system. Or, as Grieco argues, weaker states try to construct rules that allow them 'effective voice opportunities' to 'ameliorate their domination by stronger partners'.[111]

Neorealists also recognize that IOs can be created through great power cooperation. In a multipolar system, powerful states cooperate for the purpose of managing crises and avoiding wars. That is, cooperation between rival poles is possible when there are mutual benefits to be gained. Nevertheless, if the great powers' interests change, this will indeed be reflected in their attitude towards the organizations they have created.[112] Thus, from a neorealist perspective, international institutions are most likely to be created by hegemonic power(s). Hegemonic power however will not maintain IOs if its relative position *vis-à-vis* other states is eroded. As far as the role of IOs is concerned, the state-centric assumption and the characterization of anarchy underpin neorealist assessments of institutions. As Finnemore puts it, in a state-centric theory, IOs 'are understood to be creations of states and servants of state interests'.[113] Neorealists also operate with a core assumption that world politics unfolds in a state of international anarchy. They draw a variety of conclusions about the effect that anarchy has on international cooperation and on the significance of institutions, "the invisible hand of anarchy".[114] In general, scholars have long recognized that cooperation is an important feature of world politics. However, they have argued that cooperation is hard to achieve and difficult to sustain.[115] As Grieco comments, neorealism 'presents a fundamentally pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation'.[116] This view is driven by the implications of international anarchy. For Waltz, self-help systems 'make the cooperation of parties difficult.... Rules, institutions, and patterns of cooperation... are all limited in extent and modified from what they might otherwise be'.[117] From this perspective, two main constraints affect the willingness of states to cooperate in an anarchic arena. The first is the potential for cheating. Considering anarchy as the absence of authority, realists posit that states will cheat when doing so serves their interests.[118] The second obstacle to cooperation is the matter of relative gains. Neorealists contend that states have no choice but to maintain their relative power or risk being victimized by others.[119] Drawing from this argument, Waltz asserts that two states in anarchy are not concerned whether both will gain [absolute gains] but rather with who will gain more [relative gains].[120]

On the same lines, Joseph Grieco[121] and John Mearsheimer[122] argue that concern with relative gains prevents states from intensive cooperation even when they share common

interests. It can thus be argued that the overwhelming emphasis on the importance of the anarchic international milieu has led neorealists to underplay or ignore the role of institutions. The theory's deep conviction that the international system is governed according to the precepts of self-help, which is moulded by system structures (in the view of neorealists),[123] makes neorealists conclude that IOs cannot break the vicious circle of power politics.[124] In a system of self-help, institutions cannot prevent conflict 'when push comes to shove'.[125] Since the distribution of power is the only crucial variable in international relations, neorealists ask only one question: Do institutions matter? In theory, institutions matter to the extent that they constrain state behaviour. For neorealists, IOs are essentially epiphenomenal to state interests. Therefore they 'have no independent effect on state behavior'.[126] This 'no effects thesis' is clearly associated with John Mearsheimer's famous article *The False Promise of International Institutions*, the title of which summarizes well his pessimistic position. Similarly to Waltz, Mearsheimer argues that international politics is a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and have little reason to trust each other.[127] As a result, state cooperation will always be difficult and short-lived. In other words, Mearsheimer does not deny that international cooperation occurs, but he maintains that it is 'constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of co-operation can eliminate'.[128]

Having argued that the international system promotes conflict, Mearsheimer infers that the presence of institutions does not necessarily encourage cooperation. In a world constrained by state power, institutions merely reflect state calculations of self-interest. According to this extreme view, the most powerful states usually form institutions so that they can maintain or increase their share of world power. Institutions therefore only mirror the distribution of power in the international system.[129] On this basis, Mearsheimer not only argues that institutions depend upon powerful states, but also maintains that they 'matter only on the margins'.[130] He views international institutions as permissive and subservient to power politics with little or no role in maintaining international peace and security. According to him, institutions may foster cooperation on a range of issues but 'cooperation and peace are not the same thing'.[131] Mearsheimer goes on to argue that

empirical evidence shows that institutions' effect on state behaviour is meager, especially in the area of security affairs. Mearsheimer thus dismisses a role for institutions in world politics.

In short, Mearsheimer accepts the existence of institutions; however, he concludes: 'What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior'.[132] This conclusion however is not generally approved by all scholars. In fact, realism embodies more diverse views about institutions than the arguments of Mearsheimer. It is inadequate to judge realism solely upon a view that is mainly grounded on neorealism's parsimony. This line of argument will be developed further in the next section.

2.3.2 Alternative Views of IOs: Intervening or Constitutive Variables

In contradistinction to the simple neorealist interpretation, this section contends that IOs are in fact an important part of realist theory. It posits that while neorealists at one extreme [Waltz, Mearsheimer] argue that outcomes in international politics would be the same with or without IOs; there are some scholars who, while still in the realist vein, acclaim the virtues of institutions. Since Mearsheimer is an 'offensive realist', we might assume that he offers an extreme account of institutions. His account however does not constitute the sole realist position for many reasons. Firstly, it overlooks arguments advanced by classical realists concerning the origins and capabilities of international institutions. Secondly, it ignores the view of defensive realists, who consider institutions significant but generally dependent. Thirdly, it does not reflect the claims of rational choice realists, regime theorists and the ES, that states can and do cooperate through institutions which have independent effects. All these accounts are reviewed below.

2.3.2.1 Classical Realism

Contrary to popular conceptions, the classical realist position is not that institutions are unimportant. Pre-Waltzian realists believe that institutions can, and sometimes do matter. It is true that classical realists do not often refer to institutions, yet as indicated earlier,

they take explicit positions on the role of international law and IOs in world politics. As Schweller and Priess put it: 'Although traditional realists did not develop a full-blown theory of institutions, they had many insights on the subject'.[133] According to them, IOs can play an intervening role in great power cooperation. They are important tools of statecraft, but they reflect state interests. As Morgenthau notes:

> The contribution the United Nations can make to the preservation of peace, then, would lie in taking advantage of the opportunity that the co-existence of the two blocs in the same international organization provides for the unobtrusive resumption of the techniques of traditional diplomacy.[134]

At the same time, he asserts: the UN 'is an international government of the great powers'.[135] Morgenthau thus admits the importance of institutions, not in their own right, but as entities that bring states together, or as instruments of powerful member states. Similarly, Carr argues that international institutions are epiphenomenal to state interest[136] and arenas for acting out power relations.[137] Accordingly, it is possible to say that classical realists view institutions as far from inconsequential, but they do not ignore the hand of power exerting the true influence behind the façade of international organizational structure. In short, although classical realists do not touch much upon issues of international institutions, organizations do indeed matter in the realist world. This stems from the belief that, while institutions have little influence on state behaviour, they enable states to achieve common gains when they cooperate. Classical realists thus assess the effectiveness of institutions in terms of two aspects. As constraints on state behaviour, institutions can play an intervening role in great power calculations. As tools of empowerment, institutions can organize the relations between the great powers and weaker states more effectively and efficiently.[138]

2.3.2.2 Defensive Realism

As previously discussed, there are differences of opinion within neorealism regarding the prospect of inter-state cooperation and the role of institutions. While Waltz and Mearsheimer provide the preeminent examples of offensive realists, the defensive variant is most clearly evident in the arguments of Charles Glaser and Robert Jervis.[139] They diverge from Mearsheimer and take a position that has more in common with neoliberals,

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yet is less optimistic. According to defensive realists, states are security, not power, seekers. Hence, there are good chances for international cooperation. For Glaser, competition is not an inevitable logical consequence of structural realism's fundamental assumptions.[140] Defensive realists however maintain that, if states act aggressively, then conflict will be unavoidable.[141] Cooperation therefore is possible where two status quo powers face each other in a security dilemma, not where a status quo power faces a revisionist power. Defensive realists thus criticize the 'competition bias' established by offensive realists. They also reject the exaggerated emphasis on relative gains and on the problem of cheating. Defensive realists, instead, seek to explain both conflict and cooperation. They even stress the wide range of cooperative options available to adversaries. In spite of this agreement on the possibility of cooperation, defensive realists disagree on whether institutions have causal significance. For Glaser, cooperation exists as the result of anarchy. Therefore institutions do not have a special role. As he puts it, institutions are 'the product of the same factors – states' interests and the constraints imposed by the system – that influence whether states should cooperate'.[142] On the contrary, Jervis believes that institutions are not without efficacy. He contends that 'when the actors have limited foresight' institutions can be autonomous in the sense of affecting actors' preferences over outcomes.[143] In general, defensive realists posit that states are willing to cooperate through institutions. They see institutions as the outcomes of states' interests; however, they believe that institutions facilitate cooperation. These arguments allow defensive realists to occupy a position somewhere between offensive realists [institutions matter very little] and liberal institutionalists [institutions have a life of their own].

2.3.2.3 Rational Choice Realism

At the margins of realism there is a form of rational choice realism which rejects the pessimistic arguments of Mearsheimer. It also criticizes Waltz's structural account because it cannot explain inter-state cooperation. This variant questions whether the realist model can account for many important features, behaviours, and effects of international institutions. The challenge has been taken up by a number of scholars in the realist vein, who believe that anarchy does not prevent international cooperation. They

recognize that the international system is a formal anarchy; that is, there is no governmental authority higher than the state, but they do not follow realism in accepting that this necessarily means self-help and only instrumental cooperation. In other words, rational choice realists reject the argument that international cooperation is 'thin' and 'weak' and can break very quickly. Instead, they contend that states can develop an interest in maintaining cooperation. This branch of the realist paradigm attempts to construct a purely realist theory that can explain the persistent phenomenon of international cooperation, which is for any realist a big "puzzle".

Having argued that the international system is anarchic (without a central authority), yet it has never been anomic (without rules); advocates of this position try to incorporate institutions in a realist framework. They posit that realism's focus on problems of power does not require the rejection of institutions. Combining insights from both classical realism and structural realism, rational realists argue that state behaviour cannot be explained solely by referring to the international distribution of power. Rather institutions play an important intervening role in world politics. Instead of abandoning the concept of institutions, this version of realism tries to modify the analysis to bring institutions 'back in'. In other words, rational choice realists are determined to link classical realist understanding of world politics with an explanation of how institutions encourage cooperation. This being so, it could be argued that the main difference between rational choice realists and structural realists turns on the belief that there are mutually accepted sets of rules and institutions that regulate international relations. This conceptual innovation allows for more latitude, but remains a realist in that it maintains an actor's position in the international distribution of power is the major factor in determining behaviour. Rational choice realists, therefore have much in common with neo-liberals. Both assume that states are rational egoists that often cooperate across a range of economic and security issue-areas. Rational choice realists, however, highlight the primacy of state power and the problem of anarchy when explaining cooperative arrangements. According to them, 'power is no less central in cooperation than in discord among nations'.[144] They occupy a position somewhere in between liberal-institutional thought, that cooperation is 'too easy', and that of realists, who think that it is 'too hard'.

In short, rational choice realists accept the key assumptions of classical realism, yet argue that the theory is incomplete. For them, realism is broad enough to explain conflict and cooperation, states and institutions. Joseph Grieco presents the arguments of the 'binding thesis' and 'side payments'. According to him, scholars in the realist vein have long acknowledged the importance of inter states cooperation (the literature on hegemonic leadership and international economic cooperation, and the scholarship on balance and alliances). Grieco, however, admits that realism 'has not offered an explanation for the tendency of states to undertake their cooperation through *institutionalized* arrangements'.[145] To meet this challenge, Grieco constructs what he calls the 'binding thesis', which explains cooperation among states and how states use institutions to advance their own goals. In Grieco's words: 'If states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide for effective voice opportunities for them and will thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners'.[146]

By adopting this standpoint, Grieco is intentionally subscribing to the belief that states consider collaborative arrangements in terms of both the substantive benefits the arrangements yield, and the opportunities for effective voice which such arrangements provide.[147] On this latter issue Grieco writes:

> Effective voice opportunities may be defined as institutional characteristics
> whereby the views of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just
> expressed but reliably have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative
> arrangement....states (and particularly weaker states) may view effective voice as a
> "good" that they enjoy as part of being in a collaborative arrangement, and enjoy-
> ment of a satisfactory level of this "good" may itself be a basis for assessment
> by states of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the arrangement.[148]

In attempting to allow for a structural realist explanation of cooperation, Grieco forms the voice opportunities hypothesis, which 'shows that instead of attacking the concept of institutions, realists can make a contribution to understanding how institutions encourage cooperation and how particular institutional forms emerge over others'.[149] This is because Grieco tends to explain international cooperation by including not only structure but also

state motivation. This unit-level factor 'might not allow for an orthodox neorealist explanation of cooperation, but would still allow for an explanation consistent with broader realist principles'.[150] In short, Grieco's structural innovation does expand the possibilities for rational realist explanations of international cooperation. In addition to 'effective voice opportunities' or the 'binding thesis', Grieco contends that institutions can promote cooperation by reducing the gaps in relative gains that might result from international cooperation. According to him, institutions help states to manage relative gains concerns by serving as frameworks to facilitate the arrangement of side-payments to relatively disadvantaged states. The problem of relative gains can be overcome by side payments or other concessions to the dissatisfied actors. As Grieco notes, it is possible to investigate states' use of side-payments to 'mitigate the relative gains concerns of disadvantaged partners'.[151] Seen from this perspective, relative gains concerns do not diminish the possibility of cooperation among states. The argument is that states can cooperate even with relative loss, because they expect to be compensated later. In other words, states will collaborate if relative losses can be out-weighed by absolute gains.

In Grieco's view, states are sensitive to both relative and absolute gains. The likelihood of cooperation is greatest when expected gains appear in the balance, especially for dominant member states, and relative losses appear not to accumulate. Grieco stresses that situations in international politics tend not to be zero-sum; therefore states' sensitivity to relative losses varies.[152] Grieco argues that institutions have potentially positive effects on inter state cooperation: they mitigate concerns about relative gains, serve as frameworks to facilitate side-payments or provide voice opportunities for disadvantaged states, and can also promote a norm of reciprocity.[153] In summary, although his position is often regarded as anti-institutionalist, Grieco acknowledges their role; yet, for him, they exert less causal force than liberals assert. He is perfectly clear on this point:

> International institutions *do* matter for states as they attempt to cooperate.
> Indeed realists would argue that the problem with neoliberal institutionalism
> is not that it stresses the importance of institutions but that it *understates* the
> range of functions that institutions must perform to help states work together.[154]

2.3.2.4 Regime Theory

Stephen Krasner's theory of international regimes gives another twist to the neorealist perspective on states' cooperation and the role of institutions. His view is that, while structural realists argue that conflict may dominate over cooperation, there is substantial evidence of international cooperation. Krasner notes that situations exist in which states must coordinate on policy and agree on international rules to avoid undesirable outcomes.[155] International cooperation is a common phenomenon that rises above and beyond the particular interests of states.[156] Krasner contends that states are able to cooperate fully.[157] He introduces the concept of international regimes to explain how patterned or rule-governed behaviour exists, even though the international system is anarchic. He distinguishes between three perspectives on international regimes: 'realist or structuralist', 'modified structuralist or modified realist', and 'Grotian'. The realist model assumes that regimes have no independent effect on behaviours. They are merely arenas for acting out power relationships. Modified realists, like Krasner, conceive regimes as autonomous and intervening variables. Accordingly, regimes have a significant impact even in an anarchic world. From a Grotian perspective, regimes are an inevitable feature of the international system. Krasner summarizes the distinctions as follows:

> The conventional structural [realist] views the regime concept as useless, if not misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. And Grotian sees regimes as much more pervasive, as inherent attributes of any complex, persistent pattern of human behavior.[158]

Building on the arguments of modified realists, Krasner identifies regimes as: 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.[159] An issue-area comprises interactions in such diverse areas as nuclear nonproliferation, telecommunications, human rights, and environmental problems. This definition however does not clarify the differences between the four ambiguous components of a regime: principles, norms, rules and procedures. As Young notes, Krasner's so-called consensus definition is 'a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often overlap in real-world situations'.[160] In order to solve this problem, Krasner extends his definition by stating:

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.[161]

The above definition suggests that regimes lack a constitutive element. Rather, they are limited to regulative and procedural functions.[162] The phrase 'convergence of expectations' implies that regimes incorporate standards of behavior, which mitigate interstate conflict and therefore facilitate cooperation. In this view, regimes increase the probability of sustaining cooperation yet are still a function of the international distribution of power. Krasner's understanding of regimes is based on a realist analysis. He assumes that patterns of state action are influenced by regimes, but that such rule-governed behaviour is entirely consistent with the pursuit of national interests and relative power capabilities.[163] As he recognizes, a power-oriented analysis 'seeks to explain outcomes in terms of interests and relative capabilities, rather than in terms of institutions designed to promote Pareto optimality'.[164] Building on this argument, Krasner contends that hegemonic powers provide international regimes for their own advantage. He uses hegemonic stability theory to explain the creation of regimes following a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system: 'Powerful states establish regimes that enhance their interests'.[165] International regimes, in sum, are framed in terms of state power and interests. Herein lies the state-centric conception of world politics. This, however, does not mean that institutional arrangements are inconsequential. Indeed, they are necessary 'to resolve coordination problems and to establish stability'.[166] Accordingly, it can be argued that, while emphasizing structure, Krasner rejects the notion that moral and legal rules are meaningless. This being so, he attempts to include new elements, such as principles of behaviour, norms, rules and decisional processes into realist theory. His contention is that 'There is not always congruity between underlying power capabilities, regimes, and related behavior and outcomes'.[167] This line of argument posits that outcomes do not always follow from power inputs, because regimes can function as intervening and autonomous variables. Krasner goes further to argue that regimes can be a source of power. For example, the Third World can sometimes influence policies as a result of its membership of universal

international organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union, that operate on a 'one state-one vote rule'.[168] Moreover, Krasner believes that regimes sometimes show some resilience to change in fundamental variables, such as power structures and interest structures. As he puts it, regimes 'constitute the general obligations and rights that are a guide to states' behaviour' and therefore should be understood as 'something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift of power'.[169] By his logic, there is a time lag between changes in fundamental variables and regime outputs. Thus, regimes and power distributions change at different rates. Further, there is an interactive process between power base and regimes since regimes can modify fundamental variables. Krasner notes:

> The autonomy of regimes is derived from lags and feedback. Lags refer
> to situations in which the relationship between basic causal variables
> and regimes becomes attenuated. Regimes come to have an independent
> impact on outcomes and related behavior......Feedback refers to processes
> by which established regimes alter power and interests.[170]

'Lags and feedbacks between power base and regime are the basic puzzles of Krasner's research program'.[171] While regimes originate as mere reflections of the distribution of power in the system, over time they can themselves become causal agents. Simply put, regimes shift from being intervening variables to independent variables. In this respect, Krasner identifies four feedback mechanisms. Firstly, regimes may alter actors' calculations of how to maximize their interests. Secondly, regimes may alter actors' interests. Thirdly, regimes may become a source of power to which actors appeal. Fourthly, regimes may alter the power capabilities of different actors, including states.[172] In short, regimes do have independent influence on state behaviour and, without such institutions, inter-state relations would be very different. On this basis, Krasner defines institutions as: 'formal or informal structures of norms and rules that are created by actors to increase their utility'.[173] According to him, states arrange institutions as a way of promoting or protecting their interests. Therefore the preferences of actors should be treated as given and exogenous to these institutions.[174] At the same time, Krasner claims that institutions will have a life of their own: 'Once an institution is in place, regardless how it got there in the first place, it can generate shared expectations that become a force for stability'.[175] Seen in this way, Krasner posits that institutions' efficiency stems from

their power to show both consequentiality and durability. Consequentiality refers to the behaviour of actors actually guided by the rules of the institution: 'An environment devoid of institutional structures would be akin to a state of nature in which behavior is driven only by short-term calculations of interest and action is constrained only by the power of others'.[176] Durability is the persistence over time of patterns of behaviour, which reflect routinized agreement with the rules of the institution. Krasner writes: 'One way to show that institutions, as opposed to simply the power and interests of actors, matter is to demonstrate that they endure even though the interests and capabilities of specific actors differ'.[177] On this basis, rules, norms and institutions are 'equilibrium outcomes'; they can influence the probability or depth of international cooperation by altering state strategies but not preferences.[178]

The conclusion to draw from this is straightforward: 'The international order is founded on the principle of the sovereignty of states. However, states have to play by the 'rules of the game' that they themselves have drawn up or accepted, at the risk of losing the rights and advantages that go with their observance'.[179] In other words, regimes codify states' interests; therefore, there is a great deal of compliance with regimes. Using the same logic, Arthur Stein maintains that realist assumptions are not inconsistent with international cooperation. He rather contends that cooperation is achievable and sustainable even under anarchy. According to him, states are autonomous and independent actors. There are situations, however, in which self-interested calculation leads states to create and maintain international regimes 'which serve to circumscribe national behaviour and so shape international interactions'.[180] From this perspective, regimes arise 'when the patterned behaviour of states results from joint rather than independent decision making'.[181] International regimes thus exist to solve two types of dilemmas: dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions. In the former situations, regimes help states to collaborate. In the latter situations, where the participants have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome, regimes are only established to facilitate co-ordination. Building on this argument, Stein concludes: 'State behaviour does not derive exclusively from structural factors like the distribution of power; neither can such behaviour be explained solely by reference to domestic sectors

and interests. Structure and sectors play a role in determining the constellation of actors' preferences, but structural and sectoral approaches are both incomplete and must be supplemented by an emphasis on strategic interaction between states'.[182]

2.3.2.5 The ES

Regime theory is close to the so-called ES since both approaches highlight inter-state cooperation rather than conflict. Using different concepts, ES scholars reject neorealism's false dichotomy between institutions as dependent or explanatory variables. Instead, they believe that norms and therefore institutions have constitutive implications. This means that institutions can alter the intersubjective context of states interactions. Institutions define what the nature of the game is, how it is to be played, how it might be changed and so forth. ES advocates acknowledge the role that power plays in world politics, yet maintain that institutions have a much more profound impact than merely shaping state behaviour. In effect, they are an important feature of international society. This idea is rooted in the classical legal tradition of Hugo Grotius, best known through the work of Hedley Bull. In his book *The Anarchical Society*, Bull describes an international society of states in which, at its core, lie some principled rules, institutions and values that affect state behaviour and state-ness. According to Bull and Watson, an international society can be defined as a group of states that have 'established by dialog and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements'.[183] The existence of an international society means that states do collaborate with one another and do create institutions. Bull, like other scholars within the same tradition, offers a broad definition of the institutions of international society. He writes:

> By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organization or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals. These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society, or serve as a surrogate central authority in the international system. They are rather an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions – and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration.[184]

From this perspective, the rules and institutions of international society condition state behaviour in ways that could not be predicted by looking at material power structures alone. As a consequence, Bull argues that elements of order can be found in differing degrees within a formally anarchic international system. As he puts it: 'Order ...is maintained by a sense of common interests in those elementary or primary goals; by rules which prescribe the pattern of behavior that sustains them; and by institutions which make these rules effective'.[185] Thus, for Bull, institutions keep international order by carrying out these positive functions: formulating, communicating, administering, interpreting, enforcing, legitimating, adapting, and protecting rules.[186] In other words, rules work because institutions generate the circumstances that allow them to work.[187] In short, the argument Bull makes is that when a group of states share coherent goals, they constitute an international society. By strengthening the institutions of such a society, the clashes of interests and conflicting values [the logic of anarchy] can be mitigated.[188] Much of this argument stems from the belief that cooperation arises because of mutual interests and because of the functional benefits provided by institutions. More straightforwardly, there is no world government above sovereign states. However, there are *common rules, standards of conduct and organizations formed by states, which help to shape relations.* Hurrell notes: 'The theorists of international society sought to understand order and cooperation in terms of both power and the operation of legal and moral norms'.[189] Bull adopts a state-centric perspective on international society since he considers that the agreed framework of rules and institutions, which fosters cooperation and maintains order, is based on state sovereignty and defined by the dominant states in the system. For him: 'It is states themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states'.[190] And since that is so, the ES refines the realist understanding of anarchy. It highlights the existence of an international society, at the same time keeping the core meaning of the concept: the lack of an overarching authority in the international system.

Using the same logic, Barry Buzan captures the idea of international society as a causal variable very aptly: 'just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in international society which they shape and

are shaped by'.[191] International society, in this conception 'is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states'.[192] Consequently, Buzan introduces the idea of 'interaction capability' and refers to a mature anarchy and primary institutions associated with international society based on systemic structures, able to moderate anarchy. An original contribution here is the idea of 'interaction capacity', which Buzan conceives as broadly systemic but not structural factors that 'not only affect the ability and the willingness of units to interact, but also determine what types and levels of interaction are both possible and desired'.[193] He identifies two factors that affect interaction capacity. The first is 'the physical technologies', which determine the size and degree of integration not only of the international system as a whole, but also of the units and subsystems within it. The second factor is 'the social technologies', which include some primary institutions (diplomacy, international law) and many secondary ones (forum organizations such as the UN).[194] Such factors are systemic since 'they profoundly condition the significance of structure and the meaning of the term "system" itself'.[195] This line of argument allows Buzan to see institutions as determining even in a condition of anarchy. He writes:

> Political communication in a system with no such international norms and institutions will be quite different from one that is richly endowed with them. Institutions provide not only more opportunities to communicate, but also more obligations and more incentives to do so.[196]

On this basis, Buzan predicts that, with the growth in states' technological and societal capabilities, interaction capacity will increase and a mature form of anarchy will be created. As he puts it: 'when the volume, speed, range, and reliability of interaction become sufficiently high, they might begin systematically (and systemically) to override the deep structural effects of anarchy'.[197] Buzan subscribes to the view that there is not one single self-help logic of anarchy, but many. He posits that the international system of the 1980s was midway between high 'immature' and low 'mature anarchy'[198] and goes on to conclude that there is a tendency towards a more mature anarchy, especially in Europe, where ample space for international collaboration exists. Buzan's conception of 'mature anarchy' thus rests on the explicit claim that, while states still seek their own interests, they become embedded in systems of rule-governed practices, which move self

interested behaviour away from the purely conflictual. It is through this framework that Buzan is able to explain how functionally differentiated units can coexist in a condition of anarchy. As he notes: 'the rapid, complex and universal growth of interaction capacity from the nineteenth century onwards is a key driver in the shaping of international relations'.[199]

Buzan's argument of mitigated anarchy, where sovereign states work together in pursuit of mutual interests, allows him to admit the centrality of the institutions of international society in ES theory. For him, international society is the legal and political base on which the concept of international institutions rests.[200] In this context, Buzan refers to the institutions in the ES literature as 'primary institutions'. He posits that the institutions of international society reflect something more fundamental than those referred to by regime theory, which therefore can be called 'secondary institutions'. Buzan's central claim is the dissimilarity between primary and secondary institutions, which is strongly implicit in the literature of both regime theory and ES writing. He condemns Krasner's definition of international regimes because it does not distinguish between rules, norms and principles; it also omits the term 'values', which is vital for the ES. Accordingly, while both regime theory and the ES acknowledge the significance of institutions, their accounts are very different. As Evans and Wilson note, institutions for most regime theorists are 'empirically observable phenomena'.[201] From this perspective, institutions are viewed mainly as formal IOs. However, for the ES, institutions not only include formal organizations, but both formal and informal sets of rules. For this school, an institution is: 'A cluster of social rules, conventions, usages and practices..., a set of conventional assumptions held prevalently among society members....[that] provide a framework for identifying what is the done thing and what is not in the appropriate circumstances.'[202] As a result, for ES scholars formal organizations are not important, unless they 'strengthen and render more efficient the more basic institutions of diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power'.[203] It is important to note that, there is some disagreement on what do and do not count as primary institutions. Diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and neutrality are all institutions according to Wight. These are not consistent with Bull's classic set of five institutions: diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, war

and the concert of great powers.[204] Given this divergence, Buzan posits that among English scholars primary institutions have two main features: 'that they are relatively fundamental and durable practices, that are evolved more than designed; and that they are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other'. [205]

A distinction between the ES approach to institutions and that of regime theory is that the latter defines institutions for specific issue-areas, i.e. economic and technological issues; ES scholars, on the other hand, pay more attention to the politico-military sector and the problem of international order. The ES thus offers a definition of institutions that is much broader than that of regime theory with no reference to specific issue-areas.[206] At the centre of this definition is the belief that institutions have 'constitutive' rather than instrumental implications, in that they define the basic character and purpose of international society. In Buzan's words:

> There are two core elements in the idea of constitutive institutions: one is that such institutions define the main pieces/players in the game; the other that they define the basic rules by which the pieces/players relate to each other.[207]

Seen from this perspective, the ES stresses the functional benefits of norms and therefore institutions. 'They may well serve as regulatory rules designed to constrain choices and/or as parameters within which individual agents pursue their own preferences'.[208] In other words, norms not only serve a regulatory function, when they enjoin an actor from behaving in a particular way, but they can also shape forms of behaviour, roles and identities through practice. ES scholars hence portray norms as consequential, in the sense that they have both constraining and constitutive effects. In this regard Buzan writes: 'If the units share a common identity (a religion, a system of governance, a language), or even just a common set of rules or norms (about how to determine relative status, and how to conduct diplomacy), then these inter-subjective understandings not only condition their behaviour, but also define the boundaries of a social system'.[209] Building on this, it can be argued that norms, as shared understandings and intersubjective knowledge, play a crucial role in the ES. At the centre of this role lie the constitutive implications of norms which differentiate the ES from regime theory, which conceives of norms only as ordering and constraining variables.

In addition to the constitutive nature of institutions, Buzan posits that the primary institutions of interstate society have a life cycle: they rise, evolve and decline. He also contends that there is some sort of hierarchy within primary institutions: some are deeper and more constitutive than others. Hierarchy exists, but some institutions are nested inside others. In other words, some primary institutions, such as sovereignty are 'master', as they stand alone. Others are 'derivative' from sovereignty like non-intervention and international law. A key point is how some institutions are complementary, whilst others are in tension. Buzan notes: 'Although the potential for contradictions among primary institutions is real, it is also sometimes overdone'.[210] Building on these premises, Buzan develops the idea of deeply evolved patterns of practice among states, labelled primary institutions. He identifies a tendency among ES writings to discuss primary or master institutions. For instance, Holsti highlights the idea of international institutions 'as a significant maker of change'.[211] For him, almost every institution has some combination of common practices, a consensus of ideas underlying those practices, and commonly observed and accepted norms, rules, and etiquette. As a consequence, the institutions of international politics are fundamental.[212] On this basis, Holsti makes a distinction between 'foundational' and 'procedural' institutions. Foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors. They also define the fundamental principles, rule and norms upon which mutual relations are based. Finally, they lead to highly patterned forms of action. 'Procedural institutions are those repetitive practices, ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors [including] the conduct of both conflict and normal intercourse'.[213] It seems immediately clear that Holsti subscribes to the idea of hierarchy within primary institutions. He writes: '[Procedural institutions] are important in helping us describe the essential characteristics of an international system, but they are of secondary significance compared to the foundational institutions'.[214]

In a similar vein, Mayall's book *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (2000) addresses the question of hierarchy among primary institutions. Mayall first distinguishes between institutions and principles and then asks important questions: 'Do all these institutions and principles have equal weight, or are they arranged in a hierarchy? And if so, is it

fixed?'[215] Reus-Smit uses a parallel line of argument, but emphasizes a functional understanding of primary institutions. Like Holsti and Mayall, he argues that institutions operate at three levels in contemporary international society: constitutional structures, fundamental institutions, and issue-specific regimes. These institutions especially the deepest layer, which Reus-Smit calls constitutional structures, accomplish two main functions in the regulation of international societies. As he puts it:

> Constitutional structures are the foundational institutions, comprising the constitutive values that define legitimate statehood and rightful state action; fundamental institutions encapsulate the basic rules of practice that structure how states solve cooperation problems; and issue-specific regimes enact basic institutional practices in particular realms of interstate relations. [216]

Drawing on the arguments of Reus-Smit and Donnelly about hierarchy and functionalism within primary institutions, Buzan allocates to these institutions a list of five functions performed by any international society: membership (sovereignty, democracy and human rights); authoritative communication (diplomacy); limits to the use of force (war, alliances); allocation of property rights (territoriality, institutions associated with trade and finance); and security of agreement (international law).[217] A final point in Buzan's analysis of primary institutions is the possible range of institutions that exist in different forms of international society. In this regard, Buzan comments: 'Even with a functional frame, one cannot set out a definitive list of primary institutions for all times and places'.[218] He attempts to identify the primary institutions in four types of interstate social order: a power political interstate society; a coexistence interstate society; a cooperative interstate society; and a convergence interstate society. He contends that the primary and even secondary institutions can, to some extent, 'change quite fundamentally the nature of relations among [states]. [This, in turn, will] call into question the (neo) realist understanding of what anarchy means'.[219] Thus, by highlighting the idea of the causal significance of primary institutions, Buzan demonstrates both how this differentiates ES theory from realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the study of international regimes, and how it can be used to generate accounts of the prevalence of order in international society.

In sum, seeking to account for cooperation, ES scholars contend that the anarchic international system is part of international society. Such a society inclines the system towards greater cooperation and order. Recognition of this fundamental idea, Buzan comments, would have 'beneficial effects on the practice of how states relate to each other'.[220] Thus the main thrust of the ES is the acknowledgment of the role of institutions as consensual restraints on foreign policy. From an ES perspective, states certainly operate in an anarchical system; therefore there is a continued acceptance of the importance of power and the politics of power. However, institutions can to some extent moderate the effects of power politics. They are a systemic-level phenomenon, part of what constitutes deep structure, including power, rules and norms.[221] For this school, power undoubtedly matters. This however does not mean that politics is only about power. In this sense, states are concerned about their power and sometimes follow exclusively their egoistic material interests. At the same time, they are concerned about normative obligations. As a consequence, the structure of common understandings, norms and mutual expectations often determines outcomes. ES scholars thus reject the Hobbesian notion that, in the absence of an overarching authority, morals and norms are meaningless. Instead, they contend that rules, norms and conventions can emerge without a global sovereign. They even assert that such obligations do not depend on the power, interests or values of one group of states but rather on reciprocal interests. In short, the ES rejects the neorealist claim that power and self-interest are the basic causal factors in the creation of international cooperation. It rather contends that common interest among states supersedes the self-interest of a particular state.[222]

It is worth noting that, within the ES, there is a debate about the actual and potential extent of shared norms within systems of states. In this context, pluralists [conservatives] believe that in 'thin' international societies, shared norms are few. Solidarists [progressives], on the other hand, argue for 'thicker' international societies, where wider ranges of norms are shared. This being so, and since both of them acknowledge the significance of international society in terms of shared norms, rules, and institutions, it is plausible to say that the above debate merely presents different degrees of a fundamentally similar contention: the constitutive implications of norms in international

politics. As Buzan notes: 'pluralism and solidarism should be understood as positions on a spectrum representing, respectively, thin and thick sets of shared norms, rules and institutions'.[223] Also, it is worth emphasizing that, while adherents of the ES recognize the significance of international norms, they never claim that state behaviour always perfectly matches those norms. In other words, having accepted the anarchic character of the international arena, ES theorists acknowledge the violation of norms. For them, the presence of long-standing norms does not mean that key actors cannot contravene them. They imply that actors are likely to do so if material interests are at stake. This stems from the fact that norms do not affect outcomes in the same way as structures of power. On this basis, Bull and other members of the ES stress that 'norms may be overwhelmed or shunted aside by power'.[224]

Finally, it is instructive to note that the ES view about social structures in international relations and the internalization of norms in political practice runs in close parallel to that of social constructivists. For construcivists, structures of power affect international outcomes, but norms affect conceptions of identities and interests in the procedure of actor decision-making. Ruggie summarizes the latter perspective well: 'Constructivists view international structure to be a social structure...made up of socially knowledgeable and discursively competent actors who are subject to constraints that are in part material, in part institutional'.[225] Thus, for constructivists, norms have explanatory power independent of structural and situational constraints although this is not to the exclusion of interests or power. A comprehensive understanding of international relations must embrace both. The point is well put by Finnemore: 'My argument is not that norms matter but interests do not, nor is it that norms are more important than interests. My argument is that norms shape interests. Consequently, the two cannot logically be opposed'.[226] Building on this argument, one can conclude that, while the ES is actually a variant of realism, when it comes to the question of whether the ultimate causal factors are material or socially constructed, the ES takes a position that is close but not identical to that of the constructivists. This stems from the fact that the ES is more materialist than constructivist. For this school, 'power is not always socially constituted - sometimes (and actually quite often) it is real and brute power that speaks'.[227]

In light of this discussion, it could be argued that, although the ES does not place an emphasis on the enforcement of norms and values, it has drawn attention to neglected areas in the neorealist account: the scope of shared interests and identities and the role of institutionalized norms and moral obligation in world politics. As noted, neorealism has traditionally dismissed these issues on the grounds that material power is the only variable relevant to state action, interests and preferences. Thus, by highlighting the role of norms in international relations, the ES places normative structures at the centre of realist theory. This being so, the ES presents a *via media* between an unnecessarily pessimistic neorealist view of institutions and the idealistically optimistic view of institutional liberalism. As Weaver puts it, the ES can 'combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other'. [228]

Figure 2.1 below summarizes the various realist arguments concerning the prospects for state cooperation and the significance of international institutions.

Figure 2.1 The Intra-Realist Debate about Institutions

The Intra-Realist Debate about the Prospects for State Cooperation

And the Significance of International Institutions

Classical Realism

Contends that conflict is virtually inevitable due to competitive preferences and the dark side of human nature. While cooperation in the form of short-term alliances against active threats is likely, cooperation outside this narrow realm is unlikely. Institutions therefore play an important and positive role in facilitating the coordination of policies and actions, yet they do not constrain the great powers.

Offensive Neorealism

Emphasizes the structural dynamics and the problem of relative gains. Again, institutional cooperation among states tends to be thin and weak and totally conditioned by the prevailing distribution of power and configuration of interests. Institutions in this context matter only at the fringes of world politics.

Defensive Neorealism

Argues that states seek security, not power. Cooperation therefore is possible under specific conditions. It generally believes that institutions can play a special role, but that they also reflect the interests of dominant and powerful states.

Regime Theory

Assumes that cooperation can emerge in anarchy. States are self-interested and utility maximizers. However, they deliberately construct regimes as a way of facilitating cooperation in specific issue-areas of international politics, where compromising and creating shared goals are necessary. International institutions (or regimes) are, to some degree, functional and consequential.

English School

Holds the belief that reciprocal interests and shared values among states, not the power and the self-interest of a particular state, are the basic causal factors of the creation of international cooperation. Primary institutions (fundamental practices that are more evolved than designed) have constitutive rather than instrumental implications in interstate society.

Having considered the key variants of realism, and the intra-realist debate about international institutions, the next section will focus on how realism explains change in IOs.

2.4 Explaining Change in IOs

How does this discussion of institutions help us understand change in IOs? The answer is clear: IOs are commonly the dominant form of international institution. For realists, international institutions represent rules and conventions adopted by states to structure their relations. These institutions can be formal, as IOs such as the UN, which are based on formal treaties, and have headquarters, budgets and staff. International institutions can also be very informal, consisting of little more than shared understandings of appropriate conduct, as in the profession of international diplomacy and diplomatic law. An intermediate level of formality is represented by entities called 'international regimes'. Regimes, which may be centred on formal organizations, consist of both informal elements, such as principles and norms guiding members' behaviour, and more formal rules and decision-making procedures.

IOs, international regimes, and even international law and norms are types of institutions with varying levels of formality. The more formal end of the spectrum of international institutions consists of IOs which can be subdivided into two categories: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). Institutions can also be as abstract as sets of shared norms and principles, not formally enshrined in a legal treaty or formal organization. Even shared cognitive frameworks such as a conception of international relations in terms of state sovereignty, or the concept of spheres of influence, can be considered fundamental forms of international institutions. Thus, the concept of international institution is a broad one, encompassing both formal organizations and the shared belief systems that underlie and structure international interaction. The focus here however will be on IOs *per se*. But what can realists tell us about the causes and processes of IO change, including reform? As implied earlier, realism has much to say about IOs: why they exist, how they function, and what

effects they have on the behaviour of international actors. But what about the reform and the potential for major transformations of IOs? The previous section demonstrated that there is disagreement amongst the realists on the significance of IOs. Some scholars consider them as merely the agents of their member states; others, however, assume that IOs can acquire a degree of autonomy. It is important here to investigate how each variant accounts for the potential and limits of organizational change. To address this issue, the section first examines the neorealist view of the factors driving or constraining reform in IOs, followed by a discussion of the ES, which takes IOs seriously.

2.4.1 The Neorealist View of Change in IOs

Since neorealists in the Waltzian vein allege that IOs are largely irrelevant to world politics, they have devoted little systematic attention to explaining organizational change. According to them, powerful states create organizations to maintain or increase their ability to exercise power; therefore, organizations reflect the interests of their creators and the constraints they face. Having argued that IOs are embedded in the broader international system, Waltzian realists assert that the possibility, content of, and limits to change are heavily conditioned by the prevailing distribution of power and configuration of interests.[229] Such an argument posits that structural change simply leads to organizational change. In other words, change in IOs occurs only when powers and material capabilities change. Therefore, for neorealists, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains reform. On this basis, Mearsheimer wrongly predicted the demise of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the end of its main threat, the Soviet Union. As for the scope of change, neorealists tend to believe that the nature of and limits to change follow the interests of dominant and powerful states. In other words, because states are self-help actors, the changes considered worthwhile by key member states of any organization are those that respond to their own needs, rather than the requirements of the system. Having argued that reforms are inherently linked to shifts in the distribution of power, and in turn to the reformulation of the perceived interests of powerful states, neorealists conclude that change in IOs, such as the UN, will always be gradual and 'sticky'. This means that radical institutional reforms are unlikely; incremental or step-by-step reform within the logic of the present system is more likely.

Thus, because changes are founded on perceptions of self-interest and on states position and roles in the international power system, neorealists insist that states will constantly favour 'rearrangements' not 'constitutional change'. As Taylor recognizes:

> The realist image means that the reform of international institutions cannot be concerned with altering their structures or procedures: if reform is possible, and in this view it is not necessarily accepted that it is, then it can only result from change in the interests, values and attitudes of member states. Institutional changes are irrelevant to this purpose.[230]

In sum, the neorealist variant of realism accounts for change in IOs as a product of calculating egoists acting in a self-help world. In such a world, IO change is the result of the changing power and preferences and interests of dominant actors.[231] Thus, the neorealist key claim is that, since IOs are endogenous, they only change in response to changes in structural variables. A quite different view of change in IOs, however, is derived from the ES. In this approach, global rules and norms are seen to be as important as the power of states.

2.4.2 The ES View of Change in IOs

As already observed, the ES acknowledges that anarchy compels states to make power calculations. However, it also maintains that global rules and norms do matter in world politics. This perspective rejects the neorealist tenet that IOs only change when power relations change. Rather it holds that shifts in societal values and international norms can lead to institutional change. ES scholars thus accept the idea that institutions can and do change. This is clear in the arguments of Bull, who believes that as states care about certain rules, not just their relative power, they work together in common institutions.[232] This mean that states recognize that they do have common interests and values and form institutions accordingly. Institutions are not fixed: they change in response to state concern about status and reputation. Bull however does not provide any details about how institutions are created in the first place and how they decay.

Holsti uses a similar line of argument. He emphasizes that, transformations in the international distribution of power, as at the end of the Cold War, does not necessarily translate into a transformation of the institutions of international politics. According to

Holsti, states tend to alter institutional arrangements, only with shifts in the key norms and rules upon which their mutual relations are based. From this perspective, Holsti identifies four potential causes of institutional evolution.[233] Firstly, institutions arise as a result of preceding common practices. These practices must become fixed, patterned, and bounded by norms and regulations to lead to new institutions. Secondly, institutions may change in response to growing complexity. This happens when the scope of activity expands, while the fundamental functions, ideas, norms and rules remain intact. For example, the institution of diplomacy has become comprehensive, but its surrounding rules and norms remain largely the same. Thirdly, change can take the form of transformation. This is the case when some of the essential characteristics of an institution remain, but its functions and purposes alter. A good example here is the institutional transformation of contemporary war. In the eighteenth century, the purpose of war was to protect the interests of the state. Yet, the purpose and function of many contemporary wars is to enrich small group private interests, e.g. Sierra Leone and Liberia. Finally, change can take the form of demission. The international slave trade is an example of an obsolete form of institution. It began as a common practice in the sixteenth century, but with the peace movements in the early nineteenth, it has become illegal. In addition to these types of change, Holsti notes that conceptualizations of such changes can vary: it can be in the form of a replacement, addition, adoption, or synthesis. He also asserts that the four possibilities of institutional change do not always occur at the same time or in the same way.

Drawing on Holsti's arguments about the sources and types of change, Buzan concludes that international institutions have some kind of life cycle: they rise, change, and disappear. According to him, primary institutions are durable because they reflect some shared principle, norm or value. This however does not mean that such institutions are permanent or fixed.[234] As for the sources of change, Buzan contends that institutions will change when common norms change. Change results from shifts in societal aspects of the member states. He believes that change in international norms can be driven by 'promotion by transnational actors, by the discursive tendency of norms to expand by filling in gaps, by analogy, by responses to new problems and/or by debate in IGOs'.[235]

Like Krasner, Buzan distinguishes between changes in, and changes of, institutions. He asserts that 'change is at best slow, and powers of resistance can be great'.[236] Buzan thus holds the belief that power relations between the main actors form an important part of the process of change. He contends that institutions do not change significantly as a result of shifts in structural variables. This stems from the fact that states design institutions not only to reinforce their own power but also to provide order and secure justice in the international community. For that reason, change in IOs is related to change in the major rules, values and norms of the international system. Great powers are the primary sources of such change, but the evolution of international norms is also important. Accordingly, while for neorealists power and interests are the only causal variables in explaining change, Buzan and other ES scholars conceive of, and treat, international social structures as causal variables. For them, moral obligations and the normative environment in which states interact matter to any explanation of change in IOs.

In short, the ES perspective stresses the pervasiveness of norms in the process of IO change. It addresses a question that is often ignored or oversimplified in neorealism: How do shared norms and values affect change in IOs? Such a question is of crucial importance, given the end of the Cold War and the rise of what Buzan characterizes as a 'more mature anarchy', where states work together in pursuit of mutual interests. In such a context, international ethics and norms matter. Thus, the neorealist 'power thesis', according to which pressures for UN reform only stem from member states' self-interests, is no longer convincing. The emergence of human rights protection and the promotion of democracy as new imperatives in world politics and therefore as new objectives for the UN, constitute significant pressures for organizational change. Indeed, the UN operates in an international system that is governed on the basis of power and interest. The international system, however, also represents an international society that is governed by norms. In other words, in trying to avoid the trap of 'rude realism', the ES links IO change to shifts in internationally held norms and values.

2.5 Conclusion

In the light of the above, it is not difficult to conclude that a realist perspective does not deny the existence of institutions. Contrary to the popular opinion, for most realists, such as Schweller and Priess 'international institutions are the 'brass ring' so to speak: the right to create and control them is precisely what the most powerful states fought for in history's most destructive wars'.[237] The issue is whether international institutions affect outcomes and behaviour. There is no general agreement amongst the realists on this point. This stems from the fact that a realist interpretation of IOs is shaped by a basic assumption about the normal state of international affairs. Two views can be distinguished. The first, represented most prominently by Waltz and Mearsheimer, conceives of world politics as consisting essentially of power and conflict. Institutions therefore have little or no impact on fostering cooperation among states. They are merely epiphenomenal; they cannot mitigate the structural effects of anarchy and therefore they are not significant. The second realist view believes that anarchy itself produces cooperation. According to this view, compromise is possible in the context of anarchy when states become conscious of certain common interests and common values. This leads to the creation of institutions, which override the deep structural effects of anarchy. Institutions therefore matter, but they are used by great powers to gain advantage. This view is associated most clearly with the works of classical realists such as Morgenthau, defensive realists except Glaser, and rational choice realists and the ES such as Krasner and Bull.

Despite the intra-realist debate about institutions, it is worth noting that realists of all persuasions insist that states continue to be the most powerful actors. The realist view is straightforward: 'states can shove and shape the others more easily than they can be shoved and shaped by them'.[238] According fundamental status to IOs therefore 'would embed states in a more diverse context of causal factors and push beyond the limits of realism'.[239] This being so, realist scholars in general tend not to focus much attention on the causes and process of IO change. Their silence is noteworthy because, as mentioned before, there has been so much debate in international relations between those who find

IOs consequential and those who do not. On this basis, the chapter identified two different realist arguments for explaining change in IOs. The first is the neorealist, which regards change as a product of structural and great power politics. Such an argument posits that organizational reform depends only on the power and interest of key member states. In this perspective, given the limited impact of the UN on world politics, no attention is paid to organizational reform. If IOs are inconsequential part of their landscape, why would they focus on IO change? So, on rare occasions when they do, 'they typically fail, sometimes flamboyantly'.[240]

By comparison with neorealists, who focus primarily on power relations as the cause of IO change, adherents of the ES opt to understand organizational change in the context of both the international distribution of power and the operation of legal and moral norms. From this perspective, UN reform is viewed not solely as a manifestation of state power, but rather in terms of common and shared understandings between member states.

In sum, the analysis presented in Chapter One made clear that both power and norms are important factors in understanding Post-Cold War UN reform. That being the case, this chapter has described two conceptual frameworks for exploring the argument, and I will develop these frameworks further in Chapter Three. The main aim is to give a full exposition of the neorealist and ES accounts before deploying them to explain UN reform or more specifically in the shape of Ghali's reform agenda (Chapter Six).

Notes

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[3] Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', in John Baylis and Steve Smith, Eds., The Globalization of World politics. An introduction to international relations, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 173.
[4] Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, 1976, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 317.
[5] Joseph Grieco, 'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics', in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, Eds., New Thinking In International Relations Theory, USA, Westview Press, 1997, p. 165.

[6] See for example Joseph Grieco, <u>Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade</u>, New York, Cornell University Press, 1990.

[7] Hedley Bull, <u>The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics</u>, London, Macmillan, 1977.

[8] Robert Gilpin, <u>War and Change in World Politics</u>, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[9] Kenneth Waltz, <u>Theory of International Politics</u>, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979.

[10] Stephen Krasner, <u>International Regimes</u>, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983.

[11] This refers, most notably, to Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer.

[12] Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Grieco.

[13] J. Martin Rochester, <u>Waiting for the Millennium. The United Nations and the Future of World Order</u>, University of South Carolina Press, 1993, p. 69.

[14] Grieco, 1997, p. 165.

[15] Benjamin Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', in Benjamin Frankel, Ed., <u>Realism: Restatements and Renewal</u>, London, Frank Cass and Company, 1996, p. xviii.

[16] J. Samuel Barkin, 'Realist Constructivism', <u>International Studies Review</u>, September 2003, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 328.

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[18] John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', <u>International Security</u>, Winter 1994/95, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 11-12.

[19] Justin Rosenberg, 'What's the matter with realism?' <u>Review of International Studies</u>, 1990, vol. 16, no. 4, p. 289.

[20] Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, 'Realism Reconsidered: The Realpolitik Framework and Its Basic Propositions', in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, Eds., <u>Reconstructing Realpolitik</u>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 11.

[21] Stephen Krasner, 'The accomplishments of international political economy', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, Eds., <u>International theory: positivism and beyond</u>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 115.

[22] See for example Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, Eds., <u>Reconstructing Realpolitik</u>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994.

[23] For example, realism can be divided into three: classical realism, Realism and neorealism. Whereas classical realism locates causes at the level of human nature, both Realism and neorealism locate causes at the structural level. Neorealism here refers particularly to the parsimonious version of the theory developed by Kenneth Waltz in <i>Theory of International Politics</i>, 1979.

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[25] Edward H. Carr, <u>The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939</u>, New York, Harper and Row, 1964, p. 235.

[26] As quoted in Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', in John Baylis and Steve Smith, Eds., <u>The Globalization of World politics. An introduction to international relations</u>, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 167.

[27] As quoted in John Vasquez, 'Realism And The Study Of Peace And War', in Michael Brecher & Frank P. Harvey, Eds. <u>Realism and Institutionalism In International Studies</u>, University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 54.

[28] As quoted in Michael Joseph Smith, <u>Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger</u>, Louisiana State University Press, 1986, p. 226.

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[30] As quoted in Michael Joseph Smith, 1986, p. 227.

[31] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 30.

[32] Ibid, p. 25.

[33] Ibid, p. 5.

[34] Scott Burchill, 'Realism and Neo-realism', in Scott Burchill et al., Eds., <u>Theories of International Relations</u>, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 76.

[35] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 5.

[36] Ibid, p. 25.

[37] Ibid, p. 155.

[38] Ibid, p. 8.

[39] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, 1973, p. 5.

[40] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 9.

[41] Ibid.

[42] As quoted in Jack Donnelly, 'Twentieth-Century Realism', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Eds, Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 86.

[43] As quoted in Jack Donnelly, 1992, p. 86.

[44] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 25.

[45] Ibid, p. 251.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Morgenthau, 1973, p. 273.

[49] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 251.

[50] Ibid, p. 439.

[51] Ibid, p. 440.

[52] Ibid, p. 452.

[53] Morgenthau, 1973, p. 478. ·

[54] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 452.

[55] Ibid, p. 502.

[56] Ibid, p. 494.

[57] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Third Edition, 1962, p. 470. As quoted in Peter Willetts, 'The United Nations and the Transformation of the Inter-State System', in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones, Eds., Change and The Study Of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension, London, Frances Pinter, 1981, p. 103.

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Morgenthau, 1962, p. 491. As quoted in Willetts, 1981, p. 103.

[61] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Second Edition, 1960, pp. 492-3. As quoted in Clive Archer, International Organizations, London, Routledge, Third Edition, 2001, p. 121.

[62] Morgenthau, 1960, p. 496. As quoted in Archer, 2001, p. 121.

[63] Morgenthau, 1973, p. 468.

[64] Ibid, p. 488.

[65] Morgenthau, 1955, p. 465.

[66] Ibid, p. 453.

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[72] Waltz, 1979, p. 117.

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[74] Ibid, p. 82.

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[77] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Respond to My Critics', in Robert Keohane, Ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 329.

[78] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, especially chapters 6 and 7. For the levels of analysis see J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in James N. Rosenau, Ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, NY, The Free Press, 1969, pp. 20-29; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International

Politics, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, chapter 1; and Barry Buzan, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, Eds., _International Relations Theory Today_, Cambridge, polity Press, 1995, pp. 198-215.

[79] Waltz, 1959, pp. 172-86 and pp. 201-5.

[80] Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate', _International Organizations_, 1994, Spring, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 318.

[81] Ibid, p. 317.

[82] Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', _International Organizations_, 1994, Spring, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 253.

[83] Waltz, 1979, p. 65.

[84] Burchill, 1996, p. 78.

[85] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', _Journal of International Affairs_, 1990, Spring, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 36.

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[87] Waltz has rejected the claim that states try to maximize relative power. For example see his book _Theory of International Politics_, 1979, p. 118, 126, and 127; and Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Respond to My Critics', in Robert Keohane, Ed., _Neorealism and its Critics_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 334.

[88] Waltz, 1979, p. 126.

[89] Randall Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?' in Benjamin Frankel, Ed., _Realism Restatement And Renewal_, London, Frankcass, 1996, p. 102.

[90] Waltz, 1979, p. 117.

[91] Ibid, p. 127.

[92] In his structural model of balance of power theory, Waltz uses the term 'bandwagoning' to serve as the opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side. Waltz credits the term to Stephen Van Evera, see Kenneth Waltz, _Theory of International Politics_, 1979, p. 126.

[93] Ibid, p. 126.

[94] Ibid, p. 118.

[95] Jack Donnelly, 'Twentieth-Century Realism', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Eds., _Traditions of International Ethics_, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 107.

[96] As quoted in Donnelly, 1992, p. 106.

[97] Waltz, 1979, p. 93.

[98] Ibid, p. 94.

[99] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Political Structures', in Robert Keohane, Ed., _Neorealism and Its Critics_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986a, p. 89.

[100] Waltz, 1979, pp. 115-116; and Waltz, 1986, p. 336.

[101] Waltz, 1979, p. 118.

[102] Waltz, 1959, p. 201.

[103] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', _International Security_, 2000, Summer, vol. 25, no. 1, p. 24.

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[113] Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 13.

[114] Waltz, 1979, p. 77.

[115] Grieco, 1997, p. 174.

[116] Grieco, 1990, p. 27.

[117] Waltz, 1986, p. 336.

[118] Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', International Security, 1994/95, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 79.

[119] Lebow, 1994, p. 260.

[120] Waltz, 1979, p. 105.

[121] Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', International Organizations, 1988, Summer, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 485.

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[129] Ibid, p. 13.

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[131] John J. Mearsheimer, 'A Realist Reply', International Security, 1995, Summer, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 86.

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Chapter Three

UN Reform: The Post-Cold War Context

3.0 Introduction

This chapter builds on Chapter Two, which introduced the two realist frameworks I employ as a means of understanding change in IOs. In this chapter I provide a more detailed exposition of the neorealist and ES accounts which subsequently will be applied to an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda.

The main purpose of this chapter is to develop more fully both the neorealist and ES accounts of IOs, as introduced in Chapter Two. In doing so, the chapter commences with an explication of the neorealist argument that the end of the Cold War marked a transformation in the structure of global power. Here, it is worth noting that neorealism emphasizes the polarity of the international system as a principal factor in explanation. The end of the Cold War, 1989-1991, and the demise thereby of bipolarity, were predicted to have profound consequences not just for the US and Russia, but also for the international system. From this standpoint, it was argued that structural changes at the international level would prompt changes in the preferences and attitudes of key states towards IOs and the UN in particular. The UN had to confront the new demands of the Post-Cold War era, which were mainly a reflection of the changing power structure and inter-state relations - the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity. The chapter then explores the ES account of the Post-Cold War context which emphasizes that a new normative structure - the upholding of emerging universal values and norms in the new era - created new demands upon and challenges for the UN. For example, the promotion of the human security agenda and the move away from the non-intervention norm resulted in changes to the tasks the UN was called upon to undertake. The chapter concludes by arguing that the neorealist explanation of the changing role of the UN in the

Post-Cold War world needs to be complemented by that of the ES which takes seriously the role of norms. To address these issues, the chapter will proceed in two stages.

The first section reviews the academic debate about the impact of the changing global power structure and the collapse of communism on the UN. The purpose here is to explore the neorealist view that changes in the structure of global power forced the organization to rethink its role and agenda. It is worth noting that it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an assessment of the neorealist argument, which will be addressed instead in Chapter Six. This section rather sets out to offer an overview of the neorealist literature on polarity and its implications in the period immediately after the Cold War. The second section illustrates how the changing normative structure of global politics was reflected in the UN's mandate. The aim is to examine the ES argument concerning norm change. For the ES, the transformation of the UN's role was in part a response to changes in norms and conventions, not just changes in power and the structure of the international system.

3.1 The Neorealist Account of the Post-Cold War Context: Changes in Power Structure

The purpose of this section is to explain the neorealist view that the distribution of power in the international system [and thereby within the UN] is crucial to how that international body is to serve 'We, the peoples'. From this perspective, the waning of the Cold War and the subsequent new balance of power had a vital impact on the UN's role. To assess the neorealist argument properly, it might be worthwhile to illustrate how neorealism characterized the world that was emerging in 1990. This is not straightforward, owing to the fact that neorealists had different perspectives on this issue. The early Post-Cold War literature on polarity displays no shared neorealist view on the changing global structure of power. With the ending of the Cold War, a debate developed in which there were competing claims about whether the world was, or was becoming multipolar, unipolar or some combination of those structural conditions, i.e. uni-multipolarity.[1] Waltz complicated the issue by insisting that, even after the breakup of the

Soviet Union, the international system remained bipolar, 'but in an altered state',[2] since Russia could still reasonably expect to defend itself against an American attack. Thus, examining the nature of the emerging world provides crucial insights into the neorealist account of power shift and its implications for IO. In particular, it helps us to address three central questions: How did neorealists disagree about the immediate Post-Cold War world? What evidence was there in favour of the hypothesis of unipolarity/multipolarity? And finally, what were the implications of these debates for the UN? These questions will be discussed in turn, below.

3.1.1 Persistent Unipolarity: US Unchallenged Power

As discussed in Chapter Two, the polarity of the international system, defined in terms of the number of great powers, is of particular interest to neorealist scholars. This is so because the international distribution of material capabilities determines the fundamental character of interstate relations. In Waltz's words, 'the placement of states in the international system accounts for a good deal of their behavior'.[3] During the Cold War, there was significant agreement among neorealist theorists that the international power structure was durably bipolar. The US and the Soviet Union were the only two superpowers whose global economic and political dominance was reinforced by possession of vast nuclear arsenals. With the sudden but peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, some neorealists, most notably Charles Krauthammer,[4] William Wohlforth,[5] and Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno[6] characterized the Post-Cold War structure as a unipolar (or hegemonic) order evolving around the US. According to this view, when one of the two superpowers collapsed, the system simply went from bipolarity to unipolarity. As Wohlforth puts it: 'Given that the United States and the Soviet Union were so clearly in a class by themselves, the fall of one from superpower status leaves the other much more unambiguously "number one" than at any other time since 1815'.[7]

The claim for unipolarity was grounded on one basis: US capabilities and the enormous power gap separating the US from other states. This gap was evident even before the end of the Cold War. In other words, although the Cold War system was bipolar, the two

superpowers were never equal. This view was supported by Waltz, who in 1979 noted: 'never in modern history has a great power enjoyed so wide an economic and technological lead over the only other great power in the race'.[8] From this perspective, many observers[9] contended that, in early 1990, the US emerged with commanding leads in all the elements of material power: economic, military, technological and strategic. The end of the Cold War left the US in a position of unchallenged preeminence. Its military and economic strength exceeded by a remarkably wide margin any other country or set of countries combined. In 1993, the US gross national product was $6.3 trillion. The next most powerful state was Japan with a GNP of $4.2 trillion. Moreover, American military expenditures of $280 billion represented nearly half of what the entire world spent on defence, and more than the EU, Russia, and China put together.[10] Similarly, in 'soft power' attributes,[11] American's ideological and cultural appeal and language strengthened its superiority.

Having focused on the distribution of power at the systemic level, some neorealists concluded that there really were no obvious alternatives to an American-dominated structure governing international trade, finance and military relations. As Mastanduno observed, 'technological primacy, military and economic power, and ideological appeal combine to offer the United States strong potential to remain the world's only superpower in the years ahead'.[12] Conceived in this light (drawing upon the criteria offered by neo-realist theorist Waltz) to qualify as a pole in a global system, a state must score high in all sectors: population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, political stability and competence, and military strength.[13] It was accepted by unipolarists that there was only one superpower and some second-tier states or second-rank powers. The argument about America's unique set of material (hard) and cultural (soft) capabilities led some neorealists[14] to assert that the unipolar moment would last for decades. For this group of neorealists, the Post-Cold War system was not only unipolar but also prospectively peaceful and durable.

In contrast to Waltz, who holds that unipolarity is the least stable or peaceful of all structures,[15] Wohlforth contended that the new unipolar system was liable to bring peace.

This was simply because the likelihood of hegemonic rivalry and security issues was low under unipolarity.[16] The unprecedented concentration of power in the US removed the problem of great power conflict over leadership. Because of its overall size and the comprehensiveness of US power, none of the second-tier states could compete. This inclined them to remain neutral or bandwagon [joining] with the US in a unipolar structure. Since the secondary states were not strong enough to influence outcomes, they bandwagoned while still trying to maintain some independence. A unipolar distribution of power therefore offered the prospect of cooperative relations among great powers. This implies that, as other states recognized the high costs of challenging the US and the potentially considerable benefits of cooperating with the US dominated system,[17] they were keen on avoiding any irreparable damage to the relationship with the hyper power. The point is well put by Kapstein: 'From economics to security to culture, it has become almost impossible for countries to hide from the long arm of the United States, or to pursue any success strategies that are at odds with its preferences or interests'.[18]

Those inclined towards the unipolar thesis drew strength from the fact that the significance of American power made the costs associated with balancing against its global hegemony prohibitive. In analyzing the grand strategies of the secondary powers after the Cold War, some neorealists such as Wohlforth concluded that internal and external counterbalancing was missing during the 1990s. He found considerable evidence that states like Germany, Japan and China were 'coming to terms with unipolarity'.[19] From this perspective, it is possible to argue that, instead of responding by balancing, middle powers were adjusting in various ways to the reality of a US centred international system. In this context, Germany and Japan maintained the pattern of engagement that characterized the Cold War. They remained dependent to a considerable extent upon the US. Germany continued to view the persistence of NATO and forward deployment of US forces within NATO as the cornerstone of their national security strategy. Japan's official strategy also continued to be oriented around the maintenance and strengthening of the US-Japan Security Treaty. This Treaty obliges the US to defend Japan, if necessary with nuclear weapons, maintaining Japan as a secondary military power. Accordingly, Japan and Germany were not challengers to US hegemony. They were rather status quo powers

content to play a subordinate role within a US dominated system. In other words, they were more likely to support the existing order than to challenge or undermine it. As for China, although US-Chinese relations were jolted by the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, China's Post-Cold War military acquisition pattern did not reflect a strategy of counter balancing the US. Neither did China reduce its trade dependence on the US. On the contrary, China's economic dependence on the US increased. In the mid 1980s, about 10 percent of China's trade was with the US. By 1993, the figure stood at about 14 percent, rising to 15 percent from August 1994 to August 1995. Exports to the US as a share of all China's exports jumped even more dramatically after 1991.[20]

In short, the high concentration of US capabilities in the global system foreclosed the possibility of power balancing within a unipolar power structure. The preceding arguments about the bandwagoning trend that characterized the international system since the end of the Cold War ran in parallel with Kapstein and Mastanduno's analysis. They found little evidence of military balancing by the major powers of Europe and Asia.[21] According to them, during the initial decade of the Post-Cold War world, the US succeeded in persuading the major powers, through diplomatic engagement and reassurance, of the benign character of its dominance. As a consequence, middle power states acquiesced, because they felt that they would be better off remaining within the orbit of the American system. Kapstein and Mastanduno's analysis hence maintained that states did not balance against the US because the strongest state used its power wisely and therefore convinced other states that it was not necessary to counter US preponderance. Put differently, middle power states integrated into the political and economic institutions of the US international order rather than trying to engage in a balancing strategy, because the foreign policy behaviour of the US was not threatening. Thus, it can be argued that balancing behaviour was a response to threat as well as to capabilities.[22] Simply stated, the unprecedented power of the US along with its benign character justified the great bandwagoning trend that characterized the Post-Cold War world. This is not to assert that there were not any attempts by second-tier states to improve their position in the hierarchy or to preserve their standing in international economic competition. Some states were inclined to enhance their relative position by

seeking nuclear tests or by expressing desire for a permanent membership of the UN SC. In this respect, Kapstein and Mastanduno point out the importance of 'positional competition' among states, even in the absence of balancing strategies: 'Although major powers currently may not be competing militarily, positional conflicts over resources, markets, prestige, and political influence are prevalent and will persist'.[23] Thus, given the logic of positional competition, states competed for international influence, but without challenging the underlying structure or the basic great power hierarchy that existed in the international system. As one observer puts it: 'The key is that regional and second-tier competition should not be confused with balancing to restructure the system toward multipolarity'.[24] This brings us to the other point of the unipolarists' argument: the endurance of the Post-Cold War unipolar system.

Wohlforth affirms that unipolarity can persist for some considerable time. According to him, there was no hope, in the near term, of any state overtaking the US, especially in light of its military capabilities. Kapstein and Mastanduno concluded: 'There is little evidence to date of a single power or group of powers rising in the near future'.[25] For this group of neorealists, the unipolar moment was to endure. The question however remained: Why would second-tier states such as Japan, Germany, or China not emerge as a global challenger to US hegemony? For unipolarists, the answer was simple: the capabilities of these states were undoubtedly great but unbalanced. Japan for example had great economic capability which could easily be, but had not been, translated into military capability. As Japan was not clearly inclined to think of itself as a superpower, its growing economic resources were mostly converted to soft power rather than hard, military power.[26] Thomas Berger observed that, even if the Japanese government decided to expand its military forces, 'given the existing culture of anti-militarism they would encounter strong opposition from the general populace as well as from large sections of the elite'.[27] From this standpoint, Japan's military weakness, as well as its economic vulnerabilities [in terms of raw materials], would prevent it from becoming number one. Like Japan, Germany was only endowed with economic and technological power. Therefore, as both of them lacked the requisite military capabilities, especially nuclear weapons, Japan and Germany would be likely to remain as partial/incomplete great

powers or as some analysts suggested 'civilian powers'.[28] As one commentator observed: 'Despite the economic weight and the growing assertiveness of Japan and Germany, the United States is still the over-whelming global power…Tokyo and Bonn will define their own interests through their own processes, but neither is in a position to take initiatives outside their respective regions'.[29] As for China and Russia, the former had large populations and territory, yet were less-developed, with backward economies, the latter continuing to suffer from economic weakness and domestic uncertainties. As a result, it is unlikely that Russia, which emerged from the Cold War as a weak state internally, would be able to regain superpower status. Some viewed the European Union (EU) as potentially a leading challenger to the US. It is equal to the US in population, economy and human resources but it lacks the political unity required to act as a single global power. As Waltz pointed out in 1993: 'Without political unification, economic unity will always be as impaired as it is now'.[30] It is true that Europe was economically united, but it must be admitted that political unification appeared remote. Wilkinson puts it most plainly when he says: 'Thus Europe is hampered in becoming a superpower not only by its not, or not yet, being either a nation or a state, but also by the fact that it contains self-respecting great powers still more or less enamored of their national histories'.[31]

Thus, the US not only excels in military power and preparedness, economic and technological capacity, size of population and territory, resource endowment, political stability, but even 'soft power' attributes such as ideology. All other would-be great powers are limited or lopsided in one critical way or another. As a consequence, all Post-Cold War candidates for superpower status were merely regional powers that played a hegemonic role only in their region. Any attempt to increase their power in the wider international system would stimulate fear and countermeasures from regional rivals. These states were likely to be kept in check by their own neighbours. Considered from this perspective, perhaps there were other states that might have developed regional aspirations and capabilities and in turn affected the regional balance of power. The fact that the EU could not become a great power because it was not a single sovereign state and that others were states but with unbalanced capability profiles allowed some neorealists, most prominently Wohlforth and Mastanduno, to assert that there could only

be one superpower, and there were no other plausible candidates on the horizon. A united Europe or a rising Japan or China could not affect the unique position of the US or alter the polarity of the international system. As Mastanduno and Kapstein concluded the US would face a world 'without any significant challenge to its hegemonic position'.[32] How then would unipolarity affect the UN?

The Implications of Unipolarity for the UN

For neorealists, the consequences of unipolarity for the UN were twofold. First, as a hyperpower, the US may have easily been tempted to act unilaterally, and face little pressure from IOs. By this logic, it was predicted by unipolarists that, in the 1990s, the US would ignore IOs, especially the UN and establish coalitions of the willing. In other words, in a unipolar context, the US was expected to act alone to advance narrow national interests. The US decision to go it alone – or to act in small coalitions – would have been motivated by the desire to advance the narrow interests of the US. This is especially so given the American view that the UN and other IOs were weak and frequently ineffective. In addition, multilateralism could be costly for the US, constraining freedom of action and infringing on national sovereignty. As a single superpower, the US was particularly sensitive about multilaterals tradeoffs, since it had unilateral and bilateral options. The resulting impression was that the US would regard international alliances, treaties, and organizations as sometimes inimical to American national interests and often more trouble than they were worth.[33] In short, in the Post-Cold War world, we could expect the US to ignore IOs. As former senator Robert Dole complained, 'International organizations - whether the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others . . . [too often] . . . reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect American principles and ideals'.[34]

American unilateralism in the new era was often justified on the grounds that, as the only super power, the US had to preserve its international freedom of action. This logic would apply to US participation, not only in formal treaties and organizations, but also to *ad hoc* coalitions.[35] The result was a growing emphasis on unilateral policy initiatives and a national security strategy aimed at ensuring US predominance (it is worth noting here

that anti UN hostility in the US long preceded the end of the Cold War). In this context, America would implement its strategies by organizing coalitions of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that guaranteed US primacy. Thus, rather than relying on the UN to authorize the use of military force, the coalition of the willing would become the dominant trend for Post-Cold War US military engagement.

Secondly, the assertion of a unilateral foreign policy by the US would present a major challenge to the multilateral system of the UN based on the notion of collective security. From an unipolar perspective, because of its uniquely favourable situation and its substantial power projection capabilities, the US would have considerable freedom to manoeuvre in international politics. Unlike other great powers, it was not constrained by regional rivals, nor did it have to respond to, counter or outwit a rival superpower, as it had in a bipolar international system. These systemic factors meant that the US could be selective in what its did, and could afford not to act immediately when faced with emerging threats to international order. Most importantly, however, the UN response to a particular crisis becomes dependent upon the interests and will of one state. As Bennis notes: 'That superiority also ensured Washington's power to determine not only how, but whether the world organization would respond to emerging crises'.[36] This was evident from US policy towards UN military interventions in the Post-Cold War era. For example, in the early 1990s, American forces formed the core of the UN-mandated coalition that liberated Kuwait. On the other hand, the Americans refused to become involved in the Balkans – Secretary of State James Baker famously declaring that 'we don't have a dog in this fight'. American troops were also used for military crisis management in Somalia and Haiti, although not in Rwanda, despite clear evidence of genocide.[37] The UN delivery of humanitarian assistance to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was thus delayed by the reluctance or unwillingness of the US to provide such forces after the deaths of 18 army Rangers in the Mogadishu firefight in the previous year, even though the Rangers were acting fully under the US chain of command. This appears to confirm the neorealist argument that an effective UN response to threats to international stability would depend substantially on the US position, or could not be made in the absence of US involvement. A related issue is raised by Krauthammer, who

argues that the UN cannot be an independent force for peace and justice. According to him, the UN could play little or no role in maintaining international peace and security after the Cold War. Rather, it was the US which decided whether or not to intervene in preventing war and violent conflict. This means that 'There is not reality behind the façade of UN 'peacekeeping'.[38] To put the argument bluntly: 'The UN comes to life only when animated - manipulated - by the US'.[39] Consequently, effective security can be guaranteed only by US military power. This allows Krauthammer to conclude that, in the new world, 'the United Nations is a guarantor of nothing'.[40] In short, the lack of a clear pattern to US military intervention in the 1990s offers evidence for neorealist expectations that unipolarity left America free to decide when to intervene, and when not to.[41]

Building on the above, it could be argued that, for these neorealists, the end of bipolarity, and the emergence of a single superpower initiated a fundamental structural change in the UN's role. This was simply because, in the unipolar era, it was the unbridled or unchecked power of the US that ultimately determined the UN's role and responsibilities. There really were no obvious alternatives to the American domination of international organizations. This argument implies that American power in the Post-Cold War world was overwhelming, such that the US appeared to have the means to make the UN bow to its will. The result was that UN actions would generally reflect Washington's preferences and interests, and were likely to do so for the foreseeable future. Simply stated, according to unipolarists, the US after the Cold War had more influence over the UN than any other great power in its history: 'As for multilateral institutions themselves, they will continue to operate within the direct and indirect constraints that US instrumentalism imposes'.[42] Following the logic of the unipolar model, it might be expected that the US would use its material and soft capabilities to advance its own agenda in the UN. In other words, the US would take advantage of its position as the only super power and elevate its national interests over the interests of the international community. Unipolarists would not in any case expect the UN to be independent from the US. For them, in a unipolar order, IOs, such as the UN, would play a US defined role. Unipolarity thus imposes more of a constraint and gives the UN less room to manoevre. As one commentator puts it: 'The

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United States has emerged not only as the sole remaining superpower but also as the principal driver of the [Security] Council's agenda and decisions, passively and actively'.[43] We should also expect the US to make a consistent effort to preserve its privileged position in the organization. According to this line of thinking, it is argued that US officials in the UN would pursue policies aimed at reinforcing the status quo, dissuading other states from rising to great power status. Thus the US, the most important player in the UN, would attempt to convince them that an American-led organization provides enough benefits, so that it is unnecessary for them to undermine it.

This being so, other states became inclined to play a subordinate role. The Gulf War of 1991 was taken by some as an example of states bandwagoning with the US. Krauthammer, for example, argued that the Gulf Conflict revealed, the essential unipolarity of the Post-Cold War world: 'The Center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies'.[44] Nye puts it simply: the US led, and everyone else followed.[45] This however, is not the view of those who argued that 'the Gulf conflict, far from confirming American leadership, may paradoxically accelerate a process of decline – not in American power but in American follower-ship'.[46] Thus, despite the economic weight and growing assertiveness of Japan and Germany, the US was the over-whelming global power, with an excellent opportunity to impose its own view about the roles and responsibilities of the UN on other member states. According to Mingst and Karns, the US maintained the ability to shape actions and the behaviour of others. The US was still the largest contributor of funds to the UN, despite its arrearages since the mid-1980s.[47] The US was 'bound to lead' IOs.[48] To summarize, the logic of unipolarity would allow America to act arbitrarily or to avoid multilateralism. It is noteworthy that, while acting alone in the face of global problems, the US would periodically make use of some multilateral institutions. This suggests that the sole superpower could proceed through the UN to 'spread burdens, control risks and promote its values'.[49] Within this context, the UN would provide a convenient 'toolbox' from which to assemble ad hoc US-led coalitions of the willing. In view of that, it is perhaps not surprising to find that, as the logic of neorealism would suggest, US leadership, and acceptance of it by others, would remain strong. We can see the US

behaving in the organization as an unconstrained great power with considerable sustenance to its values. This would lead to American calls for institutional reforms in directions that brought the world body in line with its interests. The preceding discussion should make it clear, that in the new era the UN would continue to serve the general interests, not of humanity, but of the primary power holder itself. Thus, changes in system polarity meant that the US continued to matter the most. But other neorealists predicted a universal trend towards a conflictual, multipolar international system characterized by balancing great powers. What would this account lead us to expect of the UN's role? The next section first explores this multipolarity argument and then addresses its implications for the UN.

3.1.2 Inevitable Multipolarity: Power Checks Power

In contrast to unipolarists, who argued that America's power was so great that it would last for decades, many prominent neorealists[50] asserted that the world was sweeping inevitably into an era of genuine multipolarity. According to them, the US achieved hegemony by possessing all-round superiority in hard and soft power; but the Pax Americana was ephemeral. It would end as other large countries developed and became less enamored with following America's lead.[51] In other words, whilst the immediate Post-Cold War world was unipolar, it did not mean that it was a durable order. On the contrary, most neorealists, such as Waltz and Layne, asserted that the unipolar system was a brief transition to another era of multipolar balancing. It was, in Layne's phrase, just 'a geopolitical interlude'.[52] The question was not whether new powers would emerge, but when. Waltz and Layne predicted multipolarity by the first or second decade of the twenty-first century.[53] In this context, two arguments were commonly advanced in support of multipolarity. The first was American economic and technological decline. The US may remain dominant in military terms, but its economic advantage relative to Japan, Germany, and the EU would reduce, as would its share in the world economy [GDP], which had already dropped from around 40 percent in 1950 to around 25 percent by the mid-1990s.[54] From this perspective, it could be argued that while the US continued to be the most formidable military power in the world, its relative strength had declined

in other areas, such as monetary reserves, trade, and technology.[55] As one observer puts it: 'In economics, at least, the United States cannot exercise hegemony'.[56]

With the relative decline of the US, some scholars such as Schweller contended that, in terms of economic power, the emerging system was tripolar, with three roughly equal superpowers: the US, Japan and the EU.[57] Similarly, Huntington asserted

> In the coming years, the principal conflicts of interests involving the United States and the major powers are likely to be over economic issues. US economic primacy is now being challenged by Japan and is likely to be challenged in the future by Europe…[T]he United States, Japan, and Europe…have deeply conflicting interests over the distribution of the benefits and costs of economic growth and the distribution of the costs of economic stagnation or decline.[58]

In short, since there was little debate about the primacy of US military power in the Post-Cold War world, it is plausible to argue that military power seemed to be unipolar, concentrated in the US. The world economy, in contrast, was tripolar: the US, Germany and Japan accounted for half of the economic activity of the entire world.[59] This view was echoed by President Clinton, who spoke at the Tokyo summit in July 1993 of 'a tripolar world, driven by the Americas, by Europe, and by Asia'.[60] The acceptance of the links between security and the economy and of the 'primacy of economic'[61] over military power led to the conclusion that the international system had shifted in the direction of multipolarity, with so many independent centres of power.

A unipolar system, it is argued, would also beget a multipolar world, because states necessarily balance against the existing or emerging hegemon(s). This is consistent with Waltz's argument that balance of power policy is essentially automatic, given the compelling impact of structural forces. For him, the nature of international anarchy 'stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balance of power'.[62] In other words, the anti-hegemonial nature of the international system encourages major states to engage in balancing strategies against the dominant state. Waltz puts the argument as follows: 'In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it'.[63] This hypothesis suggests that, given the international system structure, other powers would move individually and collectively to balance

against the preponderant power of the US to preserve their independence and autonomy.[64] Hegemony was not sustainable because 'no state, not even the United States, can rise above the international political system's structural constraints'.[65] Thus, following Waltz's schema, the US could not maintain its standing as the sole great power, because other states balanced against the dominant pole in the system. As Waltz says: 'Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them'.[66] In other words, secondary states ought to balance against whichever state appears to be trying to establish a hegemonic position in the system. Even if a rising state has no intention to threaten, it is imperative for it to seek a balance. From this perspective, states would act against mounting US capabilities, regardless of how threatening those capabilities are, 'because the threat inheres in the hegemon's power'.[67] Accordingly, since the greatest source of threat to a state comes from the possible power advantages another state may have over it, states opt to balance against the power of an aspiring and not necessarily threatening hegemon. As Waltz puts it: 'nobody wants anyone else to win; none of the great powers wants one of their number to emerge as leader'.[68] Moreover, because under conditions of anarchy security is scarce and the intentions of others are always uncertain and subject to change, a hegemon will always be tempted to abuse its unchecked power. So there are no benign hegemons and power is inherently threatening, as Waltz observes: 'Countries that wield overwhelming power will be tempted to misuse it. And even when their use of power is not an abuse, other states will see it as being so'.[69]

Simply put, those inclined towards multipolarity supported the inevitable demise of American hegemony, with the idea that powerful states would tend to balance, not bandwagon, because this carries a higher probability of maintaining security and autonomy. This would make secondary states more likely to balance against rather than cooperate with the US. Or to put it differently, American hegemony would not last, because other powers were, in Waltz's terms, 'edging away' from the US and balancing or preparing to balance against it. In this context, eligible states like Japan and Germany would respond to new international systemic constraints by becoming great powers. This is because, when a state's economic or military stakes grow, its international political

interests also increase. Moreover, a state's demands for power and prestige increase in proportion to its rising strength. Thus, the growth/shift of relative economic or military power is always accompanied by the acquisition of capabilities to defend national interests. To quote Waltz: 'The increase of a country's economic capabilities to the great-power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. It widens the range of a state's interests and increases its importance'.[70] This being so and given the economic advantage Japan and Germany enjoyed, their rise to great power status was virtually inevitable. It could be argued that the effect of differential growth rates was an important factor in Germany/Japan's emergence as great powers. They were convinced that failure to attain great power status might affect their security and autonomy. Structural constraints pushed these states to balance against the US. Layne writes: 'Unipolarity is likely to be short-lived because new great powers will emerge as the uneven growth process narrows the gap between the hegemon and the eligible states that are positioned to emerge as its competitors'.[71]

The conclusion drawn from these power dynamics is that the US could not succeed for long in maintaining its unipolar preeminence, because some combination of over-stretch and counter-balancing would prevent it. In addition to balancing against bandwagoning behaviour, Waltz and Layne highlight the importance of the imitation of successful practices within the international system. According to this view, in a self-help system, units must take care of themselves or suffer the consequences. As a result, 'States mimic or echo each other's successful behavior'.[72] In other words, to be secure in an anarchic system, states need to develop the kind of military, economic or even administrative capabilities that would enable them to compete with a great power. In this context, anarchy and its consequences compel states to copy the great power model. As Waltz observes: 'competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors'.[73] Thus proponents of Waltz's theory maintain that states imitate the successful practices of their rivals or risk falling behind. Put differently, states face strong structural incentives to copy the effects of the most successful. If they fail to do so, competition will tend to eliminate them. As Waltz points out: 'For a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly'.[74] Viewed in this way, eligible states had little choice but

to imitate the US. Emulating successful methods led to power balancing. Engagement in imitation would bring US power into balance. In other words, the 'sameness' effect was an important factor in the rise of great powers.

On this basis, it could be argued that the emergence of a new great power was inevitable and unavoidable because of the power dynamics of the system. In that environment, an 'invisible hand' produces a balance of power. This means that, historically, balancing occurs almost all the time. For multipolarists, 'there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon'.[75] A multipolar system emerges, whether or not any particular state desires it. In other words, the US might seek power domination, but the system as a whole opposes it consistently. The need for security in the face of the US hegemony forces eligible states to replicate the US and to balance against it in order to attain great power status. In this context, a unified Germany, Japan, or China were identified by neorealists[76] as 'rising powers' with the potential to challenge US dominance. They were likely to seek to restore equilibrium in the balance of power by bringing US power into check. As Waltz suggests: 'in the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years, three political units may rise to great power rank: Germany or a West European state, Japan, and China'.[77]

Japan qualifies through its economic ability and technical capacities. As a response to its enhanced economic standing, prominent neorealists such as Waltz predicted Japan's aspiration to a larger political role. According to him: Japan was 'ready to receive the mantle [of great power status] if only it will reach for it'.[78] And despite the fact that its military capabilities were significantly less than those of the US, Japan's military power was a result of state policy, not resource limitations.[79] Therefore, increased international activity would lead Japan to acquire greater military capabilities to support its policies. In a similar vein, Layne considered Japan to be the most likely geopolitical rival to the US.[80] Its economic capability would allow it to follow an independent course, a fear accentuated by Shintaro Ishihara in his book *The Japan That Can Say No*.[81] Overall, Japan had become very rich, and could easily become militarily strong as well.

Germany qualified as a potential great power on the basis of being economically dominant. Many neorealists saw unification leading it to seek a more prominent position within the international system. In addition, with the ending of the Soviet threat, Germany showed a growing tendency to behave more independently of the American-led NATO structure. This argument implies that, as its geopolitical interests expanded, Germany would act like a great power and reject any external constraints. In this respect, Tagliabue posits that Germany was no longer an economic giant and a political dwarf.[82] From this point of view, it is commonly argued that Germany and Japan were beginning to assert political power more in accordance with their status as economic superpowers. In this context, their desire for permanent membership of the UN Security Council was a clear indication that these states were seeking places at the table. To quote Waltz: 'Countries with great-power economies have become great powers, whether or not reluctantly'.[83]

China was a prime candidate to be a great power on the grounds of its dramatic economic growth, large size and tradition of education and culture. Clinton described China as 'the world's fastest growing economy'.[84] The Chinese nuclear force along with its veto power also increased its abilities to protect its interests abroad. And as its economic and military strength continued to grow, China would be the subject of severe structural pressures to occupy the top rank.[85] Speaking of China and Japan, Waltz says: 'to all but the myopic, [multipolarity] can already be seen on the horizon.... Some of the weaker states in the system will...act to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or multipolarity. China and Japan are doing so now'.[86] Finally, the EU was one of the very few international actors potentially capable of challenging US hegemony. With an adequate economic and technological base, the EU - if it achieved its political unification - would produce an instant great power independent of and equal to the US. In this context, Kapstein argued that the introduction of a single currency within the context of the European Monetary Union was seen as a challenge to the dollar's domination of international finance.[87] Expressing similar concerns in 1993, Waltz noted that: 'The US will have to learn a role it has never played before: namely to coexist and interact with other great powers'.[88]

The Implications of Multipolarity for the UN

From this multipolar perspective, the behaviour and priorities of the UN have to be understood in relation to the motivations and priorities of leading member states, in particular Japan and a unified Germany, which have each been identified as rising powers within the emerging structure of international politics. This shift to multipolarity has affected the structure of relationships between all the major powers, and in turn has radically altered their attitudes to the UN. Emerging great powers were keen to enhance their positions in the UN and IOs in general. Multipolarists also anticipated that the tendency of the international system to encourage states to pursue balancing strategies would also mean that major secondary states are likely to seek much greater prominence within the UN system. Thus, the implications of multipolarity would be especially evident in the UN, as rising powers demanded 'a seat at the table' in order to protect their new status. Consequently, Germany and Japan - as wealthy states - were inclined to adjust their participation in UN activities. In general, this meant building up UN resources [funds] to make UN operations less dependent upon Washington.[89] From this we can hypothesize that rising economic powers tended to weaken the US hegemony in existing institutions, notably the UN. In other words, they were eager to redress the power imbalance in the UN, particularly away from the US. This hypothesis leads us to conclude that, in the Post-Cold war era, potential great powers like Japan and Germany would make serious attempts to restrain US power in the UN by using their financial and other capabilities. Thus, in a world in which economy appears to carry more weight than armies, wealthy states were inclined to look for opportunities to influence the activities of UN bodies and to alter the distribution of power in their favour. As one commentator puts it: 'Japan is expected to make the most of the changing tide by actively contributing to a wide range of UN activities'.[90] In this context, Japan became the second-largest contributor, after the US, to the UN system. Also it started to show strong interest in the management of the organization and in turn took the initiative to reform the UN's administrative and financial situation.

The most significant shift in these emerging states' policies towards the UN was a growing tendency to join UN military forces. From this standpoint, it could be argued

that, during the 1990s, the trend towards a more active military role became more pronounced. The major powers' participation in UN development, assistance or disaster relief reflected their growing global perspective and interest. As a special Panel of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party argued in February 1992, 'Now that we have become one of the very few economic powerhouses, it would fly in the face of the world's common sense if we did not play a military role for the maintenance and restoration of global peace'.[91] In a similar vein, Germany's foreign minister Klaus Kinkel noted: 'As a reunited and sovereign country, we must assume all the rights and obligations of a member of the United Nations to avoid any discrepancy between our verbal commitments to peace and human rights and our active involvement in their defense'.[92] Accordingly, during the early 1990s, it was widely presumed that these rising powers defined their interests in relation to their relative power capabilities. In this context, Germany became more assertive in defence of its national interests in international organizations and acted more independently in pursuit of its objectives.[93] In Harrison's words: 'Changes in the international system will encourage Germany to behave more independently within multilateral institutions than it has in the past'.[94]

As Japan also became more active on the international stage, a leading role in the UN would advance its policies and ensure an independent foreign policy. By this logic, Japan would make full contributions to the UN because, although an economic giant, its lack of natural resources and its culture of anti-militarism 'require an international security net'.[95] In addition, Japan's flourishing economy led it to support the UN in stabilizing the global environment on which its economy's grow be depended. As one analyst posits: 'Japan's orientation toward the United Nations is dictated by its economic, geographic, military, and technological position, as interpreted by its leadership, within an evolving international system'.[96] Such views fit the neorealist prediction that a state's basic attitude towards the UN is heavily determined by its position in the global power structure. As middle powers' stakes in the international system grow, so will their ambitions and interests in the UN and world politics. In other words, structural imperatives will cause major economic powers to reject US constraints imposed on their behaviour towards the UN. In this sense, their policies towards the UN demonstrate a

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growing willingness to follow an independent course, even if doing so leads to open friction with Washington. Rather than supporting the US, these states have been determined to distance themselves from it and have expressed different interests in the UN. Overall, a case can be made that, as rich states become great powers, their behaviour towards the UN will be profoundly altered. In Mingst and Karns' words: 'Financial contributions to the UN and international economic weight suggested the possibility of greater independent influence'.[97] In this regard, it is worth pointing to the emergence of a more aggressively unilateral stance in IOs in the new era. Developments such as these can be interpreted from a multipolar perspective as reflecting the rising powers' desire to advocate their own interests over the wishes of the international community. Building on this, it could be argued that, in a multipolar system, the US cannot control the UN. As economic might supplants military strength as the primary currency of national power and prestige, the US has to exert its leadership in IOs as part of a coalition. It follows that the time for the US to act alone seems indeed to be over. The US needs to accept that it is just one major power among many in a world of disorder. In this context, the US should not seek absolute gain when choosing among UN strategies simply because structural powers impel other states to become great powers and to develop a major voice in the UN. In other words, the US is unable to achieve power steering in the UN system, because there is a need for some degree of power balancing. In the multipolar model, UN outcomes are not determined by a single player. Rather they are the result of bargaining among key players. In such a model, the US can lead but not dominate the UN.

In short, those who conceive the Post-Cold War world dominated by geo-economics rather than geopolitics suggest that other states are increasingly important in UN affairs, especially in view of the fact that the UN itself was (and is) a multipolar institution. In other words, the UN Charter assumes a multipolar distribution of power, with the five great powers protected by their vetos. Simply stated, multipolarists see power balancing as the essence of UN activities in the new era, especially as wealthy states shift from a 'policy taker' to a 'policy maker' role within IOs. To conclude, neorealists are only concerned with a changing power structure and its implications for IOs. For them the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity is the key factor that affects the UN's

role and position. This however is not the view of ES theorists, who contend that changes in international norms do bring about UN change. The next section examines the ES argument which focuses on the normative determinants of the UN's role.

3.2 The ES Account of the Post-Cold War Context: Changes in Normative Structure

In contrast to the neorealists, the ES contends that the UN's role is not reducible solely to power considerations. Power politics among states have implications for the UN no doubt, yet the end of the Cold War gave rise to a set of principles, duties and norms to which the UN had to respond. For the ES, normative changes which occurred as a result of the end of East-West confrontation were clearly relevant to a fundamental alteration in the UN's role. ES scholars thus criticize neorealism for its mono-causal focus on material power and for denying the social nature of inter-state relations. They contend that relations between states are also norm-governed. Changes in the UN's role are not solely driven by systemic constraints; but were also a product of the evolution of international constitutive norms.

The main purpose of this section is to explicate the ES argument that shifts in the UN's role can be understood in terms of changes in the international normative standards articulated by member states, especially the most powerful among them. This counters the neorealist view that norms are marginal. As noted in Chapter Two, the ES highlights the impact of norms in international relations. As a consequence, it emphasizes the effect of the changing normative context following the end of the Cold War. The new era witnessed developing international norms related to human rights and in support of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians. Normative evolution, in which the UN itself played a key creative role in reconstruction, shaped and affected the values, expectations and behaviour of states. In other words, shifts in established norms, especially those that obliged intervention for humanitarian reasons in cases of gross violations of human rights, were important, because in the society of states, norms matter. Advocates of the ES examine the way norms evolve or change in IOs. They argue that

the UN's role cannot be understood ignoring the changing normative context in which it operates. From this point of view, traditional power based ways of looking at US hegemony in the Post-Cold War world or the strategic interests of the great powers cannot adequately account for the evolution of UN activities. What is needed is an explanation of the UN that whilst recognizing the significance of power or material influences, takes account of normative factors.

In short, the argument is that the end of the Cold War brought with it a seismic shift in the global normative landscape. Many new norms and principles were taking root and slowly reshaping the international landscape. The principal norm at stake was non-intervention. There was a change to the norm to the extent that 'humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in international society'.[98] This however does not mean that norms were absent before. On the contrary, the Cold War order had global norms, but they played a limited role. Because of security concerns, some norms, such as human rights, were not particularly salient issues. In other words, humanitarian norms were conditioned by East-West conflict – they had no independent role. But with the disappearance of the Cold War as the meta-issue, a whole range of new international issues had emerged. Thus, in a Cold War world, the concept of protecting people or defending civilians from acts of violence was understood or accepted. Yet in practice, the major problems to be confronted were those of peace and war. Simply put, the norms of human rights have always existed. This was clear in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Convention, which all recognize that people's rights are as important as those of states. As a result, with the end of the Cold War, there has been an explicit effort to reconstruct norms especially in relation to humanitarian intervention. Thus, it can be argued that the lessening of tensions in 1989 between the US and the Soviet Union started to emphasize new norms that came to occupy a central place in international politics. There was a significant shift of attitudes on the question of common humanity, especially amongst Western states. These states found themselves under pressure to act in humanitarian emergencies.

In the context of the Post-Cold War world, globalization simply meant that rights abuse 'in one place in the world [were] felt everywhere'.[99] This means that: in an era of

increasing globalization, the security of populations around the world was interlinked or interconnected. With the emergence of worldwide problems and the increasing interdependence of nations, it has become increasingly clear that what happens or does not happen in one country can have serious repercussions elsewhere. Globalization, with its benign and dark sides, 'is pushing down into the affairs of states and affecting the lives of individuals everywhere'.[100] States thus can no longer choose their domestic policy in isolation from the international context. This stems from the fact that 'every domestic issue has an international dimension'.[101] Globalization in this sense has eroded the ability of a state to protect its citizens. It follows that, in the Post-Cold War globalized world, no country, however powerful, can ensure the safety and security of civilians on its own. Consequently, states cannot turn their backs on fundamental human rights abuse [humanitarian crises] and walk away. Viewed in this light, the phenomenon of globalization not only facilitates growing levels of interaction among states, it has also created what Bull called a growing sense of 'cosmopolitan moral awareness'.[102] In other words, if it is impossible for basic rights to be protected by national institutions, then other states are obliged to act. They have to do so, because domestic and international politics are related. As the report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbuorhood*, put it: 'the shortening of distance, the multiplying of links, and the deepening of interdependence: all these factors, and their interplay, have been transforming the world into a neighbourhood'.[103]

From this standpoint, it is to be expected that in a world in which crimes against humanity in all shapes and forms transcend borders, pressures on states to think globally, rather than merely locally or regionally, have increased. The forces of globalization thus are conceived as forces that helped the re-emergence or re-construction of old ideas that were too easily overlooked in the past. A Swedish government report, for example, asserts that the 'threats to our own security today are assumed to be associated, inter alia, with global population trends, combined with slow economic development and social justice'.[104] Humanitarian assistance therefore is not only a moral right, but a common interest among states. In other words, given the countervailing pressures of globalization in the international system, states were no longer willing to leave human rights

completely beyond global purview.[105] In general, the promotion of universal values and the move towards more coercive enforcement has been bound up with arguments concerning growing global interdependence, new systems of communication and transportation, and new technologies. In this context, it is commonly observed that the media play a crucial role in the globalization of moral concern.[106] CNN [Cable News Network] coverage for example heightens public awareness of human suffering in faraway places. In doing so, it constitutes powerful pressures on state leaders to address domestic concerns and crises that require external help. In other words, the media bring pressure to bear on Western governments to act. As Martin Shaw asserts, media coverage of the suffering of the Kurds in northern Iraq 'compelled intervention by the Western powers'.[107] States thus operate in an environment of governmental and non-governmental constraints on their human rights practices. Although these constraints do not always lead to humanitarian intervention, they strengthen global humanitarian protection capacities by making state leaders believe that 'they will be held accountable if they decide not to save strangers'.[108]

The preceding arguments lead to the assertion that changing norms and global interdependence have generated pressures for humanitarian intervention in international society. This is, however, not the view shared by all scholars working from an ES perspective. In other words, although advocates of the ES accept the potential for moral action in a world of sovereign states, they disagree about the scope for, and desirability of, moral change. This is clear in the pluralism-solidarism debate (detailed in Chapter Two).[109] This debate, especially in the new era, has come to focus on the closely related questions of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility of the richer states towards weak states. It has considered the notion of giving teeth to the enforcement of human rights. For pluralists there are no universal human rights, given individuals only have rights accorded to them by states. Since international society is a society of sovereign states, it is not acceptable that states sacrifice sovereignty for the sake of justice. The fundamental argument is that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are the cornerstones of the international legal order. From this standpoint, pluralists consider that intervention poses a threat to international order. Bull, for example, was particularly

concerned that humanitarian intervention might 'jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention'.[110] This view is echoed by Robert Jackson and James Mayall,[111] who both highlight the fact that the promotion of the principle of intervention, even on humanitarian grounds, is likely to undermine international order. In this regard, Jackson notes: 'In my view, the stability of international society, especially the unity of the great powers, is more important, indeed far more important, than minority rights and humanitarian protection in Yugoslavia or any other - if we have to choose between these two sets of values'.[112] Accordingly, and as a consequence of the high priority given to order, pluralists conclude that even in cases of humanitarian disasters, international society must not intervene.

The solidarists, by contrast, are more inclined to the notion of universal ethics or common standards of human rights. According to them, states have moral obligations to uphold the rights of their citizens and those of strangers across borders. As a consequence, genocide and massive violations of human rights are a matter of concern for every state in international society. The solidarists assert the existence of a right to intervene in extreme cases of human suffering relaxing the norm of non-intervention so regarding humanitarian intervention as legitimate.[113] A solidarist conception therefore tends to give priority to justice over order as the superior value. This is so because order is dependent upon justice and, in turn, a lack of internal justice risks international disorder. Thus, in cases of humanitarian catastrophes, the international community must do something. In other words, promoting and enforcing human rights is not only morally permitted but also morally required, because 'an unjust world will be a disorderly one'.[114] Accordingly, a solidarist commitment to intervention in what Wheeler calls a 'supreme humanitarian emergency'[115] can be defended on grounds of both national interest and common humanity. The conclusion drawn from this is that, sovereignty is no longer an absolute principle, and the principle of non-intervention is not sacrosanct. On this basis, the rights of the sovereign should be limited by principles of humanity or in the name of global justice. As Vincent and Watson put it: 'States should satisfy certain basic requirements of decency before they qualify for the protection which the principle of non-intervention provides'.[116] Thus, the controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention expresses itself

in terms of a conflict between concerns of order and justice. What is most important: to preserve international stability or to act to protect suffering in a conflict? Order and justice therefore are perceived as antagonistic. In other words, the key difference between solidarism and pluralism is the tension between considerations of international order and individual justice in world politics: whether to prioritize order (the security of states) or justice (the security of individuals).

Regardless of this debate, it can be argued that the ES, exemplified by writers such as Wheeler, understood that the Post-Cold War world had changed normatively. In his book *Saving Strangers* Wheeler contends that a new norm of humanitarian intervention is evolving and that a 'solidarist' rather than a 'pluralist' conception of international society is emerging. In the Post-Cold War era, states were expected to protect the security of their citizens, but if not, then 'there might fall to the international community a duty of humanitarian intervention'.[117] Accordingly, the emergence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention was a development that had been facilitated by the intersection of globalization and a changing normative context. In order to understand this changing context, the next section examines evolving conceptions of security and sovereignty since the end of the Cold War. It focus upon the internationalization of human rights through the broad concept of human security and then goes on to discuss how the traditional understanding of state sovereignty has given way to the notion of 'sovereignty as responsibility', which has taken firm root in international society.

3.2.1 The Concept of Human Security

During the Cold War, security was defined almost entirely in terms of military might and the balance of terror. This narrow conception of security, based on traditional military threats to the state, has been challenged by the advocates of the concept of human security which criticizes the traditional focus on the state as the referent object for security, preferring instead a focus on the individual.[118] Thus, with the end of the Cold War, a shift occurred in what it meant to be secure. This reinterpretation of the nature of security shifted the focus from traditional interstate wars to new issues, such as the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, state failure, criminalized activity and

international instability.[119] These new threats are often just as serious as traditional military threats, especially in a globalized world. From this standpoint, it could be argued that the emphasis on human well-being distinguishes human security from the objective of protecting state territory.[120] In the human security paradigm, individuals and communities of individuals, rather than governments or states, are the primary point of reference or the object of security. Human security is in essence a 'global public good'[121] to be enjoyed by humankind [genuinely universal]. On this basis, human security focuses attention on all persons making the protection of all people, everywhere [or the promotion of universal human rights norms] a priority.

Simply stated, human security elevates the security of individuals sometimes over and above the security of the state. It is worth noting, however, that this focus on the individual as the nexus of concern does not mean that the state is no longer important. On the contrary, the human security perspective emphasizes the continuing centrality of the state as it secures the physical security of its citizens. Human security therefore does not supplant, but completes, national security. It does so by being people-centred, concentrating on issues that not considered as traditional state security threats. In this context, insecurity is defined mainly 'as a threat to the quality of life of individuals'.[122] A human security perspective consequently asserts that the security of the state is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means of ensuring security for its people. As Rob McRae notes: 'The concept of human security is, in principle, quite broad. It takes the individual as the nexus of its concern, the life as lived, as the true lens through which we should view the political, economic, and social environment'.[123] In a similar vein, Hampson writes:

> The concept of human security is not just an argument about securing basic human rights. It is a conception that goes much further in its understanding, both about the potential sources of threat (or privation) to these rights and about the conditions and kinds of institutions and governance arrangements (domestic as well as international) required to sustain human rights.[124]

Accordingly, human security is a multi-dimensional concept. It can be defined in terms of basic human liberties, certain political and civil rights, material needs and equity and social justice. It, in fact, connects different types of freedoms: 'freedom from fear or safety of peoples', 'freedom from want or equity and social justice' and 'human rights

and the rule of law'. In terms of the rights/rule of law and the safety of people, the principal threats to international peace and security come from the denial of fundamental individual liberties and the absence of moral and legal rights of the non-combatants in situations of violent conflict. Freedom from want and sustainable human development are broader issues threatening human security. Pandemic diseases (AIDS), environmental degradation and the widening income gap between the worlds's rich and poor are distributive aspects of underdevelopment and socio-economic inequality. A point that needs to be stressed, however, is that all aspects of human security relate closely to a core issue: the security of individuals. Thus, to many observers, human security and its concern with all human lives overlaps with human development. Both understand people to be ends and not means.[125]

In short, human security includes non-military and non-state dimensions. Proponents of human security assert that the safety of the individual is key to global security.[126] When basic human security values are threatened intervention and the use of force is desirable. Seen in this way, the concept of human security is closely related to emerging Critical Security Studies (CSS). This de-emphasizes the role of the state and reorients the concept of security around individuals, citizens and humanity.[127] Advocates of both human security and CSS refute the state-centric and war-centric focus of security studies and prefer instead a widening and/or deepening meaning going beyond military statecraft to include the 'security of people in their homes, jobs and communities'.[128] They expand the concept of security horizontally to include humankind as a whole, and vertically to include a wider agenda of political, economic, societal, gender and environmental issues.[129] CSS does not ignore the military dimensions of security, but military threats are not the only source of insecurity. In that vein, Ken Booth views security as a process of human emancipation. He criticizes traditional international relations theories for emphasizing power and order as the bases for security. Booth rather argues for the concept of emancipation, which, for him, means freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.[130] Such constraints not only include war and conflict, but also poverty, poor healthcare and lack of education. It is

worth noting that Booth considers security and emancipation as 'two sides of the same coin' with security being the means, and emancipation as an end.[131]

With the Cold War over, it was increasingly accepted that all individuals possessed certain political and civil rights by virtue of their humanity. Some ES scholars, most notably Wheeler, went even further to assert that, when these rights are violated, members of international society ought to act to ensure that individuals are able to claim the rights to which they are entitled, especially in countries where the government proves unable to help or there is a vacuum of power. This being so, and since the victims of mass murder are no longer excluded from the discourse of the society of states, it can be argued that, in the Post-Cold War era, new emergent norms of humanitarian intervention have begun to supersede the norm of non-intervention. According to Wheeler: 'States that massively violate human rights...forfeit their right to be treated as legitimate sovereigns, thereby morally entitling other states to use force to stop the oppression'.[132] This means that Article 2 (7) of the Charter[133] can be overridden when the UN is taking enforcement action under Chapter VII.[134]

Putting the issue in this way implies that the norms of the international system are being transformed in ways that make intervention more likely and more legitimate. An obvious tension, however, exists between human security values and more traditional values embodied in the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.[135] In other words, by making the individual the reference point, human security 'offers a powerful critique of traditional notions of sovereignty'.[136] In this context, the promotion of human security unsurprisingly has led to a reconsideration of sovereignty in all its aspects, a reconsideration that is part of the broader process of globalization, and that simply means that state sovereignty should not stand in the way of promoting human security values. This shift can be attributed to a continual increase in the incidence of civil wars, which have deleterious consequences for the global community as a whole. Peace should start at home, with the 'eradication of poverty, social injustice and the violation of human rights'.[137] Human values must supersede state rights and the norm of non-intervention must be breached in response to gross violations of human dignity.

3.2.2 Sovereignty as Responsibility: A Reconceptualization

The advancement of human security, especially the protection of civilians in armed conflict, transcends borders; yet international recognition of state sovereignty is the defining mark of membership of the society of states. The principle of sovereignty and respect for international borders was enshrined by the international community as a response to the horrific interstate wars of the twentieth century. Accordingly, in the traditional Westphalian system, sovereignty implied absolute rights to territory and the prohibition of trespass by others. From this standpoint, the sovereignty of states was expected to be a prohibition against foreign intervention, but it was not always respected. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union repeatedly and consistently breached the sovereignty of weaker states on the grounds of defending democracy or communism. Sovereignty was not a barrier to intervention. Thus, nonintervention was a norm, but states violated it in practice. The Westphalian system was nothing but a form of 'organized hypocrisy'.[138]

The idea that state sovereignty is not absolute and borders are not sacrosanct is not a new phenomenon. As noted, sovereignty has always been malleable, conditional and constantly reinterpreted in a host of ways.[139] This leads Krasner to contend that: 'Interventions have always been a feature of the international system'.[140] In the Post-Cold War era what was new, however, was the increasing acceptance of the protection of individual rights as the reasons for intervening in another country. In other words, during the Cold War years, invoking global humanitarian norms did not justify the use of force. Political reasons were usually the key reason for intervention. This has been expanded with the end of the Cold War to include the human rights of all individuals. Some observers contend that 'Interventions are not a new phenomenon. In the past they have been associated with power asymmetries, not with consensus regarding values'.[141] Wheeler similarly notes that 'humanitarian claims were not accepted as a legitimate basis for the use of force in the 1970s but that a new norm of UN-authorized humanitarian intervention developed in the 1990s'.[142] Given the internationalization of security issues, violations of human rights, even when they occur within state borders, are no longer be tolerated by outsiders. To put it differently, although individual rights were previously the

traditional concerns of domestic policy, in an era of mutual interdependence, states cannot abuse global humanitarian standards and expect to get away with it. The result has been 'a shift in world opinion toward a re-balancing of the claims of sovereignty and those of extreme humanitarian need'.[143] It could be argued that constraints on state sovereignty have been increasing significantly in the Post-Cold War era as a consequence of growing interdependence. This means that, under the influence of what is commonly known as globalization, when states fail to uphold certain standards of justice, i.e. peace, order and basic human rights, they are liable to the intervention of other states.

In short, as the Cold War ended, there was a shared desire amongst some states to advance and promote human rights and to protect both the physical and the human security of individuals. These criteria constitute the norms of state sovereignty in a new era. An argument is therefore made that, with emergent human rights norms, the sovereign state should ultimately be responsible for the protection of its citizens, and sovereignty is dependent upon how each state behaves towards its citizens. The Post-Cold War era thus saw an attempt to reconcile state sovereignty with responsibility.[144] This positive interpretation of sovereignty means that, in order to be legitimate, states must demonstrate responsible sovereignty and protect their citizens. The traditional conception of sovereignty was challenged by the norm that legitimacy in the exercise of the rights of sovereignty is dependent on respect for global standards of civilization. This being so, it became far clearer than before that the notion of national sovereignty was no longer, if it ever was, sacrosanct; but it by no means follows from this that sovereignty is disappearing or becoming outmoded.[145] In other words, the assertion of universal human rights was not an alternative to the fundamental conception of sovereignty and non-intervention. On the contrary, human rights should be maintained within the sovereign territorial state. From this perspective, it is commonly argued that, while changes in the normative climate have altered the traditional interpretation of sovereignty, they have not transcended it entirely. As Donnelly notes: 'By the end of the Cold War, human rights became a regular and well-established part of international relations......States and their sovereignty prerogatives, however, also remain strong'.[146] This is confirmed by Dunne

and Wheeler who believe that: 'Sovereignty remains the constitutive norm of the society of states, but the meaning that was given to sovereignty had been modified'.[147]

The preceding arguments suggest that sovereignty is still a guiding principle of international relations, but following the end of the Cold War, the international community was less willing to ignore massive violations of human rights within the borders of a sovereign state. Growing public awareness of human rights and moral issues was accompanied by a revolution in the principle of sovereignty. In other words, if states claim sovereignty, they must live up to their obligations, not only towards other states, but also towards their own subjects. States are responsible for providing their citizens with physical security and basic subsistence needs. The international community in turn has commensurate responsibility to hold states accountable and intervene to provide humanitarian assistance. Philpott concludes that: 'Where the state's authority is challenged, it is challenged significantly, but the challenge extends only to certain matters in certain places'.[148] From this we can hypothesize that a state's sovereignty is eroded only when it does not enforce human rights and justice. If it claims sovereignty, the state also has obligations to protect civilians in times of war. Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War world was conditional upon maintaining certain minimum standards of civilized behaviour.[149] This was a qualified sovereignty, in which states were responsible for upholding the needs and wishes of the members of global society. As Duffield argues, although sovereignty was important, it remained and qualified from 'above and below, as it were'.[150]

In general, it can be postulated that, if sovereignty is a right, it must come with a corresponding duty, in order to be meaningful. Duties that are constitutive of the rights of sovereignty constrain the behaviour of every state belonging to international society. The decreasing scope of sovereignty means that it is conditional upon the human purposes it is meant to serve. Seen in this perspective, the right to sovereignty is no longer a permit to do wrong. There are limits to sovereignty based on human rights. In this context, if states are responsible for their own security and for the security of their citizens, then human security should be conceived as an extension of the concept and practice of

sovereignty. As one observer notes: 'The sovereignty of the community, the region, the nation, the state.....makes sense only if it is derived from the one genuine sovereignty – that is, from the sovereignty of the individual'.[151] A point that needs to be stressed is that, if sovereignty is conditional upon protecting fundamental human rights, the relationship between sovereignty and intervention is complementary, not contradictory. In other words, if humanitarian intervention is seen as part of an expanded definition of sovereignty and solidarity, it is not fundamentally opposed to it. Thus, in the Post-Cold War world, humanitarian assistance shifted from being a potential violation of sovereignty rights to being a safeguard for fundamental human security. As a consequence, sovereignty and human rights were perceived as two sides of the same coin: a state is sovereign as long as it provides human security for its citizens. The conclusion that emerges from all of this is that in the Post-Cold War era international society was argued to be evolving in a solidarist direction and moving towards a society of peoples in which an absolute claim to sovereignty is challenged by calls for the qualification of sovereignty and where the international community would intervene for humanitarian reasons and to protect the victims of massive and sustained human rights abuse. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, ES scholars emphasized that the global normative structure had changed significantly: many old norms, like non-intervention in domestic affairs, were under challenge, but new ones, like humanitarian intervention, were emerging. What did this mean for the role of the UN in the new era? It is to this issue that we now turn.

The UN's Role in the Post-Cold War Era

The ES postulates a broad normative change has occurred regarding the role of human rights and sovereignty in international society. It follows from this that a new consensus is emerging on humanitarian intervention, that is, military intervention in a state's affairs, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among its inhabitants. This normative acceptance greatly affected the ways in which the international community and its institutions like the UN are constrained or enabled to act. In other words, the ES argues that, with the end of the Cold War, international concerns have expanded to include not only the protection of the rights

of states, but also the rights of individuals. And because of globalization, it also became clear that nation-states would be unable to tackle new multi-dimensional threats alone. This has clearly altered the UN's role. Taylor and Curtis conclude that, in the Post-Cold War world, 'The UN has become the essential club for states'.[152] Thus, with increasingly material and moral interdependence, the protection of human rights has become a shared responsibility of the state and the international community. In response to new security challenges, especially those arising out of civil war and state collapse, the UN had to adopt an agenda that would put people at the centre of everything it did. Seen in this light, it could be argued that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the perspective of human security became an important element in the organization's mandate.

It was contended by some ES theorists that, from the 1990s onwards, the UN would adopt a solidarist responsibility, of acting as a guardian of global human rights, especially in light of the fact that the UN Charter did not assert merely the rights of states, but also the rights of people.[153] In other words, with the end of the Cold War, there would be a renewed focus on the implementation of international humanitarian norms. This was 'unavoidable because of its dual role both as an upholder of international standards in human rights and humanitarian law, and as the global body with responsibilities regarding the use of force'.[154] This view is echoed by some observers: 'As awareness and concern about these problems have increased in the Post-Cold War period so has the prominence of the UN as the focus of expectations as a provider of global governance and global security'.[155] Adherents of the ES were thus inclined to reconsider the UN's role in this new changing normative context. For them, in a Post-Cold war world, the UN would be the principal body for protecting endangered people. The argument goes that, because of the development of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention or the move away from a non-intervention norm, the UN could extend its power into matters that had previously belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states. Herein lies the impact of global norms. To put it differently, during the Cold War years, the UN had, in effect, little capacity to respond when humanitarian norms were violated. States tended to invoke the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs as a way to keep the international community at bay. Nevertheless, with the internationalization of human rights in the new

era, the possibility and the need for the defence of such norms had grown. As one commentator notes: 'Human rights are now more clearly a justification for action than ever before, and norms are reaching a point at which they can be implemented and enforced'.[156] What this implies is that there has been a normative change regarding humanitarian intervention. This point is taken up by Greenwood: 'The law on humanitarian intervention has changed both for the United Nations and for individual states. It is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into anarchy, international law forbids military intervention altogether'.[157] Drawing from this argument, it is suggested that, with a growing role for international norms in the new Post-Cold war world, the international community has begun to accept that the UN has a moral right to intervene to prevent humanitarian emergencies. But this is in sharp contrast to what went before. The international norm has long been against intervention in another's domestic domain. Therefore, in the UN Charter, the prohibition of attacks on states is fundamental, and self-defence against armed attack is the one remaining completely unambiguous justification for states using force. The Charter even places limits, in the famous Article 2 (7), on intervention within states by the UN itself. Thus, the principle of non-interference has on numerous occasions been reaffirmed by the UN. The basic norm of the UN Charter (Article 2) enshrines the principle of equal sovereignty and its corollary, the doctrine of non-intervention.

It follows from the above that the UN Charter was enacted on the assumption that nation states were sovereign and should not meddle in each other's internal affairs, and human rights were seen as matters of domestic concern. But, as has been argued throughout the preceding section, with the Cold War over, human rights have increasingly come to be seen as matters of international concern to the extent that nations may, and sometimes should, attempt to influence the behaviour of other nation states. As a consequence, during the 1990s, national sovereignty could no longer be used as a shield against scrutiny. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, a shift in understanding as to what constituted the legitimate basis of sovereignty occurred. This new interpretation of the nature of sovereign states had a significant impact on the

UN. It led to expansion of UN roles in the process of globalizing human rights. Simply put, in the Post-Cold War era, the organization moved from articulating the human rights norm to promoting and enforcing it. As one observer puts it: '[The UN] has been central to establishing the norms, institutions, mechanisms and activities for giving effect to this powerful idea that certain rights are universal'.[158] In other words, the solidarist idea that the exercise of sovereignty should be conditional on states satisfying basic standards of common humanity yielded to a broader UN responsibility to react to and prevent humanitarian crises. ES scholars thus tend to regard the responsive changes in the character of the UN and its agenda as being a consequence of a shift in the predominant understanding of sovereignty. This is especially so with regard to the globalization of international society. To quote Taylor: 'The new interpretation of sovereignty which arose in the context of the Post-Cold War included, in particular, extensions of the role of international institutions, especially the UN'.[159]

This line of thinking would lead us to expect that the principle of international protection of human rights has progressively gained weight at the cost of the traditional, highly prohibitive interpretation of state sovereignty. It is worth remembering however that sovereignty is still the norm in international society. Therefore, it was widely accepted that, to be legitimate, humanitarian interventions must be multilateral and organized under UN auspices. This indeed puts more responsibility on the UN. The new trend also meant that when providing humanitarian assistance, the UN must find a way to balance the rights of individual sovereign states and the rights of individual human beings. This was affirmed in the GA Resolution 46/182 (adopted in December 1991), which highlights that one of the guiding principles for humanitarian intervention was that: 'The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country'.[160] ES theorists thus emphasize the continued viability of state-centrism in a Post-Cold War world. For them, 'Nonintervention is still a broadly constitutive principle, as it was in the wake of Westphalia'.[161] Yet, a qualitative shift has occurred in the balance between sovereign

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rights and the authority of states and the rights and authority of the larger international community. This shift has led the international community, working through the UN, to uphold a new norm: starvation and wanton killing are "everybody's business". In short, taking the Post-Cold war normative context into consideration, the ES suggests a considerable increase in UN engagement in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. This has become more politically feasible with the change in relationship between the Permanent Five (P5). As commonly observed, during much of the Cold War period, East-West tensions were the concern in the UN and IOs in general. Both camps struggled to use the UN and its Secretariat to pursue ideological interests. In this context, the split in the UN SC along Cold War lines destroyed the organization's capacity to operate as a genuinely collective body. But as the Cold War ebbed, the great powers became more willing than before to work together on behalf of internationally recognized human rights. This means that, with the disappearance of the Cold War as a meta-issue, the role of the UN as an agent for multilateral cooperation was reassessed. One important signal of the decisive thaw in the Cold War for the UN was a new political environment prevailing within the SC between the East - the Soviet bloc - and the West - mainly the US and Western Europe. The statement of the leaders of the world's seven major industrialized countries in 1991 encapsulated the new paradigm as follows:

> We believe the conditions now exist for the UN to fulfil completely the promise and the vision of its founders. A revitalized UN will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression.[162]

From this point of view, the passing of the Cold War has represented a turning point in the normative structure of international politics and in the relationships between the great powers. This in turn would make the new world a more benign environment for the UN. Simply stated, the demonstrated willingness of the P5 to work within the UN framework did remove one barrier to collective/consensus decision-making, which had crippled the UN before. For ES theorists, changes in the role of the UN mirrored a stretched definition of what constitutes a threat to international stability in the Post-Cold War context. In such a context, states were prepared to legitimate intervention if governments violated the human rights of their citizens, or if states collapsed into civil war and disorder and

citizens found themselves in a quasi-state of nature. As one analyst comments, the new idea that the security of states, and the maintenance of international peace and security, are ultimately constructed on the foundation of people who are secure, presented 'a qualitative development in the [Security] Council's understanding of its function of maintaining international peace and security'.[163]

To summarize, the ES emphasizes that: in a world motivated more by human security concerns or other global norms and conventions, the UN role would not be as it was before. In this new climate, it would be logical to anticipate a greatly expanded demand of international role for the UN. These deeper changes in the role of the UN were a response to a changed normative context, by the early 1990s, in which human security took precedence over state sovereignty. Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that the expanded agenda of the UN regarding the maintenance of international order after the Cold War not only reflected the special interests of the great powers but also expressed evolving norms of moral interdependence including a new norm of humanitarian intervention.

Simply stated, the UN position in the new era reflected the increased importance of human rights norms in world politics. Without the acceptance of such norms, it would be hard to argue for a greater role for IOs in general. From this understanding of a changing international normative context, the ES contends that objective material factors, such as polarity, are by themselves insufficient to understand the UN's role in the new era. Such a role cannot be explained solely through changes in the balance of material power, as neorealists state, because a shift in the norms governing the membership of international society also played a crucial role. Thus, for the ES, material structures alone were not enough. Norms along with power brought about new roles for the UN. In this context, it is worth noting that adherents to the ES did not want to concede the irrelevance of power to this development. On the contrary, they acknowledged that changes in the international balance of material power helped to bring about this evolution. At the same time, they stressed that neorealists err in ignoring the role of norms, which in fact alter state behaviour in some issueareas. To put it another way, it is correct to say that, without the

material power of Western states, calls for the UN to intervene in various civil and intrastate emergencies would not materialize. In the case of Somalia however, a purely materialist explanation fails to explain that it was not of strategic or economic value to the US, but there was US/UN intervention.[164] To understand how such intervention became possible, it is necessary to focus on the changes in normative context that permitted, and in some cases encouraged, intervention.

ES theorists argue that the structural neorealist perspective is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the UN's predicament in the Post-Cold War era. In particular, it fails to account for the role of international norms. As one analyst notes: 'Structural realism with its assumption of homogeneity of objectives and its focus on the distribution of power among states, must be supplemented by some analysis of the motivations of the most powerful actors in the system'.[165] In short, ES scholars draw particular attention to the normative context. According to them, shifts in the distribution of power and state attempts to balance/bandwagon power are not the sole factors in explaining the UN's predicament. Consequently, the Post-Cold War agenda is more likely to be heavily influenced by international norms than it has been previously. The ES explanation of the UN's role in the Post-Cold War era therefore has the merit of highlighting issues of global norms, something that neorealist accounts tend to ignore.

3. 3 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explicate the two realist approaches to IOs identified in Chapter Two: neorealism and the ES. The first section examined the neorealist literature on system polarity in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The aim was to show how neorealist scholars characterized the new structure shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and what expectations would follow with regard to the UN. It was apparent from the literature review that there was no consensus among neorealists on any of these issues. Some argued that the Soviet bloc's collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity. Others suggested that unipolarity would be transformed into multipolarity. In this context, the section posed an important question: Why was

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there such a strong disagreement among neorealists in the early Post-Cold War period about the shape of the emerging international order? The discussion showed that this was simply because neorealist theorists differed on the criteria that distinguish a pole from other actors in the system. Strict Waltzians, for example, ranked states according to how they score on several dimensions of power capabilities. As a result, they came to the conclusion that the system was unipolar, as the US was prominent on all dimensions of power. On the contrary, for those prepared to think more economically in a world in which power was less aggregated, the structure of the system was judged to be multipolar, with the US as the strongest pole and Japan and the European Community (especially with a unified Germany) as lesser poles.

The section went on to explore the likely effects of a change from bipolarity to unipolarity on UN roles and responsibilities. Also, it examined in more detail the impact of multipolarity and changes in relationships between the major powers on the UN. In general, it concluded that all neorealists assumed that the UN's role in the new era was responsive to the constraints and opportunities of international power structures. Both unipolarists and mulipolarists built on this assumption, but each generated different predictions for the UN after the Cold War. A central theme running through this section was that all neorealists focus primarily on the distribution of power, relative position, state calculations of power and interests in deriving explanations of the UN's role. They are less concerned with shared values or emerging norms as independent sources of international outcomes. From a neorealist perspective, the UN cannot but mirror the hierarchical distribution of power. Therefore, the UN role is the story of the rise and fall of great powers, of change in the international power distribution. From this standpoint, traditional balance of power prognoses, whether stressing unipolar or multipolar structures, represent a continuation of scepticism about the role of institutions in the new era. In line with the neorealist model, institutions like the UN would not determine state behaviour, except at the margins. In other words, as power relations are still the most important issue affecting states' stance towards the UN, the collapse of bipolarity would not release the potential for a greater UN role. So, whatever the changes in system polarity, states matter and powerful states continue to matter the most. In short,

neorealists base their pessimism concerning a more significant role for the UN on the fact that the international system remains governed by power and interests.

The second section of this chapter examined the ES account. It concluded that, for the ES, one of the most important changes in the international context of the Post-Cold War era was the normative change. This was more visible on the issue of humanitarian intervention. In explaining the implications of this for the UN, the section started with the concept of human security and how it altered the UN global mandate. It then went on to examine how globalization had major implications for the circumstances of sovereignty. These factors brought about changes in the international normative context of global politics. Advocates of the ES thus maintained that the expansion of the notion of security and therefore of humanitarian intervention, led to new roles for the UN. From this standpoint, they concluded that common morality not just power relations would provide a better understanding of the UN's role in the new era. Of special interest here was the SC's extended definition of what constitutes a threat to international stability to include a range of humanitarian catastrophes, particularly those generating large exoduses of refugees and displaced persons, internally and internationally. This innovation in shaping the normative framework for international relations, allowed the UN to address a range of conflicts, mostly internal in nature. Overall, the establishment of new norms had shifted the emphasis in many institutions like the UN to civilian tasks, and placed new demands on its members to provide both military and civilians resources.

To conclude, the present chapter has attempted to develop the neorealist and ES accounts of IOs (outlined in the preceding chapter) which will be applied to an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda (in Chapter Six). In order to do so, it explored how the two realist perspectives view power structures and normative changes and their association with the changing expectations concerning the UN's role and functions in the new era. In the next two chapters, I provide a detailed analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. Chapter Four will explore the context, background and content of Ghali's reform agenda, while the politics of such reforms will be the focus of Chapter Five.

Notes

[1] Samuel Huntington described the system's structure as: uni-multipolarity with one superpower and several major powers. See Samuel Huntington, 'American's Changing Strategic Interests', Survival, January-February 1991, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 6, and Samuel Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower', Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, vol. 78, no. 2, p. 36. Also, Richard Betts argued that in the Post-Cold War world, the worldwide structure of power no longer governs the regional structure of power, as it did before. Global unipolarity coincided with regional multipolarity. See Richard Betts, 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security, Winter 1993/94, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 34-77.

[2] Waltz, 1993, p. 52.

[3] Ibid, p. 45.

[4] Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, vol. 70, no. 1, p. 24.

[5] William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security,1999, Summer, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 20

[6] Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.

[7] Wohlforth, 1999, p. 20.

[8] Waltz, 1979, p. 201.

[9] Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, vol. 70, no. 1, p. 24 , and William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security,1999, Summer, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 20.

[10] Ethan B. Kapstein, 'Does Unipolarity Have a Future?' in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 472.

[11] On soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, 'Soft Power', Foreign Policy, Fall 1990, no. 80, pp. 153-171, and Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1991.

[12] Mastanduno, 1999, p. 31.

[13] Waltz, 1979, p. 131.

[14] Charles Krautharmmer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 23-33, and Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.

[15] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Evaluating Theories', The American Political Science Review, 1997, vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 915-916.

[16] Wohlforth, 1999, p. 27.

[17] Michael Mastanduno and Ethan Kapstein, 'Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War', in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 16.

[18] Ethan Kapstein, 'Does Unipolarity Have a Future?' in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 465.

[19] Wohlforth, 1999, p. 35.

[20] Alastair Ian Johnston, 'Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period', in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 275.

[21] Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999, p. 4.

[22] Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War', International Security, 1997, Spring, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 49-88. See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 1987, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, who suggests that states do not balance power, as Waltz would expect, but oppose threats to their interests. He also contends that, in deciding whether or not to balance, states look not just at aggregate power (more is more threatening), but also at geographical proximity (closer is more threatening), offensive capabilities (more is more threatening), and offensive intentions (states that have them are more threatening).

[23] Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999, p. 5.

[24] Wohlforth, 1999, p. 36.

[25] Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999, p. 20.

[26] Joseph S. Nye, 'Coping With Japan', Foreign Policy, 1992-93, Winter, no. 89, p. 114.

[27] Thomas Berger, 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism', International Security, 1993, Spring, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 147.

[28] Hanns Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, Winter, vol. 69, no. 5, pp. 91-106. See also Yoichi Funabashi, 'Japan and America: Global Partners', Foreign Policy, 1992, Spring, no. 86, pp. 24-39.

[29] Jeffrey E. Garten, 'Japan and Germany: American concerns', Foreign Affairs, 1989/90, Winter, vol. 68, no. 5, p. 99.

[30] Waltz, 1993, p. 70.

[31] David Wilkinson, 'Unipolarity without Hegemony', International Studies Review, 1999, Summer, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 159.

[32] Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999, p. 22.

[33] Stewart Patrick, 'Don't Fence Me In: The Perils of Going it Alone', World Policy Journal, 2001, Fall, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2–14.

[34] Robert Dole, 'Shaping America's Global Future', Foreign Policy, 1995, Spring, no. 98, p. 36.

[35] Stewart Patrick, 'Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism', Ethics & International Affairs, 2003, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 44.

[36] Phyllis Bennis, 'Command and Control: Politics and Power in the Post-Cold War United Nations', in Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, Eds., Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order, New York Olive Branch Press, 1993, p. 38.

[37] Samantha Power, 'A Problem From Hell': America and the Age of Genocide, London, HarperCollins, 2002.

[38] Charles Krauthammer, 'Sarajevo Burns. We Learn?' The Times, 15 June, 1992, p. 78.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Krauthammer, 1990/91, p. 25.

[41] Mastanduno, 1999, pp. 143-44. Also see Benjamin Miller, 'The Logic of US Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era', Contemporary Security Policy, December 1998, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 72-109.

[42] Rosemary Foot et al., 'Conclusion: Instrumental Multilateralism in US Foreign Policy', in Rosemary Foot et al., Eds., US Hegemony and International Organizations, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 272.

[43] David Malone, 'Introduction', in David Malone et al., Eds., The UN Security Council From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2004, p. 8.

[44] Krauthammer, 1990/91, p. 23.

[45] Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American power, New York, Basic Books, 1991.

[46] Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, 'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict', Political Studies Quarterly, 1999, Autumn, vol. 106, no. 3, p. 408.

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[134] It is worth noting here that the second part of the first UN General Assembly discussed India's complaint about South Africa's treatment of peoples of Indian origin (almost all of whom were South African nationals). In 1952 the UN General Assembly went on to discuss the question of race conflict in South Africa.

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Chapter Four

Ghali's Reform Agenda:
Background, Causes, Timing and Content

4.0 Introduction

This chapter introduces the substantive case study of the thesis: the UN reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. It draws on both primary and secondary sources supplementing these with the testimony of those involved at the time.[1] It therefore provides an original contribution to the literature on UN reform. The concern here is not so much to identify differences between the primary evidence, in this case interviews and official documents, and existing secondary accounts. This in part will be the focus of Chapter Six. This chapter and the chapter that follows rather review in detail Ghali's reform agenda. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between reforms concerning the expansion of the UN role and reforms related to the administrative machinery necessary to deliver that role. As this chapter will demonstrate, Ghali advocated new UN roles as a consequence of the outbreak of new conflicts in different parts of the world and the resulting increase in demand for the organization's preventive, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building services. To enhance effectiveness in fulfilling this agenda, the former SG also initiated the process of redefining and evaluating the UN's internal administrative structure.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first explains the historical background to Ghali's reform agenda. It charts the history of reform in the UN, focusing especially on three key reform attempts: the Capacity study, the Group of 25 Experts and the Report of the Group of 18. It links the theoretical analysis of Chapters Two and Three to the substantive analysis of the case study. The second section comprises an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. It starts with the underlying factors that triggered Ghali's reforms. The section then goes on to identify the timing of his reform agenda, addressing the question: Why did Ghali initiate his reforms at this particular time? The third section explores the content of Ghali's reform agenda. The first part focuses on changes related to the UN role. To that end, it examines Ghali's

three proposals that set forth his vision of how the UN should contribute to a stable order, one in which peace, development and democracy form an interdependent, mutually reinforcing set of relationships. The second part of the section examines Ghali's efforts at administrative reform to deliver on these proposals.

4.1 Historical Background to Ghali's Reform Agenda

This section provides the necessary background to Ghali's reform agenda placing it in its proper historical context. It is worth noting that historically a considerable number of reform initiatives have emerged from inside the UN Secretariat, the governing bodies or from outside the organization. Three main reform initiatives dominated the first forty years of the organization: The Capacity Study, led by Robert Jackson and entitled 'A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System'[2], was the most important reform initiative of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Group of 25 Experts, which was established in the mid-1970s to make recommendations on structural changes, was the second.[3] The last major review was 'The Report of the Group of 18' in the second half of the 1980s.[4] This section examines the background, advocates, recommendations, reactions and implementation strategies for each of these initiatives.

4.1.1 The Capacity Study [1969]

Background

With the ending of the colonial era in the 1960s and early 1970s, the UN had to deal with a flood of newly independent states. In September 1960, 17 newly independent states, 16 of them African, joined the UN, the biggest increase in membership in any single year.[5] Though only three African and three Asian countries were among the founders at San Francisco, by the early 1960s more than half the member states came from these two continents.[6] In order to help them match their political independence with economic progress, technical cooperation activities were firmly established towards the end of the 1960s, representing one of the main functions of the UN. Basically funded from the voluntary contributions of member states, there were expectations that these activities would grow significantly over the next few years.

Despite the creation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965, the implementation of technical cooperation programs by the UN System remained constrained.

Advocates

The Sixth Session of the Governing Council of the UNDP designated Robert Jackson of Australia, administrator and former UN Under-Secretary General, as Commissioner, to undertake a study of the capacity of the UN system to carry out an expanded development program. This study was established at a time of swift expansion in UN development funding: 'The challenge was not whether the world body could do more with less, but whether the UN could handle another doubling of its development programs in the course of a few years time'.[7] Jackson and his team held consultations with governments and organizations within and outside the UN System. The Jackson report, also known as the Capacity Study, was published in 1969.

Recommendations

The Report made a number of recommendations forming a coherent plan to rationalize UN development activities, including the UNDP, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and inter-agency co-ordination. Consideration was given to the UNDP because it was seen as the largest single controller of technical co-operation funds in the UN system. To make it more powerful, the study proposed that the governing bodies of the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) should be merged into the UNDP. It tried to solve capacity problems by making the UNDP a co-coordinator of these agencies, both centrally and through its resident representatives in the field, and by using its central funding capability as main instrument. In addition, the study emphasized the importance of clarifying and defining the respective roles of the various components of the system. It recommended that the World Bank Group should be the chief arm of the UN system in the field of capital investment, while UNDP should perform the same function for basic technical co-operation and pre-investment.[8] Moreover, it was proposed that ECOSOC should become a 'one-world parliament' - a policy centre to supervise and co-ordinate the development activities of the Specialized Agencies. Jackson also formulated 'Ten Precepts' [9] as important conditions for any significant

improvement in the capacity of the UN development system: introduction of the programming method, which would help in organizing all the system inputs; prompt and effective project execution of approved projects; an evaluation system accountable to the UNDP Administrator for the use of all the resources contributed to him; efficient external follow-up to every project; proper information systems to be used; integrative organizational reforms from headquarters from regional to country levels, combining central control with decentralization based on strong UNDP country resident representatives; far-reaching measures to attract and maintain the best-qualified people at all levels; a financial framework, which would serve as a channel for maximizing funds to the UN development system and enhanced accountability; the effective use of modern management and administrative aids to reduce system expenses; and a flexible system to meet challenges and respond to any new opportunities. An important recommendation involved a complete restructuring of UN development operations. It was proposed that this restructuring should be backed by a three-part computer-based information system to deal with technical and scientific information (documents), economic and social information (statistics), and operational and administrative questions (budget and project control).

Reactions

The report was the subject of a rather lengthy review by the UNDP Governing Council. There was some resistance to the proposal to implement the reform as a package. Comments were also received from the Inter-Agency Consultative Board (IACB). The final debate took place subsequently in ECOSOC and the General Assembly (GA). The study was welcomed by most member states, but strongly opposed by the Specialized Agencies, who were concerned about reduced independence. As Steele notes: 'the specialized agency secretariats prefer their autonomy even at the expense of (what some of them believe to be a spurious) increase in efficiency'.[10]

Implementation

Some of Jackson's vision was implemented almost immediately, such that by the 25th Session of the GA in 1970: the new system of 'country programs' for technical co-operation activities financed through the UNDP was set in motion. Governments had to project development programs over a period of 5-10 years to obtain UNDP funds.

This was the centerpiece of the reform and was predicated on the assumption that UNDP would continue to be the central financing mechanism for the technical co-operation activities of the whole UN system. Reorganization of UNDP Headquarters and the abolition of any remaining distinctions between the old Technical Assistance and Special Fund programs were also implemented at that point. Some recommendations, such as the institution of a post of Director-General for Technical Assistance and the modification of the old Department of Economic and Social Affairs, came about several years later. Others, such as the practice of program budgeting and the harmonization of accounting systems and cycles, were implemented as a result of pressure from other sources, such as the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU).[11]

Nonetheless, many of Jackson's proposals, which were based on the hope for the doubling of resources made available through the UNDP, were not put into practice.[12] For example, it was proposed that the UNDP would play the role of a "hub" in the system's development activities. This was dependent on the support of the Specialized Agencies and on its 'power of the purse' as a funding agency. Centrifugal forces increased and, with the growth of the agencies' regular budget and funds-in-trust technical co-operation programs, neither of which were subject to the country programming exercise, the UNDP's role as a central funding and co-ordinating mechanism suffered progressive decline. In addition, the suggestion of a long-term reform of the ECOSOC to become a 'one-world parliament' largely remained an ideal. ECOSOC's mandate was in fact to supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the Specialized Agencies but this could not come to fruition, since the Agencies were not officially responsible to either ECOSOC or the SG. Again, the Specialized Agencies were keen to safeguard their autonomy. Other proposals aimed at inter-agency co-ordination were similarly not implemented, such as a system-wide computerized information system for development activities, the creation of a combined UN Development Service and the harmonization of developmental policies through the ACC Development Resources Panel under the UNDP Administrator.[13]

Background

As noted, reform in the 1960s was aimed at ensuring the UN adjusted to new demands, especially that of development, which had come into prominence because of rising membership from the Third World. Reform in the 1970s, however, was intended to reconstruct UN activities in the economic and social fields.[14] The limited success of development activities prompted demands for fundamental structural changes in the world economic system. Following the unsatisfactory outcome of negotiations in The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) among developing countries - organized in the Group of 77 (G-77) - and developed countries, the G-77 switched negotiations from UNCTAD to the GA and the specialized agencies. In response to pressure from the developing countries, the GA adopted (in 1974) its Declaration and Program of Action on the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) covering important areas, such as trade, commodities, industrialization, technical co-operation and transfer of technology.[15]

Advocates

In order to ensure the implementation of NIEO, the developing countries used their overwhelming numbers in the Assembly to promote significant pressures for change. They sought a structural alteration in international economic relationships and adjustments to the UN system. As a consequence, the GA decided in 1974[16] that the SG should appoint a high-level group of experts, known as the 'Group of 25', which was to make recommendations on structural changes aimed at re-shaping the economic and social sectors of the UN system, and to present their report to the seventh special session of the GA in 1975.

Recommendations

In 1975, the Group of twenty-five independent experts, headed by the Ghanaian diplomat Ken Dadzie, issued their report, containing numerous recommendations.[17] They recognized critical problems in the structure of the organization, most of them not new, having been identified in the Jackson report.[18] For example, they referred to the weakness of the UN's planning, programming and budgeting system, for which the group proposed the merging of the Committee on Program and Coordination

(CPC) and the Administrative Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions (ACBAQ) to form a single body responsible for programming and budgeting. In addition, the report suggested the need for more flexibility in operational activities and an independent system of monitoring and evaluation within a proposed United Nations Development Authority (UNDA), which would be able to profit from external advice. To avoid fragmentation of effort, it was necessary to integrate both intergovernmental and management bodies, with a greater degree of coordination in the proposed UNDA. Other problems included inadequate decentralization of regional agencies and the need for more co-ordination of policies and projects at that level, along with fragmentation of financial resources and possible consolidation of the latter under the proposed UNDA. Furthermore, improved human resources management through further measures in the areas of recruitment, examinations and training were proposed. Finally, the group suggested that the post of Director-General should be created to manage all activities within the UN system in the economic and social spheres, and that it should be held by a national of a developing country, as the SG (Kurt Waldheim at the time) was from a developed country. It also suggested that a new consultative procedure should be established to achieve consensus on controversial issues. As for the UNCTAD and ECOSOC, the group proposed that the former should be replaced by an international trade organization and the latter should be revitalized.[19]

Reactions

During the seventh special session of the GA, most of the representatives from the Group of 77 countries, as well as those of the European Community and the US, objected to many recommendations made in the report. While the Group of 77 supported the creation of the office of Director-General for economic development, the growth of the GA and UNCTAD, and the concentration of development activities in the regional commissions, it resisted the consolidation of development funds, since it was expected that this would lead to a reduction in such funds. In general, as Rochester notes, although the report was the product of mainly developing countries, they 'were dissatisfied not only with the report's failure to address their substantive economic concerns but also with the political implications they read into the restructuring provisions'. [20] The West was equally dissatisfied with the report because it challenged the status quo. On this basis, the US expressed opposition to some of the

report proposals such as: strengthening the GA, limiting the autonomy of the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to the establishment of the office of Director-General. However, the US and some of the major donor countries supported the reduction of the ECOSOC machinery and the consolidation of funds and emphasized the need for administrative reforms especially on planning, programming, budgeting, evaluation and co-ordination. The reaction of the European and socialist countries was virtually the same as the West's: opposing steps that would entail Charter amendment or additional costs. Yet the Nordic countries were more supportive of the demands of the Group of 77 for a NIEO.[21]

Implementation

As was the case with Jackson's recommendations, few of the group's proposals were implemented. In fact, the most significant structural changes implemented included: the appointment of 'Resident Co-ordinators' to enhance the coordination of development operational activities at country level, along with the establishment of an office for Program Planning and Co-ordination to examine system-wide co-ordination problems. To encourage medium-term joint planning among UN system suborganizations, a Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions (CCSQ) was established. In addition, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) of subsidiary bodies was re-organized and streamlined. Other important reforms, as mandated by GA Resolution 32/197 (1977), never really materialized. These included the rationalization of the ECOSOC subsidiary machinery and work program, the strengthening of UNCTAD's role in international economic negotiations and the creation of a single governing body for the control of operational activities. The former was resisted by developing and the latter by developed countries.[22] Finally, with Resolution 34/197, the GA established the office of Director-General with wide responsibilities in managing and coordinating the UN development activities yet supplied it with inadequate resources.[23]

4.1.3 The Group of 18 [1985]

Background

The period between the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed growing dissatisfaction among member states (both developed and developing countries) with the UN system. In addition to sharp political divisions, the UN was facing another of its recurring financial crises which required prompt action. By the mid-1980s, the US Congress decided for the first time that it had compelling reasons to link substantial financial withholdings to its preferred reform agenda for the world body. The UN was therefore on the brink of bankruptcy. All reserves had been committed to meeting the deficits resulting from the withholdings of 18 member states from the regular budget and from the late payment of assessments. The financial situation became precarious with the additional cut in the contribution of the US based on the Kassebaum Amendment to the Foreign Relation Act of 1985. According to this amendment, US contributions to the UN and its Specialized Agencies for the US fiscal year 1987 (from 1 October 1986 to 30 September 1987) and the following years would be reduced to a maximum of 20 per cent of the organization's entire budget through withholding of funds. It also stipulated that the reduction should remain in effect until the UN introduced weighted voting on budgetary matters 'proportionate to the contribution of each such member state'.[24] This legislation would effectively give the four largest contributors among the non-Communist nations [the US, Japan, West Germany and France] slightly more than 50 per cent of the vote, and control of the budget.[25] At the beginning of 1986, the US had indicated to the Secretariat that it would pay $90.5 to $102.5 million less than its assessed contributions for 1985 and 1986.[26] The chronic financial predicament of the UN was rapidly developing into the most serious crisis the organization had experienced.[27]

Advocates

The GA reacted to the worsening financial crisis and the growing US withholdings by establishing the Group of 18. The proposal for this new reform project was initiated by Japan, during the general debate at the beginning of the 40th session of the GA. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, proposed the establishment of a 'group of eminent persons for a more efficient United Nations'.[28] Following this initiative, the GA established a Group of High Level Intergovernmental Experts, known as the

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"Group of 18" (GA Resolution 40/237).[29] The Group included, as Muller notes: 'political leaders, former cabinet ministers, senior officials and permanent representatives'.[30] It was intergovernmental in nature, so that a complete representation of all member states was assured. However, many Third World states initially resisted the idea of establishing the group, 'which they feared might lead to a discussion on the possible introduction of a weighted voting system'[31] although, they finally acquiesced. The Group-18 was established - with a term of one year - to carry out the several tasks: 'to conduct a review of the administrative and financial matters of the UN, with a view to identifying measures for further improving the efficiency of its functioning, and to submit to the GA, 41st session, a report containing the observations and recommendations of the Group'.[32]

Recommendations

The G-18 examined managerial and financial issues in a wider context with concern given especially to intergovernmental structure. Eventually, the Group produced seventy-one recommendations calling for critical changes in finance and budgeting. These recommendations covered four familiar areas: planning and budgeting; inter-governmental machinery and the structure of the Secretariat; personnel; monitoring, evaluation and inspection. In other words, many of the Group suggestions were not innovative. However, taken together, they highlighted the scale of reform that the UN urgently needed. These recommendations are discussed below.

A- Planning and budgeting

The specific recommendations of the G-18 on programs, planning and budgetary process aroused great controversy and were considered to be the most crucial.[33] The Group noted that 'disagreement with the content and level of the budget reflected political differences as well as criticism of UN administration. It was argued that the medium-term plan and the program budget did not serve as the principal policy directive'.[34] Thus the Group suggested a new procedure, which would make it possible for member states to exercise necessary intergovernmental leadership, particularly regarding the setting of priorities within available resources. Unable to agree on a remedy, the group laid out to the Assembly three different alternatives. Parties, as Taylor notes, 'were united on strengthening the role of the CPC but varied in their view about the role of the ACABQ'.[35] The first view supported the separation

of financial and administrative aspects of the budget (the task of the ACABQ) from the review of program content (the task of the CPC). A second view differed over the degree of specificity in clarifying the respective roles of the CPC and ACABQ, whilst the third view advocated the merger of the two into a single, intergovernmental expert body. The three alternatives emphasized that budgetary recommendations and decisions should be made by consensus and agreement on a number of basic changes. The first was 'the mandating of a central intergovernmental body with broad accountability for shaping the program of the UN prior to its approval'. The second was 'change in the relationship between the legislative and executive parts of the organization'. The third was the expansion 'of the dialetic process to all aspects of program planning and the budgeting process;' the fourth was 'a permanent Secretariat for the CPC or its successor'.[36]

B- Inter-governmental machinery and the structure of the Secretariat

The first two sections of the report concerned the inter-governmental machinery and Secretariat structure. The report - like the Jackson Report and that of the Group of 25 - made a similar assessment of the state of the organization, i.e. the unnecessary growth in the inter-governmental machinery for dealing with political, economic and social issues, making co-ordination difficult. It noted that, at the time of the report, there were more than 150 committees, commissions, sub-committees, sub-commissions and working groups in the economic and social fields in the UN inter-governmental machinery, with some duplication of agendas and work.[37] Thus the group recommended that: the number of conferences and meetings should be significantly reduced; the agenda of the GA should be rationalized by grouping or merging related items and by setting an interval of two or more years for the discussion of certain items; an intergovernmental body, designated by the GA, should undertake a study of intergovernmental structure in the economic and social fields.[38] Extending its analysis of structural overlap and duplication from the intergovernmental level into the Secretariat, the Group of 18 found the higher levels of the Secretariat to be 'too top-heavy', 'too complex', and 'too fragmented'.[39] This being so, it was suggested that its recommendations should be implemented over a period of three years. Noting that the number of posts funded through the UN regular budget had grown more than sevenfold in 40 years, from 1,546 in 1946 to 11,423 in 1986,[40] the Group recommended a 15 per cent cut in the overall number of regular

budget posts and a deeper 25 per cent cut in the number of posts at the level of Under-Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) over a period of three years.[41] It also suggested that the Management Advisory Services, established to advise on management techniques and to evaluate management structures and weaknesses, considered of marginal usefulness, should be abolished.[42]

C- Personnel

In addition to addressing the familiar themes of the need for clear and coherent staff rules and regulations, senior managerial leadership, less political and other pressures in the selection of staff, job rotation for career development, fixed term appointments and improved performance evaluation,[43] the Group of 18 advanced proposals to reduce staff benefits. It suggested that the total entitlement (salaries and other conditions of service) of staff members should be reduced. These included the elimination of the education grant for post-secondary studies and the establishment of a four-week instead of the existing six-week annual leave system.[44] A related proposal was that at least 50 per cent of the nationals of any country recruited as international civil servants should hold permanent appointments.[45] The latter recommendation was aimed at preventing the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and China from not permitting their nationals to accept permanent appointments.[46]

D- Monitoring, evaluation and inspection

To improve the monitoring, evaluation, and inspection of UN activities, the group recommended an upgrading of the JIU, along with a broadening of its mandate. It also called for closer coordination and a clearer division of labour between the JIU and External Auditors.[47] In addition, the Group focused on ways of improving the degree of guidance from the GA and the circulation of reports to member states.[48]

Reactions

'Reaction to the report was sharp and divisive of the membership'.[49] The major disagreement came from third world countries, many of whom perceived the new budget process as a threat to the principles of sovereign equality and of majority decision-making enshrined in the Charter as the basis for the adoption of GA resolutions. As a scholar from a developing country noted, these countries felt that the so-called consensus would grant a veto to major powers.[50] In addition, the report did

not contain any changes in the economic development agenda which these states believed was the key issue. Lastly they agreed on reform, tied to the expectation that the US would resume full quota payment. As for the developed countries, the US welcomed the drastic cuts as the best way to simplify the existing structure. The reaction of both developed and developing countries can be explained on the grounds that representatives of industrialized countries, which pay almost three-quarters of the organization's budget, usually support any change that would limit or reduce budgeting, staffing and costs. They regularly require explanation from the Secretariat when extra resources or fund are requested. Developing countries' representatives, on the other hand, aim to continue to benefit from generosity in the organization's budget. As they contribute less to the budget, they tend to support the expansion of any programs related to development, which are not favoured by the industrialized countries.

Implementation

The G-18 study was aware of the lack of progress to date on UN reform predecessors. It therefore concluded:

> Over the years, many recommendations on administrative and financial reforms have been adopted by the General Assembly....a substantial number of these recommendations have, however, remained unimplemented. The reasons for this are partly that the body or organ in question has shown little willingness to implement the recommendations and partly that the General Assembly itself has not taken the steps necessary to ensure such implementations.[51]

In order to ensure implementation, the Group proposed that the SG should present a progress report to the GA by 1 May 1987, outlining which of the Group recommendations had been acted upon. This should also include plans for implementing the remaining recommendations.[52] In addition, the Group suggested that the CPC should oversee the implementation of recommendations concerning the intergovernmental machinery and its functioning.[53] By the end of 1989, the reforms had largely been implemented. For example: 10 out of the required 14 ASG and USG posts had been cut and the Secretariat staff reduction had reached approximately 12 per cent. Furthermore, the recommendation that UN staff from any country should be awarded permanent contracts was also respected by the socialist countries.[54] The SG gave effect to the Group's recommendations concerning the political, economic and social sectors, public information, conference services, administration and finance, by

creating or discontinuing offices, consolidating, transferring or fusing functions, discontinuing offices or initiating reviews.[55] Reform of the Secretariat in the political field was implemented swiftly: five offices were consolidated into other existing departments, leading to significant savings in posts, nearly half of them at the professional level. In the economic and social sector, the Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva assumed supervisory responsibility for human rights activities. The review of the Department of Public Information began in March 1987, when a new USG assumed the direction of the Department with the objective of improving the public's support of the UN. In the Administration and Finance sector, the SG established an Office for Program Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Department of Administration and Management, which consolidated functions previously performed by the Office of Program Planning and Co-ordination (in the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs) and the Budget Division of the Office of Finance Services (in the Department of Administration and Management).[56] The major success of the reform effort, however, was the implementation of the new budget procedures. The budget for the biennium 1990-1991 was approved in 1989 by consensus and reflected a decrease of 0.4 per cent in real terms compared with the budget for the biennium 1988-1989.[57]

In short, this section provides some necessary background information on the history of reform in the UN. This helps to put my case study, the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali, in its accurate historical context. Given these past UN reforms, the chapter now attempts to provide a substantive analysis of Ghali's agenda. The following section therefore will examine the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda.

4.2 The Initiation of Ghali's Reform Agenda

Before considering the substantive content of Ghali's reform agenda, it is necessary to examine underlying motivations and political factors that shaped the process. This section will first address the underlying factors driving Ghali's reforms and then discuss the particular timing of his reform agenda.

4.2.1 Underlying Factors

Interviews with former UN staff and Permanent Representatives show that Ghali's reform agenda was driven by one consideration: the pressing need for the UN to adapt in a rapidly changing world, one in which there was massive social dislocation, appallingly destructive military conflict, and horrendous levels of human suffering. According to David Hannay, then the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 'The single most important factor for Ghali's reform agenda was the implications for the UN of the end of the Cold War. Clearly, many believed that the Post-Cold War world was more favourable to achieving UN goals, as the threat of superpower confrontation had disappeared'.[58] At the same time, the world's condition was more problematic, given many politically and economically unstable states. Moreover, Post-Cold War conflicts appeared not to be relevant to the theory of collective security. They did not arise out of clear cut inter-state aggression but from the spread of local conflict, usually of an ethnic nature, with long standing root causes, and no party having a monopoly of right or side. But these were conflicts which the UN was increasingly called upon to manage or resolve. For the UN to deal with them effectively, it needed a greatly expanded capacity. Preventive diplomacy required an improved Secretariat support structure, a better system for launching and maintaining peace keeping operations and a guaranteed financial base to pay for the operations. At the same time, development remained a main priority of the majority of member states.

Following the end of the Cold War, the UN was faced with a new international agenda embracing major socio-economic problem, which is because of global interdependence, could not be solved unilaterally such as the environment, AIDS, drugs and the mass movement of populations. These changes moulded the nature of the challenges the UN and its SG had to face. Ghali's reform agenda was a response to changes in the world political climate. Yet Ghali inherited a UN that was ill-equipped to meet the tasks of the Post-Cold War era.[59] Hence, his reform agenda was designed to improve the effectiveness/capacity of the organization in the face of a myriad of new responsibilities. As Sylvana Fao, Ghali's spokeswoman, pointed out, 'Some of the problems Ghali faced and attempted to tackle included: an organization on the verge of bankruptcy because of the failure to pay dues, a bloated bureaucracy that had been marginalized by the superpowers during the Cold War and was not used to taking responsibility, making decisions or acting quickly, and a staff that was filled

with incompetents hoisted on the organization by member states'.[60] In this context, one of Ghali's close advisors, Charles Hill, asserted that an important factor was Ghali's own experience with bureaucracies in Third World countries, which he had found to be inefficient, duplicative, and obstructionist. The former SG regarded the UN as similar so he sought to reform it. Hill added that Ghali's personal impulse was also enhanced by the insistence of the US that the UN must reform. According to Hill, 'The US, mainly Senators such as Jesse Helms, constantly denounced the UN for its failure to reform. In fact, however, these denunciations were more a political way to oppose the UN than a serious desire to see it reformed'.[61] This was confirmed by Edward Perkins, former Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, who emphasized the fact that the US at that time insisted that reform had to take place, if not it would withhold its payments. As a consequence, 'The first driver for Ghali's reform was the need to establish a manageable peacekeeping philosophy at the UN, with the Secretariat working with the SC. The other was to reform the UN administrative machinery. These however were broad objectives'.[62] In this regard, Angela Kane, the Principal Officer for Political Affairs in Ghali's office, notes that one of Annan's first actions when he came to the Secretary Generalship was to go to Washington to convince Congress to pay American arrears to the UN. 'That was a major success because the US had withheld its contribution as retaliation to Ghali. So, Annan was able to unblock the fund'.[63]

This view is echoed by Melissa Wells, then USG for Administration, who stated that 'the drive for Ghali's reforms would have been obvious considering the tremendous pressure and criticism that the UN was undergoing at that time. Hardly a day went by without some newspaper or other running a negative story about the UN'.[64] So, despite its achievement and successes, many criticisms were directed at it, especially its financial structure, system and management, which required immediate reform in order to remain effective in maintaining peace and security for member states. According to Fawzi, Ghali's spokesman, Ghali was determined to achieve economy, efficiency and greater effectiveness, and to meet the high expectations of many member states.[65] In this context, Thomas Pickering, former US Ambassador to the UN, remarked that, prior to Ghali's election, the Ford Foundation, with Sir Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, gathered a small group of Permanent Representatives (PRs) in connection with a book they had produced on UN reform.[66] This group of

ambassadors,[67] coordinated by the permanent representative of Australia, Peter Wilenski, drew up detailed recommendations for restructuring the UN, some of which had to do with the organization and functioning of the Secretariat and the SG office. The proposed reform was the focus of discussion amongst a group of 30 ambassadors that resulted in a short paper, submitted in 1992 to the incoming SG Boutros Ghali. According to Pickering, 'Ghali's conceptions were different and he was never able to share that with us. And until the time I left the UN [Spring 1992] he had not begun a process of introducing ideas of reforms of his own'.[68] In a similar vein, former USG for Political Affairs James Jonah, believed that, when Ghali assumed office, he was not pleased with the proposals from the previous studies especially the creation of four Deputy SGs. Therefore, 'while rejected, he had to come with his own proposals. I think that was the motivation'.[69] In this context, a former UN official notes that Ghali 'recognized that a new international system had not yet been established, so he thought that this is the time when the UN could be revitalized'.[70] Ghali himself supported the view that reform was the necessary product of changes in the international system. From his office in The National Council for Human Rights in Cairo, Ghali explained:

> The main challenge was that we had a different structure. It was a bilateral system but, with the end of the cold war, it seemed to be a system which is based on unilateralism. The US perceived the end of the Cold War as a victory against Communism. A second challenge that appeared later was the international technology revolution and globalization. This had a direct impact on communication and contact among states. Besides, democratization at the national level dictated a corresponding process at the global level. New ways of preventing internal disputes and inter-state confrontations would need to be developed. Moreover, the controversial boundary between international prerogatives to protect human rights and claims of domestic sovereignty was steadily shifting into the international role played by the UN. All these changes at the world level necessitated a change in the UN system. Simply put, change was a prerequisite to reform.[71]

Another important pressure was the desire to engage non-state actors. According to Ghali, the UN had to provide a political space for NGOs, especially in such fields as human rights and environmental protection. For him, 'The UN was considered to be a forum for sovereign states alone. Within the space of a few short years, this attitude has changed. NGOs are now considered full participants in international life'.[72] Finally, Ghali highlighted the fact that the major powers had not come together at the end of the Cold War to revitalize the system as they had done after every major war going back to the Napoleonic wars. Hence, the end of the Cold War was certainly an

occasion but the world missed the opportunity. Ghali commented, 'I was under the impression, and this was my mistake, that the UN would play a role to manage the Post-Cold War world, especially with the SC meeting in 1992, which gave me a mandate. And on the basis of this mandate, I started the reform and published an Agenda for Peace. So the reform was asked for by the SC special meeting on 31 January 1992'.[73]

Having discussed the underlying causes of Ghali's reforms, the analysis turns to the timing of the reform agenda.

4.2.2 Timing

Former USG James Jonah in describing the timing of Ghali's reforms noted: 'It was a more hopeful time because it was the beginning of what President Bush had called a 'New World Order'. For the first time, the UN had the opportunity to take important decisions, especially in the sphere of security, as was done in the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The Gulf war came as a hopeful sign and the American dominance was not clear at the time.'[74] Thus, when the Cold War ended, it was assumed, for a short time at least, that the UN system, freed of the ideological and other constraints of the East-West struggle, would come into its own. The word 'renaissance' was freely used in this connection, and indeed the SC developed an unprecedented consensus and momentum on many issues. Simply put, when Ghali arrived, 'there was a mood for reform'.[75] In general, most interviewees for this study [76] highlighted the fact that the Post-Cold War period was an opportunity to give the UN a world role, something like that originally envisioned in the Charter in 1945. They also believed that the UNSC Summit of 31 January 1992 produced a reform mandate for the SG. The formal request for reform came from this Summit which was an extraordinary meeting (the first ever held) of heads of state and government whose states held seats on the SC. It was an initiative of the President of the SC, then held by the UK, and it was chaired by the then Prime Minister John Major. This SC Summit amounted to 'a sort of first-class funeral for the Cold War. It was in effect a formal announcement that the Cold War was over and that new winds were blowing',[77] stated Alvaro de Soto, Ghali's senior political adviser.

It is worth noting that the purpose of this historic Summit was not to tackle any particular situation. The SC rather opted to reaffirm its commitment to the Charter's collective security system to deal with threats to peace and reverse acts of aggression. The Council also asked the SG to put forward recommendations on ways to strengthen and make more efficient the UN capacity for peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive actions within the UN Charter's framework and provisions. The Summit began with a joint statement read out by the Council President John Major; Council members asserted that the SC session was taking place at 'a time of momentous change'. The end of the Cold War had raised hopes for 'a safer, more equitable and more humane world' and the Council's 15 members were meeting to give the SG their 'full backing in carrying out his mandate'. They undertook to work closely with him 'in fulfilment of their shared objectives, including a more efficient and effective' UN system.[78] The joint statement also commented on the changing character of threats to international security. Noting the increasing role of the UN in election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatriation of refugees, it identified the 'acute problems' resulting from 'changes in state structure':

> The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself
> ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability
> in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
> to peace and security.[79]

In addressing the SC Summit meeting, Ghali commented: 'Now that the cold war has come to an end, we must work to avoid the outbreak or resurgence of new conflicts. The explosion of nationalities, which is pushing countries with many ethnic groups towards division, is a new challenge to peace and security'.[80] Account must be taken of 'the abundant supply of arms, the aggravation of economic inequalities between various communities and the flow of refugees'.[81] Ghali favoured periodic summit-level meetings of the Council to take stock of the state of the world. There had hardly been a stage more critical in modern history, he added. 'The revolution that is sweeping large parts of the world derives its momentum and authenticity, not from any outdated or recycled ideology, but from the primal need of peoples for freedom, for justice, for solidarity and for recognition of their identities'.[82] Democratization at the national level dictated corresponding progress at the global level, Ghali stated. At both levels, it aimed at the rule of law. For global society, it meant the democratization of international relations and the participation of all states in

developing new norms of international life. This Summit meeting, under the British presidency of the SC, demonstrated, as one former US Ambassador noted, 'that the SC was unified on the reform issue'.[83] The Council's request also implied that its members were intent on going beyond traditional peacekeeping and that they looked to Ghali to provide leadership in this area. This was important, especially with a new SG and with Russia taking her seat in the Council. In other words, Ghali felt that he was given ample latitude to improve the operation of the Secretariat. It was an opportunity according to Alvaro de Soto, 'Ghali took that clearly as an encouragement, not only to produce a blueprint for peace and security in the new era, which he did in his famous Agenda for Peace, but also to carry out the reforms he wanted'.[84] So, the Summit was a 'turning point' in a sense that it was the first time that the Council gave the SG such a broad mandate on matters within its domain.[85] It was a clear sign of the enhanced status of the SG. In the past, the SC and the GA had often charged the SG with responsibilities in specific situations, like the appointment of a Special Representative in a particular conflict, but not in the broad field of peace and security. In this context, the principal officer in Ghali's office Angela Kane asserted: 'The SC meeting was seen as something revolutionary. It was a tremendous boost for Ghali, not only as SG, but also for him personally because he got endorsement for suggestions he outlined'.[86] In other words, Ghali initiated the 1992 reform because he felt that he had a mandate from the SC to make changes so that the organization could cope with the challenges of the Post-Cold War world. He proceeded in his reforms on that premise.[87] In this regard, one observer, Benjamin Rivlin, writes:

> For a short time after the end of the Cold War, it appeared that a new collaborative ethos was taking over in the world and the UN and its Secretary General were the agencies through which this was to be articulated. The Security Council summit meeting of January 1992 was the highpoint of this vision. It raised expectations of a more autonomous Secretary General to go along with a more powerful and relevant UN.[88]

In short, by 1992, the winds of change had accelerated to the point where Ghali spoke of the birth of a new action-oriented organization in his annual report: 'Never before in its history has the United Nations been so action-oriented, so actively engaged, and so widely expected to respond to needs both immediate and pervasive. Clearly, it is in our power to bring about a renaissance - to create a new United Nations for a new

international era'.[89] He also noted that the end of the Cold War may have ushered in a 'new chapter in the history of the UN'.[90]

4.3 The Content of Ghali's Reform Agenda

This section seeks to provide a detailed account of Ghali's reform agenda. It must be emphasized here that Ghali's reforms were never formalized in a proposal. There was never a formal reform plan as such, but there were cumulative steps the former SG took that constituted a reform agenda. Thus, in this study, 'Ghali's reform agenda' refers to the three Reports that he published during his term in office: an *Agenda for Peace*, an *Agenda for Development* and an *Agenda for Democratization* and to the first (February 1992) and second (December 1992) phases of restructuring the Secretariat. These will be examined in turn below.

4.3.1 Reforms Concerning an Expanded UN Role

Justifying an expanded UN role, especially given the greater responsibilities accorded to the organization in the Post-Cold War world, Ghali responded with three Agendas. This section details the three proposals: an *Agenda for Peace*, an *Agenda for Development* and an *Agenda for Democratization*.

An Agenda for Peace [1992]

According to David Hannay, then the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, an *Agenda for Peace* was a response to a request of the 15 members of the SC. it was not solely Ghali's initiative.[91] In June 1992, Ghali presented his report, which drew upon ideas and proposals from governments, regional agencies, non-governmental organizations, institutions and individuals from many countries with, he said, a 'sense of moment'. In this regard, Hannay stated: 'The main aim of an *Agenda for Peace* was to give the UN the tools to do the peacekeeping and the peacemaking and conflict prevention jobs that the member states wanted the UN to do in individual countries but, which it was very badly equipped to do'.[92] In other words, it was actually a very bold way of addressing new challenges.[93]

To assist him in formulating his response, Ghali created an interdepartmental high-level task force to develop ideas and consider the many relevant suggestions that had been made by outside groups. The Chairman of the task force was the newly appointed USG for Political Affairs, Vladimir Petrovsky.[94] It included Ghali's most senior officials, a broad cross-section of the UN Secretariat and key USGs.[95] The group's ideas were reflected in the substance of an *Agenda for Peace*, but it was Ghali who played the decisive role in the formulation of the final Report. As Cox puts it: 'Although it may have enjoyed wide (though not necessarily unconditional) support amongst his most senior officials, the report emerged not only as bold and comprehensive, but also as Boutros-Ghali's personal agenda for action for the course of his tenure as Secretary-General'.[96] In short, in an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali sought to identify the various means available to the international community in order to prevent disputes and/or conflicts from threatening international security. In addition to offering recommendations on improving the organization's capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Ghali addressed the related concept of what he called, 'post-conflict peace-building'. These four areas for action, Ghali stated, 'taken together, and carried out with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter'.[97] Ghali also addressed the issue of cooperation with regional security organizations and suggested the creation of more effective financing and budget-making mechanisms for peacekeeping operations. These proposals are discussed in more detail below.

Ghali sought to balance the work of the UN in relation to two concerns: international norms and state sovereignty. In this respect, a crucial challenge facing the UN was the necessity to reconcile the sovereignty of member states with the legitimate needs of a genuinely supra-national authority. He emphasized the need to square the circle: 'The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality'.[98] The report then went on to emphasize in particular the need for a commitment to human rights and the international protection of minorities, without which, it argued, there would be no limit to fragmentation and claims for statehood. It is worth noting that Ghali's quest for the language of a 'balanced design' was not novel. States recognized in the League of Nations

Covenant that 'any war or threat of war was a matter of concern to all'. Also, in 1990, Perez de Cuellar observed that 'Threats to national and international security are no longer as neatly separable as they were before'.[99] Similarly, in his agenda, Ghali noted that 'The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice'.[100] This revolution was part of the trans-national challenge to state sovereignty in the sense that it forced societies to consider the existence of common threats to all people regardless of where they live. In other words, the line between international and domestic affairs became increasingly blurred, forcing new interpretations of the venerable principle of sovereignty.

As noted, the SC Summit requested Ghali to focus on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The former SG shaped these concepts into a set of mainly sequential measures, and then added a fourth element: post-conflict peace-building. Preventive diplomacy focuses on taking diplomatic action at the earliest possible opportunity to prevent the onset or escalation of conflict; Peacemaking seeks to bring conflicting parties to agreement, using the techniques described in Chapter VI of the Charter; Peace-keeping involves the development of a UN presence in the field to help prevent conflict or limit its further escalation; and peace-building requires measures 'to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'.[101] Here it is important to emphasis, as Cox noted that the first three concepts embraced ideas and proposals which had been much discussed both within and outside the formal councils of the organization.[102] But, in adding post-conflict peace-building, Ghali 'completed the logical sequence of conflict-controlling mechanisms that ought to be at the disposal of the United Nations',[103] and by doing so, the former SG had linked international security with economic and social development. For example, at the outset of the Report, Ghali mentioned some measures necessary to remove the immediate, catastrophic consequences of war. These included: the disarming of rival groups, the destruction of weapons, a de-mining program, the repatriation of refugees and the restoration of transportation. In section VI, however, Ghali moved beyond immediate remedial measures to longer-term programmes, emphasizing the need for agricultural, transportation and resource co-operation amongst states as a means of ensuring that the future likelihood of conflict were reduced. In addition, Ghali argued that there needed to be 'support for the transformation of deficient national structures

and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions......there is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision - making-and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order'.[104]

Among the proposals put forward under these four rubrics (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building) was the preventive deployment of UN forces, in situations were parties suspected each other of aggression, even at the request of only one side, and the creation of stand-by peace enforcement units under the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter in order to impose a ceasefire. Such units would be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces, which would be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the UN Charter. They could also be used in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. It is worth noting here that, although the section on peace-building constituted an important addition to Ghali's first report, the proposals concerning peace-keeping attracted much more attention. In this regard, Ghali recommended that clear stand-by arrangements be confirmed for the provision by UN members of personnel and equipment in advance of new operations.[105] Similarly, the report requested the immediate establishment of a peacekeeping fund of $50 million, and more flexibility for the SG in the placing of contracts.[106] The SG also urged a review of training for peacekeeping and police contingents and improvements in Secretariat field support for peacekeeping.[107]

In his first attempt at restructuring the Secretariat in January 1992, Ghali dismantled the Office of Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI). In this report, the former SG re-invented the office by calling for strengthened Secretariat arrangements so that information from various sources 'can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it'.[108] Ghali further asserted that 'the analyses and recommendations for preventive action that emerge will be made available by me, as appropriate, to the Security Council and other United Nations organs'.[109]

The proposal for an early warning system to assess threats to peace was revolutionary. The Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs and Department of Humanitarian

Affairs, UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), and other Specialized Agencies, and even ECOSOC were to be charged with monitoring inter-state frictions and flows of refugees and guerrillas from one country to another. Such an early warning system, the report argued, would facilitate the preventive deployment of UN peace-keeping missions in a variety of situations, where previously the UN would have been reluctant to act immediately.[110] This, however, depended on the SG having peace-keeping forces promptly available. In this sense, in his 1994 Annual Report, Ghali called for the application of preventive measures to protect the peace and the good relations between states, rather than observing crises and human suffering, which subsequently the UN might find great difficulty in resolving or remedying.[111]

In pursuing peacemaking, the report recommended a focus on mediation and negotiation, the greater use of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] and the amelioration of potential conflict through international assistance in, for example, the resettlement of displaced persons. It is worth noting that Ghali added the use of military force to this list of peaceful efforts 'to bring hostile parties to agreement'.[112] In order to establish the context for the use of military force as peacemaking, the report identified the long-term need for Article 43 agreements[113] and, with that, a functioning Military Staff Committee under Article 47.[114] Such capabilities would be required to deal with the kind of large-scale enforcement actions envisaged under Chapter VII. In addition, Ghali called for UN forces to perform a task beyond the mandate of UN peace-keeping: 'Ceasefires have often been agreed to, but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the ceasefire'.[115] So, most noteworthy among his proposals, was a call for the establishment of rapid deployment 'peace-enforcement units'. To restore ceasefires, Ghali highlighted the need to constitute and use special forces - peace enforcement units - under Article 40 of the Charter.[116] This would provide the SG and the Council with a UN-style rapid force: 'Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces'.[117]

Peace-enforcement units would be a mid-point between traditional UN peace-keeping and Chapter VII-style enforcement actions. Their use would be authorized by the SC,

yet they would be under the command of the SG. These peace enforcement recommendations constituted a departure from the letter of the Charter which reserves the use of force to the Council under Chapter VII. As Rivlin noted: 'The former SG was calling for the implementation of those articles in Chapter VII of the Charter authorizing such forces and a Military Staff Committee that had lain dormant during the Cold War'.[118]

Noteworthy here is that, while the four stages of UN involvement in conflict resolution were the main focus of the report, Ghali highlighted two other issues that he thought were closely related to the organization's ability to fulfil its goals: financing of the UN and the role of regional organizations. In regard to financing, Ghali lamented: 'A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it'.[119] His main concern was the mounting costs of the numerous and extended military operations in which the UN was engaged, adding to the long-time costs of maintaining peace-keepers in still unresolved conflicts in regions like the Middle East. He also had in mind the continual struggle of long-term financing of economic and social programmes that were aimed at what he called the 'poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair',[120] that were the breeding grounds of conflict. All of this, aggravated by the chronic problems of countries in arrears or late in paying their obligated assessments led to a vulnerable financial state. Ghali therefore made an appeal for a reliable financial base. He endorsed the three far-reaching proposals[121] made by his predecessor in the 46th GA session for the improvement of the financial situation of the organization and added a series of new proposals. In his *Agenda for Peace*, the former SG discussed the establishment of a peacekeeping reserve fund of $50 million.[122] In addition, he recommended a levy on arms sales that could be related to maintaining an Arms Register by the UN, a levy on international air travel, authorization for the UN to borrow from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), tax exemption for contributions made to the UN by foundations, businesses and individuals and changes to the formula for assessing peacekeeping contributions.[123] These proposals would stabilize the UN's financial situation and make the SG less dependent upon governmental contributions or a more independent player.

Moreover, Ghali announced a select group of qualified persons of high international repute to examine these financial issues and report back to him.[124] The report of this group, under the co-chairmanship of Shijuro Ogata of Japan and Paul Volcker of the US [convened by the Ford Foundation], was published in February 1993.[125] The group made recommendations not only on the peace-keeping budget but also on the regular assessed budget of the UN and on affiliated operational programmes, including the UNDP, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), UNICEF, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UNCR. Echoing the SG's report, the advisory group concluded that 'the United Nations remains the only existing framework for building the institutions of global society'.[126] This was not the only time the former SG drew attention to the funding difficulties of the organization. In his first report on the work of the organization [September 1992], Ghali declared that 'the financial foundation of the Organization daily grows weaker, debilitating its political will and practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities'.[127] At the same time, 'the question of assuring financial security to the Organization over the long term is of such importance and complexity that public awareness and support must be heightened'.[128] In 1995, Ghali stated to the *Irish Times*: 'The UN is almost bankrupt and will find it hard to achieve its goals without financial support from its members'.[129] In January 1996 to help address the financial crisis and in his desire for the UN to operate on a 'secure and steady independent financial foundation',[130] Ghali proposed a modest levy on certain transactions. However, the Republican majority in Congress continued with various financial sanctions, so that Ghali had to announce that the organization was on 'the edge of insolvency'. [131]

In addition to discussing funding problems, an *Agenda for Peace*, perhaps for the first time as an official UN policy statement, placed considerable emphasis on the role of regional organizations. It called for increased cooperation between the SC and regional organizations in the area of peace and security. With the end of the Cold War and with the renewed effectiveness of the Council, it had become easier to implement Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, in which the council would provide regional initiatives, as well as assistance. Regionalization would assist the UN goal of reducing the burden and expense of peacekeeping: 'Regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could not

only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs'.[132]

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace [1995]

As the UN embarked on the commemoration of its fiftieth anniversary, Ghali used the occasion to breathe new life into the discussion over peacekeeping by issuing a position paper as a *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. It is worth noting that in general, Ghali's first report, an *Agenda for Peace*, was an optimistic document, which outlined a number of ambitious steps that would, if they were implemented, make the UN able to respond more quickly to deteriorating security situations. In his 1992 report on the work of the organization, the tone was optimistic: 'a better world is within our reach'.[133] The *Supplement* was 'a stock-taking document that presented a more sober vision of conditions confronting the UN in fulfilling its peace maintenance mission'.[134] For example, it called for the recruitment of qualified persons to head peacekeeping operations. The *Supplement* also pointed to the declining availability of troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations, and the obstacles to preserving unity of command in them. In this context, Ghali criticized 'the increasing tendency in recent years of the Security Council to micro-manage peacekeeping operations',[135] pointed to the practical and ethical shortcomings of economic sanctions imposed by the Council, and noted that, 'collectively, Member States encourage the Secretary-General to play an active role...; individually they are often reluctant that he should do so when they are a party to the conflict'.[136]

Ghali also argued that international action should extend beyond traditional peacekeeping efforts to include comprehensive efforts at reconstruction, rehabilitation and re-establishment of effective government. Decision-making responsibility should therefore be transferred from the SC, which would have authorized the peacekeeping operation, to the GA or other intergovernmental bodies responsible for civilian peacebuilding activities.[137] Finally, coordination was considered essential for the UN to succeed in implementing an integrated approach to human security. For that reason, Ghali recommended that principles for coordination with regional organizations should be developed, including mechanisms for consultation, respect for the primacy of the UN, the definition of labour to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry and consistency by members of regional organizations that were also member states of the

UN.[138] In short, the *Supplement* detailed a wide range of issues, among them dramatic changes in the quantity and nature of activities in the field of peace and security after the SC Summit held on 31 January 1992, which had resulted in Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*. Other areas discussed were UN instruments for conflict control and resolution, including preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, sanctions, enforcement, the issue of disarmament and arms limitation and how it could be implemented with the assistance of the UN, and the need for financial resources. 'The failure of member states to pay their assessed contributions for activities that they themselves had voted into being', the SG stressed, made it 'impossible to carry out those activities to the standard expected'.[139]

From the above, it could be argued that in this position paper, Ghali highlighted, albeit diplomatically, his frustration about the constraints under which the UN operated. One can detect an element of defensiveness in his comments about command and control and the need for peace operations to function as 'an integrated whole' after the 'experience in Somalia'.[140] Regarding the availability of troops and equipment, 'problems have become steadily more serious'.[141] Similarly, equipment and adequate training were of increasing concern.[142] From this Ghali concluded that the UN should give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. He also warned of the danger of pulling out of post-conflict peace building situations too early. In addition, the former SG reported difficulties in finding representatives and envoys for his mushrooming preventive and peacekeeping activities. Moreover, he suggested that, in the long term, the UN should develop a capacity to deploy direct, command and control enforcement operations itself.[143] Finally, Ghali contended that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations held great potential. But, he also noted, albeit rather obliquely, the potential for problems, observing that 'the political, operational and financial aspects of the arrangement give rise to questions of some delicacy'.[144] It worth noting here that, in his reassessment of an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali did not call into question structures and procedures that had been tested since June 1992 nor did he alter his original proposals - i.e. the need for special forces or peace enforcement units. Instead, 'he faced the political reality of dwindling support'.[145]

An Agenda for Development [1994]

Ghali was accused, by some of the Third World member states[146] that, in the *Agenda for Peace*, he had accepted the western priority of international peace and security rather than development. Thus, Ghali promised to turn the agenda into a trilogy. In October 1992, the Report of the SG, 'New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era',[147] was released. In this report, Ghali argued for a new reading of the notion of disarmament. He also stated that 'the time has come for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda'.[148] Furthermore, the process termed 'micro-disarmament' should not be addressed as a sub-section of disarmament. It would seem to fit more adequately into the context of measures designed to reserve the breakdown of law and order.

The New Dimensions report, however, did not ease the pressure on the former SG, since some developing countries[149] noted that it appeared to promote the role of the Council in disarmament affairs while failing even to mention the GA. Ghali therefore made efforts to reassert the importance of development. In his September 1992 Report on the Work of the Organization, the former SG placed the section on development ahead of that on 'peace endeavours', and argued that the UN had to become an organization 'which views its objectives in respect of social and economic co-operation with the same sense of responsibility and urgency as its commitments in the political and security areas'.[150] Ghali appeared to be deeply aware of Third World criticisms, since the 'dominant theme' of this report was that 'the current international situation requires an Organization capable of dealing comprehensively with the economic, social, environmental and political dimensions of human development. This requires the full application of the principles of democracy within the family of nations and within our Organization. I take this as my central priority as Secretary General'.[151] Similarly, in his 1994 Report to the Assembly, Ghali insisted on the necessity to implement UN strategy with respect to economic development. Since development is the foundation of peace, Ghali pointed to the importance of social and economic progress as the basis for lasting peace - a theme developed further in his subsequent report an *Agenda for Development,* published in 1994. Thus, Ghali published his second Agenda to counter complaints that peacekeeping had been given priority over development. This Agenda affirmed the right to development first

approved by the GA in 1986 and the relationship among the economic, social, environmental, and political dimensions of development. As Ghali noted: 'The United Nations cannot be a strong force for peace unless it is also a strong force for development.....[which cannot be separated from the universal goals of] freedom, social justice and environmental equality'.[152] In other words, the former SG sought to explore the nexus between political concerns and underlying economic factors. While peace was seen as providing the most secure context for lasting development, it was recognized that the root causes of political conflicts were economic and social.[153] Many non-military factors were just as threatening to states and peoples as armed conflicts. Wide-spread economic crises and the consequent worsening of social conditions and standards of living in less developed countries were all factors to be taken into account in the quest for true peace and security. Poverty, social deprivation, environmental degradation and underdevelopment could lead to social turmoil, with consequences for the security of a state and its neighbours.[154] In this regard, Simpson commented: 'Ghali started to work on the relationship between development and security. The argument was that, without security there could be no development and without development there would be no security'.[155]

Ghali also stressed the urgent need for greater links between UN development activities and the Bretton Woods institutions, and, in his *Agenda for Development,* he listed the various practical benefits that would flow from effective cooperation.[156] Pointing to the developed countries, Ghali noted that multilateralism was resisted by those who feared a loss of national control and that there was a reluctance to provide financial means to achieve agreed ends.[157] Referring to developing countries, the former SG described an unwillingness to engage in difficult operations and a preference for seeking guarantees of perfect clarity and limited duration.[158] Overall, the *Agenda for Development* had the potential to provide an important blueprint for global development cooperation in the Post-Cold War world. It contained numerous new elements that allowed a broader view of development than had been adopted in the past. In this respect Ghali noted 'from an understanding of development as limited to transferring funds and expertise from the haves to the have-nots, the perspective has shifted towards a broader concept encompassing the full range of human endeavour'.[159] The agenda also outlined a vision of revitalizing development based on the unique UN experience. Five major dimensions of development were identified,

including peace as the foundation, the economy as the engine of progress, the environment as a basis for sustainability, justice as a pillar of society and democracy as good governance.[160] The need for a new collective vision was considered essential. In his last annual report, Ghali stated: 'Linking policies and measures with institutional capacities is an important feature of the "Agenda for Development", and is a strong indication that the international community is committed to maintaining the central position of the United Nations in international cooperation for development'.[161]

An Agenda for Democratization [1996]

In his first report, an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali argued that 'democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter'[162] and that 'democracy, at all levels, is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice'.[163] He also declared that the UN would engage in rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife. Finally, the former SG made clear that those institutions would be built according to democratic models, asserting: 'There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order'.[164] Thus, early in his tenure, Ghali stated his conviction that democracy - especially the process of democratization that might lead to it - is crucial for the betterment of peoples in every sphere of life. According to him, in order for a government to preserve peace, that peace must be just, and in order for it to be just, a society needs to be democratic and able to develop economically, enabled by democratic culture and institutions. In other words, without democracy, neither peace nor development could be expected to last long. This being so, and since the GA had requested him to report on UN electoral operations in the field, in August 1995, Ghali presented an *Agenda for Democratization* to the Assembly staff. However, they rejected it as being too controversial. Even Ghali's senior political advisor, Rosario Green, described the Agenda as 'pontificating and paternalistic'.[165] Still, in December 1996, Ghali had nothing to lose and issued the document,[166] which stressed the principle of personal sovereignty as a focal point for democratization: 'While democratization must take place at all levels of human society - local, national, regional and global - the special power of democratization lies in its logic, which flows from the individual human

person, the one irreducible entity in world affairs and the logical source of all human rights'.[167]

In this Agenda, Ghali defined democratization as 'a process which leads to more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society', and democracy as a 'system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people'.[168] In this context, the former SG rejected the view that democracy begins and ends with elections. Rather, he introduced a 'participatory' understanding of democracy.[169] Moreover, Ghali was careful not to advocate that one model of democracy and of democratization is superior and should be imposed on societies. Furthermore, he stressed the idea that some aspects of international relations and global systems of governance should be democratised alongside democratization of nation states. Ghali thus called for democratization of the UN and the power-sharing relationships between states in the international system in general. Two obvious methods of democratizing global governance were to include non-member state entities in the administration of the UN[170] and democratizing the architecture of the UN by giving more decision-making power to more populated member states.[171] Finally, Ghali recognized the limits of democratization at international level due to the absence of an 'internal structure equivalent to that of state Government'.[172]

It is worth noting here that this Agenda regarded democratization a common goal and therefore should be the task of IOs. It also highlighted the fact that although development is achievable without democracy; the latter is a vital component of sustainable development.[173] Besides, in this Agenda, Ghali emphasized the relationship between democracy and international peace, and went further to assert that democratization at the national level cannot be attained without the democratization of the international system. 'Thus, democratization within states may fail to take root unless democratization extends to the international arena'.[174] In this regard, Laura Zanotti notes that an *Agenda for Democratization* 'reprises the liberal emphasis on electoral processes and institutions, but also includes socialist and republican concerns about the relations between economic equality and participation'.[175] Though little noted, this Agenda capped four remarkable years, in which human rights, women's rights, and democracy were promoted more than ever

before by the UN, through progressive states and by NGOs. Ghali's Chief of Staff, John Claude Aime stated: 'an *Agenda for Democratization* was important because Ghali wanted to see international norms respected in the occupied territories and the only way was to keep democracy and peace in the world'.[176] This was confirmed by the former SG:

> This agenda is the most important because I am offering a new approach, which is the participation of non-state actors in the elaboration of new norms and in the management of globalization. At this time, globalization was not very clear, but practically, it is one consequence of the end of the Cold War and the dominance of one superpower. Annan now is applying what was said in this Agenda.[177]

In short, peace and security, development, and democratization were the central concerns and themes addressed by Ghali in his three Agendas. He stressed the interdependent and mutual relationship between peace and development, and the importance of democracy for peace within and between nations, along with the application of democratic principles within the UN itself. To accomplish the above objectives, Ghali proposed the necessary reform of the UN administrative machinery. Ghali's proposals to ensure that the Secretariat was capable of meeting the demands placed upon it are discussed in the next section.

4.3.2 Ghali's Reforms to the UN Administrative Machinery

In parallel with efforts to enhance the organization's role in the field of peace and security and to introduce an improved conceptual framework for pursuing the organization's development mission as well as to reinforce democratic principles in world affairs, reforms in the structures and methods of work of the UN gained momentum. This section, Ghali's reform with regard to administrative arrangements is considered.

4.3.2.1 The First and Second Phases of Restructuring the Secretariat

From the very outset when Ghali assumed office, member states called for various administrative reforms. As a consequence, in February and December 1992, Ghali announced a number of proposed reforms to the Secretariat - the organ over which the SG exercises direct control.[178] In his note to the GA on 21 February 1992, Ghali stated that 'These changes are intended to consolidate and streamline the

Organization's activities into well-defined functional categories aimed at ensuring effective implementation of the objectives of the Charter and of the mandates entrusted by the policy-making organs'.[179] Some of the major changes are discussed below:

Four New Departments

Ghali proposed a pyramid-shaped administrative structure, with the organization's work divided into four major departments:

- The new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) incorporated the responsibilities of five former departments and offices.[180] The DPA was the political department, dealing with ongoing political relations and questions, and a key focus of Ghali's reforms. A former senior UN staff member highlighted the importance of understanding the background to it: 'Until Ghali created this Department, what we had in the Secretariat was the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs [DPSCA]. This Department, which became part of the current department, was headed, always by unwritten convention, by a Soviet diplomat. When Ghali created the DPA, he appointed two people. The first one was Vladimir Petrovsky. The other one was James Jonah from Sierra Leone, who was a longstanding staff member. When both left, which was not too much later, Ghali appointed a former retired British diplomat Marrack Goulding, and not a Soviet diplomat. So, the Department became much more dynamic. This is important because, until Ghali created this department, all the UN good offices were run by the SG out of his own office. Now it can be done in a regular way using the people'.[181]

- A new Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) incorporated the responsibilities of the former Office of Special Political Affairs. This Department reflected the emphasis of the SC Summit on 31 January 1992 in which world leaders had affirmed the UN's role in maintaining peace in the Post-Cold War era.

- In order to meet the extraordinary demand on the UN to provide humanitarian assistance under unprecedented conditions of complexity and insecurity, Ghali proposed a new Department to deal with Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) incorporated the functions of the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and Special Emergency

Programs and 10 other units of the Secretariat dealing with emergencies and humanitarian assistance programs. The department was to coordinate the UN system's civilian agencies when they were called upon to work in a multi-agency context, either purely humanitarian or a complex political emergency. It was however a controversial innovation because many countries feared that the creation of a coordinated if not centralized UN agency for humanitarian assistance would introduce a humanitarian justification for intervention in their internal affairs. As a result, the new department was limited to a circumscribed coordination role.

- A fourth new Department of Economic and Social Development was proposed in February 1992 to promote broad-based and sustainable development through an integrated approach to economic, social, environmental, population, and gender-related aspects of development. This department was a consolidation of three major UN units, including the former United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC), the Center for Science and Technology for Development and the Department of Technical Cooperation for Development. It is worth noting here that, taking into account the views of ACABQ and the Third World countries, a year later, in March 1993, this new department was separated into three departments, each headed by an USG.[182] As a result, the balance at Headquarters between Secretariat structures in the political, humanitarian, economic and social fields had improved.

In addition to these four new departments, Ghali suggested that the Legal Department and the Department of Administration and Management (DAM) were to be maintained. While the first would absorb the functions of the Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the Department of Conference Services was downgraded and incorporated into DAM. Finally, Ghali proposed no changes in the Information or Disaster Relief Departments. It is worth noting however that peacekeeping and disaster relief were allotted special departments of their own. In other words, the new priority of the UN was evident when four of the departments were created to deal with problems of international peace and security and the increasingly related activities of humanitarian assistance: two Departments of Political Affairs [divided by regional responsibilities], an Office of Peace-keeping Operations, and a Department of Humanitarian Assistance. This indicates the importance attached by Ghali to these UN activities.

What is noteworthy here is the connection between Ghali's three Agendas and the proposed administrative reforms. In his three Agendas, the former SG attempted to catalogue all the challenges to which the UN must respond in order to play an expanded and assertive role in peace, development and democratization. While the administrative machinery was good enough for the limited role which the UN used to play, it was inadequate for the more expanded one available to it. As a result, Ghali realized that the most important immediate items were administrative ones, and he launched a major restructuring of the Secretariat. For example, in the political sector, emphasis was given to strengthening the support provided to the SG on matters related to peace and security and to enabling the Secretariat to respond efficiently to the mandates of the SC and the GA. The work of the Secretariat thus expanded exponentially and this led to the establishment of the DPKO to manage them. Likewise, in the economic and social fields, the aim was to achieve greater integration and enhance the capacity for coordinated responses to complex emergencies.[183] In this sense, the UN became involved in observing human rights and delivering humanitarian assistance. Again, this led to the establishment of a new department: the DHA. Thus, to meet the new challenges and adapt the organization to the evolving demands of the times, Ghali initiated the process of restructuring the organization's administrative body. His intention was to make the most effective use of resources through a rationalization and streamlining of structures and procedures, as well as managerial improvements. A more effective and efficient Secretariat also meant clearer and more accountable lines of responsibility. Unnecessary bureaucratic layers therefore were reduced through the elimination of several high-level posts, as detailed below.

4.3.2.2 High-level Positions

In addition to configuring the activities of the headquarters into eight departments, Ghali cut recruitment and reduced the number of senior advisors (avoiding P5 discontent by keeping their nationals), rejigged offices and departments, and set about rooting out corruption and waste. The sudden reduction in advisors reflected his belief that a bureaucracy could best be run by 'stealth and sudden violence'.[184] However, he was criticised by former USG Melissa Wells commented on other management issues: 'By the time I took over from my predecessor, Governor Richard Thornburgh, Ghali had done a lot reshuffling of offices, most from overseas to New York, where

we had no excess office space and no money to rent such space in the highest rent district in Manhattan. This was a major time-consuming headache for me'.[185] In his first annual report in the work of the organization, Ghali summarized the steps he took to streamline the Secretariat: 'A number of offices have been regrouped, related functions and activities have been consolidated and redeployments of resources have been undertaken. Unnecessary bureaucratic layers have been reduced through the elimination of several high-level posts. Lines of responsibilities have been more clearly defined by concentrating the decision-making process in seven key departments at Headquarters under eight Under-Secretaries General.[186] Ghali thus believed that the Secretariat would be better able to provide more effective and integrated assistance to member states with a streamlined structure comprising components with clearly delineated responsibilities and greater managerial accountability. In this regard, Gregg points out that both Ghali and his predecessor, Perez de Cuellar, had been under unrelenting pressure by the US to be what UN SGs have never been, tough administrators, willing to say no to the many vested interests in a multinational Secretariat.[187]

In short, what characterised the restructuring of late 1992 was not the abolition of posts but the shifting around of officials and the creation of new departments. The needs of each component of the Secretariat were thus being re-evaluated with a view, on the one hand, to eliminating any remaining duplication and redundancy and, on the other, to reinforcing those offices and departments with expanding mandates and responsibilities. For example, the capacity of the Secretariat to provide a timely and coordinated response to complex emergencies and the delivery of humanitarian assistance had been consolidated and strengthened. Another characteristic was the preoccupation with the problems of the less developed countries. The creation of three new departments in economic and social fields, Policy Coordination and Sustainable, Economic and Social Information, and Development Support and Management Services, headed by the USG, were supposed to serve better the development needs of the South.[188] The changes aimed at keeping the balance between the peace and security area, on the one hand, which had been enlarged after the end of the Cold War, and the social and economic area, on the other, which had been relatively neglected. The former SG sought to steer a course between those states mainly in the North concerned with the political and military problems of peacekeeping, and those

preoccupied with social and economic development. It thus became clear that Ghali's reform agenda stemmed from the changed circumstances of the Post-Cold War world. In this new context, the priorities were: reforming and reinforcing the Secretariat in the area of peace-keeping, professionalisation of peace-keeping operations, a new institutional basis for peace-keeping or conflict resolution activities, and an improved approach to development assistance.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with the substantive element of my thesis: Ghali's reform agenda. The purpose was to sketch the historical background to Ghali's reforms. To accomplish this, section 4.1 examined the legacy of several past UN reform efforts and, in particular, highlighted three which were key among them: the Jackson reform, the Report of the Group of 25, and the Group of 18.

After setting out the history of reform in the UN, the chapter proceeded to examine the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda. The second section of the chapter illustrated the principal pressures and constraints which prompted Ghali's reforms. It then went on to analyse the timing of his reform agenda. The preceding discussions showed that Ghali took over at a historical moment that was highly significant, a transition in history for the UN and for the world. It was the beginning of a new era, in which the SG grasped the opportunity to fulfil the original promise of the UN Charter. As for the timing of Ghali's reforms, section 4.2.2 showed that the first-ever meeting held by the SC at the level of heads of State and Government, in January 1992, represented a major stimulus for Ghali's reforms to the UN.

Finally, the third section examined the content of Ghali's reform agenda. In order to do so, it focused on Ghali's efforts to make the UN more responsive to the multitude of new demands and problems resulting from the dramatic changes engendered by the end of the Cold War. These efforts related to the UN's role in the new international context. This role however could not be fulfilled without an organization capable of comprehensively addressing global issues of peace, sustainable development and

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democracy. In this context, Ghali produced three Agendas. This in turn, stimulated demand for administrative reform.

In his first report entitled an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali outlined proposals for enabling the UN to respond quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and security in the Post-Cold War world. The main contribution of the Agenda however, was the introduction of post-conflict peace-building at the end of the continuum. This turned into a multifunctional activity, in which UN responsibilities had increased, particularly in the humanitarian and human rights fields. In June 1994, the former SG sought to correct the common misperception of the UN as an organization dedicated primarily to peace-keeping. As part of that effort, he presented the GA with a report entitled an *Agenda for Development*. The report explored the multiple dimensions of development and the multiplicity of actors engaged in the development task. It also provided a comprehensive framework for thinking about the pursuit of development as a means of building foundations for enduring human progress. Ghali concluded that peace, the economy, the environment, society and democracy were interlinked dimensions of development. In his last report, an *Agenda for Democratization*, Ghali highlighted the importance of democratization within states, among states and throughout the international system. Again, this document was a full expression and synthesis of Ghali's conviction that peace, development and democracy were inextricably linked.

Concerning the Secretariat's ability to deliver vital and effective administrative and support services, the chapter demonstrated that Ghali proposed a reorganization of the Secretariat. His aim was to achieve a lean, streamlined Secretariat with clear lines of responsibility and accountability. The changes initiated by Ghali were primarily to rationalize the working of the Secretariat and to give more authority and increase coordination amongst offices in the field.

To summarize, the present chapter has sought to provide historical background to Ghali's reforms. This was followed by a discussion of Ghali's reform agenda both in terms of the underlying factors and its timing. The chapter concluded with an examination of the content of Ghali's agenda. In the chapter that follows, the politics

of Ghali's reforms will be discussed. This helps to give a full picture of the most significant attempt to date of Post-Cold War UN reform.

Notes

[1] The analysis I present is based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary evidence is in the form of 20 open-ended and semi-structured interviews conducted with former Permanent Representatives and key members of staff who used to work for the UN in the period from 1992-97. Of particular importance was an interview with Boutros Ghali himself [see appendix 1 for a list of interviewees]. These in-depth elite interviews, both by telephone and in person, are complemented by an analysis and interpretation of official documents and reports relating to Ghali's reforms published by the UN. Also, the statements of the former SG and his five Annual Reports on the work of the organization will be consulted. In addition, the debates and speeches made at that time by the heads of delegations in both the GA and the SC meetings will be surveyed and critically applied [GA Resolutions and SC Presidential Statements]. The secondary evidence consists of the analyses of many books and articles about Ghali's reform agenda.

[2] United Nations, 'A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System', Geneva, vols. I and II, 1969. The Jackson Report also known as the Capacity Study.

[3] United Nations, 'Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the UN System', General Assembly, 30th Session, UN Document E/AC.62/9, 28 May 1975.

[4] United Nations, 'Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations', General Assembly, 41st Session, Supplement 49, UN Document A/41/49, August 1986. The Report also known as the Report of the G-18.

[5] The ranks of UN members swelled from 51 in 1945 to 114 in 1963.

[6] Edward C. Luck, 'Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress', Academic Council on the United Nations System Occasional paper, No. 1, 2003, available on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/intro/2003history.pdf. Accessed 6-3-04.

[7] Ibid.

[8] United Nations, Capacity Study, vol. I, 1969, p. 21.

[9] Ibid, pp. 22-23.

[10] David Steel, The Reform of the United Nations, London, Wolfeboro, 1987, p. 26.

[11] Douglas Williams, The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations. The System in crisis, London, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 1987, p. 48.

[12] Georgios Kostakos, 'Reforming the United Nations 1985-1989', PhD in International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1989, p. 55.

[13] Williams, 1987, pp. 48-49.

[14] Paul Taylor, 'Reforming the System: Getting the Money to Talk', in Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, Eds., International Institutions at Work, London, Pinter Publishers, 1988, p. 224.

[15] Joachim W. Muller, The Reform of the United Nations. A volume in the series Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, New York, Oceana Publications, 1992, p. 25.

[16] GA Resolution 3343 XXIX.

[17] United Nations, 'Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the UN System', General Assembly, 30th Session, UN Document E/AC.62/9, 28 May 1975.

[18] Paul Collins, 'Implementing administrative reforms in international development organizations', Public Administration And Development, 1987, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 131.

[19] David Nicol and John Renninger, 'The Restructuring of the UN Economic and Social System: Background and analyses', Third World Quarterly, 1982, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 74-92.

[20] Rochester, 1993, p. 166.

[21] Muller, 1992, p. 26.

[22] Ibid, p. 27.

[23] Collins, 1987, p. 138.

[24] Section 143 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1986 and 1987, Washington, DC. 1985.

[25] Elaine Sciolino, 'Kassebaum Bill has UN worried', The New York Times, 1985, 6 October, p. A22.

[26] See UN Chronicle, August 1985, vol. xxiii, no. 4, p. 63.

[27] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization from the fortieth to the forty-first Session of the General Assembly', General Assembly, 41st Session, Supplement 1, UN Document A/41/1, 9 September 1986, p. 6.

[28] UN Document A/40/PV.7, pp. 24-26. As quoted in Muller, 1992, p. 38.

[29] United Nations, 'Establishment of a Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/237, Supplement 47, UN Document A/40/.47, 18 December 1985.

[30] Muller, 1992, p. 42.

[31] Antonio Donini, 'Resilience and Reform: Some Thoughts on the Processes of Change in the United Nations,' International Relations, 1988, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 302.

[32] United Nations, 'Establishment of a Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/237, Sub-Paragraphs 2 (a) and (b), 18 December 1985.

[33] For a detailed presentation see Joachin W. Muller, 'Planning, Budgeting and Performance Reporting in the United Nations', in Chris De Cooker, Ed., International Administration, Law and management practices in international organizations, Norwell, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp. 1-45.

[34] Joachim W. Muller, Ed., Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, The Hague, Kluwer Law International Muller, volume I, 1997, p. I/66.

[35] Taylor, 1988, p. 125.

[36] John Mathiason, 'Who controls the machine? The programme planning process in the reform effort', Public Administration And Development, 1987, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 176-177.

[37] Yves Beigbeder, 'The continuing financial problems of the United Nations: Assessing reform proposals', in Paul Taylor et al., Eds., Documents on reform of the United Nations, USA, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1997, p. II.4/19.

[38] Collins, 1987, p. 133.

[39] United Nations, Report of the G-18, Recommendation 14 (a).

[40] Ibid, paragraph 4.

[41] Ibid, Recommendation 15.

[42] Ibid, Recommendation 31.

[43] Collins, 1987, p. 134.

[44] United Nations, Report of the G-18, Recommendation 61.

[45] Ibid, Recommendation 57.

[46] Muller, volume I, 1997, p. I/66.

[47] Ibid, Recommendations 63-67.

[48] Collins, 1987, p. 134.

[49] K. P. Saksena, Reforming the United Nations: The challenge of relevance, London, Sage Publications, 1993, p. 112.

[50] Ibid.

[51] United Nations, Report of the G-18, p. 42.

[52] The SG submitted to the GA two progress reports on the implementation of the recommendations proposed by the G-18 and a final report in 1989 (UN Document A/44/22).

[53] United Nations, Report of the G-18, p. 42.

[54] Ruth Pearson, 'UN Cries Uncle', Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, October 1988, vol. 44, pp. 37-38.

[55] Beigbeder, 1997b, p. II.4/31.

[56] Ibid, p. II.4/21.

[57] Muller, volume I, 1997, p. I/68.

[58] Interview with David Hannay.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Interview with Sylvana Fao.

[61] Interview with Charles Hill.

[62] Interview with Edward Perkins.

[63] Interview with Angela Kane.

[64] Interview with Melissa Wells.

[65] Interview with Ahmed Fawzi.

[66] Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, Towards a More Effective United Nations, Two Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992.

[67] The small group included a broad representation: Aliasson from Sweden, Wilenski from Australia, Thomas Pickering from the US, Hantano from Germany, the Permanent Representative of the UK (David Hannay), France (Jean-Bernard Merimee) and a number of representatives from the developing world- for example Ibrahim Gambari from Nigeria.

[68] Interview with Thomas Pickering.

[69] Interview with James Jonah.

[70] Interview with Abdel Halim Badawi.

[71] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[72] United Nations, 'Address by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN to the annual UN/DPI Conference of NGOs', New York, 19 September 1994.

[73] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[74] Interview with James Jonah.

[75] Interview with Gillian Sorensen.

[76] David Hannay, Ahmad Fawzi, Gillian Sorenson, Thomas Pickering, Alvaro de Soto, Amr Moussa and James Jonah.

[77] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[78] United Nations, 'High level Meeting of the Security Council: Note by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Members', Security Council, UN Document S/23500, 31 January 1992.

[79] Ibid.

[80] The 38th Floor, 'Clearing the line of command', UN Chronicle, June 1992, vol. xxix, no. 2, p. 6.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Thomas Pickering.

[84] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[85] Benjamin Rivlin, 'Boutros-Ghali's Ordeal: Leading the United Nations in an age of uncertainty', in Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, Eds., A United Nations For The Twenty-First Century: Peace, Security and Development, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 133.

[86] Interview with Angela Kane.

[87] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[88] Benjamin Rivlin, 'The UN Secretary-Generalship at Fifty', in Dimitris Bourantonis and J. Wiener, Eds., The United Nations in the New World Order: The Organization at Fifty, London, Macmillan, 1995, p. 101.

[89] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-Sixth to the Forty-seventh Session of the General Assembly', General Assembly, Forty-Seventh Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/ 47/1, 11 September 1992, p. 2.

[90] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Empowering the United Nations', Foreign Policy, Winter 1992-93, vol. 71, no. 5, p. 89.

[91] Interview with David Hannay.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[94] Vladimir Petrovsky, a former Soviet vice-minister of foreign affairs, was the highest-ranking Russian at the UN in the time of Ghali. He was in the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the transition of Gorbachev and the end of the Soviet Union. He was also the author of a famous article that Gorbachev wrote which was considered a landmark of the evolution of Soviet thinking towards the UN.

[95] The task force included USG Marrack Goulding [Peace-Keeping], Jan Eliasson [Humanitarian Affairs], Richard Thornburgh [Administration and Management], Special Political Advisor Alvaro de Soto, former Chef de Cabinet Virendra Dayal, and a small support staff.

[96] David Cox, Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secretary-General, Aurora papers 20, Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993, p. 3.

[97] United Nations, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping - Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', General Assembly, Forty-Seventh Session, Supplement 277, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 22.

[98] An Agenda for peace, paragraph 17.

[99] Javier Perez de Cuellar, 'Anarchy or Order: Annual Reports 1982-1991', United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 288.

[100] An Agenda for peace, paragraph 12.

[101] Ibid, paragraph 21.

[102] Cox, 1993, p. 8.

[103] Ibid.

[104] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 59.

[105] Ibid, paragraphs 51 and 53.

[106] Ibid, paragraph 73.

[107] Ibid, paragraph 52.

[108] Ibid, paragraph 26.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-eighth to the Forty-ninth Session of the General Assembly: Building Peace and Development', General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement 1, UN Document A/49/1, 1994, pp. 147-278.

[112] Ibid, paragraph 34.

[113] Article 43 reads: All members of the UN, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

[114] Article 47 reads: There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

[115] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 44.

[116] Article 40 reads: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

[117] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 44.

[118] Benjamin Rivlin, 'The changing international political climate and the Secretary General', in Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, Eds., The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making: "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible, London, Praeger, 1993, p. 18.

[119] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 69.

[120] Ibid, paragraph 13.

[121] Ibid, paragraph 70.

[122] Ibid, paragraph 73.

[123] Ibid, paragraph 71.

[124] Ibid, paragraph 74.

[125] Shijuro Ogata et al., 'Financing an Effective United Nations'. Report of the Independent Advisory Group on United Nations Financing (Ogata/Volcker Group), New York, Ford Foundation, 1993.

[126] United Nations, 'Financing an effective United Nations', Note by the Secretary General, General Assembly, 48th Session, Supplement 460, UN Document, A/48/460, 11 October 1993.

[127] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General', UN Document A/47/1, 11 September 1992, p. 19.

[128] Ibid, p. 20.

[129] See The Irish Times, 26 June 1995.

[130] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Globalization, fragmentation and consequent responsibilities on UN', The Secretary-General's Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford University, 15 January 1996. UN Press Release SG/SM/5870/Rev.1. Available on: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19960112.sgsm5870.html. Accessed 19-6-03.

[131] See Washington Post, 7 February 1996, p. 16.

[132] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 64.

[133] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-sixth to the Forty-seventh Session of the General Assembly', General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement 1, UN Document A/ 47/1, 11 September 1992, p. 68.

[134] Rivlin, 1996, p. 143.

[135] United Nations, '*Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN', General Assembly, 50 Session, Supplement 60, UN Document, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paragraph 39.

[136] Ibid, paragraph 40.

[137] Ibid, paragraph 54.
[138] Ibid, paragraph 88.
[139] Ibid, paragraph 97.
[140] Ibid, paragraph 41.
[141] Ibid, paragraph 43.
[142] Ibid, paragraph 45.
[143] Ibid, paragraph 77.
[144] Ibid, paragraph 86.
[145] Stanley Meisler, 'Dateline UN: A New Hammarskjöld?' Foreign Policy, 1995, Spring, no. 98, p. 193.
[146] See for example 'Statement by Malaysia at the Open-Ended Working Group of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations', 18 August 1992, no reference number. The final Document of the non-aligned meeting in Jakarta also used similar language. See Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Jakarta 1-6 September 1992, Final Document, UN Document A/47/675, p. 25.
[147] United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary General on the Occasion of Disarmament Week: New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era', UN Document, A/C.1/47/7, 23 October 1992.
[148] Ibid.
[149] For a compilation of the formal responses to the report, see General Assembly Documents A//47/887, Add. 1 to 3, and A/47/902.
[150] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General', UN Document A/47/1, 11 September 1992, p. 28.
[151] Ibid, p. 3.
[152] United Nations, 'An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary General', General Assembly, Forty-Eighth Session, Supplement 935, UN Document, A/48/935, 6 May 1994, pp. 84-85.
[153] Interview with John Simpson.
[154] Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, 'Peace, Security and Development: Roles for the UN in the Twenty-First Century', in Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, Eds., A United Nations For the Twenty-First Century: Peace, Security and Development, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 8.
[155] Interview with John Simpson.
[156] An Agenda for Development, paragraphs 145 and 229.
[157] Ibid, paragraph 241.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid, paragraph 235.
[160] An Agenda for Development, section ii.
[161] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Fiftieth to the Fifty-first Session of the General Assembly: The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization', General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement 1, UN Document A/51/1, 1996, p. 66.
[162] An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 81.
[163] Ibid, paragraph 82.
[164] Ibid, paragraph 59.
[165] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S-U.N. SAGA, New York, I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999, p. 320.
[166] Thomas Weiss et al., UN Voices: The Struggle For Development And Social Justice, USA, Indiana University Press, 2005, p. 354.
[167] United Nation, 'An Agenda for Democratization – Supplement to Reports A/50/332 and A/51/512 on Democratization', General Assembly, 51st Session, Supplement 761, UN Document A/51/761, 20 December 1996, paragraph 128.
[168] Ibid, paragraph 1.
[169] Ibid, paragraph 42.
[170] Ibid, paragraphs 77-103.
[171] Ibid, paragraphs 104-110.
[172] Ibid, paragraph 62.
[173] Ibid, paragraph 21.
[174] Ibid, paragraph 67.

[175] Laura Zanotti, 'Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The UN Debate on Democratization and Good Governance', Alternatives, October 2005, vol. 30, Issue 4, p. 469.

[176] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[177] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[178] See for example, United Nations, Press release, Department of Public Information, 'Secretary-General announces changes in Secretariat', SG/A/479, 7 February 1992; United Nations, 'Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization', Note by the Secretary General, General Assembly, UN Document A/46/882, 21 February 1992; United Nations, Secretariat, 'Secretary-General's Bulletin', ST/SGB/258, 11 March 1993 and ST/SGB/249, 16 March 1992; United Nations, 'Restructuring and Efficiency of the Secretariat', Report of the Secretary General, General Assembly, UN Document A/48/428, 29 September 1993; and United Nations, 'Restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat', Report of the Secretary General, General Assembly, UN Document A/49/336, 24 August 1994.

[179] United Nations, 'Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization', Note by the Secretary General, General Assembly, 46th Session, Supplement 882, UN Document A/46/882, 21 February 1992.

[180] The former Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Centre against Apartheid, Office for Political and General Assembly Affairs, Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship and Department of Disarmament Affairs.

[181] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[182] The Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, and Department of Development Support and Management Services.

[183] Complex emergencies are situations in which the capacity to sustain livelihood and life is threatened primarily by political factors and, in particular, by high levels of violence. The lethal mix of poverty, inequity, injustice, racism and other factors has the direct effect of causing illness, death, human rights abuses, psychological stress and disabilities. The indirect effect of complex emergencies includes displacement of populations, disruption of food production, and the destruction of infrastructure. For the UN, a complex emergency is a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system wide response. Commonly, a long-term combination of political, conflict and peacekeeping factors are also involved.

[184] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[185] Interview with Melissa Wells.

[186] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General', UN Document A/47/1, 11 September 1992, p. 9.

[187] Gregg, 1993, p. 153.

[188] See United Nations, 'Note by the Secretary-General', General Assembly, 47th Session, Supplement 753, UN Document, A/47/753, 3 December 1992, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Three Department Heads Named in a New UN Shakeup', Diplomatic World Bulletin, December 7-14, 1992, vol. 23, no. 12, p. 1.

Chapter Five

Ghali's Reform Agenda:
Actors, Reactions and Implementation

5.0 Introduction

Following the discussion in Chapter Four concerning Ghali's reform agenda, its timing and content, this chapter considers the political aspects of Ghali's reforms. It provides a detailed examination of the main actors involved and their reactions to the reform process. It helps to explain the role played by key member states in reform during the period 1992-1997. In addition, it provides a thorough analysis of the feasibility, implementation, significance, direction and impact of Ghali's reform agenda.

The central objective of this chapter is to complete the historical narrative of reform. It is worth noting that as in the previous chapter, the analysis presented here is based on both primary and secondary sources.[1] It is important also to emphasise that while this (and the preceding) chapter analyses Ghali's reforms, the next chapter (Chapter Six) will seek to explain them deploying the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

The previous chapter demonstrated that the surge in new demands and substantive responsibilities across the spectrum of UN activities engendered and facilitated Ghali's reform agenda. The present chapter considers the politics of Ghali's reforms and to accomplish this, it first outlines the principal actors in the reform process. The second section then portrays how member states responded to such reforms whilst the chapter concludes by examining the implementation and impact of Ghali's reforms. This provides a complete analysis of Ghali's reform agenda.

5.1 The Main Actors in Ghali's Reform Agenda

Former representatives and senior staff in the UN[2] have made it clear that Ghali himself was the main player advocating reform. As discussed, the former SG's speech to the special SC meeting on 31 January 1992 outlined those reform objectives endorsed by Council members. Former US Ambassador Perkins notes that 'The SC approval did not mean that we were happy but it did mean that there were certain objectives that, if handled correctly, it would serve as a platform from which Ghali could cooperate with the SC and particularly with the P5'.[3] A point that needs to be stressed is that Ghali took every opportunity to explain his plan to member states and to key groupings, including the EU, the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. In this respect, many aspects of the reform proposals were communicated to member states in informal consultations as well as in formal documents. He also telephoned and spoke to P5 heads of state to obtain support for proposed reforms.[4]

American Ambassador Perkins said that the P5 were deeply committed along with the SG to the reform of the UN system. The main players in reform were the SG and the P5 states.[5] According to former British Ambassador Hannay, 'The P5 are always significant in terms of UN affairs'.[6] These states changed slightly at that time because the Soviet Union became the Russian Federation. In this context, a former UN senior staff member pointed out that the permanent members of the SC carried major weight, but they were not equal: 'The US is always special'.[7] Angela Kane, the principal officer in the office of the SG at the time of Ghali, believed that it would be misleading to suggest that the P5 agreed on the issue of reform because China was absent since 'it kept itself on the back bench'.[8] In addition, a former USG commented that the main actors in Ghali's reforms were 'the SG and those of us in senior positions who worked closely with him'.[9] A clear case can be made that the main actors were the SG and key member states, especially the US, 'the only remaining superpower and the principal driver of the Council's agenda and decisions'.[10] The EU governments also played an important role. As for China, it had a very cautious attitude to reform and did not want to be in the forefront.[11] In addition, Russia did have a role after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This, however, is not to

say that other countries did not play any role in the reform process. On the contrary, the non-aligned group was influential, because its votes counted. In this respect, Mohamed Shaker, then the Representative of Egypt to the UN, noted:

> Other nations had an effective role within the UN system, but their role depended very much on their national representative. Even small countries could have active representatives. For example, during my time in the UN, Malta which is a very small island in the Mediterranean, played a leading role in the law of sea, simply because of the personality of its representative, who was an active lawyer.[12]

Finally, it could be argued, as Charles Hill, a former senior staff member puts it: 'Ghali was the main player in pushing for reform. Also any member state which felt its own interests might be affected negatively would work to block reform'.[13]

5.2 Member States' Reactions to Ghali's Reform Agenda

This section describes member states reactions to Ghali's reform agenda focusing in particular on the question: To what extent did key states support or resist the proposed changes? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine how member states responded to Ghali's recommendations concerning the expansion in the UN role as outlined in his three Agendas. Then, the focus will be on states reactions to reforms in the UN administrative machinery.

5.2.1 Reactions to an *Agenda for Peace*

There were diverse reactions amongst member states to an *Agenda for Peace*. Amongst the major powers, Ghali's proposals in an *Agenda for Peace* were received favourably, yet with qualifications, judging by the speeches of their delegates at the UN GA in September 1992. The US welcomed Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* as an 'extremely valuable contribution to both the consideration and actual construction of the United Nations' future role in international security'.[14] The US even offered some military facilities for training of UN-earmarked troops and other related activities.[15] US Ambassador Pickering noted: 'Ghali's reforms were generally broadly supported by the US. It was near the end of the first Bush administration, and he had been himself the US Representative to the UN some years before. So he knew a great deal about the organization, and was attracted

and supportive to it. This was in the period following the first Gulf war, so he used the UN extensively at that time, and he felt that the UN deserved to have attention and to be reformed'.[16]

In a similar vein, former USG James Jonah, reflected: 'The US did not react [oppose it] too much at that time. It should be taken into account that President Bush was a man believing in multilatarism and he had been in the UN and had been an ambassador to China, so he believed in working within the international system'.[17] Jonah however noted that 'The feeling amongst many big countries was that the Agenda was too ambitious financially and practically, and philosophically unrealistic. The British for example said it was too expensive'.[18] David Hannay, then the British Ambassador to the UN, comments: 'The UK broadly speaking favoured most of the reform proposals that have been put forward over the years by Ghali. The UK on the whole has been very favourable to the ideas of the SG but it is not in the position to obtain decisions on those on its own, it has to work through its partnership with the EU, which also favoured reforms. Also the UK has to work on its links with the US which has been much more ambivalent about this. So, the UK has to work with a lot of other people if the reform is to bring concrete outcomes'.[19] The European Community too responded favourably in welcoming the recommendations on preventive diplomacy:

> The European Community and its member States attach great political significance to the field of preventive diplomacy, and believe that it is possible to explore the potential of the Charter of the United Nations to foster a deeper and more effective use of its capabilities to defuse potential conflicts at an early stage.[20]

Overall, the US and the P5 supported an *Agenda for Peace* since they believed that the success of the UN was an important advance and this was worth making some sacrifices for. This was in the period before Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda presented difficult problems for the SC, but the Council and the P5 certainly had a positive attitude as a result of the success of the UN in dealing with the first Gulf war and the aftermath of the Cold War. Former American Ambassador Pickering concluded: 'I don't know that we had any in particular who opposed it; individual states may have opposed particular reforms that might have affected what they considered to be serious interests'.[21]

As regards Japan, the Japanese Ambassador Hatano welcomed the report in his speech to the GA in September 1992. But, as the UN speeches by Japanese representatives consistently reiterated the need for Council reform, Hatano commented: 'With the aim, however, of enhancing effectiveness of and trust in the United Nations, it is equally important to consider seriously how the United Nations as a whole should be structured, including the function and composition of the Security Council, and other aspects of the Council's work'.[22] Since Japan was a member of the Council in 1992, the Report's failure to address reform of the composition of the Council seemed to broaden debate.[23]

At the end of June 1992, the SC referred to the report as 'a first and comprehensive reflection' on the ongoing process of transforming and strengthening the UN. It contained a set of 'complex, interesting proposals', which the Council said it would examine 'in depth and with due priority'.[24] The non-aligned states on the Council believed that all member states should be called upon to respond to all aspects of the report: 'The Council therefore trusts that all organs and entities, in particular the General Assembly, will devote particular attention to the report and will study and evaluate the elements of the report that concern them'.[25] The Council issued a series of statements that supported some, but not all of the Agenda proposals. For instance, in a resolution on peace-keeping,[26] the Council encouraged member states to inform the SG of their willingness to provide forces or capabilities to the UN for peace-keeping operations and the type of units or capabilities that might be available at short notice, 'subject to overriding national defence requirements and the approval of the governments providing them'.[27] The Council supported the wider use of fact-finding mission as a tool of preventive diplomacy, in some instances through dispatching them to states requesting it.[28] In addition, the Council shared the SG's observation that, when sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, it was important that states, which, as a consequence, suffered from special economic problems should have the right to consult the Council (as provided in Article 50).[29] The SC also endorsed the recommendations calling for greater involvement of regional organizations in the peace-related activities of the UN. It invited regional organizations to strengthen their capacities to engage in preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-building, and requested the SG to communicate with

appropriate regional organizations and report back to the Council, if possible by April, 1993.[30] Moreover, the Council appeared to accept totally the SG's observations on the relationship of humanitarian assistance to peace-keeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. It emphasized the critical role of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs as a co-ordinating agency for the various agencies and functional offices of the UN.[31] Other than inviting the SG to explore ways of advancing co-operation with non-governmental relief organizations, the Council declaration did not initiate further specific measures on humanitarian assistance. The SC discussed the safety of peace-keeping personnel in an *Agenda for Peace* noting the particular difficulties arising when states or parties that had agreed to peace-keeping operations were unable to enforce the role of law. The Council therefore asked the SG to make further recommendations for enhancing the safety and security of UN forces and personnel.[32] The Council also issued a general statement on the various components of peace building[33] but it provided no specific proposals however for strengthening the UN's capacity to build (and finance) peace. Its last statement clearly indicated that a clear mandate must exist; the consent of the government or parties still stands, except in 'exceptional circumstances' and the emphasis must be on impartial peaceful settlement to conflicts and political solutions, so that peacekeeping is not prolonged.[34]

Many other member states submitted their views to Ghali, for example, the Nordic/Canada/Australia and New Zealand Group (Nordic/Canz group) proposed the development of a comprehensive early warning system which would encompass both potential conflicts and an assessment of global trends. It argued that the UN had access to a great deal of information through its own agencies: 'The organization should rationalize and enhance its capability to collect, analyse and disseminate within the Secretariat and to the relevant UN organs and, as appropriate, to member states information on current and potential threats to international peace and security'.[35] Reiterating longstanding concerns of established peace-keeping countries, the Nordic/Canz group was particularly emphatic on the need to streamline peace-keeping operations: 'There should be an integrated organizational and command structure that would incorporate and co-ordinate existing Secretariat expertise, which is relevant to the growing complexity of peace-keeping

operations'.[36] Similarly, the Rio Group of Central and South American states supported, in principle, the need to make the UN more effective in preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-making, but drew the line at any encroachment on the principle of state sovereignty: '... such efforts must be based on respect for the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, sovereignty equality, the territorial integrity of states and the self-determination of peoples'.[37] It emphasized the connection between security and development, calling for 'preventive peace-building in order to prevent the outbreak of crises for economic and social reasons'.[38] The Group also called for greater transparency and democratisation in the decision-making processes of the UN, again liking steps to achieve a more effective UN with insistence on the 'adequate representation' of the member states in decision-making processes.[39]

Ghali's first report however drew mixed reactions from Third World countries. They felt that excessive attention was given to peacekeeping rather than to development in the poorest countries. They also sponsored a resolution in the 47th GA requesting the SG to invite the views of member states on the issue of reforming the SC and to report the findings to the 48th session of the GA.[40] According to former US permanent representative Edward Perkins: 'The non-aligned movement probably thought that they wanted to see the reform as an open process, so that they could believe that it was not inimical to the best interests of the less developed nations, of the less rich nations'.[41] An *Agenda for Peace* and its many proposals were debated during the 47th session of the GA. From an examination of the record of these debates, the following overall picture emerges. While almost all Third World spokespersons expressed their support for Ghali's study of the ways and means to promote world peace more effectively, they voiced two concerns. Firstly, they had doubts or uncertainties about some of the specific proposals and suggested that they should be closely scrutinized and their feasibility more closely examined. For example, Ghali had proposed an international army. Some states expressed a concern that such an international army could be used to enforce the other political objectives rather than preserving the peace. Secondly, they expressed genuine concern about the assumptions underlying aspects of the document's proposals. For example, the report calls for UN technical 'support for the transformation of deficient national

structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions'.[42] The Mexican delegate counselled that, as 'these ideas fall exclusively within the sovereignty of states', at best they 'merit cautious consideration'.[43] Similarly, regarding the concept of preventive deployment, the Singapore delegate suggested that, as an idea, 'it might be ahead of its time' and required further study.[44] Concerning preventive diplomacy, the Indonesian delegate expressed concern that 'the list of situations that may constitute a threat to peace alluded to under the heading 'Early Warning' may be susceptible to differing interpretations and consequently infringe on the sovereignty and independence of Member States'.[45]

Ghali's proposals, especially on peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy, appeared to many of Third World countries 'to tip the balance in the direction of an interventionist UN controlled by the western powers'.[46] They did not like the linkage asserted between peace-building and security, given that the emphasis on democratization raised the prospect that the UN might insist on democracy as necessarily Western liberal pluralism as a foundation stone of international security. The report itself argued that the authority of the UN to act on peace-building rested on 'the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace'.[47] In addition, for Third World countries, the priority attached to reconstruction and long-term development suggested that international development policies might become adjuncts to international security policy rather than emphasizing the importance and inherent value of development. The Third World was also concerned about the relative silence in the SG's report given to the economic dimensions of world security. Ghali touched on this when he referred to 'the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustices and political oppression',[48] yet the primary focus of the SC and the Secretariat had been on the peacekeeping and peacemaking functions of the UN. The world organization had diverted most of its time and resources to problems related to peace and security and ignored the development needs of the South. Another concern for Southern leaders was what they perceived as a 'diminished General Assembly'. Many feared that as attention, time and resources were increasingly focused on the SC, the GA had emerged the loser. They called for the GA to play an increased role in peace issues, with 'more regular and closer consultations

between the general membership and the Security Council'.[49] It was the principle of sovereignty, however, that was the primary focus of Third World criticisms of the *Agenda for Peace*. This was evident in the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) 1992 conference in Jakarta. The NAM first asserted that the principle of sovereignty 'should not be diluted or abridged in any way on the pretext of promoting globalism or self-determination, either through the UN, regional organizations or through unilateral or other means' concluding:

> The [Non-Aligned] Movement is concerned over the recent tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of other states under the pretext of protecting human rights or preventing conflicts which in effect would erode the concept of national sovereignty. In this regard, the Movement could not accept those elements in the Secretary-General's report, *An Agenda for Peace*, that could be detrimental to the sovereign rights of states.[50]

Ghali then responded: 'The United Nations shall never intervene in the domestic affairs of a Member State, neither in the guise of preventive diplomacy or for a humanitarian aim, unless it has obtained consent to do so from all the parties concerned'.[51]

Like Japan, the Non-Aligned bloc subscribed to the need for restructuring the SC since it was viewed as dominated by western powers. In this respect Malaysian Ambassador Razali Ismail noted: '…the current situation underlines the need for the reform and restructuring of the Security Council so that its membership should be expanded to reflect better the general membership of the United Nations, and so that there is transparency, accountability and democracy in the workings of the Council'.[52] Another argument for modifying Council membership related to its increased importance, since from the end of the Cold War, it had reasserted its primary role in monitoring peace and security. It had also expanded that role to include other issues, most notably peace building and the protection of human rights. In the meantime [April 1992], an Informal open-ended Working Group was established by the GA at its 47th session, under the Chairmanship of the then Ambassador of Egypt Nabil Elaraby, to consider and respond to the SG's recommendations contained in an *Agenda for Peace*. According to Elaraby, 'in the Group meetings, the US was the most determined and forthright defender of the prerogatives of the SC, and was willing to declare its unconditional opposition to proposals which

appeared to promote the role of the GA at the expense of the Council. The UK and France took a similar view, but were perhaps slightly less adamant. Russia was not prominent in the discussions, and was conciliatory, but with no indication that it championed the cause of the Third World. China was also relatively passive, guarding watchfully against any language that might open internal dissent in China to the scrutiny of the Assembly, but not obviously promoting the larger agenda of the non-aligned states. The Third World states were far from being a cohesive group. Every state began to assert its national position'.[53] Finally, the GA, after an extensive debate on *An Agenda for Peace*, adopted without vote an seven-point Resolution 47/120B (20 September 1993).[54] This welcomed the Report and invited the SG to strengthen the UN's capacity for early warning, the collection and analysis of information, and confidence-building measures. Coordination of humanitarian assistance programmes with peace-keeping or related operations was also urged. Marrack Goulding, USG for Peace-keeping at the time of the Report, commented: 'The ideas that he [Ghali] put into his *Agenda for Peace* were his own ideas, not ideas foisted on him by the West. The West liked them, but they encountered some criticism in the third world, with the result that the General Assembly was never able to adopt a substantive resolution approving them'.[55] It is worth noting here that Goulding stated on different occasions that he did not totally support the Report's most controversial proposals on the strengthening and expansion of peace-keeping operations.[56]

In short, it can be argued that the principal recommendations on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking (excluding peace enforcement) enjoyed broad support amongst member states, as evidenced in the statements of the SC. Member states also supported Ghali's proposal for greater involvement of regional arrangements and organizations in the UN's peace-related activities. Similarly, recommendations to improve the management of traditional peace-keeping operations were supported by many states. But recommendations that went beyond the broad consensus that existed in 1992 would be vastly more difficult to implement. Evidence demonstrates that there was broad support amongst the Council's permanent members for Ghali's Report, but reluctance to take the bold new steps it had advocated. It is also worth noting that neither the SC nor the GA

tackled the crucial question of how best to organize a standby UN force, since they both fell far short of embracing the concept of peace enforcement and therefore remained silent on Ghali's proposals to create a standby force for early deployment, peace enforcement, and command of peacekeeping and enforcement units by the SG. In this regard, many practical difficulties arose, i.e. How big a force would be needed? Who would pay for it? Who would provide logistics? Who would sacrifice their soldiers? And who would want their soldiers dying under incompetent international command? As one commentator writes: 'The silence of the Council on these issues reflected uncertainty and ambiguity, as well as the potential veto of China as a staunch supporter of sovereignty and opponent of UN intervention'[57]

5.2.2 Reactions to the *Supplement*

In January 1995, Ghali issued an update to an *Agenda for Peace,* which reviewed the 1992 proposals, especially the need for a rapid reaction force under UN command. In addition, he called for expanded resources and greater powers for the SG in respect of mediation and peacekeeping because insufficient resources were available to hire skilled diplomats for mediation and observers for preventive diplomacy. He criticized the Council and the US for 'micro-managing' conflicts, a responsibility that, Ghali believed, should be reserved for the SG. These proposals were not warmly received, especially in the US, following the 'Republican revolution'[58] and a sharp rightward shift in Congress. The US and other powers rejected Ghali's call for a UN rapid reaction force, which would create a stronger peace and security regime and provide the UN with the capacity to respond to genocide and other humanitarian disasters. The US expressed reservations, viewing Ghali's position paper as an attempt to strengthen the position of the SG and to blame key member states for some of the inadequacy in recent peace operations.[59] American Ambassador to the UN at that time, Madeleine Albright, accused Ghali of trying to 'arrogate more power' to himself with the proposed rapid reaction force and belittled the report, even before Ghali had a chance to explain it at his news conference.[60]

In spite of US opposition, the *Supplement* was considered, and even welcomed, at the SC on 22 February 1995.[61] In a statement by its President,[62] Legwaila J. Legwaila of

Botswana, the Council recognized the crucial importance of the availability of resources to sustain international peace and security. It agreed with Ghali that priority should be given to enhancing the existing stand-by arrangement. In this context, France produced an *aide memoire*, proposing 'conflict moderation' forces authorized by the Council, a rapid reaction capacity, improvements in training, and early operation planning units within the Department of Political Affairs.[63] Furthermore, in its 22 February statement, the Council welcomed the SG's analysis of peace-keeping operations. It also urged him to strengthen Secretariat units dealing directly with sanctions, so that matters were addressed in an 'effective, consistent and timely' manner.[64] Besides, the Council wanted appropriate measures to ensure that humanitarian supplies reached affected populations, and appropriate consideration given to submissions by third party States affected by special economic problems as a result of the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, it encouraged continued study of options to improve UN capacity for rapid deployment and reinforcement of peace-keeping operations, including the establishment of a comprehensive database to cover civilian and military resources. It strongly supported the SG's conclusion that such operations needed effective information capacity.

The *Supplement* outlined the forms of on-going cooperation between the UN and regional organizations: consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. The Council responded to this by reaffirming the importance it attached to the role that regional organizations and arrangements could play in peace and security. It also took note of the proposals for 'micro-disarmament'[65] and welcomed efforts to curb the spread of anti-personal land-mines. Yet, no reference was made to the proposal to develop further the Register of Conventional Arms. As for the recommendation on establishing a mechanism for assessing proposed and ongoing sanctions, lack of support in Washington and other Western capitals had shelved the notion. Instead, a general reference was included to study ways and means of addressing these issues. Again, the Council emphasized the necessity for careful control of peacekeeping costs, efficient use of funds, and urged member states to honour their financial obligations to the UN. The recommendation to increase financial flexibility however was not taken up. Finally, as was the case with an *Agenda for Peace*, no hard decisions, as termed by Ghali, were

taken on the more contentious proposals, i.e. the establishment of a rapid reaction force and the enhancement of information capacity, for practical and political reasons.

5.2.3 Reactions to the *Agenda for Development* and the *Agenda for Democratization*

The *Agenda for Peace* was generally well received and attracted great attention. That cannot be said of Ghali's other two projects, *Agenda for Development* and *Agenda for Democratization*. According to both interviews and secondary sources, Ghali's first Agenda emerged at the height of hopes for a new role for the UN, fuelled by successful enforcement action in Iraq. But with the UN experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, Ghali's holistic vision of how the UN could and should contribute to a peaceful, developed and democratic international order, proved analytically and operationally ambiguous. These experiences blunted Ghali's later calls for greater UN capacity and larger contributions from member states. They also distracted attention from the main theme in Ghali's proposals: peace and development were interlocking and mutually reinforcing. Ghali's Chief of staff Alvaro de Soto believed that the former SG was able to get away with an *Agenda for Peace* as he was still in 'a honeymoon period'.[66] In similar vein, Bruce Russett wrote that the final document on democratization was released in the last days of 1996, when Ghali had become a 'lame duck Secretary General'.[67]

As for the *Agenda for Development*, it was debated during the World Hearings on Development organized by the President of the GA[68] in New York in June 1994,[69] as well as during the high-level segment of ECOSOC in July 1994.[70] In general, the developing countries expressed disappointment that the agenda had not included a more action-oriented blueprint, based on the spirit of partnership. These countries wanted to focus the discussion on economic growth and expected, in particular, commitments by developed countries regarding resources for development.[71] Special attention also needed to be given to strengthen the cooperation between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. This included building a more integrated, efficient and effective framework through which the UN could better assist countries to realise their development objectives.

Developed countries, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of the market, human rights and the democratic system for development and environmental sustainability. As a result, no agreement could be reached during the 49th session of the GA (December 1994). Instead the Assembly established an *ad hoc* open-ended working group to elaborate an action-oriented, comprehensive *Agenda for Development*.[72] As no final agreement could be reached, the Assembly decided that the working group should continue during its 51st session, in 1996-97. In the meantime, the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1995, emphasized willingness to work towards a more efficient UN, based on its special capacity to support the process of development. It was noted that, given a shared vision and a common purpose, coordination and integration of UN operational activities could be ensured. Also, in June 1995, the annual G-7 summit, which met at Halifax, Canada, declared their readiness to work with others in order to set out a novel approach to global cooperation and to define the particular contribution expected of UN bodies. One year later, during the 1996 G-7 summit, held in Lyon, it was acknowledged with satisfaction that the principal reforms of the UN economic and social institutions were widely supported in all parts of the world. The Summit also noted that part of the Agenda relating to background and objectives had largely been agreed and that the negotiations on institutional adaptation were in progress.[73]

The *Agenda for Democratization* included ideas regarding the definition and foundations of democracy, its relation to peace and development, and the role of the UN system in bringing both about. Key among them was the proposal that some aspects of international relations and global governance should be democratized alongside the democratization of nation states. This turned out to be controversial, and was resisted by the US and big member countries of the EU. Authoritarian states in Asia and elsewhere, and their intellectual allies in Europe, vigorously rejected such objectives arguing that democracy was a Western concept such that Ghali's endorsement of it was a betrayal of his own cultural roots.[74]

5.2.4 Reactions to Ghali's Administrative Reforms

Ghali's first challenge had been to attempt to reorganize senior staff early in his tenure. He realized that the Secretariat tended to inefficiency and budgetary waste so he made changes to improve its efficiency and fiscal discipline, reducing the number of USGs from 14 to eight. This indeed could be taken as a sign of the SG's independence, but governments that lost posts were undoubtedly unhappy. Former USG James Jonah emphasized that Ghali's first administrative reform in February 1992 was not well received. He cut back senior staff and amalgamated many departments into one. These changes caused great concern to member states, especially the P5, who 'believed that there were some political patronage posts that should not be distributed'.[75] The US, in particular, was not satisfied with fewer USGs/ASGs, a hiring freeze or the termination of programs, and their staff.

Moreover since Ghali's reforms did not significantly reduce the UN budget or bureaucracy they did not impress US officials and other reform advocates. So, while some progress had been made by the end of 1992, the prevailing view between the big powers was that Ghali's proposals fell far short of what was required. Former US Ambassador Perkins commented: 'In terms of how the US looked at it, I think it is safe to say that the US considered it to be a start, only a start, and that, over the years, the machinery had become worn down and was not able to meet what the US considered to be the challenges facing the administrative machinery and the political machinery of the UN. So I don't think the US considered Ghali's administrative reforms, whatever they were, to be all that significant'.[76] Such opinions were further reinforced on 1 March 1993 when the American Dick Thornburgh, then USG in charge of Management, presented his final report on UN reform to Ghali.[77] His successor, Melissa Wells, also from the US, agreed in an interview with Mick Wallace (Sixty Minutes, CBS) in April 1993 that there were serious problems in UN management and administration, that many criticisms were well founded and that there were on-going [but confidential] investigations into many issues involving corruption and mismanagement. In this regard, Wells pointed out that: 'Wallace slanted the program by deleting huge parts of my responses in order to make his point, a very negative view of the UN'. She added: 'The year I spent in the job was a very

difficult year for the UN. We were compelled to act defensively against attacks from a number of fronts, not least on the public relations front, and in which we had to expend immense effort and energy just not to lose ground'.[78] In short, although reforms to the UN administration were introduced by Ghali in 1992, there were still persistent charges of incompetence and inefficiency and extremely poor levels of internal communication within the Secretariat.[79] Furthermore, the machinery for managing peace-keeping operations - the principal UN task - remained 'wholly inadequate to meet the present and future needs of the UN'.[80] As a consequence, many developed states suggested that still more change was needed: more drastic reorganization and management overhauls, more inspections and auditing, more coordination, supervision and retrenchment.

As for Third World reaction, interviews suggest that many governments were disappointed over the restructuring of the Secretariat, especially the combining of three economic departments into one, 'in which they perceived a contraction and weakening of the economic and social areas in favour of the security priorities of industrial countries'.[81] Ghali eliminated the second-most senior post in the Secretariat, the Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation. This was not so well received by developing countries, since this office had been imposed on the SG by the GA [1977].[82] Other organizations of particular relevance to developing countries had not been disbanded such as the Centre on Transitional Corporations and the Centre for Science and Technology for Development. Moreover the restructuring of February 1992 had been carried out without consultation with the GA, as former USG Melissa Wells noted:

> One aspect that I experienced was the sense of frustration, and even anger, that many delegates in the Fifth Committee of the GA (the Committee that handles budgetary and administrative matters) expressed over the lack of prior consultations between the SG and the member states on the restructuring of the Secretariat in 1992 by Ghali [this was before my arrival]. I felt that this weakened our position in terms of defending the SG's request for more positions and other proposals.[83]

The G77 (at the Fifth Committee)[84] made clear that some of Ghali's proposals were the cause of great concern. While viewing his proposals as having 'some constructive elements', the Group criticized them for being too heavily weighted in favour of the Western powers. Commenting on the restructuring of the Secretariat, the Chairman of the

G77, Ambassador Louis Fernando Jaramillo of Colombia highlighted that any such reform 'must respect the programme mandates' decided by the GA and which 'constitute an obligatory legal reference'.[85] The Group also noted some inconsistency in the budget-cutting exercise. For example, a post of ASG had been created at the Geneva Centre for Human Rights division, while the post of head of the International Trade Centre (ITC) was downgraded. The G77 mandated the Fifth Committee: 'Given the outstanding work that the ITC carries out in the promotion of the exports of the developing world, the position of the Director of the Center must be maintained at the level of the ASG'.[86]

In summary, the US paid lip service to administrative reforms that did not affect the jobs of its nationals, did not cost money, did not involve it paying its dues and did not give the UN the authority to act. The other powers were concerned with losing posts. Surprisingly, some of the most vocal critics of the reforms were from the non-aligned nations, who conceived any cuts as detrimental to the steady stream of assistance they had come to expect from the UN.[87] It is worth noting that Ghali acknowledged that the process of restructuring was causing anxiety and trouble. He therefore emphasized the need for 'a deeper appreciation of and respect for the international civil service on the part of governments'.[88] For him, the ideal was 'to build a stronger, more independent Secretariat, where the best traditions of public service are combined with modern management practices'.[89]

Having illustrated the principal actors in the reform agenda and how member states responded to such reforms, the task now is to examine the implementation and impact of Ghali's reform agenda.

5.3 Implementation and Impact of Ghali's Reform Agenda

The aim of this section is to identify the extent to which Ghali's proposals were actually implemented. It also considers the impact they had on the UN's role in the areas of peace, development, and democratization as well as on the organization's administrative structures.

5.3.1 Implementation of an *Agenda for Peace* and its *Supplement*

Regardless of SC reservations or other criticisms, Ghali sought to implement controversial proposals for preventive peace deployment, peacemaking and peace enforcement in an *Agenda for Peace*. With regard to peacemaking, he followed through on his claim that the SG could be effective if he were more autonomous from the SC. Starting in mid-1992, Ghali and his Special Representatives became directly involved in managing security affairs, with limited reference back to the Council. In August 1992, for example, additional peacekeeping forces were deployed to Somalia and throughout 1993, Ghali pushed for peace enforcement in Somalia. In this context, several interviewees noted that, in Ghali's years, the UN had been called on more peacekeeping operations than in the previous 44 years.[90] Such operations involved new situations, and more complex tasks. Peacekeepers had been sent to areas where there was no peace to keep, where consent to a UN presence was sporadic and where government did not exist or had limited effective authority. During Ghali's tenure it became clear that UN peacekeeping should protect vulnerable populations, deliver humanitarian relief or respond to state collapse. It also entailed restoring democracy or building a foundation for national recovery. Often these tasks had to go on simultaneously in the same theatre of operation. It should be noted here that UN peacekeepers have always done more than just keep warring sides apart e.g. giving humanitarian assistance but this was, of course, in a minor way before the 1990s.

As for preventive peace deployment, USG James Jonah pointed out that it had come to be understood as a vital area of practical action.[91] Consequently, new forms of preventive diplomacy had evolved. They incorporated efforts designed to prevent the occurrence of armed conflict, such as fact-finding, good offices and goodwill missions, the dispatch of special envoys to tense areas, and efforts to bring parties to a potential conflict to the negotiating table. In this sense, both Ghali and the US pressed for the first UN mission (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. Through Resolution 795 (1992), adopted unanimously on 11 December 1992, the SC authorised the preventive deployment of UN peacekeepers on the border of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) with Albania and

Serbia, following a request by FYROM. Although the term 'preventive deployment' was not used in the text of the resolution, this was what it was in practice. In arranging for implementation of the mission, Ghali acquired considerable freedom of manoeuvre from the SC.

Member states continued to attach importance to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as the most cost-effective ways of preventing disputes from arising, escalating into military conflicts, or controlling and resolving existing conflicts. In this sense, Ghali continued to receive mandates from the GA and the SC to maintain existing efforts, and to undertake new ones. Ghali's special representatives, special envoys and other emissaries were actively engaged, on a resident or visiting basis, in helping the SG to implement these political mandates in many different places. In his second annual report on the work of the organization, Ghali noted that over 100 missions of representation, fact-finding and good offices were undertaken on his behalf during his tenure.[92] Between August 1992 and July 1993 alone, Ghali himself, or his representatives, held high-level diplomatic talks in 27 countries. In some cases, the activity had stretched traditional notions of peacekeeping [e.g. Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo] from a strictly military operation to one involving political, economic, social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions.[93]

Thus, in line with peace building and peacekeeping proposals in an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali and the Council cooperated in mounting complex, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions.[94] The multi-dimensional approach first succeeded in Namibia in 1989-90 and achieved further successes in Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti. These operations combined elements of cease-fire monitoring, disarmament and demobilization of warring forces, and administration, as well as the holding of elections, refugee repatriation, reconstruction and development assistance. In all four missions, the UN was involved in peacemaking and peace enforcement, even before peace could be kept. The adoption of Resolution 794 (1992) of December 1992 authorised the SG and member states to 'use all necessary means' to secure delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, which resulted in the deployment of UN and US contingents. The Somali operation

represented to some extent a 'peace enforcement' activity, although it was not explicitly called so in the SC resolution text. In short, the UN under Ghali struggled to deal with the deadly mixture of starvation and civil war in Somalia, the humanitarian nightmare of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, a vast election and infrastructure rebuilding exercise in Cambodia, and the tensions of fledgling democracy and economies in transition in former Soviet republics. See the Figure below for all UN peacekeeping operations as of 31 July 1995, although the costs of these operations skyrocketed as well. [See Table 5.1].

Figure 5.1 UN peacekeeping operations as of 31 July 1995 [95]

Ongoing United Nations Peace-keeping Operations as of 31 July 1995

Table 5.1 UN Peacekeeping Budget[96]

Year	UN Peacekeeping Budget in US $
1980	0.19 Billion
1988	0.23 Billion
1991	0.4 Billion
1993	3.61 Billion
1994	3.50 Billion

On 15 June 1993, the SG reported to the GA on action taken to implement the recommendations of the Agenda. He emphasized the 'overriding importance of the full and timely provision'[97] by member states of the needed resources: 'If the Organization is to respond effectively to the hopes placed in it by the peoples of the world, the Member States have to be as innovative in devising new financial approaches as they are in devising new tasks for the Organization to perform'.[98] His report suggested that significant progress had been made in strengthening the capabilities of the Secretariat to manage peace-keeping operations. Progress had also been made in acting upon the SG's recommendations on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. Ghali, however, excluded from the latter the recommendations on ceasefire enforcement. Subsequently, the former SG submitted a report in 1994 entitled 'Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping'.[99] In this report, the measures taken to improve the peace-keeping capacity of the organization were identified. For instance, a special team was established to devise a system of national stand-by forces and other capabilities which member states could maintain at an agreed state of readiness as a possible contribution to UN peace-keeping operations. Ghali strongly supported the initiation of standby forces. His Military Advisor, General Maurice Baril, created a small task force, whose mission was to match the various elements of a peace-keeping force, down to very small units, with the capabilities of potential contributors. This task force set out to better explain to member states what contributions they might usefully make to peace-keeping operations, to clarify terminology and so to facilitate the widest possible participation in peace-keeping missions.[100]

In late 1992, the SC endorsed the proposal to develop standby arrangements. France and Russia approved the creation of such a force, probably in the belief that they would have 'a larger voice in peacekeeping if it is directed through the UN than if it is organized on *ad hoc* basis by Washington'.[101] The US however, proved reluctant to make firm commitments.[102] The British government also seemed equally loath to offer binding assurances. Similarly, the Nordic states and Canada, and other UN peacekeeping stalwarts feared that calls for peace enforcement would drown out demands for measured changes in traditional peacekeeping. In September 1993, it was reported that the Western powers 'refused to countenance' the idea of a standing UN force.[103] Finally, in 1995, Ghali noted that not one of the 19 governments which at that time had undertaken to have troops on standby for UN service wanted to contribute troops to a UN operation in Rwanda where one million people had to be massacred before France felt impelled to act.[104] In this regard, David Bolton, Director of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) asserted that the UN 'is not equipped to directly conduct military operations, and it should delegate that job to NATO or a proven military organization while it maintains the political direction of the operation'.[105] A former UN staff member, however, believed that the idea of a standing army was not implemented because 'Ghali did not push for that', adding: 'This idea was mentioned before Ghali came to office and he was in favour of it as it would make it easier to deploy UN forces in cases of conflicts'.[106]

As for the financing of peace-keeping, in its forty-seventh session, the GA accepted two of Ghali's proposals. To ensure a rapid response,[107] the GA established a peace-keeping Reserve Fund of $150 million exceeding the sum requested by Ghali in an *Agenda for Peace*.[108] Yet, six months later, the Fund had received only $64 million, most of which had been spent on ongoing bills.[109] The Assembly also invited the SG to make proposals for possible incentives for implementation of his financial proposals on or before 1 January 1995. The Assembly otherwise repeated its rather empty exhortations, urging the SG 'to increase his efforts in encouraging Member States to meet their financial obligations towards the Organization with regard to all outstanding assessed contributions to the regular budget and all peace-keeping operations'.[110] The idea that the UN should be directed to assist in the reconstitution of societies devastated by conflict was one

which enjoyed broad support but only in principle. Although Ghali had received broad support for his recommendations on financial reforms, states refrained from writing their cheques. On 10 August 1995, unpaid assessments totalled $3.9 billion, of which, $858.2 million was for the regular budget and $3 billion was for the peace-keeping budget.[111] In this context, it is worth noting that, on 31 December 1995, the US debt to the UN reached $1.231 billion: $414 million for the regular budget, and $816 million for peacekeeping.[112]

In his report entitled an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali recommended greater involvement of regional arrangements and organizations in the peace-related activities of the UN and member states supported these recommendations. It is in this context that the SC on 28 January 1993 invited regional organizations to give consideration to ways and means to strengthen their structures and functions to correspond with the concerns of the UN in the field of international peace and security.[113] In a presidential statement in May 1994[114] the Council assumed that one of the factors that should be taken into account when establishing new peacekeeping operations was the existence of regional and sub-regional organisations, and how they could assist in resolving conflicts.

By the same token, in Resolution 48/42 (10 December 1993), the GA welcomed Ghali's efforts to develop a set of guidelines governing cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. Likewise, the adoption by the GA in Resolution 49/57 (9 December 1994) the 'Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security' encouraged closer cooperation and coordination in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building, and, where appropriate, peace-keeping. On many occasions, Ghali and his staff emphasized the complementary role of regional organizations. As Jan Eliasson, former USG for humanitarian affairs put it: 'Our new and innovative tools, from preventive diplomacy to peace-building, can only be effective if there is full collaboration with regional organizations and the support and participation of all those committed to peace and development'.[115] The cooperation between the UN and NATO in Bosnia exemplified this new approach. Moreover, in New York, on 1 August 1994, Ghali convened the first high-level meeting between the SG and

heads of regional organizations. The purpose of the meeting was to assess cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements and organizations. The participants[116] were in broad agreement that primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security remain with the SC. At the same time, they acknowledged the desirability of decentralizing some tasks, under a UN mandate. Ghali convened a second meeting on 15 and 16 February 1996, bringing together 13 regional organizations for fruitful discussions on new, practical and effective ways of working together. In addition, mechanisms of consultation and cooperation were strengthened between the UN and regional organizations. Progress could be seen, for example, in the periodic high-level consultations that Ghali held with the Ministerial Contact Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the periodic consultations between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and UN Secretariat with regard to efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. In addition, cooperation between the UN and the Organization of American States [OAS], the Organization of African Unity [OAU], the Caribbean Community [CARICOM] and the League of Arabs States [LAS] continued to intensify.

In January 1996, Ghali made the first visit of a UN SG to the headquarters of LAS in Cairo in order to improve relations further and to continue overall consultation. Gharekhan, Ghali's senior political advisor and his personal representative to the SC, emphasizes that integrating regional organizations and NGOs into the UN system was Ghali's key achievement: 'Ghali was the first SG to invite the heads of these bodies, such as the African Organization, to join the UN Headquarters and to work together towards strategies and methods to coordinate activities at the regional level, especially in the peacekeeping areas'.[117] Whilst Ghali observes: 'I was in favour of cooperating with NGOs internationally. I obtained from Mr. Swatch to participate in the 50th Anniversary. So, the participation of non-state actors was essential because it would contribute to the democratization of the UN. Also, it helps in obtaining the support of the public opinion. NGOs will in a certain way limit the role of states'.[118]

Finally, in the *Supplement*, Ghali noted that the multifunctional nature of both peace-keeping and peace-building made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the relevant departments could function as an integrated whole under his authority and control. The three substantive departments of the Secretariat, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace-keeping Operations therefore developed information sharing, consultations and joint action for the coordination of their respective activities in the planning and implementing of complex field operations. This mechanism, known as the 'Framework for Coordination', embraced the departments' activities during routine monitoring and early-warning analysis, assessment of options for preventive action where possible, fact-finding, planning and implementation of field operations, and conduct of evaluations or lessons-learned exercises.[119] In summary, all those interviewed for this study agreed that very few of Ghali's proposals came to any fruition. According to a UN official, 'The differing interests of member states complicated the situation'.[120] The former permanent representative of Britain to the UN, David Hannay, also highlighted the fact that there was no proper process of systematic consideration and decision making in Ghali's reforms.[121] As a result, many of Ghali's proposals were seldom followed up, and one reason for that was the SG himself: 'He did not try to work out a method by which his proposals could be carried forward. Annan has been more successful in that'.[122] This however was not the view of the former SG:

> The reform I suggested was not fully implemented because I was not taking into consideration that we moved from a bipolar system to a unipolar system where we had one superpower who decides what the UN has to do. I will not say that the US was not interested in the UN reforms, but for the Americans, reforms only mean a greater control of the organization by the US. So the fact that there was only one superpower put an end to the possibility of reform and to the real philosophy of the UN. The UN is based on multilateralism and democracy but the fact that there was only one superpower who was accepting multilateralism when they want, proved that it is very difficult to do any genuine reform.[123]

Ghali then added: 'If the other member states were more active, more interested in reforms, they would have been able to contain, I would not say to eliminate, the negative aspects of being controlled by one superpower. They were only interested in reforming the composition of the Security Council'.[124]

In his subsequent two Agendas, Ghali introduced new proposals on economic and social development to ensure that the economic gap between the South and the North was narrowed. But the proposals would require serious financial resources. In this respect, Ghali's Chief of staff, John Claude Aime, pointed out that it was difficult to promote social development and democratization without adequate resources.[125] Similarly, in a statement to the GA on 17 December 1996, Ghali declared that 'the volume of assistance to developing countries was not only failing to grow, it was in fact declining. Resources for long-term development were being diverted to emergency efforts. Africa was hit hardest'.[126] This was mainly because Western countries had been targeting their aid to former Eastern bloc countries, as Tariq Rauf states, 'seemingly at the expense of aid to the South'.[127] Both Agendas were hampered in their implementation because the whole peace agenda became so fraught with difficulties. Former senior UN staff member, Charles Hill argues that 'precisely with the outbreak of war in, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the impetus for change quickly fell apart and the UN struggled to survive for the rest of the decade'.[128] An *Agenda for Development* therefore appeared to have little impact on the UN system's development activities.[129]

An *Agenda for Democratization* suffered some of the same failures as the *Agenda for Development*. Despite high hopes for democratization, a counter-trend emerged since human rights atrocities reached unprecedented levels, not to mention the horror of ethnic cleansing. According to Ghali: 'In some countries, democratization proved more difficult than expected, creating political instability, social disarray and economic disappointment. In others, democratization was even eroded'.[130] Angela Kane, the principal officer in the SG's office at the time, argues that 'The good thing about *Agenda for Peace* was the consensus that had developed around it. This consensus came out of the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Union. Member states felt that the world could pull together, but this did not happen, either with *Agenda for Development* or with *Agenda for Democratisation*'.[131] Kane also asserts that it was a matter of timing since if Ghali's last two agendas had been produced 6 or 7 years later, it might have been a different

outcome.[132] Simply put, Ghali's reform agenda was ahead of its time. All of this, however, is not to say that both Agendas' recommendations never really materialized. On the contrary, facing a sharp decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA),[133] the UN worked to forge international agreement on a new rationale and framework for development cooperation. Furthermore, the organization contributed to finding ways and means to narrow the gap between the North and South and to tackle the crippling problem of international debt. In this sense, the World Bank, for example, changed its orientation from an emphasis on major infrastructure projects and private sector participation to sustainable development, poverty alleviation and 'good governance'. This change in policy reflected the notion that states must have respect for integrated human rights into a 'social policy framework supportive of economic development strategies'.[134] The 1990s also saw an increasing preoccupation by the World Bank with the relationship between violent conflict and development. For example, in the mid-1990s, 24 percent of IDA [International Development Agency] funding (other than that to China and India), went to countries that had been 'under or were in the process of emerging from significant periods of intrastate conflict'.[135]

As an integral part of this process, the UN's global conferences had produced specific commitments and one shape to the comprehensive agenda and co-operative framework that was needed. It is worth noting here that the former SG placed great importance on these conferences as a way to raise the world's awareness of global problems. The UN under Ghali sponsored five 'mega conferences', on the environment, human rights, population, social development and women. These conferences were linked and cumulative and generated specific global commitments providing a comprehensive framework for international action. For example, the landmark Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992 brought the first ever global plan – Agenda 21 – for a new and equitable partnership to achieve sustainable development, promoting economic growth as well as managing natural resources.[136] In general, UN Global conferences had a significant impact, reinforcing international regimes and demonstrating that the UN under the Secretary-Generalship of Ghali was not only concerned with peace and security, but also a wide array of socio-economic issues.

Finally, Ghali's effort to restore the balance between peace and development had been followed by unprecedented effort on the part of the UN system as a whole. This included the attempt to bring about a coordinated follow-up to outcomes around common priority themes: employment, social services, the enabling environment, the advancement of women and poverty reduction.[137] In this context, one of the UN Development Program's (UNDP) primary publications was the annual *Human Development Report*, which endeavoured to measure empowerment, well-being, literacy, and human, not economic, development. It is worth noting that the concept of human security, to a large extent, was promoted by the UNDP's 1994 *Human Development Report*. Also, given the emphasis the UNDP had placed on human development, it earmarked about 14 percent of its resources for 'good governance'.[138] These included UNDP support for free elections, rule of law, accountable national assemblies, a strong judiciary, a free press, a vibrant private sector and a role for civil society. Building on the above, it could be argued that although an *Agenda for Development* lacked 'any clear intellectual centre',[139] it did contribute to Ghali's overall commitment to a multilateral approach to development.[140]

In addition to promoting development, democratization became a new feature of the work of the UN. Member states, new and old, turned to the organization for support in democratization. The UN in turn, developed its capacity to provide electoral assistance. In the Secretariat in New York, for example, Ghali created a new office to deal with electoral assistance requests by member sates - an Electoral Assistance Unit in the DPA. Supporting democratization became a new thrust in the work of the UN. Electoral assistance continued to grow, while the full range of support for societies to prepare the institutional and cultural ground in which democratization could take shape was being expanded in the increasing number of member states that sought it.[141] For example, from January 1992 to the end of June 1994, the UN received requests for electoral assistance from 52 member states, some for the first time, compared to no such requests in 1987.[142] This electoral assistance covered a broad range of operations. In some countries, the UN helped in the organization and conduct of an electoral process, as was the case in Cambodia. In others, the UN's role was to coordinate and support international observers for the electoral process, as was the case in Kenya and Malawi. The presence of more

than 2,100 observers in the South African elections in April 1994 made it the largest UN electoral assistance operation ever mounted.[143] What is noteworthy is that the UN began to realize that democracy does not start and end with elections. Thus, in addition to electoral assistance, the actual activities of the UN in promoting and sustaining the democratic impulse included: return of refugees and displaced persons; institution-building such as enforcing the rule of law; depoliticizing the military and providing a police force during crises; building social institutions, such as the promotion of independent trade unions and the advancement of women.

At the same time, to an increasingly greater extent than in past decades, the UN sought to promote democratization internationally. One way of doing this was by opening UN forums for non-state actors, such as regional organizations, NGOs, parliamentarians, members of the academic and business communities and the media. Another integral element of these efforts was to promote respect for the rule of law in international relations and the progressive development of international law.

In short, as development and democratization may themselves be the most effective forms of conflict prevention, the UN under Ghali endeavoured to ensure that urgent efforts in peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance did not detract from long-term efforts for human progress. Yet, by the middle of 1993 strained relations with the US over Bosnia and Somalia had undermined Ghali's optimism and affected the implementation of his reforms.

5.3.3 Implementation of Administrative Reforms

As for the implementation of administrative reforms, those interviewed for this study noted that Ghali took up the issue of the reorganization of the Secretariat from the beginning of his term of office and completed it during the first half of 1993.[144] The guiding principle of his initiatives had been simplification and consolidation. A number of hitherto independent units in the economic and social domains[145] were consolidated into three major departments (the Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis,

and the Department for Development Support and Management Services) and the number of senior posts was also reduced. The GA approved the SG's proposals for the abolition of 11 high-level posts to ease financial pressure[146]- a 23% reduction, from 48 to 37. The presence of Richard Thornburg in the post of USG for Administration and Management, a US appointment, with a record of civil service job cutting during his tenure as Governor of Pennsylvania, reinforced this process.

Restructuring involved abandoning the post of Director-General for Development and Economic Cooperation, which, as noted in Chapter Three, was a post supported by the Group of 77 in the 1970s. This post had originally been intended to provide a kind of economic alter ego for the SG, but in practice had confused rather than simplified lines of authority. Since Ghali was under pressure from member states to make further reductions in the Secretariat, he abolished the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI). ORCI's functions were merged into the Department of Political Affairs.

In addition to 'streamlining the chain of command',[147] an entirely new strategy for human resources was introduced and subsequently endorsed by the GA at its forty-ninth session (Resolution 49/222). It established a catalogue of good management principles and intentions, with the expressed aim of modernizing and re-energizing human resources management. An external management consultant was reported to be examining the 'efficiency and cost-effectiveness' of the Secretariat[148] with all aspects of personnel administration under review. In particular, the Secretariat instituted new rules and procedures for recruitment for limited durations, to facilitate the administration of peacekeeping and other mission staff. A comprehensive programme of management training, aimed at developing leadership and managerial capacity within the Secretariat, was also launched, with a series of management seminars for all director-level staff. In June 1994, a freeze on recruitment was lifted, allowing the organization to launch campaigns aimed at recruiting well qualified candidates. Finally, in November 1995, and at his own initiative, Ghali created an Efficiency Board that he hoped would encourage UN managers to identify ways of improving performance and saving money. According to its September 1996 report, the Board required every department in the Secretariat to

carry out efficiency reviews[149] and in its first year, 400 efficiency measures were identified and some 20 percent of them implemented.[150] Financial constrains were a major factor in this efficiency review. The SG reported that at 31 July 1996, unpaid assessments totalled $3 billion, of which $0.8 billion was due to the regular budget and $2.2 billion to the peace-keeping budget.[151] Costs therefore had to reduced through diverse measures. Efficiency measures implemented during Ghali's office led to substantial savings: the printing of documents and publications was cut by 27 per cent from January 1996; travel was reduced by 26 per cent in the first six months of 1996, and economies on purchases of foreign currencies amounted to more than $1 million during the biennium 1996-97.[152]

The Secretariat initiated many projects in association with an *Agenda for Peace*, especially in respect of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building. In addition to providing a conceptual framework for peace and security policy in the new era, an *Agenda for Peace* gave rise to many concrete reforms within the UN. A number of tangible measures were undertaken, for instance, as a result of a German initiative, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was established in Geneva. In 1994, the Department began to put into place an early warning system to identify potential crises with humanitarian implications. After lengthy discussions in the GA, it was also decided (in 1993) to appoint a High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). The creation of this high-level position was an acknowledgement by the world community of the importance of human rights to the current and future mandate of the UN.[153] The UNHCHR had the facility to engage states in dialogue in order to secure respect for human rights; however, it had little enforcement powers. As a result, the UNHCHR mandate fell short of confronting grave human rights situations in the Post-Cold War world. It rather relied heavily on the work of various NGOs to provide reliable information about violations. To coordinate UN activities in response to humanitarian disasters, Ghali appointed Jan Eliasson of Sweden to the new post of UN Coordinator for Emergency Relief as Undersecretary-General.

As noted before, peace-keeping operations experienced an increase in personnel and costs, as well as major qualitative changes to their scope. The consequent need for strong

supervisory and management capability Headquarters had been recognized by Ghali. The establishment of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) served to enhance the Secretariat's capacity for the planning, preparation and coordination of UN peace-keeping operations. A report issued in 1994 by Mats Berdal on reforms, notes the steps taken to strengthen the DPKO:

> ...a considerable expansion of staffing levels; the creation of a Planning Division under a new Office of Planning and Support; and the establishment of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre, originally set up to support activities in Somalia, has since then been upgraded and now operates round the clock in accordance with proper staff procedures. It acts as a communication channel between the headquarters in New York and missions in the field, while also providing a mechanism whereby information is disseminated within the Secretariat and to troop-contributing countries.[154]

The establishment of more permanent positions in the DPKO required budgetary approval, ultimately by the GA, but a rapid, permanent expansion of the Secretariat did not seem feasible. However, secondment of military officers to the office of the Military Advisor did increase.

In order to evaluate the increasing range of information available to the Secretariat, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was created in 1992 and worked alongside the DPKO. A further decision in early 1994, to place the DPA under a single USG, Marrack Goulding, in place of the two who previously headed it, produced an administrative structure that was capable of carrying out necessary tasks in an effective and well-coordinated way. The consolidation of all political activities into a single department of Political Affairs created better conditions for monitoring and analysing political developments and identifying conditions in which the UN could play a preventive, peacemaking, peace-keeping or peace-building role. It also enabled greater ability to oversee peace-keeping operations, thereby ensuring the coherence and harmonization of political direction of missions in the field and facilitating preparation of reports to the GA and the SC.

Special attention in the reform process was devoted to auditing and inspections. In conjunction with administrative streamlining, internal controls and audit mechanisms was

strengthened. First, a new post of Inspector General was created to investigate waste, fraud and abuse within the UN. It reported to Ghali direct, who would then be responsible for taking corrective action if it was warranted.[155] The former USG for Administrations, Melissa Wells, stated: 'At this time, we were also able to locate a personnel slot in order for the SG to appoint an Assistant Secretary General to function as an Inspector General who would report directly to the SG. This was, I thought, a wonderful idea and I worked closely with the individual who was appointed for the short time remaining in my tenure'.[156] In addition, on 24 August 1993, the Office for Inspections and Investigation was established. The main aim was to provide comprehensive audit, inspection and investigation services. Finally, on 29 July 1994, Ghali yielded to US pressure for the creation of a new body, the Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS), to be responsible for performance appraisal and monitoring efficiency (GA Resolution A/218B). As one commentator puts it: 'It was hoped that the appointment, largely an American initiative, would make it easier for Washington to pay its debts to the UN'.[157] The Office was headed by a USG, Theodor Paschke (Germany), and took over the function of the pre-existing units in charge of these activities. The then US Representative, Madeleine Albright, called the approved text 'a victory for taxpayers around the world'.[158]

In general, it could be argued that, in the Secretariat, considerable progress was made in the implementation of Ghali's administrative reform plan. However, as chief administrative officer, the former SG had a number of proposals that he wanted to push through. As he noted: 'I came out of Foreign Service machinery and from the Foreign Ministry, so, I know what bureaucracy is all about'.[159] In an *Agenda for Development*, development was considered a multi-dimensional undertaking to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. Development strategies thus should include economic development, social development and environmental protection. In the past, the responsibility to assist nations in the development process fell upon specialized agencies, funds and programs. However, Ghali realized that separately, they represent a very modest proportion of total resource flows for development purposes. He therefore promoted the need for the UN to

develop closer coordination between development-agencies, while maintaining their individual mandates.

An integrated approach to international security required the UN to co-ordinate the activities of its various agencies. Instead of having a UNDP office, a UNHCR office, and information centres in different locations, Ghali wanted to locate all offices in one place and cut expenses. The proposal however met with an incredible amount of opposition from member states because 'separate offices provided additional employment opportunities'.[160] They also considered the proposal as a ploy to establish an embassy in every country and felt that this should not happen. Finally, the UN Specialized Agencies and programs were extremely resistant to any efforts to achieve greater centralized co-ordination and control. Gharekhan, Ghali's senior political advisor and his personal representative to the SC, emphasized that the SG was the first to invite all UN Agencies, such as the World Bank, to a collective discussion and chaired the first meeting.[161] He wanted to make use of other components of the UN family, like UNDP and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Even though these institutions were formally part of the UN family, they were not in fact under the direct control of the SG. Since assuming office, Ghali had shown interest in tackling the wider task of coordinating the cluster of international organizations comprising the UN family,[162] yet he lacked the power to integrate system-wide activities effectively, for example he did not have the authority to convene meetings with UN or Specialized Agencies. Accordingly, as the former US Ambassador Perkins noted, 'the SG can affect the UN Agencies spiritually, but he cannot order them. So, what Ghali wanted to do was to lay a platform that everyone could agree on. In my judgment, I think he was so ambitious'.[163]

The SG also wanted to reduce bureaucracy and enhance autonomy in the recruitment system. Ghali was determined not only to have political employees at the ASG and USG levels but to create a kind of third layer like the D3.[164] This did not occur since member states considered that they would have fewer posts for political employees. It is worth recalling that Ghali had reduced the number of USGs from 14 to eight, whilst five of the

eight Undersecretary positions were nationals of the P5. The principle of national representation at the top of the Secretariat therefore affected the SG's ability to function as chief administrative officer. Ghali was also determined to improve the UN's information collection and analysis service. This was mainly because the UN lacked any capacity to gather and process information, whether derived from trained staff on the ground or from satellite systems. So, he recommended a range of measures to enhance access to information and early warning. Member states however, believed it was intended to gather intelligence rather than a tool for research and analysis. Again, the member states had an interest in preventing the UN from acquiring such a capacity since they had their own intelligence networks and were keen to filter the information supplied to the UN. Moreover, if the organization were to evolve an independent intelligence facility, its dependence on the member states would diminish. In this context, proposals for the use of satellite and computer technology were advanced, though the response was limited, mainly because of US opposition. As one commentator puts it, 'This proposal may be seen as good for the international community but disturbing for powerful member states'.[165]

In the final analysis, relatively little administrative reform was achieved, despite the fact that Ghali's proposals could have been accommodated without amending the Charter. As a former UN official noted: 'The ACABQ basically killed the administrative reform by ordering that his proposals be sent for in-depth analysis. That meant years'.[166] In a similar vein, Angela Kane, the Principal Officer in the Office of the former SG asserted: 'Ghali encountered a number of obstacles and however much he tried to push, it seemed that he was hemmed in with many different corners. That is why his internal reforms did not come into fruition'.[167] All states openly agreed with administrative reform but did not always support it. As a former UN staff member reflected, 'it was hard to oppose something that would cut down on posts and save money, but when it appeared to be on the verge of taking place, some decisions were not taken to the Fifth Committee, or would be overturned there'.[168] The prime example of this, but by no means the only one, was when the Fifth Committee voted at its 40th meeting in December 1995 to postpone reform of the internal system of justice in the UN Secretariat, as proposed by Ghali.[169]

When Ghali took office, he stated that his priorities were to streamline the bureaucracy and fight corruption. Initially he succeeded in cutting a number of high level positions, including several ASGs. However, the GA, which was dominated by the G-77 states, blocked other reform proposals. In sum, most reforms that the SG proposed were implemented to some degree, but reforms requiring GA approval lagged behind. In addition, the UN's growing number of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and an *Agenda for Peace* soon demanded most of his attention. Finally, Ghali had to take into consideration the political and financial constraints of the organization's structure. As Newman phrased it:

> Boutros-Ghali's tenure demonstrated that there are undoubtedly fewer 'no-go' areas for the Secretary-General than ever before. Simultaneously, however, the Office suffered from grave material shortages and the constraints which are inherent in an Organization which reflects the narrow interests of a small group of states.[170]

In a similar vein, Ghali's Chief of Staff commented: 'The big powers, when they have something against a specific reform in the Secretariat, will not pay for it, and then the message was clear. The US supported Ghali's reforms in the Secretariat but at the same time they did not pay their dues at the time'.[171] Overall, a case can be made that Ghali took advantage of political opportunities to steer the organization towards its new role in the Post-Cold War world. Upon assuming the office of SG, he initiated a comprehensive review of the activities of the UN, aimed at transforming the organization into a more effective, modernized and relevant instrument at the service of the international community. His premise was: international peace and security is a shared responsibility. Therefore, he sought to create the instruments for universal action: instruments for security, for expanding the means available to the SG for intervention and preventive diplomacy; instruments for supporting social and human development as the greatest challenge to world peace; and finally instruments to spread the culture of democracy at domestic level and worldwide. In this respect, he outlined an ambitious vision, ranging from the establishment of peace enforcement units under the command of the SG to enhancing coordination of the Specialized Agencies. Autonomy and leadership were fundamental precepts for Ghali and were embodied in his reform agenda and he was productive in a way that major powers historically were not used to. Nevertheless, it

needs to be acknowledged, that Ghali's agenda provided the foundation for recently implemented reforms. In this context, interviewees admit that Ghali laid the groundwork for some of the rather successful reform proposals that have emerged over the last decade. According to David Hannay, Britain's Permanent Representative at the UN from 1990-95, 'Ghali prepared the grass but he made less progress in concrete terms'.[172] In brief, Ghali came to the Secretary-Generalship with a new understanding of the UN as 'an international player'.[173] He initiated a blueprint for UN reform but it was not very successful in the short term, yet it set the stage for restoring development and international economic cooperation to its rightful place on the agenda of the UN, as a major objective and as a pre-condition for lasting international peace and security. The reform package of his successor, Kofi Annan, should not therefore be seen in isolation from Ghali's three Agendas. For example, in Annan's first democratization report, issued in October 1997, the new SG emphasized the continuity with Ghali's *Agenda for Democratization*. Also, the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the GA in 2000 constituted a new context for advancing democratization and governance.

Building on the above, Angela Kane contends that Ghali's reform agenda should not be evaluated by its initial impact. Rather, 'its genuine impact was everything that happened after he left office'.[174] UN member of staff Sylvana Foa believed that 'Ghali's reform was successful only to the extent that he made nations think: he opened their eyes to what could and should be done. However, it will take 50 years to accomplish what Ghali hoped to achieve. He also made life a lot easier for Kofi Annan who implements some of Ghali's ideas '.[175] A case in point is the regular meetings with representatives of regional organizations. Ghali's spokesman, Fawzi, has asserted that 'Ghali had tenure of 5 years and reform takes much longer time'.[176] By the same token, Former American Ambassador, Pickering, notes: 'It is difficult to assess his role or his reforms given the fact that he only served one term and all SGs served twice and that the US was able to mobilize a significant number of states to be against him'.[177] Others however asserted that it was not that the time was not enough, it was that 'the mission was impossible'.[178]

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed Ghali's reform agenda. The main aim was to continue the substantive analysis introduced in Chapter Four. In order to do so, the chapter focused exclusively on the political aspects of Ghali's reforms. Section 5.1 demonstrated that many actors, in particular the former SG Ghali, played a key role in the reform process. Besides Ghali, member states, especially the P5, were deeply involved to and concerned with reform, not just the US. Many of Ghali's reforms had the support of other major powers, especially Britain, Japan and Germany. The Scandinavians and most Third World countries remained advocates of economic and social programmes. The chapter went on to consider member states reactions to Ghali's proposals to strengthen the UN's role and Secretariat structures. It concluded by arguing that although Ghali proposed significant reforms, implementation was seriously inadequate.

This chapter and Chapter Four have demonstrated that Ghali was an assertive and determined leader, but as the fate of his reforms demonstrates, 'the audience was not there'.[179] Member states and the P5, in particular, had too many vested interests in the status quo to allow radical change in the organization.[180] On paper, the proposals developed by Ghali seemed logical and necessary. Nevertheless, whilst the SG may make proposals, other organs of the UN, notably the SC and the GA, which states dominate, may be disposed to act differently. In sum, the historical analysis indicates that the responses of the member states, especially the P5, were crucial to prospects for successful implementation of the key recommendations. A prime example of this, but by no means the only one, was Ghali's proposal for the creation of a standing army to act in peace-making situations and to assist in the UN's 'nation-building' initiatives. Lack of support in Washington and other Western capitals shelved this initiative. Moreover, although he put forward positive reforms, the SG failed to push hard against predictable resistance from staff and member states. A far more determined action for following through on reform proposals was required to ensure that they were fully implemented. Finally, throughout his time in office, the organization's financial crisis continued to pose a serious obstacle to reform.

To summarize, this and the preceding chapter has provided a detailed narrative of Ghali's reforms. Chapter Four demonstrated how the demands for Ghali's reform agenda, its timing, and its substance reflected the context of the Post-Cold War period. Chapter Five examined the main actors involved in Ghali's reform agenda, the reception it received and finally its implementation and impact. In the chapter that follows, the extent to which two versions of realism [neorealism and the ES] can help us explain Ghali's reforms and their limited success will be discussed. In addition, Chapter Six seeks to illustrate how my account challenges and complements orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda. This helps to demonstrate the original contribution that this thesis claims to make to existing literature on UN reform and Ghali's agenda in particular.

Notes

[1] Please refer to Chapter Four for more detail.
[2] These included Ahmed Fawzi, David Hannay, Alvaro de Soto, Chinmaya Gharekhan, James Jonah, and John Claude Aime.
[3] Interview with Edward Perkins.
[4] Interview with Ahmed Fawzi.
[5] Interview with Edward Perkins.
[6] Interview with David Hannay.
[7] Interview with Gillian Sorensen.
[8] Interview with Angela Kane.
[9] Interview with Melissa Wells.
[10] Interview with Sylvana Fao.
[11] Interview with Mohamed Shaker.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Interview with Charles Hill.
[14] Judy Aita, 'US Supports Stronger UN Peacekeeping Operations', United States Information Agency, no. 247189, 10 October 1992. Available on: http://www.usia.gov. Accessed 30-6-06.
[15] United nations, 'Address by the representative of the US to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Document A/47/PV.4, September 1992, pp. 32-34.
[16] Interview with Thomas Pickering.
[17] Interview with James Jonah.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Interview with David Hannay.
[20] United Nations, 'letter dated 6 July 1992 from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/24244, 7 July 1992, p. 2.
[21] Interview with Thomas Pickering.
[22] United Nations, 'Address by the representative of Japan to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Document A/47/PV.32, September 1992, P. 66.
[23] According to former USG James Jonah, although an *Agenda for Peace* did not deal with the question of enlargement of the membership of the Security Council, Ghali had let it be known that he supported the US position on that matter - to offer permanent seats to Germany and Japan. Interview with James Jonah.
[24] United Nations, 'Statement issued by the President of the Security Council in Response to an Agenda for Peace', S/24210, 30 June 1992.

[25] Ibid.

[26] SC Statement S/24728 issued on 29 October 1992.

[27] Ibid.

[28] SC Statement S/24872 issued on 30 November 1992.

[29] SC Statement S/35036 issued on 30 December 1992.

[30] SC Statement S/25184 issued on 29 January 1993.

[31] SC Statement S/25344 issued on 26 February 1993.

[32] SC Statement S/25493 issued on 31 March 1993.

[33] SC Statement S/25696 issued on 30 April 1993.

[34] SC Statement S/25859 issued on 28 May 1993.

[35] United Nations, 'Joint Nordic/Canz Submission in Response to the Summit Level Meeting of the Security Council held on 31 January 1992', New York, no date or reference number. As quoted in Cox, 1993, p. 49.

[36] Ibid, p. 6.

[37] United Nations, 'Letter dated 26 May 1992 from the representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General', UN document A/47/232, 28 May 1992, p. 4.

[38] Ibid, paragraph 7, p. 5.

[39] Ibid, paragraph 9, p. 5.

[40] The draft resolution was sponsored by 37 Latin American, African and Asian states, among them, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan and Mexico; see UN Document A/47/L.26, A/47/L.26/Rev.1, and A/47/L.26/Rev.1, Add.1, 11 December 1992.

[41] Interview with Edward Perkins.

[42] An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 59.

[43] United Nations, 'Address by the representative of Mexico to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly', UN Document A/47/PV.31, September 1992, p. 51.

[44] UN Document A/SRC/47/SR.15, P. 6.

[45] United Nations, 'Address by the representative of Indonesia to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly', UN Document A/47/PV.37, September 1992, p. 34.

[46] Cox, 1993, p. 8.

[47] An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 21.

[48] An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 15.

[49] United Nations, 'Address by the representative of Malaysia to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly', UN Document A/47/PV.39, September 1992, p. 90.

[50] United Nations, 'Non-Paper by an Informal Group of Non-Aligned Countries', no date, p. 5. As quoted in Cox, 1993, p. 14.

[51] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 'the Secretary General's statement at the Tenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries', Diplomatic World Bulletin, vol. 23, no. 9, Special Report, 21-28 September 1992, p. 6.

[52] UN Document A/47/PV.39, P. 90.

[53] Interview with Nabil Elaraby.

[54] United Nations, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/120 B, 20 September 1993.

[55] Marrack Goulding, 'The UN Secretary-General', in David Malone, Ed., The UN Security Council From the Cold War to the 21st Century, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p. 272.

[56] See for example, Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peace-keeping', Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford University, 4 March 1993 and Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', International Affairs, July 1993, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 451-464.

[57] Stephen Burgess, The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997, USA, Scarecrow Press, 2001, p. 12.

[58] The 'Republican Revolution' is a general reference to the November 1994 elections in the US, in which for the first time in 42 years, the Republican Party captured the majority in the House of Representatives. In the same time the Republicans also gained control of the Senate.

[59] Muller, volume I, 1997, p. I/172.

[60] Meisler, 1995, p. 193.

[61] United Nations, Security Council Presidential statement S/PRST/1995/9, 22 February 1995. See also SC statement S/PRST/1995/61, 19 December 1995 and SC statement S/PRST/1996/13, 28 March 1996.

[62] United Nations, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council in Response to a Supplement to an Agenda for Peace', S/PRST/1995/9, 22 February 1995.

[63] United Nations, 'France letter on Supplement to an Agenda for Peace', General Assembly, 50th Session, Supplement 869, UN Document, A/50/869, S/1996/71, 30 January 1996.

[64] Security Council Presidential statement S/PRST/1995/9, 22 February 1995.

[65] *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, paragraph, 60.

[66] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[67] Bruce Russett, 'Book Reviews: International Relations. An Agenda for Peace 1992; An Agenda for Development 1995; An Agenda for Democratization', The American Political Science Review, 1997, vol. 91, no. 2, p. 494.

[68] Samuel R. Insanally, Permanent Representative of Guyana to the UN.

[69] United Nations, 'Open-ended and Broad-Based Consultations on an Agenda for Development: Report of President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and Summary of World Hearings on Development, 6-10 June 1994', General Assembly, 49th Session, Supplement 320, United Nations document, A/49/320, 22 August 1994.

[70] United Nations, 'Official Records of the General Assembly', 49th Session, Supplement 3, UN Document A/49/3/Rev.1.

[71] Muller, volume I, 1997, p. I/139.

[72] UN Resolution 49/126 of 19 December 1994.

[73] Muller, Volume I, 1997, p. I/145.

[74] Russett, 1997, p. 495.

[75] Interview with James Jonah.

[76] Interview with Edward Perkins.

[77] Dick Thornburgh, 'Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations', 1 March 1993, unpublished. Made available by Mr. Thornburgh. In this report, the UN's 'deadwood' bureaucrats and outdated management methods were severely condemned, with charges of defects existing in nearly every aspect of personnel practice. It was suggested that recruitment was 'more or less haphazard' and that it consumed 'an inordinate amount of time', while training was inadequate and promotions 'unduly complicated to the point of being nearly unworkable'. Further, criticisms were levelled at the 'almost surreal' budget practices and at internal audits that were 'chronically fragmented and inadequate'. One UN unit, the report charged, had become a 'convenient patronage dumping ground', and had recently spent $4million on a study of the management of works of art at the New York UN headquarters. Thornburgh declared that the UN was 'almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff members', and that it was difficult to get rid of 'dead wood': 'discipline and dismissal procedures are encumbered to seemingly interminable appeals procedures', with the result that a 'few good staff members are doing too much, and over-extending themselves sometimes to the point where they have become counter-productive'. A major disappointment for Thornburgh was that the UN had failed to devise an effective method for evaluating performance; the system was 'virtually useless', producing positive assessments for 90 per cent of the staff. It is worth noting that the report on mismanagement produced by Thornburgh at the request of Ghali was then 'suppressed'.

[78] Interview with Melissa Wells.

[79] See, for example, William J. Durch, 'Building on sand; UN peacekeeping in the Western Sahara', International Security, 1993, Spring, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 158-160.

[80] Mates R. Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping? An analysis of the changing military requirements of UN peacekeeping with proposals for its enhancement', Adelphi Paper no. 281, London, Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 51.

[81] Interview with James Jonah.

[82] Interview with Alvaro de Soto.

[83] Interview with Melissa Wells.

[84] The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), as reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution 45/248 B, Section VI, is the Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administration and budgetary matters.

[85] United Nations, 'Address by Louis Fernando Jaramillo, Chairman of the Group of 77 to the Fifth Committee in comments on the Secretariat structuring proposals presented by the UN SG Boutros Ghali', New York, 30 March 1993. Available on: http:// www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/develope/03311193.htm. Accessed 30-6-06.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Interview with Sylvana Fao.

[88] See 'Cuts will affect only Most Senior Posts, UN Staff are promised', The Diplomatic World Bulletin, 1992, September 21-28, vol. 23, no. 9, p. 8.

[89] Ibid, p. 10.

[90] Interviews with David Hannay, James Jonah, John-Claude Aime, and Ahmed Fawzi.

[91] Interview with James Jonah.

[92] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-seventh to the Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly, General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/48/1, September 1993, p. 97.

[93] Ibid, p. 2.

[94] As peacekeeping has evolved, particularly since the late 1980s, a growing number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have become 'multidimensional' in nature, composed of a range of components, including military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, and public information.

[95] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-ninth to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly: Confronting New Challenges', General Assembly, 50th Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/50/1, 1995, p. 231.

[96] United Nations Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000: Statistical Data and Charts. Available on: http:// www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm. Accessed 25-11-06. Also see Hirofumi Shimizu, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000', Journal of Peace Research, 2002, vol. 39, no. 6, p. 651.

[97] United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary General on Implementing of the Recommendations Contained in An Agenda for Peace', General Assembly, 47th Session, Supplement 965, UN Document, A/47/965-S/25944, 15 June 1993.

[98] Ibid.

[99] United Nations, 'Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping', UN Document, A/48/403-S/26450, 14 March 1994.

[100] Cox, 1993, p. 24.

[101] Charles William Maynes, 'Containing Ethnic Conflict', Foreign Policy, 1993, Spring, no. 90, p. 6.

[102] It is worth noting that the US government under Bush reserved judgment on Ghali's proposal for the creation of a UN standing force, but in his campaign speeches, Clinton suggested the value of a UN rapid deployment force, which 'could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression; preventing more violence against civilian populations; providing humanitarian relief; and combating terrorism'. Despite the multiple tasks, he argued that it would 'not be a large standing army but rather a small force that could be called up from units of national armed forces and earmarked and trained in advance'.

[103] Simons, 1995, pp. 137-38.

[104] United Nations, 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace', UN Document, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, p. 18.

[105] Madeleine Bunting, 'British brass cool to UN standing army', The Guardian, London, 24 September 1993.

[106] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[107] By the time Ghali arrived as SG in 1992, UN peacekeeping operations had undergone significant increase. For example, 8 peacekeeping operations were active at the beginning of 1991. But with the rise in demand for UN peacekeeping, particularly in the Balkans and Africa, the number of operations increased to 18 by the middle of 1994. And of the 38 peacekeeping operations undertaken since the founding of the organization in 1945, 25 were established between 1988 and 1995. With regard to the deployment of troops, UN peacekeeping operations started with a total strength of approximately 10,000 at the beginning of 1991, peaked at approximately 78,000 in 1993. This was largely due to expansions in UN operations in Somalia [UNOSOM II] and the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia [UNPROFOR]. In late

1994, UNPROFOR alone had nearly 40,000 troops. The 1990s also showed a substantial increase in peacekeeping costs from a $0.4 billion budget in 1991, the cost rose to an all-time high of $3.6 billion in 1993. For more information see: 'UN peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000: Data and charts'. Available on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm. Accessed 25-11-06. For a discussion of the development of UN peacekeeping operations, see: Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', International Affairs, July 1993, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 451-464.

[108] United Nations, 'Establishment of a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/217, Supplement 49, UN Document A/47/49, 25 December 1992.

[109] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[110] United Nations, 23 December 1992, 'Improving the financial situation of the United Nations', General Assembly Resolution 47/215, Supplement 49, UN Document A/47/49.

[111] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-ninth to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly: Confronting New Challenges', General Assembly, 50th Session, Supplement 1, 1995, UN Document, A/50/1, p. 58.

[112] Available on:
http:// en.wikipedia.org/wikdi/United_States_and_the_United_Nations/The_U.S_arrears_issue. Accessed 24-11-06.

[113] Security Council Statement S/25184 issued on 29 January 1993.

[114] Security Council Presidential statement S/PRST/1994/22 issued on 3 May 1994.

[115] Jan Eliasson, keynote address in 'Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Intergovernmental Organizations', Report Series vol. 5, no. 1, Atlanta, Carter Centre of Emory University, February 1993, p. 18. Available on: http://www.ciaonet.org/cof/car28/6603710.gif. Accessed 26-6-06.

[116] The meeting was attended by the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Commonwealth Secretariat, CSCE, EU, the League of Arab States, NATO, OAU, OAS, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Western European Union. The Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] was invited but was unable to attend.

[117] Interview with Chinmaya Gharekhan.

[118] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[119] United Nations, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-ninth to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly: Confronting New Challenges', General Assembly, 50 Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/50/1, 1995, p. 217.

[120] Interview with Ahmad Khalil.

[121] Interview with David Hannay.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[126] United Nations, 'Address by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN to the Fifty-first Session of the United Nations General Assembly', Press Release SG/SM/6133/Rev.1, 17 December 1996.

[127] As quoted in Gerald Dirks et al, The State of the United Nations, 1993: North-South Perspectives, Providence, R. I, Academic Council on the United Nations System, Reports and Papers 1993, no. 5, p. 2.

[128] Interview with Charles Hill.

[129] Mingst and Karns, 2000, p. 153.

[130] United Nations, 'Address by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN to the Fifty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly', Press Release SG/SM/6133/Rev.1, 17 December 1996.

[131] Interview with Angela Kane.

[132] Ibid.

[133] From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, Official Development Assistance [ODA] declined at an alarming rate. For example, rather than closing the gap on the target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Product [GNP] set by the international community as far back as 1992 and reaffirmed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED] in 1992, overall ODA has fallen from an average of 0.35% of GNP ($60.9 billion) in 1992 to less than 0.25% ($48.3 billion) in 1997. Available on: http://www.blobalissues.org/tRadeRelated/USAaid. asp. Accessed 25-11-06.

[134] J. Daniel Livermore and B.G. Ramcharan, 'Purposes and Principles: The Secretary-General's Role in Human Rights', in Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, Eds., The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: "Making The Most Impossible Job in the World Possible", London, Praeger, 1993, p. 234.

[135] World Bank, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank', Washington, World Bank, 1998, p. 23. Available on: http://sitersorces.worldbank.org/INTCPR/1081426. Accessed 30-6-06.

[136] For a full assessment of UN mega-conferences during Ghali's time see Stephen F. Burgess, The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997, USA, Scarecrow Press, 2001, pp. 141-172.

[137] United Nations, 'The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization', General Assembly, 51st Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/51/1, 1996, p. 329.

[138] Thalif Deen, 'Flaws in UN's Moral Authority', InterPress Service, 22 June 1999. Available on: www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/. Accessed 27-4-04.

[139] Russett, 1997, p. 494.

[140] Marcus Alexander, 'Constructing Development: The Failure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agendas and the Entrenchment of American Unilateralism', Prepared for The Concept of development: Questions and Problems, organized by the BISA IR and Global Development Working Group, 26 September 2002, [Version 1.0], p. 8. Available on:
http://www.scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=&lr=&q=cache:FUuoWtTCUIQJ. Accessed 24-11-2004.

[141] For a detailed discussion of electoral assistances provided by the UN from 1989 to 2003 see Robin Ludwing, 'Free and Fair Elections: Letting the People Decide', in Jean E. Krasno, Ed., The United Nations: Confronting The Challenges of a Global Society, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 115-133.

[142] Details of UN electoral assistances 1989-1995 are available in the 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-eighth to the Forty-ninth Session of the General Assembly: Building Peace and Development', General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/49/1, p. 273.

[143] United Nations, 'Boutros Boutros-Ghali, United Nations Secretary-General', Press Release SG/2015/ Rev.4BIO/2936/Rev.4, 16 August 1995. Available on: ·
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1995/19950816.sg2015.r4.html. Accessed 18-5-06.

[144] James Jonah and John Claude Aime.

[145] For example, the former United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC), the Center for Science and Technology for Development and the Department of Technical Cooperation for Development.

[146] United Nations, 'Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations and programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/212, Supplement 49, UN Document A/47/49, 5 June 1992.

[147] See 'Boutros-Ghali reviews his First Five Months', The Diplomatic World Bulletin, June 8-15, 1992, vol. 23, no. 6, p. 2.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Yves Beigbeder, 'The United Nations Secretariat: Reform In Progress', in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, Eds., The United Nations At The Millennium: The Principal Organs, London, Continuum, 2000, p. 211.

[150] Zarrin Caldwell, 'US policy and UN reform: past, present and future', UN Association of the USA. Available on: http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=475013. Accessed 7-8-06.

[151] United Nations, 'The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization', General Assembly, 51st Session, Supplement 1, UN Document, A/51/1, 1996, p. ix.

[152] Ibid, p. viii.

[153] Charles Hill, Ed., The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Yale University Press, 2003, Volume 2, p. 1357.

[154] Mats Berdal, 'The United Nations at Fifty: Its Role in Global Security', Ditchley Conference Report, 2-4 December 1994, no. D/94/15. As quoted in James Mayall, Ed., The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 19.

[155] United Nations, 'Office of the Inspector General', General Assembly, Forty-Eighth Session, Fifth Committee, A/C.5/48/35, 23 November 1993.

[156] Interview with Melissa Wells.

[157] Simons, 1995, p. 156.

[158] As quoted in Yves Beigbeder, The Internal Management of United Nations Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, London, Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 123.

[159] Interview with Angela Kane.

[160] Interview with John Claude Aime.

[161] Interview with Chinmaya Gharekhan.

[162] United Nations, 'Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Geneva', UN Press Release SG/SM/4727/Rev.1, 10 April, 1992, p. 6.

[163] Interview with Edward Perkins.

[164] UN high administrative posts designated as: Secretary General (SG), Undersecretary-General (USG), Assistant secretary-General (ASG) levels, Director (D-2), Principal Officer (D-1), and Senior Officer (P-5), First Officer (P-4), Second Officer (P-3), Associate Officer (P-2), and Assistance Officer (P-1).

[165] Simons, 1995, p. 145.

[166] Interview with Sylvana Foa.

[167] Interview with Angela Kane.

[168] Ibid.

[169] A summary of Ghali's proposals for a reform of the UN internal justice system is in International Documents Review, 19 June 1995.

[170] Edward Newman, 'The 'Fire of Realism': Boutros-Ghali and the Office of UN Secretary-General', The Shumei Journal of International Studies, April 1998, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 80.

[171] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[172] Interview with David Hannay.

[173] Meisler, 1995, pp. 101-2.

[174] Interview with Angela Kane.

[175] Interview with Sylvana Foa.

[176] Interview with Ahmed Fawzi.

[177] Interview with Thomas Pickering.

[178] Interview with John Simpson.

[179] Interview with James Jonah.

[180] Interview with Sylvana Foa.

Chapter Six

Understanding Ghali's Reform Agenda:
Neorealism and the English School

6.0 Introduction

Over the course of the previous two chapters, the nature of Ghali's reform agenda, its content, responses to it and its implementation have been reviewed in detail. This chapter seeks to explain his reforms drawing upon realism. More specifically, the chapter applies the realist frameworks outlined in Chapters Two and Three to an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. This is in order to determine the extent to which these two different versions of realism - neorealism and the ES - offer complementary insights into Ghali's reforms. The present chapter thus reflects on the evidence, discussed in the two previous chapters, to assess the claims of realism as a theory of change in IOs - both in its neorealist form, and in the ES interpretation. The chapter also intends to show how the primary research conducted for this thesis adds to orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda. In doing so, it makes an original contribution to the existing literature on Ghali's reforms.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first focuses on the neorealist explanation of Ghali's reform agenda. The foremost aim is to assess the utility of the neorealist interpretation, to highlight the areas where structural analysis can contribute to our understanding of Ghali's agenda, and to expose the difficulties associated with applying this theory alone to complex phenomena. The section then provides a final evaluation of neorealism as a theory to account for UN reform. The second section explores the particular utility of the ES in this case, assessing the extent to which changes in the normative, as well as in the material structure, of the international system can explain the causes, timing, content and implementation of Ghali's reform agenda. The third section looks at the limitations of orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda in the light of the preceding analysis. It does so by reviewing the existing literature and the

limitations of its arguments. The main aim is to illustrate the contribution of the thesis to the existing literature on Ghali's reforms.

6.1 The Neorealist Explanation of Ghali's Reform Agenda

The present section assesses the explanatory value of neorealism as applied to Ghali's reforms. As indicated in Chapters Two and Three, neorealism takes the polarity of the international system as its focus. This section therefore sets out to illustrate how the neorealist argument about the impact of the changing global power structure helps to account for the causes, timing, content and implementation of Ghali's reform agenda.

6.1.1 Underlying Causes

Neorealism uses the concept of polarity to identify and explain the structural forces shaping Ghali's reform agenda. It argues that the number of great powers in the international system dictates polarity, which in turn impacts upon the behaviour of states. From this perspective, the end of bipolarity would be expected to have dramatic consequences for the UN and its role. This is because the structure of the international political system and the constraints it exerts on great power behaviour would impose new and different demands on the UN. In response to these structural pressures, states would attempt to persue their own demands, leading to the reform of the organization. In other words, the UN confronted new demands in the Post-Cold War world which were mainly a manifestation of changing power relations. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity was thus a primary factor underlying Ghali's reforms. From a neorealist perspective, the end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. There was a rash of wars within newly independent states, often of religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence or cruelty. With the decline of Cold War hostility the UN acquired a major role in facilitating the settlement of a number of conflicts in which the great powers had been involved. Yet, the UN had little experience in dealing with failed states/ break-up of countries (Congo, Yugoslavia, and Somalia), but this did not prevent calls for the UN to oversee the transition from civil war to domestic peace and tranquility. Systemic

constraints forced member states and the Secretariat to reconsider the UN's role, capabilities and limitations.

This neorealist account of power shift helps explain the initiation of Ghali's reforms. As the analysis in Chapter Four indicated, changes in the distribution of power between the most powerful states in the international system were significant. With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the UN struggled to adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances and the new relations of power. At the same time, member states made a variety of demands on the UN to perform complex tasks. As many interviewees noted,[1] changes in the structure of global power encouraged the organization to rethink its role and agenda as a neorealist account suggests.

6.1.2 Timing

Neorealism can provide a convincing explanation for the timing of Ghali's reform agenda through its emphasis on the shifting distributions of material capabilities. According to neorealist logic, the changing international distribution of power significantly increased incentives for the US and the major powers to reform the organization. Given this, it was to be expected that the issue of reform would receive a great deal of attention in the Post-Cold War era.

Neorealism stresses the explanatory power of system structure - or polarity -[2] in that, under bipolarity, the UN was constrained because of the political deadlock in the SC. 'Countless issues were excluded from the UN agenda'.[3] Neorealism implies that, within such a bipolar structure, UN reform was unlikely.[4] But the disintegration heralded a new era in which there was a noticeable improvement in the climate among the permanent five (P5) members of the UN SC. A new mood prompted the Council to act rapidly and consider new orientations on several intractable conflicts. This relaxation in East-West tensions within the Council was manifested in the cooperative manner in which the P5 reviewed the options for the UN in the new world order. The first ever SC summit was convened on January 31, 1992, to discuss new ways of enhancing the Council's and the UN's role in furthering international peace and security. Freed of Cold War rivalries,

member states found themselves both prone to, and more committed to cooperation in order to resolve protracted internal conflicts. The UNSC Summit of 1992 required the SG Boutros Ghali to produce a blueprint for preventing and ending conflicts, as well as for restoring peace.[5]

In short, neorealist theory, because of its emphasis on power as a central variable, can explain the timing of UN reform. With new power relations, neorealism predicted a significant increase in cooperation among the P5 leading to increased consensus in respect of the impetus for improving UN efficiency. With a burgeoning workload, the Council sought greater operational efficiency and a new strategic approach to non-military sources of international instability, as discussed in the analysis in Chapter Four (section 4.2.2).

6.1.3 The Content of Ghali's Reform Agenda

Considering that neorealism has been a useful theoretical tool for understanding the causes and timing of Ghali's reforms, we might expect that it could explain the content of his reform agenda. However, as this analysis reveals, neorealism does not offer a very satisfying account of the content of Ghali's reforms.

The neorealist account implies that Ghali's reform agenda evolved appreciably in response to systemic and great power constraints. For example, Ghali's reforms promoted the notion that IOs and the UN in particular were needed in this transitional time to ameliorate conflicts that arose from the demise of bipolarity. That was apparent in Ghali's expansion of the UN's role as well as in reforms related to the administrative machinery necessary to deliver that role. Undertaken at the request of a SC reeling from the growing demands placed on its agenda, Ghali's key document, an *Agenda for Peace,* provided the framework for the Post-Cold War reform needed to meet security needs. It advocated a transformation of the UN's role in the light of the outbreak of new conflicts in different parts of the world and the resulting increase in demand for the organization's preventive, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building services.[6]

Ghali's path-breaking an *Agenda for Peace*, primarily addressed, as Chapter Four explored, the serious question of how far the UN's role could be developed to deal with the problems of Post-Cold War peace and security. Preventive diplomacy was given primacy, including suggestions for UN intelligence capacities and monitoring of 'hot spots'. Peacemaking proposals involving strengthening the authority of the Office of the SG to deploy force were also given pride of place in the Agenda. Finally, post-conflict peace-building was considered essential as a means of preventing recurrence of armed conflict among states. In short, Ghali's Agenda explored how the UN could respond more quickly and flexibly to conflict situations, as the great powers required it to do. Similarly, neorealism can account for some of Ghali's recommendations in an *Agenda for Development* and an *Agenda for Democratization*. Having recognized that the root causes of political conflicts were economic and social, Ghali's second Agenda stressed the urgent need for greater links between development policy and security policy. It promoted international development and cooperation as a way of securing true peace affirming the rightfulness of development, while international peace and security remained at the heart of development, even though the latter was the dominant theme of the report.

The demand for democracy, in Ghali's third document, was justified on peace and security grounds. As Chapter Four demonstrated, an *Agenda for Democratization* advocated the spread of democracy, because the domestic rule of law was considered to be the essential foundation of the international rule of law. Democracy, according to Ghali, was the ultimate guarantor of peace. Building on the above, it can be argued that Ghali's three reports were constructed on the premise that the best way to minimize domestic violence and thus the prospect of international violence was to link development, democracy, and an expanded UN role.

With regard to Ghali's administrative reforms, neorealist emphasis on power helps explain some reforms of the Secretariat. The analysis in Chapter Four explained how new threats to international peace and security, led to the creation of new functional departments. Ghali first proposed the creation of the Department of Peace-Keeping to

enable the Secretariat to deal with the political and military problems of peacekeeping. He then established the Department of Political Affairs to rationalize and codify political and military matters. In addition to these new departments, Ghali's reform plan revolved around trying to encourage cooperation among all UN functional agencies in the common purpose of strengthening international security.

In sum, from a neorealist perspective, Ghali's reforms can be explained as a response to changes in the international power structure at the end of the Cold War although evidence in Chapter Four demonstrated that these reforms are not reducible to power alone. For instance, all three reports, particularly an *Agenda for Peace*, emphasized the importance of universal human rights standards, and stressed humanitarian intervention. The appointment of a USG for Humanitarian Affairs was one of the main changes that Ghali introduced. Overall, a major purpose of all of Ghali's reform proposals was to strengthen the UN's decision-making processes and its capacity for confronting the problem of failed states and inter-ethnic violence. However, evidence suggests that the nature of his reforms was not solely or even primarily a consequence of the collapse of Cold War structures or reflected Washington's or the great powers' preferences or priorities. For instance, Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* envisioned a wide-ranging role for the UN in confronting humanitarian disaster against the preferences of the US and great powers. Neorealism does not provide an adequate account of the content and direction of Ghali's reforms, because it derives explanations and predictions exclusively from changes in the material capabilities of states. As a result, reforms that were influenced more by normative considerations, rather than material interests and power adjustments, tend to be ignored. This will be discussed further in section two.

6.1.4 Implementation
This section explores how neorealism can shed light on the implementation of Ghali's reform agenda. It commences by illustrating how neorealism explains the failure of some aspects of Ghali's reforms. The section then considers the neorealist explanation of the successful aspects of his reforms.

From a neorealist point of view, the structural pressures and constraints created by a new distribution of power should have affected negatively the implementation of Ghali's reforms. Since the US was the dominant power in the Post-Cold War international system, neorealists, especially unipolarists,[7] would have expected Washington to preserve its privileged position in and through the UN. Hence, they assert that the US would have been unwilling to endorse reforms that made the UN independent from Washington. This helps to explain the US inclination to block Ghali's recommendations that gave the UN more autonomy or more authority to act. For example, in an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali requested member states to allocate personnel and other assets to a standing UN force, available for speedy deployment when the need arose. In 1995, Ghali issued a *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, which re-emphasized the need for a rapid reaction force under UN command. As Chapter Five discussed, the US opposed the creation of special peace enforcement units at the disposal of the SG. Washington preferred a case-by-case approach, as it ensured US control and reduced the prospects of extended commitments. More generally, while acknowledging that peace-keeping operations offered a solution to intra-state conflicts, the US remained reluctant to grant Ghali too much authority.

Neorealism also seems to account for US resistance to any proposals that would give the UN greater independence or autonomy in budgetary matters. Throughout his time in office, the UN's financial crisis continued to pose a serious obstacle to reform. Ghali declared frequently his intention to have the UN operate on a secure, steady and independent financial foundation.[8] To this end, he advocated the power to tax either international arms sales or international air travel. The US, however, objected to the UN raising or collecting global taxes since it would restrict its control over the organization.[9] Besides, keeping the UN on a short financial leash would assure it of additional leverage in relation to key issues. By the same token, the US blocked Ghali's proposals which sought to enhance the organization's capacity to gather and process intelligence. According to neorealist logic, a sole superpower would have an interest in preventing the UN from acquiring such a capacity, because it ran its own intelligence networks and was keen to filter the information supplied to the UN. More precisely, if the UN were to

evolve an independent intelligence facility, its reliance on Washington in this regard would diminish.

Finally, in a unipolar world, neorealism suggests that Washington would act where necessary unilaterally to achieve its foreign policy goals.[10] This can explain a great deal of US policy towards UN reform in late 1993. Chapter Five highlighted that the reversal of US government attitudes towards the UN were crucial to the failure of Ghali's reforms. Section 5.2.2 demonstrated that the Clinton administration's abandonment of assertive multilateralism in 1993 and, especially the November 1994 'Republican revolution' in Congress, contributed to a dramatic U-turn, making the possibility of further UN reform difficult. As a result, the UN proved unable to conduct the enforcement operations, suggested by Ghali, and ideas of nation-building were abandoned. The starkest example of this was the case of Rwanda, where the UN delivery of humanitarian assistance in the face of genocide in 1994 was delayed by the unwillingness of the US to provide support forces. Washington took the position that the use of US soldiers in UN operations could only be feasible in defending the national interest. Given this, the SC defined the conflict in Rwanda as a civil war and focused on cease-fire efforts rather than on preventing genocide revealing in the process it own structural weakness. This confirms the neorealist view that effective UN reaction to threats to international stability cannot be made in the absence of US support or involvement.[11]

In short, the structural constraints on the UN were clearly in evidence in respect of the failure of some aspects of Ghali's reforms. By mid-1993, the US became wary of collective multilateralism a slippery slope, once the cost - in human and material terms - of Ghali's reform agenda was realized. The US Congress consequently seemed more intent on lowering the UN profile in US foreign policy rather than in increasing the effectiveness of the organization. This, as the previous chapter, reveals undermined the implementation of Ghali's reforms. To quote Newman: 'There was a fundamental divergence of ideology between the cautious new thinking in the US administration and the internationalist rhetoric of Boutros-Ghali'.[12]

Having illustrated how neorealism explains the failure of Ghali's reforms, it is to the neorealist explanations of the successful aspects of his reforms that we now turn. As mentioned before, neorealism asserts that the UN in the Post-Cold War era continued to serve the interests, not of people or humanity, but those of the US as the primary power holder. This can explain the success of Ghali's call to strengthen the UN in the early Post-Cold War euphoria (from 1990 to late 1993), when both the Bush and Clinton administrations welcomed and supported a stronger mandate for UN peacekeeping. American optimism about the possibilities for the UN was highest during the Gulf War. As a result, in the early 1990s, Ghali's recommendation of greater UN involvement was implemented: American forces formed the core of the UN-mandated coalition that liberated Kuwait. This was consistent with the US policy of assertive multilateralism. In 1992-93, Washington also envisioned a peace and security regime that included collective security and peace enforcement. One outcome was that, 'the US displayed the most interest and commitment'[13] in launching the Somalia mission. President Bush thus supported Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in sending US troops to Somalia. Similarly, when Clinton took office, his first ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, announced a policy of 'assertive multilateralism', which included extensive US engagement with the SC on the issue of peacekeeping, while asserting leadership over it - partly in the hope that it would help reduce US military involvement overseas. In June 1993, Albright asserted that the end of the Cold War placed 'the United Nations in the centre of the effort to guide and safeguard a suddenly chaotic world'.[14] This can explain why the SC - and particularly the US - welcomed Ghali's proposals for preventive activities and wider conceptions of peace and security. From this it follows, as Chapter Five demonstrated, Ghali acquired a central role on the world stage. 'He despatched fact-finding missions, set up 'interim offices', combining political information and humanitarian functions in some former Soviet republics, took initiatives to limit conflicts and tried to anticipate possible flows of refugees and displaced persons'.[15] In other words, the UN was authorized to prevent the occurrence of civil war and to halt all military operations.

It is worth noting here that for those neorealists, who characterised the Post-Cold War by multipolarity,[16] the motivations and priorities of all the major powers are significant in

explaining the implementation of reform. According to this view, a state's basic orientation towards UN reform is heavily determined by its rising (relative) capabilities.[17] This can explain why states like Germany and Japan supported Ghali's reform agenda and launched intensive campaigns for SC membership. The analysis in Chapter Five demonstrated that both states were keen on implementing Ghali's proposals. They raised the level of their voluntary contributions and agreed to participate in peacekeeping activities to legitimize their respective claims. Japan played a very large role in UNTAC's efforts to stabilize and democratize Cambodia since they wanted to be good global citizens, to assist their case for a permanent membership of the SC. The British and French deployed relatively large numbers of peacekeeping troops to the Balkans, and the French mounted an operation in Rwanda and Congo and the Russians in Georgia. Finally, Canada and Norway and other states continued to be stalwart supporters of UN peacekeeping.

Finally, multipolarists predict that structural changes at the end of the Cold War would lead to big powers' support for institutional reforms in directions that brought the UN more in harmony with their specific interests. This explains why the P5 supported Ghali's recommendations for better management, i.e. the creation of a post of Inspector General, even though the post of Director of Management is always held by a US citizen. By the same token, the P5 favoured the UN association with regional collective security organizations, such as NATO, in the area of peace enforcement as an alternative to augmenting the UN's strategic capabilities by creating a standing UN peacekeeping force. In this context, it is worth noting that the cessation of the East-West confrontation and the collapse of the Eastern bloc reduced significantly the direct politico/military involvement of the major powers in many regions. As a consequence, member states sought to utilize regional arrangements in order to preserve international peace and security in ways that reflected better their security interests, values and policies.

To summarize, by taking into consideration the realities of national interests and the foreign policy objectives of key member governments, neorealism can provide answers to an important question: Why were some of Ghali's key recommendations never

implemented? The answer for neorealists is clear: key member states would not accept reforms that potentially altered the global distribution of power, or enhanced that of the UN. This explains why Ghali's proposals to reform UN procedures were rejected. In other words, member states favoured institutional arrangements which led to greater efficiency in the pursuit of established goals. On this basis, they required value for money, clear objectives, zero growth budget, effective management and financial control. At the same time, any efforts to give the organization command of an army, or levy taxes, were blocked.

Ghali's reform agenda was clearly conditioned by changes in state power but reform was not simply a product of power or interest, even that of the most powerful states. Although structural constraints shaped reform, it is important to note that there were also aspects of Ghali's agenda that were implemented even though they contradict neorealist expectations about the UN and its role. For example, if power structures were all that counted, why did member states support Ghali's broad recommendations for improving the UN's capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies? This implies that something besides polarity and polarity shifts influenced the preferences of the most powerful actors and the process of reform. Neorealism thus seems to account for the failure of Ghali's reforms yet fails to provide an adequate explanation for the success of his reforms. Section 6.2.4 elaborates this argument.

6.2 The ES Explanation of Ghali's Reform Agenda

As a supplement to the neorealist explanation, the ES assumes that UN reform is much more about power and norms. For adherents of the ES, Ghali's reform agenda cannot be understood outside the changing normative context. The internationalization of human rights and the evolution of state sovereignty are of great significance to the explanation of UN reform. This section assesses the extent to which changes in the global normative, in addition to power structure, can explain the causes, timing, content and implementation of Ghali's reform agenda.

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6.2.1 Underlying Causes

The ES can provide a convincing explanation of both the motivations and the changing conditions that shaped Ghali's reforms. It does so since it focuses on the changing normative structure of the Post-Cold War world order. According to this perspective, change in the global power structure and relations did indeed bring about UN reform, but the end of the Cold War gave rise to a set of principles and norms to which the UN and its members had to respond. In other words, normative changes also occurred as a result of the end of the East-West confrontation. Such changes were clearly relevant to a fundamental alteration in the UN's role. Ghali's reform agenda therefore can be considered a result of the evolution of international constitutive norms.

The Post-Cold War era witnessed changing international norms related to human rights and, in turn, national sovereignty. With the end of the Cold War, new emergent norms of humanitarian intervention began to supersede the norm of non-intervention. This normative shift had significant consequences for the norm of states sovereignty in all its aspects. In parallel to the increasing involvement of the UN in Post-Cold War civil strife, the expanded notion of security embraced humanitarian intervention leading to new demands on the UN. The UN had to change in part to meet a pressing normative agenda. Accordingly, as chapter Four demonstrated, Ghali introduced the wider conceptions of peace and security as the organization came to terms with the shifting values and processes of human rights and sovereignty. There was a pressing need for reform as the organization became more active in protecting human rights, as well as maintaining global peace and security. In summary, the ES approach, because of its emphasis on norms, highlights how the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda was also a response to the changing normative structure of world politics. The Post-Cold War years underscored international expectations, which respect fundamental human rights, placed by international society on sovereign political authorities. This prompted a new role for the UN in preventing and responding to humanitarian crises. The ES approach emphasizes how evolving norms, not just shifts in power structure, influenced the motivations and initiation of Ghali's reform agenda.

6.2.2 Timing

The ES can also explain the timing of Ghali's reforms, because it emphasizes that the normative context changed markedly with the end of the Cold War. According to this view, a normative change regarding the role of human rights and sovereignty was evolving. By the time Ghali took office as SG in 1992, many UN members were supportive of the newly evolving norm of humanitarian intervention. As a result, in the first ever SC Summit in 1992 the overwhelming majority of members states - with reservations from Zimbabwe and objections from China -[18] talked of human rights as being integral to peace and security. Prime Minster John Major of the UK, in concluding the SC meeting, revealed that 'People increasingly agree that humanitarian affairs are every man's affair'.[19] The statement adopted by the Summit asserted that the protection of international human rights had become one of the tasks of UN peacekeeping sanctioning practices which had been happening for a few years.[20]

In similar vein, the GA declared that international peace and security not only must be conceived in an integrated manner, encompassing *inter alia* environmental aspects, but also emphasized that economic development was also vital to it.[21] Together, the declarations of the SC and the GA raised the issue of human rights to an unprecedented level of significance on the UN agenda. Taking the Post-Cold War normative context into consideration, and with the lessening of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, the ES can provide a partial explanation of the timing of Ghali's reforms. According to ES logic, as the Cold War ebbed, the great powers became more willing to work together. This consensus on norms was coupled with greater interdependence among nations. This was evident in the UNSC Summit of 1992, when there was a significant shift of attitudes on the question of common humanity, especially amongst Western states.[22] As a result, human security became both a new measure of global security and a new impetus for global action.

6.2.3 The Content of Ghali's Reform Agenda

The ES suggests that the role of shared norms, not just power relations, might provide a satisfactory account of Post-Cold War UN reform. From this standpoint, a norm-based

explanation emphasizing the gradual evolution of human rights norms captures the direction and content of Ghali's reforms. As discussed above, the world fundamentally changed with the end of the Cold War and human rights norms became more widely diffused. Using this consensus as a point of departure, it is not surprising that Ghali attempted to address the complex relationship between threats to international peace and security, with an emphasis on human security.

From an ES perspective, human rights norms allowed for an expanded definition of international stability. Human rights violations, mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, and other such violations of human security were held by international society to constitute threats to the peace.[23] As a result, in the 1990s, security came to be defined more broadly, and the role that economic globalization played in international peace became more visible.[24] This explains why Ghali's reforms emphasised the non-military aspects of international peace and security. In his report to the SC an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali highlighted that at least some of the causes of violence between states could be addressed by reducing gross social and economic inequalities and deprivations. He went so far as to place economic despair, social justice, and political oppression among the 'deepest causes of conflict'.[25] This in turn allowed the SG to stress the need for human rights expertise in peacekeeping and post conflict activities.

The ES emphasis on the significance of norms can also help explain why the need to merge peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance was an important respect of Ghali's reforms. In the *Agenda for Peace*, for example, he outlined a comprehensive approach to UN responses to the new plague of complex emergencies afflicting the Post-Cold War world. He presented a spectrum of policy stars from preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making to peace-building. The spectrum involved economic and social programs beyond the traditional deployment of a few UN political officers and a comparatively small number of Blue Berets to deal with specific short-term emergencies.[26] Ghali thus called as chapter Four demonstrated for mobilization of the whole UN system - economic as well as political - to deal with ostensibly humanitarian and political crises.

Furthermore, Ghali's agenda called for an expanded UN role including peace enforcement, with the implication of intervention in the internal affairs of nation states. This new role, based on actual experience in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1993), was justified on humanitarian as well as political grounds given that humanitarian crises were considered threats to international peace and security. Accepted norms of human rights legitimized Ghali's call for the UN to give greater attention to inter-state wars as well as to the humanitarian crises they provoked. Reinterpretation of sovereignty also altered the environment in which states related to each other. These changes in turn affected the ways in which the UN responded to genocide and massive human rights violation in war zones around the world. On this basis, Ghali pointed to a change in the balance between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights, and declared that 'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty....has passed. Its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of states to understand this'.[27] He elaborated his view on sovereignty in another context: 'The centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory. A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty'.[28] Ghali postulated that managing the international dimensions of security required an expanded concept and practice of sovereignty.

As noted earlier, in an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali advocated the relaxation, under certain circumstances, of the long accepted principle of consent by the conflicting parties before a peacekeeping operation could be mounted.[29] Speaking in Tokyo in April 1993, he pointed out that in both the former Yugoslavia and Somalia the consent of both parties had not been a prerequisite for UN action. He also noted that 'not all states are in fact able to preserve stability or exercise sovereignty'.[30] Finally, in an attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the traditional concept of state sovereignty and the emerging norm of 'a duty to protect others', Ghali proposed a flexible, multifaceted approach:

> Underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of people is a dimension
> of *universal sovereignty* that resides in all humanity and provides all people with
> legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole (emphasis added).[31]

Building on the above, it could be argued that Ghali's reference to 'universal sovereignty' was a measured description of the new norm which states, IOs and civil society perceived as legitimizing UN intervention in humanitarian crises. In short, in his 1992 report *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali suggested that national sovereignty was weakening now that the Cold War had ended. He rejected the orthodox doctrine of national sovereignty as non-interference, and instead argued for more aggressive intervention to prevent conflict and establish domestic order. This normative shift set the stage for UN peacekeeping operations, which in practice assumed sovereignty over war-wracked territories - e.g. East Timor and Cambodia interventions in the 1990s. Ghali rethought the UN's role in peacekeeping and in his view, member states should be willing to cede a measure of sovereignty to the UN. During his period of office, peacekeeping operations evolved from only policing the separation of two warring parties into joint approval to virtually all possible means of preventing, ending and settling war issues.[32]

Finally, the ES can account for Ghali's reforms to the UN's administrative structure. Ghali's institutional reforms sought to ensure that the Secretariat was capable of meeting the Post-Cold War demands conditioned by threats to human security. Preventative measures, peace building, and the protection of civilians in conflict situations, required new instruments in order for the UN to take effective action. In other words, the old instruments of promoting human rights must become integral to a new, more comprehensive approach centred on the protection and welfare of civilians. Humanitarian values thus became a catalyst for and legitimation of administrative reform.

The ES also suggests that normative changes influenced Ghali's adoption of an integrated approach to human security. This helps explain Ghali's recommendations that coordination with regional organizations should be developed. By the same logic, Ghali encouraged a better coordination of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and the humanitarian and human rights aspects of the Secretariat's response to the proliferation of complex emergencies in the Post-Cold War era. Moreover, he promoted cooperation among all UN functional agencies in the common purpose of strengthening human rights.

All of these measures were intended to facilitate more effective intervention whenever there were serious violations of human rights.

In short, the ES contributes to an understanding of the direction and content of Ghali's reform agenda through its emphasis on changing global norms regarding human rights and sovereignty. These normative considerations were central to Ghali's changes regarding the expansion of the UN's role as well as reforms related to the administrative machinery necessary to deliver that role. Accordingly, it reasonable to conclude that Ghali's reforms reflected not only the special interests of the great powers but also expressed evolving norms of global interdependence.

6.2.4 Implementation

As elaborated above (section 6.1.4), neorealism can provide a sufficient explanation of the failure of some aspects of Ghali's reforms. It however fails to shed light on a key aspect of reform that was successfully implemented, namely recommendations for improving the UN's capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. This section deploys ES theory to explain this anomaly demonstrating how it supplements the neorealist account of Ghali's reforms.

Highlighting changes in normative standards articulated by member states, especially the most powerful, the ES can plausibly claim to account for the success of aspects of Ghali's reforms. As noted, the Post-Cold War era embodied a normative shift which shaped and conditioned the values, expectations and behaviour of states. In other words, the international community had become increasingly aware of its global responsibilities. With the end of the Cold War, there was a renewed focus on upholding international humanitarian norms and this was reflected in the implementation of Ghali's proposals to enforce the protection of basic human rights.

The ES highlights the internationalization and institutionalization of human rights to explain why the SC adopted a number of resolutions, committing the international community to deeper and wider peace operations in domestic conflicts or peace settlements, as suggested by Ghali. In the early 1990s, the Council made a broad

interpretation of the scope of Chapter VII pertaining to enforcement action in response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace and acts of aggression. Based on agreement among the P5, this interpretation posits that humanitarian conditions within a state, even those that do not appear to generate negative external security effects, may constitute a threat to international peace and security and merit enforcement action as it did with respect to the situations in Somalia or Haiti. Here it is worth noting that the Council took article 39 resolution on South Africa in 1977 (arms embargo).

For the ES, changes to the norms that underpin international society constrain even powerful actors like the US. In this context, the discussion in Chapter Five demonstrated that, in the early 1990s, Washington was an enthusiastic advocate of humanitarian activism, in areas of human rights, democracy, and humanitarian intervention within a UN framework. The US had been a strong advocate of the establishment of tribunals to hear cases arising from the wars in Bosnia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively. At the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, US delegates played the leading role in pushing for reaffirmation of universal human rights. Similarly, President Clinton urged the Forty-eighth GA to 'create, at long last, a high commissioner for human rights' and to do it 'soon, with vigour and energy and conviction'.[33] The Assembly complied and unanimously voted to create the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights. Finally, the US was the primary player in the UN campaign to repel Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, to pressure Iraq to comply with various UN resolutions after Desert Storm, and to make other UN security operations succeed. Most significantly, the US was the driving force in the Council behind the authorization of intervention in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1994, identifying humanitarian crises and disruption to democracy, respectively, as threats to international peace and security. This redefinition of the concept of international peace and security legitimized a broader UN responsibility to respond to and prevent humanitarian crises. Normative change thus helps explain why the SC welcomed Ghali's initiatives in response to humanitarian emergencies. For example, in an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali emphasized that peacekeeping entailed a human rights element. Chapter Five also emphasized that the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights formed an important and uncontroversial part of the mandates of several UN

peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s. In line with Ghali's multi-dimensional peacekeeping approach, UN activity had stretched traditional notions of peacekeeping - e.g. in Namibia, Somalia, and Kosovo - beyond a strictly military operation to one involving political, economic, social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions. As Ghali observed in his final annual report in 1996, 'The United Nations…has moved to integrate, to the extent possible, its human rights and humanitarian efforts with its peace efforts'.[34]

There was also a great deal of support for the improvement of instruments of preventive diplomacy and the settlement of conflict, as emphasized in Ghali's *Agenda for Peace.* The analysis in the previous chapter (section 5.3.1) showed that over 100 missions concerning representation, fact-finding, confidence-building measures, early warning and good offices were undertaken during his tenure. In some cases, the UN remained in the countries to help build peace and lay the groundwork for socio-economic and political development. In Cambodia, for example, peacekeepers made the peace, compelling opposing forces to abide by agreements sufficiently for peace to be established and maintained. This operation demonstrated key member states' support for Ghali's proposals for peace making and peace enforcement even before peace could be kept.

A focus on norms can also help explain why member states demonstrated commitment to Ghali's multilateral approach to development, articulated in an *Agenda for Development.* Chapter Five (section 5.3.2) demonstrated that states and IOs sought to integrate human rights into a social policy framework supportive of economic development strategies. In this context, the World Bank promoted 'good governance', including political and civil rights, among its aid recipients, along with the empowerment of women and civil society participation. Simultaneously, normative considerations can help explain why member states welcomed Ghali's idea that the UN had a significant role in relation to democratization. As discussed, democracy, a term not even mentioned in the Charter, had become the proclaimed goal of much of the UN's operational activities and the subject of one of Ghali's three agendas. The UN missions in the Caribbean and Central America in the 1990s illustrate this shift towards the adoption of human rights and democracy as

fundamental principles of the UN. In this context, Chapter Five illustrated that the UN under Ghali demonstrated, for the first time, a commitment to civil and political rights by deploying human rights monitors, and to multiparty democracy by supporting, monitoring and managing elections. To succeed over time, Ghali asserted that democratization within a nation must be supported by a process of democratization among nations. The democratization of the international system was therefore one of the UN's greatest challenges.

The legitimation of UN democracy promotion rested on the emerging consensus that violating state sovereignty was justifiable in pursuit of higher objectives. A more comprehensive and effective UN approach to democratization was taking shape. The previous chapter demonstrated that the UN offered a range of assistance beyond assistance in holding free and fair elections, from support for a culture of democratization to institution-building. In short, many member states accepted the value of democracy as a route to peace and security. In this regard, the UN acquired an obligation to protect individuals, promote universal values, and create institutions that encouraged political and economic freedom.

Finally, new norms associated with the end of the Cold War encouraged the UN to reform its administrative machinery. This can explain why member states implemented many of Ghali's proposals, including the creation of new strategies and tools to promote human security. The analysis in chapter Five illustrated that Ghali expeditiously constructed UN humanitarian mechanisms by creating a new department of Humanitarian Affairs which advocated human security and sought to improve the coordination of the whole network of Specialized Agencies and NGOs. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the importance of human rights was highlighted in proposals to restructure the Secretariat including the creation of a Commissioner for Human Rights who would cooperate with the USG for Humanitarian Affairs. These reforms along with the Representative of the SG on Internally Displaced Persons were an institutional expression of the new normative agenda.

In short, the evolution of global norms related to human rights and development encouraged changes in the interpretation of state sovereignty. The direction of that change was towards a new conception of sovereignty that legitimized UN intervention on the basis of humanitarian concerns. Without the acceptance of such norms, it would be hard to understand or explain Ghali's reform agenda in general. This is especially so given that the UN, after all, is an organization of sovereign states. This implies that a reform proposal that fails to preserve and in some ways even to strengthen state sovereignty can hope for a favourable reception from those who have the power to enact it. Overall then, a case can be made that Ghali's reforms were legitimated or made possible by normative shifts within the international society of states in the Post-Cold War era emphasizing new standards of state behaviour. This reinforces the ES view that normative as well as material variables are important to any explanation of UN reform. Given the significance of normative factors in understanding Ghali's reforms, the ES complements neorealism. The table below summarizes both the neorealist and the ES explanations of Ghali's reform agenda.

Table 6.1: Comparison between Neorealism and the ES regarding the Causes, Timing, Content and Implementation of Ghali's Reform Agenda.

	Neorealism	The English School
Causes	Shifts in power structure.	Shifts in both power and normative structures.
Timing	Significant increase in cooperation between the permanent five (P5) to maintain peace and security.	Increase in cooperation between the P5 to maintain peace and security, along with normative consensus on the protection of international human rights.
Content	Reflected primarily the priorities of major states and/or US hegemony.	Reflected the priorities of major states and/or US hegemony as well as evolving global norms, i.e. the role of human rights and the new interpretation of state sovereignty.
Implementation	Depended solely on systemic and great power constraints.	Depended not only on systemic and great power constraints but also on how deeply the changing normative structure of global politics was internalized by the UN's major players.

The table above compares the two theoretical accounts of Ghali's reform agenda. It shows that an analysis based on the neorealist approach accounts for Ghali's reforms by focusing primarily on the international distribution of power. This being so, it emphasizes that Ghali's agenda evolved appreciably in response to the systemic changes and challenges of the Post-Cold War era. Structural changes required the organization to rethink its role and agenda to reflect the priorities of major states and/or US hegemony. As such, this analysis of the structural factors alone may enable us to explain the causes and timing of Ghali's reforms but it fails to provide many insights into the content and direction of reform project. Similarly, neorealism offers an explanation of the failure of aspects of Ghali's reforms yet cannot shed much light on those successes in his reforms.

The ES, by contrast, accounts for Ghali's reform agenda by emphasizing normative changes alongside power shifts. It maintains that, both the international system and international society were undergoing complex changes. Normative factors shaped the content and direction of Ghali's reforms in so far as they were sustained and legitimated by a set of widely accepted norms. These norms became especially significant from the beginning of the 1990s. Given changes in the significance of human rights and the re-interpretation of state sovereignty, the ES can also explain the success of some of Ghali's reforms. This ES analysis generally complements the neorealist argument in that, while neorealism appears to account better for the initiation and failure of aspects of Ghali's agenda, the ES, appears to present a more satisfactory explanation of the content, direction and key successes of his reforms. Ultimately, therefore these two accounts are best considered as complementary rather than opposing narratives of UN reform. This will be taken up further in the concluding chapter.

Having examined the explanatory power of both the neorealist and the ES approaches to the analysis of Ghali's reform agenda, the next step is to demonstrate how this analysis enhances the critique of the existing literature on Ghali's reform agenda developed in the previous chapters.

6.3 Moving beyond the Orthodox Literature on Ghali's Reform Agenda

The intent of this section is to highlight the original contribution that the thesis claims to make to the existing literature on Ghali's reforms. It considers the limits of early explanations and narratives of Ghali's reform agenda. Although there is a substantial body of work on Ghali's reforms, much of it is based on theoretical insights drawn from the neorealist approach. This perspective leads many authors to regard Ghali's reform agenda as solely or primarily the consequence of changes in the global power structure and the attitudes of the major world powers; particularly of the US. Thus, much of the literature focuses solely on the P5 and explains reforms in terms of shifts in power relations among major states and/or US hegemony.

In his book *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1992-1997*, Stephen Burgess examined Ghali's period in office and the imprints that he attempted to make on the UN. According to Burgess 'With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1991, the world featured only one dominant power for the first time in centuries. With unipolarity, the United States grasped the opportunity to lead smaller powers and the United Nations toward the US vision of global concord'.[35] Burgess went on to assess the role of the US in UN Post-Cold War activities with the main focus on Washington's policies towards the SG and the UN. For Burgess, in the early 1990s and with US backing, 'reform was viewed as a positive initiative that was achievable'.[36] This, however, was not the case by 1994 when the Republican revolution in the Congress turned the US against the UN. Burgess argues that, during the Ghali years, the importance of the US was crucial and the most important factor in understanding both Ghali's reform efforts and his management was 'the reversal of US government attitudes toward the UN'.[37]

This interpretation is reinforced by Geoff Simons in *UN Malaise: Power, Problems and Realpolitik*. He argues that commitment to Ghali's reforms was all about furthering narrow national interests: 'In fact it soon became increasingly clear - though some observers were perversely slow to notice - that the new American enthusiasm for the

United Nations (which rarely extended to Washington paying its dues on time) derived from the fact that the international body could now be conveniently dragooned to serve American foreign policy - a role that the American founders of the United Nations may well have intended'.[38] Building on the above, he concluded that the major powers desired a UN that would oil the wheels of the newly emergent world order, not one that would seek to build a new order. The US therefore remained opposed to the creation of special peace enforcement units at the disposal of the SG. In Simons's words, 'Boutros Ghali and many others have urged member states to provide predictable and generous support to the UN, and to agree the concept of a standing UN force. Such developments would gradually erode the American dominance in the Security Council (and for this reason have been opposed by Washington)'.[39] Complementing the views of Geoff Simons, Benjamin Rivlin in *Boutros-Ghali's Ordeal: Leading the United Nations in an Age of Uncertainty*, noted that Ghali was an assertive and determined leader. But as the fate of his reform demonstrated, 'It is primarily the national interest of the individual UN member-states that determines the nature of UN involvement. In this process, the interest of the United States as determined by its government is most compelling'.[40]

A deeper analysis of Ghali's tenure was offered by Edward Newman in his classic work *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era*. In this book, Newman examined Ghali's reforms in the context of the evolving Post-Cold War political environment. Particular attention was given to developments in peace and security and the multifaceted – and sometime paradoxical – implications these had for the reform process. According to Newman, 'In the 'post-hegemonic' and post-imperial world, the United Nations and its Secretary-General have reflected systemic volatility, which has forced the members and the international secretariat to reconsider their roles and limitations'.[41] Ghali's reform agenda was thus put into the context of a wider conception of peace and security, which increasingly blurred the distinction between the international and domestic realms and embraced a far wider agenda than traditionally accepted. As Newman phrased it, 'Boutros-Ghali was in many ways suited to an environment which offered the UN and the Secretaryship-General opportunities to increase their activity in international peace and security'.[42] Nevertheless, 'The structure and ideology of the UN

remain largely static and calls for reform have not resulted in substantial institutional change'.[43] Newman concludes: 'The Office of Secretary-General under Boutros-Ghali has continued to execute the functions traditionally assigned to it. In addition, it has experienced the new opportunities and constraints which are a reflection of a volatile and possibly transient political climate'.[44] Yet, 'The Office still reflects the use of the UN as an instrument of certain states or transient alliances within the Security Council'.[45] In other words, while the SG's activity had burgeoned and he had performed tasks and encouraged discussion at the forefront of innovative UN practices, 'material shortages and political constraints condition the Office'.[46] In short, Newman interprets Ghali's reforms in the context of the political constraints and opportunities that existed at the time. For him, the predominance, although not necessarily leadership, of the US determined the success of reforms as Newman asserts that 'Boutros-Ghali's 'innovative' post-Cold War activities were at the pace of the Council, and eventually he ran aground'[47] and Ghali's tenure 'as a failure of international, or perhaps supranational, leadership in the face of systemic and great power constraints'.[48]

Other writers also observed the importance and influence of the five Permanent Members to the success of Ghali's reform agenda. Saadia Touval in 1994, for example, concluded: 'The SG is still constrained by the views and interests of the Security Council's five permanent states. He needs their active support, to accomplish any significant intervention'.[49] In a similar context, Manuel Froehlich, in his 1997 article *The Old and the New UN Secretary-General,* examined the conditions, possibilities and limitations of the office under Ghali. He went so far as to claim that: 'All the activities of the Secretary-General are always governed by the imperative of the trust and feedback of member states, especially of the permanent members of the UN Security Council'.[50] Following this line of thought, the author concluded that 'Boutros Ghali's efforts to achieve a determining role for the UN when coping with the new challenges of world politics increasingly put him into a position of conflict with the USA'.[51] An important aspect of Ghali's legacy, therefore, was in highlighting the prominence of the US as a permanent member of the SC. For Froehlich, Ghali's account demonstrated why real reform was a far too ambitious goal, especially when the SG 'lost his link with the USA'.[52] It is

perhaps not surprising to find that 'The discussion of reform under his leadership fizzled out despite the heavily symbolic opportunity of the UN anniversary'.[53]

Building on the above, it is plausible to conclude that Ghali's three reform manifestos have one thing in common: their analysis are set in the context of existing power relations. Orthodox accounts assert that the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the global balance of power, with Western states, led by the US, occupying a hegemonic position in the global political order: 'It is not surprising, therefore, that Boutros-Ghali seemed eager to please Washington'.[54] He reacted to Washington's claim that the UN administration was top-heavy and unwieldy, by trimming the bloated bureaucracy and reducing the size of the upper echelons of the Secretariat. Ghali also appointed Americans to top positions in the Secretariat, as Yves Beigbeder pointed out: 'US financial and other pressures made him [Ghali] submit to most of the US demands, perhaps more to save the Organization than in a real appreciation that reform was needed. In order to carry out the reforms, the Secretary General surrounded himself with US-nominated candidates'.[55] Moreover, it was always understood that, since the US was the largest contributor, its power over the reform was significant. For example, in an article published in 1993, William Branigan asserted that the Congress voted to withhold 10 percent of US 1993 UN dues - some $29 million - until the post of inspector general was established.[56] Benjamin Rivlin adds that in 1996 when Ghali raised the issue of independent financing for the UN, Washington threatened 'to prohibit United States voluntary or assessed contributions to the United Nations if the United Nations imposes any tax or fee on United States persons or continues to develop or promote proposals for such taxes or fees'.[57] The existing literature thus concludes that Ghali's agenda reflected those changes that the P5 and particularly the US supported. As Max Jakobson puts it, 'The fact remains that, without active American engagement in terms of political will and money, nothing much can be done to make the United Nations a more effective and important body'.[58]

It follows that a central issue in the existing literature on Ghali's tenure and reforms is the leadership role of the US. As Benjamin Rivlin aptly notes, 'As the sole superpower, the

United States fills the role in the United Nations that exists within all multilateral organizations – that of the catalytic dominant power that provides the leadership which is necessary for the institution to function'.[59] In his view, to understand the Ghali's travail during his tenure, 'one must recognize the built-in tension between any secretary-general discharging the responsibilities of the office laid out in the Charter and the leading member-states of the organization, particularly the hegemonic power'.[60]

Using the same logic, in *Dateline UN: A New Hammarskjöld?* Stanley Meisler noted that like Hammarskjöld, Ghali was keen to extend his authority, expand the role of the office and transform the UN on many fronts. Yet, 'he continually modifies his missions and sometimes steps into forbidding territory to satisfy the demands of powerful members of the Security Council like the United States'.[61] This view runs in very close parallel to Jeffrey Gedmin's article *The Secretary-Generalissimo* which describes Ghali as 'the most powerful UN secretary-general in the organization's history'.[62] Gedmin however warned that it would be a great mistake to assume that in the issue of reform, the GS was entirely independent.

Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, in their valuable account of the challenges facing the six occupants of the UN office, *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, were also close to this view when they observed that, with the end of the Cold War, 'The Security Council increasingly entrusted to the Secretary-General responsibility for developing and implementing the machinery for resolving the conflicts'.[63] The UN was involved in a variety of international crises and global issues and Ghali in turn was able to implement his proposals in the areas of peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. Rivlin asserts that, while it was clear that a central role belonged to Ghali, it must always be remembered that 'The Secretary-General and his organization function in an international political climate that establishes the parameters of their behaviour, determining where and to what end the UN presence should be invoked'. [64]

A related issue is raised by James Sutterlin emphasizing that the SG, as chief administrator, is not bound to accept candidates of the Permanent Members for the most senior Secretariat positions. 'Each Secretary-General, including Boutros-Ghali, has done so, however, essentially for other reasons of executive leadership'.[65] Seen in this way, Rivlin contended that Ghali's experience during his five years in office revealed that 'In the equation of the United Nations, the Secretary-General has been the dependent variable while the Member States, particularly the major powers, represent the independent variable'.[66]

In view of all this, it is perhaps not surprising to find that existing traditional studies of Ghali's reforms tend to focus exclusively on state power and material power. As discussed above, one of the major themes throughout the existing literature is that Ghali's reform agenda was determined solely or primarily by power politics. This being so, the content of his reforms is understood in relation to the interests of the dominant states. However, this study, especially this and the preceding chapter, provide evidence that Ghali's reform agenda has to be understood as more than the expression of great power interests. Given this, existing studies, which tend to focus solely on the motivations and priorities of the most powerful member states, are inadequate to the task of fully understanding Ghali's reforms. They particularly fail to explain why the content and direction of reform did not always match with the interests of leading states, or why the implementation of Ghali's proposals was not directly linked to US interests.

In reviewing the existing literature, one can argue that there is little consideration of the normative dimension. By contrast, the evidence I described in the course of this research, however, indicates the significance of international norms. Moreover, most interviewees asserted that international norms had evolved from the end of the Cold War and, to a certain extent, these had influenced Ghali's reform project. According to a former UN member of staff, one of the distinguishing features of the Post-Cold War world was that changes in material structures had occurred in combination with the spread of new shared norms.[67] This makes the normative context, within which Ghali's reforms took place, has an explanatory role. In other words, new norms and principles were taking root and

slowly reshaping the international landscape. The UN and its member states responded to these normative shifts in distinct ways, but they could not ignore them. One conclusion to draw from this is that: Ghali's reform project was a product of both structural and normative changes.

Former British Ambassador David Hannay maintains that 'a point that needs to be remembered here is that the international power structure is the landmark on the map that nations have to follow'.[68] As these landmarks changed, the UN changed too. But, the growing extent to which norms of democracy and human rights were spreading around the world was also noteworthy. According to him, 'Ghali's reform agenda was influenced by both of them. It is a mistake to believe that his reforms were influenced solely by the reality of power. It is also an illusion to think that his agenda was the result of the huge normative shift'.[69] In a similar vein, Pickering, then the US permanent representative to the UN, highlighted the fact that, in the early years of the Post-Cold War era, there was increasing international attention to human rights and priority attached to economic development. The increasing embrace of humanitarian norms as justification for the use of force also implied a different agenda. Ghali's reform agenda in turn had to serve the common as well states' interests. Member states supported his proposals, which not only served their own interests but also common interests. Pickering concluded 'I believe international norms and rules had to be taken into account. Viewed in this light, both power and norms played a role in Ghali's agenda. It is difficult to divorce the two'.[70]

Fawzi, Ghali's spokesman, also commented that 'besides power, there was an evolving norm emphasizing that member states are responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. It was not a question of citizens' loyalty to governments but governments' loyalty to citizens'.[71] Prior to the end of the Cold War, humanitarian activities and peacekeeping operations were almost entirely separate. Peacekeeping was a purely military task and humanitarian assistance was left to agencies, funding organizations and programmes. The end of the Cold War brought more complicated challenges to the area of peace and security. There was general agreement among members about the need for comprehensive approaches to international stability, in which human rights and the

military, humanitarian and development organs of the UN are deployed to promote peace and security. 'Ghali had to alter the UN structure in order to provide a multilateral framework and legitimacy for such actions in the future'.[72] Fawzi added, 'State power is a reality, but at the end of the day, member states have to respect new international norms. So, changes in common values outside the UN definitely derive internal reform'.[73]

Building on the above, it is clear that the interviewees believed that Ghali's reform agenda was inevitably influenced by the global normative landscape. As a former UN staff member points out, 'a weight of power existed, and therefore the US influenced Ghali's reforms. Yet, a wisdom among players within the UN and international norms that everyone agreed upon also had weight'.[74] This view is echoed by the then USG, James Jonah, who asserted that Ghali's recommendations reflected norms that were widely held within the international community. According to him, 'Ghali's reform agenda clearly served the pragmatic interests of key states. However, it would have been a wholly different agenda if it only defined their narrow interests during the new era'.[75]

Finally, Boutros Ghali himself believed that the UN in the Post-Cold War era was a representative, not only of the international system as the collective interests of key states, but also of an international society which is constituted through certain norms. Whereas, the early 1990s reforms did indeed reflect the reality of the global power structure, nevertheless, they had to be responsive to the norms of international society. In Ghali's words: 'Reform was a product of a change in the international system. The agenda however was not constrained by the US hegemony. During my tenure, new perceptions and interpretations were evolving. International norms also changed sufficiently to permit the organization to adopt a whole new political and social agenda - democratization, election-monitoring, and the building of civil society - that was not contemplated, or even mentioned, in the Charter. All these changes at the normative level necessitated a change of the UN system. Although the role of norms was limited, still they played a role in the way the reform was applied'.[76] In this context, Ghali adds, the

UN had both benefited from and contributed to a noticeable shift in common notions of the scope and limits of national sovereignty.[77]

It is generally agreed by interviewees that changing international norms had fundamental implications for Ghali's reform project. But as Pickering pointed out, the Post-Cold War era had witnessed a normative shift though 'the shift was neither complete nor universally approved'.[78] Many member states, not all of them, were ready to accept these new norms. Moreover, the major powers believed in human rights norms, but refused to pay a political price. The UN, as a result, was struggling with the new norm of humanitarian intervention. The interviewees emphasized that Ghali was an enthusiastic advocate of humanitarian activism within a UN framework.[79] He emphasized the importance of protecting the people in Somalia and Rwanda and the UN responsibility to intervene in both these crises. But, 'the international community was not ready to accept humanitarian intervention at that time'.[80] In 1992, Ghali informed the GA: 'Human rights are universal, but the promotion and protection of the human rights of indigenous people require a special sensitivity to particular situations'.[81] In short, Ghali's genuine agenda was to bring the UN into the Post-Cold War era as a real player - an organization that could respond effectively to humanitarian crises and move quickly to allay the animosities that led to so much ethnic violence.[82] He was the first to use the word 'genocide' in the SC. 'The US however did not approve this, since it obliged member states to take actions which they were not ready to do at that time'.[83] The interviewees also highlighted that although the humanitarian norms evolved during Ghali's period they became rather more prominent during Annan's time. According to the principal officer in Ghali's office, Angela Kane, 'The responsibility to protect and the concept of human security are far more advanced today than in the time of Ghali'.[84]

Finally it needs to be acknowledged, as the previous chapter demonstrated, that international norms had no value without the power to implement them. In the words of David Hannay, then the British Ambassador, 'The important thing is to get the big powers to accept the rules because it is in their interests to do so'.[85] From this, we can postulate that in terms of the impact of these evolving norms, 'it depended on the degree

to which Western countries starting to become affected by human right issues'.[86] In this context, former American Ambassador Perkins went so far as to claim that 'international norms were relevant as long as they affected the national interests of key players'.[87] For example, during Ghali's term, it was generally agreed that failed states matter, that poverty, political instability, and the absence of effective and accountable government abroad can create serious threats to US interests at home. This perspective affected the implementation of Ghali's proposals for the UN's security role.[88] The SC - and particularly the US - pushed the norm of human rights and consequently, by 1990, the humanitarian intervention norm was institutionalised by the UN, challenging notions of sovereignty and non-intervention.

To summarize, existing orthodox accounts assert that Ghali's reform agenda was driven primarily if not entirely by considerations of power. Normative considerations were hence largely irrelevant to an explanation of his reforms. But, the evidence revealed here confirms that more was at work than power or a mere congruence of key states' interests. Following from this, a central contention of this chapter is that existing accounts of Ghali's reforms are limited by their neglect of normative change. Given this tendency, they fail to appreciate that normative changes constituted and legitimized changes in the tasks the organization was called upon to undertake. The normative and power realities of the early 1990s demanded a reorientation of the organization. In view of this, it is simply not convincing to assert, as do many realist scholars, that reform was solely the product of systemic change.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter had two main aims. The first was to apply both the neorealist and the ES approaches to analysing the reform agenda adopted by Ghali over the period 1992-1997. On the basis of this analysis, conclusions were drawn about how the approaches provided complementary insights into Post-Cold War UN reform. The second was to identify the key limitations of existing orthodox accounts of Ghali's reforms, and more especially, to

shed light on how this thesis makes an original contribution to that literature. In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter was structured as follows.

The first section demonstrated that neorealism illuminates some aspects of Ghali's reforms using the concept of polarity as an explanatory variable. For example, shifts in international power structure help us understand the initiation of reform. Also, the view that Ghali's reform agenda was the inevitable consequence of structural changes at the end of the Cold War sheds some light on the timing of his reform. The section however illustrated that the view that Ghali's reforms evolved appreciably in response to systemic and great power constraint does not offer a very satisfactory account of the content of the reform agenda. For example, the analysis indicates that Ghali's recommendations had a strong normative dimension. Finally, while the priorities of major states and/or US hegemony provide an explanation of why specific reforms were opposed - i.e. the failure of Ghali's proposals for UN peace enforcement units, as well as new sources of revenue - they fail to explain why member states implemented his recommendations on serving human needs rather than those of states.

The section concluded that neorealism derives its explanatory value from its concern with power. Power is vital in providing insights into the causes, timing and failure of Ghali's reforms, but it left certain questions unanswered: If Ghali's reforms were driven primarily by considerations of power, why were his proposals concerning human rights implemented? The fundamental problem with neorealism is that it excludes the role of global norms and, as a result, does not fully explain the content, direction and success of his reforms. By failing to take normative factors seriously, neorealism appears a partial theory for analysing UN reform, since one of the key features of the Post-Cold War era was the growing significance of norms.

The second section of the chapter therefore sought to explore how the ES perspective might provide complementary insights into the explanation of Ghali's reforms. The ES, because of its emphasis on both power and norms, highlights how the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda was in a part a response to the changing normative structure of world

politics. The ES argument that both the international system and the international society were undergoing complex changes at the beginning of the 1990s can also explain the timing of his reforms. Moreover, the ES contributes to an understanding of the content of Ghali's reform agenda through its emphasis on changing global norms regarding human rights and sovereignty. In doing so, it complements the neorealist account. Finally, by highlighting changes in normative standards articulated by key member states, the ES can account for the success of Ghali's reforms. For example, the assumption that state sovereignty was not absolute legitimized Ghali's calls for humanitarian intervention. This implied that Ghali's efforts to deal with failed states (Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, etc.) were not just a series of special cases, reflecting the special interests of the great powers, but were important expressions of an evolving international norm. The section concluded that the ES offers a convincing account of the content and implementation of Ghali's reform. This being so, it makes a valuable contribution to explaining UN reform but as a complement, rather than alternative, to neorealism.

The final section of this chapter reviewed the existing literature on Ghali's reforms. It demonstrated that, existing studies tend to explain Ghali's reforms through a neorealist perspective, i.e. shifts in the structure of power. As a result, most studies have focused on the influence of the P5 and attempted to analyze Ghali's reforms as a product of power relations. Simply put, wedded to a neorealist framework, the existing literature is inclined to exaggerate the importance of international power structure in explaining reform. Moreover, it is clear from the review that norms are given cursory treatment in studies of UN reform. Consequently, there are gaps in the literature on Ghali's reforms which this thesis begins to redress.

As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, this thesis attempts to fill a gap in the literature on Ghali's reforms by considering the significance of norms. In order to do so, it employs ES insights to explain Ghali's reform agenda. At the heart of this analysis is the contention that: to understand UN reform, it is necessary to focus on the changing normative context as well as the changing power distributions. Thus, by emphasising and explicating the significance of norms, this thesis constructs a fuller understanding of

Ghali's reforms. It demonstrates that power structure, while important, cannot bear the full analytical burden in explaining Post-Cold War UN reform. This being so, much of the existing literature which emphasize that only material power counts are less able to provide plausible explanations for Ghali's reforms - both on theoretical and empirical grounds. As noted, neither the content nor the success of his reforms can be explained solely through changes in the balance of material power between key member states.

In sum, this chapter enriches the neorealist account of Ghali's reforms with important insights from the ES, which the thesis considers as complementary. In the final, concluding chapter, I will return to the primary research question: How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform? In this context, I will offer some concluding remarks about the strengths and weaknesses of the neorealist and the ES explanations of Ghali's reforms. Finally, I will reflect upon the substantive contributions that this thesis has made towards a better understanding of the process of change in IOs, and I suggest possible avenues for further research.

Notes

[1] David Hannay, Ahmed Fawzi, Thomas Pickering, James Jonah, Chinmaya Gharekhan, and Angela Kane.
[2] See for example the arguments of Waltz, Mearsheimer and Grieco as illustrated in Chapter Two.
[3] Edward Newman, 'The Fire of Realism: Boutros-Ghali and the Office of UN Secretary-General', The Shumei Journal of International Studies, April 1998, vol. xi, no. 1, p. 76.
[4] See for example, Paul Taylor, 'Prescribing for the reform of international organization: the logic of arguments for change', Review of International Studies, January 1987, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-38.
[5] Please refer to Chapter Four for more detail.
[6] Please refer to Chapter Four (section 4.3.1) for more detail.
[7] See for example, Krauthammer, 1990/91, pp. 23-33; Wohlforth, 1999, pp. 5-41 and Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999.
[8] Jesse Helms, 'Boutros Boutros-Ghali Dreams of U.N. Sovereignty', Human events, 15 March 1996, p. 234.
[9] Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics And International Organization 1919-1999, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 52.
[10] Please refer to Chapter Three for more detail.
[11] See for example, Krauthammer, 1990/91, pp. 23-33 and Krauthammer, 1992, p. 78.
[12] Newman, 1998, p. 82.
[13] Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe, and Roger Coate, The United Nations And Changing World Politics, USA, Westview Press, Fourth edition, 2004, p. 330.
[14] As quoted in Benjamin Rivlin, 'Leadership in the UN, 1997: the secretary-general and the U.S. - a symbiotic relationship under stress', International Journal, 1997, vol. 52, no. 2, p. 215.
[15] David Armstrong et al, 2004, p. 134.
[16] See for example, Waltz, 1993, pp. 44-79; Layne, 1993, pp. 5-51 and Kupchan, 1998, pp. 40-79.
[17] Please refer to Chapter Three (section 3.1.2) for more detail.

[18] This was clearly evident in the statement by Chinese Premier Li Peng to the 1992 SC summit: 'The issue of human rights falls within the sovereignty of each country and should not be judged in disregard of its history and national conditions. It is neither workable nor appropriate to demand that all countries measure up to the human rights criteria or models of one or a small number of states. China is opposed to using human rights as an excuse for interference in the internal affairs of other countries'. UN Document S/PV.3046.

[19] United Nations, 'High level Meeting of the Security Council: Note by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Members', Security Council, UN Document S/23500, 31 January 1992.

[20] Joanna Weschler, 'Human Rights ', in David Malone, Ed., The UN Security Council From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p. 57.

[21] United Nations, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters', General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/120, 18 December 1992.

[22] Please refer to Chapter Four (section 4.2.2) for more detail.

[23] See for example Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London, Zed Books, 2002.

[24] See for example Hampson et al., Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

[25] An Agenda for Peace, section 15.

[26] Ibid, section VI.

[27] Ibid, paragraph 17.

[28] Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93, pp. 98-99.

[29] An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 20.

[30] United Nations, 'Challenges and Opportunities for the United Nations in the 21st Century', the statement of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN at the inauguration of the new headquarters building of the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan, 18 February 1993, p. 17.

[31] Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93, p. 99.

[32] Please refer to Chapter Five for more detail.

[33] United Nations, 'Address by William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America to the Forty-eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly', 4th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 1993, UN Document, A/48/PV.4, 4 October 1993.

[34] United Nations, 'The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization', General Assembly, 51st Session, Supplement 1, UN Document A/51/1, 1996, p. 328.

[35] Burgess, 2001, p. xv.

[36] Ibid, p. 201.

[37] Ibid, p. 174.

[38] Simons, 1995, p. 16.

[39] Ibid, p. 238.

[40] Rivlin, 1996, p. 138.

[41] Edward Newman, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era: A Global Peace and Security Mandate? New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 2.

[42] Ibid, p. 111.

[43] Ibid, p. 199.

[44] Ibid, p. 194.

[45] Ibid, p. 204.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Newman, 1998, p. 97.

[48] Ibid, p. 73.

[49] Saadia Touval, 'Why the UN fails ', Foreign Affairs, 1994, vol. 73, no. 5, p. 47.

[50] Manual Froehlich, 'The Old and the New UN Secretary-General', Aussenpolitik, 1997, vol. 48, no. 3, p. 303.

[51] Ibid, p. 304.

[52] Ibid, p. 306.

[53] Ibid, p. 307.

[54] Rivlin, 1997, p. 205.

[55] Beigbeder, 2000, p. 208.

[56] William Branigan, 'As UN Expands So Do Its Problems', <u>Washington Post</u>, 20 September 1992, p. A1.

[57] As quoted in Benjamin Rivlin, 1997, p. 207.

[58] Max Jakobson, 'Better to redesign a scaled down, realistic United Nations', <u>International Herald Tribune</u>, 18 October 1995, pp. 1-3.

[59] Rivlin, 1997, p. 197.

[60] Ibid, p. 202.

[61] Meisler, 1995, p. 187.

[62] Jeffrey Gedmin, 'The Secretary-Generalissimo', <u>The American Spectator</u>, November 1993, vol. 26, no. 11, p. 30.

[63] Rivlin, 1993, p. 13.

[64] Ibid.

[65] James Sutterlin, 'The UN Secretary-General As Chief Administrator', in Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, Eds., <u>The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible</u>, London, Praeger, 1993, p. 56.

[66] Rivlin, 1993, p. 19.

[67] Interview with Ahmad Fawzi.

[68] Interview with David Hannay.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Interview with Thomas Pickering.

[71] Interview with Ahmad Fawzi.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Interview with Mohamed Shaker.

[75] Interview with James Jonah.

[76] Interview with Boutros Ghali.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Interview with Thomas Pickering.

[79] Interview with James Jonah.

[80] Interview with Alvero de Soto.

[81] As quoted in Nancy Seufert-Barr, 'Seeking a New Partnership', <u>UN Chronicle</u>, June 1993, p. 43.

[82] Interview with Sylvana Foa.

[83] Interview with John-Claude Aime.

[84] Interview with Angela Kane.

[85] Interview with David Hannay.

[86] Interview with John Simpson.

[87] Interview with Edward Perkins.

[88] Ibid.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

7.0 Introduction

This thesis has attempted to explain and understand UN reform in the Post-Cold War era through a case study of the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. It commenced with an assertion: Power and norms are important in understanding the process of change in IOs. Having argued that norms had some role to play in the context of Ghali's reforms, it contends that existing neorealist scholarship is limited in its explanatory scope by failing to give sufficient credence to the role of norms in explaining institutional change. This conclusion returns to the principal research question: 'How does realism contribute to an understanding of Post-Cold War UN reform?' In responding to this question, this study has evaluated both neorealist and the ES accounts of UN reform in two significant ways. Firstly, it has shown how the process of change may be understood theoretically, through a combined analysis of distinctive realist arguments (concerning the significance of IOs). Secondly, it has assessed the claims of both neorealism and the ES in respect of a case study of Ghali's reform agenda, relying upon primary research as well as drawing on a large number of secondary sources. This chapter will review the central analyses, arguments, and evidence of the thesis in order to offer some broad conclusions in response to the principal research question and research aims identified in Chapter One. The chapter also highlights the original contribution of the thesis to the study of UN reform in general, and to Ghali's reform agenda in particular. An agenda for further research is also presented in the concluding section.

7.1 Principal Arguments: Thesis Overview

As stated in the introduction, neorealist theory has dominated analysis of UN reform since the establishment of the organization, but, as the thesis has argued, while the existing neorealist account is relevant for understanding the process of reform during the

Cold War years, it is inadequate for explaining the content, direction and success of reform. This is because, in the emerging Post-Cold War world, there has been a key shift in collective understandings or norms concerning the internalization of human rights and the relationship between sovereignty and intervention. This normative shift has shaped new roles for the UN as a guarantor of human security. Traditional neorealist accounts provide little room for norms or underplay questions of how the shifts in normative framework affect the UN's role.

This study has questioned the general contribution of realism in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War world, through a case study of the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. It began by addressing the first of two theoretical aims namely: to assess the utility of realism - both in its neorealist form, and in the ES interpretation - in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. Chapter Two established the theoretical framework and gave a broad overview of realist theory including its core assumptions. The first section demonstrated that realism is a cluster of approaches and identified six fundamental assumptions that most realist writers share. Subsequently, section 2.2 examined the main variants of realism, dividing realist scholars into classical and structural variants. The section concentrated on the works of Hans Morgenthau[1] and Kenneth Waltz[2] who are often credited with presenting the fullest account of classical and structural realism (or neorealism) respectively. It focused particularly upon their explanations of IOs.

The Chapter went on to investigate the intra-realist debate about the significance of IOs [section 2.3]. It argued that, contrary to the general view, IOs are an important part of the realist landscape. This is simply because, even though neorealists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer[3] argue that IOs are merely epiphenomenal, i.e. 'no effects thesis,' this presents only a partial view of the realist account. By this logic, sub-section 2.3.2 contended that neorealism overlooks other realist arguments that IOs are intervening and even constitutive variables, as advanced by classical theorists such as Morgenthau,[4] by defensive realists such as Glaser and Jervis,[5] by rational choice realists such as Grieco,[6] by regime theorists such as Krasner[7] and by the ES scholars such as Bull and Buzan[8].

Building on this discussion, the chapter concluded (section 2.4) by identifying two different realist arguments for explaining change in IOs. The first was the neorealist view that since IOs are endogenous, they only change in response to shifts in power structure. In this context, authors such as Waltz and Mearsheimer[9] both focus primarily on power relations as the cause of change. Other authors such as Buzan[10] are far more optimistic concerning the significance of IOs, and therefore, the second realist view considers the process of change, not mainly as a manifestation of the distribution of power, but also in terms of the common and shared understandings between member states, i.e. global norms.

Having noted that it is important to understand UN reform in its systemic context, Chapter Three considered the changing international context within which the UN operated in the Post-Cold War period. The main purpose was to compare and contrast the two realist accounts of international organizations discussed in Chapter Two. This was necessary to explore how existing studies at the time [or early analyses/versions] associated with neorealism and the ES understood the international system at the end of the Cold War. To address these issues, the Chapter proceeded in two stages. Section 3.1 surveyed the neorealist literature on system polarity in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In doing so, it provided crucial insights into power shifts and their implications for IOs and the UN, in particular. The literature review indicated that there was no consensus among neorealists on the changing global power structure. Some neorealists such as Krauthammer,[11] Wohlforth[12] and Kapstein and Mastanduno[13] argued that the Soviet Bloc's collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity. A variation of this approach is to be found in the arguments of some neorealists such as Waltz[14], Layne[15] and Kupchan[16] who stressed that unipolarity would be transformed into multipolarity. In this context, the section contended that such a strong disagreement among neorealists in the early Post-Cold War period about the shape of the emerging international order stemmed from the fact that theorists differed on conceptions of polarity and criteria that distinguish a pole in the system. Strict Waltzians, for example, ranked states according to how they scored on several dimensions of power capabilities. As a result, they characterized the Post-Cold War structure as a unipolar (or

hegemonic) order evolving around the US. This claim of unipolarity was grounded on one foundation, that is the enormous fire power gap separating the US from other states. Such an argument about US preeminence also allowed these neorealists to assert that the unipolar moment would last for decades. According to this view, there was little hope that any second-tier states such as Japan, Germany or the EU could overtake the US. The main reason for this was that all the potential challengers were materially deficient in some respect. The first part of section 3.1 thus illustrated the evidence in favour of the unipolarity hypothesis. This was followed by an examination of the implications of structural change for the UN. It argued that, for unipolarists, the unchecked power of the US determined the UN's role and responsibilities. The result was that, in the Post-Cold War era, the sole remaining superpower would act unilaterally and selectively. Also, following the unipolar thesis the UN's role and actions might generally be expected to reflect Washington's preferences and priorities.

After setting out the logic of unipolarity, the section went on to explore the multipolarist argument and addressed its implications for the UN. Section 3.1.2 argued that, for those prepared to think more economically in a world in which the sources of power were diverse, the structure of the system was more multipolar, with the US as the strongest pole and Japan and the European Community (especially with a unified Germany) as lesser poles. According to this point of view, the US achieved hegemony by possessing all-round superiority in hard and soft power. But America's predominance was ephemeral, as new powers would rise and balance the US. In this context, those inclined towards the multipolar thesis drew strength from the fact that the US remained dominant in terms of military power, yet weaker in relation to economic and technological power. They also used Waltz's argument that the balance of power policy is essentially automatic, given the compelling impact of structural forces, to support the view that a unipolar system would beget a multipolar world. This led to the conclusion that the emergence of a new great power or powers was inevitable and unavoidable. On this basis, a unified Germany, Japan, and China were identified as rising powers with the potential to challenge US dominance. The section then examined the impact of multipolarity and changes in relationships between the major powers on the UN. It showed that, according

to multipolarists, profound change at the structural level would prompt changes in the preferences of second-tier countries regarding international institutionalization. Such views fit the neorealist prediction that a state's basic orientation toward the UN is heavily determined by its position in global power structure. From this, they hypothesized that dominant economic powers would make serious attempts to influence the activities of UN bodies and to alter the distribution of power in their favour. This being so, the UN's role and actions cannot be determined by a single player but by bargaining between leading member states such as Japan and Germany. Overall, then, section 3.1 demonstrated that all neorealists focus primarily on changing power structures. For them the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity was the primary factor that would influence the UN's role and position in the Post-Cold War era.

The second section of the Chapter examined the ES account. It began by illustrating the ES argument that normative changes also occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War. This new era witnessed developing international norms related to human rights and in support of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians. This normative evolution was significant as it shaped and affected the values, expectations and behaviour of states. In this respect, section 3.2.1 examined the ES argument concerning the internalization of human rights through the broad concept of human security. Authors such as Bellamy,[17] Booth[18] and Hampson et al [19] argue that, with the end of the Cold War, a shift had occurred in what it meant to be secure. As a result, the focus was on human security not just state security. This was especially so in a globalized world where underdevelopment can constitute a source of international instability. From this perspective, it was widely accepted that, when individual human rights are seriously violated, international society ought to intervene in what Wheeler in *Saving Strangers* calls a 'supreme humanitarian emergency'.[20] An obvious tension, however, exists between human security values and the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs of states. Subsection 3.2.2 consequently illustrated how sovereignty is being reformulated to adapt to new circumstances. It first examined Krasner's contention that the evolution and entrenchment of state sovereignty in international relations reflected 'organized hypocrisy'.[21] Nevertheless, Dunne and Wheeler[22] assert that during the Post-Cold War

years the value of individual human rights put more constraints on state sovereignty. The new era witnessed an attempt to reconcile state sovereignty with responsibility. This was manifest in the writings of Philpott[23], Deng[24] and James[25]. Such interpretations implied that, if states seek sovereignty, they must live up to their obligations towards their own populations. This led to new roles for the UN.[26] On this basis, the final section of Chapter Three concluded that normative, not just structural, changes led to UN reform in respect of its functions and roles.

Thus, for realists, as the evidence in Chapter Three demonstrated, the collapse of the bipolar system transformed the international environment in which the UN operated. Both neorealist and ES scholars built on this assumption, but, each generates different analyses. To investigate these theoretical arguments, this research focused on the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. As I acknowledged in the introductory chapter, Ghali's agenda represented a key moment in UN reform. In addition, Ghali's reforms could test the validity of neorealism in terms of how crucial power was in this transition. Besides, applying the ES to an examination of Ghali's agenda could assess the explanatory power of global norms. Neorealism and the ES are therefore assessed in respect of Ghali's reform agenda. Chapter Four outlined the historical evolution of Ghali's agenda and detailed the SG's reforms concerning the UN's role as well as changes related to the administrative machinery necessary to deliver that role. In doing so, it combined evidence collected from interviews with former UN officials with secondary sources. For example, section 4.1 examined the legacy of several past UN reform efforts and, in particular, highlighted three which dominated the first forty years of the organization. The Capacity Study, which was led by Robert Jackson and entitled 'A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System', was the most important reform initiative of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Group of 25 Experts, which was established in the mid-1970s to make recommendations on structural changes, was the second. The last major review was 'The Report of the Group of 18' in the second half of the 1980s. Each of these initiatives was examined with respect to its background, advocates, recommendations, reactions and implementation strategies. The discussion revealed that the reforms of the late 1980s were the most successful. This presents an

interesting paradox for neorealists since the G-18 reform in 1985 was the most successful but the failed Jackson reforms were backed by the most powerful states. The section contended that this paradox cannot be explained solely by referring to structural factors related to power. With an improvement in great power relations by the late 1980s and the ending of the Cold War, other factors (i.e. normative factors) also explain the process of UN reform. Section 4.1 concluded by highlighting the importance of global norms, setting the scene for the subsequent chapters.

Having explored the historical context of Ghali's reforms, the Chapter sought to explain the nature of such reforms. It began with an effort to identify the motivations and conditions that drove Ghali's agenda. The discussion presented in section 4.2.1 demonstrated that Ghali's reform agenda was a response to changes in the world political climate. According to the interviewees, the most important factor was the end of the Cold War. The section then analyzed the timing of Ghali's agenda. It noted that the first-ever meeting held by the SC at the level of heads of State and Government, in January 1992, represented a key moment in Ghali's efforts to reform the UN. After setting out the underlying factors that prompted Ghali's reform agenda, the second section went on to explore the content of Ghali's reforms. In order to do so, section 4.3 examined Ghali's three agendas. The first was the *Agenda for Peace*' (1992), which raised serious questions about how far the UN could deal with problems of peace and security. It also explored the alternatives to UN involvement given the unprecedented challenges of the Post-Cold War world. In this agenda, Ghali highlighted the issue of cooperation with regional organizations and suggested the creation of more effective financing and budget-making mechanisms for peacekeeping operations. Ghali's second document, an *Agenda for Development* (1994), was a blueprint for action on a broad range of economic and social issues. Its main aim was to dispel the notion that the UN was only involved in peacekeeping operations and underscored the integral linkage between development and peace. Conceived as a counterpart to his 1992 report *Agenda for Peace*, the *Agenda for Development* recommended ways to enhance the UN role in promoting international cooperation for development. A fuller rationale for the inherent linkages between peace, development and democracy was also explored in Ghali's final report *Agenda for*

Democratization (1996). The discussion in section 4.3.1 demonstrated that Ghali was convinced that there cannot be lasting peace without sustainable development and the converse is also the case. Moreover, democratization can promote both peace and development. He also believed that there is a need to expand participation to a greater range of actors beyond member states. His reports therefore suggested that regional organizations, NGOs, and parliamentarians represent groups that should be included in global decision-making and that new ways should be found to integrate them into existing and newly developing international structures and mechanisms. Finally, section 4.3 considered Ghali's reforms in the UN administrative machinery. It demonstrated the SG's efforts to simplify the Secretariat structures as well as to reduce the number of high-level positions.

The objective of Chapter Five was to complete the narrative begun in the previous chapter and address the politics of Ghali's reforms. To accomplish this, it first considered the main actors in the reform process. The discussion demonstrated that Ghali himself was the main agent advocating reform. Member states, especially the P5, were also deeply involved and committed to reform. Section 5.2 then discussed states' reactions to Ghali's proposals concerning the expansion of the UN's role, along with his administrative reforms. It noted that, in general, the US and the big powers welcomed Ghali's reform project, yet they were concerned deeply about the new political, military and material demands on them. As for Third World reaction, the discussion demonstrated that these states were mainly concerned with the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. In addition, the UN had diverted most of its time and resources to problems related to peace and ignored the economic and development dimensions of world security. The Chapter concluded by identifying the extent to which Ghali's proposals were implemented and it also considered the impact they had on the UN. It emphasized that the SC supported some of Ghali's recommendations for dealing with civil and ethnic conflicts within state borders. The P5, however, had too many interests in the status quo to allow drastic changes to the organization. The Chapter demonstrated finally that, although Ghali's main

recommendations never really materialized, his reform agenda set the stage for his successor's reforms.

Chapter Six presented an assessment of the explanatory power of both the neorealist and the ES approaches in respect of Ghali's reform agenda. To accomplish this, it highlighted the extent to which these perspectives offer insights into the causes, timing, content and implementation of reform. These four variables served as criteria for judging the explanatory capacity of neorealism and the ES. Orthodox interpretations appear to succeed in explaining satisfactorily the underlying causes of Ghali's reforms, yet they provide few clues about the actual content and direction of UN reform in the 1990s. These four variables therefore help in assessing or evaluating more rigorously the neorealist perspective discussed in the initial theoretical chapter. They also help highlight how the ES can complement the neorealist explanations of Ghali's agenda.

On this basis, section 6.1 considered the explanatory power of neorealism in respect of Ghali's reform agenda. It showed that neorealism emphasizes the concept of polarity to identify and explain the forces driving reform. By doing so, it accounts adequately for the initiation and timing of Ghali's reforms. As the analysis in the previous chapter indicated, changes to the structure of global power forced the UN to reconsider its role and agenda. This being so, and as the interviewees noted, the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity was a significant factor in triggering Ghali's reform agenda. By the same token, the changing power structure was an important step forward, especially with the improvement in relations between the permanent members of the SC. This was evident in the first ever SC summit in January 1992, which invited the SG to consider new ways of using the Council and the UN to further international peace and security in the wake of the Cold War.

Having illustrated how structural analysis can contribute to our understanding of the causes and timing of Ghali's reform agenda, the section went on to demonstrate the utility of the concept of polarity in explaining the content of reforms. It showed that a neorealist perspective helped, since, as both interviewees and secondary sources indicated

that, up to a point, systemic and great power constraints did influence the content and direction of Ghali's reform agenda. However, the content of Ghali's proposals, as well as his three agendas, did not always reflect Washington's or the great powers' preferences and priorities. Likewise neorealism can shed some light on the failure of some aspects of Ghali's reforms. For example, section 6.1.4 noted that neorealist expectations were confirmed by US resistance to Ghali's proposals that would give the UN greater autonomy, i.e. the creation of a UN standing force. However, at the same time, the section highlighted that the US and key member states implemented many of Ghali's proposals that obviously contradicted neorealist expectations. This indeed exposes the limits of attempts to understand the success of reform solely by reference to power.

The second section (section 6.2) therefore expounded the ES argument concerning the explanatory power of norms. The section firstly demonstrated the ES view that, with the end of the Cold War, there was a pressing need for change as the UN became more active in protecting international human rights. The ES explained the timing of Ghali's reform agenda with reference to shifts in norms of humanitarian intervention as well as new interpretations of sovereignty. Taking the normative standpoint, advocates of the ES provided a better explanation of the content and direction of reform than neorealism. The discussion in section 6.2 showed that normative developments could explain why Ghali made many proposals to integrate the separate functions of an enhanced UN system – peacekeeping and conflict-resolution, human rights, social and economic development and peace building – to achieve human security for all peoples. Finally, pointing to changes in the normative standards articulated by powerful member states, especially the notion of sovereignty and the right of intervention, the ES can explain the success of Ghali's reform agenda. According to ES logic, without these normative changes, the international community would not have understood and legitimized Ghali's call for an expanded UN role in internal and humanitarian conflicts.

The chapter concluded with a literature review of the existing studies on Ghali's reforms. This was necessary to illustrate the serious gap that exists in orthodox explanations - the second aim of the thesis. This literature review made clear that orthodox analyses of

Ghali's reforms overwhelmingly adopt a neorealist perspective - i.e. they return mainly to factors related to international position and power. It also indicated that international norms have received insufficient attention in this literature. From this, it follows that few studies to date have attempted to explore how and why the change in normative context was important, or focused explicitly and extensively on the explanatory power of norms. This appears to be an important omission in the orthodox accounts of Ghali's reforms, which this thesis has attempted to correct.

7.2 Principal Findings and Conclusions

The thesis had two aims, firstly, to assess the utility of realism in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era, and secondly, to critically evaluate orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda through both the neorealist and ES perspectives. The approach pursued has been to demonstrate the continuing relevance of realism, i.e. both neorealism and the ES, in explaining change in IOs generally, and Ghali's reform agenda in particular. This was achieved through substantive analysis of secondary and primary sources, including interview material. By drawing on primary and secondary research and, in consideration of the principal research question and aims, the study has evaluated the explanatory power of neorealism in respect of Ghali's reforms, and assessed the extent to which the ES complements the partial explanation offered by neorealism.

7.2.1 Neorealism: What Explanation does it Offer?

This study used four variables - causes, timing, content, and implementation - as criteria for judging the strengths and fundamental weaknesses of neorealism regarding Ghali's reforms. Below, I summarize the findings relating to each of these variables.

Underlying Causes and Timing
The previous chapter made clear that a power-based neorealist approach captures very clearly the causes and timing of reforms. For neorealism, Ghali's reform agenda was

shaped by changes in power structures – from bipolarity to unipolarity or multipolarity. This part of the neorealist account seems to be supported by the primary and secondary research and, as I demonstrated in Chapter Four, the initiation of reform took place alongside the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the UN struggled to adapt to the rapidly evolving circumstances of a new distribution and new relationships of power. In particular, member states used the UN to accomplish a wide variety of demanding and complex tasks. From this standpoint, as I argued in detail in Chapter Four, changes in the structure of global power forced the UN to rethink its role and agenda. What remains puzzling, however, is the content of Ghali's agenda.

The Content and Implementation of Ghali's Reform Agenda

The neorealist account suggests that power is the primary or sole factor that helps us understand the content and implementation of institutional change. As a consequence, the preferences of major states and/or US hegemony in the Post-Cold War era should provide explanations of the direction of Ghali's reforms. But, as the critique I presented in Chapter Six made clear, power-based analysis accounts inadequately for the content of Ghali's agenda. The evidence in Chapter Six demonstrated that a neorealist view of the impact of material constraints can account for some of Ghali's proposals in *Agenda for Peace*. For example, Ghali's first agenda explored the alternatives to the UN to meet security needs, a task that the great powers wanted the UN to fulfil. On this basis, preventive diplomacy measures were given primacy, including suggestions for UN intelligence capacities and monitoring of 'hot spots' before actual conflict broke out. Peacemaking proposals that involved strengthening the capacity of the Office of the SG to utilize force were also given pride of place in the Agenda. Finally, post-conflict peace-building was considered essential as a means of preventing the recurrence of armed conflict between or within states. In summary, from a structural perspective, Ghali's reforms can be seen as a response to changes in power distribution at the end of the Cold War. This reinforces the neorealist argument that Post-Cold War systemic considerations overshadowed many of the initiatives of Ghali's peace agenda. However, the evidence reveals that some of his reforms were not reducible to power. For example, Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* envisioned a wide-ranging role for the UN in confronting humanitarian

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disaster. He was determined to strengthen the UN's decision-making process and its capacity for confronting the problem of failed states and inter-ethnic violence. The appointment of a USG for Humanitarian Affairs was one of the main changes that Ghali introduced. Thus, a systemic analysis based on material interests and power adjustments is ill-suited to account for the normative trajectory of reform.

In applying neorealism to Ghali's reforms, it became clear that it captured the causes of reform more clearly. The fundamental problem, however, is that it derives its explanation from changes in polarity, which, though significant, are not the only driver of reform and are also ambiguous, given the debate about unipolarity *vis versa* multipolarity. As the discussion in the previous chapters indicated, structural forces triggered initial reform decisions, yet the subsequent reform agenda was determined as much by normative considerations as it was by material factors. Neorealists, for the most part, remain puzzled by the content of reform because crucial variables are omitted from their explanation, resulting in failure to account satisfactorily for a number of features of the reforms. There is little evidence of his reform agenda being driven solely by structural factors, i.e. reflecting Washington's and the great powers' preferences and priorities. As the discussion in Chapter Four made clear, Ghali's three reports, particularly *Agenda for Peace*, emphasized the importance of universal human rights standards, and even stressed external coercive humanitarian intervention. These major recommendations were legitimized by appealing to normative arguments about human rights, and by appealing to values such as global equity and justice. It has therefore become clear that, while neorealism is powerful as an explanatory theory of change, the roles of norms and values help us understand the content and direction of reform.

Similarly, neorealism attempts to explain the implementation of Ghali's reform agenda by drawing upon arguments about systemic and great power constraints. As explained in Chapter Three, neorealist theorists contend that the structural pressures and constraints created by the distribution of power affect the implementation of reform. This implies that, given US hegemony in the Post-Cold War world or/and the strategic interests of the great powers, neorealism should provide an explanation of the failure of Ghali's reforms.

This seems to be confirmed by the US resistance to Ghali's proposals, which emphasized UN autonomy, i.e. the creation of special peace enforcement units at the disposal of the SG, and the collection of global taxes. But as the discussion in Chapter Five demonstrated, the P5 supported Ghali's recommendations, clearly contradicting neorealist expectations about the UN and its role. More specifically, it demonstrated that key member states approved Ghali's broad recommendations for improving the UN's capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. For example, President Bush implemented Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* by sending US troops to Somalia. Similarly, in the early 1990s, the SC - and particularly the US - welcomed Ghali's proposals for preventive activities and wider conceptions of peace and security. It is thus apparent that the fundamental problem with neorealism is that it brackets changes in normative factors, privileging material interest and power distribution. This being so, it fails to provide a convincing answer to an important question: If power structures were all that counted, why would member states implement recommendations that serve broader human needs, rather than simply national power considerations? Finally, the case study demonstrated that member states supported the improvement of UN instruments of preventive diplomacy and the settlement of conflict as suggested by Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*. This cannot be explained except by referring to changes in perceptions of the UN and its role in the Post-Cold War world.

In short, by focusing on the imperatives and material constraints of the international power structure, neorealism answers many questions about Ghali's agenda. While the first and second elements of reform - causes and timing - are well explained, the third dimension is not. Neither does neorealism say much about the successful aspects of his reforms. From this it follows that neorealism may help us to understand why reform came about but it does not address the question of how such reform was possible or conceivable. In other words, neorealism by itself is inadequate, because it excludes other key factors. This, however, does not undermine the validity of the theory. Rather, it reveals its limits when applied to complex phenomena like UN reform. In that case, the problem is how to bring norms 'back in' to the analysis of UN reform. If neorealism

understates the significance of norms, what conceptual framework can help explicate their role?

7.2.2 The ES: What Explanation does it Offer?

Here I consider the four variables - causes, timing, content, and implementation - in respect of assessing the explanatory capacity of the ES.

Underlying Causes and Timing

This study suggests that the ES provides a complementary interpretation of Ghali's reforms. At the heart of this analysis is the contention that Ghali's agenda was not merely a reflection of material interests, but also of new global norms. In focusing on the normative changes generated by the end of the Cold War, as well as the structural consequences of the changes in the distribution of power, the ES is able to provide a supplementary explanation for the initiation of Ghali's reforms. Hence the ES account focuses upon widely held norms and the way they evolve, to identify the motivations and justifications behind Ghali's reform agenda. In this regard, the discussion in Chapters Two and Three made it clear that the priorities of humanitarian intervention altered expectations for the UN's role in the Post-Cold War world. The dramatic evolution in attitudes concerning the bounds of sovereignty required changes to the organization's role. Emergent norms of humanitarian intervention superseded the norm of non-intervention. This normative shift undoubtedly had deleterious consequences for sovereign rights since it led to a reconsideration of the norm of sovereignty in all its aspects. The result was that, in the early 1990s, the UN was subject to changes, to meet a pressing normative agenda. The ES approach, with its emphasis on the impact of norms, points to the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda as a response not only to the changing power structure but also to shifting values and the practices of human rights and sovereignty. By the same token, it sheds light on the timing of Ghali's reforms, highlighting the fact that the normative structure of the international system also changed markedly with the end of the Cold War. This is confirmed in the discussion in Chapters Four and Five which emphasize that the protection of human rights increasingly came to

be seen as a matter of international concern, to the extent that the UN under Ghali was required both to maintain peace and security and to prevent humanitarian crises.

The Content and Implementation of Ghali's Reform Agenda

As is evident from Chapters Four and Five, ensuring international security in the broad sense of human security required new approaches both by governments and the UN. This normative change can explain Ghali's attempt in an *Agenda for Peace* to address the complex relationship between threats to international peace and security, the politico-military and the socioeconomic agendas, and the emphasis on human security. Furthermore, Ghali's agenda called for an expanded UN role in the world - that of peace enforcement, with the implication of legitimate intervention in the internal affairs of nation states. This new role was justified by humanitarian, as well as political considerations, on the grounds that humanitarian emergencies were actual threats to international peace and security.

It is clear that the content of Ghali's agenda was in part a manifestation of the evolution of humanitarian norms that had become more politically visible and more significant in the West. Particularly prominent among these changing norms were the redefinition of state sovereignty and the universalization of a humanitarian discourse. This being so, and as argued in Chapter Six, viewed in a broader normative context, it became clear that the ES offers a convincing explanation of the content and direction of Ghali's reforms. For example, section 4.3.1 demonstrated that, in his document an *Agenda for Peace*, Ghali outlined a comprehensive approach to UN responses to the flood of complex emergencies afflicting the Post-Cold War world. Thus, as suggested by the ES, Ghali's call for greater attention to be paid to internal wars as well as to the humanitarian crises that they provoked was connected to the broader normative shifts towards human security and sovereignty. Changes in normative interpretations of sovereignty altered the environment in which states related to each other. This can in part explain Ghali's recommendation to adopt an integrated approach to human security. In short, the thesis demonstrates that Ghali's reforms were also directed towards making the organization more capable of responding to the challenges of human security. This confirms the ES argument that,

without acknowledging changes in the underlying international norms, it would be difficult to explain the content of Ghali's reform agenda.

Along the same lines, the ES posits that both structural and normative factors are equally important for understanding UN reform in general. The success of Ghali's reform agenda cannot be explained unless the change in normative context is taken into account. For example, without an expanded notion of security, many of Ghali's proposals to enforce the protection of basic human rights would not have been implemented. In other words, the development of an international obligation to end starvation and malnutrition did strengthen and legitimize Ghali's attempt to draw the world's attention to humanitarian emergencies. This being so, and in line with Ghali's multi-dimensional peacekeeping approach, the reduction and eradication of human suffering, particularly suffering caused by the gross violation of human rights, was a central dimension of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.

Likewise, the ES contends that without changes in the normative interpretation of state sovereignty, it is unlikely that the reform would have evolved and been implemented in that particular way. For example, the assertion that state sovereignty was not absolute justified Ghali's calls for humanitarian interventions in what would normally be the domestic affairs of a state. Section 5.3.1 demonstrated that, during the early 1990s, the SC adopted a number of resolutions, committing the international community to deeper and wider peace operations in domestic conflicts or peace settlements, in line with Ghali's recommendations. Member states accepted Ghali's notion that the UN should be concerned not only with peace and security, but also with a wide array of socio-economic issues (Somalia and Haiti). In a related vein, the UN under Ghali demonstrated, for the first time, a commitment to civil and political rights, by deploying human rights monitors, and to multiparty democracy, by preparing, running and monitoring elections. The discussion in Chapter Five made clear that states sought to integrate respect for human rights into a social policy framework supportive of economic development strategies, as recommended by Ghali. This affirms the ES argument that, in the new era, the implementation of UN reform was rooted, not only in key states priorities, but in a wider

normative structure of international moral responsibility – as Wheeler refers to it as solidarism.[27]

A central theme that runs through this thesis is that the ES combines structural explanation, with insights into the normative conditions and motivations that explain institutional reform. This allows for a richer interpretation of reform dynamics, as explanations are derived from the power structure of the international system, as well as its normative structure. This is one of key conclusions of the thesis, and one which addresses a significant gap in the existing literature (see section 7.3 below).

7.3 Contribution to the Literature on UN Reform

In this section I review the substantive contribution this thesis makes to the literature on UN reform and accounts of Ghali's reforms in particular. Before doing so, it is worth reviewing the principal findings of the interviews.

As noted in the introductory remarks on methodology, an important component of my research was a series of open-ended and semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in Ghali's reforms. This offers a unique perspective not available in much of the existing literature on UN reform. Here, I summarize the key findings of these interviews. First, however, it is important to emphasize that there were several problems associated with the elite semi-structured interviews. The most important was the unintended distortion resulting from recalling events from many years earlier, as the interviews were conducted ten years after the events. The problem was not, however, insurmountable since it is possible to assess the accuracy of the testimony of one interviewee against written documents and against other interviewees. Also worth noting here is that, in general, the interviewees were able to corroborate data from secondary sources and, importantly, to provide further evidence and interpretations of Ghali's reform agenda. This was particularly the case in relation to the role of humanitarian norms. It was apparent that most of the interviewees believed that both power and norms affected the initiation and implementation of Ghali's reforms. Only one respondent provided a purely

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material analysis of Ghali's agenda, noting that the structure of power was central to the reform. Another theme evident across the interviews was that of generating greater clarity about which international norms were significant to Ghali's reforms. Most of the interviewees made reference to human rights as the key norms, yet noted that they were evolving during Ghali's Secretary-Generalship. A strong theme that also emerged from the interviews was that of the legacy of Ghali's reforms. Of the twenty interviewees, sixteen emphasized that many of GS Annan's proposals drew on ideas found in Ghali's reform agenda. Ghali's agenda therefore 'set the stage' for Annan's successful initiatives.[28]

Although this positive observation was echoed by the majority of interviewees, the respondents were hardly of one voice in respect of Ghali's personality. It was evident that Ghali was a controversial figure. Some believed that his forthright, outspoken approach helped to stamp an activist demeanour upon the office, and they applauded his efforts believing them necessary and/or inevitable. Others however felt that Ghali was something of a loose cannon, high-handed, distant, aristocratic and arrogant towards both his staff and the member states. There was never a general staff meeting among senior staff. His Chief of Staff, John Claude Aime, was the gate keeper, and to secure a meeting with the SG was almost impossible.[29] This made the staff feel that there was a significant gap between the 38th floor and the rest of the UN, whereas with Annan there was a notably different style. Between these two opposite views, some interviewees believed that Ghali relied on some key staff but did not delegate responsibilities a great deal.[30] In other words, Ghali had a very small tight circle of advisors and nearly everybody else, including senior staff, were kept at a great distance. 'He trusted his staff more than he trusted the UN bureaucracy, which resisted him almost from the very start of his tenure'.[31] In this regard, a former UN staff member noted that Ghali had about ten hand-picked people that he consulted regularly: 'One of these was in the pockets of the Americans and always gave him bad advice'.[32]

It was clear from the interviews that Ghali had outstanding intellectual qualities, but he lacked personal skills. I asked each interviewee whether or not they thought that Ghali's

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personality affected the implementation of reform. Again, there was no uniform assessment of the impact of Ghali's personality. Some interviewees highlighted the importance of an SG's personality as an 'orchestra player' who must influence nations and make a difference as well as a 'manager' who has to handle bloated bureaucracy.[33] In this sense, Ghali's personality, particularly with the US, was a critical issue. This was especially in the light of Albright's conception of that SG's role and style, which was in conflict with that of Ghali's. There was no way to find mutual ground, and that affected reform, because whatever he proposed was often automatically opposed.[34]

In short, the interviews were valuable sources of additional evidence to explain Ghali's reform agenda. In this respect, they indicated that recognition of the centrality of power in reform does not result in the reduction of reform to material factors alone. Such an understanding of reform clearly stands at some distance from the existing literature. This leads us to an important question: What claims can this study make regarding its contribution to the current literature on UN reform?

As stated in the Introduction, the thesis has two substantive aims. The first is to assess the utility of realism - both in its neorealist form, and in the ES interpretation - in accounting for the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. The theoretical analysis in Chapter Six concluded that neorealism offers adequate explanations of the initiation, timing and failure of reform (in response to changes in power relations). It highlighted however, that neorealism cannot account much for the content and success of Ghali's reforms. This is important, since it calls into question the neorealist assertion that only power matters. The findings of this research demonstrate that neorealism cannot provide by itself a convincing framework for analyzing the process of UN reform in the Post-Cold War era. This being so, I suggested that one possible way forward was to incorporate insights provided by the ES. To do this, I applied an ES framework to explicate the role of norms in UN reform and to an analysis of Ghali's reform agenda. In this respect, the evidence reveals that the ES offers considerable insights into the substantive nature, direction and success of Ghali's reforms. Consequently, the ES provides a complementary view to neorealist (materialist) explanations of Ghali's

reforms. This thesis presents the case for adopting the ES as a suitable complementary account. Before proceeding further, it is important that we are clear about what the term 'complementary' implies. Here it is instructive to consider the argument of Niels Bohr, who introduced the principle of complementarity in the area of Physics.[35]

The essence of the complementarity approach is that apparently paradoxical, contradictory accounts of events should not divert attention from their essential wholeness. Thus, in observing that properties are 'complementary' Bohr meant that they are incompatible but equally required for the full description of a system.[36] In short, Bohr formulated complementarity as a framework for understanding phenomena. From his point of view, to obtain a complete explanation of an event, complementary analysis must be used. This being so, a central claim of this thesis is that explanations that focus only on power or interests are not sufficient: norms also have an important role to play by justifying and legitimizing Ghali's reforms.

Linked to the above claim, the second substantive aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate orthodox accounts of Ghali's reform agenda. As my literature review in Chapter Six illustrated, existing explanations of Ghali's reforms are structural in the sense that they emphasize reform reflects distributional shifts in power at an international level. As a result, numerous studies of the cases of UN reform cite shifts in power structures and new relations between the P5. For example, section 6.3 demonstrated how Newman's study[37] offered valuable insights into the initiation of Ghali's reform agenda. However, his analysis was solely focused on the roles that both political constraints and opportunities play in the context of change. This perspective led Newman (in an article published in 1998) to assert that under Boutros Ghali 'the Offices suffered from grave material shortages and the constraints which are inherent in an Organization, which often reflects the narrow interests of a small group of states'.[38]

The review of the current literature also demonstrated that values and norms are given cursory treatment in studies of Ghali's reforms. As I noted in Chapter Six, authors like Simons,[39] Burgess,[40] Froehlich,[41] Rivlin and Gordenker[42] analyse Ghali's reform agenda

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solely in the context of power relations. This being so, they mainly consider how variations in the international power positions of states had led to new roles for the UN, especially on peace and security matters. They do not, however, devote space to analyzing how a normative change was important. The strength of my analysis is that it does precisely that: It demonstrates the explanatory value of both norms and power.

This thesis draws upon the ES in order to understand whether Ghali's reforms were a product of changes in power structure, as emphasized in the existing literature, or how far they can be explained as a product of changing norms. Although the latter is crucial to all studies of UN reform, it is rarely directly addressed in the literature. There may be a simple explanation for this lack of attention to normative issues. Given that the majority of studies have explicitly endorsed neorealist theory, there is an incentive for scholars to avoid the issue. Any attempt to grapple with questions of norms would expose the tensions within realism as to the centrality of power. One of the consequences of this has been the tendency amongst orthodox accounts of UN reform to emphasize the importance of 'hard' variables (material capability), rather than 'soft' variables (norms).

The existing literature only tells part of the story of Ghali's reforms. This research supports the assertion that norm change, especially during the early 1990s, evolved with an emphasize on humanitarian intervention. This norm did not simply justify Ghali's reform agenda, it also legitimized it through a logic of appropriateness. As the discussion in Chapter Four made clear, Ghali's proposals included the creation of new strategies and tools to meet human security demands rooted in an international society conception of international relations, which emphasized that the international community, through IOs, should uphold certain universal standards. This study completes the story by examining the role of norms. It explains not only why Ghali's reforms came about, but also the content, direction and success of reforms.

Drawing on primary and secondary research, dominant neorealist explanations are found to be inadequate. This does not mean that the existing studies are irrelevant. On the contrary, this thesis contends that, despite its limitations, neorealism is important, as it

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draws attention to the centrality of power considerations. The Post-Cold War international power structure undoubtedly shaped Ghali's reform agenda. But such mainstream interpretations, focusing on structural variables, and excluding the role of global norms, provide few clues about the actual content of reform. This thesis fills this critical gap by exploring the impact of underlying norms.

This thesis advances the argument that, even if member states invoked reform only to serve national interests, as Simons argues,[43] they found themselves constrained in their subsequent actions by the solidarist claims advanced collectively by the international society of states. Such claims were the result of normative change at the international level. In other words, in its analysis of Ghali's reforms, the thesis acknowledges that Ghali's agenda reflected the distribution of international power. Here, I return to Newman's observation that, 'In the wider attitudes and policies of the Great Powers, the Secretary-General is still constrained and often manipulated'.[44] He makes the point in the following way: 'In the post-Cold War world the Secretary-General will continue to fulfil the institutional needs of Great Power trade-offs'.[45] However, we should not ignore how changes in global norms alter conceptions of national interests. For example, Western states' growing commitment to democratic values was reflected in a new commitment to defend human rights internationally. Thus, a key part of this normative transformation was an acceptance by governments in the West that humanitarian intervention is both morally permitted and morally required in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency. Chapter Three developed these arguments.

Building on the above, another central theme in the thesis has been that institutionalized norms impact on state behaviour towards the UN reform. This impact, however, cannot be fully understood without reference to key actors, their preferences, their interests, and relative power. Understanding the role of norms in this way has several implications for explaining UN reform. It helps to explain the significance of norms in the context of change in IOs. This analysis also challenges the neorealist materialistic assumption/analysis that the process of reform is entirely dependent on power distributional factors. The discussion thus far points to at least three original contributions

the thesis can claim to make to the existing scholarly literature on UN reform. Firstly, it makes a substantial empirical contribution to the literature on Ghali's reform agenda by providing a detailed discussion of UN reform from 1992 to 1997, using an extensive range of sources (outlined in Chapter Four). It also contributes to the study of change in IOs more generally by combining a theoretically informed and empirically detailed analysis of reform processes in the context of the Post-Cold War era. It is based on a broad range of interviews conducted with several key participants in the reform process. Evidence obtained from these interviews has generated a new understanding of the political and normative context of UN reform. In addition, the thesis contributes original material on aspects of Ghali's reform, in particular, the role of norms in the formulation and implementation of reform.

A second contribution of the thesis is that it systematically develops neorealist accounts of IOs and institutional change. In this context, Chapter Two demonstrated that neorealism overlooks the significance of IOs and focuses heavily upon structural dynamics. Such an analysis comes from the pessimistic view of the prospects of state cooperation in IOs. This line of argument holds that IOs like the UN do not have an independent effect; instead they merely reflect states' calculations of self-interest and the constraints they face.[46] From this point of view, IOs matter very little, and consequently states, especially the most powerful, are often compelled to shun cooperation. This was evident in Chapter Three, in considering the neorealist argument that unipolarity effectively means unilateralism. According to unipolarists, the unipolar structure of power has a number of important consequences for the US approach to IOs. First and foremost, it meant that the US had the power simply to ignore the UN. Given unipolarity, the argument is that the US is tempted simply to act unilaterally or in coalitions of the willing. Surprisingly, though, the thesis demonstrates that, from the 1990s, a hegemonic US retained a commitment to promoting and strengthening international institutions and to the multilateral consensus within them. For example, the evidence in Chapter Five suggests that the US was much engaged in Ghali's reforms, rather than pursuing a unipolar strategy aimed at consolidating and enhancing its primacy in the international system. In other words, unipolarity did indeed give the US the power to go it alone, yet

the sole super power chose reform over unilateralism. The findings of this research weaken the neorealist contention that IOs are irrelevant, because, if they were insignificant, why would the US prefer to operate through them? Neorealism is silent on this issue. In addition, unipolarity cannot provide an answer to the important question: why did the US push for fundamental reform while it had the clear option of acting unilaterally? This demonstrates one of the limits to neorealism, because it tends to dismiss IOs and therefore cannot adequately explain why in a unipolar system the US engaged with Ghali's reforms. Here the thesis contends that, in order to make neorealism progressive, it is necessary to relax its insistence on the relative insignificance of international institutions. This thesis elucidates the weaknesses of parsimonious neorealism as a theory of IOs and UN reform in particular, and provides an indication of how it can be strengthened.

Thirdly, by exposing the underlying role of norms, this study fills a gap in the existing literature on Ghali's reforms (and Post-Cold War UN reform in general). It shows that, by continuing to presume that UN reform is always a phenomenon of power, the literature reinforces the idea that Ghali's reform agenda is best explained only by shifts in distributional power. This effectively excludes consideration of the significance of other factors but this study has demonstrated that a concentration on changes in relative state power is only part of the reform story, yet, unlike the existing literature (which does not discuss international norms or does so in a limited way) it considers normative structures to be a key explanatory variable. This account of UN reform thus emphasizes the role of shared values and norms, as well as the changing power distributions among states. It shows that although power remained an important factor in Ghali's reforms, yet more was at work than simple balance-of-power calculations. In the Post-Cold War era, a new normative consensus on humanitarian intervention evolved within the international community. The UN consequently had to play a positive and constructive role in mitigating ethnic conflict and the new socio-economic and human rights challenges. This means that increasing demands on the UN and the need to undertake responsibilities, of which it had no previous experience, shaped and drove Ghali's reforms. Ghali's agenda

highlighted the fact that norms could, therefore, be equally significant variables in explaining Post-Cold War UN reform.

While this thesis builds on the analysis of orthodox studies, it is nevertheless a departure, in that it tries to explain UN reform in its broader normative context. In doing so it identifies the impact of new or changed norms in the Post-Cold War era (i.e., the humanitarian intervention norms) on the UN and Ghali's reforms. Of course, it makes use of existing analysis, but rather contends that Ghali's proposals must be viewed in the light of shifts in normative standards articulated by key states. Understanding this normative evolution and the changing interest structure it created is, therefore, a major conclusion of this thesis. Most importantly it takes norms seriously: treating norms as more than simply expressions of military or economic power, or as instruments of actors' pre-conceived self-interests. In short, orthodox studies of Ghali's reforms tend to be dominated by capability and material (self-interest) variables rather than by values or norms. It is in this area that the biggest gaps in the literature lie, and it is here that the greatest potential exists for future contributions to understanding UN reform in the new era. The question now is: What next?

7.4 Proposed Future Research

The thesis engages with a topical issue. Inevitably, this opens up many more questions that could not be addressed within the confines of a thesis limited by time, length and scope. Therefore, if more comprehensive research is to be conducted, it may lead to further interesting results. Below are two suggested ways in which further research might contribute to this academic field in an original and critical way.

7.4.1 UN Reform and NGOs

This research could be pursued further to develop the issues and implications of a developing global society. A closer investigation is needed to address expanded roles for citizen groups, social movements, the proliferation of NGOs, parliamentary bodies and the media. This could be linked to their implications for the UN, particularly in the

context of reform. Thus there is scope to research civil involvement and influence on the reform agenda. This is especially so given the fact that NGOs no longer have a hierarchical relationship with the UN. They have increasingly assumed the role of promoters of new ideas and norms; they have alerted the world community to emerging issues and they have developed expertise and talent which have become vital for the UN's work, both at policy and operational levels. Moreover, since security in the contemporary era is ultimately about people, rather than states, then civilians should not stand for being excluded from shaping the normative agenda. In short, as NGOs' participation in IOs has increased exponentially since the 1990s and, as their activities, approaches and attitudes to the UN often reflect changing international priorities, more research that engages NGOs and their implications for the implementation of reform is needed.

7.4.2 How, Where, and When do Norms Matter?

Further research might also be based on the increasing need to understand how, where, and when norms 'truly matter' in the context of UN reform. Such research could explore the dynamic interaction between international and domestic norms. The research also might seek to explore why states promote and advance certain norms. In part, this thesis has touched upon the utilization of common norms and how they have affected UN reform. More needs to be done on the constitutive effects of norms and the extent to which they can make certain practices possible.

The aim of the thesis is not to convince by sheer weight of evidence that norms justified and legitimized Ghali's reform agenda. The aim is simply to indicate that the normative context is a contributory factor in the analysis, and that if more comprehensive research were to be conducted - through more interviews for example - then it may lead to interesting results. It could provide more evidence to support the argument that norms do matter in the process of IO change. In short, the limitations and weaknesses found in applying neorealism to Ghali's reform agenda suggest that future research on UN reform should include variables which neorealism factors out, i.e. global norms. The next move

therefore should be towards devising a more sophisticated theoretical framework in which these normative factors can be analyzed.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with the main arguments and significant findings and conclusions offered by the thesis. Starting from the contention that both power and norms are important in understanding UN reform, the thesis sought to question the utility of realism in accounting for UN reform in the Post-Cold War world, through a case study of the reform agenda of former SG Boutros Ghali. The main argument is that, during the Cold War years, *Realpolitik* neorealism seemed an appropriate theory for UN reform. However, as the Cold War collapsed and the concept of universal norms evolved, material factors, such as polarity, by themselves became insufficient to understand or explain UN reform. Thus, in consideration of existing works framed by neorealist theory, the chapter demonstrated that the picture drawn by such orthodox accounts is at odds with the reality of the Post-Cold War world where international norms matter.

The chapter then proceeded to analyse the extent to which neorealism and the ES can account for the causes, timing, content and implementation of Ghali's reforms. The research indicates that, while neorealism explains the causes, timing, and failure of reform, its power-type explanations are of little help when it comes to explaining the content, direction and success of reform. The chapter demonstrated that a structural neorealist account is necessary to explain or understand Ghali's reform agenda, but by itself not sufficient. In particular, it fails to account for the significant role of global norms. As a consequence, the chapter moved on to consider the explanatory power of the ES. The aim was to elucidate the value it provides in respect of explaining Ghali's reform project. The research also indicates that, by referring to changes in normative standards articulated by member states, the ES accounts adequately for the content and success of Ghali's reforms. The thesis therefore concludes that no single theory is likely to be suited to the task of understanding UN change in the Post-Cold War world. Such a task needs explanations combining both material and normative factors (see table 6.1 which

compares the two theoretical approaches discussed in the thesis to account for Ghali's reform agenda).

In contradistinction to much of the existing literature, which focuses exclusively on the international distribution of power in its explanation of UN reform, this study takes into account the effects of normative factors in its understanding of that process. The contribution of this thesis, therefore, is that it offers a complementary explanation of Ghali's reform agenda. It accepts the orthodox proposition that UN reform in the new era responds to the opportunities and constraints of a changing power structure. Unlike the existing studies, however, it takes norms seriously in its explanation of UN reform. In summary, this thesis enriches the neorealist approach with important insights from the ES, which it considers as complementary rather than contradictory. By doing so, it brings norms back in to the realist analysis of world politics and the analysis of IOs more specifically.

Notes

[1] Morgenthau, 1955.
[2] Waltz, 1979.
[3] Ibid, and Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp. 5-49.
[4] Morgenthau, 1955.
[5] Glaser, 1994/95, pp. 50-90, and Jervis, 1999, pp. 42-63.
[6] See Grieco, Summer 1988, pp. 485-507; Grieco, August 1988b, pp. 600-24, and Grieco, 1990.
[7] See Krasner, 1991, pp. 336-5, Krasner, Spring 1982, p. 190, and Krasner, Spring 1982a, pp. 497-510.
[8] See for example Bull, 1977; Buzan, 1983 and Buzan, 1993, pp. 327-52.
[9] Waltz, 1979 and Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp. 5-49.
[10] Buzan, 2004.
[11] Krauthammer, 1990/91, pp. 23-33.
[12] Wohlforth, 1999, pp. 5-41.
[13] Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999.
[14] Waltz, 1993, pp. 44-79.
[15] Layne, 1993, pp. 5-51.
[16] Kupchan, 1998, pp. 40-79.
[17] See for example, Bellamy, 2003, pp. 321-341; Bellamy and McDonald, 2004, pp. 307-330 and Bellamy, International Society and its Critics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005.
[18] See for example Booth, 1991, pp. 313-26; Booth and Vale, 1997, and Booth, Ed., Critical Security Studies and World Politics, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
[19] Hampson et al., 2001.
[20] Wheeler, 2000. Also see Wheeler, 2001, pp. 113-128.
[21] Krasner, 1999.
[22] Dunne and Wheeler, 1999.
[23] Philpott, 2001.
[24] Deng, 2000, p. 128. Also see Deng et al., 1995.

[25] See James, 1999, pp. 457-473.

[26] See for example, Roberts, 2004, p. 71.

[27] Wheeler, 2000, pp. 33-51.

[28] Interviews with Angela Kane and David Hannay.

[29] Interview with Gillian Sorenson.

[30] Interview with John Simpson.

[31] Interview with Charles Hill.

[32] Interview with Sylvana Foa.

[33] Interview with David Hannay.

[34] Interview with Angela Kane.

[35] In physics, complementarity is a basic principle of quantum theory closely identified with the Copenhagen interpretation, and refers to effects such as the wave-particle duality, in which different measurements made on a system reveal it to have either particle-like or wave-like properties.

[36] Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse, eds., Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p. xv.

[37] See Newman, 1998.

[38] Newman, 1998, p. 80.

[39] Simons, 1995.

[40] Burgess, 2001.

[41] Froehlich, 1997, pp. 301-309.

[42] See Rivlin and Gordenker, Eds., 1993.

[43] Simons, 1995.

[44] Newman, 1998a, p. 191.

[45] Ibid, p. 189.

[46] See Waltz, 1979 and Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp. 5-49

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Mohamed Shaker (Former Egyptian Ambassador) 1st August 2005.

Abdel Halim Badawi (Former UN Official) 2nd August 2005.

Nabil Elaraby (Former Egyptian Ambassador and Former Judge in the International Court of Justice) 4th August 2005.

Boutros Ghali (Former UN Secretary General) 7th August 2005.

Ahmed Khalil (Former Senior UN Staff Member) 8th August 2005.

Amr Moussa (Secretary General of the League of Arabs States) 9th August 2005.

John Simpson (Member of Ghali's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters) 23rd September 2005.

Edward Perkins (Former American Ambassador) 1st December 2005.

Gillian Sorensen (Ghali's Special Advisor for Public Policy) 4th January 2006.

David Hannay (Former British Ambassador) 6th January 2006.

Charles Hill (Former Senior UN Staff member) 11th January 2006.

Alvaro de Soto (Ghali's Senior Political Advisor) 12th January 2006.

James Jonah (Former USG for Political Affairs) 14th January 2006.

Thomas Pickering (Former American Ambassador) 16th January 2006.

Chinmaya Gharekhan (Ghali's Senior Political Advisor and his Personal Representative to the Security Council) 20th January 06.

Ahmed Fawzi (Ghali's Spokesman) 18th April 2006.

Melissa Wells (Former USG for Administration and Management) 23rd April 2006.

John Claude Aime (Ghali's Chief of Staff) 5th May 2006.

Angela Kane (The Principal Officer for Political Affairs in Ghali's Office) 8th June 2006.

I also attempted to interview Madeline Albright (Former American Ambassador), Marrack Goulding (Former USG for Peacekeeping), and Joseph Conner (Former USG for Administration and Management), but they declined to be interviewed. I did, however, receive written answers from Sylvana Fao (Ghali's Spokeswomen). In addition, Dick Thornburgh (Former USG for Administration and Management) supplied his unpublished 'Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations'.

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