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The Evolution of Japan's Security Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons: 1945-1998

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ABSTRACT
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By Yuri Kase

The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to analyse certain aspects associated with the theory of Neo-realism, particularly as applied to arguments concerning nuclear weapons acquisition. Neo-realism places an emphasis on material factors in explaining state behaviour and international outcomes. As a theory, it also suggests that a state's external environment is a significant causal influence on its behaviour and that any changes in that environment will consequently have an impact on the policies it pursues. Contrary to this theoretical approach, those analysts emphasising the importance of strategic culture have suggested that neo-realism is an inadequate guide to state behaviour and what is required instead is a causal account which postulates the linkages between a state's culture and its behaviour. In the context of Japan, some neo-realist explanations have argued that while Japan may have remained a non-nuclear weapons state during the Cold War this will change now that the international environment has altered radically. Those emphasising strategic culture, however, have argued that Japan has remained non-nuclear due to its 'anti-military and anti-nuclear' culture. Their emphasis on the sociological aspects of Japan's national security consequently highlights factors that the rationalist neo-realist account cannot explain. In addressing these issues, this thesis suggests when and how the strategic culture approach can supplement the neo-realist account in terms of explaining the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

Second, on an empirical level, the thesis seeks to analyse why, despite Japan's potential to develop nuclear weapons and the volatile regional situation in Northeast Asia, Japan has maintained its security policy towards nuclear weapons, even in the changed international circumstances following the end of the Cold War. In addressing this objective, the following factors are analysed: 1) the importance of certain domestic considerations, such as Japan's 'anti-nuclear' sentiment, and the conflicting views on the US extended deterrence towards Japan, which range from those viewing it as 'essential' to those who argue it is 'detrimental'; 2) the US-Japanese security relationship as the most fundamental factor in the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons (especially in the context of the link between a) Japan's perception of the credibility of the US extended deterrence towards Japan and b) Japan's response to regional nuclear weapons states); and 3) the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation.

In addition, the thesis also analyses the role of Japan's civil nuclear programme in this context, particularly concerning plutonium use and fast breeder reactor development. The perceived implications of Japan's plutonium programme with regard to nuclear proliferation has been at the centre of international concerns but these concerns are not well recognised within Japan. Consequently, there has been an inevitable tension caused by the perception gap between Japan's search for a solution to what it deems as an essential 'energy security' question and the international concerns about the nuclear weapons potential of the civil nuclear programme.

To date, only limited research has been undertaken on this topic. This PhD has consequently sought to utilise both Japanese and English sources, supported by extensive primary material in the form of interviews with key individuals, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

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List of Abbreviations

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ANZUS: Australia- New Zealand- United States (alliance)
ARF: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATR: Advanced Thermal Reactor
CBM: Confidence-Building Measure
CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea/ North Korea.
ED: Extended Deterrence
EU: European Union
EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community
FBR: Fast Breeder Reactor
FM: Foreign Minister
FMCT: Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
G-7: Group of Seven
GHQ: General Headquarters/ Occupation Authority
HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium
HLW: High-Level Radioactive Waste
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IMEMO: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (USSR)
INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INFCE: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
INFCIRC: IAEA Information Circular
JAEC: Japanese Atomic Energy Commission
JAERI: Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
JCP: Japan Communist Party
JDA: Japan Defence Agency
JNC: Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute
JNFS: Japan Nuclear Fuel Services
JSP: Japan Socialist Party
KEDO: Korean Peninsula Development Organisation
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
LTP: Long Term Programme for Development and Utilisation of Atomic Energy
LWR: Light Water Reactor
MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction
MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOF: Ministry of Finance
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOX: Uranium/ Plutonium Mixed Oxide

MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPO: National Defence Programme Outline
NFU: No-First-Use
NHK: *Nihon Hoso Kyokai* (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NMCC: Nuclear Material Control Centre
NNPA: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
NNWS: Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission
NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWS: Nuclear Weapon State
NWFW: Nuclear Weapons Free World
ODA: Official Development Aid
PM: Prime Minister
PNC: Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty
RDT: Rational Deterrence Theory
SCC: Japan-US Security Consultative Committee
SDF: Self-Defence Forces of Japan
SDI: Strategic Defence Initiative
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM: Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
STA: Science and Technology Agency
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
THAAD: Theatre High Attitude Area Defence
TMD: Theatre Missile Defence
UN: United Nations
UN CD: UN Conference on Disarmament
UN GA: UN General Assembly
WPO: Warsaw Pact Organisation

3NNP: Three Non-Nuclear Principles of 1967

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Introduction

Speculation beyond Japanese borders on Japan's nuclearisation[1] is not a new phenomenon. A report written as early as 1957, by the United States (the US) Department of State, considered the possibility of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons under a succession of conservative governments.[2] However, since the latter half of 1993, Western speculation has drastically increased, due to the following six factors.[3]

First, it was believed that North Korea's ambiguous nuclear programme would compel Japan to develop its own nuclear capability as a counter-measure. Second, the Japanese government's initial opposition to the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) increased international suspicion regarding Japan's potential to 'go nuclear'. This position was also a continuation of Japanese unwillingness to accept the unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1993 summit of the Group of Seven (G-7) on the grounds that it would perpetuate the existing five nuclear weapons states (NWS), thus reducing the possibility of nuclear disarmament.[4] Third, the delay in re-defining the US-Japanese security relationship in the post-Cold War era was considered as a sign of Japan becoming fully 'independent' from the US nuclear umbrella. By the time the Joint Declaration on Security between the two states was issued in April 1996, which reaffirmed the co-operation and efforts of both sides, the seeds of international speculation had already been sown. Fourth, a number of scholarly works emphasised a link between the end of the bipolar structure that had characterised the East-West confrontation between 1945-1989 and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan.[5]

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[1] In this article, 'nuclearisation' refers to Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. By the 1990s, Japan already depended upon nuclear energy for about 30 per cent of total energy consumption. On Japan's dependence on nuclear energy, see for example, Ryukichi Imai (1994-b), *Kagaku to Gaiko,* (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho), pp.91-105. See also Sogo Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko (National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA), (1995), 'Abolishing Nuclear Arms and the Peaceful Use of Plutonium as an Energy Resource in the 21st Century', *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu,* Vol. 8:12, 1995 (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement).

[2] Peter Hayes (1993), *Japan's Plutonium Overhang and Regional Insecurity,* Working Paper No. 136, (Canberra: Australian National University Peace Research Centre), pp. 12-16.

[3] The author is indebted to Kamiya (1995), for the following analysis. Matake Kamiya (1995), 'Kaigai ni okeru 'Nihon Kaku Buso Ron'', *Kokusai Mondai*, No.426, pp.60-61.

[4] Shortly after the G-7 Summit in 1993, the Japanese government decided to support the indefinite extension of the NPT due to the increasing pressure from the US government. However, by that time, suspicion of Japan's nuclear intention had already increased.

[5] As will be discussed in Chapter 1, Kenneth Waltz's 1993 article in *International Security* is a typical

Fifth, Japan's plutonium recycling programme had long been a focus of suspicion due to the growing plutonium surplus.[6] According to an estimation carried out by Japan's Atomic Energy Commission, by the year 2010, 80 to 85 tons of plutonium will have been separated for Japan's civilian use. However a significant portion of this would remain unused due to the delayed development of commercial fast-breeder plutonium reactors.[7] Finally, Japan's civilian H-2 rocket development has become another cause for speculation concerning its ultimate role: Japan could convert its rocket technology into intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), if necessary.

It is commonly assumed outside the country that Japan already possesses the necessary technology to develop a credible nuclear weapons capability. This widespread belief, however, remains unfounded. According to Ryukichi Imai, Japan presently lacks the technology to produce highly enriched plutonium and uranium for nuclear warheads. Japan's commercial light-water reactors use uranium 235 that is enriched only to 3 per cent, while highly enriched uranium 235, 93 per cent or purer, is required for nuclear warheads. In addition, Japan also lacks the technology to build ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) required for an independent credible nuclear deterrence, though delivery by an aircraft would be a possibility. Imai claims that Japan would need at least ten years to develop its own credible nuclear deterrence capability.[8] However, the common consensus amongst nuclear specialists is that even 'reactor-grade' plutonium can produce nuclear weapons, as India's 1974 nuclear test using 'reactor-grade' plutonium demonstrated; though it may not be an ideal material for doing so, since it is more difficult to handle.[9]

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example of this kind of argument. Kenneth Waltz (1993), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, Vol.18: 2, pp.44-79.

[6] On a comprehensive analysis on Japan's plutonium program, see E.Skolnikoff, T.Suzuki, & K.Oye (1995), *International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs* , Working Paper from the Centre for International Studies, MIT, CIS Archive No. 2614 C/95-5 (Cambridge, MA.: MIT)

[7] Kumao Kaneko (1996), 'Japan Needs No Umbrella', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* Vol.52: 2, (March/ April), p.47. A similar estimation can be found in Jinzaburo Takagi (1996), 'Japan's Plutonium Program: A Critical View' (Chapter 2), *Japan's Nuclear Future*, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Of course, counter-arguments regarding this estimation can be found, see for example, Atsuyuki Suzuki (1996), 'Why Plutonium is a "Must" for Japan' (Chapter 1), Ibid.

[8] Personal communication with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1996.)

[9] The US State Department (1976), 'The November 1976 Telegram to 25 US Embassies', (November 1976), quoted in Atsuyuki Suzuki (1995), 'Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: Where to Draw the Line', a paper presented at the Japan-US Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control after the Cold War, (Tokyo, Japan, September 28-30, 1995), p.1.

The perceptual gap between the Western speculation on the possibility of Japan's nuclearisation and accounts from Japan is thus becoming wider than ever. It is against this background that this thesis will analyse why and how, despite the changed circumstances in which Japan has had to construct a viable security policy, Japan has maintained its security policy towards nuclear weapons. In pursuing this objective, this thesis will highlight the following six themes: 1) the significance of neo-realist explanation to defining certain elements of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons; 2) the importance of understanding Japan's strategic culture as a contributory factor to that policy; 3) conflicting Japanese views on US extended deterrence (ED) towards Japan; 4) the implications surrounding the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation; 5) the 'dual role' played by the US ED towards Japan; and 6) the civil-military tension over nuclear energy use. Hence, in order to understand the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, this thesis will therefore argue that it is necessary to consider all six themes in their totality, as the removal of any one is likely to make the account partial and incomplete.

In considering the first theme this thesis seeks to analyse the validity of applying the theory of neo-realism to questions concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Neo-realism, which remains the dominant theory of security studies, places an emphasis on non-ideational factors such as the importance of international structure based upon the distribution of material power. A number of theorists have consequently argued that the end of the Cold War (i.e., the end of the rigid bipolar structure) will sooner or later change Japan's attitude towards nuclear weapons: some neo-realists predict Japan's inevitable nuclearisation, while others focus on the importance of the US-Japanese security alliance as a 'brake' on Japans 'nuclear ambition'.[10] However, like any other theory of international relations, neo-realism is not a theory that can explain all aspects associated with the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. But there are certain neo-realist arguments, such as the one advocated by Buzan, Jones and Little, that do deserve attention in the

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[10] See for example, Kenneth Waltz (1993-a), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, Vol.18: 2 (Fall 1993), pp.44-79; John Mearsheimer (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Organization*, (Summer 1990), pp.5-56; Benjamin Frankel (1993), 'The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/ 4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.37-78.

analysis of Japan's security policy.[11]

Second, the thesis will highlight Japan's strategic culture as a supplementary variable to neo-realism. The advocates of strategic culture, such as Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein, argue that Japan has remained, and will remain non-nuclear, due to the 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism' amongst the population since the end of the Second World War.[12] Their emphasis on the sociological aspects of Japan's national security seeks to explain certain puzzling factors that neo-realism is unable to explain. The thesis suggests when and how the cultural approach can supplement neo-realism, and thereby provide significant insight into Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

Third, conflicting Japanese views on the US ED towards Japan – from 'essential' to 'detrimental'- can be frequently observed. As discussed more fully in the text in Chapter 2, there have been three schools of strategic thought on Japan's security since 1945, and these have taken different attitudes towards the US-Japanese security treaty and nuclear weapons: the Left idealists have long advocated the idea of unarmed neutrality and a non-nuclear Japan[13]; the pragmatic Centrists have always supported the US ED towards Japan as the ultimate security guarantee for Japan[14]; and the Right nationalists have argued in support of a fully 'independent' Japan with its own nuclear weapons.[15] Amongst the three, the pragmatic Centrists have formed the mainstream of Japanese strategic thinking despite pressures coming both from the Left and Right idealists.

Fourth, the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation will be discussed from both military and political perspectives. It will be shown that certain influential analyses have

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[11] Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (NY: Columbia University Press)

[12] See for example, Thomas U. Berger (1993), 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum', *International Security*, Vol.17:4 (Spring 1993), pp.119-150; Peter Katzenstein (199-b), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, (NY: Cornell University Press).

[13] See for example, Motofumi Asai (1996), *Hikaku no Nihon, Mukaku no Sekai* (Tokyo: Rodo Shimbun sha); Takehiko Kamo (1990), *Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Koso* (Tokyo: Iwanami); and Kumao Kaneko (1997), *Nihon no Kaku, Asia no Kaku* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha).

[14] See for example, Masashi Nishihara (1983/4) 'Expanding Japan's Credible Defence Role', *International Security*, Vol.8:3, (Winter 1983/4), pp.180-205; Satoshi Morimoto (1995), 'Ampo Kaisho Ron no Ayamari', *This is Yomiuri*, (September 1995), pp.122-129; and Yonoshuke Nagai (1994), *Heiwa no Daisho*, (24th edition) (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha).

[15] See for example, Ikutaro Shimizu (1980) *Nippon yo Kokka tare- Kaku no Sentaku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju); and Shintaro Ishihara (1970) 'Hikaku no Shinwa wa Kieta', *Shokun* (October 1970), pp.65-83.

indicated that the only benefits of nuclearisation would be that Japan would no longer have to contemplate questions concerning the credibility of the US ED towards Japan. However, it has also been acknowledged that the enormous costs involved in such a move would outweigh any perceived benefits associated with the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[16]

Fifth, the 'dual role' of the US ED towards Japan - to 'protect' or to 'contain' Japan – will also be highlighted. The tension on the US side has frequently confused Japan's policy-makers.[17] While some regard the US ED towards Japan as a necessary policy in order to protect the US's national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, others view it as a means for containing Japan's nuclear 'ambition'. The latter opinion has been particularly strong amongst those who give credit to the arguments of neo-realism,[18] and with the increasing number of the so-called 'revisionist' school of Japan specialists in the post-Cold War era.[19] Hence, it will be noted that the significance of this fifth theme is increasing.

Sixth, the civil-military tension in relation to nuclear energy use also requires some discussion in this context. The 'dual use' of nuclear energy (i.e., the potential to make a bomb or to generate electricity), has put Japan's civil nuclear policy, particularly concerning plutonium use and fast breeder reactor development, at the centre of international concerns. On the one hand, Japan's plutonium programme in the post-Cold War era is widely regarded outside the country as indication of Japan's 'covert' nuclear ambitions, which is not well recognised within Japan. However, on the other hand, the necessity of Japan's civil nuclear use from an 'energy security' perspective is not necessarily understood outside Japan. This perception gap between 'non-proliferation' and 'energy security' has led to an inevitable tension between Japan and the outside world.

It is also worth stating, by way of qualification, that it has been difficult to deal with the

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[16] See for example, Royama Michio (1968-b), 'Kaku Jidai ni Okeru Gaikko Seisaku no Sentaku', *Jiyu*, (August 1968), pp.10-19; Matake Kamiya (1995), 'Kaigai ni okeru Nihon Kaku Buso Ron', *Kokusai Mondai*, No.426, (September 1995), pp.59-73.

[17] On the conflicting US views on Japan, see for example 'the Morse Target', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 21, 1998.

[18] See for example, Michael Mandelbaum (1995), 'Lessons for the Next Nuclear War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.74:2 (March/ April 1995), pp.22-37.

[19] See for example, Chalmers Johnson and E.B.Keehn (1995), 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, (July/ August 1995), pp.103-114.

twin issues of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons and its civil nuclear energy policy in this single project due to their separate programme rationales: while Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons derives from essentially its military and defence thinking, its civil nuclear programme forms an important part of Japan's energy policy. As a consequence, the analysis of Japan's civil nuclear policy will remain fairly minimal in this thesis. Although Japan's civil nuclear policy is important in the broader context of Japan's security debate, which includes economical, environmental, societal, and energy issues, a detailed analysis on the totality of Japan's civil nuclear policy would require a separate project.

The lack of information and understanding on what precisely is the reality of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons continues to concern many overseas researchers and journalists on Japanese politics.[20] The lack of information has provided an advantage to what might be termed the 'pure' theorists who, in their analyses, have ignored certain important factors, but each of which is an integral piece of Japan's non-nuclear weapons 'puzzle'.[21] At the same time, on the Japanese side, the misunderstanding of the nature and the role of the US ED towards Japan have created various, some often misleading, arguments on nuclear weapons issues amongst policy-makers and scholars alike.

The response to this project has been both discouraging and encouraging. Interestingly, discouragement came from Japanese scholars and people, while encouragement was given mainly from the scholars beyond Japan. The project was severely criticised by two groups of thought in Japan. First, a sheer disgust was expressed by those who support the idea of the immediate elimination of nuclear weapons (the Left idealists) and those who are sympathetic with the victims of nuclear weapons. They strongly believe that Japan, as the only victim of atomic bombs, has a mission to advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons: Japan must behave as a moral example to deny the evil and immoral power of nuclear weapons. From their perspectives this project, which deals with the nature and the effectiveness of US ED towards Japan, is immoral and shameful. This is particularly so

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[20] See for example, Selig S. Harrison (1996), *Japan's Nuclear Future* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); and Frank Barnaby (1994), 'Nuclear Programmes in Japan and North Korea', *Current Decision Report*, No.14 (Oxford Research Group), (August 1994), pp.21-22.

[21] The term 'proliferation puzzle' is often used by researchers dealing with nuclear proliferation. See for example, Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds.) 'The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons

since the author is Japanese, the same nationality as the nuclear victims. The author is seen as a shameful Westernised 'betrayer' who has no national pride of sharing the 'lofty' mission of advocating the nuclear weapons free world for the sake of every human being on the earth. Second, the scholars who have a fixed view on nuclear weapons expressed a sheer rejection. They regard the US ED towards Japan as well as Japan's non-nuclear posture as the absolute 'given' in Japan's national security. From their viewpoint, there is no 'evolution' of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons as such. They criticised this project as a futile attempt to conjure up some sort of story, since "nothing has ever changed in Japan's non-nuclear weapons status for the past half a century, and nothing would ever change in the future."[22] They also have a fixed view on international politics as a whole: nuclear weapons have deterred the outbreak of a major war for the past half a century, and it will remain so for the future. In short, they are the strong supporters of 'status quo'. For them, the prevalent Western speculation on Japan's nuclearisation, which was discussed earlier, does not pose any negative political implication between Japan and other states, and there is nothing Japan could do to stop these 'unfounded' speculations.

These discouraging responses are worrying, however. First, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 ('The Influence of Internal Factors in the Debate within Japan over its Security Policy towards Nuclear Weapons'), it is common for the Left idealists and the Japanese public in general to talk about the ideal world without suggesting any concrete measures to achieve it. Rejecting the investigation into the US ED towards Japan for the past half a century, i.e., the lack of empirical research on such a crucial factor for Japan's national security, will keep the Left idealists' arguments a merely emotional appeal. Secondly, the strong supporters of 'status quo' do not realise the implications of their arguments. It is certainly important to fully acknowledge the present security situation, which they regard as 'the reality'. However, denying (or probably abandoning) any possibility of change in approach or security objectives, would bring new security thinking to a standstill. Japan does not exist in a vacuum, and Japan's security policy has been implemented in an interaction between internal and external environments. Focusing merely on the 'outcome', i.e., Japan as a non-nuclear weapons state under the US ED, would rule out any possibility for a multi-dimensional approach towards nuclear issues.

Spread and What Results', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/4 (Spring / Summer 1993).

[22] No.18, a Japanese professor of security studies. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December

There was little Japan could do in the event of a superpower nuclear confrontation during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, however, with the arrival of a new nuclear environment, in particular in Northeast Asia, Japan needs a comprehensive approach towards its security policy towards nuclear weapons. This can range from the promotion of pains-taking confidence-building-measures (CBM) in the region, Japan's further efforts to create a better bi-lateral relationship with its neighbours, to Japan's efforts to increase the credibility of the US ED towards Japan. Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons is not a zero-sum game. Japan needs a more flexible and comprehensive multi-dimensional approach to nuclear issues. This should be realistically and concretely discussed, including the measures ranging from Japan's economic 'carrots' to its support for the US's 'sticks' in dealing with nuclear threats towards Japan.

If this thesis can present some insight into the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, which has been one of the 'unknowns' in the study of non-/ proliferation of nuclear weapons, my commitment for the past four years would be neither an 'immoral activity' nor a 'waste of time'.

1995).

Chapter 1: Neo-realism and Strategic Culture: Theorising Japan's Security Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons

1.0. Introduction

Many analysts have applied various theories to the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation to try and explain or understand its dynamics. Although only five states have been officially designated as nuclear weapons states (NWS), the number of states that may have taken a decision whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons is said to be around forty.[1] In the latter regard, Japan has been one of those which has attracted the most attention. What is interesting is that those analyses, which have focused on Japan, occupy a wide spectrum of positions. Some theorists predict that Japan will inevitably acquire its own nuclear weapons in the future due to the dramatic international structural change caused by the end of the Cold War. In contrast, other theorists argue that Japan has not, and is unlikely to, develop nuclear weapons because of its membership of the liberal democratic 'core' group of states or because of its identity as a 'peaceful state'. So just as with Stephen Walt's comment that international relations is 'One World, Many Theories',[2] accounts of Japan's policy in the context of the debate about nuclear weapons acquisition is also one phenomenon with many theories. However, the aim of this chapter is not to identify a single generic theory for understanding or explaining the acquisition or non-acquisition of nuclear weapons.[3] Rather, this chapter provides a literature review of what I consider as two of the most relevant theories that apply to Japan in this particular area of policy: neo-realism and strategic culture. It will be argued that while neo-realism does provide a general theoretical basis for addressing certain crucial aspects associated with the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, this accounts needs to be

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[1] Benjamin Frankel and Zachary S. Davis (1993), 'Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Theory and Policy', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), p.2.

[2] Stephen M. Walt (1998), 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy*, No.110, (Spring 1998), pp.29-46.

[3] Various theories give an insight into certain aspect of nuclear proliferation/ non-proliferation. For neo-liberal institutionalists' explanation on the proliferation dynamics, see for example, Glenn Chafetz (1993), 'The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Alternative to the Neo-realist Perspective', *Security Studies,* Vol.2: 3/ 4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.127-158. For organisational theory, see Scott Sagan (1993), *The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). For the 'myth maker' model, see Peter R. Lavoy (1993), 'Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation', *Security Studies,* Vol.2: 3/ 4, (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.192-212. For the 'social construction of technology theory' (sociological approach), see Steven Flank (1993), 'Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation', *Security Studies,* Vol. 3:2

supplemented with insights stemming from those who adopt a strategic culture approach.

1.1. Neo-realism and Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons

Kenneth Waltz, the most prominent advocate of neo-realism, has argued that theory gives meaning to countless numbers of 'value-free' facts in order to make sense of them. Waltz claims that "[o]ne can find his way among infinite materials only with the guidance of theory."[4] According to this logic, even though there seem to be many holes and omissions in theory, a theory can select and organise facts into an isolated, artificial domain so that their significance can be identified for the study of international relations. The task of explanation and prediction in the study of international relations can only be achieved by distinguishing theory from facts.[5] Some neo-realists have argued that it is important to apply theory to the dynamics of nuclear weapons acquisition because theory can make clear the assumptions it brings to the analysis of what Realists call 'reality' and which can therefore give guidance to policymakers.[6] This will not only have the consequence of providing policymakers with a better understanding of proliferation dynamics, but it will also lead to better policy-recommendations.[7]

During the Cold War, neo-realism was the most influential theory of international politics, particularly in the area of security studies. It was widely viewed as a theory that could explain the enduring features of international system such as war between states and the formation of countervailing military alliances. Neo-realism also enjoyed a predominant position in the study of nuclear proliferation as states were considered to be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons as a means for enhancing their security in an anarchic international arena. In contrast, little attention was devoted to analysing the domestic context as a critical factor in nuclear weapons dynamics as all states were seen to respond

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(Winter 1993/ 94), pp.259-94.

[4] Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, (NY: McGraw-Hill), p.5

[5] Kenneth N. Waltz (1990-a), 'Realist Thought and Neo-realist Theory', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.44:1, p.22

[6] The term 'Realism' (with a capital 'R') is used as a general term to include various versions of realists' theories. As will be discussed in details in this chapter, 'Realism' is not a single theory, but rather it embraces a variety of realisms, in particular classical realism (such as Morgenthau), and neo-realism (such as Waltz). At least the following assumptions were shared amongst the numerous denominations: statism, survival, and self-help ('three Ss'). Timothy Dunne (1997), 'Realism', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.109-124.

[7] Benjamin Frankel and Zachary Davis (1993), 'Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Theory and Policy', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/4, p.2.

similarly to the international environment in which they found themselves. For theoretical purposes, therefore, the domestic context of states tended to be placed in what might be termed a 'black box' and, in so doing, was excluded from the analysis. This situation was reinforced by the relative lack of information to be found in the public domain concerning the domestic variables that might contribute to nuclear weapons decision-making. Neo-realism thus provided a straightforward theoretical basis which is to address the dynamics of nuclear weapons proliferation without resort to any need to add complexity by incorporating domestic factors into the account.

Despite numerous interpretations of Realism, many Realists share the following points: 1) states are rational unitary actors, and the unit of analysis; 2) the 'survival' of the states is the precondition for attaining all other goals; and 3) the balance of power provides the best means for avoiding conflict in the 'self-help' anarchical international system.[8]

Classical realism, such as that often associated with Hans Morgenthau, claims that sovereign states seek to maximise their 'national interests' defined in terms of 'power' in order to survive in the competitive international system. The absence of a world government in such a system means that the 'self-help' of each actor is the principle for action, which can ultimately lead to a 'struggle for power' between them.[9] In this competitive international system, external pressures on a state, in terms of perceived external military threats, could also trigger a potentially endless 'security dilemma'.[10] In such a system, the mechanism of the balance of power is regarded as an essential stabilising factor as this is the best way of managing or offsetting any one states' tendency to accumulate strategic power.[11]

The most obvious difference between classical realism, represented by Hans Morgenthau,

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[8] Dunne (1997), pp.109-124.

[9] Hans Morgenthau (1985), *Politics Amongst Nations,* (6th edition), (London: McGraw-Hill), p.33. The book was originally published in 1948.

[10] There are two types of 'security dilemma': inadvertent security dilemma and deliberate security dilemma. An inadvertent security dilemma is perceived by state B due to state A's failure to act carefully on security matters, thus state A's activities gives unintended signals towards state B. On the other hand, a deliberate security dilemma is perceived by state B as a result of the deliberate actions of state A in order to deter state B. See Ken Booth and N.J. Wheeler (1992), 'Security Dilemma', in John Baylis and N.J.Regger (eds.), *Dilemma of World Politics*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp.30-31.

[11] Scott Burchill (1996), 'Realism and Neo-realism', in Scott Bruchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan Press), p.77

and neo-realism, as initially advocated by Kenneth Waltz, is that while Morgenthau emphasised pessimistic human nature as the permanent source for international conflict, Waltz ignores human nature and emphasises instead the anarchical structure of the international system as the main source for influencing the behaviour of states.[12] While Morgenthau's reliance upon the laws of pessimistic human nature to explain states' behaviour is impossible to observe and quantify, Waltz's neo-realism borrows from natural science the method of observable laws of the international system. These authors also disagree about issues such as what is the best 'polar' structure in international politics. While Morgenthau stressed the virtues of the classical, multi-polar balance of power system as the best method for stabilising the international system, Waltz claimed that bi-polarity is more stable than multi-polarity.[13] Importantly, Waltz stressed security as motivation, Morgenthau stressed power.

Regarding nuclear issues, the most profound difference is that while Morgenthau was against nuclear deterrence, Waltz and other early version of neo-realists have supported such deterrent relationships. Morgenthau argued that mutually assured destruction (MAD) drastically reduced US political and military options, since the United States had to face either the slaughter of tens of millions of civilians or appeasement. Morgenthau was especially opposed to the idea of 'gradual deterrence' and 'limited nuclear war', which gained a prominent position in US strategic thinking after the arrival of inter-continental ballistic missiles and MIRVed weapon systems. In theoretical terms at least, nuclear arsenals beyond assured destruction level might make it possible to wage limited nuclear war, a possibility that Morgenthau considered as an irrational.[14]

1.1.1. Neo-realism and nuclear proliferation

The early version of neo-realism, developed by Waltz, goes beyond the assumptions of classical realism when it emphasises the importance of such features as the structural configuration of the international system and the restrictions imposed on the behaviour of all states by the condition of anarchy. The assumptions of neo-realism can thus be

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[12] Waltz argues that 'a structure' is determined by the arrangement or positions of its components, hence only the changes of arrangements can be called structural changes. Waltz (1979), p.80, 93, and pp.100-101.
[13] For a compact summary of today's major theories of international relations, see for example, Stephen Walt (1998), 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, (Spring 1998), pp.29-46
[14] Morgenthau (1985), pp.439-450, especially pp.444-445.

summarised as follows: the ordering principle of the international system is anarchical, and this forces states to rely on themselves ('self-help') [15]; the increase in the level of mutual transaction amongst the member states within any given international system makes each state accept and imitate each others' character, thus creating the same type of entity ('like units'), these units operate as 'rational unitary actors'[16], and they therefore demonstrate functional similarity[17]; the international system can change through shifts in the distribution of material capabilities amongst its constituent units (sovereign states), altering the number of major actors ('Great Powers') in the system; a state's most important goal is to secure its own survival, and a state secures its own survival either by accumulating military forces of its own or by formulating military alliance with other state(s); and a multi-polar system has inherent complexity which can generate greater potential for instability, since "stability decreases as the system complexity increases."[18] Within a multi-polar system the fluidity of alliance formation and break-up means that there is no enduring distinction between friends and enemies, which ultimately leads neo-realists to argue that bi-polarity is more stable than multi-polarity.

Based on these assumptions, the early version of neo-realists have developed an explanation relating to the link between the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and the absence of war between the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) during the Cold War. Steve Weber argues that a slow structural change in the international system has been brought about by the presence of nuclear weapons, from an anarchic order to a more hierarchical ordering structure.[19] Within the structure, the NWS have acted as "joint custodians"[20] of the international system, thereby exercising an overarching power, which operates as a structural constraint to reduce the incentives to go to war.

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[15] Waltz (1979), pp.79-80, 99. Also Waltz (1986), 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics', *Neo-realism and Its Critics*, in Robert Keohane (ed.), (NY: Columbia University Press), pp.325-30, 341-44.
[16] Waltz (1986), Ibid., pp.7-16.
[17] Waltz (1979), pp.127-8. Many realists agree with Waltz that anarchy forces states to perform the same function, but expect that this will be done in somewhat different ways. For example, Christopher Layne (1993) argues that great powers will perform the same functions but may have different structures. 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', *International Security*, Vol.17:4 (Spring 1993), pp.15-6.
[18] Alvin Saperstein (1991), 'The 'Long Peace'- Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol.35: 1 (March 1991), pp.68-79.
[19] Steve Weber (1990) 'Realism, Détente, and Nuclear Weapons', *International Organization,* Vol.44:1, (Winter 1990), pp.55-82.
[20] Ibid., p.77

Daniel Deudney goes further than Weber's argument.[21] Deudney argues that nuclear weapons have drastically weakened the traditional role of sovereign states in the international system.

Although Waltz is not the only advocate of rational deterrence theory, his monograph 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better' has probably been the most provocative and most-frequently criticised article related to this theory.[22] Waltz explicitly formulates rational deterrence theory by combining his strong belief in the 'caution-inducing' properties of nuclear weapons and his version of neo-realists' assumptions: that states are 'unitary rational actors'.

1.1.2. Rational Deterrence Theory

The 'rationality' assumption (i.e., the idea that the behaviour of states is determined by calculations of the gains and losses resulting from alternative courses of actions) is generally considered central to all strategic thinking.[23] Colin Gray argues that the task of prediction in nuclear strategic thinking cannot be approached empirically, since no previous case studies can be effectively applied to conflict in the nuclear age. Therefore, Gray argues that nuclear deterrence cannot help but be approached by the theory of "great chains of reasoning": nuclear deterrence theory is based upon chains of 'if-then' hypothesis that examine the costs and benefits of the deterree (the potential aggressor) and the deterrer.[24]

Rational deterrence theory suggests that as soon as one state has acquired a second-strike nuclear capability, war between nuclear-equipped states will be avoided due to the situation of mutually assured destruction in which the 'cost' of retaliation from the adversary is 'unacceptable'.[25] Since the 'cost' of nuclear war is so high, even a small

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[21] Daniel Deudney (1993), 'Dividing Realism: Structural Realism Versus Security Materialism in Nuclear Security and Proliferation', *Security Studies,* Vol.2: 3/ 4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.7-37; and (1995) 'Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real-State', *Daedalus*, Vol.124: 2, (Spring 1995), pp.209-231.
[22] Waltz (1981), 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better', *Adelphi Paper,* No.171 (London: IISS)
[23] Barry Buzan (1991), *An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (London: Macmillan), p.206.
[24] Colin Gray (1982), *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: the American Experience*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press), pp.6-7.
[25] Kenneth Waltz (1990-b), 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', *American Political Science Review*, No.84 (Fall, 1990), pp.734-7. Note that this is the explanation given by the 'easy' school of Rational Deterrence Theory. On the differences between the 'easy' and 'difficult' schools on Rational Deterrence

possibility that the adversary will retaliate can produce strong deterrence. The 'uncertainty' in the mind of the deterree on the behaviour of the adversary will induce 'caution' and 'restraint'.[26] Hence, according to analysts like Waltz, the slow spread of nuclear weapons is better for the stability of the international system in terms of the absence of war amongst nuclear weapons states. Rational deterrence theory is critical of what might be termed 'ethnocentric views' of deterrence as these claim that the political leaders of nuclear threshold states might not share the same rationality as the political leaders of existing NWS. Hence, nuclear weapons in the hands of irrational leaders are more likely to cause major disturbance. Waltz explains that due to the 'high cost' of nuclear failure, if it happens, all nuclear states behave with extreme caution since all political leaders are highly 'sensitive to costs'.[27]

Waltz and other supporters of rational deterrence theory attribute the 'long peace' (i.e., the absence of major wars amongst great powers during the Cold War to the bi-polarity and the effects of mutually assured destruction stemming from the possession of nuclear weapons), held in the hands of the superpowers.[28] With the end of the Cold War, (i.e., with the end of rigid bi-polarity), they predict that bi-polarity will be replaced by a system more akin to a multi-polar one, where a number of 'great powers' are in possession of nuclear weapons. Having said that, Waltz clearly states that the mere possession of nuclear weapons without a certain level of economic capability will not turn a state into a great power. According to Waltz, great power status is determined by the combination of size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic and military capability, political

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Theory, Buzan (1991), pp.163-177.

[26] Buzan (1991), pp.170-2.

[27] Waltz (1981); (1993-a), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, Vol.18: 2, (Fall 1993), pp.44-79; Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (1995), *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,* (N.Y.: W.W.Norton and Company), especially Chapter 1.

[28] Waltz (1993-a), p.44; and (1990-b), p.744. For other realists' explanation, see for example, John Lewis Gaddis (1986), 'The Long Peace', *International Security*, Vol.10:4, (Spring 1984); Alvin Saperstein (1991), 'The 'Long Peace'- Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol.35: 1 (March 1991), pp.68-79. Of course, many scholars have counter-argued the effectiveness of rational deterrence theory. In a direct criticism on Waltz' argument, see Sagan and Waltz (1995); Scott Sagan (1994), 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', *International Security*, Vol.18:4 (Spring 1994), pp.66-107; Peter Feaver (1992/3), 'Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations', *International Security*, Vol.17:3 (Winter 1992/3), pp.160-187. For the criticism of the 'Long Peace' thesis, see for example, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfled (1991), 'International Crises and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace'', in Charles Kegley (ed.), *The Long Postwar Peace,* (NY: Harper Collins), pp.85-104.

stability and competence.[29] Due to their emphasis on the notion of polarity in the international system, neo-realists, such as Waltz and John Mearsheimer, in particular, have predicted (and have encouraged to some extent) the possibility of the nuclearisation of Japan and Germany in the near future:[30] Germany and Japan with their economic capabilities supported by their technological capabilities, will inevitably turn their material capability into military power in order to emulate other major powers in their regions in today's 'fluid' security situation. Their belief in what Mearsheimer calls 'the pacifying effects' of nuclear weapons[31], stemming from their analysis of the cautious behaviour of the existing NWS, and the rough equality brought about by the possession of nuclear weapons, underpins their "nuclear inevitability" thesis.[32]

Waltz in his article pays special attention to today's economic great power, Japan.[33] Waltz's prediction that Japan will eventually nuclearise is a logical product of his version of neo-realism: given the continuity of conflict amongst states and the necessity of protecting their own interests, it is normal to assume that a state with economic and technological great power capability would eventually turn its material resources into military capability by acquiring nuclear weapons, as these weapons have served as a great deterrent to war. Although Waltz does acknowledge Japan's abstention from joining the nuclear club, he still claims that, "Japanese... nuclear inhibitions arising from World War II will not last indefinitely; one might expect them to expire as generational memories fade."[34] Waltz downplays the possibility of an arms race in the region following Japan's nuclearisation, as he believes that the spread of nuclear weapons makes a nuclear arms race irrelevant, since relative advantage in dealing with the absolute weapon does not make any difference.[35] Thus, Waltz concludes that, "[w]hy should nuclear weapons in

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[29] Waltz (1993-a), pp.50-52. It should be pointed out that by counting 'political stability and competence' as one of the requirements for 'great power' status, Waltz contradicts his earlier arguments of Neo-realism in which all states are 'unitary rational actors', hence no domestic factors are influential in states' behaviour in international system.

[30] Waltz (1993-a); and John Mearsheimer (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, (Summer 1990), pp.5-56.

[31] Mearsheimer (1990), p.32

[32] Darryl Howlett (1997), 'Nuclear Proliferation', in Steve Smith and John Baylis (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.349-350.

[33] Waltz defines 'great powers' as those states that possess high capabilities in the following fields: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. See Waltz (1993-a), p.50.

[34] Ibid., p.67

[35] Sagan and Waltz (1995), p.30.

...Japanese hands be especially worrisome? Nuclear weapons have encouraged cautious behaviour by their possessors and deterred any of them from threatening others' vital interests. What reasons can there be for expecting ...Japan to behave differently?"[36] Here, Waltz is almost encouraging a scenario whereby if dynamite were attached to all the cars on the street, all the drivers would drive slowly and carefully since the costs of being blown-up by dynamite were just too high.

David Arase also encourages Japan's nuclearisation, but in the form of developing an 'ambiguous' nuclear status like Israel. In the words of Arase:

> To induce caution in others while avoiding the costs and problems of a declared nuclear capability, Japan could follow the Israeli and South African model of denial and ambiguity, and Japan could ask of the West the same consideration the West gave to these...nuclear weapons efforts. The rationale would be strengthened if one believed that the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella was weakening, and that the most stable relationship between Japan and its existing and soon-to-be nuclear armed neighbours would be one of mutual deterrence.[37]

This analysis, however, underestimates the costs, economically, militarily and above all, politically, of Japan opting for a nuclear weapons path, as will be analysed in detail in later chapters.

Waltz's belief in the 'caution-inducing' effects of nuclear weapons, along with his neo-realist assumption that states are 'unitary rational actors', places too much emphasis on the consequences (the outcomes) and ignores the process. However, it is the various stages of the process that determines the final result. Waltz argues that stability comes from deterrence. Then, what would happen before this final stage? Would a state A merely watch the nuclear development of its adversary state B? Or would state A launch a preventive attack upon state B before B fully acquires a nuclear weapons capability? Would state B's nuclearisation become a trigger for a regional nuclear arms race which might cause more instability and insecurity than a security environment without the nuclear weapons of state B? The problem of Waltz's prediction in connection with Japan's

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[36] Waltz (1993-a), p.67.
[37] David Arase (1996), 'A Militarised Japan?' in Desmond Ball (ed.), *The Transformation of Security in the*

nuclearisation is that Waltz's *ahistorical* and *acultural* neo-realism inevitably leaves out other important factors that can be crucial for the maintenance of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. In particular, his neglect of the importance of the US-Japanese security relationship for both states undermines the credibility of his argument. This is also the major difference between Waltz's brand of neo-realism and the more refined version of neo-realism, which will be developed in this thesis to account for Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

The weakness of the 'nuclear inevitability' thesis stems from its basic assumptions. First, the theory regards states as 'rational unitary actors' whose domestic context should be placed within a 'black box' and excluded from the analysis as it is external factors that determine state behaviour. Second, it narrowly focuses upon military strategic calculations on nuclear decision-making. Waltz points out seven reasons why states acquire nuclear weapons, but only from the standpoint of military strategic calculation.[38] However, they do not explain the reasons why some states, such as South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland, decided not to acquire nuclear weapons despite their strategic motivations. As Jozef Goldblat and Peter van Ham argue, the decisions to develop nuclear weapons can stem from various factors, such as domestic imperatives, diplomatic bargaining and economic factors.[39] Waltz's narrow focus on military factors in nuclear decision-making can also be seen in his assumption that political leaders are 'sensitive to costs' which are defined as purely military calculations involving losses and gains. However, these costs may vary according to the interests of individual states: costs can be militarily, economically, and above all, politically defined. Third, Waltz's denial of the possibility of a nuclear arms race stemming from one states acquisition of nuclear weapons is also questionable as even the rationality assumption in neo-realism could easily serve to generate corresponding responses from other states.[40] History has indicated that during the Cold War a nuclear arms race was engendered between the main protagonists even though they might be viewed as rational actors.

Asia/ Pacific Region, (London: Frank Cass), pp.90-91.
[38] Waltz (1981), pp.7-8
[39] Jozef Goldblat (1985), *Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore,* (Stockholm: SIPRI), pp.18-29; Peter van Ham (1993), *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s*, (London: Pinter), pp.73-75.
[40] Waltz (1990-b), pp.738-741; Waltz and Sagan, (1995), pp.29-33

One must be careful, however, not to view neo-realism as a single unified theory. This is most noticeable when judgements are made about the possibilities of Japan's nuclearisation, as the accounts are very different. On the one hand, analysts such as Waltz predict Japan's nuclearisation while other neo-realists, such as Richard Betts, on the other hand, claim that Japan will remain a non-nuclear weapon state as long as the US nuclear umbrella remains intact as a security guarantee.[41] The following section therefore analyses these different neo-realists views on the proliferation dynamics surrounding the debate on Japan.

1.1.3. Refined versions of neo-realism and the issue of nuclear proliferation

As seen earlier, the early version of neo-realists, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, emphasise the absolute 'pacifying effects' of nuclear weapons. Although Waltz is probably the most-frequently cited neo-realist on nuclear proliferation, his argument seems to have less credible support than the refined neo-realists. Departing from Waltz's universal 'top-down' perspectives, for example, Benjamin Frankel and other refined neo-realists put the emphasis on the bipolar system and the role that the superpowers played as the nuclear guarantors to their allies, thus weakening some of the rigid systemic characteristics of international anarchy that Waltz cites.[42] Yet, Frankel's view on theory remains similar to that of Waltz, as they believe that the role of theory is to 'describe' the 'reality' which already exists, while other theorists would argue that theory is not meant to 'describe' but to give an insight into a certain aspect of a phenomenon in order to 'interpret' it. Frankel clearly admits that his version of neo-realism has its limits like any other theory. However, he argues that it is impossible to create a theory with too many independent variables, since reality offers infinite materials. Frankel concludes that "[g]ood theories elucidate by simplifying."[43]

Frankel's major concern is that the end of the Cold War (i.e., the end of the rigid bi-

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[41] Richard Betts (1993), 'Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revised', *Security Studies*, Vol.2:3/ 4, pp.100-126.

[42] Frankel draws the line between his version of neo-realism and that of Stephen Van Evera and John Mearsheimer. While Mearsheimer and Van Evera encourage managed proliferation of nuclear weapons to key states, such as Ukraine, for the stability of international system, Frankel does not touch upon the question whether or not further nuclear proliferation would increase or decrease the stability of international system. Benjamin Frankel (1993), 'The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/ 4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.38-9.

[43] Frankel (1993), p.38

polarity), would weaken the role of the superpowers as nuclear guarantors, leading to an increase in the influence of systemic characteristics such as the security dilemma and self-help behaviour of individual states: bipolarity has 'checked' nuclear proliferation, but multipolarity in the post-Cold War era would induce proliferation. Frankel clearly recognises the influence of domestic factors on a state's decision to go or not to go nuclear. However, he dismisses these as secondary to the factors caused by the anarchical structure.[44]

Frankel argues that the virtues of security guarantees provided by the superpowers and their credibility have been a key factor in discouraging a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. According to this logic, therefore, Frankel predicts that deep reductions in the nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers would intensify pressures for nuclear proliferation. Many refined version of neo-realists argue in a similar line to Frankel's: state N feels compelled to develop nuclear weapons as a result of its perception of the external threats (perceived insecurity) it faces. State N then either develops its own nuclear weapons or forms an alliance with one of the nuclear superpowers. Therefore, forming an alliance with one of the nuclear superpowers has been an important factor of state N's decision not to acquire nuclear weapons.[45] To be more precise, Frankel argues that the perceived credibility and strength of a superpower's commitment to state N's security is of fundamental importance to determine state N's nuclear decision-making in a bipolar system.[46]

However, there are two problems in this analysis. First, Japan is treated as the same as those states forced to abandon their nuclear weapons programme due to US pressure, such as Taiwan and South Korea. As will be discussed in later chapters, Japan did not have any hidden nuclear weapons programme, though it has done some analysis on the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation. Second, even the refined version of neo-realism still remains a general 'grand theory'. It is not sufficient to merely highlight the significance of

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[44] Ibid., p.38

[45] George Quester and Victor Utgoff (1993), 'US Arms Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Counterproductive Possibilities', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.16:1 (Winter 1993), pp.129-140. For an analysis of the role of US security guarantees in preventing nuclear proliferation, see Robert Art (1991), 'A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol.15: 4 (Spring 1991), pp.28-30.

[46] Michael Brenner (1982), *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Remarking of US Policy* (NY:

the United States as the external 'security guarantor' to Japan, since the US factor has been well 'internalised' in Japan's security policy-making, particularly in relations to nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War structural change did not change Japan's attitudes towards nuclear weapons as some neo-realists highlighted. This is mainly because the end of bi-polarity did not change the 'internalised' structure of the US-Japanese security treaty, which is often considered as little more than a Cold War 'anti-Soviet' alliance. However, as will be discussed in later chapters, this treaty has many functions, not least in the context of Japan's domestic debate and, to a large extent, in that of the United States as well. This is why the treaty continues to have a high profile and the need is felt in both states to re-affirm its enduring worth for their mutual security. For example, the following extract from the report by the US Department of Defense, 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region', allows us to place the significance of the treaty in context: "[t]here is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia. It is seen not just by the United States and Japan, but throughout the region, as a major factor for securing stability in Asia."[47]

With reference to technologically capable Germany and Japan, Richard Betts argues that as long as state N's security is maintained better by its nuclear ally than its own independent nuclear development, the question to go nuclear is irrelevant.[48] According to this logic, the best measure to prevent nuclear proliferation in the bipolar system was for the two superpowers to provide a credible security guarantee to those states facing external threats.[49] This is also the opinion expressed by Joseph Nye and Robert Art.[50] In Art's words, "American actions, including the stationing of troops overseas, have played a crucial role in retarding nuclear weapons spread among key states."[51]

Avery Goldstein has tackled the question of nuclear proliferation by examining both the

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Cambridge University Press), p.235.
[47] US Department of Defense (1995), 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region', p.10.
[48] Richard Betts (1993), 'Prarnoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revised', *Security Studies,* Vol.2: 3/ 4, p. 106
[49] Waltz (1981), p.28.
[50] Joseph Nye (1985), 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', *Foreign Policy*, No. 59, p.126; and Art (1991), p.29.

unit-level and structural (system-level) variables. Goldstein argues that the interdependence between the structural and unit-level influences encourages the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The structural constraints, especially the condition of anarchy and self-help principles force states down the path of preferring autonomy to dependence upon external security guarantees. Insecurity, Goldstein argues, when combined with insufficient external security guarantee, becomes the principal motive for a state to develop nuclear weapons.[52] Goldstein agrees with Stephen Walt's argument that it is threats against which states balance, rather than power *per se* which the supporters of balance of power theory claim. Although power in the hands of others may be inherently threatening in the condition of anarchy, mediating influences at both the system and unit level weaken the direct link between power and balancing behaviour.[53] Goldstein concludes that a state would not develop nuclear weapons if it perceives no serious external threats or it is satisfied with existing external security guarantees, and any compromises of its autonomy that might be required to ensure sufficient levels of external support.[54]

However, Goldstein does not analyse further how and why a sense of insecurity is formed by an individual state. The assumption that a state would automatically feel insecure when it is disappointed with the benefits from an alliance explains the consequence, but it does not explain the process of why it has happened. To analyse any individual case study from Goldstein's 'insecurity' thesis, the following questions must be asked: how does a state assess external threats from its neighbouring states? Why doesn't a state (such as Japan) seem to perceive any serious external threats? Is this because of the lack of a sense of security/insecurity *per se*? Or worse, is it merely because of the government's or people's indifference to security issues in general? Is this because of the presence of an alliance security guarantee perhaps? What are the required compromises concerning Japan's autonomy to ensure sufficient levels of external support?

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[51] Ibid., p.29

[52] Avery Goldstein (1993), 'Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China's National Experience', *Security Studies*, Vol. 2: 3/ 4, (Spring/ Summer 1993), p.240.

[53] Stephen Walt (1988), *The Origins of Alliance,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); (1992), 'Alliance, Threats, and US Grand Strategy', *Security Studies,* Vol.1:3, (Spring 1992), pp.448-482.

[54] In addition to a state's satisfaction with its security, Goldstein points out two more factors: the level of its material resources (such as economic, geographic and human resources) to make it feasible to maintain conventional forces to cope with external threats to its national security; and the inadequacy of its industrial and scientific capacity to produce nuclear technology. Goldstein (1993), p.239.

By using the same approach as the one used to explain China's nuclearisation in his case study, Goldstein argues that Japan would go nuclear with the advent of new security threats in the region in the post-Cold War since the 'anti-Soviet alliance' with the US was becoming out of date and Japan's domestic restraints after 1945 were fading.[55] However, as will be discussed in later chapters, this analysis does not recognise the nature and the importance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, which continues to have a multi-faceted function for both states.

Although Michell Reiss does not explicitly refer to any theoretical arguments for his various state case studies, *Without the Bomb*, certain assumptions of neo-realism underpin his analysis. After analysing a mixture of various factors both domestically and externally, Reiss concludes it has been the US's security guarantee that has prevented Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons, since the US has provided 'a viable alternative'.[56] Reiss's argument is more comprehensive than many other neo-realist accounts due to his intensive research on individual case studies. However, Reiss's analysis is not without problems. The nature of the US's security guarantee, and the credibility of this guarantee in the context of Japan, needs further investigation. In the very least, it requires more comment than to point out that Washington 'never' gave Japan sufficient reasons for doubting the US's security commitment.[57] The nature of the security arrangements and the function of US ED towards Japan are more complicated than is often assumed. It has been generally argued by neo-realists that the United States and the Soviet Union provided their ED to their allies since any strategic changes anywhere in the world could have led to significant losses or gains for either of these states during the Cold War.[58] However, this analysis represents only one of several roles ED has played. For example, the US ED provided to Japan was as much political as military, and it has also played two different roles. It was meant to deter any regional external nuclear threats towards Japan, while at the same time acting as a 'check' on Japan's nuclearisation. This aspect will be developed more fully in subsequent chapters.

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[55] Ibid., p.241
[56] Mitchell Reiss (1988), *Without the Bomb,* (NY: Columbia University Press), p.135. A similar opinion was expressed by Lewis Dunn regarding alternative means of nuclear security. See Dunn (1991), 'Containing Nuclear Proliferation', *Adelphi Paper,* No. 263 (Winter 1991), (London: IISS), pp.41-45.
[57] Reiss (1988), p.137.
[58] Waltz (1981), p.3

Based upon his previous work on various case studies, Reiss presents a useful list of incentives/disincentives for nuclearisation during and after the Cold War era. According to Reiss, the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons during the Cold War can be categorised into four factors:1) a sense of insecurity (often considered the primary reason for a states' acquisition of nuclear weapons); 2) political status; 3) technological determinism; and 4) scientific and bureaucratic determinism (i.e., the presence of 'nuclear myth makers').[59] This list is useful as it allows for an investigation of whether any one or perhaps all of these factors were of influence in Japan. The issue of insecurity is undoubtedly an important one for Japan, especially in the context of an ambiguous nuclear situation in North Korea and China's nuclear modernisation programme. Two questions are important here. The first is the question of how is Japan's perception of insecurity constructed? The second is to what extent has the US's security guarantee played a significant role in shaping Japan's insecurity perception? These questions will be discussed in the following chapters.

While Waltz and other refined version of neo-realists regard the anarchic nature of the international system static, Barry Buzan, Charle Jones and Richard Little have questioned this assumption, trying to turn neo-realism into a more operational theory to give a better understanding of a given phenomenon. The following section will review the arguments presented by structural realism.[60]

1.1.4. Structural realism and nuclear proliferation

Buzan's structural realism is more flexible and operational than Waltz's form of neo-realism. Structural realism remains within neo-realism as it is based upon the assumption that sovereign states are the primary and rational actors in international politics and interact in an anarchic environment, hence 'self-help' for survival is the behavioural principle.[61] Whilst Waltz claims that the international political system consists of two levels of units and structure, and international outcomes can be explained by the analysis

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[59] Mitchell Reiss (1994), 'Conclusion: Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War', in Mithell Reiss and Robert Litwak (eds.),, *Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War,* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press), p.348 Figure 15.2.

[60] Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press).

on the ordering principle of the system (i.e., anarchy) and the distribution of capabilities across the system (i.e., polarity), Buzan adds the third level of 'interaction'. By doing so, Buzan tries to make neo-realism more sensitive to the dynamics of change.[62]

Buzan's structural realism expands the meaning of certain key concepts, such as power, which are rigidly defined by Waltz, synthesising neo-realism and neo-liberalism in order to enhance its explanatory power.[63] Yet, both approaches remain in the rationalist domain, putting ideational factors aside. Some definition of the vocabulary of structural realism must be mentioned. Buzan divides the concept of power into 'attributive' and 'relational' power. Attributive power refers to 'absolute power' that is the capability of a state which it possesses in terms of its internal attributes such as technological capabilities, political system, and collective identity, to perform some specified tasks. The attributive power of a state changes in both quantity and quality, implying a significant change in its relationship with other states.[64] Buzan argues that the attributive power of the units will determine the level and type of interaction capacity amongst the units: states with low attributive power, due to the lack of social and political cohesion, will have low interaction capacity with other states, resulting in various degrees of international isolation; one the other hand, states with high attributive power will experience high levels of interaction with other states. The interaction capacity of a system, with widely shared norms and values amongst the major actors, can give rise to the establishment of communal institutions and organisations, which is the key element of a mature international society, or a 'mature anarchy'.[65] In a 'mature anarchy' where the interaction capacity is high, the structural effects of anarchy can be weakened.

Relational power refers to the pattern of distribution of capabilities amongst the units in the system. While attributive power is absolute and non zero-sum, relational power is

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[61] Buzan et al. (1993), pp.7-11.
[62] Ibid., p.80.
[63] Steve Smith presents a concise summary of the 'neo-neo' synthesis (the neo-realism and neo-liberalism synthesis) in Smith (1999), Chapter 9, 'New Approach to International Theory', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press), pp.165-190. Similarly, David Baldwin argues that structural realism has much in common with neoliberalism. David A.Baldwin (ed.) (1993), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press), p.4. While anarchy is considered as the source for insecurity by Neorealists, neoliberalists argue that anarchy can be tempered by interdependence amongst the units and the creation of institutions.
[64] Buzan et al. (1993), p.67.
[65] Ibid., pp.70-71.

wholly positional and zero-sum. This is what Waltz focuses upon in his analysis. 'Polarity', the main pattern of relational power, is one of the key concepts of Waltz's version of Neo-realism. Relational power plays the major role in 'action-reaction dynamics', such as arms racing, amongst the units in the system.[66] Whilst Waltz considers the deep structure of the system (i.e., anarchy) as static, Buzan regards it as open to change, trying to demonstrate how the structure and unit levels interact each other. This is because Buzan considers that structure is "only one component of a more complex systemic question. There is not one logic of anarchy but many. ...It does wreck the fences around Waltz's tidy universe in which a single logic of anarchy prevails."[67]

Buzan pays special attention to the importance of interaction capacity as applied to Japan. In the high level of interaction apparent amongst the leading capitalist members, the units are becoming more similar and interdependent. These units could erode the anarchic nature of the system, allowing some units to survive through 'specialization'.[68] Buzan points out that Japan, with its high economic strength and low political and military power, plays a specialised economic role in the international system, as a viable long run strategy. This analysis is an advance from Waltz's version of rigid neo-realism. Japan as a 'trading state' is the principal element of the Centrists Yoshida-line governments' foreign policy-making (which will be discussed in later chapters). However, why and how this characteristic of Japan has been constructed is lacking from Buzan's analysis. Here, the importance of analysing more domestic and/or ideational elements should be brought to light, and this is the area where strategic cultural approach can provide a better insight.

Structural realism offers a more convincing explanation of the dynamics of nuclear proliferation than Waltz's version of neo-realism does. This is because, unlike Waltz's version of neo-realism, structural realism brings the state into the analysis. If a state is 'weak' due to ethnic conflict, a lack of territorial integrity and political legitimacy, it will not be considered as an attractive ally of a 'strong state' which has a high level of socio-political cohesion and stable political and economic system within its boundary: hence, a 'weak state' has to balance internally against threats coming from outside the boundary.[69]

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[66] Ibid., p.68.
[67] Ibid., pp.244-5.
[68] Ibid., p.78.
[69] Barry Buzan (1991), Chapter 2 'National Security and the Nature of the State', *People, States and Fear*,

In applying this logic to nuclear proliferation dynamics, structural realism would argue that 'weak states', such as North Korea and Ukraine, were unable to acquire nuclear umbrellas because they are considered as unattractive allies of nuclear providers.[70] Then, according to structural realists, Japan as a 'strong state' would be considered as an attractive ally of the US, the nuclear guarantor. Yet, this is one of many factors which have determined Japan's position under the US nuclear umbrella. Japan as a non-nuclear weapons state is the 'outcome' deriving from various 'processes' and factors, though this does not mean that Japan has had a nuclear weapons programme such as the case with South Korea.

In order to achieve greater analytical rigour it is necessary to shift the focus from one which concentrates solely on the 'consequences' to one which allows for a consideration of the 'process' of why and how specific 'consequences' are brought about. This is all the more necessary as the aim of this thesis is to aid our understanding of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons and some discussion of the 'process' is vital to this task. The following section will therefore seek to explore some of the underlying causes of a state's strategic attitudes and behaviour. In so doing, the focus will shift from an analysis of international constraints to one that highlights the importance of certain domestic factors. The intention of this shift is to provide a better insight into particular or 'puzzling' outcomes that neo-realist accounts alone cannot explain.[71]

1.2. A strategic cultural approach to Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, debate over the utility of neo-realism, in particular, Waltz version of neo-realism, as a theoretical enterprise has increased drastically. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwill, for example, suggest that despite the predictions made by neo-realists, the end of the Cold War came about without a major war between the United States and the Soviet Union and, furthermore, that this event was not caused by any

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(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), pp.57-111.

[70] Tanya Ogilvie-White (1998), *Theorising Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Nuclear Policies of India, South Africa, North Korea, and Ukraine*, (Ph.D. thesis, University of Southampton, U.K., 1998), p.249.

[71] Theo Farrell (1998), 'Culture and Military Power', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24:3, (July 1998), pp.407-416.

radical shift in the distribution of capabilities between the two.[72] Other approaches have also attempted to offer alternative explanations concerning the dynamics of nuclear non-/ proliferation by emphasising the importance of domestic and sociological factors, aspects that are neglected by neo-realism. Amongst these latter accounts, the strategic culture approach is often considered to be one of the most prominent challengers to neo-realism in such studies.

It should be noted, however, that the cultural approach to security studies is not new.[73] Michael C. Desch, for example, analyses the ebb and flow of three cultural waves: the first wave came as a study of national character of the Axis Powers during the Second World War; the second wave focused upon the different military organisational characters of the two superpowers during the Cold War; and the third wave, which we know in the context of the more contemporary 'strategic culture' debate, arrived with the end of the Cold War as a criticism of the dominant realist view of security studies.[74] The strategic culture approach argues that the identity of an individual state matters, as it gives different meanings to objective variables such as technology, polarity and material capabilities. Consequently, similar strategic situations could result in different outcomes, as states perceive the situation differently according to their own strategic culture. In short, strategic culturalists claim that the culture of an individual state represents an important 'cause' of strategic action, although the evaluation on the notion of 'strategic culture' varies.[75] Some argue that the strategic culture approach merely supplements neo-realism,[76]

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[72] Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil (1994), 'Understanding change in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and the international system', *International Organisation*, Vol.48: 2 (Spring 1994), pp.215-47. See also Walt (1998).

[73] Similarly, Michael Mazzar (1996) categorises the growing literature on culture in international relations into four models: the first model considers culture as equipment for both individual and national economic success; the second views culture as the basis for socio-economic success of individual states, advocated by Francis Fukuyama; the third model defines cultural factors as the dominant framework for international conflict in the post-Cold War era, addressed by Samuel Huntington. The fourth model, the 'strategic culture' approach views culture as the 'cognitive filter' of decision-making in national security issues. For further details see Mazarr (1996), 'Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.19:2, pp.177-197.

[74] Michael C. Desch (1998), 'Culture Clach: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', *International Security*, Vol.23:1 (Summer 1998), pp.144-150.

[75] The concept of 'strategic culture' itself is not new. The first generation of the literature on strategic culture emerged in the early 1980s, focusing on the different interpretations on nuclear strategy between the superpowers. The second generation appeared in the mid-1980s, argues that there is little link between strategic culture and strategic choices, which are actually made, as strategic choices are the reflection of the interests of a group of decision-makers. The third generation, which will be discussed throughout this thesis, has drastically grown since the end of the Cold War, emerged as a critique of today's dominant theory of international relations, neo-realism. For a detailed account for different generations of strategic culture, see

while others go further by contending that it could supplant neo-realism.[77]

But just as neo-realism is not a unified single theory, arguments also differ among strategic culturalists. Alastair Iain Johnston attempts to construct a 'grand theory' for security studies by offering, "an alternative to neo-realists explanations for strategic choices".[78] His aim is to devise a positivist method to study strategic culture. In his article, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', Johnston defines strategic culture as "an integrated system of symbols...which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military forces in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious."[79] While Johnston's elaborate efforts to establish a strict methodology for this concept suggests a tight link between social effects and observed behaviour, there is still a fundamental question surrounding whether beliefs and values concerning the efficacy of military forces can be rigidly quantifiable. Other advocates of the cultural approach, such as Peter Katzenstein, Yoshio Okawara and Thomas Berger, take a more interpretivist stance. While accepting neo-realism as a broad orienting framework for the analysis of international relations, Peter Katzenstein offers a 'sociological institutionalism' approach as an additional frame of reference that allows for the creation of specific arguments about an individual states' security issues.[80] He and other culturalists have therefore tried to investigate the "important effects and processes that shape the nature of political interests and the character of political actors", all aspects which rigid neo-realism neglects.[81] Katzenstein argues that culture helps explain how actors form strategic preferences and act on them, and that in order to examine culture as a 'cause' of strategic actions, cultural norms must

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Alastair Iain Johnston (1995), 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol.19:4, (Spring 1995), pp.32-64.

[76] See for example, Farrell (1998) and Desch (1998).

[77] See for example, Ted Hopf (1998), 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, Vol.23:1 (Summer 1998), pp.171-200.

[78] Johnston (1995), p.43

[79] Ibid., p.48.

[80] Peter Katzenstein and Yoshio Okawara (1993), *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, (NY: East Asia Programme, Cornell University); Peter Katzenstein (ed.) (1996-a), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (NY: Columbia University Press); (1996-b), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, (NY: Cornell University Press)

[81] Katzenstein (1996-a), p.525.

be focused upon in security studies.[82] While rigid neo-realism regards an actor's strategic choices as 'given' and 'fixed', because they are based on material conditions, culturalists claim that social conditions (i.e., norms which can be defined as "collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity")[83], would influence an actor's choices, thus highlighting the 'process' of how strategic choices are made.

Katzenstein points to two types of norms: a) 'constituitive norms', which express an actor's identity; and b), 'regulatory norms', which define standards of appropriate behaviour.[84] Combined together, by providing identities and prescribing actions, norms construct the way actors define their interests and form preferences.[85] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein argue that a state's political identities (i.e., 'constituitive norms') generate and shape national interests. Some national interests are basics, such as the mere survival of a state (which is also a common feature of neo-realists accounts). Many national interests, however, depend on particular components of the identity of a state. Katzenstein emphasises, for example, the significance of Japan's 'collective identity', which is defined as 'a peaceful country' and represented by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, in his analysis of Japan's security policy.[86] Article 9 renounces war and the threat or use of force to settle international disputes. Katzenstein is also in agreement with Davis Bobrow when he argues that Japan's security issues lie not in the international structure, such as the US-Japanese security relationship, but in "the autonomous factor of the militarily limiting 'peace constitution''.[87] Katzenstein claims that the US-Japanese Security Treaty is much less important than Article 9 of the Constitution, pointing out that the US-Japanese security links stay in the realm of 'regulatory norms': that is, of standards of appropriate behaviour within a diplomatic relationship. But, ultimately, these do not touch upon

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[82] Katzenstein (1996-b), pp.18-9.
[83] Katzenstein (1996-a), p.4
[84] Katzenstein (1996-b), pp.18-9.
[85] Definitions of some important key words should be given here. Katzenstein features 'norms', 'culture' and 'identities' in causal analysis on national security policy. Katzenstein argues that the strength of 'norms' as a causal effect varies. Weak norms, as in the case of nuclear deterrence, do not dictate compliance. Strong norms, such as Japan's refection of militarist policies, construct "common wisdom". Katzenstein (1996-a), p.56. The term 'culture' refers to "a set of evaluative standards, such as norms and values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate". 'Culture' means "collective models of nation-state authority or identity, represented in custom or law." Ibid., p.56.
[86] Katzenstein (1996-b), pp.150-151.
[87] Davis Bobrow (1989), 'Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.33: 4, (December 1989), p.595.

Japan's collective identity.[88]

Culturalists argue that national historical experiences are a main factor of strategic culture. Like Katzenstein, Thomas Berger emphasises historical and cultural variables in his analysis of Japan's security policy.[89] Berger argues that strategic culture (though he uses the term 'political-military culture') shapes the political actor's perceptions of the objective conditions, goals and norms in foreign policy-making, thus producing the unique security policy of a state. Berger finds the origin of Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism', defined as Japan's "determination not to pursue a destructive course of military expansionism and nationalist self-assertion"[90], in the Japanese people's profound aversion and distrust of their own military institution, and which has been a perennial theme since 1945. The Japanese felt victimised by the Western Great Powers over Manchuria and by their own military after the Second World War, as unlike the Nazis in Germany which was a mass-based movement embraced within a political party, the Japanese military institution was controlled by an old elite without civilian control and whose independent power was allowed under the Meiji Constitution (which was abolished after 1945).[91] This feeling amongst the Japanese was strongly reinforced by the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan.

In light of this analysis, to what extent can strategic culture provide an insight into Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons? According to the strategic culturalists, the influence of Japan's 'anti-militarism' (including 'anti-nuclearism') on Japan's security policy has been of great importance. However, this is not the only factor. The formation and maintenance of Japan's minimalist military stance and non-nuclear posture was

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[88] Katzenstein (1996-b), p.150. Interestingly, Buzan includes 'collective identity' of a state as a determinant element of 'attributive power'. Yet, what Buzan means by 'collective identity' is different from what Katzenstein defines. Buzan regards Japan's 'collective identity' as specialised economic state in the international system. Buzan et. al. (1993), p.79.

[89] Thomas U.Berger (1992), *America's Reluctant Allies: The Genesis of the Political-Military Cultures of Japan and West Germany,* (PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); (1993), 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum', *International Security*, Vol.17:4 (Spring 1993), pp.119-150; and (1996), 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan' (Chapter 9), in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (N.Y.: Columbia University Press). Berger (1992) defines the concept of 'political-military culture' as "the constellation of attitudes, perceptions and patterns of behaviour regarding national defence, the armed forces and the use of forces that exists in a particular political system". Berger (1992), p.11.

[90] Berger (1993), p.121

[91] Ibid., pp.131-136

imposed by the United States at the end of the Second World War; as it was in the US's interests at that time to ensure that Japan would not threaten the US's interests in the 'Far East' region again. This in turn facilitated the establishment of Japan's 'protected peace' under the US security guarantee. Katzenstein regards Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons as contradictory due to Japan's 'dual policy' of nuclear denial and nuclear approval: while Japan calls for nuclear disarmament and prohibits the presence of nuclear weapons inside Japan (which is given expression in Japan's three non-nuclear principles of 'not manufacturing, not possessing, and not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan'), Japan also takes shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Katzenstein clearly admits that Japan's three non-nuclear principles, which were articulated by Prime Minister Sato in December 1967 at the National Diet, are only one of the four pillars of Japan's official nuclear policy. These are the following: 1) the three non-nuclear principles; 2) efforts towards nuclear disarmament; 3) reliance on the nuclear deterrent power of the US based upon the US-Japanese Security Treaty; and 4) the peaceful use of nuclear energy.[92] However, Katzenstein is still keen to emphasise that Japan's strict adherence to the first two non-nuclear principles (of not manufacturing and not possessing nuclear weapons) demonstrates Japan's "remarkably stable social norms" of anti-militarism.[93]

Those adopting strategic culture approach are correct in their assumption that the 'anti-nuclearism' amongst the Japanese does represent a very strong 'social norm': to the extent that it is often said to have acquired the status of a 'neo-religion' within Japanese society.[94] As Sun-ki Chai argues, despite the lack of formal institutionalisation (i.e., laws and constitutional clauses), the three non-nuclear principles have become 'quasi-sacred barriers' that should never be crossed.[95] However, the main purpose of the Government's adoption of the four nuclear pillars in January 1968 was to put less emphasis on the three non-nuclear principles, and more on the third policy of Japan's dependence on the US nuclear guarantee.[96] In other words, the Government clearly announced that the US

[92] John Endicott (1975), *Japan's Nuclear Option*, (London: Praeger Publishers), p.45
[93] Katzenstein (1996-b), pp.150-1, and p.116.
[94] A Japanese journalist, interview by the author (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998).
[95] Sun-Ki Chai (1997), 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defence Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalisation', *International Organization*, Vol.51: 3, (Summer 1997), pp.389-412.
[96] Akiyoshi Sakuragawa (1985), ' Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko: Hikaku Sangensoku to Kaku Yokushiryoku Izon no Hazama', *Kokusai Seiji,* No.80 (October 1985), p.65

nuclear guarantee was thereafter to be the prerequisite for the continuation of the three non-nuclear principles.[97]

It is the contention of this thesis that although Katzenstein is correct in highlighting the importance of Japan's anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism, his cultural approach cannot serve to supplant neo-realism. This is because Japan's anti-militarism is to a large extent a 'dependent' variable of the US-Japanese security alliance, which will be discussed fully in later chapters. Although Japan's strategic culture has significantly influenced Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, the policy has been maintained under the material constraints, such as Japan's geo-strategic importance in the international anarchy and Japan's lack of natural resources, which neo-realists emphasise. This point will be fully analysed in later chapters. To be fair, Katzenstein does acknowledge the importance of the US factor in Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons when he argues that the norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons is clearly intertwined with the Japanese government's awareness of the domestic and international (in particular the US) opposition to Japan's own nuclear weapons development.[98] Katzenstein even argues that if Japan is not protected under the US security guarantee, military options that Japan's institutionalised norms have so far prohibited could become what he terms, 'fallback options'.[99] In similar vein to Katzenstein's analysis, Berger's thorough investigation into Japan's post-Second World War political history deserves great attention. While Katzenstein is convinced that Japan's cultural norms have not changed significantly since 1950s, thus not addressing adequately the issue of cultural change (i.e., under what conditions Japan's cultural norms of anti-militarism can change), Berger touches upon how Japan's cultural norms of anti-militarism could change under certain circumstances.[100] This is an advance in the cultural approach to the study of security. Berger argues, "[c]ultures can and do change, but usually they do so in an evolutionary fashion. Dramatic change only occurs when the type of behaviour that a culture produces no longer meets its basic needs."[101] Similarly, Jeffrey Legro claims that, "reality can be socially created, but only with available materials and within existing structures...

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[97] Eiichi Sato (1981), 'Kaku 'Mochikomi' no Kyojitsu', *Sekai,* No.430, p.71.
[98] Katzenstein and Okawara (1993), p.171.
[99] Katzenstein (1996-b), p.208.
[100] Berger (1993), pp.148-9.
[101] Ibid., p.148.

However, when the contradiction between external conditions and cultural tendencies becomes too great, culture will likely adapt."[102] In this context, Berger reiterates the importance of the stable US-Japanese security relationship as the prerequisite for the survival of Japan's anti-military culture.

However, while acknowledging the fundamental importance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty for Japan's anti-militarism, Berger does not analyse the relationship between Japan's strategic culture and the bi-lateral security alliance. If Japan's anti-militarism cannot survive in the case of the collapse of the US-Japanese security alliance then this anti-militarism is a 'dependent' variable of the external factor of the US-Japanese Security Treaty. This is what Desch argues: culture matters in security studies, yet the critical question of how much 'independent' explanatory power culture has must be answered.[103] In his analysis of Japan's strategic culture, Berger concludes that "[d]espite profound changes in external security environments" Japan's political elite has been consistent with the core principles of Japan's anti-militarism established by the Japanese people in the 1950s and 1960s.[104] However, this conclusion is not sufficient in the way the US-Japanese security relationship is dealt with. Berger seems to consider this bi-lateral relationship as a 'given' in his analysis of post-1945 Japanese security policy.

This discussion therefore raises one important question: how can an analysis of the US-Japanese security relationship, based upon the US-Japanese Security Treaty, be combined with an analysis of Japan's strategic culture? Yoshihide Soeya stresses the importance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty as one extra 'channel' (one extra 'layer') between domestic and external levels in order to understand Japan's low military posture.[105] At the domestic level, strategic culture gives a far better analysis of Japan's low military posture. However, since this focuses only on domestic issues, its overall explanatory power concerning Japan's low military posture is limited. To overcome this problem, Soeya presents a useful analytical tool to aid an understanding of Japan's low military posture by

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[102] Jeffrey W. Legro (1995), *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), p.231, quoted in Desch (1998), p.170.
[103] Desch (1998), p.169.
[104] Berger (1996), p.356.
[105] Yoshihide Soeya (1996), 'Beichu Wakai to Nichibei Kankei', *Hogaku Kenkyu*, Vol.69:8, (1996, August), pp.1-18; (1997-a), 'Asia no Chichujo Hendo to Nihon Gaiko', *Kokusai Mondai*, No.444, (1997, March), pp.38-48; (1997-b), 'Nichibei Kankei no Kozo to Nihon no Gaiko Senryaku', *Gaiko Forum*, (1997, a special

using the concept of 'Japan's double identity'.

In relation to the first identity, at the domestic level, Japan views itself as a 'non-Great Power'. This is based upon the Japanese people's profound aversion towards any type of military activities, particularly those related to nuclear weapons. In short, the first identity can be expressed through an understanding of Japan's strategic culture. As analysed by Berger, the majority of Japanese felt doubly victimised at the end of the Second World War by the US atomic bombs and by their own military institutions who dragged Japan into what was later viewed as an irrational war.[106] Since the beginning of the Meiji era in the 1870s, under the slogan of the *'Fukoku Kyohei'* policy (i.e., to enrich and militarily strengthen Japan), and particularly during the assertive militarism of the 1930s, the Japanese political elite had tried to establish a new international order under its form of imperialism. Eighty years later in 1945, the Japanese elite realised that their national orientation of using military means to achieve economic and political ends, had resulted in disaster. Therefore, it is not surprising that Japan drastically changed its focus towards economic means as a way of rebuilding a new Japan.

So although Japan's strategic culture can aid the understanding of Japan's behaviour with reference to the use of and the threat of the use of force, this approach alone does not give a satisfactory account of Japan's actual security policy. Like any other state, Japan has still had to contend with the problems associated with military force in the international realm despite Japan's avowed anti-militarism. And it is here that the second aspect of Japan's identity has to be taken into consideration. The second 'identity' can be understood, as Japan's international 'image' as this is perceived by other states.[107] Japan is viewed as a 'Great Power' in the international system due to two principal factors: first, because of Japan's past aggressive history and Japan's materialistic capabilities, states in the Asia-Pacific region in particular regard Japan as a Great Power (and one which is ready to engage itself in international power politics if necessary); and second, regardless of

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issue on China), pp.36-49.

[106] Berger (1993) points out two factors that made the Japanese feel victimised. In his analysis, they are 1) the Western Great Powers which refused to respect Japan's legitimate right to defend its national interests in Manchuria, and 2) Japan's own military which dragged them into a irrational war. See Berger (1993), pp.135-136.

[107] Soeya clearly admits the difficulty of using the term 'double identity'. While the first identity is literally Japan's domestic political identity, the second one is a 'perceived' Japan's 'image', given by other states.

Japan's past history, the materialist capabilities of today's Japan makes it one of the major players in the international system and which also, according to the *ahistorical* and *acultural* rigid version of neo-realists' logic, engages itself in seeking to maintain the stability of international order.

But due to the existence of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, Japan has been able to stand outside any direct dealing with issues related to military power politics. For example, as discussed fully in Chapter 4 ('Japan's Security Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons: The Impact of the Cold War (1947-1989)'), in the face of the deployment of Soviet SS-20s in the Far East in the 1980s, Japan strengthened its political ties with the United States in the eyes of the Soviet Union (so that the Soviet Union could not attack Japan without also risking retaliation from the United States).[108] This option was taken instead of others, which might have been contemplated at the time, such as inviting US nuclear weapons directly onto Japanese soil or by Japan developing its own nuclear weapons (an option that would have caused a public outcry inside and outside Japan). According to Soeya, maintaining Japan's 'double identity'/'double image' via the Treaty has been, in effect, Japan's 'post-WWII Realism' (see Chart 1 below): like any other state, Japan's security policy must take international power factors into consideration whether Japan likes it or not, as Realists argue. However, the underlying reality is that, since 1945, 'anti-militarist' Japan has been able to deal with power political issues only via the US-Japanese Security Treaty. This aspect of the bi-lateral relationship is also observed by Katzenstein and Okawara when they argue that, "[w]ith the removal of Japan as an active participant from international power politics, the relationship with the United States became the essential factor in the Japanese interpretations of most international developments".[109]

Japan's 'post-WWII Realism' can be best observed in the implementation of the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine', which has been Japan's foreign policy orientation since 1945. The Yoshida Doctrine is often defined as follows: 1) due to the close US-Japanese security

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Personal communication with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998.)

[108] For example, Prime Minister Nakasone publicly defined Japan as '[US's] unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific' to emphasize the close relationship between Japan and the US. Nakasone agreed that US would deploy its F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa air base in northern Japan beginning in 1985, and the transfer of Japan's defence-related technology to the US. This latter decision was a significant reversal of Japan's decades-old principle of restricting the export of weapons-related technology. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

relationship; 2) Japan is able to maintain the minimum self-defence capability under the restrictions of Article 9 of the Constitution; and 3) Japan's domestic rehabilitation after the devastation of the Second World War must be directed towards the national goal of reconstructing Japan as a *'Tsusho Kokka'* (i.e., a 'trading state').[110] The Yoshida Doctrine, the best manifestation of Japan's 'Post-WWII. Realism', however, is often misunderstood outside Japan. For example, David Arase regards the Doctrine as the source for Japan's "permanent inferior position in international hierarchies of prestige and privilege", and this is manifest in the inferior relationship Japan has with the US, and in Japan's unclear future security prospects.[111]

Chart 1: Japan's 'Post-WWII Realism'



[109] Katzenstein and Okawara (1993), p.130.
[110] Masataka Kosaka (1992), *Nihon Sonbo no Toki*, (Tokyo: Kodan sha), p.195.
[111] Arase (1996), pp.99-100.

However, under the constraints imposed upon Japan after 1945, Prime Minister Yoshida and his political disciples[112] during the 1950s and 1960s did seek to elaborate the Doctrine in order to maintain Japan's 'double identity'/'double image'. On the one hand, the Japanese government had to deal with the US's demand for Japan's further contribution towards the US-Japanese security relationship (which started in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War). But, on the other hand, domestically, the Centrist PM Yoshida and his disciples also had to resist the demand for the abolition of the US-Japanese Security Treaty coming both from the Right nationalists and the Left idealists: while the Right nationalists viewed the Treaty as a device to keep Japan as an inferior 'little brother' to the US, the Left idealists regarded it as a device to drag Japan into unwanted military conflicts in which the United States would be involved. And while this delicate 'pragmatic' balancing between political positions has not been an easy policy to maintain, there is good reason to believe that it has worked well for Japan since it was adopted.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, it is therefore necessary to consider how the US-Japanese security relationship has been implemented on the Japanese side. In its 'purest' form, Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism' will be demonstrated by reference to the idea of *'Hibuso Churitsu'* (i.e., a neutral, unarmed and non-nuclear Japan). This idea had long been advocated by the Socialist Party of Japan, that was until 1994 when the Socialist leader Murayama became Prime Minister. However, in answering the question of how much actual strategic behaviour is explained by culture, it will be contended that strategic culture remains an influential, yet dependent variable.[113] Like other states, Japan's security policy has been implemented via the interaction of both domestic and external factors. In this context, Japan's 'anti-militarism', in its 'purest' form, cannot be observed in Japan's 'actual' security policy. This is because it has been implemented within the confines of the close security ties Japan has had with the US since 1945. The US-Japanese Security Treaty is often described by many US policy-makers and academics as an 'unequal treaty', i.e., the US military personnel are fighting in the battlefield for the sake of 'free-rider' Japanese

[112] PM Yoshida's political disciples known as 'the Yoshida School', in particular, PM Hayato Ikeda (1960. 7-1964.11) and PM Eisaku Sato (1964.11- 1972.7), elaborated Yoshida's ideas during their premiership.
[113] Desch (1998), p.170.

who are enjoying peace under US protection.[114] However, this Treaty is viewed by many in Japan as an 'equal' security treaty because there is a 'division of labour' under which the United States is in charge of military activities while Japan provided the bases and funding for the US's defence activities in the Asia-Pacific (which are carried out to protect the US's national interests). It is in this respect that it is possible to observe Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism'.

To what extent, then, does Japan's 'Post-WWII. Realism' explain its security policy towards nuclear weapons, which is often described as a 'dual policy' because it incorporates both nuclear 'denial' and nuclear 'approval'? Successive Japanese governments have neither admitted nor denied the possible violation of the third of Japan's three non-nuclear principles (the non-introduction principle) by US nuclear vessels calling at Japanese ports. This is due to the basic 'anti-militarism' amongst Japan's population.[115] At the same time, however, the Japanese government has depended on the US ED as the ultimate security guarantee for Japan. Under such circumstances, the Japanese government has supported the US ED towards Japan very much in the 'Japanese way': Japan has deterred any nuclear threats towards Japan by invoking the importance of the US ED, yet the US ED has been implemented without the actual deployment of nuclear weapons in Japan. The upshot is that the situation of Japan was quite different from that which affected certain West European states during the Cold War, which will be discussed in later chapters.

Japan's 'Post-WWII. Realism' is a skilful way of integrating two competing theories of 'strategic culture' and 'Realism'. What Soeya demonstrates is that unless the two theories are integrated, it is impossible to give an useful insight into Japan's low-military policy. Here, the fundamental question regarding the validity of theory is brought to light: whether a theory must be logically constructed as Waltz and Frankel claim by omitting several variables, or whether it has to give some insight into a given phenomenon by using

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[114] See for example, Chalmers Johnson and E.B.Keehn (1995), 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', *Foreign Affairs,* (July/ August 1995), pp.103-114.

[115] The evidence of 'anti-militarism' in Japan can be found in various opinion polls. For example, a *Yomiuri Shimbun* opinion poll in June 1969 shows that 25.4 percent of the interviewees supported the idea of the termination of the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 in order to become an 'unarmed neutral state', while 44.5 percent opposed. In another *Yomiuri* poll in August 1983, 36.0 percent supported the position of 'unarmed neutrality' while 33.1 per cent opposed. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (June 1969 and August 1983). This will

as many variables as possible.[116] Soeya's idea of Japan's 'Post-WWII. Realism' tries to bridge the gap between the rationalist approach of Realism and the ideational approach of 'strategic culture', and by doing so, Soeya's version of 'Realism' reveals that it is no longer a rationalist approach viewed from a strictly theoretical perspective. Japan's 'Post-WWII. Realism' contains contradictions in itself by borrowing anything useful from competing theoretical approaches despite the fact that by doing so renders the perspective invalid theoretically speaking.[117] This demonstrates the difficulty in selecting a theory to analyse a given phenomenon. This thesis takes the view that no single theory can explain every aspect of international relations. Every theory has its strengths and weaknesses and is always inherently limited in its explanatory power. Yet, it does not mean that using a theory for the analysis of international relations is useless. If a theory or a combination of theories can give some insight into a given phenomenon, the theoretical approach has some credit.

1.3. Conclusion: neo-realism revisited: bringing unit and culture back in

The literature review on both neo-realism and strategic culture so far has shown that both can, in different ways, contribute to the analysis of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. It can be plausibly hypothesised that nuclear proliferation is the outcome or 'consequence' of a complex combination of both external systemic constraints and domestic factors, as well as material and ideational factors. On the one hand, neo-realists have tried to explain and predict systemic 'consequences', yet their predictions could be misleading due to the neglect of the domestic or unit-level where the 'process' occurs. On the other hand, the strategic culturalists have shown that the individual culture of a state can be more determinate than the material structure as a source for strategic behaviour. All neo-realism, including Buzan's Structural Realism, have shared at least the basic assumption that the primary goal for a state is survival in the anarchic international system. Like any other states in the system, Japan's principal goal is to survive, yet survival in the 'Japanese way'. How Japan defines its national interests, security threats, and costs/ benefits of nuclearisation is different from other states. In this context, Japan's

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be further analysed in Chapter 2.

[116] Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Influence in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp.104-5.

[117] Personal communication with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

strategic culture of anti-nuclearism has played a great role in determining Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. A state's strategic culture can therefore be said to influence the 'process' of nuclear non-/ proliferation, yet as Michael Desch has argued, how much independent explanatory power culture has remains the crucial question.[118]

It has been shown in this chapter that strategic culture does provide a significant insight into Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. However, Japan's strategic culture cannot be interpreted as representing the sole or even a direct influence on 'actual' policy. This is because Japan's 'actual' security policy towards nuclear weapons must take the US ED into account, as this has been the basis upon which Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons has been implemented. Having said that, however, without a thorough consideration of Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism', this policy cannot be understood. Therefore, it will be contended that Japan's strategic culture has served to illuminate Japan's domestic debates, but it has failed to explain the fundamental significance of the US's security guarantee towards Japan. As will be discussed later, strategic culture can offer an important insight into how Japan's security/nuclear debate has been constructed. However, it is unable to supplant neo-realism as long as certain elements associated with traditional notions of power politics, and the constraints deriving from the anarchic international structure, which neo-realism highlights, form the basis of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

By dividing the concept of 'power' into attributive and relational power, and adding the third level of analysis (i.e., the 'interaction capacity'), Buzan's Structural Realism provides more variables (hence a multi-level analysis) than Waltz's version of neo-realism to help understand a given phenomenon, though still lacking ideational and normative arguments. Therefore, what can be done is to make the most of what one theory can provide, and combine a chosen theory with other theories which can provide other insights into a given phenomenon. In this context, it is important to choose complementing theory to help understand the dynamics of nuclear non-/ proliferation. For the sake of theoretical debate, this thesis will use Buzan's form of neo-realism, structural realism, as the first cut of an analysis in order to grasp the general characteristics of the international system under which Japan exists with other units. Then, use the strategic cultural approach as the second

[118] Desch (1998), pp.169-170.

cut for further analysis which can give a far better insight into the internal debate of the state. After all, a state's foreign policy is implemented in the consideration with both external and domestic issues, as well as material and ideational factors.

Chapter 2: The Influence of Internal Factors in the Debate within Japan over its Security Policy towards Nuclear Weapons

2.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the influence of domestic factors in shaping Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. As indicated in Chapter 1, Neo-realism denies the importance of domestic factors. Yet, it is the argument of this thesis that it is impossible to understand Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons without explicitly integrating such factors into the analysis.

The Chapter begins by providing an outline of the evolution of Japan's 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism': here the emphasis will be on the symbolic meanings attached to nuclear weapons by the Japanese people. To accomplish this, a broader analysis of Japan's view on security as a whole will be made, as issues related to nuclear weapons are an intrinsic part of Japan's overall security concerns. The second part of the chapter also highlights the seemingly inevitable tension between Japan's policies of 'nuclear approval' and 'nuclear denial': Japan has been criticised both domestically and internationally for, on the one hand, accepting protection under the US' extended nuclear deterrence (US ED) while, on the other, successive governments have prohibited the entry of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory and have advocated nuclear disarmament. This aspect also highlights the Japanese government's difficult task of striking the right balance between the anti-nuclearism amongst its population and the maintenance of the US ED towards Japan. As will be explained in detail, the importance of the US factor in Japan's strategic thinking has been 'internalised' as an extra channel between Japan and the outside world.

2.1. Legal Constraints

2.1.1. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (which is often called the 'Peace Constitution') is often seen to be the major constraint on Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Article 9 reads:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the

threat or the use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.[1]

There is no explicit provision against nuclear weapons possession in the Constitution, and this general statement has subsequently become the subject of various interpretations regarding the legality of nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan. For example, Japan's Commission on the Constitution delivered an independent juridical verdict in 1964 after seven years of study. It carefully stated that, "excluding the question of policy, in general, all nuclear weapons must be termed unconstitutional because of their nature."[2] Also, successive Japanese governments have always regarded nuclear weapons in terms of their 'defensive' nature and therefore are not explicitly banned by the Constitution. For example, in the context of the introduction of US dual-capable Honest John rockets into Japan in 1955, Prime Minister (PM) Hatoyama stated that the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan can be justified under conditions of national emergency.[3] PM Kishi confirmed this view that nuclear weapons of a defensive nature were permissible under the Constitution two years later in 1957.[4] Similarly, contrary to the common image, PM Sato, who received the Nobel Peace Prize due to his achievement of formulating the three non-nuclear principles (3NNP) of 'not manufacturing, not possessing and not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan', was not an wholly against nuclear weapons. In March 1969, in a debate in the House of Councillors budget committee, PM Sato stated that Japan is able to possess strategic nuclear weapons for the sake of its national defence.[5]

The first Defence White Paper published in October 1970 (***Nihon no Boei***) is probably the first document to confirm Japan's official views on nuclear weapons. While categorically rejecting the possession of weapons, which pose a threat of aggression to other states

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[1] Quoted in Hisahiko Okazaki (1986), *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense* (NY: University Press of America), p.76.
[2] John M.Maki (ed.) (1980), *Japan's Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report* (Seattle: University of Washington Press), p.100.
[3] Martin Weinstein (1971), *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy, 1947-1968,* (NY: Columbia University Press), p.81
[4] John Emmerson (1971), *Arms, Yen and Power,* (NY: Dunellen), p.129.
[5] *Sangiin Yosan Iinkai Kaigiroku* (the Diet record of the budget committee, the House of Councillors), March 18, 1969.

(such as long-range bombers and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) and also confirming Japan's 3NNP, the White Paper clarified the governments' views on the subject (these had originally been stated by PM Kishi in 1957 and have subsequently been repeated):

> Even though it would be possible to say that in a legal and theoretical sense possession of small nuclear weapons... falling within the minimum requirement for the capacity necessary for self-defence and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries, would be permissible, the government, as its policy, adopts the principle of not attempting at nuclear armament which might be possible under the Constitution.[6]

Therefore, the Japanese governments' view was that Japan would not have to revise Article 9 of the Constitution if Japan decided to develop its own nuclear weapons: Article 9 itself does not serve as a prohibition on Japan's nuclearisation.[7]

2.1.2. The 1955 Atomic Basic Law and other legal constraints

Ryukichi Imai, a former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, argues that it is the 1955 Atomic Basic Law, not Article 9 of the Constitution, that legally limits the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.[8] The Basic Law has three principles of 'democracy, autonomy and openness' concerning Japan's peaceful use of nuclear energy, with Article 2 stating that, "the research, development, and utilisation of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes."[9] Together with Japan's support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), these serve as a legal framework against Japan's nuclearisation. The 1955 Basic Law will be discussed later in this Chapter with regards to Japan's civil nuclear policy.

In addition to these laws, the 3NNP are well known both at home and abroad as Japan's

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[6] Boei cho (the Defence Agency of Japan) (1970), *Nihon no Boei 1970* (Japan's Defence White Paper 1970), p.40. This interpretation has been repeated by other officials as well as the LDP's Security Research Council policy paper written in July 1973. It is alleged that in the early 1970s under the guidance of then Director-General of Japan's Defence Agency, Yasuhiro Nakasone, the Defence Agency discussed Japan's capability to produce its own tactical nuclear weapons from its stocks of plutonium. *The Guardian,* October 19, 1984.

[7] Mitsuru Kurosawa (1997), 'Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Japanese and Canadian Perspectives', *Osaka University Law Review*, No.44 (February 1997), p.11

[8] Ryukichi Imai (1994-b), *Kagaku to Gaiko*, (Tokyo: Chuo Shinsho), p.105

[9] For the background of the fomulation of this 1955 Basic Law, see for example, Genshiryoku Kaihatsu Junenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.) (1965), *Genshiryoku Kaihatsu Junenshi* (Tokyo: Japan Atomic Industrial

irrevocable national policy ('*kokuze*') against Japan's nuclearisation. However, because Japan's national law does not stipulate these principles, they have also attracted controversy. The 3NNP were officially stated by PM Sato on 11 December 1967, during the Diet deliberations on the bill relating to the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction (a subject which will be discussed in detail in a later section of this Chapter). However, contrary to common assumption, the 3NNP were formed without detailed US-Japanese consultation. This was mainly because the significance of the 3NNP was overshadowed by the immediate need for a bi-lateral agreement with the US in the late 1960s on the reversion of Okinawa.[10]

The origin of the 3NNP can be found in the discussion on Article 2 of the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law. Since then, the basis for the 3NNP has been gradually formed in an *ad hoc* manner, without necessarily considering their long-term security implications. PM Kishi's statements in the late 1950s contributed to the formation of the second of the three principles: while explaining that the possession of nuclear weapons for 'self-defence' purposes would not contradict the Peace Constitution, PM Kishi stated in April 1958 in the Upper House that the Japanese government, as its policy, would not possess nuclear weapons. In the late 1960s, the Okinawa issue dominated the debates in the Diet. In answering the questions asked by the Socialists Party on the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa after the reversion at the 57th Diet session, PM Sato declared the 3NNP.

In addition to domestic legal constraints, Japan is also under an obligation to maintain its security policy towards nuclear weapons as a result of several international agreements. These include several bilateral agreements on the civil use of nuclear energy between Japan and the US. Japan is also a member of international arms control agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty. Of all these agreements, however, it is Japan's signature of the NPT that is the most explicit pledge to maintain its non-nuclear weapons status.

Forum, JAIF), pp.48-61; JAIF (1986), *Genshiryoku wa ima* (Tokyo: Marunouchi shuppan) pp.32-40

[10] Tsuneo Akaha (1984), 'Japan's Nonnuclear Policy', *Asian Survey*, Vol.24, p.853

2. 2. The three contending schools of thought on Japan's national security and nuclear weapons

On the issues of Japan's national security and nuclear weapons, there are three major contending schools of thought in Japan[11]: the Left idealists, the pragmatic Centrists (or 'Yoshida Line' Centrists), and the Right nationalists.[12] The basic arguments of the three schools were formed by the early 1960s. Although certain developments can be observed amongst three schools since then, such as the marginalisation of the Right nationalists and the further divisions amongst the Centrists, the basic lines of their respective arguments remain the same today. Also, in light of their views on Japan's political and social orientation, they can be defined as the 'social-democracy' line, the 'economy-first' stance, and the 'traditional nationalists' line.[13] To highlight the differences in their approach to Japan's security, special attention will be paid to the following five issues: 1) the security threat to Japan; 2) Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution; 3) the US-Japanese Security Treaty; 4) Japan's ideal defence policy, and 5) nuclear weapons and US ED towards Japan.[14] A summary of the three schools of strategic thought is given in Table 1 (below).

Until the early 1990s, the political groups associated with the three schools were as follows: the Left idealists were found among the Japanese Socialists Party (JSP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and the religious *Komeito* (or 'Clean Government Party'). The Centrists were associated largely with the majority of Liberal Democratic

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[11] During the GHQ occupation, five Cabinets existed in Japan: they were three conservatives (Higashikunimiya, Shidehara, and Yoshida) and two coalition governments led by Socialists Prime Ministers of Katayama and Ashida. However, Japanese politics was not influenced at all by the ideology of the Cabinet during this time since the sovereignty of Japan belonged to the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, D.C. Makoto Iokibe (1993), 'Kokusai Kankyo to Nihon no Sentaku', *Koza Kokusai Seiji*, Vol.4, pp.24-5.

[12] For the analysis on the different political groups and their views on Japan's national security , see Mike Mochizuki (1983/ 4), 'Japan's Search for Strategy', *International Security*, Vol.8:3 (Winter 1983/ 4), pp.152-189; Daniel Okimoto (1978), *Ideas, Intellectuals and Institution*, (PhD thesis, University of Michigan); (1982), 'Chrysanthemum without the Sword: Japan's Nonnuclear Policy', in Martin Weinstien (ed.), *Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam* , (Chigago: University of Illinois Press), pp.128-156; Tetsuya Umemoto (1985), *Arms and Alliance and Japanese Public Opinion,* (PhD thesis, Princeton University); Kiyofuku Chuma (1985), *Saigumbi no Seijigaku* (Tokyo: Chishikisha), pp.177-180; Yoshihide Soeya (1998), 'Sengo Nihon Gaiko 52nen no Kiseki', *Gaiko Jiho*, No.1345, pp.79-93; Makoto Iokibe (1994) *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon* (Osaka: Osaka Shoseki), pp.210-218; Hiroshi Nakanishi (1998),'Sengo Nishon to Heiwa- Rongi no fumo to Rinen no Kibo', *Gaiko Forum*, (January, 1998), pp. 16-25; Shigeru Kido (1982), 'Anzen Hosho wo meguru Ronso no Keifu to Bunsuiki', *Hogaku Semina* (special issue on 'International politics and Japan's option'), Series 18 (1982), pp.122-131.

[13] Yoshihide Soeya (1995), *Nihon Gaiko to Chugoku: 1945-1972*, (Tokyo: Keio University Press), pp.8-23; Makoto Iokibe (1989), *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon*, (Osaka: Osaka shoseki), pp.210-215.

[14] The following categorisation are partly drawn from the article of Mochizuki (1983/ 4).

Table –1: Three conflicting schools of strategic thought in Post-WWII Japan

	The Left Idealists ('Unarmed Neutralists)	The Pragmatic Centrists (The 'Yoshida Line')	The Right Nationalists
1) security concerns	Retaliatory attacks on Japan due to the US-Japanese Security Treaty (*'makikomare ron'*)	-the credibility of US's security guarantee towards Japan -Japan's economic vulnerability as a *'Tsusho Kokka'* (a 'trading state')	-the credibility of US's security guarantee towards Japan -Military aspects of external threats to Japan
2) article 9	Oppose any revision	Support status quo	Support revision
3) the US-Japanese security treaty	Oppose	Support	Admit the importance, but support revision
4) ideal defence policy	Unarmed neutrality (*'Hibuso Churitsu'*)	Support status quo	Japan's own strong army as a sovereign state
5) US ED towards Japan	Detrimental	Essential	Not sufficient

Source: adopted from Okimoto (1978), p.59.

Party (LDP) members. The Right nationalists were marginal members of the LDP. However, due to the radical rise and fall of various political parties since 1993[15], it is now less appropriate to categorise the security policy of each political party in terms of three schools of thought, although it is apparent that these schools of thoughts still have resonance in the minds of Japanese decision makers and in the mass media generally. This will be shown below.

2.2.1. The Left idealists (or 'Unarmed Neutralists')

Prominent proponents of this line of argument include the so-called 'progressive' intellectuals and the members of the JSP. These include prominent scholars such as Masao Maruyama, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Takehiko Kamo, Kinhide Mushakoji, Takeshi Ishida, Hiroharu Seki, Hisao Maeda, Motofumi Asai, Toshiyuki Toyoda, and Shigeto Tsuru. In particular, it was the former party leader of the JSP, Masashi Ishibashi, who articulated the party's mainstream argument of 'unarmed neutrality' and their position has been supported in the mass media by the ***Asahi Shimbun*** (a Japanese daily newspaper), ***Gunshuku*** (a monthly opinion magazine), *Sekai*, and *Iwanami* Publishers (including its monthly opinion magazines). To some extent, the ***Mainichi Shimbun*** (a Japanese daily newspaper) can be included in this group.[16]

The Left idealists have been the most critical of Japan's past history, which they consider was a consequence of the actions of the old Japanese feudal order. At the beginning of the post-Second World war era, the Left idealists wanted to remove those groups in the conservative parties and business circles which they considered had been associated with the rise of militarism in the 1930s. Leading these calls were the members of the JSP and the so-called 'progressive' intellectuals, although the latter did not necessarily share the

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[15] Japanese party politics today has been in the process of drastic systemic change since 1993. The LDP's long grip on power ended with the Party's drastic decline in July 1993's election which triggered a chaotic period for Japanese party politics. For the account of the recent rise and fall of new parties since 1993, see for example, Yuri Kase and Stephen Day (1997), 'From Here to Eternity? Continuing Development in Japanese Party Politics in light of the 1996 Parliamentary Election', *Democratization*, Vol.4:3, (Autumn 1997), pp.172-196. As soon as Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama came to the office in June 1994, the Japan Socialists Party drastically changed their decades'-old political stance on security issues, admitting that the SDF is not 'unconstitutional' and Japan would maintain the US-Japanese Security Treaty. In this article, due to the flexible nature of present Japanese party politics, the names of political parties are used according to the time of analysis.

[16] For the different account of nuclear issues in August 1990 and 1991, see for example, 1990 Genbaku no Kai (ed.), (1992), 'Hodo to iu Kanten kara mita Hiroshima', *Hiroshima wa do tsutaerareteiruka- Jyanaristo to Kyoshi ga Oikaketa 45 nen no Genbaku*, (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron sha), pp.8-43.

views of the JSP on other issues such as the trade labour movement. The JCP remained a minority in the Left idealists camp, since communists in Japan advocated an independent people's militia.[17] Also, it should be noted that Japanese Communists' view on nuclear weapons are different from those of Japanese Socialists, a point that will be developed later. For the Left idealists (as well as the Right idealists), questions of appropriate defence represent more than a national security issue and they have consequently sought to incorporate them within a broader debate about the post-war reforms within the Japanese social, economic and political system.[18]

According to the Left idealists, the biggest threats to Japan's national security are: 1) the violation of the 'war-banning' Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution; and 2) a retaliatory attack on Japan from the enemies of the US. First, the Left idealists consider themselves as the 'guardian' of the 'Peace Constitution'. They emphasise the fact that Japan is the only country in the world which has suffered from atomic bombing, and argue that Japan must appeal to the entire world about the futility and immorality of war: it should be an example of the 'peace nation' as embodied in Article 9 of the new Constitution adopted in 1947. But Article 9 of the Constitution did not stem from the Japanese government: it was imposed by the General Headquarters (the GHQ) of the occupation authority during Japan's post-war process of democratisation as a means for preventing Japan's resurgence as a military state.[19] The Japanese Constitution was signed as 'a contract' between the GHO, as represented by US General MacArthur, and the Government of Japan.[20] As General MacArthur, the author of Article 9, himself clarified the achievement of a world order as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations was considered as a prerequisite for the situation embodied in the article.[21] However, the Left idealists, or the 'pacifists' as they are often called, took their *raison d'être* as being the 'guardians' of the spirit of this Article and adamantly opposed any revision of its provisions.

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[17] Thomas U.Berger (1993), 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum', *International Security*, Vol.17:4, (Spring 1993), p.138, footnote 59.
[18] Hideo Otake (1996), *Sengo Nihon no Ideology Tairitsu* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo), Chapter 3.
[19] For various opinions on the Japanese Constitution, see for example, *This is Yomiuri- Nihonkoku Kempo no Subete* , (May 1997, Special issue); See also Hiroshi Nakanishi (1998), 'Sengo Nihon to Heiwa', *Gaiko Forum*, (January 1998), pp.16-25.
[20] Hiroshi Nakanihsi (1998), p.20.
[21] Teruya Abe (1997), 'Kempo ga Hatashita Yakuwari', *This is Yomiuri* (May 1997, Special issue), pp.32-45.

Second, the Left idealists had a constant fear that Japan might be involved in a military conflict or might be attacked due to its close security ties with the US, particularly in connection with US bases on Japanese soil. This argument is generally known as the *'makikomare ron'*. For fear of *'makikomare'*, the Left idealists have long advocated the eventual termination of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, and have argued in favour of the signing of friendship treaties with Japan's neighbouring states.

This fear of *'makikomare'* resonates in Japanese society. In an opinion poll conducted by the PM's office in February 1997, 54.9 per cent think that there is a possibility that Japan could be involved in some military conflict, while 30.2 per cent disagree (14.9 per cent unanswered).[22] In the same opinion poll, 43.5 per cent pointed out 'the efforts by the United Nations' as the main reason for Japan not being involved in any military conflict. Other answers included, 'the US-Japanese Security Treaty' (37.9 per cent), and 'the Peace Constitution' (33.2 per cent). Previously, the same question had been asked in January 1988 and January 1994. The results were similar to those of 1997: 'the efforts made by the UN' as the main reason for Japan not being involved in military conflict (34 per cent in 1988 and 43 per cent in 1994); 'the US-Japanese Security Treaty' (40 and 35 per cent); and 'the Peace Constitution' (40 and 35 per cent).[23]

Instead of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, the Left idealists have long supported the idea of *'Hibuso Churitsu'* or unarmed neutrality, which was the tenet for the JSP until the summer of 1994.[24] Although the JSP suddenly dropped its long-standing opposition to the US-Japanese Security Treaty in 1994 with the arrival of its leader, Tomiichi Murayama as PM, there are indications that their belief in *'Hibuso Churitsu'* has not been removed entirely.[25] Yet, the direct influence of *Hibuso Churitsu'* on Japan's defence policy is limited since this policy is firmly based on the US-Japanese Security Treaty.[26] However, its pacifist sentiment has prevailed among the Japanese public, and it has become an

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[22] Prime Minister's Office (*'Sori fu'*), February 1997. 2,114 out of 3,000 answered. Subject: 3,000 Japanese adults (20 years-old plus) are selected at random.
[23] Ibid.
[24] For the details of *'Hibuso Churitsu ron'*, see for example, Masashi Ishibashi, (1980), *Hibuso Churitsu ron* (Tokyo: Nishon Shakaito Chuohonbu Kikanshi Kyoku), pp.12-41.; Takehiko Kamo *et.al.*, (1984), 'Hibuso Churitsu ron no Shin no Kadai', *Sekai*, No.458, (January 1984), pp.38-51.
[25] Many supporters of Japan Socialists Party deserted the Party due to this confusing policy, which was clearly shown in the Upper House election result in 1996. See Kase and Day (1997), p.185.
[26] Osamu Kaihara (1996) points out the theoretical weakness of the *'Hibuso Churitsu'* ron, from the Centrist

important factor in shaping Japanese security policy. As Mochizuki (1983/84) points out, the persistence of Japanese public support for '*Hibuso Churitsu*' should not be underestimated.[27]

According to an opinion poll done by the ***Yomiuri Shimbun*** in June 1969, 25.4 per cent of the interviewees supported the idea that Japan should terminate the US-Japanese Security Treaty and gradually abolish the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in order to become an 'unarmed neutral state', while 44.5 per cent opposed and 30.1 per cent did not answer. In response to the question of what was the best security policy for Japan: 39.6 per cent indicated some sort of 'neutrality'; 18.7 per cent supported the idea for the gradual termination of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, the re-shuffling of the SDF, and Japan's neutrality; 6.8 per cent supported the abolition of both the US -Japanese Security Treaty and the SDF, and moving to a position of unarmed neutrality; and, 14.1 per cent supported neutrality without the US-Japanese Security Treaty, but with the SDF if necessary.[28]

In another ***Yomiuri*** opinion poll in August 1983, 36.0 per cent supported the position of 'unarmed neutrality', while 33.1 per cent opposed (31 per cent did not answer). Moreover, in response to the question, 'Have you ever changed your views on 'unarmed neutrality' or have you always supported this policy?', 8.9 per cent said 'changed' while 62.2 per cent said 'not changed'.[29] In the July 1991 opinion poll conducted by ***Jiji Tsushin*** (Jiji Press), 67.1 per cent regarded being 'a member of the Western Liberal Democracy block' as the best orientation for Japan, 0.5 per cent chose being 'a member of the Communist block', and 21.7 per cent supported Japan's neutrality (10.6 per cent did not answer).[30]

'Hibuso Churitsu' ron, the idea of an 'unarmed neutral' Japan, has gradually developed into an idea of a militarily isolationist concept in the mind of many Japanese. This has become known as '*Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi*': that is, Japan's defence policy is considered a success if peace is maintained only over Japanese territories.[31] As long as Japan is not the

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viewpoint. *Chi ni ite Ran wo Wasurezu* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun), pp.93-98, 179-181.

[27] Mochizuki (1983/ 4), p.171

[28] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 1969, 2,311 out of 3,000 answered.

[29] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 1983, 2,186 out of 3,000 answered.

[30] Jiji Tsushin sha, July 1991, 1,457 out of 2,000 answered.

[31] The Japanese public has certainly shared the pacifist sentiments with the JSP. However, the public at the same time has supported the US-Japanese Security Treaty advocated by the LDP. After all, with the

direct target of military aggression, the Japanese public seems to support the Japanese government's interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which makes it unconstitutional to assist an ally that has been attacked by a hostile third country. But according to the critic's viewpoint, *'Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi'* represents Japan's isolationist idea,[32] which is often articulated as *'Heiwa Boke'*, or the view that the Japanese have no realistic sense of security issues due to the lasting peace which has endured over its territory since 1945. As a result, Japan has been able to focus on its national re-construction under the 'protected' peace provided by the US' security guarantee. Yet, *'Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi'* also suggests that Japan would not aid its principal ally, the US, if the US is militarily attacked. In contrast, the pacifists, who support the *'Hibuso Churitsu'*, and many Japanese (who do not know what precisely this argument is about), have regarded this idea as the manifestation of a 'lofty' duty given to Japan as the leading advocate of the promotion of international peace, by detaching itself from any international military conflict.[33]

The 'unarmed neutralists' main interests are disarmament and the promotion of world peace. They argue that the termination of the US-Japanese military alliance, the implementation of complete disarmament, and the promotion of confidence building measures among its neighbours, will eventually bring peace not only to Japan but also to the world. Regarding nuclear weapons, the `unarmed neutralists' advocate nuclear disarmament, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They have always been the most adamant opponent of the US ED towards Japan, which they consider is detrimental to Japan's national security. The US ED is considered as the source for insecurity not only because it might invite retaliatory nuclear attack towards Japan from enemies of the US (*'makikomare' ron*), but also because it prevents the establishment a nuclear weapons free world. The `unarmed neutralists' also demand that the 3NNP should be promoted to the status of national law. As a step towards a nuclear weapons free world, they argue for the establishment of a regional nuclear weapons free zone in Northeast

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increase in the standard of living since the 1960s, the importance of the issues of national security declined in Japanese politics.

[32] The Gulf War of 1990-91 sparked a severe criticism against Japan's *'Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi'*, leading to the deliberation of Japan's PKO Law. See for example, Takashi Inoguchi (1990), 'Kokuren Heiwa Kyoryoku Hoan wa Naze Haian ni nattanoka', *Economisto*, (December 25, 1990), pp.67-71;

[33] Tsuneharu Higuchi (1993), *'Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi' no Sakkaku*, (Tokyo: PHP), p.1

Asia.[34] Yoshikazu Sakamoto, one of the most prominent scholars on nuclear disarmament, argued for a 'unilateral initiative' on nuclear disarmament to promote regional nuclear disarmament.[35] So the `unarmed neutralists' and many among the Japanese people, especially those who were the victims of nuclear weapons in 1945 (*'hibakusha'*), found themselves together in their support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

2.2.2. The Right nationalists

The views of the Right nationalists are, to some extent, associated with pre-1945 Japanese nationalism, yet they are different from the pre-1945 militarists who took Japan into the war.[36] Despite their occasional loud voices in politics, their numbers are limited. As Mochizuki points out, in the early 1980s no prominent SDF officers publicly associated themselves with this school of thought.[37] The same can be said in the late 1990s. Prominent proponents of this political position include academics such as Jun Eto, Tetsuya Kataoka, and Ikutaro Shimizu. A small number of LDP politicians (former or present ones), such as Shintaro Ishihara and Masayuki Fujio[38], also belong to this school of thought. There is no fixed part of the mass media that constantly supports their argument, although the opinions of the Japanese Right idealists can be occasionally found in opinion magazines, such as ***Bungei Shunju***, and ***Shokun***.

The Right Nationalists are concerned about external military threats and the credibility of

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[34] For a general argument on nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons free zone in the Northeast Asia, see for example, Motofumi Asai (1996), *Hikaku no Nihon, Mukaku no Sekai,* (Tokyo: Rodo Shumpo sha). Chapter 4; Asahi Shimbun Osaka Honsha 'Kaku' Shuzai han (1995), *Kaku Haizetsu eno Michi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha); Kumao Kaneko (1997), *Nihon no Kaku, Asia no Kaku* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha), Chapter 3; Kiyofuku Chuma (1985), *Saigunbi no Seiji Gaku* (Tokyo: Chishiki sha); Hiroharu Seki, Tadashi Kawata, and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (1968), 'Hikaku Buso no Bunseki to Teigen', *Sekai* (May 1968), pp.10-31; Yoshikazu Sakamoto (1982), 'New Dimensions of Disarmament Processes', *Japan Quarterly,* Vol.29: 2 (June 1982), pp.165-175; (1995), 'Kaku Haizetsu eno Futatsu no Michi', *Sekai* (October 1995), pp.22-34; Yu Takaoka (1984), 'Nihon wa Kaku Senjo ni Naranaika', *Sekai* (April 1984), pp.35-42; Takehiko Kamo (1990), *Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Koso* (Tokyo: Iwanami), Chapter 5; Toshiyuki Toyoda (1972), 'Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Kaku Buso ron', *Sekai* (April 1972), pp.47-65; (1982), 'Kaku Heiki Haizetsu wa Kno de aru', *Sekai* (May 1982), pp.28-45.

[35] Sakamoto (1982), pp.173-4.

[36] Hideo Otake (1996) *Sengo Nishon no Ideology Tairitsu* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo), Chapter 2, especially pp.162-166.

[37] Mochizuki (1983/84), p.166.

[38] Masayuki Fujio became Minister of Education under the PM Nakasone in 1986. Due to his public statement, which justified Japan's colonisation of Korea, Fujio was sacked by PM Nakasone. For his arguments on Japan's recent history, see Masayuki Fujio (1986), ''Hogen Daijin' Ooi ni Hoeru', *Bungei Shunju* (October 1986), pp.105-118.

the US's military commitment for the protection of Japan. They are also concerned about the inferior Japanese position vis-à-vis the US since 1945. They acknowledge the importance of maintaining a friendly relationship with the US, yet they find the present bilateral security alliance with the US insufficient.[39] In addition to their doubts about the US's commitment, the Right Nationalists regard the Security Treaty as the measure that keeps Japan subordinate to the US's national interests in the region.

Some of the Right nationalists are anti-American due to Japan's devastating defeat by the US, followed by the US occupation of Japan for seven years and the 'imposed' Article 9 of the post-war Constitution. Ikutaro Shimizu is perhaps the most prominent anti-American nationalist in this case. Shimizu was one of the leading figures of anti-US riots in 1960, at the time of the revision of the first US-Japanese Security Treaty (originally signed in September 1951). Twenty years later Shimizu surprised the Japanese public and scholars by suddenly advocating Japan's nuclearisation.[40] Fuji Kamiya has suggested that Shimizu's activities, which appear rather different at first sight, are in fact driven by his deep-rooted anti-US sentiment: Shimzu's actions were different ways of expressing his anti-US nationalism.[41]

The Right nationalists wanted to revise Article 9 not only because they viewed an independent military as an essential part of any sovereign state, but also because they hoped to rekindle a sense of national pride amongst the Japanese after the devastation in 1945 by re-building an independent national military establishment.[42] Similar to Shimizu, Jun Eto has argued that under the 'imposed' Constitution, Japan would remain mentally occupied by the US.[43]

The Japanese Right nationalists' arguments concerning Japan's own nuclearisation are not necessarily unified. While Ikutaro Shimizu, and Tetsuya Kataoka have clearly advocated Japan's nuclearisation, others merely imply Japan's possible political change towards nuclearisation. At the height of the Cold War, Kataoka, for example, argued in favour of

[39] Ikutaro Shimizu (1980), *Nihon yo Kokka tare- Kaku no Sentatku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju), p.93.
[40] Ibid., p.76.
[41] Fuji Kamiya (1995), *Sengo shi no Naka no Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: Shincho sha), pp.106-7.
[42] Fujio (1986), p.84.
[43] Jun Eto (1980), *1946 nen Kempo- sono Kosoku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju)

Japan acquiring its own independent nuclear deterrent. Kataoka argued that Japan's nuclear forces would deter a Soviet nuclear blackmail. And, by so doing, Japan could maintain its neutrality in a possible military conflict between the US and the Soviet Union (*'makikomare ron'*).[44]

It is interesting to note that *'makikomare ron'*, which can be viewed as the term to describe the Left idealists' fears about Japan's security, is also used by the Right idealists in order to justify part of their argument. By referring to the same concern of *'makikomare'*, however, the two groups of thought arrive at the opposite conclusions: while the Left idealists argue for 'unarmed neutrality', the Right nationalists advocate Japan's acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent capability. It seems that, for the Right nationalists, the reference to *'makikomare ron'* might be merely an excuse to disguise their anti-US nationalist sentiments. As mentioned earlier, the majority of the Right nationalists are clearly aware of the importance of maintaining a friendly tie with the US for the sake of Japan's own national security.[45] Since they are concerned with external military threats (for example, during the Cold War this principally emanated from the Soviet Union), they seem to consider it unwise to abolish the US-Japanese military alliance overnight. They admit that the existing 'weak' Japanese military forces are unable to defend Japan without the US's help.

Shintaro Ishihara has argued that the US' 'nuclear umbrella' is a 'broken umbrella', and cannot be relied upon for the protection of Japan's national security. Therefore, he has suggested that Japan must develop its own nuclear weapons.[46] His argument stems from his strong anti-US nationalism, which is evident in his books on the subject: the co-authored ***Japan that Can Say 'No'***.[47]

Most of the Right nationalists[48] do not seem to know, or perhaps do not even care about, the nature of the US ED towards Japan. For the Right nationalists, the development of Japan's own military power projection and independent deterrent represent the ideal way

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[44] Tetsuya Kataoka (1979), 'Nippon Daini Kyowakoku no Koso', *Shokun* (October 1979), pp.85-98.
[45] Mochizuki (1983/4), p.166
[46] Shintaro Ishihara (1970), 'Hikaku no Shinwa wa Kieta', *Shokun* (October 1970), p,143.
[47] Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita (1989), *Japan that can say 'No': the New US-Japanese Relations Card,* (NY: Simone and Schuster)..
[48] Note that, as mentioned earlier, the number of the right idealists is very limited.

of expressing Japan's sovereignty and national pride. In their eyes, Japan's independent nuclear forces would represent the culmination of Japan's nationalism. However, only a few exceptions in this group argue for Japan's nuclearisation from a military perspective. Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, for example, has suggested that Japan's nuclearisation in a close military co-ordination with the US would enhance the deterrence capability of the entire 'West'.[49] Nakagawa's logic is simple: if Japan's independent nuclear forces would cause anxiety in the mind of US' policymakers, then integrating Japan's nuclear forces into the US's nuclear strategy would solve the problem. To support his argument, Nakagawa points out articles written by Robert Pranger, which argue that the nuclearisation of the US's allies in East Asia would enhance US' national interests.[50] Hence, Nakagawa argues that Japan's nuclear forces would re-structure and strengthen the credibility of the US ED in the region.

2.2.3. The 'Yoshida Line' Pragmatic Centrists

The basic tenets of Japan's post-war security policy were founded during the bi-lateral negotiations between the US and Japan under PM Shigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s. PM Yoshida, who led Japan for most of the seven years under the GHQ occupation, played a major role in these negotiations, especially concerning the development of the SDF and the formation of the new Japanese Constitution. The 1950s witnessed the victory of the Centrists over the other political camps in Japanese politics. With the arrival of the Cold War in Asia,[51] the forging of close ties with the US became the only option for Japan to implement the urgent task of re-constructing its economy and regaining its post-war independence. The rise of the communist regime in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 had a significant impact upon Japan's political orientation. The US realised the geo-strategical importance of Japan in Asia and started demanding Japan's rearmament. On their part, however, the Japanese political leaders were reluctant to accept the US demand, fearing that a large scale re-armament might divert resources from economic reconstruction and encourage a militarist revival from the Right idealists.[52]

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[49] Yatsuhiro Nakagawa (1984), 'Higashi Aisa ni okeru 'Kakudai Yokushiryoku' to INF', *Shin Boei Ronshu,* Vol.11: 3, (January 1984), pp.48-77.
[50] Robert Pranger (1981), 'Nichi Bei ni taisuru Soren no Kyoi', *Chuo Koron* (November 1981), p.125.
[51] Note that the Cold War arrived in Asia later than in Europe. Chruchill's famous speech on 'the iron curtain' of March 1946 was to let the US know the approaching danger of Communism in Europe.
[52] Makoto Iokibe (1994), *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon* (Osaka: Osaka shoseki); Fuji Kamiya (1995), *Sengoshi no naka no Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: Shincho sha). On Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's

Ultimately, the US accepted the Japanese position of limited defence co-operation towards the US's defence activities. And the policy adopted by PM Yoshida was later continued by his political disciples in the 1960s.[53] This is why Japan's post-war security policy is often called the 'Yoshida Strategy'[54] or the 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine'.[55]

From the US's viewpoint as well, the Yoshida line Centrists in Japan have proven to be the best alliance partners. Since the beginning of the bilateral relationship with Japan, there have always existed two opinions inside the US. On the one hand, some highlight the importance of 'protecting' Japan since Japan is both strategically and politically important to the US's national security. On the other hand, an alternative opinion seeks to 'contain' Japan's nuclearisation.[56] These contending US views, or what Mike Mochizuki calls "a feeling of ambivalence"[57] concerning Japan's further military development, have been perennially present.

Masashi Nishihara has argued that the 'Yoshida Doctrine' has played a central role in Japan's post-war foreign policy orientation.[58] Although the 'Yoshida Doctrine' is never clearly defined, it is widely considered as follows: 1) a close US-Japanese security relationship is deemed desirable; 2) Japan is able to maintain the minimum self-defence capability under the restrictions of Article 9 of the Constitution; and 3) Japan's domestic rehabilitation after the devastation of the Second World War must be the national goal in order to reconstruct Japan as a '*Tsusho Kokka*' ('Trading state').[59] These Yoshida line Centrists are very different from the pre-1945 military establishments whose primary security concern was the balance of power defined in terms of military capability, yet this

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opposition against the rearmament of Japan advocated by the US special envoy to Japan, Republican J.D. Dulles, see for example, Shigeru Yoshida (1951), 'Japan and the Crisis in Asia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.29: 2, p.195.

[53] PM Yoshiada's political disciples knows as students of 'the Yoshida school', in particular, PM Hayato Ikeda (1960. 7- 1964. 11) and PM Eisaku Sato (1964. 11-1972.7), elaborated Yoshida's ideas during their role as prime minister.

[54] Mochizuki (1983/4) pp.152-3.

[55] See for example, Sun-Ki Chai (1997), 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defence Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalisation', *International Organization*, Vol.51:3 (Summer 1997), pp.389-412

[56] On the conflicting US views on Japan, see for example, the 'Morse Target', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 21, 1998. Yoshihide Soeya (1996) 'Beichu Wakai to Nichibei Kankei', *Hogaku Kenkyu* Vol.69:8 (August 1996), pp.1-18

[57] Mochizuki (1983/4), p.174

[58] Masashi Nishihara (1978), 'How Much Longer the Fruits of the 'Yoshida Doctrine'?', in Hahn Bae-Ho and Tadashi Yamamoto (eds.), *Korea and Japan* (Seoul: Korea University), pp.150-167,.

[59] Masataka Kosaka (1992), *Nihon Sonbo no Toki*, (Tokyo: Kodan sha), p.195.

does not mean that their position is close to the 'unarmed' neutralists.[60] As will be explained below, their strategy embraces the inevitable contradiction stemming from the very nature of the 'Yoshida Doctrine'.

The Centrists have articulated what has become the mainstream of Japan's strategic thinking in the post-war period. This has been particularly the case since 1960[61] when PM Ikeda turned the Japanese public's attention from anti-US nationalism, as demonstrated in 1960 at the time of the revision of the 1951 security treaty, to a rapid economic growth under the slogan of *'Shotoku Baizo'* ('doubling the income'). Japan's dramatic economic recovery since 1960s, has steadily increased the domestic support for the Centrist position of low-spending and low-profile on military issues. The Japanese people became reluctant to damage the basic institutions of the post-war order under which Japan's economic success was achieved and a higher standard of living was provided.[62]

Therefore, the Centrists are the least ideological and most pragmatic amongst the three schools. The prominent members of this group include scholars such as Masamichi Inoki (former principal of the National Defence Academy), Masashi Nishihara (Professor at the National Defence Academy), Masataka Kosaka, Seizaburo Sato, Fuji Kamiya, Makoto Momoi, Satoshi Morimoto, and Yoshihide Soeya. Some prominent writers in this group also belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). ***The Yomiuri Shimbun*** (one of Japan's daily newspapers) is also generally associated with the Centrists.

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[60] Yoshihide Soeya (1996), 'Beichu Wakai to Nichibei Kankei', *Hogaku Kenkyu,* Vol.69:8, (August 1996), pp.1-18; (1997-a), 'Asia no Chichujo Hendo to Nihon Gaiko', *Kokusai Mondai,* No.444, (1997, March), pp.38-48; (1997-b), 'Nichibei Kankei no Kozo to Nihon no Gaiko Senryaku', *Gaiko Forum* (1997, a special issue on China), pp.36-49.

[61] 1960 witnessed the mass protests against the revision of the 1952 US-Japanese Security Treaty. In 1960 the Japanese government under PM Nobusuke Kishi managed to revise then existing 1952 US-Japanese Security Treaty for a more equal condition for Japan. The new (present) 1960 Treaty requires the US-Japanese consultation prior to any major changes regarding the equipment and deployment of US forces stationed in Japan. The process of this revision however triggered mass demonstrations against the Treaty, against the US, and also against the way PM Kishi handled the issue. After this upheaval, PM Hayato Ikeda (of LDP) took the office turning the nation's attention to economic growth. Therefore, between 1960 and 1976 when the first National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) was made the defence establishment developed without having a clear-cut discussion. For further details, see for example: John Dower (1979), *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp.445-7.

[62] The public support for the US-Japanese Security Treaty and the SDF increased from less than 50 % in the late 1950s to well over 70 % by the mid-1970s. *Asahi Shimbun*, November 6, 1988. See also Umemoto (1985), pp.79-85

Various opinions exist among the members of this school of thought on individual issues. Mike Mochizuki, for example, divides the members into two groups of 'political realists' and 'military realists': while the former group limits their policy recommendations to those, which do not incur too many domestic political costs, the latter group does not. Instead, the latter group assess the military environment first then develop necessary measures to meet the threat.[63] Although several differences can be identified between what Mochizuki calls 'the military realists' and 'the political realists', their emphasis on the maintenance of a stable US-Japanese security relationship, and the US ED towards Japan, is a common element of the two. Consequently, both schools are treated within the same group in this thesis under the name of 'Yoshida Line Pragmatic Centrists'.

The Pragmatic Centrists regard three issues as having a potentially negative effect on Japan's security: a decline in the US security guarantee; the emergence of any external security threats towards Japan; and Japan's economic vulnerability. The Centrists' first and greatest fear is the weakening of, or worse, the severing of, the US security guarantee. Hence, the Centrists have long been concerned about the arguments presented by the so-called 'revisionist' school of experts on Japan, such as Chalmers Johnson[64] and Karel Van Wolferen[65], who link the bilateral friction over trade with the US's criticism of Japan's 'free-ride' on defence issues.

Second, the Pragmatic Centrists define external threats towards Japan more in political than in purely military terms.[66] During the Cold War, they assessed the external threats to Japan's national security from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union by assessing both military and political aspects, such as the intentions of these states.

Third, Japan's economic vulnerability is regarded as one of the main concerns amongst the Pragmatic Centrists, the roots of which are found in the 'Yoshida Doctrine'. Under the 'Yoshida Doctrine', Japan has established itself as a 'trading state', *('Tsusho Kokka')* since 1945. But Japan's vulnerability as an industrialised trading state, because it has few

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[63] Mochizuki (1983/4), pp.168-175.
[64] Chalmers Johnson and E.B.Keehn (1995), 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', *Foreign Affairs,* (July/ August 1995), pp.103-114.
[65] Karel Van Wolferen (1990), *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation* (NY: Knoph Publisher).
[66] Mochizuki (1983/ 4), p.159

natural resources (which can be termed as the economic dimension of Japan's national security), has continually been a major factor in wider foreign policy discussions. Japan depends on international trade for the maintenance of its national security.[67] In the 1990s, about 85 per cent of its energy consumption and nearly 100 per cent of its oil consumption come from abroad. Successive Japanese Diplomatic Bluebooks repeat the importance of the maintenance of international peace, which is seen as indispensable for Japan to secure its prosperity. Thus, preserving friendly relations with its neighbours is of crucial importance.[68] This factor has been the basis for Japan's economic aid programmes to the developing states in terms of Official Development Aid (ODA).

The majority of the Pragmatic Centrists have strongly supported the present Japanese Constitution, in particular Article 9. As discussed later, the maintenance of Article 9 is one of the two themes of the 'Yoshida Doctrine'. Recently, though, certain minority voices have been on the increase in support of the revision of the Article 9, such as that of the conservative politician, Ichiro Ozawa.[69] The reason for this support comes mainly from their sense of need to strengthen Japan's security ties with the US. They advocate closer military co-operation between Japan and the US, which they think requires the revision of Article 9. This line of argument was frequently heard during and shortly after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While the US and its other allies sent their soldiers to fight against Iraqi military forces, Japan's 'contribution' remained mainly within the financial dimension. Although Japan sent its SDF for the sweeping of mines in the Gulf after the peace was restored, this also sparked some international criticism.

The advocates of the move to revise the Constitution are concerned about the increasing voices of the so-called 'revisionist' school within the US. Interestingly, in the 1990s, those Japanese who have long opposed the revision of Article 9, such as Masamichi Inoki, have begun to accept some of the arguments in favour of the revision. They argue that 'anti-militarism' is now so ingrained within the Japanese public mood it is safe for Japan to modify the Constitution to allow for Japan's further contribution towards the

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[67] Boei cho (the Defence Agency of Japan) (1997), *Nihon no Boei 1997*, (Japan's Defence White Paper), (Tokyo: the Ministry of Finance Printing Office), p.128.
[68] See Gaimu sho (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), *Gaiko Seisho* (Diplomatic Bluebook) (Tokyo: the Ministry of Finance Printing Office) of each year.
[69] Ichiro Ozawa (1993), *Nippon Kaizo Keikaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha).

maintenance of the international security.[70] Having said that, as the past 50 years of history has shown, the Japanese government has continually expanded its interpretation of Article 9: from a strict ban on any type of military forces in the 1950s[71] to the full acceptance of the existing SDF in the 1990s. Therefore, the majority of Centrists consider it appropriate to maintain the existing Article 9 even in the face of the new security environment of the post-Cold War era.

Opinion polls also suggest such a revision of the Constitution would be politically very costly.[72] In the December 1990 opinion poll conducted by ***the Asahi Shimbun***, 61 per cent regarded the Japanese Constitution as a whole to be a good one, while 24 per cent disagreed (15 per cent did not answer). In response to the question, 'Do you support the revision of the Constitution in order to allow Japan to have a 'formal' army?', 81 per cent opposed and 13 per cent supported the proposition (6 per cent did not answer).[73] Similarly, in the March 1992 opinion poll undertaken by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), 75.3 per cent thought that Article 9 of the Constitution had contributed to the peace and security of Japan (31 per cent said 'very much', and 44.3 per cent said 'to some extent'), while 18.1 per cent disagreed (16.3 per cent said 'not much' and 1.8 per cent 'not at all').[74]

In the March 1994 opinion poll done by ***the Yomiuri Shimbun***, 44.2 per cent supported the revision of the Constitution, while 40 per cent did not (15.8 per cent did not answer).[75] Those who supported the revision of the Constitution pointed out the following reasons (multiple choices): 'New issues, such as Japan's contribution to the international community, have developed, and these cannot be dealt with by the present Constitution' (62 per cent); 'It is confusing to keep changing the interpretation of the Constitution' (30.6 per cent); 'There are too many statements on rights, but not enough statements on duties in the Constitution' (21.1 per cent); 'In order to stipulate the right of self-defence and allow Japan to have an appropriate military forces' (5.1 per cent); and 'The present Constitution

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[70] No.25, a Japanese professor on security studies. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998.).
[71] Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF) was originally formed under the name of 'Police Reserve Forces' in 1950.
[72] Masamichi Inoki *et al.* (1982), *Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Boei e no Kinkyu Teigen*, (Tokyo: Kodansha), pp. 28-9.
[73] *Asahi Shimbun,* December 1990. 2,365 out of 3,000 answered (78.8 per cent).
[74] *NHK Seron Chosa*, March 1992. 2,522 out of 3,600 (16 years-old plus) answered (70.1 per cent).
[75] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 1994. 2,100 out of 3,000 answered (70 per cent).

was imposed upon Japan by the US' (28 per cent).[76] Those who opposed the revision of the Constitution pointed out the following reasons (multiple choices): 'The Constitution has already been rooted in the Japanese people' (54.2 per cent); 'Japan is proud of its 'Peace' Constitution' (39.2 per cent); 'The Constitution guarantees the basic human rights and democracy' (26.4 per cent); 'The interpretations of the Constitution can be flexible according to the day's need' (16.4 per cent); and, 'The revision of the Constitution might open up the road to Japan's militarism' (25.4 per cent).[77]

As noted previously, the US-Japanese Security Treaty has been the centre of the Yoshida Line Centrists' strategy. They have long supported, intentionally or unintentionally, the idea of a 'division of labour' between the US and Japan under this security arrangement: while the US would engage in the military dimension of international security, Japan would serve in the non-military dimension, in particular in financial situations. This formula has been consistent with Japan's constitutional framework as well as conforming to Japan's domestic constraints against a strong and fully-independent army. However, as already indicated, US policymakers have been critical about it, especially since the Gulf War.

The Centrists place considerable emphasis on Japan's geo-strategic position in the context of the US-Japanese alliance. The most prominent advocate of the stronger US-Japanese security relationship from this factor has been Hisahiko Okazaki. Okazaki's position is summarised in the following passage:

> Although leftists in Japan argue that it may be involved in a war because of the existence of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and of the U.S. bases in Japan, in fact it is threatened not because of its military alliance but because of its geostrategic situation. It would be unreasonable not to expect a major power to attempt to seize a geostrategically important area before its opponent utilizes it, particularly if the country at issue were inadequately armed.[78]

The geo-strategic importance of Japan is also deemed to be as important in the future as in

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[76] In total 151.0 per cent of this multiple choices.
[77] In total 164.4 per cent of this multiple choices.
[78] Hisahiko Okazaki (1982), 'Japanese Security Policy: A Time for Strategy', *Internatinal Security*, Vol.7:2 (Fall 1982), p.191

the past. In his book, ***Senryakuteki Shiko towa Nanika?***[79] ('What is strategic thinking?'), Okazaki emphasises this factor as a significant aspect of the Cold War security situation. From the Soviet perspective, according to Okazaki, access to the Western Pacific by its Pacific Fleet was of crucial importance and so, to accomplish this, the Soviet Navy would need to gain passage through three straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) which border Japanese territory.[80] So the geostrategic importance of Japan was viewed as a vital aspect of the Cold War, as the US was able to use it as a base to control the Western Pacific and to engage in military operations on the Korean Peninsula.

Viewed from the geo-strategic perspective, it was therefore difficult for Japan to remain neutral in such circumstances.[81] The Centrists argued that the geo-strategic importance of Japan consequently was one of the 'givens' in Japan's strategic thinking, along with Japan's policy orientation as a 'trading state' without any natural resources. This has meant that the maintenance of the US-Japanese security relationship has become viewed by the Centrists as a fundamental element of Japan's national security. Many Centrists even argue that it is impossible to conceive of Japan's defence policy without resort to the US-Japanese Security Treaty.[82] Due to this assessment, they tend to restrain themselves from openly criticising US defence policy.

The majority of Centrists support Japan's defence posture which is outlined in the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO). This defines the SDF's activities as being engaged solely for the purposes of defending the Japanese homeland (*'Senshu boei'*). The Centrists, at the same time, support the gradual increase in Japan's co-operation with US defence activities, especially in 'the area surrounding Japan' (an area defined in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Co-operation).[83]

Regarding nuclear weapons and US ED towards Japan, the Centrists have regarded the

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[79] Hisahiko Okazaki (1995), *Senryaku teki Shiko towa Nanika?* (18th edition),(Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho)
[80] For a full account of the importance of these straits in Japan's defence thinking, see for example, Tsuneo Akaha (1984), 'Japan's Nonnuclear Policy', *Asian Survey*, Vol.24, pp. 852-877.
[81] This point was emphasisied by a JDA bureaucrat and a Japanese defence specialist. Interview by the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 and January 1998, respectively).
[82] This point was emphasised by a Japanese professor on security studies and a MOFA bureaucrat. Interview by the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1995 and January 1998, respectively.)
[83] The 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation defined the practical roles of both sides in relation to defence issues. Under the second (revised) 1997 Guidelines, Japan is to support the US defence

latter as the ultimate guarantor for deterring other nuclear weapons states in the region. They do not support the idea of a nuclearized Japan, since they consider that the costs, both militarily and politically, of Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons to be prohibitively high. Hence, they regard a conventional build-up as being more strategically essential for Japan than the acquisition of a small nuclear force.

The credibility of the US ED towards Japan has been one of the major security concerns for the Yoshida line Centrists. As the rest of the thesis will explain, Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons has evolved in light of the tension of striking the right balance between the Japanese people's 'anti-nuclearism' and the Japanese Governments' continuous efforts to enhance the credibility of the US ED towards Japan. Successive Japanese Governments, the majority of which are formed by the Yoshida line Centrists, have consequently sought to enhance the credibility of the US ED whenever they face new nuclear threats from neighbouring states. For the purposes of increasing the credibility of the US ED towards Japan, some Centrists have argued in favour of relaxing the principle of 'not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan'. For example, Masashi Nishihara supported this argument in order to permit the transit of US's nuclear weapons through Japanese waters and ports as a means for increasing the credibility of the US ED.[84]

The Centrists' adoption of the 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine' as its policy orientation inevitably contains contradictions between the two opposing ideas of Article 9 of the Constitution (which renounces the sovereign right of making war and which is widely regarded as the expression of Japan's 'anti-militarism'), and the US-Japanese Security Treaty (which is an explicitly military alliance). This is why Japanese defence policy, and especially Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, has always embraced an element of 'ambiguity' or 'grey zone'. This can be observed in the government's handling of crucial issues such as over the 'prior consultation system', the 3NNP, and the reversion of the Okinawa basing policy. This 'grey zone' is an inevitable outcome of the search for a compromise between: the Centrist government and the opposition coming from the Left idealists and a small number of Right idealists within the LDP; and the Japanese

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activities in 'the area surrounding Japan'.

[84] Masashi Nishihara (1983/ 84), 'Expanding Japan's Credible Defence Role', *Internatinal Security*, Vol.8:3

government and the US government.[85] To put it simply, the 'grey zone' in Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons is an inevitable consequence of the choice made by Japanese Centrist governments to adhere to the inherently contradictory 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine'. (see Chart 2) This contradiction has been explained earlier in Chapter 1 by Yoshihide Soeya in his articulation of the concept of Japan's 'double identity'/ 'double image.

Chart 2: Japan's Centrist 'Yoshida Doctrine'



The US-Japanese Security Treaty as an
Extra channel/layer ('internalised' external factor)

2.3. The Evolution of 'Anti-militarism' and 'Anti-nuclearism' amongst the Japanese people

Bearing in mind the three contending schools of strategic thought, this section will highlight what the Left idealists have shared with many portions of the Japanese public: namely, Japan's 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism'. But although the main focus of this section is the evolution of 'anti-nuclearism' among the Japanese population, the way the Japanese view security and military issues in general must be briefly explained. This is necessary in order to highlight their views on nuclear issues as a part of Japan's 'anti-militarism'.

(Winter 1983/4) pp.198-9.

[85] One of the most prominent Pragmatic Centrists, Yonosuke Nagai, argues that this 'ambiguity' is the product of Japanese people's 'wisdom' and Japan's foreign policy must make the most of it. *Mainichi Shimbun* June 12, 1981, quoted in Yasushi Yamaguchi (1981), "Tate to shiteno Boeiryoku' ron Hihan'

2.3.1. The 'anti-militarism' amongst the Japanese

Tsuneharu Higuchi has analysed the evolution of the idea of 'the absolute pacifism' amongst the Japanese.[86] The older generation, who remember Japan's pre-1945 militarism and who actually suffered from it, are more appreciative of the post-1945 'pacifism'. This group regards the term 'peace' as a 'relative' concept. On the other hand, those generations, which do not know the pre-1945 militarism, interpret the term 'peace' as an 'absolute' idea (*'Zettai Heiwa shugi'*). Since the younger generation, born after 1945, do not have any yardstick to compare between 'peace' and 'war', or 'pacifism' and 'militarism', they interpret anything connected with military issues, be it related to 'self-defence' or not, as Japan's resurgence of 'militarism'. What would be interpreted as issues related to non-militarism by Americans, for example, are considered as issues related to militarism by Japan's 'absolute' pacifists.[87] In short, the concept originally advocated by the Left idealists shortly after the Second World War has widely spread to the Japanese population in general, with the help of a radical interpretation of the concept of 'pacifism'.[88] As Takashi Inoguchi has pointed out, the Japanese talk about international politics based upon their presumption of Japan as a 'peace island'.[89]

Similarly, Susumu Nishibe explains the Japanese people's views on 'peace' and 'war' since 1960 as follows. It is often said the Left idealism that was popular in Japanese society until the 1950s, due to the still vivid memories of the war, has drastically declined since 1960. However, this is a superficial observation. The Left idealism has been scattered, extensively rather than intensively, within the Japanese society in a more 'diluted' form. The slogans that the Left idealists advocated, such as the liberation of humanity, the pursuit of freedom, and the expansion of the concept of civil rights, have lost much of their ideological appeal. But the more these slogans lost their ideological meaning, the more they became integrated into the daily lives of the ordinary Japanese population.[90]

Sekai (August 1981), p. 36.

[86] Tsuneharu Higuchi (1993), *Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi no Sakkaku* (Tokyo: PHP), pp. 180-181

[87] Ibid., p.180.

[88] Ibid., p.180.

[89] Takashi Inoguchi (1988), *Kokka to Shakai* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press), p.96.

[90] Susumu Nishibe (1991), *Senso ron- Zettai Heiwa shugi Hihan*, (Tokyo: Nihon Bungei sha), p. 132

As shown in opinion polls below, the Japanese people think that Japan has been the island of 'peace' because of its 'pacifism'. This interpretation is well accepted as 'common sense' by the Japanese at large. However, probably the reality would be opposite: the long-lasting peace has made it possible for Japan to continue advocating 'pacifism'. This is an 'illusion' caused by Japan's 'one island pacifism'.

According to an opinion poll conducted by ***Kyodo Tsushin*** (Kyodo Press) in December 1978, only 14.4 per cent suggested that 'military power (including the US-Japanese Security Treaty)' was the most effective way of maintaining Japan's national security. Other answers included: 'economic power (including science and technological capability)' (32.6 per cent); and 'the maintenance of the Peace Constitution' (46.7 per cent).[91] The Japanese people's high level of trust in their Peace Constitution has been a perennial theme in various opinion polls.

In an opinion poll conducted by ***Asahi Shimbun*** in December 1982, 24 per cent pointed to 'the tragic war-time experience' as the main reason why Japan has maintained peace for nearly 40 years. Other answers included: 'the Japanese people's efforts' (24 per cent), 'Peace Constitution' (22 per cent); and 'the US-Japanese Security Treaty' (14 per cent).[92] A similar opinion poll conducted by the PM's office in January 1989 resulted in 39.3 per cent pointing to the Peace Constitution as the main reason for Japan's maintenance of peace. This was followed by 'the stability of Japan's economy and society' (19.3 per cent) and 'the US-Japanese Security Treaty' (17.8 per cent).[93] The December 1990 ***Asahi Shimbun*** opinion poll asked the question, 'Do you think the idea of the Japanese Peace Constitution (that renounces the right of belligerency as Japan's sovereign right) is internationally convincing (or justified) outside Japan as well as inside Japan?' 51 per cent answered 'yes', while 36 per cent said 'no' (13 per cent did not answer).[94]

What can be observed from these opinion poll results is that the Japanese place considerable emphasis on the Peace Constitution (and the tragic war-time experience) as the foundation for the continuation of peace in Japan. Furthermore, about 50 per cent of

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[91] Kyodo Tsushin, December 1978. 2,399 out of 3,000 answered (80.0 per cent).
[92] *Asahi Shimbun,* December 1982, 2552 out of 3,000 answered. (85 per cent).
[93] Prime Minister's office, January 1989. 2,281 out of 3,000 answered (76.0 per cent).
[94] *Asahi Shimbun,* December 1990. 2,365 out of 3,000 answered (78.8 per cent).

the Japanese people thought that this 'common sense' approach to peace was applicable to the world in December 1990, a time when the world was feeling the high tension between Iraq (after its invasion of Kuwait) and the US, Japan's only military ally. The strong 'victim mentality' (*'Higaisha Ishiki'*) felt in 1945 has thus evolved into an 'illusion' that Japan's Peace Constitution, which has kept Japan as a 'Peace island', must be appreciated by the world as much it is by the Japanese. However, the Pragmatic Centrists, such as Masamichi Inoki, warns of the danger inherent in this notion of Japan's illusion: if Japan alone wishes peace and renounces the right of belligerency, then Japan's national security would be guaranteed.[95]

2.3.2. The evolution of 'anti-nuclearism' amongst the Japanese population

Not only have the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 created a feeling of victimisation among Japanese people, in 1954 the US hydrogen bomb test conducted at the Bikini Atoll reinforced this victim mentality.[96] This anti-nuclearism is often described in terms of a 'nuclear allergy' or 'nuclear taboo'.[97] Some critics argue that the Left idealists artificially created the 'nuclear allergy' amongst the Japanese. Writers such as Takeshi Muramatsu have pointed out that the 'nuclear allergy' might not have had such political power had it not been manipulated by the Left idealists and the mass media which supported them. To compensate, Muramatsu argues in favour of a skilful manipulation of the mass media, with the help of political propaganda from the opposite political camps, to cure Japan of its 'nuclear allergy'.[98]

Others argue that the term 'nuclear allergy' was coined by the Japanese conservatives to describe the prevailing Japanese people's psychology.[99] By using the term 'allergy', which describes abnormal phenomenon, they attempted to cure it. For example, as will be discussed later, at the Diet Speech of 27 January 1968, PM Sato talked directly about how to survive the nuclear era by re-confirming the 3NNP he had previously declared at the

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[95] Masamichi Inoki (1995), 'Fusen Ketsugi heno Gimon', *Sekai Shuho* (May 2, 1995), p.1.
[96] On the political implication of the Lucky Dragon incident, see for example, Roger Buckley (1995), *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-90* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.58-61.
[97] On 'nuclear allergy' see for example, T.J.Pempel (1975), 'Japan's Nuclear Allergy', *Current History*, Vol. 68 (April 1975), pp.169-73.
[98] Takeshi Muramatsu (1973), 'Japan's Choice', in William Kintner and Robert Pfaltzraff, Jr., (eds.), *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).
[99] Ryukichi Imai (1969), 'The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan', *Survivial*, Vol.11:9, (September 1969), p.280.

Diet in December 1967. According to PM Sato's secretary, Minoru Kusuda, and Sato's political advisor, Kei Wakaizumi, the main purpose for this speech was to challenge the 'nuclear allergy' by directly talking about it.[100] Up until then an open public discussion of nuclear weapons had been 'taboo', as it was simply regarded as an evil force. The question that then arose though was: to what extent has the 'nuclear taboo' been broken or the 'nuclear allergy' been cured? To answer this question, an overview of Japan's anti-nuclearism is provided by discussing the impact of developments in the following periods: 1) 1945-early 1950s; 2) mid-1950s-early 1960s; and 3) early 1960s-to the present.[101]

2.3.3. From 1945 to the early 1950s: the imposition of the 'nuclear taboo' by the GHQ

During the GHQ occupation of Japan (19 September 1945 until 28 April 1952, when the Peace Treaty between the two states came into force) the sovereignty of Japan was overseen by the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, D.C.[102] The Occupation authorities, through the Press Code, imposed a severe censorship on the publication of information related to the atomic bombing written in Japanese. The GHQ was also afraid of anti-US feelings amongst the Japanese population, stemming from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at a time when the reconstruction of Japan's social and political system was taking place in accordance with American provisions.

With the end of the GHQ occupation, the publication of information related to the nuclear attacks started, providing both the nuclear victims *('Hibakusha')* and other Japanese with details on the effects of the bombings. This evoked anti-American sentiment for a short while, although it did not prove detrimental to the establishment of the US-Japanese post-war security relationship. But by the mid-1950s, this anti-Americanism has turned into a more universal abhorrence towards anything connected with 'nuclear weapons'.

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[100] Akihiko Tanaka (1997), *Anzen Hosho*, pp.221-224. See also Glenn Hook (1996), *Militarization and Demilitarization of Contemporary Japan*, (London: Routledge), Chapter 6.

[101] This section partly relied upon the works of Glenn Hook (1996), Chapter 7, pp.169-179, and Makoto Kitanishi (1980), 'Gensuikin Undo no Ryakushi to Mondai ten', *Heiwagaku Kogi*, (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo), pp. 221-234. See also Kazuyo Yamane (1998) 'Current Attitudes to the Atomic Bombings in Japan', in Douglas Holdstock and Frank Barnaby (eds.), *Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Retrospect and Prospect*, (London: Frank Cass), pp.46-54; Juro Ikeyama (1998), 'Nihon ni Okeru Hankaku Heiwa Undo', *Senso to Heiwa,* Vol.7 (Osaka: Osaka Kokusai Heiwa Kenkyusho Kiyo), pp, 38-49; Eiichi Sato and Shuzo Kimura (eds.) (1977), *Kaku Bo Jyoyaku*, (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujyo), pp. 111-117

[102] On the US-Japanese relationship during the Occupation period, see for example, Buckley (1994), pp.4-26.

2.3.4. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s: the beginning of nation-wide anti-nuclear movements

The year 1954 witnessed the great Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons, which was allegedly described by the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in terms of the Japanese having caught a 'nuclear allergy'.[103] The main cause for this was the No.5 *Fukuryumaru* ('Lucky Dragon') incident. A small Japanese fishing boat called *Fukuryumaru* was contaminated with radioactive fallout as a result of a US hydrogen bomb test at Bikini atoll in the Pacific in March 1954, claiming one Japanese crew member's life.[104] The news of this incident provoked a chain reaction of hysteric fear that swept throughout Japan. The catch brought back to Japan by the contaminated *Fukuryumaru* was then released to the market and, although it was later retrieved, the effect of this safety scare over the contamination in the domestic fish supply was enough to cause mass hysteria. A grassroots signature collection campaign, which was organised by a group of ordinary housewives in Tokyo, rapidly spread nation-wide. Within a few short months, millions of Japanese- estimated at between 23 to 40 million (i.e., more than half of the registered voters in Japan) - signed petitions requesting the immediate prohibition of any atomic bomb tests.[105]

Although the Left idealists and the mass media played some role in strengthening the 'nuclear allergy', the initial outcry amongst the Japanese public was genuine and was not associated with any particular political party. Nuclear weapons were viewed as threatening the lives of ordinary Japanese people, ranging from babies to the elderly, and who were without any protection or warning in time of peace and war. These experiences reinforced the 'victim mentality' (*'Higaisha Ishiki'*) among the ordinary Japanese. Combined with anger and fear (towards the absolute destructive power of nuclear weapons), this formed the basis of the Japanese people's anti-nuclearism.

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[103] Seinosuke Hashimoto (1971), *Nihon no Genshiroku: 15 nen no Ayumi*, (Tokyo: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum), p.19.

[104] The rest 22 crewmen also suffered from radiotion symptoms.

[105] Jijimondai Kenkyujo (1961), *Gensuikyo* (Tokyo: Jijimondai Kenkyujo), p.4. 'Gensuikyo' is the left-dominated Japan Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. While Gensuikyo claims 23 million, 40 million is the figure cited in J.A.A. Stockwin (1968*), Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism,* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press), p.88.

In an opinion poll conducted ten days after the incident, a question was asked whether the interviewees support the comment of Foreign Minister Okazaki, who emphasised the importance of Japan's co-operation with the US H-bomb tests in order to defend the security of liberal democracies. Only 11 per cent were in favour of this statement and 55 per cent were against.[106] Another opinion poll done in July 1957 asked, "Do you think every kind of A- and H-bomb test should be prohibited?", 87 per cent of the respondents replied they should be, and only 5 per cent supported the bomb tests.[107]

The goal of the anti-nuclear movement, which was originally focusing on the Bikini incident, rapidly expanded into a more universal one which focused on the banning of all atomic and hydrogen bombs. This led to the first of the annual World Conference Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima in August 1955. This Conference inspired the foundation of the *Gensuikyo* (The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb) in September 1955, an umbrella organisation which united the Japanese peace movements.

The Bikini incident was the beginning of Japan's anti-nuclear movement. Glenn Hook has highlighted the centrality of the issue of radiation in the Bikini incident as a crucial link in the 'nuclear chain': the focus on radiation as a threat turned the nuclear issue in Japan into one that had a more universal nature. Not only the survivors of the two bombings, but other Japanese who were contaminated by fish, also were seen in the context of being nuclear victims. It was thus at this point that nuclear issues, especially concerning the effects of radiation and which had previously been associated with the minority of *'Hibakusha'*, were to take on a broader concern among the Japanese population as a whole.[108]

2.3.5. From the early 1960s to the present: increasing alienation of the public

The ideological differences between the various groups of the anti-nuclear movement, in particular between the Communists and the Socialists, led to a split in the anti-nuclear movement in 1963. This created a new organisation, *'Gensuikin'*, in February 1965. The

[106] *The Asahi Shimbun,* May 10, 1954. A total of 2,498 individuals were asked.
[107] The poll was conducted by the Yoron Kagaku Kyokai (Scientific Public Opinion Association), in July 1957, cited in John Endicott (1975), *Japan's Nuclear Option* (London: Praeger Publishers), p.92.
[108] Hook (1996), pp.171-2

split was induced because the Japanese Communists supported Soviet nuclear testing, opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and regarded the possession of nuclear weapons by Communist states as necessary to maintain world peace. For the communists, the problem was nuclear weapons in the hand of US 'imperialists'. In contrast, the Japanese socialists opposed any country's nuclear weapons and tests, making it clear in public that their opposition to nuclear weapons stemmed from anti-nuclearism, but not anti-Americanism. Although the majority of Japanese supported the inclusiveness of the ban on all nuclear weapons, the split between *'Gensuikyo'* and *'Gensuikin'*, and the politicisation of the anti-nuclear movement, served to alienate ordinary Japanese people.[109] Since then, two separate organisations' (i.e., *Gensuikyo* and *Gensuikin*) have staged annual conferences in Hiroshima every summer. However, as revealed in public opinion polls, despite its 'publicity', Japan's anti-nuclearism has not become such a significant driving force that it has changed drastically the course of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, let alone the world's nuclear direction.[110]

This alienation of the Japanese public has contributed to the decline of Japan's anti-nuclearism since the mid-1960s. By this time, the Japanese public were becoming more used to the fear of living in a world where nuclear weapons existed and the memories of 1945 began to fade. Additionally, China's first nuclear test in October 1964 temporarily alarmed the Japanese public regarding Japan's national security. And finally, the commercialisation of Japan's civil nuclear energy in the latter half of the 1960s also had some impact on Japan's anti-nuclearism. According to Sato and Kimura, the more the civil nuclear programme developed, the less anti-nuclear feelings amongst the Japanese there were: the public started to accept the civil, as opposed to the military uses of nuclear energy, as an important factor for Japan's energy security.[111]

2.3.6. Attitudes towards nuclear weapons: opinion poll findings

The presence and universal nature of the 'anti-nuclearism' among the Japanese is clearly observed in the different attitude between the US and Japan towards nuclear weapons. For example, regarding the pro-nuclear view expressed by members of the US Senate in 1953

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[109] Ikeyama (1998), p. 44

[110] Hiroshi Matsumoto (1980), 'Genten to shite no Hiroshima', *Heiwagaku Kogi* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo), pp. 212-214.

[111] Kimura and Sato (eds.) (1977), pp.114-6.

in favour of the use of nuclear weapons to win the Korean War, 73 per cent of Japanese interviewees opposed the idea.[112] In another opinion poll carried out in 1982, 14 per cent of the American, compared to 58 per cent of the Japanese interviewees agreed to the following question: 'under any circumstances, nuclear weapons should not be used even if nuclear weapons are used in an attack.'[113] The difference stems from the symbolic meanings attached to nuclear weapons by the Japanese. While many Americans acknowledge the positive aspects of nuclear weapons, as they are viewed as having contributed to the ending of Japanese military expansionism in the Pacific in 1945, nuclear weapons evoke negative emotions in the mind of many Japanese. Various opinion polls have shown this unique perception amongst the Japanese, as indicated below.

In an opinion poll conducted by the ***Mainichi Shimbun*** in April 1969, 78 per cent of the interviewees answered that they were afraid of China's nuclear weapons, while 18 per cent answered they were not. In the same poll, 35 per cent expressed a positive view about the effectiveness of the US ED to protect Japan, while 53 per cent regarded the US nuclear umbrella as detrimental to Japan's national security. To the question, 'Do you think Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons?', 46 per cent said 'absolutely no', while 45 per cent answered 'yes' either 'right now', 'in the near future', or 'sometime in the future'.[114]

Interestingly, however, in the same year, June 1969, the ***Yomiuri Shimbun*** conducted a similar opinion poll which found that 16 per cent wanted a nuclearised Japan, while 72 per cent were opposed. In response to the question, 'Apart from your own opinion, do you think Japan would develop its own nuclear weapons within 10 years?', 32 per cent said 'yes', 36 per cent said 'no' (32 per cent answered 'I don't know').[115] Between the results of the ***Mainichi*** (April 1969) and the ***Yomiuri*** (June 1969) polls, a large difference can be observed in the number of the supporters of Japan's nuclearisation (45 and 16 per cent respectively). This is probably because the ***Mainichi*** poll asked one additional question regarding the threat caused by China's nuclear weapons. Being reminded of the existence

[112] Hirohisa Ueno (1983), 'Japanese people's attitude towards Nuclear Weapons', *PSAJ Newsletter*, No.3, (September 1983), p.5, in Glenn Hook (1987), 'Evolution of the Anti-nuclear Discourse in Japan', *Current Research on Peace and Violence,* Vol.10: 1, p.41.
[113] *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 1983
[114] *Maichini Shimbun*, April 1969. 3216 answered out of 4,500 adult (20 years-old plus) who were asked these questions (71 per cent)
[115] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 1969. 2,311 answered out of 3,000 adult (20 years-old plus) who were asked

of China's nuclear weapons to begin with, it is conceivable that the interviewees responded to the same question with increased anxiety.

A similar result to the ***Yomiuri*** poll (June 1969) was observed about 10 years later in an opinion poll by the ***Asahi Shimbun*** (December 1978), when 73 per cent opposed the idea of Japan going nuclear, while 15 per cent supported it.[116] According to one NHK poll in October 1982, 81.5 per cent opposed the idea of Japan's nuclearisation, while 13.6 per cent supported it.[117] More recently, in the January 1995 ***Yomiuri Shimbun*** poll, 79.8 per cent answered that they did not think Japan would acquire its own nuclear weapons in the future, while 13.5 per cent thought they would.[118]

In June 1975, according to the ***Asahi Shimbun*** opinion poll, 41 per cent answered that they were interested in the activities organised by the anti-nuclear groups such as *Gensui kin* and *Gensui kyo*, while 50 per cent said that they were not. 73 per cent have never participated in any of their activities, such as signing a petition or giving a donation, while 26 per cent have done so. In the same poll, 47 per cent opposed the statement that Japan should rely upon the US ED for its national security, while 29 per cent supported it.[119]

Mainichi Shimbun's June 1981 opinion poll asked a similar question concerning the US ED: 34 per cent answered that they thought the US nuclear umbrella was useful for Japan's national security, while 17 per cent said the opposite (48 per cent felt that they were 'unable to answer').[120] Earlier in the same year, the ***Mainichi Shimbun*** included an interview with the former US Ambassador to Japan, E.O. Reischauer. In that interview, Reischauer clarified that 'transit' of nuclear weapons at the Japanese ports did not apply to the third principle of 'not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan'.[121] On the other hand, the successive Japanese governments have regarded this as 'introduction' of nuclear weapons. Following this account, the ***Mainichi Shimbun*** asked whether

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these questions (77 per cent)

[116] *Asahi Shimbun*, December 1978. 2,533 out of 3,000 adult answered (84 per cent).

[117] *NHK Seron Chosasho*, October 1982. 2,623 out of 3,000 Japanese (16 years-old plus) answered the question (72.9 per cent).

[118] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 1995. 1958 out of 3,000 answered (65.3 per cent).

[119] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 1975. 2,625 answered out of 3,000 adult (87.5 per cent).

[120] *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 1981, 2,309 out of 3,000 answered the question (77 per cent).

[121] For a full account of his interview, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 18, 1981; *Asahi Shimbun* (evening edition), May 18, 1981.

'transit' was the same as 'introduction' of nuclear weapons into Japan. In their response, 50 per cent of the sample answered 'yes', 23 per cent 'no', and 27 per cent 'I don't know'. Regarding this point, the ***Mainichi*** asked, 'Then what should Japan do about it?' In response 37 per cent said 'Japan must strictly observe the 3NNP, and make the US accept that 'transit' is also a part of 'introduction' of nuclear weapons'; 21 per cent said 'Japan should relax the 3NNP and allow the 'transit' of the nuclear weapons'; 26 per cent said 'I don't know'.[122]

It is interesting to see while the majority of the Japanese support the US-Japanese Security Treaty under which Japan is protected by the US ED, the Japanese do not support the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. For example, the Prime Minister's Office (*'Sori fu'*) conducted an opinion poll in January 1988, in which 68.8 per cent of the interviewees supported the US-Japanese Security Treaty.[123] In the same year in October, ***Asahi*** asked a question related to rational nuclear deterrence theory (RDT) to which 54 per cent of the interviewees denied the effectiveness of RDT, while 28 per cent supported it (18 per cent did not answer).[124]

These results provide an indication of the Japanese public's assessment of the US ED. As will be argued in later chapters, there is no concrete and written arrangements concerning the US ED towards Japan. In reality, however, the signing of the US-Japanese Security Treaty means that the US would provide its extended deterrence as the ultimate security guarantee towards its military ally, Japan. Theoretically speaking, Japan is under the US ED in political terms, as opposed to military terms. Japan's view on the US ED, whether Japan wants it or not, is an irrelevant question: what matters in the situation of nuclear deterrence is the perception of the potential aggressor towards Japan, the 'deterree', and whether the deterree regards the US ED towards Japan as being credible or not.

While the majority of Japanese support the US-Japanese Security Treaty, for example 70 per cent in 1997[125], their rejection of the US ED, which is an integral component of this bilateral security arrangement, still remains high. This implies an interesting point. The

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[122] *Maicnihi Shimbun,* June 1981, 2,309 out of 3,000 answered (77 per cent).
[123] Prime Minister's Office, January 1988. 2,374 out of 3,000 answered (79 per cent).
[124] *Asahi Shimbun*, October 1988. 2,360 out of 3,000 answered (79 per cent).
[125] Prime Minister's Office, February 1997. 2,114 out of 3,000 answered.

Japanese public does not understand the nature of the US ED towards Japan. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the nature of the US ED towards Japan has been vague and more political than military.

It is natural to assume that the feelings associated with 'anti-nuclearism' must be strongest among those who have lived in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In October 1978, ***Chugoku Shimbun*** (a regional newspaper in the Hiroshima Prefecture) conducted an opinion poll among those living in the area (no equivalent research was undertaken in Nagasaki). To the question, 'It is said that the Japanese have a 'nuclear allergy'. What do you think about this comment?', 39.2 per cent answered, 'It is natural to have a 'nuclear allergy' as a Japanese person because of the association with the nuclear victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki'. Other answers include: 'The 'nuclear allergy' should be highly valued since it has restrained the chaotic development of nuclear weapons (in the world)'(13.1 per cent); 'It is understandable that people have a 'nuclear allergy', yet I do not support their opposition to the peaceful use of nuclear energy' (28 per cent); and 'There is no need to have any 'nuclear allergy' since nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are different' (13.4 per cent).[126] In the same opinion poll, 56.4 per cent answered that they have never participated in anti-nuclear activities, such as singing, meetings, and demonstrations, organised by *Gensuikin*, but they also said they were interested in these activities. However only 8.5 per cent of Hiroshima citizens have participated in these sorts of activities and 26.8 per cent said they were not even interested in them.[127]

In June 1990, NHK conducted an opinion poll in Hiroshima, with a view to surveying the Hiroshima citizen's view on nuclear weapons 45 years after the nuclear attack.[128] As has been pointed out, the slow erosion of the 'anti-nuclearism' started in the mid-1960s, though this feeling is still prevalent amongst the Japanese.[129] This erosion of the 'anti-nuclearism' can be observed in the result of this opinion poll, as noted below. Yet, many Hiroshima citizens are convinced that it is their duty to pass the message of their tragic

[126] *Chugoku Shimbun*, October 1978. 880 answered out of 1,000 (88 per cent).
[127] *Chugoku Shimbun*, October 1978. 880 answered out of 1,000 (88 per cent).
[128] NHK Seron Chosabu (1993), 'Hiroshima Shimin no Kaku Ishiki', *NHK Seron Chosa Shiryoshu*, Vol.6, pp.916-939. 605 out of 900 answered (67.2 per cent). Out of 605, 97 (16 per cent) were the victims of the atomic bomb; 37 (6 per cent) were the second generation of the victims; and 470 (78 per cent) were non-victims.
[129] Sato and Kimura (ed.) (1977), pp.111-117.

nuclear experience to the next generations and to the world.

To the question, 'What did you do on August 6, 1990?', 52 per cent answered that they prayed, 18 per cent actually participated in some peace ceremony or visited tombs and the Hiroshima Memorial Park, and 32 per cent said they 'did nothing related to nuclear issues'. In comparison with the result of the same question asked in 1980, the numbers of those who did not do anything related to the anniversary of the nuclear bombing has increased (from 21 to 32 per cent). This can be observed not only amongst the young generation but also amongst all the generations. This indicates that the slow erosion of the anti-nuclearism has been taking place even amongst the Hiroshima citizens who probably possess the strongest aversion towards nuclear weapons in the world.

On the other hand, however, 91.2 per cent gave a positive answer to the question that the Peace Memorial Ceremony, which takes place on 6 August every year in Hiroshima, should be continued in the future (only 2.3 per cent said 'no'). This high percentage of support regardless of the generation difference remains the same as before.

It is interesting to see the answers to the question, 'What are you interested in most regarding nuclear issues?'. The answers given are as follows: 'the aid for the victims of nuclear weapons' (22.3 per cent); 'the issues related to the second generation of the victims' (14.2 per cent); 'the movements promoting nuclear disarmament and the ban on nuclear tests' (37.4 per cent); 'the Three Non-Nuclear Principles' (9.1 per cent); 'the succession of the experience of the atomic bomb' (10.4 per cent).[130] It can be said that amongst the Hiroshima citizens, the issue of nuclear weapons is not limited to the circumstances surrounding the victims of the atomic bomb. The nuclear issues in the minds of Hiroshima citizens have expanded, and they are now seen from a much wider perspective. Having said that, a clear difference regarding this question can be observed between the victims and the non-victims of the atomic bomb. While the victims point out 'the aid for the victims' as the most important issue (37 per cent) and the issues related to nuclear disarmament as the second (29 per cent), the non-victims regard the latter issue as the most important (40 per cent) and the former issue as the second (20 per cent).[131]

[130] Ibid., p.919.
[131] Ibid.. p.920

The erosion of the anger towards the atomic bombs can be clearly seen in the following answers to the question, 'What do you think about the US's atomic bombing on Hiroshima?': 47.8 per cent answered, 'I cannot forgive that bombing even today', while 45.1 per cent said 'The bombing of Hiroshima was inevitable'. To the same question asked in 1980 (i.e., 10 years before), 67 per cent expressed anger and only 30 per cent considered the bombing to have been inevitable. This change can be observed amongst the victims of the bombing as well. In 1980, 72 per cent of the victims expressed their anger, but the number decreased by 20 points (i.e., 52 per cent) in 1990.[132]

The majority of Hiroshima citizens (85.5 per cent) have constantly supported the importance of ensuring that the lessons of the nuclear experience are not lost. As measures to be taken for that purpose, 'peace education' (*'Heiwa Kyoiku'*)[133] at school is pointed out as the most important means (68.7 per cent). Other suggestions include (multiple choices): Recording the experience in the form of essays and pictures (49.9 per cent); support for the anti-nuclear movements (45.5 per cent); preservation of the Atomic Dome (39.3 per cent); and discussions at home and at work (24.8 per cent).[134]

Finally, as an assessment of the influence of the nuclear experience in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the actual movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was given as follows: 71.2 per cent think that the *'Hibaku'* experience has been influential, while 25.3 per cent did not give a positive answer.[135]

From the results of various opinion polls, the symbolic meaning attached to nuclear weapons by the Japanese people is clearly observable. Nuclear weapons evoke the 'victim' mentality (*'Higaisha Ishiki'*) amongst the Japanese and, at the same time, they also evoke the 'lofty' moral duty that Japan must appeal to the world, emphasising the immorality of nuclear weapons. In light of this, it is worth noting the concept of 'symbolic politics'. Eric Herring argues that politics often involves the manipulation of

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[132] Ibid., p.921
[133] On *'Heiwa Kyoiku'*, see for example, Toshihiko Fujii (1980), 'Heiwa Kyoiku', *Heiwagaku Kogi,* (Tokyo: Keiso shobo), pp.235-251.
[134] Ibid., p.933
[135] Ibid.. p.937

'symbols' to give people what they want. Hence, politics needs to be analysed both conventionally and symbolically. Herring argues that 'symbolic politics' plays a significant role as a means of communication to unite the politicians and the public, yet 'symbolic politics' hardly gives any indication of what the reality is. [136] Herring's analysis on symbols and military issues is enlightening and certainly catches a part of the meanings of symbols. Yet, it is an open question whether 'symbolic politics' and 'conventional politics' can be clearly separated as Herring suggests. In the case of Japan, symbols (e.g., the Japanese public's abhorrence of nuclear weapons) can be influential to the final 'outcomes' of what Herrings calls 'the reality'. Therefore, the following section will demonstrate the significance of the symbolic meanings attached to nuclear weapons in Japan's actual policy-making.

2.4. Conclusion

Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, a summary of the three contending schools of strategic thought on nuclear issues must be made. On one side of the two extremes, the Left idealists regard the US ED towards Japan as inherently detrimental to Japan's security, since Japan might be involved in a military conflict in which the US is engaged due to its close tie with that country (*'Makikomare ron'*). On the other side of the extreme, the Right nationalists view the US ED either as not providing sufficient protection for Japan's national security or as an affront to Japan's national pride. Between these two extremes, the Yoshida Line Pragmatic Centrists have maintained their security policy towards nuclear weapons. The Pragmatic Centrists regard the maintenance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, particularly the US ED towards Japan, as the ultimate security guarantee of Japan's national security. Judging from the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation, both strategically and politically, as well as domestically and externally, the Pragmatic Centrists' security policy towards nuclear weapons (based upon the 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine') has been the only realistic security option for Japan since 1945.

Second, an assessment of whether strategic culture supplants or supplements neo-realism must also be made. Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism' has

[136] Eric Herring (1998), 'Symbols', (Chapter 11), *The Arms Dynamics in World Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

significantly influenced the way Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons has been implemented under successive governments. However, Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons is the policy of the Yoshida Line Pragmatic Centrists, but not the direct reflection of the Left idealists who advocate 'unarmed neutrality' without nuclear weapons. As will be discussed later, the costs of Japan's nuclearisation are considered to be too high, hence it was the Pragmatic Centrists' choice to remain non-nuclear. 'Unarmed neutrality', the sheer expression of Japan's strategic culture in the form of national defence policy, is deemed unrealistic: Japan's geo-strategic importance between the Soviet Union and the US in the context of the Cold War, has been the 'given' in Japan's strategic thinking. This forced Japan to become an ally of the United States during the Cold War. Another material constraint - Japan's lack of natural resources which are of crucial importance as an industrialised state - did not allow Japan to become a militarily assertive state (this would have damaged the stable regional environment which was essential for Japan's national security as a industrialised trading state). Under these material constraints, the Pragmatic Centrists have maintained the security policy towards nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the case of Japan, strategic culture is an important factor but it does not supplant neo-realism. Japan's 'anti-nuclearism' still remains unique to Japanese society, especially when compared with other states (as the opinion polls have suggested). However, as seen in the slow erosion of this 'anti-nuclearism', strategic culture can slowly evolve, adapting itself to the new environment when a contradiction between cultural tendencies and the external environment becomes too great. Yet, a radical change in Japan's strategic culture is unlikely as long as the US-Japanese Security Treaty exists as the ultimate security guarantee for Japan. Since 1945, the US factors in Japan's defence thinking has become an 'inseparable' component, and the Japanese public's increasingly high level of support for the US-Japanese Security Treaty is noteworthy.[137] Since Japan's withdrawal from international military politics in 1945, this Treaty has been the extra 'channel' (or 'layer') between Japan and the external world regarding security issues. Today's Japan is able to deal with power politics only via this Treaty.

Third, the future of the 'anti-nuclearism' amongst the Japanese must be mentioned. Due to the continuation of peace education at schools (*'Heiwa Kyoiku'*) and the annual Peace

[137] In February 1997, an opinion poll done by PM's office (Sori fu), 69.4 per cent of interviewees' support the Treaty, while 15.4 per cent do not and 15.2 per cent failed to provide an answer. PM's office (Sori fu),

Ceremony in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to remember the nuclear tragedy, the young generation will probably maintain anti-nuclearism, though this feeling will not be as strong as the one possessed by the direct victims. As has been argued, the anti-nuclearism amongst the Japanese in all ages has been eroding since the mid-1960s for various reasons, but it is difficult to foresee the complete disappearance of the anti-nuclearism from Japanese society. This has already become a part of Japan's post-war culture, and this has certainly played its role as a 'brake' for Japan's possession of nuclear weapons.

Having said that, as the past 54 years of anti-nuclear peace movements have demonstrated, their direct influence on 'actual' policy-making is limited, despite their 'publicity'. As seen earlier, the Japanese anti-nuclear peace activists have tried to influence both the Japanese government's security policy towards nuclear weapons and that of other states. However, their influence on the nuclear policies of other states was clearly pointed out by the statement of Pakistan's Prime Minister, who argued that Japan would not have been attacked by atomic bombs if Japan had been a nuclear state in 1945.[138] The traditional strategy of Japan's anti-nuclear peace movements has been: 1) a focus upon an emotional appeal from the 'victim' perspectives with the slogan of 'No more Hiroshima'; and 2) advocating a nuclear weapons free world. However, they have not been able to directly influence the actual policy-making, largely because Japan's anti-nuclear movement does not present any alternative policy other than criticising successive governments' security policy towards nuclear weapons as being contradictory. This problem leads to the third conclusion.

The danger of '*Heiwa Boke*' amongst the Japanese is noteworthy. The Japanese people's lack of a 'sense of reality' concerning security issues is a product of the past 54 years of 'protected peace' under the US security guarantee. For more than half a century, Japan has not had to deal with the problems associated with military force in the international system, though of course this policy has served the US's national interests as well. Whenever Japan faces some external threats, the Government adopts a policy that is only calculated for short-term effects until the crisis is over. Japan's '*Heiwa Boke' was* clearly demonstrated by Socialist PM Tomiichi Murayama. Upon his appointment as Japan's PM

'Jieitai Boei Mondai ni Kansuru Seron Chosa', (Febrary 1997).

[138] Pakistani Prime Minister Sheriff, quoted in *Asahi Shimbun,* June 1998.

in June 1994, the JSP suddenly dropped the Party's long-standing tenet of *'Hibuso Churitsu'* ('unarmed neutrality') and accepted the US-Japanese Security Treaty. His sudden policy change indicated that all that had been advocated under the slogan of *'Hibuso Churitsu'* for half a century was merely an 'ideal', which was neither useful nor practical as a real policy option for Japan.

As Yukio Okamoto, a former senior diplomat has pointed out, the Japanese in general have no sense of reality about international politics: they strongly believe that peace will be achieved by merely hoping for it.[139] The danger stemming from this attitude is that, in case of emergency, opinions inside Japan could go either way of the two extremes. Japan will be either: a) unable even to realise the level of external danger Japan faces, hence no concrete security measures will be discussed and during the course of time, the policy-makers as well as the public will forget the danger; or b) respond hysterically to the threat Japan faces and temporarily advocate hard-line counter-measures. Neither of these would produce beneficial long-term effects on Japan's national security. What is needed for Japan is to discuss, in peacetime, realistic and concrete long-term measures to maintain its security policy towards nuclear weapons, instead of temporarily responding to any security threat. Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons must be maintained from the long-term perspectives.

[139] Yukio Okamoto (1998), 'Hitsuyo nano wa Nihon no 'Sebone'', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 11, 1998.

Chapter 3: The Influence of External/ International Factors in the Debate within Japan over its Security Policy towards Nuclear Weapons

3.0. Introduction

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section provides the external influence upon Japan's domestic debate regarding nuclear weapons. It traces all the major agreements over nuclear issues between the US and Japan in the form of the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960, Joint Communiqués, and various official statements from the both governments. This is done so in particular with reference to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. The aim of this section is to highlight the inevitability of the 'grey zone' in Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons stemming from the very nature of the 'Yoshida Doctrine' which has formed the basis of Japan's foreign policy since 1945. The second part discusses Japan's civil nuclear policy. As highlighted in the *Introduction*, Japan's civil nuclear programme has no hidden military link, hence it is difficult to deal with this policy in the context of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. Yet, due to the increasing international concerns over Japan's civil nuclear policy, some clarification of its position within Japan's national security discussion is required.

3.1.The US-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and Japan's Security Policy towards Nuclear Weapons

Contrary to common assumption, Japan's reliance on the US nuclear umbrella is not explicitly written in the bilateral security treaty of 1960, which was originally concluded in 1951. The word 'nuclear attack' or 'nuclear weapons' never appears in the Treaty text. Article Five of the Treaty reads: "Each Party recognises that *an armed attack* against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."[1]

[1] The text of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of

The word "an armed attack" has been generally interpreted as the one including 'nuclear attack'. However, successive Japanese governments have always tried to obtain further assurances from the US, by seeking in particular a more concrete reference to the protection of Japan against nuclear attack. The question is why did the 1960 Security Treaty fail to offer explicit assurances that the US nuclear umbrella did cover Japan?

When the bilateral security treaty was originally concluded along with the Peace Treaty (to legally mark the end of the Second World War and the end of the US's occupation of Japan for seven years) in September 1951, Japan's national security did not seem to be threatened by any imminent nuclear attack. Even in the context of the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons possessed by the Soviet Union ten years later when the Treaty was renewed, the Soviet nuclear threat did not appear to be directly affecting Japan. The US enjoyed a predominance over the Soviet Union during that time, and the possibility of Soviet nuclear attack against Japan seemed relatively low, especially in comparison to the NATO states, which were experiencing the presence of highly hostile forces across the land frontiers of Europe. Therefore, an explicit nuclear guarantee from the US was not requested at the beginning of the bilateral security relationship.

Japan's perception of the nuclear threat (to Japan) drastically changed with China's first nuclear test in October 1964.[2] China was the first developing state to join the exclusive 'nuclear club' and this prompted many Japanese defence analysts to re-think their previous views on Japan's vulnerability to nuclear attack and to the question of explicit assurances from the US. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, in order to reduce the anxiety amongst the Japanese President Johnson and PM Sato issued a joint communiqué in January 1965. Article 8 of the Communiqué reads, "[t]he President reaffirmed the United States' determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside."[3] The word "any armed attack" was regarded by the

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America (concluded in January 1960) can be found in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo (ed.) (1983), *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho/ Nempyo,* Vol.1 (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), p.961. Emphasis added by the author.

[2] Tetsuya Umemoto (1993) argues that until the mid-1970s there was no immediate and direct military attack against Japan. 'Anzen Hosho', *Koza Kokusai Seiji*, vol.4, p.131. Akihiko Tanaka (1997) similarly argues that despite the escalation of the Vietnam war and the PRC's first nuclear test in 1964 (and the following Cultural Revolution), the Japanese government viewed security environment surrounding Japan rather relaxed. *Anzen Hosho*, (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun), pp.219-221

[3] Article 8, the 1965 Johnson-Sato Joint Communiqué, in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyusho (ed.) (1983), p.544.

Japanese as the first explicit statement of the US's obligation to defend Japan both by conventional and nuclear forces.[4] This pledge has been reaffirmed on several occasions through subsequent joint communiqués issued by the two governments such as the ones in November 1967 and November 1969, and the comments by President Nixon and his Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird. On his visit to Japan in September 1970 as President Nixon's Secretary of Defence, Laird confirmed the US's offer in the statement that the US is committed to use 'all types of weapons' for the defence of Japan under the 1960 Security Treaty.[5] Japan's first White Paper on Defence, which was published in 1970, quoted Laird's statement as the confirmation of the US's readiness to "use all types of weapons for the defence of Japan."[6]

After the 1965 Joint communiqué, PM Sato confirmed his statement with the US President by saying that as long as there is a US nuclear deterrent, no country would dare to attack Japan.[7] Therefore, since the mid-1960s, even the slightest change of this government line has always caused political chaos. For example, a senior official of MOFA, Takezo Shimoda's statement of February 1966, that Japan was not under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, caused chaos inside the Ministry. Two days later, Shimoda's statement was replaced by the unified viewpoint of MOFA, which again emphasised the importance of US nuclear deterrence in preventing a total nuclear war. Thus, the conclusion was that Japan, as one of the US's allies, was protected by 'the US nuclear umbrella' in general terms.[8] So even within MOFA, political opinions have not always been unified. The Left idealists within MOFA have regarded the US ED as being either 'detrimental' (such as Motofumi Asai[9]) or 'not necessary' (such as Kumao Kaneko[10]). On the other hand, some MOFA members have been sceptical about the credibility of the US ED.[11]

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[4] Mitsuo Yagisawa (1983), 'Nichibei Ampo Taisei no Kiseki', *Sekai*, No.447, (February 1983), p.122
[5] The statement of Laird was quoted in *Asahi Shimbun*, September 21, 1970.
[6] Quoted in Boei cho (the Defence Agency of Japan), (1970) *Nihon no Boei 1970*, (Japan's Defence White Paper), (Tokyo: the Ministry of Finance Printing Office), pp.52-3. The 1970 Defence White Paper quoted a statement made by then Secretary of Defence Laird in a conversation in Washington with Yasuhiro Nakasone, then Director General of Japan's Defence Agency, on September 14, 1970.
[7] Junnosuke Kishida (1969), *Kyodai Kagaku to Seiji*, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha), p.46
[8] Makoto Kawanago (1989), 'Kaku no kasa to Nihon', *Kokusai Seiji* No. 90 (March 1980), p.107.
[9] Motofumi Asai (1994), *Nihon Gaiko: Hansei to Tenkan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho); (1996), *Hikaku no Nihon, Mukaku no Sekai* (Tokyo: Rodo Kimpo sha).
[10] Kumao Kaneko (1997), *Nihon no Kaku, Ajia no Kaku*, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha)
[11] Daniel Okimoto (1982), 'Chrysanthemum without the Sword: Japan's Nonnuclear Policy', in Martin Weinstein (ed.), *Northeast Asian Security after Vietnam*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), p.135.

The communiqués themselves have also raised some problems, since their wording has not always been clear. As will be analysed also in section 3.2, the 'ambiguity' of the wording of certain official statements and communiqués has been the key tool for the Centrist government's efforts to obtain a workable political compromise. This can clearly be seen in the 'prior consultation system' between the US and Japan.

3.1.1. Prior consultation system

The 'prior consultation system' is contained in the Kishi-Herter note attached to the 1960 Security Treaty. This provided that any "major changes" in the deployment of equipment into Japan would be subject to the 'prior consultation' between the two governments: "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of Unites States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subject of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."[12]

While Japan accepted the presence of US military forces on its soil under the 1960 Treaty, this 'prior consultation system' was considered as the protection of Japan's sovereignty.[13] The principal object of the prior consultation system has been the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, but no attempt has ever been made by the US government to ask for Japan's consent on this issue. Therefore, the standard US position on nuclear issues is neither denial nor admittance: since the US has not asked for prior consultation with Japan to make a "major change" in military equipment, which is understood as nuclear weapons, the US has observed its commitment not to make such a change.

The standard Japanese government attitude on this issue is as follows: Japan believes that the US has observed its commitment not to make a "major change", since the US has never asked for prior consultation with Japan. In addition, if in the future the US requests the re-entry of its nuclear weapons into Okinawa after its reversion (which will be discussed in 3.2.), the Japanese government would say 'no' due to the presence of the

[12] 'Exchange of Notes' attached to the 1960 Security Treaty can be found in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyusho (ed.) (1983), p.963.
[13] Seiichi Hirota (1969), 'Kaku, Okinawa, 70 nen', *Sekai,* (April 1969), pp. 22-32; Eiichi Sato (1981), 'Kaku Mochikomi no Kyojitsu', *Sekai* (September 1981), pp.64-71; Hirosato Asonuma (1983), 'Kaku no

3NNP. This standard Japanese government position is considered 'illogical' even by the former PM Miyazawa, and who was once a Foreign Minister in the 1970s. Miyazawa argues that if Japan's answer is to be 'no' all the time to the US's request for the re-entry of nuclear weapons, the 'prior consultation system' is not as such, but it is 'Japan's veto' against the US, Japan's only military ally.[14] Theoretically speaking, Miyazawa's viewpoint is correct. However, the necessity for the Japanese government to satisfy both the US and the Left idealists (and the sentiment of 'anti-nuclearism') has meant that the 'illogical' aspect of this policy has had to be accepted.

The Left idealists found the terms used in the 'prior consultation system' to be hopelessly ambiguous. Even the term 'prior consultation' can be interpreted as meaning anything from 'prior notification' to detailed discussion and prior consent of the two governments. The choice of the interpretation has seemingly been left in the hands of the US. In the eyes of the Left idealists, therefore, the operational significance of the system is meaningless. But having said that, the Left idealists are unable to advocate the abolition of this system. This would officially open the possibility that Japan would have very little leverage over US' activities in and around its military bases, a situation perceived as being even worse than the existing one. Consequently, the Left idealists' continue to criticise the arrangement while the Japanese Government also repeats its standard explanation on this matter. The 'prior consultation system' between the two states has never been used, and may never be used. This system therefore has little impact on actual military activities, although it does have great symbolic significance in officially maintaining Japan as a nuclear weapons free state.

3.2. The Reversion of Okinawa, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the Four Nuclear Pillars

In the late 1960s, the conclusion of the Okinawa issue was crucial for the Japanese government.[15] The reversion of Okinawa was, without a doubt, one of the biggest events in

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Ronri to Hironri', *Sekai Shuho* (October 18, 1983), pp.24-29; Okimoto (1982), p.136.

[14] Kiichi Miyazawa, in an interview by *the Asahi Shimbun*, January 28, 1996.

[15] The Okinawa islands in the Pacific, the Southern tip of Japan, remained under the US jurisdiction even after the Peace Treaty between the two states was signed in 1951.

the post-war US-Japanese security relationship.[16] It is often said that lost territory in a war cannot be regained on the table. This has been well shown in the case of the Northern territories off Hokkaido, which has been occupied by the former Soviet Union (now by Russia), since the end of the Second World War. Okinawa was seen by the Americans as a prize of the war which broke out due to Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and whose ending came at a great cost on the US side as well: the territory would not easily be returned.[17] Also, from the US's viewpoint, Okinawa was a keystone of its strategy in the Pacific. Without some concrete solution before 1970, when either Japan or the US could give notice of the termination of the 1960 Security Treaty, the Japanese government would have faced serious opposition from the Left idealists who combined the reversion of Okinawa with the termination of the 1960 Treaty.[18]

The issue of the reversion of Okinawa dominated the discussion on Japan's security policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, the majority of the important decisions regarding Japan's national defence was made in the context of the reversion of Okinawa. They were formulated as a result of political compromises between a) LDP Centrist-led Japanese government and the opposition Left idealists, and b) the two governments of Japan and the US.[19] This was because two questions became central regarding the use of US bases in Okinawa after the reversion: first, the application of the US-Japanese Security Treaty to Okinawa; and second, the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. On one hand, the Left idealists demanded the total reversion of Okinawa, including the removal of all US bases and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Centrists government considered the total removal of US bases undesirable for the security of Japan, and they advocated the idea of *'hondo-nami, kaku-nuki'* Okinawa (i.e., Okinawa having the equal status as the rest of Japan without US nuclear weapons). In short, the Centrist government

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[16] Akio Watanabe (1992), 'Okinawa Henkan 20nen Rekishi teki Imi wo Tou', *Gaiko Forum,* No. 47, (August 1992), pp.85-92.
[17] Buckley (1995), p.117
[18] In 1970, the Japanese Government extended the 1960 Treaty 'automatically', i.e., without a debate at the Diet, in order to avoid the repetition of the 1960 Crisis caused by the renewal of the 1951 Security Treaty.
[19] During the late 1960s, the Japanese government did not perceive any imminent and direct external military threats towards Japan despite the escalation of the Vietnam War and China's Nuclear test in October 1964 and the rampage of the Cultural Revolution since the mid-1960s. The absence of perceived direct external threats could be seen in an internal report of MOFA dated in June 1969. The report states that even though the PRC did not pose any immediate and direct threats to Japan at that time, Japan could never be certain that the PRC would never pose military threats towards Japan in the future. The report also states that there was no immediate military threats posed by the USSR due to the successful nuclear balance of fear between the US and the USSR at that time. The report is quoted in Akihiko Tanaka (1997), p.220.

accepted the presence of US bases, but demanded that they should be subject to the restrictions under the 1960 Treaty with a ban on nuclear weapons.[20]

3.2.1. The Four Nuclear Pillars

As noted earlier, the 3NNP were not the result of a detailed deliberation in the Japanese domestic sphere nor of consultations between the US and Japan. Soon after the declaration of the 3NNP in 1967, PM Sato realised the significant security implication of the Principles. PM Sato drastically modified the government's nuclear policy on 30 January 1968, at the 58th regular session of the Lower House, by announcing the Four Pillars of Japan's Non-Nuclear policy. They are: 1) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; 2) reliance upon the US's extended deterrence based upon the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960; 3) efforts towards nuclear disarmament; and 4) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.[21]

According to the founder of the 'Four Pillars', Kei Wakaizumi, who was PM Sato's political advisor, the main purpose of the Four Pillars was to emphasis the fact that the 3NNP could only be maintained along with the three other non-nuclear policies.[22] In other words, the Government clearly announced, only a month after its outline of the 3NNP at the Diet, that the US nuclear guarantee was the prerequisite of the 3NNP.[23] PM Sato's secretary, Minoru Kusuda, and Wakaizumi, who wrote the draft for the 1968's Diet speech, explained the original purpose of PM Sato's speech as follows: PM Sato aimed to challenge the then prevalent 'nuclear taboo' amongst the Japanese by addressing the issue openly at the Diet under the title of 'how to survive in the nuclear era'. However, Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons developed in an unexpected direction despite PM Sato's initial intention.[24] Sato's Diet speech re-ignited the Left Idealists' strong belief in 'anti-nuclearism' once again, further strengthening their claims that the 3NNP should be promoted into a national law.

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[20] Emmerson (1971), p.173.
[21] Kei Wakaizumi (1994), *Tasaku Nakarishi wo Shimzemu to Hossu,* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju) pp. 140-141.
[22] Ibid., pp.140-141.
[23] Akiyoshi Sakuragawa (1985), 'Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko: Hikaku Sangensoku to Kaku Yokushiryoku no Hazama', *Kokusai Seiji*, No.80 (October 1985), p.65; Eiichi Sato (1981), 'Kaku Mochikomi no Kyojitsu', *Sekai*, No.430, p.71
[24] Minoru Kusuda (1975), *Shuseki Hishokan - Sato Sori tono Junen kan*, (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju), pp.167-173; NHK Suzaihan (1996), *NHK Special: Sengo Gojunen Sonotoki Nihon wa,* (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai), Vol.4, pp. 140-5.

The Government's downgrading of the 3NNP can also be seen in its early rejection of the demand from the opposition parties that the 3NNP should be passed as a Diet resolution. The Government's strategy was to incorporate the 3NNP with Japan's dependence of the US nuclear guarantee. The Left were opposed to this and they rejected the idea of making all Four Nuclear Pillars a Diet resolution.[25]

This position was re-confirmed in a report on nuclear policy written and officially announced by the LDP in March 1968, two months after the announcement of the four pillars. Although the report explained the LDP's ideas on Japan's nuclear policy, as long as PM Sato was also the head of the ruling LDP, this report was considered as another confirmation of the Government's policy. Furthermore, this report changed the order of the four pillars, putting the peaceful use of nuclear energy as the first, disarmament policy as the second, and the dependence on the US nuclear umbrella as the third. Following the three policies, the fourth policy was added: 'the LDP supports the three non-nuclear principles under the circumstances where Japan's national security is guaranteed by the other three policies'.[26]

Having said that, the 3NNP were, in the end, incorporated into a Diet resolution on 24 November 1971. The opposition parties were not satisfied with the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of June 1971 between the US and Japan, which dealt with the reduction of US bases in Okinawa. This was because there were still some possibility of the violation of the 'non-introduction' principle. In order to resolve this situation at the Diet, the LDP combined the 3NNP with the Okinawa agreement.[27] Here, the 3NNP were promoted from a mere policy to the status of '*kokuze*', i.e., Japan's 'irrevocable policy', from which even the slightest hint of modification would have serious implications.[28] Since the official 'birth' of the 3NNP in December 1967, the direction of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons had thus evolved in ways not foreseen by PM Sato and his advisors.[29]

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[25] Sakuragawa (1985), pp.65-6.
[26] *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 16, 1968
[27] Endicott (1975), *Japan's Nuclear Option*, (London: Praeger Publishers), p.45. While the LDP and other political parties took part in the vote, the Japanese Socialists Party and the Japanese Communist Party abstained themselves.
[28] Tsuneo Akaha (1984), 'Japan's Nonnuclear Policy', *Asian Survey*, Vol.24, p.853
[29] Tanaka (1997), pp.222-3; Kusuda (1975), pp.167-173

Whilst Sato hoped to break the then prevalent 'nuclear taboo' amongst the Japanese population and the Left Idealists by openly questioning its validity as the basis for a viable national security policy in the nuclear age, his attempt ironically rekindled a strong feeling amongst the Japanese people that they should be seen throughout the world as leading advocates of a nuclear weapons free world.

The 3NNP is one of few Japanese post-war security policies where there is a clear consensus among different political camps and a diverse cross section of the public. Even the Centre-right PM Nakasone, who once refused to recognise 3NNP as '*kokuze*' and merely called it 'an important policy' of the government, later gave in to the 'symbolic power' attached to the 3NNP. Not only the opposition political parties and the Japanese public in general, but also his fellow members within the LDP supported the ascendancy of the 3NNP' to a high profile in Japanese society. The negative reaction to PM Nakasone's statement, which came from the mass media and the public, forced him to publicly correct his views and apologise for his "lack of understanding" of the government's standpoint.[30]

3.2.2. The two and a half principles and the 'prior consultation' system: between the ideal and the reality

As seen, the 3NNP were born as a measure to obtain the support of the opposition parties regarding the Centrists governments' 'ultimate' political goal of the reversion of Okinawa.[31] However, the absence of any detailed examination of the 3NNP and their long-term security implications created political confusion over the third principle of 'non-introduction'.

It is generally assumed that the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil would violate the third principle. However, there has always been an ambiguity regarding the definition of this principle: is this principle applied to US nuclear weapons in transit, such as temporary port calls? Is there any means for verifying that US nuclear ships are not carrying nuclear weapons when they enter Japanese ports? How far could Japan claim its territorial boundaries as a 'nuclear weapons free zone'? For years

[30] *Asahi Shimbun,* February 22, 1983.
[31] Tanaka (1997), p. 221.

opposition party leaders have tried to force PMs and government leaders to clarify these points. LDP members had long tried to side-step providing any clear answers. It was not until 1975, when PM Takeo Miki admitted in the Diet that even the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan's territorial waters and port facilities would constitute a "major change" which required the 'prior consultation' of the two governments under the Kishi-Herter note attached to the 1960 Treaty.[32] In theory, under the restrictions defined by PM Miki, the operation of US vessels of the Seventh Fleet could have been severely limited near Japanese territorial waters.[33]

However, judging from the testimony of US naval officers, such as the 'LaRocque' testimony,[34] and the general logic of naval operations, it became apparent that the movements of US vessels were not affected by the restrictions clarified by PM Miki. It was illogical to assume that nuclear weapons on US vessels were off-loaded in the middle of the Pacific prior to a visit to Japanese port facilities. The lack of means of verification provided both the US and Japanese governments with the best defence against opposition charges on nuclear entry.[35] Since the 3NNP were not law, there is no clear penalty in case of their violation.[36] Being protected by the US ED, Japan could not hinder the operation of the Seventh Fleet which needed Japanese port facilities to continue its mission in the Pacific, which includes the defence of Japan.[37] Under such circumstances, the carefully maintained 'ambiguity'/'grey zone' was necessary for the Japanese government to deflect opposition charges while also maintaining the US's security guarantee. Here again, the inevitable outcome of the Japanese government's 'Yoshida defence Doctrine' can be observed.

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[32] The exchange of notes were attached to the 1960 Treaty, and the Japanese Government claims that the notes have the same force in international law as the treaty itself. As discussed earlier, the provision for 'prior consultation' is the main feature of this notes. See for example, Emmerson (1971), pp.85-87; Sato (1981), p.65; Okimoto (1982), p.137-8.

[33] No.19, a Japanese professor of International Law. Interview with the author. (Geneva, Switzerland, June 1996.)

[34] In September 1974, Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque testified to the US Congress that US ships did not off-load their nuclear weapons before entering Japanese ports. This testimony caused chaos in Japanese Diet. For Japanese media accounts, see *Asahi Shimbun,* October 7, 1974; *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 7, 1974; and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 7, 1974. See also Naoki Tanaka (1982), 'Kaku Jidai no Niho Gaiko no Kijiku', *Hogaku Semina*, Series 18 (1982, This was a special issue on International Politics and Japan's option), p.113.

[35] Sato (1981), pp.69-71; Okimoto (1982), p.138

[36] On 'semi-constitutional norms and the penalty of its violation in Japanese society, see Sun-ki Chai (1997), 'Entrenching the Yoshida Doctrine', *International Organization*, Vol.51:3 (Summer 1997), pp.389-412.

[37] For a summary of several Diet debates on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, see for

According to Daniel Okimoto, some LDP political leaders were concerned about the potential long-term costs of Japan's contradictory 'two track' nuclear policy. If the contradictions remain unresolved in the future, the public's distrust towards the Centrist LDP government could increase, and thus the legitimacy of the 1960 Security Treaty itself could be undermined. PM Kakuei Tanaka was reported to have said that the 3NNP had to be amended to recognise the US's right of transit despite the possible short-term political cost that it might cause.[38] Okimoto argued that it would be interesting to see whether and how this contradiction could be resolved.

However, Okimoto's analysis neglects the fundamental nature of Japan's national security. Since this contradiction has its roots in the very nature of Japan's adoption of the 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine', it will probably remain the same for the foreseeable future, however contradictory it may be. To make Japan's security policy 'coherent', i.e., not contradictory, the Centrist Japanese government had to abandon either one of the two pillars of the 'Yoshida Doctrine': a) the 'anti-militarism' among the Japanese public and their support for the Article 9 of the Constitution; and b) the maintenance of the stable US-Japanese security relationship. However, the political costs of losing either one of the two is too costly: Japan is unable to terminate its close security ties with the US and become a neutral state without drastically building up its military forces, possibly with nuclear weapons, due to its geostrategic position in the Pacific. This in turn would damage the factor of Japan's anti-militarism/ anti-nuclearism that this option tries to maintain. On the other hand, the Japanese government would face hysterical responses from the Left idealists and the majority of the Japanese public if Tokyo abandoned its security policy towards nuclear weapons. Domestically, this would involve mass demonstrations and possibly a drastic decline of the support for the government at elections, which could lead to the change of government. Internationally, the degree of negative responses would vary according to the nature of Japan's nuclear policy. If Japan allowed the US to deploy US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory in case of some crisis in Northeast Asia, the negative responses would stem only from Japan's potential adversaries. However, if Japan

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example, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 7, 1974.

[38] Okimoto (1982), p.139-140. Okimoto's interview with journalists and the LDP politicians in 1974-5. Before launching the political battle to amend the three non-nuclear principles, PM Tanaka was removed from power due to his involvement in financial improprieties.

developed its own independent nuclear weapons, the US would be the first and the most severe critic of this policy. This would also damage the stable US-Japanese security relationship, which Japan wants to maintain whatever the price. In short, if Japan tries to solve the 'contradiction' problem, it would face more severe security problems. Therefore, whether ideal or not, the Japanese government must deal with the dilemma of maintaining contradictory security policies.

While the majority of the LDP members welcomed the Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué of 21 November 1969, calling for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the Left idealists found the wording of the Communiqué intentionally vague (leaving the possibility of the two governments interpreting it in a contradictory way). Paragraph 6 of the 1969 Communiqué promised the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Paragraph 7 affirmed the idea of *'hondo nami'*, that on return Okinawa would have equal status with the rest of Japan. And, of particular importance, paragraph 8 stated *'kaku nuki'*, meaning the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa. This paragraph reads as follows:

> The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, *without prejudice to the position of the United States Governments with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security*, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minster.[39]

The Socialist Party, in particular, demanded a clearer statement from the government on the denial of the re-entry of nuclear weapons into Okinawa in time of emergency in the future. In reply, PM Sato reiterated the government's commitment to the 3NNP, even in time of emergency, with the emphasis on the 'prior consultation system' under the 1960 Treaty. PM Sato emphasised that this provision would apply to Okinawa as well.[40] However, PM Sato's then Foreign Minister, Aichi, was cautious enough to add the statement that "the present Cabinet" would observe the 3NNP, but the fate of these

[39] Kashima Heiwa Kenkyusho (ed.) (1983), Vol.2, p.658. Emphasis added by the author.
[40] Sato (1981), pp.70-71; Emmerson (1971), p.176.

principles would depend on the Japanese attitude towards the security treaty in the future.[41] Therefore, by extending the application of the 3NNP to Okinawa, the Japanese government managed to deal with the opposition from the Left idealists. However, one more question arose: how did the Japanese government obtain the US's acceptance concerning the restriction on their freedom of the use of Okinawa as well as the 'non-nuclear' status of the base at the time of the escalation of the Vietnam War?

Although MOFA, the official diplomatic channel of Japan, categorically denies its existence, some research suggests that PM Sato's political advisor, Kei Wakaizumi, was privately employed by PM Sato as his 'personal representative' to negotiate with then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the status of nuclear weapons in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan. According to Wakaizumi, he himself promised, on behalf of PM Sato, Japan's guarantee relating to the re-entry of US' nuclear weapons into Okinawa in cases of emergency.[42] The truth will remain a mystery,[43] yet judging from the inevitability of the 'grey zone' in Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons stemming from the contradictory nature of the 'Yoshida Defence Doctrine' it is not necessarily a surprising story. The inevitability of this 'grey zone' surrounding Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons can also be observed in the comments of Kissinger. Evaluating the above mentioned Joint Communiqué of November 1969, Kissinger stated:

> In a sense we were arguing about window dressing: a decision of the magnitude of introducing nuclear weapons would not depend on quoting clauses from long-ago communiqué but on the conditions prevailing at the time. Still the reversion would need domestic approval in *both* countries and that was unattainable without some solution to the largely self-imposed dilemma. Alex Johnson and I finally came up with a formula as ingenious as it was empty. The US-Japanese Security Treaty had a provision for prior consultation over emergencies. If we refer to it in the communiqué, both sides would satisfy their requirements.[44]

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[41] *Yomiuri shimbun*, December 5, 1969.
[42] Wakaizumi (1994), pp.382-403; Asahi Shimbun Osaka Honsha 'Kaku' Shuzai Han, (1995), *Kakuheiki Haizetsu heno Michi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha), pp.191-197
[43] Wakaizumi passed away (and so did PM Sato and President Nixon) and Henry Kissinger denies the allegation.
[44] Henry Kissinger (1979), *White House Years*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson & Michael Joseph Ltd.), p.334.

So how have the Japanese evaluated the 3NNP? According to one opinion poll conducted by ***Sankei Shimbun*** in 1975, 67 per cent of the Japanese sample supported the government's 3NNP, as did 77 per cent of those asked by ***Asahi Shimbun*** in the same year.[45] Similarly, in an opinion poll done by ***Asahi Shimbun*** in June 1985, 78 per cent of the interviewees supported Japan's 3NNP, while 10 per cent opposed (12 per cent did not answer). However, 73 per cent of the interviewees thought that the third principle of the 3NNP had not been observed, while only 11 per cent believed it had been (16 per cent unanswered). 72 per cent thought that the Japanese government must refuse the entry of any foreign vessels or air planes with nuclear capability into Japanese territory, while 13 per cent disagreed (15 per cent did not answer).[46]

From the analysis above, the symbolic meaning attached to the 3NNP can be highlighted. As seen earlier, the 3NNP are a confirmation of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, yet without legal binding power. However, the government's declaration of the 3NNP as '*kokuze*' has been regarded as important as Article 9 of the Constitution. Interestingly, as the government's interpretation of Article 9 has changed (i.e., from banning Japan from having any military forces in 1947, then allowing the establishment of small 'police reserve forces' in the 1950s, to the present SDF in the 1990s), that associated with the 3NNP has changed according to the actual political situation, in particular, in relation to the US-Japanese security relationship. Flexible interpretations of the 3NNP, similar to that of Article 9, have been inevitable in order to adjust these principles to the changing context, while also maintaining their 'high profile' as '*kokuze*' in the Japanese society.

Although many Pragmatic Centrists agree that the maintenance of the 3NNP depends upon the US-Japanese Security Treaty, as seen in the government's adoption of the Four Nuclear Pillars, one former Japanese ambassador emphasised that even without the US-Japanese Security Treaty, the 3NNP would have been formed and given a high profile in the Japanese society one way or another.[47]

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[45] Takuya Kubo (1978), 'The Meaning of the US Nuclear Umbrella for Japan', in Franklin Weinstein (ed.), *US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: the next decade* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press), pp.111-2.

[46] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 1985. The 3,000 interviewees (above 20 years old) were selected at ramdam, 2,310 answered (77 per cent).

[47] No.1, a MOFA bureaucrat, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1996)

3.3. Japan's Civil Nuclear Policy

As highlighted in the *Introduction*, it is very difficult to deal with the two separate issues of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons (which is the main focus of this thesis) and its civil nuclear energy programme. However, due to the increasing international suspicion which claims that Japan's civil nuclear policy is a latent nuclear weapons capability, this policy must be discussed in order to clarify its position within Japan's national security discussions.

One of the major reasons for the international speculation concerning Japan's possible nuclearisation has been the pace and level of its nuclear power industry. Japan's nuclear energy industry had become one of the most advanced in the world by the early 1980s and, by the late 1990s, Japan's plutonium and fast breeder reactor (the FBR) programme had become the centre of attention from all over the world due to its strong link with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[48] Japan's reliance on nuclear energy is substantial, with one-third of its total electricity supplied from nuclear power plants. Since the opening of the commercial nuclear Tokai Plant in 1966, 52 nuclear reactors have started operation, and two new reactors are under construction, with construction of four more being discussed. Japan's total installed electricity capacity is now approximately 45 gigawatts (1 gigawatts = 1,000 megawatts), the third largest in the world after the US and France.[49]

The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) was established in 1956 within the Prime Minister's Office, and is responsible for formulating long-term programmes on nuclear energy. The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) is an advisory body to the PM regarding safety of nuclear reactors. Among the governmental ministries and agencies, the

[48] Natural uranium contains about 0.7% uranium 235 and 99.3% of uranium 238. Only uranium 235 can sustain a 'chain reaction' in which the neutrons released by one fission (or one burning) can cause at least one additional fission. Currently, nuclear power reactors tap only about 1% of the fission energy stored in uranium. The plutonium breeder reactor is to make the other 99% of natural uranium available for energy production by converting uranium 238 into plutonium 239 in the reactor core and a uranium 'blanket' around it. The spent fuel and 'blanket' would then be removed and reprocessed, and the separated plutonium recycled back into the reactor core. For further information on technical issues, see for example, Ryukichi Imai (1998), 'Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy: Past and Future', *IIPS Policy Paper*, 215 E (August 1998); Frank von Hippel and Suzanne Jones (1997), 'The Slow Death of the Fast Breeder', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (September / October 1997), pp.48-9.

[49] Genshiryoku Iinkai (Japan Atomic Energy Commission, JAEC), (1998), *Genshiryoku Hakusho* (White Paper on Nuclear Energy), (Tokyo: the Ministry of Finance Printing Office), pp.135-144; p.390.

Science and Technology Agency (STA), the Director General of which is the head of the JAEC, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) have played key roles in planning and implementing Japan's nuclear energy programme. Two national organisations, the Power Reactor and Nuclear fuel Development Corporation (PNC), which renewed its organisation under the new name of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) in October 1998,[50] and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), works closely with commercial utilities.[51]

3.3.1. An overview of the programme[52]

Japan's interest in nuclear power was expressed while still under US occupation after 1945.[53] This was further encouraged by US President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech in 1953, which led to the Japanese Diet's support for the introduction of a nuclear power project in March 1954 (with a supplemental 235 million yen budget.)[54] The basic Atomic Energy Law was enacted in 1955 with its three principles of 'democracy, autonomy and openness' concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy.[55] With this as the basis for Japan's civil nuclear development, and with the assistance of the Atoms for Peace programme grant, Japan's first nuclear reactor, a 10-megawatt research facility, went critical in 1956.

The US-Japan agreement for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was originally signed in 1955, and amended in 1958.[56] Under the 1955 agreement, all the spent nuclear fuel was to be returned to the US, while the 1958 agreement allowed Japan to reprocess spent nuclear

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[50] This is due to the mismanagement of the PNC regarding the 1995 *Monju* incident and the 1997 Tokaimura fire hazard.

[51] For further information on the organisation regarding Japan's civil nuclear programme, see Michael Donnelly (1993), 'Japan's Nuclear Energy Quest', in Gerald Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (NY: M.E. Sharpe), pp.179-201.

[52] The section is heavily drawn from Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye (1995), *International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs*, (Cambridege, MA.: Working Paper from the Centre for international Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), CIS Archive No. 2614, C/95-5. For a short and concise overview of Japan's closing cycle, see for example, 'Nuclear energy and its fuel cycle in Japan: Closing the cycle', *IAEA Bulletin* (March 1993), Vol.35:3, pp.34-7.

[53] See for example, Genshiryoku Janalisto no kai (1981), *Janalisto no Shogen: Genshiryoku 25 nen no Kiseki*, (Tokyo: Denryoku Shinposha), pp.26-32; and Genshiryoku Kaihatsu 10nenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.) (1965), *Genshiryoku Kaihatsu 10nenshi*, (Tokyo: Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi), pp.48-63.

[54] Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kigi (JAIF), (ed.), (1971), *Nihon no Genshiryoku: 15 nen no Ayumi*, (Tokyo: Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi), pp.3-6.

[55] Ryukichi Imai, a former Japanese Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, argues that the 1955 law, not the Constitution, is the legal constraint on Japan's nuclearisation. Ryukichi Imai (1994-b), *Kagaku to Gaiko*, (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho), p.105.

fuel either in Japan or in a third country only with the US's prior consent to the plan. This also incorporated a safeguard requirement, following the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957.

The origin of Japan's plutonium programme can be found in the first 'Long Term Programme for Development and Utilisation of Atomic Energy' (hereafter 'Long Term Programme'), which was issued by the JAEC in 1956. The Programme set the basic goal to reprocess nuclear fuel resources by using domestic technology. It states: "it is our basic policy to conduct reprocessing using domestic technology as much as possible and [this] will be exclusively done by [the] Japan Atomic Fuel Public Corporation...Mainly [for] effective utilization of nuclear fuel resources, [the] breeder reactor is the most appropriate type of reactor for Japan, thus this is our basic goal to develop such type of reactor."[57]

The ideas outlined in 1956 eventually developed into the 1967 Long Term Programme, which set in motion the basic direction of Japan's plutonium policy.[58] The 1967 Programme defines the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle through enrichment and reprocessing as the goal of Japan's nuclear programme. Therefore, the official task was set. Since the 1967 Programme, five Long-Term Programmes have been published almost every five years (in 1972, 1978, 1982, 1987, and 1994), but the basic principles of the plutonium programme remain the same.[59]

The creation of the government-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in 1967 speeded up Japan's FBR development. Japan's first

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[56] See for example, Mitchell Reiss (1988), *Without the Bomb*, (NY: Columbia University Press), pp.110-116.
[57] JAEC (1956), 'Basic Long Term Program for Development and Utilisation of Atomic Energy', September 6, 1956, in Skolnikoff *et al.*, (1995), p.2
[58] Reprocessing is a chemical technique through which spent reactor nuclear fuel is separated. Plutonium is produced when Uranium 238 is irradiated in a nuclear reactor. When separated from spent nuclear fuel through reprocessing, plutonium can be used either for manufacturing nuclear bombs or as reactor fuel. Plutonium is suitable fuel for fast breeder reactors (FBR) which create more plutonium than is fissioned (or 'burned'). It can be used as a fuel for traditional commercial power reactors with some modifications, when mixed with uranium in a 'mixed oxide fuel' (MOX). For a concise technical information regarding plutonium, see for example, William Walker and Frans Berkhout (1992), 'Japan's Plutonium Problem- And Europe's', *Arms Control Today*, (September 1992), pp.3-4; Frank von Hippel and Suzanne Jones (1995), 'The Slow Death of the Fast Breeder', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (September / October 1997), pp.46-51.
[59] JAEC (1967), 'Long Term plan for Development and Use of Atomic Energy', April 13, 1967, in Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.2-3. See also Yasuhiro Kato (1997), 'Genshiryoku Seisaku no Hashira 'Kaku Nenryo Saikuru' wo Do Kochiku suruka' an interview with *Energy*, (June 1997), pp.20-3. Kato is Director

experimental FBR *JOYO* in Ibaraki Prefecture, was started in 1970, and went critical (i.e., achieved a sustained chain reaction) in 1977. The prototype *MONJU* in Fukui Prefecture went critical in 1994 and generated electricity for the first time in August 1995.[60] The next stage was the construction of a demonstration FBR, which is planned to begin shortly after 2000. The commercialisation of the FBR was originally planned by 2030, but this was rescheduled to a later date in the 1994 Long Term Programme. Although Japan continues to commit itself to the FBRs the future prospects are becoming more and more uncertain due to a series of accidents at nuclear plants since the December 1995 *MONJU* accident.[61] These include: the March 1997 fire and explosion at a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Tokai,[62] the April 1997 radioactive leakage at the *FUGEN* plant, and the August 1997 revelations about radioactive leakage over a period of 30 years from waste storage pits at the reprocessing plant in Tokai. The official cover-ups of the accidents have seriously damaged public confidence in the management of Japan's nuclear community.[63]

Japan's closed (reprocessing) nuclear cycle as opposed to once-through cycle (which is applied in the US and other states) has been the centre of international concerns. The use of uranium/ plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in Light Water Reactors (LWR) and the advanced thermal reactor (ATR) has been promoted,[64] as an intermediate step in preparation for the full commercialisation of FBRs. To enhance further use of MOX fuel in LWR, the 'Purusamaru' plan (plutonium thermal use) is being discussed.[65] The ATR project was planned as a preparation for other FBR projects, but in July 1995 it was suspended due to its high cost and the availability of alternatives including the use of

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of Nuclear Energy Division, the Science and Technology Agency.

[60] The development of FBR in Japan is categorised into four states: experimental reactor development, prototype reactor development, demonstration reactor displays, and commercialisation. Eiichi Katahara (1997), 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Fall 1997), Vol.5:1, pp.57-58.

[61] The leakage of two to three tons of non-radioactive liquid sodium coolant in *MONJU* in December 1995 undermined the public confidence, forcing PNC officials to re-think its policy. *MONJU* prototype FBR might cease its operation for two years. *Asahi Shimbun*, December 12, 1995.

[62] Takashi Hirose (1997), 'Tokai mura de 'Kuchubunkai shita Genshiryoku Sangyo'', *Gunshuku Mondai Shiryo*, (June 1997), pp.30-35.

[63] See for example, Yomiuri Shimbun Kagakubu (1996), *Dokyumento Monju Jiko* (Tokyo: Mioshin Shuppan); *Asahi Shimbun*, March 12, 1997 and April 16, 1997; and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 27, 1997.

[64] For a critical view on Japan's effort to increase plutonium consumption as Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) for light water reactors, see for example, Peter Hayes (1993), 'Japan's Plutonium Overhang and Regional Insecurity', *The Peace Research Centre Working Paper*, No.136, (Canberra: Australian National University), pp.5-12.

[65] Hiroshi Hiraizumi (1997), 'Keisuiro no Plutoniumu Riyo', *Energy*, (June 1997), pp.24-27.

MOX in LWR.[66]

Japan's first experimental reprocessing plant was built in Tokai-mura in Ibaraki Prefecture in 1975. This began operation in 1977, and has the capability of producing 450 kg of fissile plutonium per year. The Tokai plant has been reprocessing spent fuel since 1981, but its operation was temporarily suspended after the fire and explosion accident in March 1997. The second reprocessing plant in Rokkasho-mura in Aomori Prefecture, which is a commercial size plant and has been under construction since 1993, will begin its operation around 2001.[67] Due to its limited capacity and the difficulties of finding sites for nuclear facilities, however, Japan has been relying on Britain (British Nuclear Fuel Ltd.) and France (the state-owned COGEMA) for reprocessing.[68] Between 1970 and 1979, 13 shipments were transported from the UK to Japan, with the amount of plutonium ranging from 25 kg to 100 kg. Several shipments in 1984, totalling 253 kg, started to attract public attention. Since then, this attention as well as overseas suspicion has increased. This was particularly the case over the 1992/3 transport of 1.5 tons of plutonium, which was carried out for the first time under the latest 1988 US-Japan Nuclear Agreement. Despite the 1992/3 international controversy regarding the risks of terrorism and safety,[69] Japan's plutonium and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) shipments have continued. For the next 20 years about 30 tons of plutonium shipments are planned.

The Japanese plutonium programme has become the centre of international attention in recent years due to the demise of similar programmes in other states.[70] The US, Sweden, Italy, and Canada have abandoned their civilian plutonium programmes, and Britain and Germany have halted the operation of breeder reactors. While Britain runs a large reprocessing plant, it does not do domestic recycling. France's world largest prototype FBR, Superphoenix, was completed in 1985, but the decision was made to close it down

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[66] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 12, 1995. The construction of the ATR prototype *FUGEN* in Fukui prefecture began in 1970 and it went critical in 1978.

[67] According to the 1994 Long Term Programme, a decision to build a new reprocessing plant will be made in 2010.

[68] Originally reprocessing was carried out on a case-by-case basis with the US's prior approval, but the 1988 US-Japanese agreement granted the US's prior consent for all Japanese civilian nuclear plutonium use during the next 30 years.

[69] For negative international response, see for example Yurika Ayukawa (1992), 'Yuryo no Koe, Uzumaku', *Sekai*, (November 1992), pp.85-90.

[70] von Hippel and Jones (1997), pp.46-51

in February 1998.[71] The possibility of shutdown has also been discussed regarding the two FBRs in the former Soviet Union due to their technical problems.[72] While other states are reconsidering their plutonium programmes more negatively from cost, technology, uranium availability, safety, and environmental reasons, Japan's determination, against today's international trend, to pursue its plutonium programme is attracting further international suspicion.[73] To help explain Japan's 'plutonium puzzle', the driving forces for the programme are analysed below.

3.3.2. Programme Rationale [74]

First and the most commonly argued programme rationale of Japan's plutonium programme is its quest for energy security to ensure a stable and economically viable supplies of energy resources.[75] Japan has little natural resources of its own, and its pursuit of 'energy autonomy' has always given a priority, with the most famous example being its pursuit of oil in the Asia-Pacific region which triggered the Pacific War half a century ago. The defeat of 1945 taught Japan the necessity of securing the supply of energy from a national security perspective, yet without using military force. Today, more than 80 per cent of Japan's primary energy comes from abroad: almost 100 per cent of oil, 94.4 per cent of coal, and 96.0 per cent of natural gas supplies.[76] This over-reliance makes Japan vulnerable to supply interruptions. Japan's perceived energy vulnerability is enhanced by some worrisome claims that the reserves of fossil fuels in the world, such as oil and natural gas, and uranium without the recycling of nuclear fuel programmes, might run out sometime during the next century.[77] As will be discussed in Chapter 3, during the 1977 US-Japan negotiations over the Takai-mura reprocessing plant, one of the main claims Japan made to the US was that it has the right to commercialise an 'indigenous' plutonium cycle because of what Japan had suffered due to its oil dependence during the Second

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[71] JAEC (1998), p.205.
[72] Leonard Spector, Mark McDonough, and Even Medeiros, (1995), *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp.69-70.
[73] A typical example of a Western nuclear physicist's perspective can be found in, for example, Frank Barnaby (1994), 'Nuclear Programmes in Japan and North Korea', in Oxford Research Group, *Current Decision Report*, No.14 (August 1994).
[74] For a concise and short explanation of programme rationale of Japan's plutonium programme, see for example, Toichi Sakata (1992), 'Kagaku Gijyutsucho wa Ko Kangaeru', *Sekai*, (November 1992), pp.80-84.
[75] JAEC (1994), pp.18-9. See also 'Genshiryoku no Shinshiten to Kigakarina Purusamaru Rosen', *Energy*, (July 1997), pp.94-5.
[76] JAEC (1994), p.18. Other industrialised states imports less energy from abroad: the US (16.4 per cent); Germany (52.7 per cent); France (51.7 per cent); and the UK (1.3 per cent).
[77] Ibid., p.10.

World War.[78]

Many have argued that the changing energy equation in the region has far-reaching political and economic dimensions. Kent E. Calder predicts that Japan would have to compete with its Asian neighbours for energy imports if the Asian economic growth continues.[79] Japan's share of oil imports as a result, would be reduced from 77 per cent of total Asian oil imports in 1992 to less than 37 percent by 2010.[80] The increase in these oil imports will increase the dependency of Asia on the politically volatile Middle East. It is estimated that the oil imports of Asia from the Middle East will increase from 70 per cent at the present to 87 per cent by the year 2000.[81] In addition, many have argued that the disputed territorial claims over the oil-rich South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands remain a source for potential conflict.

Under such circumstances, nuclear energy is regarded as a promising substitute for fossil fuel resources in the region.[82] East Asia's share of global installed nuclear capacity at present is 14 per cent, yet it is estimated that between 1992 to 2010, Asia would provide 48 per cent of the entire increase in total nuclear capacity in the world.[83] The increasing reliance on nuclear energy, however, does not have a well-regulated stabilising framework: unlike the case in Europe where the civil use of nuclear energy is regulated under the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).[84] In 1996, for example, Japan relied on nuclear power to supply 34.6 per cent of its total power needs, followed by South Korea's 35.8 per cent and Taiwan's 29.1 per cent. China's dependence on nuclear

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[78] Ryukichi Imai (1994-a), *IAEA Sasatsu to Kaku Kakusan*, (Tokyo: Nikkan Kyogyo Shimbun Sha), pp.110-114.

[79] Kent. E. Calder (1996-a), 'Policy Forum: Energy Futures', *The Washington Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996), pp.91-95. See also Mark J. Valencia (1997), 'Energy and Insecurity in Asia', *Survival*, Vol.39:3 (Autumn 1997), pp.85-106.

[80] Calder (1996-a), pp.92-3

[81] Kent E. Calder (1996-b), *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia*, (NY: William Morrow and Company), p.59

[82] Tasujiro Suzuki (1996), 'Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region (ASIATOM)', paper presented at the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue meeting, (Beijing, January 8-10, 1996); and Nobuo Ishizuka (1995), 'Ajia Taiheiyo Chiiki wo Chushin to shita Genshiryoku Hatsuden no Jyuyo', *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu*, (December 1995), pp.29-31.

[83] The estimation was made by the US Department of Energy. See Calder (1996-a), pp.94-5.

[84] For an argument on the necessity of US-Japanese co-operation on nuclear energy in Asia, including that on the FBR, see Katsuhiko Suetsugu (1997), 'Energy Anzen Hosho Koso- Higashi Ajia no Energy Jyuyo no Zodai wo megutte', *Kokusai Mondai*, No447 (June 1997), pp.46-60.

power is still 1.3 per cent of total power supply, yet it has plans to increase this share.[85] The most concerning development in the region is North Korea's civil nuclear programme. Its research reactor and a reprocessing plant are frozen under the '1994 Agreed Framework' with the US. In return, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) is to provide two 1,000 megawatt LWRs by 2003. Other states in the region have also expressed their interests in nuclear power.[86]

The most commonly argued programme rationale, for Japan's civil nuclear programme, however, continues to generate dispute. One of the most severe critics of Japan's plutonium policy, Jinzaburo Takagi (1992, 1996), argues that plutonium programme does not contribute to Japan's energy security.[87] Takagi, a nuclear scientist himself, points out that due to the long 'reactor doubling time', which is necessary for the initial core plutonium load to be doubled, Japan would not benefit from *MONJU* as energy supply for 40-45 years. Also 'inventory doubling time', the time required for the total initial inventory in the FBR cycle to be doubled, is estimated 80-100 years.[88] The 'doubling time' is much longer than the life span of FBRs even with some alteration of designs, hence FBRs are not promising in the foreseeable future.

Although not as severe as Takagi's criticism, many have questioned the credibility of Japan's pursuit of 'energy autonomy'. Even those who support Japan's FBR programme are sceptical about the possibility of Japan's 'energy autonomy'. Japan without natural resources have no option but to deal with other states. In this context, what is more important for Japan than pursing the impossible goal is to disperse the supplier states as well as the variety of natural resources.[89] Similarly, Skolnikoff, Suzuki and Oye (1995) point out a 'plutonium paradox' the current Japanese programme is facing:

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[85] JAEC (1998), *Genshiryoku Hakusho*, p.138, and pp.167-170.

[86] Although the Asian states cite the economical benefit of nuclear power for electricity generation over fossil fuels, the IAEA gives a clear warning for the prevailing belief. Nuclear electricity will be suitable to those countries without cheap indigenous energy resources with their commitment to pursue a consistent nuclear power programme. However, with the availability of cheap fossil fuel, the competitive margin of nuclear electricity is small. *IAEA Yearbook 1994*, p.12.

[87] Jinzaburo Takagi and Atsuyuki Suzuki (1992), 'Plutoniumu Riyo Keikaku- Ze ka Hi ka', *Sekai,* (January 1992), pp.62-79; Takagi (1996), 'Japan's Plutonium Program: A Critical Review', in Selig S.Harrison (ed.), *Japan's Nuclear Future*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp.69-85.

[88] Takagi (1996), p.82.

[89] No.22, a Japanese professor of nuclear engineering. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December

> ...a massive commitment to plutonium and breeder reactors in commercial programs could paradoxically make Japan increasingly vulnerable to major accidents, terrorism incidents, or policy changes elsewhere over which the nation [Japan] has no control. Although technically speaking plutonium can be considered as "indigenous" energy source, in reality plutonium programs cannot be isolated from external influences.[90]

So, if the most important programme rationale is not fully justifying Japan's pursuit of plutonium and FBR policy, how about other rationales?

The estimated economic viability of nuclear power with reprocessing is considered to be the second important rationale for Japan's plutonium programme. It is officially argued that plutonium reprocessing contributes to long-term price stability in nuclear generated electricity. Atsuyuki Suzuki, for example, argues that the cost difference between the use of uranium and plutonium fuel for nuclear power generation in Japan is less than 10 per cent, and this can be justified as the use of plutonium is more conducive to environmental preservation.[91] Other supporters of the plutonium programme suggest that Japan, an industrial state without natural resources of its own, must take a long-term view, hence the costs of energy today are not relevant.[92]

However, the cost of electricity generated by nuclear power could be higher than that by fossil fuels, and this concern is seen in the request by the Federation of Electric Power Companies to cancel the Demonstration ATR project in July 1995.[93] Furthermore, the two separate studies in 1982 and 1989 suggest that plutonium recycling would be only competitive with once-through cycle in the long-term.[94] Regarding MOX fuel which is used in modified LWRs, it is said to be three to six times more expensive than

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1997.)

[90] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.32. This paradox is also pointed out by Peter Hayes (1993), p.9.

[91] See for example, Atsuyuki Suzuki (1996), pp.54-58 and pp.60-63.

[92] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (ed.)(1995), Chapter 6, 'Plutonium and Nuclear Power in Japan', *The US, Japan and the Future of Nuclear Weapons*, (Washington, D.C.: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p.42.

[93] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 12 and 13, 1995.

[94] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.34. The two reports are: 1) M.Deguchi and S.Kikuchi (1982), 'Kakunenryo Saikuru wo Genmitsuni Hyoka shite miyo', *Genshiryoku Kogyo*, Vol.28 (November 1982), pp.17-30, and 2) K.Nagano and K.Yanagi (1989), 'Nenryou Saikuru Saiteki ka Moderu no Kozo to Saiteki ka no Tokusei', *Denryoku Keizai Kenkyu*, No.26 (1989), pp.73-83.

conventional reactor fuel at present, and a steady uranium supply seems to last for at least another 50-75 years.[95] It is also argued that it will be increasingly difficult for utility companies to launch massive projects, such as plutonium recycling and FBRs, which require large investment.

Furthermore, some even question more fundamental issue. Hitoshi Yoshioka (1995, 1997), for example, is sceptical about the possibility of commercialisation of FBRs.[96] Yoshioka argues that two requirements of 1) technical capability and 2) economical competitiveness must be met before commercialisation. Since FBRs power system has not established yet after years of research commitment, it is not considered practical to even assess its economic benefit for a foreseeable future.

The third official rational for the plutonium programme is its environmental benefits. The JAEC regards the promotion of nuclear energy as a part of its action plan to prevent further green-effects of the earth by decreasing the emission of CO_2, which is produced by the use of fossil fuels.[97] It is also argued that by decreasing the use of natural resources, such as uranium, Japan can ensure conservation and environmental protection on a global scale.[98] More fundamentally, the supporters of Japan's plutonium recycling programme argue that if Japan adopts a 'once-through' cycle which the majority of states with civil nuclear programme adopt today, it faces great difficulties in disposing of the highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power generation due to its small and earthquake-prone land. The supporters argue that the US, the most vigorous advocate of the 'once-

[95] Robert A. Manning (1997), 'PACATOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.20:2, (Spring 1997), pp.221-2; Nihon Bengoshi Rengo kai (1994), *Koritsu suru Nihon no Genshiryoku Seisaku*, (Tokyo: Jikkyo Shuppan), pp.81-2; and F. Berkhout *et al.* (1992), 'Disposition of Separated Plutonium', *Science and Global Security*, Vol.3: 3/4, pp.161-214.

[96] Hitoshi Yoshioka (1995), 'Genshiryoku Hatsuden ni okeru Plutoniumu Zoshoku Rosen no Gorisei ni tsuite', in Sougo Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko (National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA) (1995), *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu*, Vol.8:12 (December 1995), pp.14-17; (1997) 'Kosoku Zoshokuro Kaihatsu no Chushi wo Motomeru Tachibade', *Kosoku Zoshokuro Kenkyu Kaihatsu no Arikata*, an interim report of the JAEC discussion group on FBRs, (unpublished), appendix 1, pp.19-20.

[97] Hiroaki Fukami (1997) 'Chikyu Ondanka Mondai to Genshiryoku', *Kokusai Mondai*, pp.35-57; 'Genshiryoku Izondo Kojyo ha 'Kachiaru Sentaku'', *Energy*, (October 1998), pp.28-30; and 'Chikyu Ondanka Boshi ni taisuru Genshiryoku Hatsuden no Yakuwari to Kitai', *Energy*, (November 1997), pp.37-8.

[98] The 1994 Programme also regards nuclear energy as means to improve the welfare of individuals in global scale, by reducing the environmental damage and providing 'international common assets' (i.e., nuclear energy) to other states. However, a clear perception gap exists between the Japanese official viewpoint and today's international mainstream view on nuclear energy. JAEC (1994), pp.19-20. See also JAEC FBR discussion group (1997), an interim report (unpublished), p.34; and Toshiaki Yashima (1997), 'Gijyutsu Senshinkoku to shite Genshiryoku Suishin wa Kokusaiteki Saimu', interview by *Energy* (November 1997),

through' cycle, is blessed with vast land and many geologically stable zones and can bury nuclear waste in the ground, while Japan is unable to do the same for different geographic reasons.[99]

However, according to Takagi, reprocessing is neither realistic nor desirable in terms of its environmental impact. In order to reduce substantially the amount of undesirable long-lived nuclear wastes, a lengthy process of repeated reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and burning is required. However, new radioactive wastes would arise from this process.[100] The Japan Nuclear Fuel Services (JNFS) plans to dispose of the high level waste by burying it underground after vitrification, but several plans have been halted by the opposition of the local residents.[101] In short, Japan still lacks any credible nuclear waste strategy.[102]

Furthermore, the use of plutonium as an energy source requires a difficult and complicated multi-stage nuclear fuel cycle, which entails potentially hazardous environmental risks.[103] It is often argued that Japan so far has a relatively good safety records in the past regarding the operation of LWRs, and this safety record can be expected in FBRs as well. However, Japan has greatly benefited from the experiences of LWR operation in the US and other predecessors. In contrast, Japan has to develop FBR fuel cycle with little experience of other states. The technical difficulty Japan faces can be observed by the series of delays in the prolonged construction and accidents highlighted by the 1995 *Monju* accident.[104]

Amongst the three rationales Japan officially claims from its long-term perspective, environmental benefits are the most controversial at this stage due to many unanswered questions regarding nuclear waste management. International criticism of the Japanese

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p.18.

[99] Atsuyuki Suzuki (1996), pp.50-51.

[100] Takagi (1996), pp.80-81.

[101] 'A Guide to Spent Fuel Disposal Worldwide', *Spent Fuel Management and Transport*, May 1992, p.5, cited in Hayes (1993), p.9.

[102] 'Akiresuken no Shiyozumi Kakunenryo Chozo', *Energy* (June 1997), pp.18-9.

[103] Takagi (1996), pp.79-80.

[104] In December 1995, two to three tons of non-radioactive liquid sodium coolant leaked from a prototype FBR called *Monju* in Fukui prefecture. This accident itself and the following official cover-ups of the events have seriously damaged public confidence in the safety of Japan's nuclear power plant, and the management of Japan's civil nuclear community. See for example, Yomiuri Shimbun Kkagakubu (1996), *Dokyumento*

plutonium programme derives partially from uncertainty attached to theorised benefits Japan claims without supporting research results.[105]

As the fourth driving force behind Japan's civil nuclear programme, domestic factors have also played a significant role in ensuring Japan's persistence with this programme. This point is poorly understood outside Japan. The unchanging factors include local politics, the structure of nuclear organisation, and industrial interests.[106] First, the economic incentives for the local area surrounding nuclear fuel cycle programme sites, in terms of compensation money from the electric utilities and tax subsidies, have been significant. For example, roughly 20 per cent of total income of the Rokkasho mura village in the FY 1990 came from this compensation money, which was used for the pavement of roads and welfare facilities for the residents.[107] This explains why the local government of Fukui prefecture was resentful of the news concerning the cancellation of the construction of a prototype ATR in one of its villages.[108]

Secondly, the impact of organisational inertia must be noted. The large nuclear organisations make significant policy changes difficult to implement. As mentioned earlier, the JAEC consists of the members of government, academics, and private corporations, and the JAEC's long-term programmes, which have a fundamental influence over all nuclear activities, involve: three key government agencies (the STA, the MOFA, and the MITI); two national research organisations (PNC, now JNC), JAERI; the nuclear suppliers industry; and the electric utilities. The complicated decision-making process inside this large nuclear organisation tends to produce self-serving and conservative results.[109]

Monju Jiko (Tokyo: Mioshin Shuppan).

[105] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.41

[106] Jinzaburo Takagi (1997), 'Nuclear Power is No Future Energy to Asian Countries', a paper presented to the Sustainable Energy Conference (Manila, September 1997), http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/cnic/english/topics/nuke-and-asia.html, pp.1-5

[107] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.42-46. The importance of Rokkasho project must be emphasised. In order to implement the long-term goal of 'closing the nuclear fuel cycle', the Rokkasho project became crucially important for the Japanese government. In 1980, Japanese utilities created 2 companies: one is Japan Nuclear Fuel Service (JNFS) and the other, Japan Nuclear Fuel Industry (JNFI). The former was in charge of reprocessing and vitrified high level waste (HLW) storage, while the latter was responsible for both low level waste (LLW) and the uranium enrichment business. The two merged to be re-born as the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) in 1992. *IAEA Bulletin*, (1993), Vol.35:3, pp.34-7.

[108] *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1995.

[109] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.47-8; and Nihon Bengoshi Rengo kai (1994), pp.83-6. See also George Perkovich (1993), 'The Plutonium Genie', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72:3, (Summer 1993), p.158.

Thirdly, a large nuclear project, such as the one in Rokkasho Mura, involves huge amounts of money and the involvement of a large industrial complex, ranging from electric utilities, banks, and construction companies. The large size of the project, in terms of costs invested by these corporate giants and the commitments of various sections of Japanese society, are likely to guarantee the continuation of Japan's civil nuclear programme.[110]

Japan's persistence with its civil nuclear energy programme, despite international criticism, can be only explained by the combination of the various factors discussed above, whether they are convincing or not when viewed outside Japan. Once the programme was launched, these domestic political factors have kept the programme alive. While all benefits that seemed initially promising from a political and economic perspective 30 years ago have changed, the rationales and main elements of the Japanese plutonium programme remains relatively static.[111] But as the circumstances regarding the gap between a changing international political context and Japan's relatively static nuclear programme becomes wider, international proliferation concerns have also increased.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the influence of external factors, in particular that of the US, upon Japan's domestic debate over its security policy towards nuclear weapons. The US factor has been well 'internalised', setting out a clear constraints upon Japan's national security debate since 1945. This 'internalised' external factor has inevitably forced the Japanese government to adopt a 'contradictory' nuclear policy, as seen in the case of the 'prior consultation system' and the three non-nuclear principles (which is in fact known as 'the two and a half principles'). Despite the fact that there is no clear agreement or clarification of some terms between the two governments on how to deal with external nuclear threats vis-à-vis Japan, the Japanese government has maintained its national security as a non-nuclear weapon state under the US extended deterrence. This has been

[110] Takagi (1997), p.2. See also 'Kosoku Zoshokuro Kaihatsu ni Takakuteki Shiten wo', *Energy*, (January 1998), p.64.
[111] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.42

implemented in striking the balance between the Left idealists' anti-nuclearism and the maintenance of a stable US-Japanese security relationship. The 'ambiguity' of the wording of certain official statements and communiqués, and the creation of the 'grey zone' have been the key tool for the Centrist Yoshida Line government's effort to obtain a workable political compromise. How contradictory it may look viewed outside Japan, Japan's 'dual-track' nuclear policy (of nuclear denial and nuclear approval), has been the most viable option for Japan.

Regarding Japan's civil nuclear programme, it should be clarified that Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism' does not have much relevance since this derives from Japan's determination to secure its energy security. As has been argued, the continuation of Japan's civil nuclear programme is the result of a combination of various factors, ranging from energy, economic, environmental but most of all domestic inertia. These have no relevance to military issues. As will be discussed in later chapters, the Japanese public's criticism of its nuclear energy policy has drastically increased since the December 1995 *Monju* accident. This is due to the public's distrust of the PNC's lack of transparency about the safety of nuclear plants, but not their suspicion about Japan's hidden military weapon programme. The only link between Japan's 'anti-nuclearism' and Japan's civil nuclear energy policy is that the development of the nuclear energy programme since the latter half of the 1960s has become a part of various reasons for the slow erosion of 'anti-nuclearism' amongst the Japanese. Thus, Japan's anti-nuclearism has not deterred the development of its civil nuclear programme, which is regarded as an important part of energy security.

Chapter 4: Japan's Security Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons: The Impact of the Cold War (1947-1989)

4.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the 'Japanese way' of maintaining its security policy towards nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In pursuing this objective, the chapter will highlight how Japan perceived the regional nuclear threats, which emerged during this period and how it responded to them. In light of this, Japan's views on the US ED towards Japan and to Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) generally will be analysed. This chapter will also highlight the geo-strategic importance of Japan in the context of US policy in the Asia-Pacific region throughout the Cold War, although ultimately the position of Japan regarding nuclear-related issues was different to that which existed in Europe between the US and its NATO allies. But, even then, and contrary to the common belief that it was only an 'anti-Communist military alliance', the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 has been of much wider significance in a region that lacks a multilateral security organisation.

The 'Japanese way' of maintaining its security policy towards nuclear weapons is based, in part, on Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-nuclearism' and 'anti-militarism', which has existed since 1945. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, Japan's strategic culture is not the most important component in this context: the overriding factor resides in the nature of the evolving security relationship between Japan and the US, a point often missed in many Western accounts of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. It is thus an irony of history that following the US atomic strike in 1945, Japan has come to be protected under the US nuclear umbrella.

4.1. Japan and the People's Republic of China

4.1.1. The views of Japanese academics

In the late 1960s, the focus of Japanese academics and defence analysts was not on the nuclear arsenal possessed by the Soviet Union, but rather on the nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China (China). In the mid-1960s,

the image of China changed dramatically, while the US and its allies started viewing the Soviet Union in a more positive way than previously. It is noteworthy that during this period Japanese scholars began assuming that the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 had induced a move towards greater nuclear stability in the US-Soviet nuclear relationship. These scholars regarded the establishment of the hot-line between Washington and Moscow in 1963 as a sign of the declining possibility of nuclear war. In contrast, they viewed the impact of China's Cultural Revolution, which started in 1965-66 and China's first nuclear test in October 1964 just before the escalation of the Vietnam War in March 1965, as the cause of the deteriorating relations between China and the US.

Japan, in the mid-1960s, viewed China as a developing state with little technological capability. Hence, China's nuclear detonation created major unease among Japanese policymakers and scholars, generating fears that if China could build the bomb on its own other developing states would soon follow suit.[1] In addition, due to the lack of diplomatic ties between China and Japan, and China and the US, there was a high risk of misunderstanding regarding each other's intentions in the case of an emergency.[2] Within this context, there emerged three main concerns originating from the perceived threat of China's nuclear weapons.

First, amongst a minority of Japanese academics, who feared that the US's 'effective' nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union (which was believed to protect Japan from a Soviet attack), might not work against China's nuclear weapons. Chinese political leaders seemed to have a different notion of rationality from that of American and Soviet leaders.[3] Before China's first nuclear test in October 1964, Mao Tse-Tung belittled the value of nuclear weapons. Mao's famous statement in 1946, which characterised nuclear weapons as the 'paper tiger' that is "outwardly strong, but inwardly feeble",[4] left the outside world with a strong impression: China was controlled by irrational, or non-rational from a

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[1] No.11, a MOFA bureaucrat, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998.)

[2] The whole problem of Japan's relations with the PRC is analysed in detail in Shigeharu Matsumoto (1965), 'Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influences on Japan's Policy', in A.M. Halpern (ed.), *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1965). See also Michio Royama (1967), 'The Asian Balance of Power: A Japanese View', *Adelphi Paper* No.42, (November 1967), pp.6-7.

[3] Atsuhiko Yatabe (1971), *Kakuheiki Fukakusan Jyoyaku ron* (Tokyo: Yushindo), pp. 179-86.

[4] Lawrence Freedman (1989), *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan), pp. 273-282.

Western perspective, leaders who did not share the same rationality required for a stable nuclear deterrence arrangement. Similar views to Mao's were expressed by China's political leaders on various occasions from the late 1950s when the Sino-Soviet political confrontation started.

However, the majority of Japanese specialists on security issues responded that these statements about a 'paper tiger' were part of a strategy orchestrated by China in order to deny the credibility of any attempt at nuclear blackmail by either the US or the Soviet Union, as 'effective' nuclear deterrence is based on the assumption that the deterree shares the same 'rationality' with the deterer.[5]

Second, other Japanese academics were concerned that China might take Japan as a 'nuclear hostage'. This situation, it was thought, might be pursued by the Chinese leadership as a means for deterring any US nuclear blackmail against China in the event of further deterioration in the Sino-US relationship caused by: another crisis on the Korean Peninsula; an aggressive Chinese military operation in the Taiwan Strait; or a result of an unexpected escalation of the Vietnam War.[6] Even before China's possession of an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability that could directly attack the US from China, this anxiety could not be denied due to the geographical closeness between China and Japan.

A so-called 'secret' report (1970) on the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation, written by four academics drafted in by the Japanese government in the late 1960s, analysed the possibility of China's nuclear blackmail in the context of Japan. Michio Royama, one of the members of this group, emphasised that this exercise was not Japan's 'secret' nuclear plan as it is often described outside Japan, but simply an assessment on

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[5] Yonosuke Nagai points out that Chinese leaders' statements about a 'paper tiger' was a well-calculated tactic in order to deny the credibility of the US or the USSR's nuclear blackmail. An effective nuclear deterrence is based upon the assumption that the deteree shares the same 'rationality' with the deterer. See Nagai (1994), *Heiwa no Daisho* (24th edition) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha), p.50. On a general assessment on the assumption of 'rationality' of political leaders, see for example Barry Buzan (1987), *An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (London: Macmillan), pp.204-209.

[6] See for example, Tatsumi Okabe (1968), 'Hatashite Chugoku no Kyoi wa aruka?', *Ushio,* (Spring, 1968), pp.15-21; Katsumaro Makoto (1966), 'Hikaku Chukyu Kokka no Boei Seisaku', *Ushio*, (Spring 1966), pp.118-126. Of course there were opposite opinions amongst academics. See for example, Yatabe (1971); Michio Royama (1968-a) 'Kaku Senryoku no Igi to Nishon no Shorai', *Chuo Koron* (March 1968)

the costs and benefits to Japan of any nuclearisation. However, taking into consideration, (1) the Japanese population's strong 'anti-nuclearism', (2) the prospect of the renewal of the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 (which was to be renewed in 1970), and (3) the Japanese media's hysterical response to the 'taboo' issue at the time when this report was written, the Japanese government did not make this report public.[7] Even when this internal report was leaked to the press twenty-four years later in Autumn 1994, the response of the media, particularly that of the influential newspaper ***Asahi Shimbun***, was significant in fomenting critical opinion. The ***Asahi Shimbun***, traditionally the critic of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government and a strong supporter of the Japan Socialists Party, revealed the story with a front-page article referring to what they called "Japan's secret nuclear plan".[8]

While admitting that the possibility of such blackmail was very small, the 1970 report examined possible outcomes if Japan disregarded China's nuclear blackmail. The crucial question here was: would China attack Japan if Japan disregarded the threat of nuclear blackmail? The report concluded that such a possibility remained very small. This assessment was based on the proposition that the purpose of nuclear blackmail would be different from that of actual attack. The costs associated with a nuclear attack against Japan were deemed too high: China had to calculate the possibilities of nuclear retaliation not only from the US but also from the Soviet Union if the Sino-Soviet political confrontation was not resolved by that time.[9] A nuclear attack on Japan would give the US the best pretext to justify a counter attack.

In order to analyse the effectiveness of its nuclear blackmail against Japan, China had to calculate a complicated triangular psychological interaction among three nuclear weapons states: China as a blackmailer against a non-nuclear Japan; the blackmailer (China) and

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[7] No.14, a Japanese professor on security studies, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1996). The summary of this report, which was leaked to the press in Autumn 1994, can be found in *Asahi Shimbun,* November 13, 1994.

[8] *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 13, 1994.

[9] The Soviet cancellation of supplying a sample atomic bomb for the PRC in 1959 is often regarded as the beginning of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. This confrontation led China to take its 'self-reliance' security policy. See for example, Alvin Goldstein (1993), 'Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China's National Experience', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3 /4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.213-255. If Gorbachev's visit to Beijiing in May 1989 is considered as the end of the confrontation, the Sino-Soviet political confrontation lasted for 30 years, which was longer than the US-China confrontation

Japan's protector (the US); and the blackmailer (China) and its potential nuclear adversary (the Soviet Union). As nuclear deterrence relies heavily upon psychological factors, a straightforward calculation remained unlikely.[10] In addition, China could not completely rule out the possibility of Japan's nuclearisation as a result of its nuclear blackmail. The resurgence of a militarily strong and anti-Chinese Japan was seen to have a negative effect on China's security environment. Therefore, the report concluded that as long as the US' nuclear umbrella towards Japan remained credible, and the Japanese government stood firm against China's nuclear blackmail, China would not achieve its objective. Here the importance of the US ED towards Japan seemed to have played the crucial role.

However, thirdly, there was a question mark by some Japanese academics concerning the credibility of the US's nuclear umbrella towards Japan at a time when China had developed its ICBM capability which meant it could directly attack the US. The 1970 report inferred the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation by analysing the example of France's nuclearisation. After the Soviet Union had acquired ICBM capability, which could directly attack the US, doubt surrounding the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella towards Europe emerged. France, in particular, openly questioned whether the US would act to protect Paris (from a Soviet nuclear attack) at the risk of sacrificing New York.

Many Japanese scholars' and opinion leaders' thoughts in the mid-to-late 1960s and the early 1970s were based upon, what can now be seen as, an unfounded assumption regarding the credibility of the US's nuclear umbrella. Katsumaro Makoto, a military critic, applied the logic of French general Pierre Gallois, to argue that Japan was vulnerable to China's nuclear threat. Makoto argued it was unthinkable that the US would defend Japan against China's nuclear attack in exchange for US cities and people. Even if the US did take that risk, Makoto continued, the US would do so only after Japan had been attacked, thus not helping Japan at all.[11] Although a minority, those who supported a similar opinion to this argued that Japan should deploy Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defence systems in order to protect Japan without provoking China.

(1949-1972).

[10] No.14, a Japanese professor on security studies; and No.24, a MOFA bureaucrat. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 and January 1998, respectively.)

The then member of the Japanese Upper House, Shintaro Ishihara, advocated one of the most critical arguments.[12] Ishihara defined the US nuclear umbrella as a 'broken umbrella' which covered only the US and Canada, and that Japan would consequently suffer from 'nuclear rain' as the US's nuclear umbrella had a hole above Japanese territory. Therefore, he concluded that Japan had to develop its own Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVed) nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable submarines to deter any external nuclear threat.

Others argued that Japan had to abandon the US nuclear umbrella so that Japan would not become involved in the event of a Sino-US military conflict: China might attack the US bases on the Japanese soil in such circumstances. Thus, Japan would be safer if it abandoned the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 and sought security in neutrality. As already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this kind of argument is called '*makikomare ron*', the basis for which is a claim that despite Japan's hesitation, Japan would become engaged in a military conflict involving the US in the Asia-Pacific region due to Japan's close security tie with the US. The power of '*makikomare ron*' gained increasing credence following the outbreak of the Vietnam War. One of the most interesting arguments was the one made by Tatsumi Okabe, a distinguished China specialist. According to Okabe, the principal goal of China's nuclear build-up was to regain control of Taiwan. China would launch aggressive military operations in the Taiwan Strait once it achieved credible second-strike nuclear capabilities and would thus also confront the US. Therefore, Japan should abandon the US-Japanese Security Treaty and become neutral before this crisis occurred.[13]

These arguments indicate that the concept of nuclear deterrence was not always uniformly understood in Japan, as some viewed it in terms of purely technical capabilities while others also included a psychological element. For example, as Masataka Kosaka defined

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[11] Makoto (1966), p.120

[12] Shintaro Ishihara (1970), 'Hikaku no Shinwa wa Kieta', *Shokun*, (October 1970), pp.65-83. On the opposite opinions to Ishihara's, see for example, Osamu Kaihara (1970), 'Hikau wa Shinwa dewa nai', *Shokun*, (December 1970), pp.52-78. See also Kaihara's other works, such as (1972) *Nihon retto Shubitai ron*, (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun), pp.318-330, and (1996) *Chi ni ite Ran wo wasurezu* , (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun), pp.133-141.

[13] Okabe (1968), p.18.

it, both technical capabilities and psychological factors are included: "When A wants to deter action by B, it is vital how B predicts A will act under various circumstances. In a situation of mutual deterrence, this process also occurs for B; and there is no clear theoretical solution to this problem of the mutual assessment of actions by two adversaries."[14]

Similarly, the concept of 'extended deterrence' can be seen to have embraced no fixed single definition. As Terumasa Nakanishi states: "[i]t is given shape by perceptions of both US and allied military capabilities and political determination. Its existence can be inferred but not verified."[15] However, some writers have pointed to the requirements of what would constitute an effective 'extended deterrence' arrangement. It usually requires three factors: 1) a nuclear state A, the provider of its 'nuclear umbrella' to its allies, has to possess effective nuclear capabilities; 2) A possesses the intention to use its nuclear weapons to protect its allies; and 3) the adversary of A recognises A's commitment to the first and second factors.[16] Although the word 'nuclear umbrella' is used interchangeably, 'extended deterrence' is not a defensive shield such as that associated with ABM defensive systems.

Many Japanese military analysts argued that the key to determining China's nuclear behaviour lay in the mind of the Chinese policymakers. It was felt that China would only attack Japan if its leadership were convinced that the US would not retaliate under any circumstances. It was therefore argued that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, therefore, should be analysed in light of the 'uncertainties' in the minds of both sets of policymakers, the deterer and the deteree. Judging from this logic, whether Japan believed the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella or not did affect China's calculation when it came to blackmailing Japan. Consequently, Japanese military analysts concluded that Japan could do little but rely on the US nuclear umbrella regardless of whether it was

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[14] Kosaka (1986), p.128.

[15] Terumasa Nakanishi, (1987), 'US Nuclear Policy and Japan', *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 1987), p.81

[16] Boei Gakkai (ed.) (1980), *Kokubo Yogo Jiten* (Tokyo: Asagumo shimbun), p.239. Similarly, Scott Sagan (1994) points out three major requirements for a stable nuclear deterrence: 1) no possibility of preventive war; 2) secure second strike capability; and 3) no possibility of unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan (1994), 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organisation Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', *International Security*, Vol. 18: 4, (Spring 1994), p.69

credible or not.

It becomes clear at this point that the majority of Japanese military analysts in the late 1960s believed in the effectiveness of Rational Deterrence Theory. As analysed in Chapter 1, Rational Deterrence Theory assumes a particular logic: that if the deterree (the potential aggressor) is not 100 per cent certain that its enemy (the deterer) is unable to retaliate after its first nuclear attack, then this 'high' cost will deter the potential aggressor. Such 'uncertainties' in the mind of the deterree will stop it from launching any aggression towards its enemies if the possible costs are considered 'unacceptably high'.[17] Rational Deterrence Theory thus served as a useful theory to guide Japanese defence specialists in their approach towards China's nuclear posture. It is also worth observing that this was mainly because, at this time, there had been few diplomatic contacts between China and Japan. This meant that Japanese analysts, knowing very little about the Chinese domestic context, could do little more than to place it in a 'black box' and see China as a monolithic state entity.

Royama argued that it was possible to envisage a mutual deterrence arrangement emerging among the US, the Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: due to the increased 'uncertainties' regarding each other's nuclear intentions, mutual deterrence amongst the three would increase the level of stability, as all three would have to behave 'very carefully'. Under such circumstances, Royama concluded that Japan would be subject to a lessening of external military threats, which in turn would serve to both increase the level of its political freedom and enhance its status as one of the major powers in the world but without having to build up massive military capabilities.[18] This analysis thus provides an interesting illustration of Japan's defence thinking in the context of a changing regional security environment and of how a state came to the conclusion that it could increase its status without resort to the instruments traditionally associated with attaining great power.

Another feature of the 1970 report was its assessment of the problems relating to Japan's nuclearisation in comparison with the French experience of the early 1960s. In particular, the following issue was discussed: if France developed independent nuclear weapons

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[17] Buzan (1987), pp.167-172.
[18] Royama (1968-a), p.65.

because it doubted the credibility of the US ED, then Japan might follow France's example as a state which was also under the 'unreliable' protection of the US's nuclear umbrella. The report considered the primary reason for France's nuclearisation as political: De Gaulle's France wanted to regain great power status inside Europe and boost the French morale, which had been tarnished by the experiences of the Second World War and the process of decolonisation. Ultimately, however, France's 'independent' nuclear capability was deemed to be only a small umbrella which still resided under the protection of a bigger US umbrella, and France failed to regain its great power status. Therefore, the report asked the following question: what would happen if Japan followed the same path?

The 1970 report pointed out several differences between France and Japan regarding their respective security environments. First, while the Soviet Union was the only nuclear threat to France, Japan was facing two hostile nuclear states, the Soviet Union and China. According to Hisahiko Okazaki, a former Japanese ambassador as well as a military analyst, the possibility of nuclear exchange was lower in the Asian theatre than in the European theatre during the Cold War. Although small, China's nuclear capabilities simply added an extra 'uncertainty' factor to the strategic calculations in the minds of policymakers in Washington and Moscow.[19] Second, there was a clear confrontation between the two multinational security organisations in Europe, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organisation (WPO), while in Asia there was no such security organisation. Although mutual nuclear deterrence between the two blocs seems to have worked in the European theatre, as there was no military conflict in Europe, the existence of US nuclear deterrent forces did not prevent the outbreak of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Third, the US-French relationship was different from the US-Japanese one in terms of historical, cultural, and racial links. Although French independent nuclear weapons created political friction between the two states, the US never considered them as a military challenge. Japan's nuclearisation, however, would pose a military threat not only to China, but also to the Soviet Union, other regional states, and above all, the US. As mentioned in the Introduction, there was already speculation inside the US government concerning Japan's nuclearisation as early as the 1950s. The outcome would thus have been deterioration in the security environment of the entire region.

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[19] Hisahiko Okazaki (1995), *Senryaku teki Shiko towa Nanika?* (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 18th edition), p.208.

The report also pointed out Japan's vulnerability to any nuclear attack no matter from whence it came. In 1968, Japan's population density was 3.6 times higher than that of China, and about 50 per cent of the whole Japanese population lived in 12 cities, which covered an area of about 19 per cent of the total Japanese territory. Other studies in the early 1970s suggested that 400 nuclear weapons would be sufficient to kill half or the entire Japanese population. On the other hand, even with damage inflicted on 1,000 cities by nuclear weapons in China it was estimated that somewhere in the region of 11 per cent of China's entire population would be killed.[20] As a result of these factors, the 1970 report concluded that the cost for Japan's nuclearisation would be too high.

4.1.2. The Japanese Government's response

While Japanese scholars were paying much attention to China's first nuclear test, the Japanese Government's reaction to this was quite muted. Governmental statements were more cautious than those of the US, Australia and the Soviet Union.[21] After the test, the Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement of regret, but not condemnation. At the same time, however, the Japanese Government clearly stated that, "Japan's peace and security will be in no way affected so long as the Japan-United States Security Treaty continues to exist".[22] The Japanese government sought further assurances from the US in addition to the Security Treaty of 1960. Article 5 of the Treaty obliges the US to come to the aid of Japan's defence, but the wording is not as committed as that under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty which provides a clear expression of the obligations of NATO members under the collective principle of self-defence.[23] Rather, Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty reads: "Each party recognises that an armed attack against either Party in the territories

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[20] Yatabe (1971), p.189

[21] John Welfield (1970), *Japan and Nuclear China*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No.9, (Canberra: Australian National University Press), p.3

[22] *Sankei Shimbun,* October 17, 1964. (evening edition).

[23] Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows: "[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area....". For a full text of the Treaty, see Appendix VIII, *NATO Handbook* (1995) (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press).

under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."[24]

In this context, as seen earlier in 3-1 Prime Minister Sato obtained further security commitments from US President Johnson in Article 8 of their Joint Communiqué issued at the Washington summit of January 1965: "The President reaffirmed the United States' determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside."[25] The words "any armed attack" is generally considered by the Japanese government as the first explicit statement of the US's obligation to defend Japan both by conventional and nuclear forces. The second and third Joint Communiqué of the two governments, which were issued in November 1967 and in November 1969, respectively, reaffirmed the intention of both governments to strengthen the alliance.[26]

The US's policy of nuclear retaliation for a conventional attack on Japan was expressed in 1970 by President Nixon: "[T]he nuclear capability of our strategic theatre nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies."[27] Nixon's Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird, further showed the US position of 'coupling' Japan's conventional defence with US strategic nuclear weapons: "[o]ur theatre nuclear forces add to the deterrence of theatre conventional wars in Europe and Asia; potential opponents cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the use of nuclear weapons. The threat of escalation to strategic nuclear war remains a part of successful deterrence at this level."[28]

From the end of the Second World War, the Japanese government was clearly aware of the importance of an early Sino-Japanese rapprochement - although initially in exchange

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[24] Article 5, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Jpan and the United States of America, can be found in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo (ed.) (1983), *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho/ Nempyo*, Vol.1, (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), p.961.

[25] Article 8, the 1965 Johnson-Sato Joint Communiqué, in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo (ed.) (1994) *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho/ Nempyo* ,Vol.4, (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), p.125.

[26] Welfield, (1970), pp.4-5

[27] President Richard Nixon (1970), *Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: US Governmental Printing Office, US GPO), quoted in James R.Van de Velde (1988), 'Japan's Nuclear Umbrella: US Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Japan', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,* Vol.7:1, (Winter 1988), p.18

[28] Statement of Secretary of Defence Melvin R. Laird before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the

for the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 in which Japan regained its post-war independence, the Japanese government had to accept the US's request of not recognising the government of the People's Republic of China. Eventual rapprochement was considered essential not only for the security of Japan but also for the peace of Asia.[29] Thus, it seems that the government did not want to emphasise the 'Chinese threat', fearing it might harden China's posture.[30] This cautious attitude can be seen in the statement of Sato's then new Defence Agency Director, Yasuhiro Nakasone. In April 1970, at the Lower House Budget Committee, Nakasone stated: "Even if China does develop nuclear missiles, we do not consider that she intends to invade Japan. Japan does not, therefore, feel any actual threat."[31] The Japanese government seemed convinced that adherence to the Security Treaty of 1960 would be the best option. This was especially so in light of the increased understanding between the US and Japan, as witnessed in the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972: a year often described as 'the culmination of a friendly relationship'.[32]

From the above analysis, it seems that despite the anxieties expressed by certain academics, China's first nuclear explosion was not regarded, at least officially, as a new military threat by the Japanese government.[33] This was because it was not only a period in which the US deployed robust conventional forces in Asia and enjoyed nuclear predominance in the world, it was also a time of increasing US-Japanese understanding.

4.1.3. Japanese responses to the re-emergence of the 'Soviet threat'

While China's nuclear threat occupied the thoughts of many Japanese academics during

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FY 1973 defence budget and FY 1973-77 Programme, (February 15, 1972), p.79, quoted in Ibid., p.18.

[29] See for example, Fuji Kamiya (1995) *Sengoshi no naka no Nichibei Kankei,* (Tokyo: Shincho sha), Chapter 5. See also Michael Yahuda (1996) *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995,* (London: Routledge) Chapter 7.

[30] Even in the 1990s, China seems to have a very rigid viewpoint of the concept of balance of power. Japanese scholars often describe this as 'the 19th century mentality'. See for example, Yoshihide Soeya (1996), 'The Japan-US Alliance in a Changing Asia', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, (Fall 1996), Vol.10:4, pp.270-271; and Tatsumi Okabe (1996), 'Chugoku Gaiko no Kotenteki Seikaku', *Gaiko Forum,* No.88 (January 1996), pp.37-45.

[31] *Yomiuri Shimbun,* April 24, 1970. (evening edition)

[32] Makoto Iokibe (1993), 'Kokusai Kankyo to Nihon no Sentaku', *Koza Kokusai Seiji,* Vol.4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press), p.35

[33] A similar view is expressed by scholars such as Akihiko Tanaka (1997) and Tetsuya Umemoto (1993), Takana (1997), *Anzen Hosho*, (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun), pp.219-221. Umemoto (1993), 'Anzen Hosho', *Koza Kokusai Seiji: Nihon no Gaiko,* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press), Vol.4, p.131.

the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan's security focus had shifted to the Soviet Union by the 1980s. The period from 1978 to 1980 marked a crucial turning point. During 1978-9, Sino-Japanese relationships drastically improved, due to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and the abrogation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship and alliance which regarded Japan as a common enemy. In addition, China fully supported the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 in the face of Soviet 'hegemonism' in the context of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. During the same period, the Soviet Union steadily built up its military forces in the Far East, particularly on the 'Japanese' islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan off Hokkaido, which Japan considered had been 'illegally' occupied by Moscow since the end of the Second World War. Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 reinforced Japanese anxiety about the Soviet military threat.[34]

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union always regarded Japan as the key to the US's strategy in the Asia-Pacific region because of US military bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa.[35] With the reduction of the US commitment after Vietnam throughout Asia in general, and the Soviet military build-up in the Soviet Far East in the late 1970s, the credibility of the US ED seemed shaken. However, unlike some NATO allies, Japan did not embark on an open questioning of the US nuclear umbrella.

Therefore, several questions arise. What kind of security arrangements existed between the US and Japan during the Cold War? Why did Japan not invite the deployment of US nuclear weapons as a visible token of the US ED as some NATO allies did? Why did Japan adopt the three non-nuclear principles as its national policy at the height of the Cold War when Japan could not completely rule out the possibility of a nuclear threat from its neighbours? How did Japan perceive the security environment in the Asia-Pacific? Why did Japan rely solely, in practical terms, on the US 'non-deployed' extended deterrence?

To answer these questions, the following section will analyse why and how the nature of the US nuclear umbrella towards Japan was quite different from that exhibited in the

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[34] Hiroshi Kimura (1986), 'The Soviet Military Buildup: its impact on Japan and its aims', in Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka (eds.), *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup*, (Dover, Massachusetts: Arburn House Publishing Company), Chapter 6, pp.108-9.

[35] 75 per cent of US bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, which accounts for only 1 per cent of the whole of Japanese territory and population. Okinawa is situated within 800 kilometres from Shanghai, and

context of NATO. The difference was clearly shown in events surrounding: (1) the deployment of Soviet SS-20s mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 1977 (with MIRVed warheads and a range of 5,000 miles, they were able to reach every corner of Japan); and (2) Japan's response to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme in the mid-1980s.

4.2. The Asian theatre and US extended deterrence

While the US ED towards NATO was explicitly signalled by the visible 'coupling' of Europe and the US, which included the deployment of nuclear weapons onto the territory of some NATO allies, the US ED towards Japan has remained verbal and less visible. This difference derives from several different characteristics of the European and Asian-Pacific theatres.[36]

First, as discussed earlier, China's nuclear weapons formed an independent third nuclear centre of nuclear decision-making.[37] Second, while the European theatre was clearly divided into the two blocs of NATO verses the Warsaw Pact, there was no clear division in the Asia-Pacific region. Under US leadership, some efforts were undertaken to create anti-Communist regional security organisations, such as the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance (ANZUS) Treaty and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). But for countries like South Korea and Taiwan, the real 'threat' to their national security stemmed mainly from the continuing implications of their own civil wars, rather than from the Soviet Union. US tactical nuclear weapons were once deployed onto South Korea, but they were to deter a North Korea attack rather than one emanating from the Soviet Union. The Communist bloc in Asia was much more fragmented than its European counterpart. The Sino-Soviet split resulted in several border clashes, and there was military conflict between China and Vietnam, and North Korea has always been a

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many Asian capitals, such as Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, and Manila, exist within a radius of 1,600 kilometres.

[36] No.10, a JDA bureaucrat, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997). The best theoretical analysis on US extended deterrence (ED) to Japan, from a Japanese viewpoint can be found in the works of Shinichi Ogawa. Ogawa (1989), 'Kaku no Kasa no Riron teki Kento', *Kokusai Seiji*, No. 90, (March 1989), pp.83-95; (1992), 'US Nuclear Forces and Japanese/ Western Pacific Security', in Patric Garrity and Steven Maaranen (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and North America*, (Plenium Press) , pp. 147-151; (1996), *'Kaku' Gunbi Kanri Gunshuku no Yukue* (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo).

rather isolated state. Thus, without a single common external military threat, it was impossible for the US to develop a well structured nuclear strategy in the Asia-Pacific based upon different levels of escalation.[38]

Third, while the European theatre was land-based, the theatre surrounding Japan was maritime-based. While the European theatre was quite symmetrical in terms of geo-strategy, the Asian theatre was asymmetrical. In Europe, within a 2,000-kilometre radius from the division line of the two blocs, one finds Paris, London, Warsaw and Moscow. While in the Asian theatre, within 2,000 kilometres from the Soviet border, there are Beijing and Tokyo, but also thousands of square kilometres of Siberian forests. NATO's European allies regarded nuclear weapons as a necessary counterbalance for the conventional force superiority of the Warsaw Pact.[39] West Germany, in particular, was facing Soviet land-based forces. To deter Soviet conventional attack, NATO had to maintain the policy of the 'first use' of tactical nuclear weapons. Under such circumstances, the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles drastically increased the level of threat towards NATO's European allies.

In the Asian theatre surrounding Japan, however, the need for the use of US tactical or theatre nuclear weapons was hardly discussed, although the US often has repeated its 'verbal' nuclear commitment to the defence of Japan. The joint Communiqué of 1975 between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki reaffirmed the US's posture: "[T]he United States would continue to abide by its defence commitment to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security in the event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional forces."[40] In response, the Japanese government, at least officially, seemed assured with the US's 'verbal' nuclear guarantee. For example, the first Japanese National Defence Program Outline of 1976 (NDPO) simply stated, "[a]gainst the nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the

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[37] Okazaki (1995), pp.206-9.

[38] This point was emphasised by No.18, a Japanese professor on security studies; and No.4, a Japanese bureaucrat. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1996). This point was also mentioned by No.31, a US Delegate to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Interview by the author. (Geneva, Switzerland, June, 1996.)

[39] John Roper and Yukio Satoh (1986), 'European and Japanese Public Debate over INF Modernisation: Lessons for the future of Western Security Cooperation', in Solomon and Kosaka (1986), p.265. See also Van de Velde (1988), p.26.

United States."[41]

Much of the reasoning behind this emanated from the fact that, until the mid-1970s, there was no perception of a conventional forces imbalance, and due to the geographical asymmetry between the Soviet Far East and Japan, the necessity for the US's 'first use' of nuclear weapons was little discussed. This geo-strategical difference in the Asian theatre therefore required different military measures to counter the Soviet threat. Purely from the strategic point of view, deployment of nuclear weapons inside Japan remained unnecessary. In addition to strategic calculations, the Japanese government had to take into consideration certain domestic factors, such as Japan's anti-nuclearism. Due to the geo-strategic position of Japan, which is different from that of the Cold War's 'main' theatre in Europe, the importance of nuclear weapons in a military role was lower.

4.2.1. The 'Japanese way' and *'makikomare ron'* [42]

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were increasing, Japan's main security concern concentrated on the Soviet military build-up in the Far East and the subsequent possibility of an interruption of its essential sources of energy and raw materials. The Soviet military build-up in the region was assessed as follows: Soviet ground forces increased from less than 20 divisions in 1965 to 53 by 1985; about 300 combat aircraft in 1965 were 2,200 by 1985; the Soviet Pacific fleet, once negligible in size, became the largest of the four Soviet fleets; from 1977, SS-20 missiles and Backfire nuclear-capable bombers were deployed in the Far East; and finally, also deployed were short and medium range nuclear missiles, which were believed to be more usable than older strategic weapons.[43] Moscow's intention was believed to be to exploit Japanese concern about this sophisticated mobile nuclear missile (i.e. SS-20), in order to manipulate Japan's attitude between Washington and Moscow.[44] Moscow also deployed

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[40] Quoted in Roper and Satoh (1986), p.265.

[41] Boei cho (the Defence Agency of Japan) (1986), *Nihon no Boei 1986,* (Japan's Defence White Paper 1986), p.257.

[42] *'Makikomare ron'* means Japan's fear of being involved in a military conflict due to its close tie with the US.

[43] For further information on nuclear forces in the Far East, see Appendix, in Solomon and Kosaka (eds.), (1986).

[44] Kimura (1986), pp.108-9.

ground troops into three of the four Japanese islands situated off Hokkaido.[45] This came at a time when US troops were withdrawing from Vietnam (due to military defeat) and then from Thailand, as well as a plan to bring about a phased withdrawal of troops from South Korea. Not surprisingly, this aroused Japan's doubt about the durability of the US presence in the region.[46] A Defence White Paper published in July 1977 stated that "[T]he expanding military potential of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of American ground forces from the Republic of Korea demand close attention. Particularly, Soviet naval expansion is affecting the West's control of the sea off the Russian coasts...The United States and the other nations of the West are beginning to take necessary countermeasures."[47]

However, despite this wording, the White Paper did not specify what the 'necessary countermeasures' were. Instead, it regarded the continuing Sino-Soviet border conflict as an important factor for the military stability of the area surrounding Japan. The 1977 White Paper's conclusion was similar to the previous years: 'Japan must firmly maintain the US-Japan security system in addition to making adequate domestic defence efforts.'[48]

As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a strong public abhorrence in Japan towards any kind of nuclear weapons. This also included US nuclear weapons whose role, if deployed, was to counter Soviet SS-20s for the protection of Japan. Due to its historical experience of 1945 and the emergence of the 'victim' mentality in the society, it is common for the majority of Japanese not to see any 'virtue' in nuclear weapons, such as the possibility of

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[45] Akaha (1984), pp.863-4. For the Japanese Defense Agency's description of the Soviet threat, see Boei cho (1982), *Nihon no Boei 1982*, pp.7-14 and 30-35. The territorial question is the most difficult issue between Japan and the USSR (now Russia), and has been the obstacle to the signing of a peace treaty between them since the end of the WWII. The territorial question was born out of the Yalta agreement (signed in February 1945) which formalised Moscow's entry into war against Japan after Germany's surrender in exchange for Moscow's territorial rewards off Hokkaido. The Yalta agreement stated merely that "the Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union", without a precise definition of the territory. After the invasion of the northern part of Japan in August 1945, which was made despite the neutrality pact of 1941 between the USSR and Japan, the Soviets captured four islands right off the coast of northern Hokkaido. They are Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are known as the southern Kuriles, and Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. The islands are not only at a close proximity (Habomai is less than five miles from Hokkaido, and Kunashiri, only twenty miles) but also large enough for staging military operations. For further details, see for example, John Emmerson (1971), *Arms, Yen and Power: THE Japanese Dilemma* (NY: Dunellen Publishers), pp.230-237.

[46] Japan's anxiety was lessened by President Carter's freeze on the withdrawal plans of US ground forces from South Korea.

[47] Boei cho (1977), *Nihon no Boei,* (Defence White Paper), p.113.

war prevention stemming from nuclear deterrence. In combination with the 'anti-nuclearism' and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the public sentiment has stood firmly behind the opinion that any deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil should be resisted.

John Roper and Yukio Sato have argued that the Japanese perceptions regarding the military threat posed by Soviet SS-20s were different from those held by the Europeans. What Japan was really concerned about was an overall rapid Soviet military build-up of both nuclear and conventional forces in the region, and the military balance shift from one where the US had superiority in nuclear forces to one where there was close to nuclear parity in Asia. With so many Soviet nuclear systems already in the region, the additional Soviet SS-20s did not seem to make a fundamental difference to an already dangerous situation.[49] A similar opinion can be found in the works of Naotoshi Sakonjo.[50] Sakonjo argued that what counted in the context of the global US-Soviet confrontation was the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, since strategic weapons could attack the mainland of both states. Even before the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s in 1977, Japan had already been under the threat of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, newly deployed SS-20s would not increase the Soviet threats towards Japan. Therefore, Sakonjo concluded, there was no need for Japan to feel threatened from the new Soviet nuclear deployment.

After all, Japan continued to rely on its strategy of 1) trusting the US security commitment and 2) strengthening the US-Japanese conventional defence co-operation, as its contribution to the enhancement of the credibility of the US's extended deterrence. At the same time, Japan made sure that these measures did not violate Japan's 'anti-nuclearism'. Such an approach has been deemed the 'Japanese Way'.[51] Terumasa Nakanishi points out a link between the US's 'verbal' nuclear commitment towards Japan and Japan's confirmation of its renunciation of its own nuclear option. Nakanishi argues that Japan's

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Roper and Sato (1986), p.264.

[50] Naotoshi Sakonjo (1989), 'Soren kara mita Ajia Taiheiyo Jyosei to Nihon no Boeiryoku', *Kokubo,* (April 1989), p.10. See also his arguments in *Sankei Shimbun,* March 15, 1983, and 'Tomahoku to Ajia no Kaku Balansu', *Defense Information,* (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun), (November 1984), pp.20-21.

[51] Nakanishi (1987), p.82

ratification of the NPT explains this link. By signing the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, Japan's trust in the US's extended deterrence as its ultimate defence was given to the US. In exchange, the US confirmed that Japan is a beneficiary of the US's extended deterrence, which will be analysed in detail in a later section.

The Japanese government, partly as a response to pressure from the US government, sought a bigger defensive role within the framework of the US-Japanese security relationship.[52] Japan's Maritime Self-Defence Forces (SDF) participated, for the first time, in joint exercises with navies from the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1980. The announcement of this exercise was made in 1979 in the face of questions by the opposition parties about the legality of participating in multi-national military exercises in relation to the Japanese Constitution which prevents Japan from joining a 'collective self-defence' exercise. The defence capability of Japan was built up and maintained for the primary purpose of preparing for attacks on Japan's territory by hostile forces, and at the same time, with a view to securing the safety of maritime traffic of vital importance to Japan. Japan's mission was to defend itself strictly upon the basis of the right of self-defence (*'senshu boei'*).

Thus, the decision in 1979 can be regarded as a further indication of Japan's readiness to assume a more active role in defence issues. Also, in 1981 Japan launched its 1,000 nautical miles sea-lane defence.[53] These measures were often criticised both by Japanese opposition parties to the LDP government and other Asian states as evidence of a Japanese resurgence of militarism. However, it was felt that such measures were necessary if Japan wanted to maintain a stable US-Japanese security relationship.[54] They were also considered as a minimum requirement for Japan in order that it should not become the 'power vacuum' in the region, which would result in an unstable regional

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[52] On Japan's defence efforts within the framework of the US-Japanese security relationship, see for example, Umemoto (1993), pp.127-154. See also Kimura (1986), pp.109-114.

[53] The US, under Defence Secretary Weinberger, pressed Japan to take steps to increase spending on military defence, including the defence of the 1,000 nautical-mile zone off the coast of Japan. Before 1981, Japan was defending a 200-mile exclusive economic zone under the Law of the Sea Convention. This expansion decision was taken in order to contribute to regional defence, as well as to the vulnerability of Japan's own trade routes on which it so desperately depends. See for example, Chapman, Drifte, and Gow (1983), pp.33-4 and pp.201-202.

[54] On the necessity of strengthening the bi-lateral security ties for the sake of Japan's national defence, see for example, Masashi Nishihara (1983/ 84), 'Expanding Japan's Credible Defense Role', *International*

security environment.[55]

This new trend was further strengthened by a series of defence measures taken by Prime Minister Nakasone who went on to define Japan as 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier' in the Pacific.[56] Nakasone's new scheme included the agreement to deploy American F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa air base in northern Japan beginning in 1985, and the transfer of Japan's defence-related technology to the US.[57] This latter decision was a significant reversal of Japan's decades-old principle of restricting the export of weapons-related technology. Contrary to many criticism from the opposition parties as well as other Asian states, what Nakasone wanted to emphasise was Japan's high level of trust in the US: such transfers to the US, a state with which Japan had a security arrangement, was not considered contradictory to Japan's 'self-imposed' principles on the ban on the export of weapons. Also, the defence measures taken by PM Nakasone remained within the framework of the traditional US-Japanese security relationship.[58]

Within the Asian theatre, the US had large numbers of air and sea-based systems. For example, there were Tomahawk (nuclear-capable) cruise missiles based on US warships. They were considered to provide a sufficient deterrence for the maritime character of the Asia-Pacific, while at the same time not directly challenging Japan's 3NNP (as the explicit violation of these Principles would probably cause severe domestic political turmoil inside Japan, and might damage the entire US-Japanese security relationship). Even PM Nakasone, who has been described as the most militaristic prime minister of

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Security, (Winter 1983/84), Vol.8: 3, pp. 194-205.

55 This factor is repeated in the new (second) National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) of 1995. In November 1995, the Japanese government renewed its first NDPO of 1976 in order to adjust Japan's defence policy in the post-Cold War era.

56 On Moscow's responses to Nakasone's statement and its verbal assaults towards Tokyo, see Akaha (1984), pp.863-871.

57 Japan maintains a policy of including under the licensing system the export of arms to a) communist countries, b) countries under UN resolution arms embargo, and c) countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. These restrictions were tightened in 1976 due to the passage of a new Diet resolution. The new arms embargo policy states that 1) arms exports to the above three categories are banned; 2) the export of arms to other categories should also be refrained from; and 3) the same restrictions shall apply to the export of plants for the production of arms. However, the Nakasone government made an exception to this policy in 1983. Nakasone officially agreed to provide advanced Japanese technology to the US, though the idea of the transfer of Japanese defence-related technology to the US was originally suggested by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki. This move was welcomed by the US as a positive sign reaffirming a stable US- Japanese security alliance. Hisahiko Okazaki (1986), *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defence* (NY: University Press of America), p.82.

Japan since 1945, could not risk his own political career by violating Japanese people's strong 'anti-nuclearism'.[59]

PM Nakasone's strategy to counter the Soviet threat to Japan is thus characterised by the following two factors: 1), Nakasone made efforts to strengthen the US-Japanese ties both militarily and politically; and 2), at the same time, however, he was careful not to violate the Japanese people's 'anti-militarism'. This political calculation also underpinned Nakasone's diplomatic efforts to establish the close '*Ron-Yasu*' (US President Ronald Reagan and PM Yasuhiro Nakasone) relationship, which became manifest in the eyes of not only the US and Japanese public but also the Soviet leadership. For the latter, Japan was viewed as an important member of the 'West', with Nakasone once describing the US-Japanese relationship as one where two states share an 'inseparable destiny'. For many, this was the best strategy that Japan could have adopted during the Cold War, and PM Nakasone knew that the future security of Japan lie in the continual cementing of the US-Japan bi-lateral relationship.

However, this approach is not without its critics. Some have argued that it has led to the exclusion of Japan from the US's nuclear planning, which in turn has meant that Japan has been less critical of the US' nuclear guarantee. For example, this policy was perceived as too passive in the eyes of some nationalistic opinion leaders, such as Ikutaro Shimizu.[60] Shimizu deplored the weak stance of Japan as a sovereign state vis-à-vis the US, and advocated Japan's own independent nuclear capabilities. But the view of Shimizu remains in a minority in Japanese society.[61]

In contrast, in Europe, extended deterrence took a rather different form. NATO's Nuclear

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[58] No.25, a Japanese professor of security studies, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998).

[59] Yasuhiro Nakasone has been known as a proponent of strong defence for Japan. For example, a Japanese *Who's Who* (1964-5) described him as the "most radical advocate of rearmament and the man who advocated the so-called 'Atom Pile Budget'." *The Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who, 1964-65*, (3rd edition), (Tokyo: The Rengo Press), p.1014, quoted in Emmerson (1971), p.339.

[60] Ikutaro Shimizu (1980), *Nippon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju). Shimizu was one of the student leaders of anti-US propaganda at the time of the renewal of US-Japanese Security Treaty in 1960.

[61] Since 1945, there have hardly been any Japanese nationalists in a 'traditional sense' who argue for much stronger Japanese military forces to defend Japan. Yoshihide Soeya (1997), ' Nichi Bei Chu Kankei no Kozo to Nihon no Gaiko Senryaku', *Gaiko Forum* (special issue on China), (May 1997), pp.36-49

Planning Group,[62] called for the deployment of land-based nuclear weapons in order to counter Soviet SS-20s stationed in Eastern Europe, and which were viewed as an attempt to 'decouple' Europe from the US's extended deterrence. Air-launched Cruise missiles were not considered visible enough to provide the connection needed for 'coupling'.[63] In sum, Europe became a land-based nuclear theatre and, in the context of NATO, this was believed to increase the credibility of the US's extended deterrence to Western Europe.

The 'Japanese way' of dealing with the new strategic situation was not without its own problems, however. The rapid Soviet military build-up in the Far East from the late-1970s posed a dilemma for Japan: on one hand, Japan would have to seek closer ties with the US to counter the Soviet threat (which the Japanese government did); while, on the other hand, the Japanese government had to also deal with the advocates of '*makikomare ron*'. Significantly, this latter grouping included a broad based opinion, ranging from the main opposition party, the Japanese Socialist Party, to the majority of ordinary Japanese citizens, who claimed that too close a security relationship with the US would invite a Soviet attack on Japan.

As Japan further intensified its defence ties with the US, the full implications of this policy were felt. For example, during the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations in Geneva[64] in 1983, then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov stated Moscow's intention of transferring its INFs from Europe to the Far East in response to Japan's agreement to the deployment of US F-16s at Misawa.[65] The Soviet government, via *Pravda,* launched a series of verbal assaults on Japan, which started with Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement in 1983 explicitly pointing out that there was a "large US nuclear base in Okinawa."[66] The annual report 'Disarmament and National Security' of 1987,

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[62] The High Level Group (HLG) was set up by the Nuclear Planning Group in the autumn of 1977. The HLG began its work with the purpose of assessing the role of theatre nuclear forces in NATO strategy, the implications of Soviet SS-20s, and the technical and political implications of alternative NATO theatre postures. For further information, see Roper and Satoh (1986), p.257.

[63] Van de Velde, (1988), p.29.

[64] While the INF Treaty of December 1987, which promised the withdrawal of all INF's, had a direct impact on NATO states, its influence hardly existed in the Asia-Pacific. Because there was no ground-based US INF in the Pacific, to begin with, there would be hardly any change in the US's nuclear system in the region. Kawanago (1989), p.109.

[65] *Asahi Shimbun*, January 18, 1983

[66] *Yomiuri Shimbun,* April 3, 1983. Of course, both Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe categorically denied the Soviet accusation of a nuclear-Okinawa.

published by the Soviet Academy of International Economy and International Relations (*IMEMO*), expressed Soviet official views on the threats in the Asia-Pacific. According to this report, Japan made itself an important target for Soviet retaliation due to its role as the keystone of the US's anti-Soviet strategy.[67] Throughout the Cold War, Moscow strongly suspected that US nuclear weapons were being introduced into Okinawa. The upshot was that as long as the US-Japanese security relationship remained the cornerstone of Japan's defence, there was little prospect that Japan would be free from verbal threats emanating from the Soviet Union.[68] At the same time, however, the Soviet government assured Japan that as long as Japan observed its 3NNP, it would be prepared to sign an agreement with Japan denying the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Japan.[69] This 'two-track' policy has thus been interpreted as an attempt by Moscow to drive a wedge between Japan and the US.

The US's sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), which were deployed in the western Pacific from 1984, posed more salient problems. SLCMs are capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons. Due to this nature, SLCMs can be seen to have both positive and negative security effects. On the one hand, SLCMs are suitable for developing a second-strike capability. Although accurate, cruise missiles do not fly fast enough to be used for the purpose of a pre-emptive attack. Thus, the deployment of SLCMs on US submarines in the Pacific was viewed as a means for increasing the credibility of US nuclear deterrence.[70]

On the other hand, however, the deployment of nuclear-capable SLCMs could have had the following negative effects. First, because it was difficult for Moscow to tell whether SLCMs carried nuclear or conventional weapons, their deployment might provoke Moscow into a pre-emptive attack on SLCMs. Second, there was the possibility of communication problems between submarines and the US National Command Authority

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[67] Naotoshi Sakonjo (1989), 'Soren kara mita Ajia Taiheiyo Jyosei to Nihon no Boeiryoku', *Kokubo* (April, 1989), p.16

[68] No.17, a former Japanese Ambassador, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1996).

[69] *Asahi Shimbun,* April 12, 1983.

[70] Frank C. Carllucci (a former US Secretary of Defence), (1988), *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1989,* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), p.243, cited in Ogawa (1989), foot note 10. See also James P. Rubin (1986) 'US and Soviet SLCM Program', *Arms Control Today,* Vol.16:3, (April 1986), p.4; and Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello (1987), *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1987), p.256.

(NCA).[71] There was also a risk that SLCMs might be launched by the decision of leaders of a submarine without having the approval from the NCA.

Some Japanese defence analysts also pointed out the possibility that the US might wage a limited nuclear war in the Pacific.[72] The argument ran along the following lines: because the US had to prevent a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the US needed a 'fire-break' in the Pacific as a brake on any escalation to the strategic level. Such a scenario can be gleaned in the statement of US Commodore Roger F. Becon when he said that US sea-based systems in the Pacific region gave, "an increase in the range of escalation control options available to the nation [the US] without resort to the central strategic system."[73] US theatre missiles deployed in the Pacific were not linked to the US strategic deterrent in the same way as NATO's 'coupling' arrangements. Thus, if the US considered the role of SLCMs deployed in the western Pacific as a 'fire-break', the deployment of SLCMs would drastically reduce the level of Japan's national security.

Having said that, however, the majority of Japanese defence analysts and academics did not believe in the possibility of a limited nuclear war in the Pacific. While there was a theoretical possibility of limiting any nuclear exchange, in practice the possibility was considered remote: the use of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons could be strictly limited and once the first nuclear attack was launched there would be no guarantee that the war would not escalate beyond that level.

4.2.2. The SDI and Japan's response

Different attitudes between NATO and Japan towards US ED can also be observed in the

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[71] On communication problem, see the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, (1983), *Living with nuclear weapons,* (N.Y.:Bantam Books), p.174; and Desmond Ball (1985/6), 'Nuclear War at Sea', *International Security*, Vol.10:3, (Winter 1985/6), pp.18-21. On the difficulty / dangers of nuclear deterrence, see for exmaple, Scott Sagan (1993), *The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); (1994), 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organizaion Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear weapons', *International Security* (Spring 1994), Vol 18: 4 pp.66-107; See also Peter Feaver (1992/ 3), 'Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations', *International Security* (Winter 1992/ 93), Vol.17: 3, pp.160-187.

[72] Ogawa (1989), pp.96-7. On the similar fear of a limited nuclear war amongst NATO's European allies, see for example, Kosaka (1986), p.125.

[73] The statement of US Commodor Roger F.Becon, director, Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Warfare Division, office of the Chief of Naval operations. The statement was made before the Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Subcommittee, the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 13, 1984), quoted in Nakanishi (1987), p.87.

debates on the US SDI programme. The Japanese government decided to join in the SDI research in September 1986.[74] Three reasons were given for this involvement: 1) the SDI was understood as a high-tech non-nuclear defence system which had the long-term objective of the disarmament of nuclear weapons (hence, the SDI system did not contradict the standpoint of Japan as a 'peace nation'); 2) the SDI was viewed as enhancing the deterrence capability of the entire Western bloc (and so by joining the US-led SDI system Japan would also increase the level of the US-Japanese co-operation and thereby strengthening the US-Japanese security system); and 3) since the research on the SDI involved large-scale and various technological developments, Japan would be able to increase the level of its own technological infrastructure.[75]

Japan's response to the SDI was thus similar to that of the INF. In the 1980s, Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons was to make Japan be seen, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, as an important US allies. Although Japan took a cautious approach to the SDI at the beginning, this changed when Western European states joined the research. What was important in this context for Japan was the consideration that Japan did not want to be left out from the Western bloc, but it is noteworthy that co-operation occurred mostly in the diplomatic area. This was clearly seen in the fact that no defence policy changed following Japan's participation in the US-led SDI research programme. Although the outline for the research was talked about at the governmental level, it was Japanese private companies that were actually involved in the research.[76]

The SDI development experience consequently highlights an important difference between the NATO members and Japan. Strategically, the impact of the SDI on Japan was not as significant as it was for the NATO states. What NATO European states were concerned about was the credibility of nuclear deterrence. For the NATO states,

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[74] It was PM Nakasone in January 1985 who positively responded President Reagan's request on Japan's support for the US's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme. Nakasone posited the SDI as one of the US's efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This statement invited a huge attention on the programme both from the opposition parties and mass media. The opposition parties, in particular the JSP, were critical about the SDI which they regarded as the first step towards arms race in the space.

[75] The official statement by Prime Minister's Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's decision to join the research on the SDI system, made on September 9, 1986, in Yu Takaoka (1987), 'SDI wa Nihon wo Hasan saseru', *Sekai*, (January 1987), pp.173-4.

[76] This was partly because the US was interested in Japan's civilian technology on the SDI research. For further information on WESTPAC and TMD, Yoshihisa Komori (1993), 'Chiiki Misairu Boei: Reisengo no

successful SDI development would ultimately mean a possible revolution in nuclear deterrence thinking.[77] On the other hand, the strategic importance of SDI for Japan was limited. First, this was because, as discussed, the nature of the US ED towards Japan was rather vague in comparison with the coupling arrangements in NATO. And second, while NATO's nuclear weapons states, the UK and France, were concerned about the strategic value of their own nuclear weapons if a defensive shield of the kind envisaged in the SDI programme was introduced, these anxieties did not exist in Japan because it did not possess nuclear weapons.[78]

So, while the US and its European allies focused on the impact the SDI as a shield against nuclear attacks would have on the credibility of nuclear deterrence, Japan focused on the nature of the SDI and on relationship between the SDI and the 3NNP. The first question at the Diet deliberation was on the nature of the SDI: that is, on whether the SDI was a non-nuclear weapons defence system or not. One of the possible SDI research projects was on X-ray laser, and whether or not X-ray lasers should be considered as a part of nuclear weapons.[79] To obtain the nation-wide support for this new programme, the SDI had to pass Japan's self-imposed 'non-nuclear' test. It was not only the opposition parties but also then ruling party of the LDP members who opposed Japan's involvement in the developments of nuclear weapon systems. The fact that the nature of the SDI programme mattered more to Japan than any of its strategic and technological aspects shows Japan's abhorrence towards nuclear weapons.[80]

The second focal point at the Diet debate was on the relationship between the SDI and the 1969 Diet resolution on 'the Peaceful Use of Outer Space', which restricts Japan's use and

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Nichibei Ampo Kyoryoku no Kirifuda', *Chuo Koron,* (July, 1993), pp.102-111.

[77] See for example, Sir Geoffrey Howe (1985), 'Kakujidai no Bogyo to Anzen', *Economisto*, (June 4, 1985), pp.20-30.

[78] Shuichiro Iwata (1996), *Kaku Senryaku to Kaku Gunbi Kanri*, (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyusho), p.150.

[79] Due to their extreme 'nuclear allergy', many 'Left Idealists have a heavily distorted view upon anything related to the terms 'radiation' and / or 'atoms'. They insist that 'X-radiation' could eventually lead to the further development of nuclear weapons. This view is unfounded as the use of X-rays is widely available only within industrial applications.

[80] Few works analysed the strategic implication of SDI towards Japan. These exceptions include Yonosuke Nagai (1985), 'SDI no Kasa ni Kakusareta Kiken na Ito', *Economisto*, (June 4, 1985), pp.12-18; and Toshio Iwade (1987), SDI *to Nihon*, (Tokyo: Hara Shobo).

development of space only for peaceful purposes.[81] In January 1967, The Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was signed at the UN General Assembly. Both the US and the Soviet Union, and many other states interpreted the term 'peaceful' as 'non-aggressive', since at that time the major purpose for developing satellites was for military purposes. However, Japan interpreted the term in the 'Japanese way': the Japanese Government interpreted the Treaty as meaning perfectly 'peaceful use', in other words, only for 'non-military' uses.[82] In adopting the Diet Resolution on 'the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space' in May 1969, the Government clarified its interpretation of the term 'peaceful uses', and this official position remains the same today. Since the SDI would have required the use of space, Japan's co-operation might violate the 1969 Diet resolution even if the SDI would only play a defensive role.[83] In the end, Japan decided to join the research in 1986 based upon its verdict that the SDI did not violate the 1969 Diet resolution.[84]

Therefore, from the analysis above, three factors became apparent. First, in Japanese defence thinking, any new defence development must pass the 'non-nuclear' verdict imposed by Japan's social norm of anti-nuclearism. This self-imposed social norm of Japan had more significance than the central questions of the strategic implication of the SDI programme. Second, developments regarding SDI also demonstrated the importance of the US in Japan's defence thinking. Although Japanese key defence analysts were not convinced by President Reagan's SDI proposals,[85] for the sake of the maintenance of the

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[81] In 1968 the Space Activities Commission was formed, and became attached directly to the Prime Minister's Office. Its mandate was to formulate space policies, adjust activities of the various agencies, estimate budgets, and outline training program. In October 1969 the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) was established by law, and replaced the National Space Development Centre. It has the purpose of developing artificial satellites, launch vehicles and tracking systems. The President of NASDA is appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Space Activities Commission. For details on the Japanese Government's interpretation of the term 'peaceful uses of the outer space', see Susumu Takai (1994), 'Seniki Dando Misailu Boei to Kokusai Ho', *Shin Boei Ronshu*, Vol. 22:2, pp.24-5.

[82] Ibid., pp.19-37.

[83] After political debates, the Japanese government decided in 1986 to participate the research on the SDI based upon its verdict that the SDI system does not violate the 1969 Diet resolution. Between 1989 and 1993 a joint research was done by Japanese private companies and US Department of Defense under the name of 'WESTPAC' ('Western Pacific Defence Architecture Studies'). The research was about the defence system in the Western Pacific against nuclear attacks by Japan's neighbouring states. See Komori (1993), pp.102-111.

[84] Due to the end of the Cold War, the research on the SDI did not lead to the actual development of the system. However, the basic framework of the SDI remains as a basis for the TMD programme in the post-Cold War era to counter the proliferation of the ballistic missiles in the developing states.

[85] No.23, a former MOFA bureaucrat, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997.)

stable US-Japanese security relationship, Japan decided to participate in the US-led new programme. Third, similar to its response to the INF, Japan tried to highlight its position as a member of the 'Western' bloc in the eyes of the Soviet Union. This diplomatic effort was the epitome of 'Japanese strategy' during the Cold War.

4.2.3. US ED towards Japan during the Cold War

As discussed so far, most Japanese defence analysts agreed that the US ED towards Japan kept the threshold of a limited nuclear exchange higher than in Europe, due to the US's superior conventional forces to those of the Soviet Union in the area surrounding Japan and the many geo-strategic differences. Thus, the more the US's robust conventional forces deterred a Soviet conventional attack on Japan, the smaller the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union became. At the same time, however, the credibility of the US's commitment towards Japan was regarded as less than that towards Europe. While the US and NATO European allies had strong historical, racial, and cultural ties, the relationship between the US and Japan was considered an 'artificial' alliance because it was based upon mutual national interests which would last only so long as both states found it beneficial. Therefore, emphasis has been placed on all means for strengthening these 'artificial ties' between the two states, especially in the military, economic and political spheres.

In sum, the effectiveness of the US ED towards Japan during the Cold War should be analysed from two dimensions. First, there is the military dimension. While NATO's strategy was based on nuclear deterrence provided by the US during the Cold War, the US-Japanese alliance was predominantly based on defence by conventional weapons although the annual white papers of the Japanese Defence Agency do not downplay the importance of the US-Japanese nuclear dimension as the ultimate defence of Japan against any external threats.[86] Japan has strengthened its conventional capabilities, in particular its air forces, in the face of the Soviet military build-up in the Far East.

However, due to the restriction imposed upon Japan's SDF, it has been unable to establish a clear and integrated defence system with the US forces based in Japan or surrounding Japan at the operational level. This was because of: 1) the SDF's mission was to defend

Japan but only in the context of certain parameters, notionally the requirements of 'self-defence' (*'senshu boei'*); and 2), the Constitutional ban on the SDF's participation in any kind of 'collective security' measures. But underlying this has been a different geo-strategic situation. Japan's maritime environment, geographical asymmetry and the lack of a clear confrontation picture such as NATO verses the WPO, did not require an explicit military doctrine between the US and Japan. Furthermore, due to the domestic sentiment of anti-militarism, it has been very difficult for the Centrist Japanese government to implement its national defence up to the level where Japan could make a major contribution in support of the US military activities in the Asia-Pacific.

Second, the non-military dimension must also be considered. Because of the difficulties that have confronted the Japanese government's attempt to make some contribution to US military operations, the promotion of closer political and economic interdependence has been given priority-status in order to increase Japan's importance in the eyes of US's policy-makers. This has been seen as an important means for increasing the US's commitment towards Japan. Effective extended deterrence has thus required a concerted effort on the Japanese side, since the US-Japanese tie lacks the historical, racial, and cultural links which exist between the US and its European allies.

After all, the credibility of the US ED towards Japan can be measured only by making some judgement about how relevant the political relationship between the US and Japan has become, as this is not possible from a purely military calculation. This 'broad' meaning of the US ED towards Japan was partly pointed out by Glenn Chafetz (1993).[87] The US ED towards Japan is not explicitly nuclear in nature, as is often misunderstood. As seen earlier, unlike the 'nuclear' nature of US ED towards NATO European states during the Cold War which was clearly demonstrated in the actual deployment of US nuclear weapons into some of NATO states, the 'political' nature of the ED towards Japan has been based mainly on the existence of the close political ties that Japan has with the US as a 'member of the West' and on Japan's contribution to the US defence framework in the region. What is important in the analysis of the US ED towards Japan, therefore, is

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[86] See for example, Boei cho (1985), *Nihon no Boei 1985*, (Japan's Defence White Paper), p.109.

[87] Glenn Chafetz (1993), 'The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Alternative to the Neo-realist Perspective', *Security Studies*, Vol.2:3/ 2 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.127-158.

a broader approach embracing political, economic and narrow military factors.

4.3. Japan and the NPT

When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970, the main targets of this treaty were West Germany and Japan. Both states were considered to have enough financial and technological capability to become nuclear weapons states. The Japanese Government signed the NPT in February 1970 as the ninety-fifth signatory state and this was a confirmation of Japan's non-nuclear weapons status, which had been determined by the Basic Atomic Law of 1955. This Law, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, restricts Japan's atomic research and development strictly only to those for peaceful purposes. The resolution commending the NPT was adopted at the 22nd UN General Assembly in June 1968, and Japan voted in favour of the resolution. However, it took more than a year and half for Japan to sign and a further six years to ratify the NPT. This was because the NPT involved a number of issues of great significance to Japan. It was not easy for the Centrist Japanese government to secure the national consensus for its participation in the NPT because of its far-reaching consequences.

Although the "confusingly pluralist nature" of Japan's democracy system added extra time for the Government's consensus building,[88] the main reason for the delay was that the NPT directly related to the central areas of Japan's industrial and security policies. All the three key players in the Japanese political system (i.e., political elite, bureaucrats, and business-industrial community), were reluctant to let Japan become tied to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty for twenty five years without having a clear picture of its implications. The problems caused by the prospect of Japan's participation in the NPT were related to the following three issues:1), nuclear disarmament; 2), the national security of Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS); and 3), the equality amongst the members of the NPT with regard to the application of the safeguard inspections by the

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[88] Joseph Frankel (1977), 'Domestic Politics of Japan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', *British Journal of International Studies*, (1977, No.3), p.262.

IAEA for the civil use of nuclear energy.[89]

First, regarding the question of nuclear disarmament, Article 6 of the NPT provides that all Parties should undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. In light of this, the Left idealists regarded the total and immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons to be of primary importance, and insisted that at least the prohibition of a nuclear arms race or concrete measures for the reduction of nuclear armaments must be a prerequisite for Japan's participation in the Treaty. The inequality inherent in the NPT between 5 Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and the other NNWS also invited criticism from the Left idealists. They argued that the Treaty would give legal recognition to such inequality, perpetuating the status quo of the nuclear haves and have-nots, and would strengthen the so-called 'world domination' by a Soviet-American conspiracy. [90]

Second, the question of the security of the NNWS, which signed the Treaty, was the main concern for the hard-liners within the LDP. They argued that the NWS should guarantee the security of the NNWS explicitly in return for the renunciation by NNWS of the right to possess nuclear weapons. The argument was not based upon any awareness of an imminent nuclear threat to Japan's national security at that time. However, the hard-liners within the LDP argued that since the international security environment can change dramatically, Japan's security might not be assured as a NNWS under the NPT which would prohibit Japan's freedom of action for a period of 25 years. They argued that the present generation have no right to 'bind the hands' for posterity. They were never totally satisfied with the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee, and supported the option of Japan's 'nuclear free-hand', i.e., the possession of nuclear weapons, if necessary. These doubts relating to the credibility of the US ED were not confined to the hard-liners within the ruling LDP. Some inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) were also concerned about this,[91] which can be seen in their informal working paper on Japan's

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[89] Takeshi Nakane (1995), 'NPT to Nihon no Taio', *Kaigai Jijyo*, Vol.42, (July/ August 1995), pp.22-26; Ryukichi Imai (1972), 'Kakubo Jyoyaku no Soki Hijyun wo', *Chuo Koron* (March 1972), pp.96-107; Eiichi Sato and Shuzo Kimura (1977), *Kakubo Jyoyaku* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo), pp.111-170.

[90] Atsuhiko Yatabe (1970), 'A Note on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: the Japanese point of view', *Japanese Annuals of International Law*, No.14, pp.21-22.

[91] In particular, some of the young MOFA officials were concerned about this issue, working upon some research on the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation. No.11, a former Japanese Ambassador,

nuclearisation written in 1969.[92] This unpublished, internal MOFA report concluded that, for the time being, Japan would maintain its security policy towards nuclear weapons, but "regardless of joining the NPT or not", Japan would maintain the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons.[93]

However, PM Miki and his supporters, who were considered 'liberals' or 'doves' amongst the LDP members, argued that Japan did not need its own nuclear weapons as long as the US-Japanese Security Treaty existed. PM Miki, who was a Foreign Minister in 1967 at the time when the draft of the NPT was discussed, was a vigorous supporter of the NPT, while at the same time clearly aware of the fundamental importance of this bi-lateral relationship for Japan's national security. Then the following question must be asked: how did Japan regard the NPT and the US-Japanese Security Treaty in the context of its national security?

On 14 March 1975, shortly before the first NPT review conference was held in May 1975, the MOFA issued an official statement regarding Japan's national security and the NPT. The statement argued that the best way to secure Japan's national security was for Japan to pursue its 'peace diplomacy' and its defence capability (which was to be strictly based upon the right of self-defence or '*senshu boei*'), while also maintaining the US-Japanese security system based upon the 1960 US-Japanese Security Treaty. This Japanese approach to national security was considered to contribute to the stabilisation of the international environment. The MOFA statement clarified that Japan needed neither strategic nuclear weapons nor tactical nuclear weapons, as Japan was protected by the US's nuclear deterrence stemming from the US-Japanese Security Treaty.[94] By joining the NPT, Japan would further strengthen its continuous pursuit of 'peace diplomacy' and increase the international trust that other states would have of Japan. In particular, the MOFA statement repeatedly emphasised the importance of Japan's ratification of the NPT

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interview with the author (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998).

[92] MOFA admitted the existence of the report but emphasised that it was an 'informal working document' and therefore not influential. See Michael Williams (1994), *Wall Street Journal,* August 2, 1994. For another media account on this report, see 'Missile Developments', *Nonproliferation Review,* Vol.2:2 (Winter 1995), p.136, both cited in Andrew Mack (1996), *Proliferation in Northeast Asia,* Occasional Paper No.28, (The Henry L. Stimson Centre), p.12.

[93] *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 1, 1994.

[94] *Asahi Shimbun*, March 15, 1975.

as a means for further increasing the US's trust of Japan: as Japan's ratification of the NPT touched upon the fundamental issue of the level of mutual trust between the US and Japan, it was felt that any further hesitation in ratifying the NPT without a clear justification would damage the friendly US-Japan bilateral relationship.[95]

Regarding the relationship between the NPT and the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, the third principle of Japan's 3NNP, the MOFA statement touched upon the issue as follows: the question of the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan is different from the issue of Japan's ratification to the NPT which does not prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into a particular state. The MOFA statement concluded that while an argument could be made that the US ED would be strengthened with the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan, the security of Japan would be best protected by the US-Japanese Security Treaty without nuclear weapons within the Japanese territory. This last point again highlights the 'Japanese way' of viewing nuclear issues.

From the MOFA statement, it also becomes clear that a high level of mutual trust between the US and Japan was considered crucial for Japan's national security. But questions concerning the prospect of Japan's nuclearization were rarely far from the political surface in the United States, although it is possible to identify two competing views on this issue as indicated by two reports written in 1974. The first report, written by the intelligence agencies of the US Air Force and Navy, states the 'pro-nuclearization' position:

> [A] strong chance that Japan's leaders will conclude that they must have nuclear weapons if they are to achieve their national objectives in the developing Asian power balance. Such a decision could come in the early 1990s. It would likely be made even sooner if there is any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, or global permissiveness regarding such activity. These developments would hasten erosion of traditional Japanese opposition to a nuclear weapons course and permit Tokyo to cross that threshold earlier in the interests of national security.[96]

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[95] *Asahi Shimbun*, March 15, 1975.

[96] US Central Intelligence Agency (1974), 'Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', DCI NIO 1945/74, (September 4, 1974), p.2, quoted in Peter Hayes (1993), 'Japan's Plutonium Overhang and Regional Insecurity', *The Peace Research Centre Working Paper* No. 136 (Canberra: Australian National University), pp.13-4.

In the same year, on the other hand, an alternative view was expressed by a US study group in a report to the Pentagon, which concluded that "there appears to be no necessarily or immediately disadvantageous implications for the United States associated with [Japan's] attainment of nuclear weapons status".[97] Since the main 'target' states to contain under the NPT were initially West Germany and Japan, Japan's refusal to participate in the NPT would have drastically increased the voices of sceptics within the US, which in turn would have caused severe political unease in the context of Japan's national security. Up to then, the US had repeatedly made statements assuring its commitment to the defence of Japan, such as via the 1965 Sato-Johnson Joint Communiqué, and the 1974 Tanaka-Ford Communiqué (as noted earlier). However, the hard-liner LDP members demanded further assurance from the US.

It was under these circumstances that Foreign Minister (FM) Miyazawa was sent to the US in April 1975 to seek greater US assurances on defence co-operation. The talks between FM Miyazawa and Secretary of State Kissinger seem to have played a crucial role in convincing the hard-liner LDP members at the Diet. Again, as it had done previously, the US announced its commitment to Japan as: 1) the two governments share the judgement that the maintenance of the 1960 Security Treaty will be in the interests of both countries viewed in a long-term perspectives; 2) the US's potential capability to wage a nuclear war is an important deterrent against a potential aggressor towards Japan; and 3) the US attaches importance to its obligation under the Security Treaty that it will be in charge of the defence of Japan in case of Japan being attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons, and Japan too will continue to carry out its obligations.[98] Due to this statement, the hard-liner LDP conservatives accepted the LDP's submission of the NPT ratification bill to the Diet. However, they attached the following six requests to the draft of the bill: 1) the strengthening of the NPT system; 2) the strengthening of the US-Japanese Security system; 3) the strengthening of Japan's own national security; 4) greater general assurances for the national security of the NNWS; 5) the promotion of nuclear disarmament; and 6) the promotion of the peaceful use of atomic energy.[99]

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[97] R.Lawrence *et al.* (1974), 'The Scientific Base for Nuclear Weapons Development', in *Implications of Indian and / or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for the U.S. Defense Policy Planning* (Stanford: Strategic Studies Centre, Stanford Research Institute), SSC-TN-1993-1, (January 1974), p.75, quoted in Ibid., p.15.

[98] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 12, 1975.

[99] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 23, 1975. The Japanese government continued its efforts to obtain further US

The role that FM Miyazawa played, in this process of persuasion, seemed to be of crucial importance.[100] Miyazawa's announcement at the Diet on 24 April 24 1975 (one day before the LDP's submission of the NPT bill to the Diet), that the government might, in emergency, use the 'prior consultation' system in the US-Japanese Security Treaty in order to invite US nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil, was welcomed by the hard-liners within the LDP. Up until 25 April 1975 when the LDP finally presented the NPT bill to the Diet, it seems that FM Miyazawa's statements were aiming at assuaging the LDP hard-liners. However, the tone of his statement became ambiguous after that day. Miyazawa started modifying his previous statements, which were more in line with PM Miki's position, in order to lessen the opposition from the Socialists.

While the government finally convinced the hard-liner LDP members on the NPT ratification by putting emphasis on strengthening the security ties between the US and Japan, the opposition Left idealists, mainly from the Japan Socialist Party, questioned the credibility of the 'non-introduction' principle of the 3NNP, which was considered incompatible with the maintenance of Japan's national security by the US nuclear guarantee. While FM Miyazawa's statements at the Diet were not always consistent, PM Miki repeatedly reaffirmed the government's commitment to the 3NNP. PM Miki had always maintained that these principles should be intact, including the 'non-introduction' principle.[101] PM Miki emphasised this point, categorically denying the slightest change of the principle, even in the 1974 crisis of the 'LaRocque Testimony', and in the process sought support from the Left idealists at the Diet.

Since the beginning of the NPT draft making in the late 1960s, the Left idealists were in support of the 'purpose' of the NPT, which they regarded as the first step towards a

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assurances on security guarantees before its ratification to the NPT in June 1976. This included the Joint statement to the press in August 6, 1975 (in particular Article 4) made by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki. See Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo (1983), *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho Nenpyo*, Vol.3 (1971-1980), (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), p.805.

[100] The final stage of debates on the NPT at the Diet, from January 1975 to May 1976, was marked by the continuity of the same government ministers of Takeo Miki as Prime Minister and Kiichi Miyazawa as Foreign Minister.

[101] A US official document written in 1972 claims that then FM Masayoshi Ohira in April 1963 agreed that "the prior consultation clause does not apply to the case of nuclear weapons on board vessels in Japanese waters or ports." The document also claims that "[n]o Japanese Government since then has challenged this interpretation." See *Asahi Shimbun*, May 15, 1999.

nuclear weapons free world. However, they were in opposition to the 'loose' and 'unequal' content of the NPT and to the way the LDP government was dealing with the issue. The different views on the NPT between the ruling LDP and its main opposition JSP were clearly observed in their requests during the NPT draft making in the late 1960s and they remained the same at the time of the ratification process in the mid-1970s. Table 2 (below) highlights their differences.

Although the Socialists were against Japan's early ratification of the NPT, they were at the same time concerned about the implication of their own policy: if they opposed too strongly the language of the NPT by pointing out the 'inequality' (or 'ego') of affording status to 5 NWS, this might in turn provoke Japan's right wing nationalists who were attached to the idea of nuclear weapons acquisition. The consequence of this might then be to force the LDP government into abandoning the 3NNP, and thereby giving in to the power of its own hard-liners.[102] Therefore, the Left idealists themselves had to strike the right balance between: a) their opposition to the 'loose' and 'unequal' context of the NPT; and b) not provoking any right wing 'nuclear nationalism'. Such concerns eventually played an important role in decreasing their opposition to Japan's ratification of the NPT.

Table 2. The Requests of Political Parties in relation to the NPT draft

	The LDP (the ruling party)	**The JSP (the major opposition party)**
General attitude	- Support 'spirit' of the NPT - Needs more effort to make equal contents of the NPT	Support NPT as the first step towards: 1) the total ban on tests and the use of nuclear weapons 2) the total elimination of nuclear weapons
Obligation of 5NWSs regarding nuclear disarmament	- ban on nuclear arms race - efforts for nuclear disarmament	- total and immediate ban on the tests and use of nuclear weapons - total elimination of nuclear weapons
Security of NNWSs	- needs a sufficient consideration (e.g. UN resolution)	- a clause on negative security assurance by 5NWSs
Civil Use of nuclear energy	- equal access to nuclear energy under an appropriate international control	- no domination of nuclear energy by 5NWSs - support for civil nuclear use

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, April 23, 1967.

Thirdly, the question of the equality in the application of safeguard inspections by the IAEA for the civil use of nuclear energy was the biggest obstacle for Japan's early

ratification of the NPT.[103] While Japan's civil nuclear programme, which was not under comprehensive safeguards, was regarded by 5NWSs as a real challenge to the NPT, this programme was considered an important means for national 'energy security' by Japan.[104] Before the ratification of the Treaty, Japan contended that the application of safeguards to Japan was `unequal'.[105] On the one hand, the NNWS of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were allowed to use their regional safeguards system as a substitute for the IAEA, following Article 3 of the NPT which states that safeguards agreements with the IAEA shall be concluded 'either individually or together with other states'.[106] But, on the other hand, the Japanese nuclear industry was concerned that it would be subject to 'unequal' IAEA safeguards in comparison to those conducted within Western Europe by EURATOM and this would put Japan in a disadvantageous position, with the possibility of industrial secrets leaked by the inspections.[107] The Japanese government issued a statement on the day of its signature to the NPT, expressing their concerns in the following way:

> [N]o peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapons states shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment or other material relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear-weapons states, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers

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[102] Sato and Kimura (1977), p.130

[103] For an account for the role of the IAEA, see for example, James E. Lovett (1994), Chapter 11' Reprocessing The Role of the IAEA', in Frank Barnaby (ed.), *Plutonium and Security*, (London: Macmillan), pp.180-201.

[104] Japan's plutonium programme is under the control of multilateral treaties, of which 1) international safeguards against proliferation carried out by the IAEA in the framework of the NPT and 2) physical protection (PP) implemented by each state under the International Convention on Physical Protection. The Convention on Physical Protection (PP) was signed in 1980, and became effective in 1987, of which Japan joined in 1988. Each member state is responsible for its own PP activities and regulations according to the Convention's general guidelines. Before the Convention, the IAEA's international guidelines for physical protection (INFCIRC 225 Rev.), issued in 1975, was playing the similar role. In addition to the requirements of the Convention, Japan must meet the requirements under the 1988 US-Japan Agreement which are more stringent physical protections. The 1992 plutonium shipments was the first under the new physical protection requirements. Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.8-9.

[105] John E.Endicott (1977), 'The 1975-76 Debate over Ratification of the NPT in Japan', *Asian Survey*, Vol.17: 3, pp.275-292.

[106] Under the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM (INFCIRC 193), EURATOM is responsible for the safeguards of the EC NNWS members, with IAEA only carrying out 'spot checks' in order to verify the credibility of the works done by EURATOM. See Darryl A. Howlett (1990), 'The Negotiation of the IAEA-EURATOM NPT Safeguards Agreements in Western Europe' (Chapter 8), *EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards* (London: Macmillan).

[107] For the details on Japan's domestic debate regarding safeguards, see for example, Kimura and Sato (eds.) (1977), pp.111-117 and 150-167; Nakane (1995), pp.22-40; Shelton L. Williams (1971-2), *Nuclear Nonproliferation in International Politics: the Japanese Case*, (Monograph Series in World affairs),

could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.[108]

Furthermore, the Japanese government clearly emphasised that it would hold back on final ratification of the NPT until it had thoroughly considered the context of the IAEA-Japan safeguards agreement in order to secure the 'equality' on the safeguards vis-à-vis other NNWSs, and this became the major prerequisite for Japan's ratification to the NPT.[109]

For this requirement to be fulfilled, however, time and a series of technical tasks were necessary. First, Japan had to wait until the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM (INFCIRC 193) was concluded in April 1973. This was necessary in order to scrutinise the context of the agreement as the basis for that between the IAEA and Japan. Following this, Japan had to ensure that the text of the Japan-IAEA safeguards agreement did not contain anything which would place it at a disadvantage in the context of arrangements made with EURATOM. Finally, Japan had to establish its own national system for accounting and control of nuclear materials, which had to be both as effective and functionally independent as that of the EURATOM system, under the terms of the NPT verification agreement.[110] However, Japan's Nuclear Material Control Centre (NMCC), which was just established in April 1972, was deemed to be neither effective nor reliable, and therefore did not meet the NPT requirements.[111] Although the process to strengthen this system was urgently required, the lack of consensus within the ruling government delayed any progress.[112]

Within Japan, the opposition to the NPT ratification was based on three different reasons, as noted earlier. It is said that those minority hard-liners of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who were reluctant to give up Japan's 'nuclear option' yet eventually lost their grounds after the repeated US security assurances to Japan, continued

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(Denver, Colorado: University of Denver), pp.35-46.

[108] The statement of the Japanese Government, issued on February 3, 1970. Part II, paragraph 6, quoted in Yatabe (1970), p.27.

[109] Kimura and Sato (eds.) (1977), pp.156-8.

[110] For details of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards agreement, see Howlett (1990), Chapter 8.

[111] Kimura and Sato (eds.) (1977), pp.163-164.

[112] In particular, the Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) Kinji Moriyama, who was appointed in November 1973, was reluctant to support Japan's NPT ratification, further delaying these

to oppose the ratification but this time on the basis of Japan's 'energy security'. To convince the various oppositions within Japan, the government emphasised the benefit of the NPT as a means to secure international co-operation regarding nuclear civil uses and the stability of supply of nuclear related materials. The government also warned that without the NPT, Japan's 'energy security' would not be guaranteed since the import of nuclear-related materials would be very difficult. With Japan's 'energy security' at risk, even the hard-liners eventually gave in.[113] In the end, the hard-liners within the LDP and the Left opposition policy-makers supported the ratification bill of the NPT, thus Japan was finally accepted the NPT on 8 June 1976.

4.4. The Perception Gap between Japan and the Outside World: Japan's Civil Nuclear Policy

Although 'autonomous' energy development has been one of the major goals of Japan's nuclear programme, its nuclear development has always been under foreign influence, in particular from the US. Under bilateral agreements, the US has strongly influenced Japan's programme as the dominant supplier of both enrichment services and nuclear reactor technologies to Japan.[114] While the US regards the plutonium issue essentially from a non-proliferation perspective, Japan's plutonium programme has remained rather static throughout its development, pursued under the guidance of the Long Term Programmes.[115] This 'nuclear perceptual gap' has inevitably caused occasional confusion and political friction between the two states.

As already shown in Chapter 3, the US-Japanese civil nuclear relationship began as a result of the encouragement provided by US President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech in December 1953. Japan's efforts could not have been successful without this

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technical procedures. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 4, 1974.

[113] No.2, a former Japanese Ambassador. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1995). See also Genshiryoku Jyanalisto no kai (1981), *Janalisto no Shogen: Genshiryoku 25nen no Kiseki*, (Tokyo: Denryoku Shimposha), pp.160-166.

[114] For an overview of the US policy for plutonium both in civilian use and non-proliferation, see Warren H.Donnelly (1992), 'US Policy for Plutonium: Civilian Use, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Arms Reduction' (Chapter 4), in Frank Barnaby (ed.), *Plutonium and Security*, (London: Macmillan), pp.29-60. Japan also has bi-lateral agreements with other states. These include the suppliers of reprocessing services (UK and France), suppliers of natural uranium (Canada and Australia). The 1985 bilateral agreement with China is unique since Japan is the supplier.

[115] Motoya Kitamura (1996), 'Japan's Plutonium Programme: A Proliferation Threat', *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.3:2, (Winter 1996), pp.5-9

initial encouragement in the context of the Cold War.[116] While US proliferation concerns were outweighed by the importance of embracing Japan as an ally during the Eisenhower period,[117] the anxiety drastically increased during the Kennedy and Johnson administration in the 1960s, mainly due to French (1960) and China's (1964) joining of the nuclear club. With the loosening of Cold War tensions after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the superpowers co-operated to strengthen nuclear control arrangements. This led to the pursuit of a more internationalist policy culminating in the establishment of the NPT in 1968, and the development of a multinational control regime against further proliferation.[118]

However, it should be emphasised that regardless of the multilateral approach embodied in the creation of the NPT, US non-proliferation policy largely remained on a country-by-country basis.[119] This was clearly observed in the bilateral negotiations between the US and Japan over the Tokai-mura plant in 1977, which sought to make the US's general non-proliferation principle and its bilateral policy towards Japan compatible.

The turning point of US plutonium policy came in 1974. Before then, the US was encouraging plutonium use to save uranium resources, and to search for some energy alternatives to oil, in particular, in the wake of the first Oil Crisis in 1973. The impact of India's nuclear explosion in 1974 was significant, since the device used plutonium

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[116] Not only economic but also ideological benefits were US's motivations behind its encouragement for nuclear energy amongst its allies, in order to disprove the USSR's propaganda charges that the US focused merely upon the destructive uses of nuclear energy. The trade related to civil nuclear energy brought about economic benefits to the US. By the end of 1960s American reactor firms dominated 90 percent of the world market through direct sales and licensing arrangements with foreign firms, with economically re-vitalised Japan after the defeat of the WWII becoming a promising client for US nuclear industry. See Kitamura (1996), p.3.

[117] For an account of the US Non-Proliferation policy during the Cold War, see for example, Peter A. Clausen (1993), *Nonproliferation and the National Interests*, (NY: Harper Collins).

[118] Before the NPT negotiations, the US examined the potential of Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. A 1964 background paper by the Department of State and a 1965 memorandum by the Arms Control and Disarmament (ACDA) reached the same conclusion that Japan's perception on the credibility of the US nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis China's nuclear weapons would play a crucial role in deciding Japan's nuclearisation. 'Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decision Concerning Acquisitions of Nuclear Weapons', Department of State, December 12, 1964 (Secret), pp.12-6, in *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Declassified Documents*, Document No.1079 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1991); 'Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals', ACDA, June 25, 1965 (Secret), pp.1-16, in *Declassified Documents 1994*, Document No. 1807 (Woodbridge, CT: Research Publication, 1994), cited in Kitamura (1996), p.6.

[119] No.8, a MOFA bureaucrat. Interview with the author. (Geneva, Switzerland, June 1996)

recovered from a research reactor.[120] President Ford decided to embargo the export of reprocessing and enrichment technology.[121] Following this, in October 1976 Washington radically changed its policy by declaring that the US no longer viewed reprocessing as a necessary requirement of the nuclear fuel cycle. Tokyo's response was negative, some even suspected the US's intention: the US might fear that Europe and Japan would not need the US's enriched uranium with the completion of their own breeder reactors, hence the US was trying to monopolise the uranium trade under the name of non-proliferation policy in disguise.[122]

The 1976 policy change was further reinforced by President Carter's (1977-1980) non-proliferation policy.[123] Carter regarded the non-proliferation issue as one of the top foreign policy priorities, and the plutonium-recycling programme became his main target. In 1977, President Carter announced that the US would indefinitely defer its domestic commercial reprocessing, and persuade other states to adopt similar policies.[124] The basis of this policy was the influential report written by the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group in 1977, which emphasised that plutonium should not be put to commercial use because of the danger of theft and /or diversion.[125] The main purpose of Carter's non-proliferation policy in 1977 was to create more stringent restrictions to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in addition to then existing NPT and IAEA safeguards arrangements. Two issues in particular, the enrichment of uranium and plutonium reprocessing, became the main targets of this policy.

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[120] Not only India's nuclear explosion but also the US's reassessment on the increasing availability of uranium made this policy change possible.

[121] President Ford's decision stemmed from some US reports written in the early 1970s on the connection between civilian plutonium programmes and nuclear weapons. See for example, M.Willrich and T. Taylor (1974), *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards*, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger).

[122] Charles K.Ebinger (1984), 'US-Japanese Nuclear Energy Relations: Prospects for Cooperation/ Conflict', in Charles K. Ebinger and Ronalld A. Morse (eds.), *US-Japanese Energy Relations: Cooperation and Competition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp.153-156.

[123] The testimony, made by then under-Secretary of State Joseph Nye at the US Senate Foreign Committee on June 29, 1977, paid a special attention to Japan. In this testimony Nye mentioned the Japanese case by pointing out that Japan's nuclear ambition was stopped by the combination of 1) military alliance (i.e., guaranteeing Japan's security by the US-Japanese Security Treaty) and 2) the NPT, hence combining the two measures is an effective political measures for non-proliferation. However, Nye concluded that, alone, they were not sufficient. For further details, see Yasumasa Tanaka (1982), *Genshiryoku no Shakaigaku*, (Tokyo: Denryoku Shimpo sha), pp.96-100.

[124] Richard K.Lester (1982), 'US-Japanese Nuclear Relations: Structural Change and Political Strain', *Asian Survey*, Vol.22:5, (May 1982), p.421

[125] The Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (1977),'Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices', (Cambridge, M.A.: Ballinger). For further details of this report, see for example, Donnelly (1992), pp.41-44.

Carter's policy caused severe frustration as well as rejection amongst those states with plutonium policies underway, especially in Japan. The clear nuclear perception gap now became obvious between the US and Japan: while the US regarded the plutonium programme from a global proliferation perspective, Japan viewed it from a energy security perspective, stemming from domestic need.[126] Furthermore, for the US, the civil nuclear issue was highly political. This can be seen by the composition of the members of the 1977 Study Group, with 13 out of 21 coming from an economic or international political science background.[127] In contrast, the civil nuclear programme was treated as mainly a technical and industrial issue by the Japanese side.

The timing of Carter's announcement could not have been more insensitive, as in the spring of 1977 JOYO reached its criticality and the Tokaimura reprocessing plant was ready for its test run, after 14 years of preparation with a cost of $170 million.[128] Due to the 1972 US-Japan Nuclear Agreement, which included a requirement for 'joint determination (by the two states)' to permit the start-up of a new reprocessing plant with the US's right to intervene, Japan was asked not to separate plutonium completely as a condition for the plant's operation. This, however, would have required a major modification of the existing facilities.[129] During the negotiation over the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant, Japan's main claim was that it had the right to establish 'autonomous' energy sources as part of its energy security programme. The Japanese side also pointed out that the Japanese government had convinced the opponents of NPT ratification in 1976 by highlighting that Japan's right to develop nuclear energy is guaranteed by Article IV of the Treaty. Hence, the US's anti-plutonium policy was considered contradictory to the NPT.[130]

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[126] Hidetake Kakibana and Koichi Kawakami (1986), *Genshiryoku to Kokusai Seiji,* (Tokyo: Hakuo Shobo), pp.4-7.

[127] Tanaka (1982), p.46.

[128] Ryukichi Imai (1980), 'US-Japan Nuclear Diplomacy', in Michael Blaker (ed.), *Oil and the Atom: Issues in US-Japan Energy Relations,* (NY: The East Asian Institute, Columbia University), pp.61-2; and (1994-a), *IAEA Sasatsu to Kaku Kakusan,* (Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha), pp.110-114.

[129] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.7-10. The 1972 agreement imposed a condition that a new reprocessing plant had "adequate safeguards arrangement" (Article 8, Item C). Due to this clause the US legally had a right to intervene in the startup of the Tokai reprocessing plant in 1977. See also Genshiryoku Jyanalisto no kai (1981), p.170.

Japan had to go through extensive negotiations until a compromise was reached, in September 1977, on the limitation of the capacity of the Tokai plant operation. This was made on the basis that a consensus within the Carter administration itself had not been achieved on the issue of to what extent the US could exercise its control over Japan's reprocessing.

President Carter's non-proliferation policy culminated in the establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE).[131] This was a US-led multi-national study group, which lasted for 2 years and 4 months from October 1977, and which sought to establish an international framework approach for the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while also promoting civil use of nuclear energy. In particular, the question of how to stop the nuclear ambitions of the then threshold nuclear states, such as South Korea and Pakistan, while not damaging the US's relationship with its Cold War allies, especially with West Germany and Japan, was an important goal.[132] Carter's pursuit of this non-proliferation policy continued with the passage of the new 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), which required the President to re-negotiate all existing nuclear agreements to satisfy more stringent requirements, including tighter regulations over plutonium shipments.[133]

Japan's reaction to the NNPA was negative, criticising it from the same standpoint as before: the US's sudden and unilateral policy change was a violation of multilateral accords such as the NPT, under which Japan had the right to pursue its civil nuclear programme.[134]

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[130] Imai (1994-a), pp.110-114. Imai was the Japanese negotiator over the Tokaimura reprocessing plant.

[131] The idea of establishing INFCE was made public by then under-Secretary of State Joseph Nye at the IAEA conference in Austria, May 1977. This US-led study group lasted over two years, involving 40 states and 40 international organisation, ending with a 20,000 page final report. The report suggested several international frameworks to support both non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotion of civil use of nuclear energy. These include International Plutonium Storage (IPS), International Spent Fuel Management (ISFM), and Regional Fuel Cycle Centre (RFCC). However, none of these suggestions have been implemented. The INFCE report had neither legally binding power nor political recommendation. See for example, JAIF (1986), *Genshiryoku wa Ima*, (Tokyo: Marunouchi Shuppan), pp.159-172.

[132] Imai (1994-a), pp.112-3; Tanaka (1982), pp.96-120; and JAIF (1986), pp.159-160.

[133] For an analysis on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, see Anthony G. McGrew (1979), 'Nuclear Revisionism: the United States and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.7:3, pp.237-250.

[134] Ryukichi Imai (1978), 'A Japanese Reaction to US Nonproliferation Policy', *International Security*, pp.62-66. A comprehensive discussion on the both US and Japanese perspectives on civil nuclear program,

Implementing a drastic change from Carter's policy, President Reagan regarded nuclear non-proliferation to be less important than the renewed power struggle against the Soviet Union, and this transformed its policy towards its allies. For example, the US agreed in 1981 to lift the operating restrictions at the Tokaimura plant. Japan broadly appreciated Reagan's approach to nuclear trade and co-operation, which was more flexible and supportive to the US allies' programmes than before. After extensive negotiations, underway since the NNPA of 1978, the two states finally ratified a new nuclear agreement in 1988. Four clauses in this agreement have a significant implication for Japan's plutonium programme: 1) the US's 'programmatic approval' for Japan's peaceful plutonium use was given, in effect for the following 30 years; 2) there was to be tighter control over sensitive technologies and material, which went one step further than the regulations specified by the 1978 NNPA; 3) also tighter physical protection over plutonium shipments was required; and 4) there was generally to be a wider US influence over almost all plutonium in the spent fuel from Light Water Reactors.[135] Although the 1988 agreement gave a comprehensive approval for Japan's plutonium programmes for the following 30 years, the US still retained the legal right to intervene.[136]

4.5. Conclusion

Several conclusions emerge from the above discussions. First, the importance of the US-Japanese security relationship regarding Japan's non-nuclear policy cannot be overemphasised. This relationship has always surpassed the non-explicit nature of the security arrangements between the two states, and the opposition parties' crusade for the abolition of the Treaty under the idea of '*makikomare ron*': in the face of China's nuclear weapons in the 1960s, Japan sought further verbal security assurances from the US; and in dealing with Soviet threats, Japan sought not only for enhanced defence efforts within the framework of the bilateral relationship, but also for closer political ties with the US as a

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see Ryukichi Imai and Henry S. Rowen (1980), *Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation: Japanese and American Views*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press).

135 'Agreement for Co-operation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy', 1988. Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.7-8

136 The Opposition to the 1988 agreement at the US Congress regarded it illegal under the NNPA of 1978. Some were concerned about the advance approval of plutonium shipments. Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p. 8 footnote 21.

member of the 'West'. Japan regarded this as the prerequisite for an effective extended deterrence during the Cold War. The fundamental significance of the US ED towards Japan as the ultimate security guarantee was also in evidence in the deliberation over Japan's ratification of the NPT. For Japan, the impetus for joining the NPT did not derive from the positive belief that Japan's national security would be guaranteed by the NPT. Rather, Japan's accession to the NPT was treated as a measure which would enhance other states' perception of Japan as a trustworthy state in the international arena, which Tokyo hoped would eventually contribute to the establishment of a better international security environment.

Second, it is apparent from this discussion that the concept of 'extended deterrence', as applied to Japan, is often misunderstood both abroad and in Japan. Domestically, those who argue against the US's nuclear umbrella tend to misunderstand this concept. An 'effective' nuclear deterrence greatly depends on the 'uncertainties' in the mind of the potential aggressor (the deteree) with regards to the consequences of its aggression. Therefore, to argue whether Japan, which is protected under the US's nuclear umbrella, wants the umbrella or not is irrelevant. It is interesting to note here the two different opinions inside Japan which both argue against the US ED. Shintaro Ishihara, from a strategic point of view, claims that the US's nuclear umbrella is 'broken' towards Japan: hence, Japan has to have its own nuclear umbrella over its own head.[137] Kumao Kaneko, on the other hand, places emphasis on the positive effects which diplomatic efforts can bring in creating a more secure security environment in the region, and argues that although Japan did have to rely on the US's military forces, conventional weapons were sufficient for this task and therefore Japan needed no umbrella. [138] However, due to the country's geo-strategic importance, Japan naturally played a significant role as a base for the US's global strategy during the Cold War. It is not Japan who decides whether or not Japan is under the US's nuclear umbrella, but rather it is the US who shows its ultimate commitment to use nuclear weapons in case of an external military attack against Japan. Indeed, it is ironic that the doubt about the credibility of extended deterrence has been argued not from the deteree (the potential aggressors towards Japan, such as China and the

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[137] Ishihara (1970).

[138] Kumao Kaneko (1996), 'Japan Needs No Umbrella', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* Vol.52:2 (March/ April, 1996), p.48.

Soviet Union) but from those who are under the protection of somebody else's nuclear umbrella, such as France and Japan.

Underlying these misunderstandings on such issues as ED there lies an interesting cultural factor: the lack of opportunity in Japan to learn about nuclear issues due to Japan's traditional anti-militarism. As Hisahiko Okazaki has claimed, Japan is the only developed state where there are no courses on military strategy taught at higher educational institutions, and thus it has been quite difficult for the Japanese to know the basic knowledge about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy which are commonly shared in the other developed states.[139] The memory of 1945 has formed a culture of anti-nuclearism amongst the Japanese that has enduring significance for discussions related to nuclear issues.

Internationally, the lack of understanding on the different nature of US ED towards Europe and Japan has also been a facet of this chapter. During the Cold War, Soviet SS-20s in Europe were deterred by US nuclear weapons deployed into some of the NATO member states. This effective 'nuclear versus nuclear' lesson still lives in the mind of security specialists in NATO states, and they tend to apply this lesson to the case of Japan. However, this Western approach to the analysis of US ED lacks an understanding of certain factors stemming from Japan's domestic context and the different security environment in Northeast Asia. In short, this has demonstrated the limits to the idea of the 'universal' application of certain strategic thinking.

Third, some assessment of the impact of strategic culture must be made in the context of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism' and 'anti-nuclearism' did significantly influence the way Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons was implemented, but there are still limits to its utility in explaining all dimensions of this policy. 'Unarmed neutrality' without nuclear weapons, the sheer expression of Japan's strategic culture, was not practically possible due to Japan's geo-strategic importance between the Soviet Union and the US in the context of the Cold War. Under this structural constraint, Japan maintained its security policy towards nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the case of Japan, it has been

argued that strategic culture does not supplant neo-realism. Yet, at the same time, it is also impossible to analyse Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons without an understanding of the strategic cultural basis of this policy: in short, the debate over this policy had distinct elements that were culturally coded.

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[139] Okazaki (1995), in the Introduction.

Chapter 5: The Post-Cold War Era: A New Security Environment for Japan's Security Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons

5.0. Introduction

The international nuclear landscape has drastically changed since the end of the Cold War. While the nuclear issue was mainly discussed in the context of the East-West rivalry during the Cold War, its scope has now taken on a more complicated, global dimension. The end of the Cold War also gave impetus to nuclear disarmament efforts between the United States and Russia, the nuclear Successor State to the former Soviet Union. This latter development was epitomised by the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II nuclear arms control agreement.[1] International efforts aimed at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states have similarly increased, as seen in the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the preparation for new treaties, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[2] and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).[3]

However, the end of the Cold War has also clearly demonstrated that the arrival of a nuclear-weapons-free-world (NWFW) remains a goal that is unachievable for the

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[1] For a concise information on START, see for example, http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/pack.htm

[2] The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly on September 10, 1996. It was opened for signature on September 24, 1996 at the UN Headquarters. As it stands in June 9, 1999, 152 states have signed the CTBT and instruments of ratification have been deposited by 37 states. Under article 14, the Treaty will not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, including non-signatory states of India and Pakistan. See for example, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/sept97/factsept.htm

[3] The negotiations of a multi-lateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the so-called 'cut-off treaty', is in progress with an aim of producing binding international commitment that could strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. The initial momentum for this was made by the US President Clinton's proposal made at the UN in September 1993. The US has given a high priority to the early completion of a Cut-off Treaty in order to halt production of highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium for nuclear explosives. The March 1993 UN resolution at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) expressed the conviction that a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects." See for example,

foreseeable future. Not only have there been questions concerning the possibilities for more nuclear threshold states (or so-called 'rogue states') to emerge, but also there is little indication as yet that the current NWS are collectively prepared to embrace a nuclear reductions programme aimed at attaining a NWFW.

More fundamentally, with the possibility of emerging new nuclear threats the role that nuclear deterrence played (or perhaps believed to have played) during the Cold War has been questioned, which has led to deliberations on measures such as counter-proliferation in case of the failure of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, new problems, such as those stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the leakage or illegal export of nuclear related materials and nuclear scientists to 'rogue states', are not easily dealt with within the existing international non-proliferation regime.

In light of these global developments, the nature of the evolving nuclear environment in the Northeast Asia region is of crucial significance: North Korea's possible clandestine nuclear weapons programme as well as ballistic missile development needs special attention; China is believed to be engaged in the modernisation of its nuclear and missile technology; and the future of the Russian state and its nuclear weapons is also full of uncertainties. Under such circumstances, the nuclear threats Japan faces in the post-Cold War era are potentially more complicated and uncertain than before. The decades-old Soviet nuclear threats towards Japan have been replaced by the prospect of a more unpredictable nuclear environment in this historically volatile region.

It is against this background that the focus of this Chapter will be situated. The main objective of the analysis will be to assess the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era in light of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993/4[4] and the subsequent Missile Crisis of 1998. This is because these two Crises are a

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http://www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/nuclear/fissile/fissile.htm

[4] North Korea's nuclear development in the 1990s has replaced the USSR as a new threat to national security as shown in Japan's Defence White Paper since 1994. Not only Defence White Paper but also Diplomatic Bluebook expressed official Japanese concern about North Korea's nuclear development as a source of instability for the security of Japan as well as the entire Asia-Pacific region. See for example, Boei cho (Defence Agency of Japan) (1995), *Nihon no Boei 1995* (Japan's Defence White Paper 1995), p.61; and Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) (1995) *Gaiko Seisho 1995* (Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook), p.19. For a full account of the development of North Korea's nuclear programme and disputes between North Korea and the International Atomic Agency (IAEA), see Michael Mazarr (1995), *North Korean and*

microcosm of the problems Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons (and in many respect, Japan's national security policy in general) faces in the post-Cold War era.[5]

North Korea's ambiguous nuclear development in 1993/4, its first missile test in May 1993 and the *Taepodong Missile* launch in August 1998 generated considerable unease within Japan. The impact of North Korea's recent military activities upon Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons must therefore be viewed in this context. Within Japan, these developments have triggered new debates over the Korean Peninsula Development Organisation (KEDO), the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), Reconnaissance Satellite programmes and, above all, the role of the US extended Deterrence (ED) towards Japan in the new post-Cold War era. The following section first analyses Japan's responses to North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Crises in order to clarify the complex nature of Japanese perceptions regarding security threats. North Korea has posed a wide range of security problems to Japan, revealing Japan's vulnerability to political as well as military threats. Second, the section examines Japan's approach to its national security in the post-Cold War era. This will highlight the contrast between continuity and change in Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons, triggered by the events of 1993/4 and 1998. Although Japan's traditional approach of close security co-operation with the US, based upon the 1960 US-Japanese Security Treaty, has been of crucial importance in dealing with the new nuclear and missile threats, it is symptomatic of the new environment that many have alluded to the inadequacy of responses based on this arrangement.

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the Bomb: A Case Study in Non-Proliferation (London: Macmillan); and Mitchell Reiss (1995), *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press), pp.231-319. For an analyses on North Korea's nuclear crisis and Japan's national security, see for example, Hideshi Takesada (1993), 'Kita no Kaku wa Nihon ni koso Kyoi- Kaiketsu tonoku Kita Chosen no Kaku Giwaku', *Toyo Keizai*, (July 10, 1993), pp.25-28.

[5] Japan formally acknowledged that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security" in the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of 1969, Article 4 (the so-called 'Korean article'). This statement was made in the context of the negotiation over the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 between PM Sato and President Nixon. This does not mean that Japan will be engaged in military commitments on the Korean Peninsula which is strictly banned by the Japanese constitution. Rather, this communiqué expressed Japan's intention of allowing the US with the 'prior consultation' to use US Okinawa bases for the security of the 'Far East' even after the reversion of Okinawa, and it stressed Japan's willingness to contribute more towards the US's defence activities in the region. For details, see Fuji Kamiya (1995), *Sengoshi no naka no Nichi Bei Kankei* (Tokyo: Shincho sha), pp. 135-7; John Welfield (1998), *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War American Alliance System* (London: Athlone), pp.249-50.

5.1. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Crises

5.1.1. Japan's Response to North Korea's Clandestine Nuclear Programme 1993/4

International concern about North Korea's ambiguous nuclear development started with its refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at its Yongbyon nuclear plant in the late 1980s. This was followed by Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 (which was later rescinded) and its test firing of Nodong-1 ballistic missiles (with a range of 1,000 kilometres) in the Sea of Japan in May 1993. North Korea's traditional tough rhetoric against the US and South Korea, its attack in 1983 at Rangoon Airport and on a South Korean civilian air plane in 1987, and its internationally isolated and closed political regime under the 'Kim dynasty', have served to reinforce North Korea's reputation as an unpredictable state in the context of the evolving security environment of Northeast Asia.[6]

Although the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Japan has been very limited, the image of North Korea in the eyes of many Japanese has always been negative due to the factors mentioned above. Although it must also be noted that North Korea is not the only state in the Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era which poses a potential nuclear and missile threat to Japan. China's military modernisation programme in the field of nuclear weapons and delivery systems has also attracted Japanese defence specialists' attention. However, in comparison with the information on North Korea, China's nuclear intention, although its open information is still limited, is considered more predictable. In particular, Japanese defence specialists point out two factors in their analysis of North Korea's nuclear development and its implications on Japan's national security: first, although details are unknown, it is apparent that North Korea's military capability has been increasing since the end of the Cold War; and second, due to its internationally isolated political regime, neither military details nor the strategic thinking of the political leaders is known to the outside world. In general terms, any assessment on the military threat posed by a particular state will be made by considering two factors: its military

[6] The possibility of guerrilla incursions into Japan cannot be easily denied due to the estimated large size of North Korea's Special Forces. For example, three North Korean agents crossed de-militarised Zone (DMZ) in May 1992 and two agents in October 1995. These activities are regarded as the North's intelligence gathering. Some also point out that these activities may aim at weakening the cease-fire on the DMZ. *Asahi Shimbun* (evening), October 17, 1995. North Korea sent a group of soldiers in charge of spying South Korean military activities in September 1997, and again in June 1998, despite the North's earlier apology regarding the 1997 spying activities. *Yomiuri Shimbun* June 23 and 24, 1998.

capabilities; and its 'will' or intentions, as judged from its traditional military and strategic thinking. In the case of North Korea, not only the first factor but especially the second are unknown. Inevitably, this increases international speculation; although having said that there have been attempts to discern the motivations behind North Korea's nuclear development. Many analysts have, for example, concluded that they are multi-dimensional, including: strategic concerns vis-à-vis its military rival South Korea[7]; the survival of the state[8], or to be precise, that of the 'Kim dynasty'[9]; and the playing of a 'nuclear bargaining card' in order to directly negotiate with the US.[10]

When the first nuclear crisis broke in 1993, numerous negotiations and diplomatic efforts involving the UN, the IAEA, South Korea, and above all, the US[11], were made before a compromise between the parties could be reached. This was outlined in the 'Agreed Framework' ('the Geneva Accord') of October 1994. In summary, under this 'Agreed Framework', Pyongyang agreed to the following actions and measures: (1), to freeze and dismantle its nuclear reactors in operation as well as those under construction, and replace them with light-water nuclear reactors;[12] and (2), accept the inspections of all its relevant nuclear sites by the IAEA. In return, North Korea obtained a comprehensive deal, both in political and economic terms, from the US. These included: (1), the establishment KEDO,

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[7] For example, Andew Mack (1991) claims that nuclear weapons would provide North Korea a strategic equaliser vis-à-vis its rival South Korea whose military is equipped with modern conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons can also be used to deter the US in case of another military confrontation in the Korean Peninsula. Andrew Mack (1991), 'North Korea and the Bomb', *Foreign Policy* 83 (Summer 1991), pp.91-3. Of course counter-arguments can be found as opposed to Mack's analysis. See for example, Seong Cheon (1992), 'National Security and Stability in East Asia: The Korean Peninsula', *PPNN Core Group Meeting Paper*, (November 1992), p.39.

[8] Paul Bracken (1993), 'Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea', *Survival,* Vol.35:3 (Autumn 1993), pp.137-153; James Cotton (1993), 'North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions', *Adelphi Paper*, 275 (March 1993), pp.94-106; Shuichiro Iwata (1994), 'Niccho Kankei no Kako to Genzai- Henka shita Gaiko Jiku', *Kaigai Jijo* (December 1994), pp.86-98.

[9] Masao Ogonogi (1994) 'Kaku ni 'Ikinokori' wo kakeru Kita Chosen to Nihon no Sentaku', *Ushio*, (June 1994), pp.138-147.

[10] See for example, Takeshi Igarashi, Mikio Sumiya, Haruki Wada, and Ryosuke Yasue (1994), 'Setogiwa Gaiko kara no Dakkyaku wo', *Sekai*, (August 1994), pp.p.198.

[11] At the height of the North Korean Crisis when there was a possibility of military confrontation between the US and North Korea in the spring 1994, former US President Jimmy Carter made a peace-making journey to Pyongyang which Kim Il Sung offered. The 'Carter-Kim summitry' in June 1994, provided the face-saving way for both the US and North Korea to shift away from confrontation and back to the negotiation table which resulted in the signing of the landmark Geneva Accord or the 'Agreed Framework' in October 1994. For the full account on the Geneva Accord, see for example, Samuel Kim (1995), 'North Korea in 1994', *Asian Survey*, Vol.35:1, (January 1995), pp.13-27.

[12] Light-water nuclear reactors are not suitable for the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

a multinational consortium in charge of supplying light-water reactors;[13] (2), the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea; and (3), the US's formal assurance to North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons (the no-first-use pledge).[14] So although the worst case scenario of a possible outbreak of a second Korean War seems to have been averted by this Agreement, many in Japan still regard North Korea as posing a continuing security problem.

Although Japan has closely co-operated with the US since the very beginning of the Crisis, differences in the degree of 'perceived threats' can be discerned in the two countries' reactions. While the US has regarded the North Korean Crisis as a severe challenge that could destroy the US's determined efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era and has approached this Crisis from a global perspective, Japan's anxiety has stemmed mainly from more specific factors. In particular, it has raised questions concerning the credibility of the US ED towards Japan and the linkages between North Korea and Japan's domestic security context. The relationship between North Korea and Japan (though there is no official diplomatic linkages between North Korea and Japan) has been prone to contention because several unsolved problems, such as the abduction of Japanese civilians since 1970s, the alleged drug smuggling into Japan by North Koreans, and the longer term historical enmity which continues to affect perceptions between the Japanese and the North Korean peoples.[15]

The differences between the United States and Japan on the North Korean issue have not been confined to the level of 'perceived threats', however. The counter-measures

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[13] KEDO's key members are the US, South Korea and Japan. This consortium agreed to provide the DPRK with funding and technology for the construction of the two light-water reactors by 2003. KEDO also agreed to supply oil to the DPRK before the completion of these reactors to compensate for any energy shortfall. The total cost of the reactors is estimated at $4 billion, of which South Korea and Japan agreed to provide $2 billion and $1 billion respectively. The rest is expected to be paid by other states, including the European Union (EU), the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN).

[14] The 'Geneva Accord' has been, so far, successful in containing the nuclear ambition of North Korea. However, this agreement is not without numerous problems. At least four flaws can be pointed out. They are:1) the Accord does not aim at investigating into the background of North Korea's ambiguous nuclear development (no investigations into Pyongyang's motivations); 2) the Accord does not deal with North Korea's previous ambiguous nuclear development; 3) the Accord does not deal with the problems related to North Korea's ballistic missile development; and 4) the roles that are to be played by the three major KEDO members, i.e., the US, South Korea, and Japan, are not clearly specified. For further analysis on the Agreed Framework and its problems, Hideshi Takesada (1996), 'Beicho Goi to Kongo no Kita Chosen no Kaku Giwaku Mondai', *Shin Boei Ronshu*, Vol.23: 3 (January 1996), pp.80-98. For further information on the 'Agreed Framework', see *Arms Control Today*, Vol.24: 10 (December 1994), p.19.

discussed were also quite different. Japan has supported the US's efforts to contain North Korea's nuclear developments only via diplomatic and economic measures. This can be observed in the Japanese government's counter-measures discussed during the first half of 1994. The government listed 10 measures of 'non-military' sanctions towards North Korea in the event of the United States's request for Japan's co-operation, which included a freeze on the trade and the flow of Japanese yen to North Korea, and a freeze on the flow of civilians and civil servants.[16] As demonstrated in these 10 measures, Japanese counter-measures towards the most serious military threats (i.e., North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles), were not discussed as these were deemed to be within the US's domain and so Japan would thus rely upon the US's capabilities as its ally.[17] The applicability of the 10 measures of 'non-military' sanctions was discussed between the United States and Japan in the process of the renewal of the 1978 Guidelines. However, even this research was proposed under a United States initiative.[18] Some defence analysts have pointed out that the '*Heiwa Boke*' (i.e., the lack of a sense of security and insecurity, or the prevailing but 'unfounded' optimism on such issues among the Japanese), as one of the reasons behind the perception gap (on threat perceptions).[19]

At the height of the Crisis in mid-1994, the United States and Japan were working closely on the possibility of US-led (through the UN) sanctions against North Korea, since various sanctions, ranging from economic sanctions to the blockade of North Korean shipping, would have required Japan's co-operation. As a result of discussions with the US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, who visited Japan in April 1994, the Japanese

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[15] Japan colonised Korea (today's both North and South Koreas) in 1910 until 1945.

[16] The ten measures of 'non-military' sanctions on North Korea are: 1) the suspension of the diplomatic normalisation talks with North Korea; 2) the freeze on the flow of civil servants of both states; 3) a strict application of immigration laws to non-Japanese into Japan; 4) the ban on the exchange of people related to cultural, sports, and science research activities; 5) the ban on special flights between the two states; 6) the ban on the export of military related technology and weapons; 7) the ban on the export of nuclear related materials; 8) the ban on trade; 9) the ban on the flow of capitals to North Korean industries, and the freeze on the flow of yen to North Korea; and 10) the ban on the flow of yen to North Korea. The summary of these ten measures of 'non-military' sanctions can be found in *the Asahi Shimbun*, June 4, 1994. A Japanese defence analyst points out that the Japanese government was seriously engaged in planning the counter-measures towards North Korea during the first half of 1994, but as soon as the sign of aversion of the direct confrontation was perceived at the time of President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, the sense of crisis within the government quickly disappeared. No.23, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997)

[17] This point was highlighted by No.23, a Japanese defence analyst; and No.28, a Japanese journalist. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 and January 1998, respectively)

[18] No.23, a Japanese defence analyst, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997)

[19] No.10, a JDA bureaucrat; and No.28, a Japanese journalist. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 and January 1998, respectively)

Defence Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that it would not be unconstitutional for Japan to provide logistical support for the blockade of North Korean shipping by the United States.[20] Japan accepted the sanctions options in general so long as they were imposed under the auspices of the UN, and offered its participation within the framework of the Constitution.[21]

As indicated above, however, some Japanese defence specialists have warned of the implications stemming from the lack of a sense of perceived threats among the Japanese (*'Heiwa Boke'*), combined with a lack of information about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and their delivery system. Shuichiro Iwata has emphasised the general strategic consequences of nuclear weapons when combined with an effective delivery system: within the range of missiles which deliver nuclear weapons, a nuclear state can hold 'hostage' the entire population of its neighbouring states. Therefore, theoretically speaking, Japan is already a 'hostage' of North Korea's nuclear weapons whether or not Pyongyang has the 'will' to overtly initiate such a situation. Iwata claims that the combination of the lack of information on North Korea and the lack of measures to verify Pyongyang's military capability, this general assessment of the strategic consequences of nuclear weapons possession is posing a great military threat to Japan's national security,[22] a threat which the majority of the Japanese do not even realise. Under such circumstances, Iwata argues that Japan should keep demanding that Pyongyang's accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear sites to prove its 'nuclear innocence' as one of the requirements for the continuation of normalisation talks between Japan and North Korea (which started in 1991 and were suspended at the beginning of the Crisis).[23] It is worth observing that in contrast to Iwata's assessment, Mikio Sumiya, argues that North Korea's nuclear weapons do not

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[20] *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23, 1994.
[21] *Asahi Shimbun,* March 22, 1994
[22] Iwata (1994), pp.94-5.
[23] The diplomatic normalisation talks between Japan and North Korea began with PM Noboru Takeshita's apology for North Korea during the Diet deliberation in March 1989. PM Takeshita's apology for war-time damage was followed by the dispatch of Makoto Tanabe of the Japan Socialist Party to Pyongyang. Tanabe gave Kim Il-Sung a letter from the former LDP President Shin Kanemaru which expressed Kanemaru's desire for improving the bi-lateral relationship. Following this letter, Kim Il Sung invited Kanemaru to North Korea in September 1990. This resulted in the release of two civilian Japanese seamen (who had been captured by North Korea) and the Joint Declaration (by North Korean Workers' Party and the LDP, not by the two governments) that called for normalisation talks between the two states. Following this Declaration, normalisation talks began in January 1991. The talks were blocked due to Japan's refusal of North Korea's demand: North Korea demanded Japan's compensation both during WWII and post-war period, while Japan only offered compensation during Japan's colonial rule over Korea. *The Asashi Shimbun,* January 31, 1991.

pose a threat, since Pyongyang's technological capability is very limited without Russia's support.[24] Other arguments are also made from humanitarian perspectives but these will be analysed later.

One new development during this Crisis was that Japan made efforts to co-ordinate its policy closely with South Korea, but within the traditional framework of the US-Japanese security relationship. The successful achievement of the 'Agreed Framework', including the establishment of KEDO, depends upon the close co-operation among three key states: the United States; Japan; and South Korea. During the Crisis, Japan and South Korea, for the first time, engaged in frequent consultation on security issues. Prime ministerial-level talks between the two states became frequent in response to the Crisis. There were also trilateral talks on nuclear policy with the United States and South Korea in June and November 1994.[25] Therefore, North Korea's nuclear crisis has acted as a catalyst for changing the strategic picture in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era, an outcome that was further strengthened by the 1998 Missile Crisis.

5.1.2. Japan's Response to North Korea's Missile Launch of 1998

On 31 August 1998, North Korea test-fired its latest *Taepodong-1* ballistic missile, with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometres, in the direction of Japan. The missile's booster section fell into the Sea of Japan, while its second stage flew over Japanese territory, plunging into the Pacific Ocean about 580 kilometres north-east of Misawa US air base. This unannounced launch was the first in more than five years.[26] While North Korea claimed that this was merely its first 'satellite' launch, denying foreign allegations that it was a ballistic missile, Japan remains stunned in the wake of the 'Taepodong missile shock', as the implications in terms of a direct security threat became apparent.[27]

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[24] Mikio Sumiya (1994), *Sekai*, p.198

[25] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 12, 1994.

[26] It is said that North Korea's missiles are all designed with Soviet technology supplied during the 1970s and 1980s. North Korea fired a much smaller Nodong-1 missile with the range of 1,000 kilometres on May 29, 1993, and Scud missiles in 1984 and 1986. *The International Herald Tribune*, September 1, 1998.

[27] *The Guardian*, September 5, 1998. A North Korean diplomatic source criticised Japan's response to its rocket launch, since Japan had also developed similar missile technology. Quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri*, September 4, 1998. C.f. Japan developed its first domestic civilian H-2 rocket in 1994 to launch civilian satellites. However, due to the H-2 rocket's capability which is similar to that of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), many overseas' observers responded to it negatively. See for example, 'Japan to 'Go Nuclear' in Asian Arms Race', *The Sunday Times*, January 30, 1994; and 'Japan: Minister Denies British Paper's Allegations on Nuclear Stance', *BBC Monitoring Service* (on Reuter Business Briefing), February 1, 1994.

Several reasons can be inferred as lying behind North Korea's intention to test-fire the Taepodong-1. First, it is said that North Korea wanted to demonstrate the capability of its missiles to foreign buyers.[28] Second, it is argued that the possession of the 'Taepodong Card' was crucial prior to the US-North Korean high-ranking bilateral negotiations, which started on the same day as the test firing. With an ability to strike at any part of Japan, including of course the American bases, Taepodong-1 certainly raised the stakes.[29] Third, the test-firing of the country's 'first satellite' was considered to be a part of the preparatory celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the state of North Korea in order to boost national morale.[30]

Due to the closed nature of North Korea's 'Kim Dynasty', it is difficult at this juncture to give a comprehensive analysis on the capability and the intention behind the North's action. This, however, does not alter the security impact North Korea has posed to Japan, despite United States' attempts to pacify the situation. The United States claimed, by mid-September 1998, that what was initially suspected as a two-staged ballistic missile was more likely to have been a three-stage rocket carrying a very small satellite (contained in the nose cone), whose third stage failed to launch.[31] In contrast, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) took the view that the rocket launch was a test firing of Taepodong-1 ballistic missiles. However, after analysing the data provided by the US Department of Defense, the JDA was unable to produce scientific counter-evidence to deny the US claims. By the end of October, Japan reluctantly admitted in the JDA's final report that the possibility of a failed satellite launch could not be ruled out, though it still implied that the

[28] It is believed that Iranian inspectors were visiting North Korea at both the time of Nodong-1 Missile in 1993 and 1998. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 1, 1998.

[29] The US has been demanding that North Korea allow inspectors to enter underground facilities under construction near Pyongyang, which many believe is prepared for producing nuclear weapons. This is the violation of the 1994 'Agreed Framework'. *The International Herald Tribune*, September 1, 1998.

[30] Celebrations centred on the opening of the Supreme People's Assembly and the election of Kim Jong Il as President. *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 1, 1998.

[31] The US cited three pieces of evidence on which it based such a conclusion: first, the third part of the rocket reached a maximum speed of about 7 km per second, close to the speed needed to put a satellite into orbit (which is 7.9 km per second); second, the maximum altitude attained by the rocket was approx. 200 km, about half that normally achieved by a ballistic missile; and third, the angle of the missile on the rise was not as steep as that of ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile would go to the outer atmosphere with a steep angle, then come down in a sharp parabola upon re-entering the atmosphere. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, October 31, 1998.

US's conclusion was based upon conjecture.[32]

Despite such findings, many Japanese defence specialists remain unconvinced by the US assessment. Some compare the test firing of 1998 with that of 1993, highlighting an increasing security threat for Japan. In 1993, the flight of the Nodong-1 was halted after 550 kilometres, despite having a range of 1,000 kilometres, and two North Korean survey ships monitored the results. In contrast, Taepodong-1 flew its full range, without any monitoring.[33] Similarly, some have argued that regardless of whether North Korea launched a 'satellite rocket' or a ballistic missile, the military threat posed to Japan is the same, as the principle behind a ballistic missile and a satellite launcher are the same.[34]

The perception gap is not limited to the assessment of the missile's capability. The United States and South Korea do not envisage the same security threats as Japan. Indeed, Japan's unprecedented firm response has been the most vocal throughout the entire region.[35] For

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[32] Technically speaking, the basic technology required for a ballistic missile is similar to that of a civilian satellite. Of course the programmatic software is different, as is its flight trajectory. A missile-test requires an assessment of its accuracy, and the rocket is launched much higher than a civilian satellite. The flight pattern does not matter for a missile test, while a civilian satellite would have to be launched towards east since the rocket needs the speed of the earth. After the initial launching period, a satellite must fly at the lowest height to save energy, the height just above the atmosphere (i.e., a height of approx. 100-km). *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1998.

[33] Satoshi Morimoto, cited in *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998.

[34] The programme difference between a ballistic missile and a satellite is whether the warhead of a rocket, which is detached from the rest of the body after entering the outer atmosphere, would fall towards the earth (in the case of a ballistic missile) or keep travelling in the space (in the case of a satellite). c.f. It is often said that the North possesses highly-enriched plutonium to produce a couple of nuclear devices. However, the North has not yet undertaken any nuclear test. To assess the explosive capability of nuclear devices either an actual nuclear test or a sub- critical experiment with computer simulation, which requires a high level of technology, is necessary. It is assumed by nuclear specialists that North Korea does not possess such a high level of technology for the simulation. The North, at present, is considered to lack the technological know-how. Having said that however, assessments vary. The plutonium extracted from the North's experimental nuclear plants between 1992-4 is said to be enough to produce 1 or 2 nuclear bombs. Yet, without the ability to test, it is considered that North Korea has not yet developed a nuclear warhead. To mount a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile is also highly problematic requiring a high level of technology to minimise the size of the weapon, down to 1 ton in weight and 1 meter in diameter. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 1998.

[35] China has been the most inactive player in the region regarding the North's behaviour. China had been one of the few friendly states towards North Korea until 1992 when it established diplomatic ties with South Korea. Since then the bi-lateral relationship between China and North Korea has cooled, and China's response to North Korea's test-firing was muted. The Chinese government made it clear that the North Korean government did not give any notice to China before or after the test-firing. The Chinese vice Prime Minister merely suggested that the test-firing may have been related to the celebration of the appointment of Kim Jong-Il as the National Leader. The reasons behind China's quiet response are said to be two-fold: first, China is stunned by the lack of warning; and second, since China has been managing its delicate diplomatic balance with both Koreas since its opening of its diplomatic ties with the South, it did not want to damage the relationship with the North by openly criticising it. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998. This does not

the United States, the most urgent and important international/ regional security question is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[36] In this context, freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, as specified in the 1994 'Agreed Framework', has more significance than the launch of a missile.[37] Hence, even shortly after the test-firing, the United States continued to hold out the 'carrot' in the form of further food aid of about one hundred to two hundred thousand tons to Pyongyang,[38] rather than the 'stick' that was being shown to Iraq.[39]

South Korea seemed to be least shocked by the North's actions[40] and continued to pursue its 'sunshine policy', under President Kim Dae Jung, of promoting business and cultural contacts between the two.[41] This approach was again emphasised in the aftermath of the North's submarine incident in December 1998.[42] In light of the fact that South Korea had already been within the range of North Korea's Scud-missiles (whose range is much shorter than the Nodong and Taepodong missiles) its more cautious reaction to the Taepodong-1 missile launch, which did not pose any new military threat to the South, became discernible.

Unlike the United States and South Korea, Japan's response to events was initially to

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mean that China is free from anxiety regarding this incident. Like other regional states, China is concerned about the 'uncertainty' in the Korean Peninsula. China's biggest concern however is the continuing development of the US-led TMD research, which gained further impetus by this Crisis. China thinks that if Taiwan joins TMD system, China's ballistic missiles would become less credible in order to deter Taiwan's independence.

[36] Section 4 'Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998*, (US Government Printing Office), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/

[37] Yasushi Tomiyama (1998) 'Nihon no Anzen yori Heiki Kakusan wo Kenen suru Beikoku', *Sekai Shuho*, September 22, 1998, pp.10-11.

[38] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 10, 1998.

[39] US and British forces attacked Baghdad for four days with an air assault starting from December 17, 1998, as a punishment for Iraq's refusal to the UN on-sight inspectors to its military facilities which were suspected to manufacture nuclear weapons.

[40] South Korea, which relies upon US satellite information, accepted the US's claims that the rocket launch was a failed attempt of an civilian 'satellite'. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 2, 1998. On the difference between the US and South Korean responses, see 'Kita no Kaku Giwaku de Beikan ni Ondosa', *AERA*, December 7, 1998, p.17

[41] *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998. The South also confirmed at the Ministerial level meeting on September 1, 1998, its policy of 'the division of politics and economy' as well as the promotion of civilian level exchanges. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998.

[42] South Korean naval forces sank a North Korean submersible vessel in a fire-fight on December 18, 1998, 100 kilometres south of Koje island, South Korea. The body of an armed North Korean frogman was found. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, December 19, 1998.

suspend elements of the rapprochement with North Korea.[43] Prior to August 1998, the Japanese government had tried to bring North Korea into the international community and prevent its further isolation.[44] However, on launch of the missile, without prior warning, the Japanese government immediately imposed two sanctions against North Korea: first, negotiations on normalisation between North Korea and Japan were suspended; and second, Japan's contribution to North Korea in terms of humanitarian aid (such as food) and funding to KEDO was suspended (the KEDO sanction was later lifted). Japan was aware that its efforts to establish a better bilateral relationship, stemming from Japan's agreement in August 1997 that the two states would resume at an early stage the suspended bilateral talks on diplomatic normalisation with the North, would regress.[45] However, the fact that the incident violated two international treaties on the maintenance of the security of civilian aeroplanes and civilian vessels as well as creating a state of shock on the part of the government was seen as more than a justification for this stance.[46]

The Japanese government's condemnation was fully supported by the policy-makers, as shown in the adoption by both the Japanese Upper and lower Houses of diet resolutions shortly after the incident. These resolutions demanded that the government pursue a firm response to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles and condemn North Korea's test-firing as a severe threat to the peace and the security of Asia.[47] However, when it came to the question of how to respond to the North opinion was rather divided beyond

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[43] Japan protested both at the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, pointing out that even if North Korea attempted to launch a 'satellite' as Pyongyang claims, it still posed a serious problem that directly concerns both Japan's national security and peace and stability in the region. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 23, 1998.

[44] Prior to the test-firing, US officials did warn Japanese Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura, about the possibility of a launch, at the US-Japanese Foreign Ministerial meetings in Washington, D.C, in mid-August 1998. Following the US warning, the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) sent a Easis Fleet to the Sea of Japan with radar detective capability. The radar is able to detect movements within a couple of hundred kilometres, which is suitable for observing the North. The JDA assumed that the North's missile would be launched in the same direction (off the Sea of Japan) as five years ago. According to a senior Japanese governmental official, Japan's threat perception vis-à-vis North Korea's missile, however, did not include the possibility of a missile flying over Japanese territory. On its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) repeatedly asked North Korea not to disturb the stability of Northeast Asia, at unofficial meetings in Beijing before the test-firing. However, the North Korean delegates gave no answer, and Japan's diplomatic pressure on the North had proven to be in vain. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998.

[45] Due to Japan's condition for the normalisation talks, i.e., the unsolved issue of the alleged abduction of Japanese citizens by the North since 1970s, the resumption has been brought to a standstill.

[46] The two treaties are 1) the International Civilian Aviation Organisation Treaty (the ICAO Treaty) and 2) the International Maritime Organisation Treaty (the IMO Treaty). Toshiki Mogami (1998), 'Kitachosen 'Misailu Jiken' to Nihon', *Sekai*, (November 1998), pp.185-6.

[47] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 4, 1998.

the non-binding resolutions. Some argued against postponing signing of the funding for KEDO, as this might harden the North's confrontational posture. Others argued that Japan must impose further economic sanctions. Some hard-liners within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)[48] requested that the government freeze the assets of the North Korean minorities living in Japan, and take measures to stop the flow of money from Japan to North Korea.[49]

The existence of the perception gap among the United States, South Korea and Japan was an obvious advantage for North Korea, which saw a 'window of opportunity' stemming from a potential exploitation of this gap. The North, for example, as was the case in 1993/4, only considered the United States as a serious negotiating partner. This has been repeatedly observed by its reluctance, as well as rejection, of any multilateral based security negotiation or bilateral talks.[50] Under such circumstances, Japan has been unable to effectively influence Pyongyang's behaviour. This has made Japan realise the importance of closing the perception gap and make efforts to strengthen the trilateral political arrangement as the most effective way of dealing with North Korea.

This initiative has increased the diplomatic intimacy between South Korea and Japan. Since the outbreak of the crisis, both countries have been engaged in frequent security consultations, in addition to the increasing US-Japanese and trilateral security consultations.[51] Ministerial-level security talks between Japan and South Korea culminated in the declaration of the Joint Communiqué following summit talks between Prime Minister Obuchi and President Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo in October 1998. The Communiqué and the attached action plan, confirmed the two states' determination to

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[48] Since January 15, 1999, the new governing coalition has been formed between the LDP and the Liberal Party (*Jiyuto*).

[49] In response to the requests from LDP hard-liners, the Cabinet Secretary Nonaka expressed a negative view. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998.

[50] North Korea has always been reluctant to attend the Four Party talks in Geneva (both Koreas, China, and the US), and completely rejected Japan's recent proposal of the Six Party talks (i.e., the Four Party plus Russia and Japan).

[51] As early as September 1, 1998, South Korean Defence Minister, visiting Tokyo, had meetings with Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Director-General of the Defence Agency, confirming the close security co-operation between South Korea and Japan. The states decided to strengthen as well as expand their bi-lateral defence ties, which included the joint exercise between Japan's Maritime SDF and South Korean Navy on rescue procedures. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 2, 1998. At the meeting between the Director-General of the JDA and South Korean Defence Minister in Seoul at the beginning of January 1999, less than a month after the North Korean submarine incident, the two states agreed to establish a crisis

enhance their security ties in addition to trilateral defence co-operation.[52] The proceedings heralded the beginning of a new era for the security relationship between the two states, something almost unimaginable up to this point due to the traumatic history between the two.[53] In the face of North Korea's unpredictable development, the three states have realised the necessity of activating simultaneous efforts to strengthen the trilateral as well as the respective bilateral relationship among them for the stability of Northeast Asia.[54] For the successful development of this new approach, however, many tasks lay ahead. For Japan, as discussed later, it requires a detailed security deliberation on a domestic level as well as a subtle security policy co-ordination with the other two states.

5.1.3. The Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)

Japan's final assessment at the time of 1994 on the military threats posed by North Korea's nuclear development was that even if it had developed a couple of nuclear weapons, they were likely to be inoperative, due to technological shortcomings (especially of the delivery system). Japan assumed that the possibility of North Korea directly attacking Japan was very low as long as the US-Japanese security relationship remained stable. Thus, the prognosis was that the Crisis should be manageable in the near term so long as North Korea complies with its obligations, which were given in exchange for the 1994 'Agreed Framework'.[55] Based upon this final assessment, Japan decided to pay the financial costs involved in order to make KEDO successful.[56] Some have criticised the basis on which the KEDO arrangement deal was struck: that KEDO is a reward for Pyongyang as an exchange for its primitive nuclear capability. However, without KEDO, there are no other measures to contain the nuclear threat of North Korea.

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communication line, similar to 'hot-line' between the US and Japan. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 8, 1999.

[52] *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 10, 1998.

[53] Japan colonised Korea as a single entity and ruled from 1910 until 1945. Hideshi Takesada (1998), 'Nikkan Shinjidai no Makuake', *Voice*, (December 1998), pp.110-119.

[54] The US has bi-lateral security treaties with South Korea and Japan, respectively, but there is not a military alliance between South Korea and Japan. The US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, during his 7-day visit to Japan and South Korea in January 1999, emphasised the importance of co-operation amongst the three states in the event of military emergencies on and around the Korean Peninsula. Almost at the same time, the Director-General of the JDA and South Korean President in their meeting in Seoul, reconfirmed the importance of working closely together with the US to deal with the North, in particular concerning the North's suspected underground nuclear and missile launch facilities. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, January 9, 1999.

[55] No.24, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

[56] The Japanese Diet approved Japan's financial contribution to the KEDO (US $10 billion) on June 30,

The future of KEDO, however, is full of uncertainties.[57] Although the United States does not contribute to KEDO financially under the present arrangement, the Republican-based US Congress is not willing to support the development of KEDO in general. On its part, many Japanese think it is far more important for Japan's national security to financially assist South Korea and the countries in Southeast Asia that have been severely hit by the economic crisis since the summer of 1997 rather than 'rewarding' North Korea. Many Japanese specialists are concerned that if the progress of KEDO is hampered, a second North Korea nuclear crisis might develop.[58]

This concern was justified by developments on the Korean Peninsula in 1998. KEDO issued a draft resolution on 31 August 1998, reconfirming the commitment of all the governments involved in the project. However, due to the North's test-firing of the missile on the very same day, the three major players of the KEDO project, namely, the United States, South Korea and Japan, initially postponed the signing of the resolution as a protest. Although the project was later resumed, Japan was the last and the most reluctant to sign the resolution.[59] KEDO posed a dilemma for Japan. On the one hand, Japan had no option but to positively respond to the request from the United States, and to some extent South Korea, on the early resumption of Japan's financial contribution to the KEDO project. At the meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (the SCC) in September 1998, Japan was strongly urged to lift its freeze on KEDO funding by the United States despite the perception that North Korea's attitude remained unchanged by Japan's temporary sanction.[60] The US Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright, clearly pointed out that KEDO should be treated as a separate issue from that of missile testing.[61]

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[57] No.24, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

[58] No.24, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

[59] Japan agreed to the funding on October 20, 1998. For a chronology of the events on the Korean Peninsula, see 'Documento: Gekido no Namboku Chosen', *Sekai* (December 1998), pp.149-157. The Japanese Diet approved the funding to KEDO on June 30, 1999.

[60] The US-Japanese Security Consultative Committee is the highest rank of the bi-lateral security meetings. Since the Japanese Foreign Minister, Director-General of the Defence Agency, the US Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defence attend the meetings, it is often called the '2 plus 2' meetings. A summary of the SCC joint statement can be found in *Asahi Shimbun*, September 21, 1998.

[61] Amongst the US policy-makers the importance of KEDO remains contested. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the US was to provide 2 light-water nuclear reactors (whose construction began in August 1997), in exchange for the North's freezing of its nuclear development. During the construction period, the US is supposed to provide the North with 50 tons of Heavy oil supply per year. For their purchase (US $60 million), the US administration needs the approval of both Houses, which has yet to be achieved. In 1998, it was only able to supply less than half of the promised oil to the North, thereby offending the North. In both

South Korea's President Kim also requested Japan's early resumption of KEDO funding during his visit to Japan in October 1998.[62] Since Japan and South Korea are the major financial backers of KEDO, which constitutes the biggest channel the North has with the outside world, Japan's contribution is of crucial importance.

On the other hand, however, Japan's lifting of its KEDO sanction following requests without any guarantee of compliance from North Korea has already sent a wrong message to Pyongyang: it seems that the North considers Japan's early condemnation as merely an expression of emotional anger, and consequently assumes that it can ignore Japan, since it is 'obedient' to any request made by the United States. Under such circumstances, it can be argued that North Korea sacrificed its relationship with Japan in order to obtain a better deal in negotiations with the United States by showing the 'Taepodong Card'. Furthermore, the US's acceptance of the North's way of 'doing business' leaves many believing that Japan's security concerns have been neglected in international negotiations, be it the US-North Korea talks or the four party talks, where Japan is not a member. Prime Minister Obuchi, during his meeting with the US President in September 1998, proposed the establishment of six party talks (both Koreas, the US, China, Russia and Japan), but the United States did not welcome the idea, as the US prefers bilateral negotiation to multilateral talks, as the latter may involve a complex matrix of discussion among the interests of each party.

Furthermore, this highlights a more fundamental question. The US's rejection of Japan's proposal for the six party talks keeps Japan out of the discussion over the North Korean nuclear and missile issue, at a time when Japan has perceived the most direct security threat since the Korean Missile Crisis of August 1998. On the one hand, Japan has, to some extent, always had some concerns over the effectiveness of its security policy of relying upon another state (i.e., the United States) for Japan's own security. This concern

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Houses, many consider the 1994 Agreed Framework as 'a policy of appeasement' towards the dictator. Benjamin Gillman, Chief on the US Commission on International Relations at the Lower House, quoted in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 19, 1998.

[62] *Asahi Shimbun*, September 3, 1998. This does not mean that South Korea has been inactive toward the Crisis, however. South Korea's Ministry of Science and Technology announced on September 23, 1998 that it aims to launch its domestic civilian satellites by 2005, 5 years sooner than originally planned, in response to North Korea's 'satellite launch'. Also, the recently published Seoul's *Defence White Paper* (1998-99) in October, 1998 set out the plan to increase the number of US service personnel stationed in South Korea, from 37,000 under normal circumstances up to 64,000 in the event of a crisis. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 2,

has been increased by North Korean developments in the 1990s, which has led to a widening perception gap between the United States and Japan. On the other hand, however, Japan has no alternative to this traditional bilateral security approach. As repeated, since 1945 Japan has relied upon the US ED as the 'ultimate security guarantee' vis-à-vis external military threats while also maintaining its defence principles of '*Senshu Boei*' (defence only military forces) and '*Kibanteki Boeiryoku Koso*' (the maintenance of the basic defence capabilities which are sufficient enough to repel a limited and small scale invasion against Japan). In addition, there is no regional multilateral security arrangement in East Asia unlike in Europe, where one can find the existence of organisations such as NATO.

Japan's lifting of its KEDO sanctions also caused domestic problems: the Japanese government had difficulties in explaining to the Japanese public, as well as the LDP hard-liners, about the sudden reverse of its policy. Among the North Korea watchers in Japan, both positive and negative voices were heard concerning Japan's decision to lift the KEDO sanction. Those who emphasised the importance of Japan's funding to KEDO highlighted the danger of giving a wrong message to North Korea that Japan was not observing the international agreement under which Japan agreed to pay $1 billion (out of US $4.6 billion in total) to KEDO projects. Such actions would give North Korea the necessary justification to resume its nuclear programme, which is currently frozen by the 1994 'Agreed Framework'.[63] Recommencing funding could prevent such a dire consequence. On the other hand, many regarded the postponement of KEDO payment as an appropriate response to North Korea's actions.[64] Such voices were also negative about the role of the United States, in particular when the US agreed on the construction of light-water reactors at the time when Japan had not even officially approved its own share of financial contribution towards KEDO. This increased the anxiety that the United States was complying with the North's way of 'doing business'.

The development of KEDO requires Japan to strike the right balance between subtle political negotiations and co-ordination with two other states in order to close the security

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[63] Hajime Izumi, in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 6, 1998.

[64] Masao Ogonogi (1998), 'Kiki Dasshutsu no Tenkai Hirakezu 'Hijyojitaisei' wo Seidoka', *Sekai Shuho*, (September 29, 1998), pp.6-9.

perception gap and domestic consensus-building by calculating the long-term benefit of KEDO from a security perspective. Japan must regard KEDO as a fundamental pillar for its long-term security, as its collapse would certainly bring about catastrophic consequences.

5.1.4. Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)[65]

The events of 1993/4 and 1998 have given increasing impetus to Japan's further participation in the US-led TMD system. At the meeting of the Japan-US SCC in September 1998, the two states decided to undertake joint research on TMD, beginning in fiscal year 1999. Japan officially decided to focus upon the research of a navy-based TMD system, which can be used by the Maritime SDF.[66] This will consist of a proposed study period of five years, and total costs of approximately US $170 to 260 million.[67]

At least three benefits can be pointed to following Japan's decision to participate in TMD research. First, judging from a strategic perspective, it seems inevitable that Japan will develop a new defensive system against the possibility of greater numbers of ballistic missiles in Northeast Asia. These include: Russia's SS-21 (with a range of 120kms), SS-23 (500kms), Scud-B (280-300kms); China's CSS-2 (with range 2,500- 3,000kms), M-9 (600kms) and M-11 (300kms); and North Korea's Scud-B and C (350kms), No-dong 1 (1,000kms), Tepodong-1 (estimated 2,000kms), and Taepodong-2 (estimated at 5,000kms).[68] Combined with the US's nuclear retaliation capability, TMD is considered to

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[65] TMD has its roots in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of the mid to late-1980s. The limitations of the Patriot missiles as an anti-missile defence, demonstrated during the 1990-91 Gulf War, revived the discussion of anti-missile defence system. China's rapid modernisation of its missile system since the end of the Gulf War, and North Korea's missile development drastically increased the impetus for the development of a new defence system. Discussions between the US and Japan on an anti-missile system against North Korean threat started in November 1993. Since December 1993 Japan has engaged in basic research on the TMD system. Shunji Taoka (1999) 'Machigai darake no TMD rongi', *Gunshuku Mondai Shiryo*, (January 1999), pp.48-55.

[66] Prior to the North's test-firing, the then Prime Minister Hashimoto demanded that 1) the JDA and MOFA assure that TMD research would continue after the Clinton presidency; and 2) both ministries work with the Cabinet legislation bureau for the legal adjustment of the 1969 Diet resolution on the 'peaceful use of the outer space' to fulfil the requirement for Japan's particiapation in the TMD. While these tasks were being undertaken, the Hashimoto Cabinet was replaced by the Obuchi Cabinet in the summer of 1998. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 28, 1998.

[67] This is based upon a dollar-yen exchange rate of US $1= 115 yen. In addition to NTWD (navy-based) system, TMD includes three other programmes: 1) PAC 3 (land-based); 2) NAD (navy-based); and 3) THAAD (land-based). The US experiments of the THAAD system have been unsuccessful so far. Japan is surrounded by sea, hence the JDA considers a navy-based TMD system is to be the most appropriate. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 22, 1998.

[68] Satoshi Morimoto (1997), 'Tairyo Hakai Heiki Kakusan no Kyoi ni taisuru Nihon no Taio- TMD to Nihon

increase the level of deterrence against the use of ballistic missiles by a potential adversary.[69] Though the capability of the TMD system would never be 100 percent, without TMD Japan would remain totally exposed to a ballistic missile attack.

In light of this, the implications of TMD towards Japan's national defence as a whole must be considered. Some point out that the Japanese government has already given the explanation to the public that Japan must financially contribute to KEDO since it freezes North Korea's further nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, the Japanese government's explanations that the country must participate in the highly expensive TMD project, since this system will protect Japan from North Korea's nuclear weapons, contradicts previous policy. Furthermore, TMD could pose revolutionary implications upon Japan's defence thinking. As seen in Japan's National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO), Japan has traditionally focused upon the maintenance of the 'basic defence capabilities' which are sufficient enough to repel a limited and small scale invasion against Japan ('*Kiban teki Boeiryoku Koso*'). This is because Japan does not want to become a 'power vacuum' in the region, which might further destabilise the regional security environment. Thus Japan's full participation in TMD might fundamentally change Japan's existing defence policy from the traditional posture of self-defence, against conventional weapons, into a new defence system against ballistic missiles.[70]

Although the argument that if the US ED is credible TMD is unnecessary is theoretically logical, as TMD is a defence measure in the event of deterrence failure actual defence policy is more complicated. During the Cold War, due to the large nuclear capability (both quantity and quality) of the Soviet Union, it was technically impossible to create any effective defence measures against nuclear weapons. Hence, the emphasis was given to 'dissuasion', i.e., nuclear deterrence. Contrary to this, the advocates of TMD argue that the technical feasibility of effective defence measures against a small number of nuclear weapons is higher in the post-Cold War era, at least in theory. With the increasing possibility that nuclear weapons might be used by the leaders of nuclear threshold states, or, to some extent, by mishaps, it becomes increasingly important for Japan to have some defence measures in the event of failure of deterrence. Therefore, the supporters of TMD

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no Anzen Hosho', (unpublished paper) April 1997.

[69] Shinichi Ogawa (1998), 'Misairu Boeimo no Jyuyosei', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 9, 1998.

argue that Japan's participation in the US-led TMD is not because of a declining credibility of the US ED towards Japan in the post-Cold War. Rather, Japan's participation is to supplement existing structures from both a strategic and political perspective.

As the second benefit of Japan's joining to the US-led TMD system, it is often pointed out that Japan will enhance the political intimacy of the US-Japanese security relationship. The US's determination to promote further joint research with Japan was clearly demonstrated by the visit of US vice-Deputy Secretary of Defence, Campbell, shortly after the North's test-firing. During his visit, Campbell emphasised the importance of Japan's participation to the TMD.[71] On its part, Japan recognises that if the country wants to maintain a stable US-Japanese security relationship, it has no option but to participate in the US-led TMD system. When the Japanese government initially agreed to participate in 1993, limiting itself to the field of research, it did so mainly for political reasons.[72] Failure to participate would inevitably send a wrong message to the United States that Japan was gradually moving away from the decades-old US-Japanese security system. A Japanese senior defence specialist argues that TMD is a 'testament' of the US-Japanese Security Treaty in the post-Cold War era,[73] and its political importance was emphasised in an internal memorandum of MOFA, which was written in February 1995.[74] Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage also warned that Japan's rejection of these developments would trigger the collapse of the US-Japanese Security Treaty.[75]

Third, TMD is considered as an effective bargaining chip for a non-nuclear Japan since it is impossible for Japan to persuade a potential adversary to freeze the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile development without having any cards. Some point out the effectiveness of the TMD vis-à-vis China which, as will be discussed later, is actively opposing the US-led joint TMD system. As already mentioned, China has allegedly been

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[70] Morimoto (1997), pp.10-11.
[71] *Asahi Shimbun*, September 28, 1998.
[72] This point was emphasised by most of the interviewees in Tokyo. (Tokyo, Japan, November 1997-January 1998)
[73] No.24, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)
[74] Asahi Shimbun Kaku Shuzai han (1995), *Kaku Haizetsu eno Michi*, (Osaka: Asahi Shimbun Kaku Shuzai han), p.240. On the evolution of the US-Japanese co-operation on TMD system, see Yoshihisa Komori (1993), 'Reisengo no Nichibei Ampo Kyoryoku no Kirifuda', *Chuo Koron* (July 1993), pp.57-62.
[75] Richard Armitage, quoted in Asahi *Shimbun*, July 28, 1997.

rapidly modernising its nuclear weapons system since the beginning of the 1990s to catch up with the United States and Russia. Hence, China seems to consider that the TMD will degrade its nuclear deterrent capability. China also refuses to join any kind of multilateral arms control talks such as START III in order, some believe, to buy time to build up its nuclear capability. But to persuade China to join these multilateral negotiations, it has been argued that some bargaining chip is required, such as TMD, as was in the case in NATO's 1979 Dual Track Decision.[76] Herein also lies the crux for Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world: on the one hand, it is important for Japan to continue to promote regional and global co-operation in the nuclear field by inducing other states with Japan's technological and financial assistance; on the other hand, it is also necessary for Japan to have as many cards as possible to obtain a better result on the negotiating table.

It was noted that Japan's traditional defence principle has been '*Senshu Boei*' (i.e., a defensive rather than offensive capability), thus at least in theory TMD fits into this principle. However, Japan's decision to fully participate in the TMD system has already revealed fundamental problems related to technical, economic, strategic, and above all, political factors, all of which will have a major impact on Japan's future security policy. First, the technical feasibility (i.e., the credibility) of TMD remains unproven. Experimentation with the land-based Theatre High Attitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, which is at the heart of the US's TMD development, has so far proved unsuccessful, and the US Department of Defence is said to admit that the development of the THAAD system might be re-assessed following repeated failure.[77] A former JDA senior official, in quantifying TMD, argued that the success rate of destroying ballistic missiles with the range of more than 1,000 kilometres in the air would be less than one in a million.[78] Such scepticism is also widespread in the US, since in the era of MIRVed nuclear missiles the attacker has more advantage than the defender.[79]

Second, the costs of TMD are astronomical. Since the fiscal year 1995, the Japanese

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[76] No.24, a Japanese defence specialist. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)
[77] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 1998.
[78] Tetsuya Nishimoto, 'Hou seibi mo Kadai', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 1998.
[79] Professor Postol of MIT, USA, in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 28, 1997. This point was also emphasised in interviews with No.10, No.14, No.24, and No.28. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997-

government has spent approximately $4.9 million in total for the research on the joint TMD system. Even if steady progress is made in developing a navy-based TMD system, it is said that it would take at least 10 years to implement the system, and cost Japan some $2.4 billion.[80] According to one estimation done by the ***Asahi Shimbun***, it will take 20 years for the navy-based TMD to be fully deployed both by the United States and Japan (whether North Korea would still exist by then remains an open question). They estimated the costs at between $11 billion to $20 billion. Given that the entire cost of the SDF in total in the fiscal year 1998 was approximately $8.2 billion (940 billion yen), expenditure on TMD would amount to the equivalent of 2-3 years of the entire SDF budget.[81] At a time when the Japanese people have assumed that the end of the Cold War would lead to the reduction of defence spending, it is difficult for the Japanese government to persuade its people and some opposition parties of the importance of this highly expensive new defence system.[82] With such a dramatic shift in defence spending priorities, the need for extensive changes in defence thinking would also be necessary.

Third, a domestic consensus has yet to be achieved on TMD. While the LDP and the conservative Liberal party advocate the necessity of TMD for Japan's national security, the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party have expressed dissent. The Communists argue that TMD, as well as the proposed reconnaissance satellite, would increase military tension in the region, while the Socialists have criticised the TMD as an emotional response to the Missile Crisis. The Democratic Party, which is a mixture of both conservatives and social democrats, and the largest opposition party to the ruling LDP at the time of the deliberation, while expressing an understanding of the importance of these new security system, faces an internal rift between party members with different political opinions.[83]

The fourth factor was the question of legality arising out of Japan's participation in the

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January 1998)

[80] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 1998.

[81] Taoka (1999), pp.53-4; and *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19. 1998.

[82] The Japanese government announced in 1997 that Japan would reduce its defence spending by $900 billion over the next three years. Satoshi Morimoto (1997), The summary of the discussion on TMD amongst the representatives of US, China, and Japan, entitled 'Theatre Missile Defence and East Asian Security Meeting', (June 16-7, 1997, MIT, USA), (Unpublished); and Isaku Okabe, 'Kokumin no Rikai wo eru Hitsuyo', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 22, 1997.

[83] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 4, 1998.

TMD programme. This stems from a 1969 Diet Resolution on 'the Peaceful Use of Outer Space', which restricts Japan's use and development of space only for peaceful purposes.[84] The Japanese government has traditionally interpreted the 1967 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which only bans the deployment of weapons of mass destruction with 'offensive' functions, as strictly 'non-military' use. Since the deployment of the TMD requires the use of space, it was initially said that the TMD might violate the 1969 Diet resolution, despite its defensive role. This interpretation, however, was later suspended, clearing the way for further research on TMD. Furthermore, its opponents questioned the constitutionality of Japan's participation to the US-led TMD system. As South Korea and Taiwan might join the system, along with the United States and Japan, such a 'multi-national' defence system might be considered as a form of 'collective self-defence' which is prohibited by the Japanese Constitution.[85]

Fifth, China's strong rejection of Japan's participation in the TMD project has also been a factor that has not gone unnoticed. Japan's decision to commence development in 1993 caused a negative reaction from China, which regards it as a threat that would 'degrade' China's nuclear deterrent in the region.[86] China has always stated that it would not use military force for the unification with Taiwan, except in the case of a foreign state actively assisting Taiwan's self-declared independence. Some Chinese defence specialists are concerned that Japan's Taiwan policy is not clear, and that Taiwan, under the protection of TMD and with support from a third country, might declare independence without fear of a Chinese missile attack.[87] China has been warning the United States and Japan that the introduction of the TMD in the Northeast Asia region would trigger a new regional arms race. In response, some Japanese defence specialists argue that it is inappropriate for the Japanese government to bind its own national defence policy in with a third country.[88]

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[84] Susumu Takai (1994), 'Sen-iki Dando Misailu Boei to Kokusai Ho', *Shin Boei Ronshu*, Vol.22:2, pp.24-5. See also Shuichiro Iwata, Susumu Takai, and Masamitsu Yamashita (1994), *TMD* (Tokyo: TBS Britanika), pp.225-235.

[85] Asahi Shimbun Kaku Shuzai han (1995), pp.235-242. Under the UN Charter, Japan has the right to collective as well as individual self-defence. However, Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defence is prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution. Okazaki (1986), p.81.

[86] Michael Green & Benjamin Self (1996), 'Japan's Changing China Policy, *Survival,* Vol.38:2 (Summer 1996), p.45; and Yan Xuetong (1999), 'Theatre Missile Defence and Northeast Asian Security', *The NonProliferation Review*, (Spring/ Summer 1999), Vol.6:3, pp.65-74; and http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/ch_tmd.htm

[87] Liu Huaqiu, one of the Chinese participants to the 'Theater Missile Defense and East Asian Security Meeting' (June 16-17, 1997) MIT, USA. (untitled and unpublished)

[88] No.23, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997)

Different opinions can be heard within Japan regarding the relationship between Japan's joining to the TMD and China's responses. As noted earlier, some argue that TMD could be used to induce any militarily assertive state to come to the negotiation table (be it North Korea or China). On the other hand, others argue that Japan's TMD participation should not go beyond what is regarded as the actual need of protecting itself from a possible ballistic missile attack.

Sixth, although Japan recognises the importance of joining the TMD from the political perspective of maintaining stable US-Japanese relations, it is clearly aware of the potential political friction between the two states. It has already been predicted that both states would face problems brought about by the complex nature of the introduction of a new defence system, which touches upon two crucial aspects of national security and business. This was the case in the development of the FSX fighter aircraft in the 1980s,[89] which was plagued by difficulties over technology-sharing and costs. Many inside Japan are already concerned that the TMD might produce the same effects.[90]

Thus, TMD has posed various questions about Japan's national security. Above all, the whole TMD debate highlighted the role and the credibility of the US ED towards Japan in the post-Cold War era. The missile threat from North Korea raises a fundamental question: namely the strategic relationship between TMD and the US ED towards Japan in the post-Cold War era.[91] Japan has always (at least officially) argued that the US ED worked effectively against the former Soviet Union (and to some extent China) during the Cold War, but has the credibility of the US ED towards Japan declined in the post-Cold War era?

To answer this question, it is important to clarify what is the main strategic change during and after the Cold War in the Northeast Asia region. It would seem that the nature of

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[89] Campbell has already predicted that the possibility of friction between the two states over the sharing of certain crucial technology is inevitable. Campbell at the public hearing session at the House of Representatives foreign affairs committee on September 24, 1998, cited in *Asahi Shimbun*, September 28, 1998.

[90] A defence specialist in Tokyo pointed out this concern amongst the Japanese policy-makers. No.24, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998) On the FSX fighter development and its problems, see for example, Shinji Otsuki and Masaru Honda (1991), *FSX Senso: Nichibei Domei o Yurugasu Gijutsu Masatsu*, (Tokyo: Ronso sha); and Ryuichi Tezuka (1991), *Nippon FSX wo Ute* (Tokyo: Shincho sha).

[91] On the function of the US extended deterrence towards Japan during the Cold War, see Shinichi Ogawa

nuclear and ballistic missile threats towards Japan posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and by North Korea in the 1990s is different. During the Cold War, the Japanese government took a view that the United States and the Soviet Union were mutually deterred, based upon their understanding that any first strike would be counter-acted by retaliation (Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD). However, in the post-Cold War era, there is nothing comparable to MAD despite the presence of potential nuclear threshold states, such as North Korea. Concomitantly, the US's security priority might not be the same as that of Japan and, under such circumstances, Japan's traditional approach of dependence on US ED alone might not be effective against new military threats in the region.

Many have questioned the credibility of Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) and its applicability to the changed strategic circumstances in Northeast Asia. In the post-Cold War era, Japan's need for nuclear deterrence (i.e., Japan's reliance upon the US ED) and that of the US may not necessarily coincide. Some argue that it is logical for the United States to give priority to the prevention of a large-scale war by containing a regional conflict so that it does not escalate outside that region rather than seeking to prevent a possible nuclear attack on the US mainland, which would require an increase in nuclear deterrence capability. Thus, it has been argued that the degree of the US's reliance upon nuclear deterrence is lower than that of Japan.[92]

Regarding this point, some defence analysts warn of the possible dangers contained in the 1994 'Agreed Framework'. Article 3 of the US-North Korea agreement of October 1994, gives the US's No-First-Use (NFU) guarantee towards Pyongyang, under which the US shall not use nuclear weapons or shall not threaten North Korea with the use of nuclear weapons unless the US is attacked by that state. However, this can also have the effect of decreasing the credibility of the US ED provided to its allies, including Japan. Although it must also be noted that one of the themes of this dissertation is that the US ED towards Japan is a matter of 'political commitment' rather than a 'military response'. But, even then, it is conceivable that there are circumstances where the US's case-by-case NFU

(1996), *Kaku Gunbi Kanri, Gunshuku no Yukue* (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo), pp.215-220.

[92] No.24, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

guarantee to North Korea could damage the credibility of the US ED towards Japan.[93] The traditional assumptions underpinning nuclear deterrence, which were implemented in the context of bi-polarity during the Cold War might not be effective against new, unpredictable nuclear threats.[94] In terms of the Japanese government's official views on the US ED, however, the situation remains unchanged. This was reflected in the revised (second) NDPO published in 1995, which states: "Against the threat of nuclear weapons, rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, while working actively on international efforts for realistic and steady nuclear disarmament aiming at a world free from the nuclear weapons".[95]

5.1.5. The Reconnaissance Satellite

North Korea's test-firing in 1998 gave an impetus to Japan's introduction of a reconnaissance satellite. While Japan's participation in the US-led TMD system was welcomed by the United States, its decision concerning the introduction of reconnaissance satellites has already caused tension between the two states. Although the United States provides Japan with the pictures taken by its spy satellites, some Japanese defence specialists doubt that the US is providing unadulterated information; rather they are manipulating the information in order to serve US's national interests.[96] Faced with the North's missile threat, the necessity of developing Japan's own reconnaissance satellite, which can detect the launch of ballistic missiles at an early stage, has been emphasised by certain specialists. However, the introduction of reconnaissance satellites brings with it many problems from both a domestic and international perspective.

Domestically, it would highlight Japan's wide range of security problems related to legal, strategic, technological, financial, and above all, political factors. First, the legal question remains similar to those associated with the TMD system. Initially it was argued that the introduction might violate the 1969 Diet Resolution on 'the Peaceful Use of the Outer Space'. However, in 1985 the Japanese government revised its initial interpretation of the 1969 resolution, enabling the SDF to use satellite-produced material that was already

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[93] No.23, a Japanese defence analyst. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997)
[94] Shuichiro Iwata (1996), *Kaku Senryaku to Kaku Gunbi Kanri* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo), pp.125-6.
[95] The Defence Agency of Japan (JDA) (1997), *Defence of Japan 1996* (Japanese Defence White Paper, English version), pp.279.

available in the public domain. Although the Japanese government officially approved the introduction of the reconnaissance satellite in December 1998, the restrictions associated with the current 1985 interpretation may mean that it is unable to provide sufficient information for Japan's defence needs. Due to such legal ambiguity, the use of a reconnaissance satellite is not fully supported by the opposition parties and the public. In response to such concerns Prime Minister Obuchi has been emphasising the new 'multi-purpose' nature of the satellite system that can be used for various purposes, such as observing natural disasters, weather forecasting, and farming as well as reconnaissance.[97] In this way, the Prime Minister is trying to blur the military aspect of the new satellite system by expressing its benefits for the public, in order to foster compliance with the 1969 Diet resolution.

Secondly, the costs of the reconnaissance satellite are considered to be immense. According to an assessment, the development of a new satellite would need approximately $350 million. Since the TMD and the reconnaissance satellite function at their best when co-ordinated, the need for a 200 per cent increase in defence expenditure is predicted. For any government, obtaining public support for such expenditure remains highly problematic. In addition to this, the information obtained by reconnaissance satellites is not useful if it is not analysed correctly by the intelligence services on the ground. This means additional funds have to be channelled to establish a proper intelligence capability.

Problems are not only confined to the domestic arena. Externally, Japan must deal with negative responses coming from both neighbouring states and the US. This is particularly the case with China. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed deep concerns about Japan's proposed introduction of reconnaissance satellites and the US-Japan joint research on TMD, pointing out their destabilising impact upon regional security.[98] The security environment in the Asia-Pacific region with regional territorial disputes, such as the Spratley Island (China and various states in the Southeast Asia) and the Senkaku Islands (between China and Japan) contains the potential for a possible arms race. Hence, it is important for Japan not to provoke unnecessary external scepticism over Japan's satellite programme. This is also one of the main reasons for Japan's emphasis on the

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[96] *Asahi Shimbun*, September 15, 1998.
[97] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 15, 1998.

'multipurpose' nature of its new satellite system.

Second, the US's long-standing opposition to Japan's possession of a reconnaissance satellite system cannot be ignored. A senior official of the US Department of Defence, visiting Tokyo shortly after the test-firing, gave a negative view of Japan's aims. The official stated that the 1960 US-Japanese Security Treaty, under which the US provides its satellite-collected information to Japan, is sufficient for Japan's present and future security needs.[99] Although Japan's thinking is to supplement the existing US-Japanese Security Treaty, which many Japanese policy-makers consider insufficient, many US defence specialists remain concerned about Japan's new developments. This was confirmed in mid-September by the Japanese Ambassador to the US who stated that both positive and negative opinions can be heard in the US regarding Japan's introduction of reconnaissance satellite.[100]

Two reasons can be used to explain the US's opposition. First, from the business perspective and in parallel with the FSX fighter development and TMD research, the US does not want Japan to compete with US industry.[101] Second, the US wants to maintain its dominance over military information in the region. As Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (1998) have argued, the US regards information technology as the most important power resource.[102] The 'information umbrella' in addition to the 'nuclear umbrella' has formed the basis of the US's power. Therefore, the US does not welcome Japan's plan of having its own reconnaissance satellite, which might challenge the US's dominance in this field.

After the initial opposition, however, the US changed, at least officially, its view on Japan's introduction of reconnaissance satellites by mid-September 1998. This sudden change can be explained as follows. The US was concerned about the LDP hard-liners' severe scepticism towards the credibility of the US-led KEDO, as a measure to prevent North Korea's nuclear development, and the US-Japanese security relationship itself. If

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[98] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, December 31, 1998.
[99] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 5, 1998.
[100] The Japanese Ambassador to the US, Kunihiko Saito, in an interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, September 15, 1998.
[101] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 5, 1998.
[102] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1998), 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', *Foreign Affairs*, (September/ October 1998), p.87. Keohane and Nye define 'soft power' as "the ability to get desired

the US continued to explicitly oppose Japan's satellite plan, which many LDP members consider necessary for Japan's defence, Japanese policy-makers' scepticism towards the US might increase, thus causing further friction between the two states. This is certainly not ideal, as both states must co-operate closely to deal with an unpredictable and fluid regional security environment. Hence, the US must have thought that it might be better to allow Japan to have its own satellite system, provided that the US and Japan could maintain co-operation in the satellite development and data collection. Hisahiko Okazaki, a Japanese defence specialist, argues that the late 'arrival' of the US information on Taepodong-1 test-firing to Japan should act as a warning sign. He argues that Japan must further strengthen its security ties with the US up to the level upon which the US would think it crucial to share its military information with Japan immediately during a time of crisis. Without such an intimate security relationship between the two states, the US would not treat Japan as a truly equal security partner.[103]

So, the North Korean Crises in 1993/4 and 1998 have posed various security questions, all of which have implications for the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. But due the historical links between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, the North Korean Crises have also posed Japan with further complications.

5.1.6. The domestic security context

Although close co-operation with the United States has been deemed as the most propitious option for Japan to deal with the North Korean nuclear and missile crises, this policy has also led to several negative implications in the context of Japan's domestic security. A Japanese government internal report, written in late 1993, and which was subsequently leaked to the Japanese media in the summer of 1994, warned of the dangers of possible domestic instability in the event of Japan's participation in US-led sanctions against North Korea.[104] Although the contents of the report were not revealed, it was said to be the largest organised by the government since the end of the Second World War, involving specialists from various government ministries.

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outcomes because others want what you want.", Ibid., p.86.

[103] Hisahiko Okazaki, cited in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 2, 1998.

[104] Iku Aso (1994), 'Seifu Naibu Bunsho wo Nhushu: Kita Chosen wa Ko Ugoku', *Bungei Shunjyu* (July, 1994), pp.198-211

The first possibility discussed by the report concerned the possibility of North Korea's nuclear 'blackmail' towards Japan as a result of a possible US-led naval blockade or economic sanctions, which required the use of US bases in Japan. In that case, North Korean minorities living in Japan, the Japanese residents living around the US bases, and peace activists as well as human rights activists would demand the lifting of the sanctions, though from different viewpoints. Thus, this might lead to a severe division of public opinion.[105] Without having solid domestic support, the Japanese government would be unable to pursue a coherent foreign policy on such a sensitive issue. However, some analysts have warned of the danger of Japan's '*Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi*' (i.e., the principle that if Japan maintains its own national security Japan does not help its ally's national security), during a crisis. For example, Masao Ogonogi, a leading Korean politics specialist, claimed that it was inevitable for Japan to participate in the UN authorised sanction, if it happened, for the sake of the maintenance of a stable US-Japanese Security alliance.[106]

It was also considered very difficult for Tokyo to completely cut the financial links between North Korea and the *Chosen Soren* (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan). To stop flows of people, trade and bank remittances to North Korea by air and sea, including an estimated 600,000 members of the *Chosen Soren* in Japan, was not considered to be an easy task.[107]

Haruki Wada, for example, strongly opposed any hint of Japan's participation in US-led economic sanctions on North Korea from a human rights perspective, since it would directly suppress North Korean minorities living in Japan and would further increase existing racial discrimination against them.[108] In 1994, about 700,000 Korean minorities were living in Japan, out of which more than 200,000 were North Koreans. They possess the Japanese government's permission to live permanently in Japan, and they have rights

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[105] Ibid., p.210.
[106] Masao Ogonogi (1996), 'Kaku ni Ikinokori wo kakuru Kita Chosen to Nihon no Sentaku', *Ushio*, (June 1994), p.146.
[107] Aso (1994), p.200. According to the Japanese Government's estimation, Japan was the second largest trading partner with North Korea in 1993. 90 per cent of North Korea-Japan trade is dependent upon the North Koreans living in Japan. Ibid., p. 200, 204.
[108] Haruki Wada (1994), 'Setogiwa Gaiko karano Dakkyaku wo', with Takeshi Igarashi, Mikio Shumiya,

to be protected under the Japanese domestic law. Hence, Hitoshi Tanaka of MOFA emphasised the importance of protecting the human rights of North Korean minorities in the event of Japan's participation in UN authorised economic sanctions.[109]

Ever since the beginning of the Crisis, even before any discussion on the possible economic sanction against North Korea, it was often reported that North Korean female students with their Korean schools' uniform became the target of not only verbal but also violent attacks in various regions of Japan. It was also reported that the activities of the *Chosen Soren* were closely monitored by the Japanese police. In April 1994, for example, the Japanese police raided two *Chosen Soren* owned companies which were believed to be exporting technology, specialised books as well as high-tech equipment which could be used for missile programmes to North Korea.[110]

Japan's participation in US-led economic sanctions was also thought to have other implications for Japan's domestic politics. Although the Hosokawa (9 August 1993- 27 April 1994) and Hata (28 April 1994-29 June 1994) coalition governments agreed to join the US-led economic sanctions, the consensus among various political parties inside the Hata government, in particular between the LDP and SDP, was impossible to maintain. This led to the defection of the SDP, which resulted in the end of the Hata government in June 1994.[111] Although the successor SDP-LDP coalition governments, under the premierships of firstly the Socialist Party leader Tomiichi Murayama and secondly the LDP leader Ryutaro Hashimoto, managed to maintain public support for involvement in the sanctions (this could have been the result of the drastically decreased 'threat perception' amongst the Japanese after the 'Carter-Kim Summitry' in June 1994) in the event of actual participation, however, it would have been difficult for any coalition government to carry out coherent policies due to the SDP's friendly ties with North Korea.[112]

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and Ryosuke Yasue, *Sekai* (August 1994), p.207.

[109] Hitoshi Tanaka (1994), 'Kita Chosen Kaku Giwaku Mondai wo Kensho suru', *Gaiko Forum*, (July 1994), pp.59-64.

[110] Edward Desmond (1994), 'Kim Il Sung's Money Pipeline', *Time International*, (April 4, 1994), pp.16-7.

[111] *Nikkei Weekly*, May 2, 1994.

[112] On the relationship between North Korea and Japanese politicians, see for example, Ushio Shiota (1994), ''Kanemaru Hochodan' de Nani ga Hanasaretaka', *Bungei Shunju*, (August 1994), pp.120-132.

Second, the 1993 internal report warned that it is easy for North Korea to cause severe instability within Japan via terrorist activities. Pyongyang might send its own well-trained specialists to Japan, or choose from North Korean minorities living in Japan to cause internal panic.[113] Although estimations vary, it is said that North Korea has 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers within special units, which are said to have been trained for terrorist activities.[114] Although Pyongyang categorically denies any involvement, Japanese governmental sources suggest that since the 1970s Pyongyang has been conducting the abduction of Japanese citizens who allegedly became Japanese language instructors for North Korean terrorists.[115] Until the terrorist activities caused by the *Aum Shinrikyo* cult religious group in 1995, the Japanese government had little experience of dealing with terrorism.[116] The government's inexperience in this field was again revealed during the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy in Peru in April 1997. Therefore, the vulnerability of Japanese society, which was pointed out in the 1993 report, remained a critical factor.[117]

Domestic instability caused not by terrorists or ordinary North Korean minorities in Japan was also considered a possibility in the event of Japan's participation in the US-led sanctions. The 1993 report warned that as a response to sanctions upon North Korea, the *Chosen Soren* would mobilise large protests at Japanese government buildings, the US embassy and the US military basis in Japan. The possibility of violent attack by North Koreans against the Japanese police, and in return, conflicts between Japanese right-wing extremists and North Koreans could not be ruled out.[118]

Third, in the event of the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, Japan would face a

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[113] Aso (1994), p.210.

[114] Katsuichi Tsukamoto (1994), ''Fuantei no Antei' wo Ijisuru Chosen Gunji Josei', *Sekai Shusho*, (May 24, 1994), pp.52-3. Tsukamoto once worked as defence analyst at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. On the analysis of North Korea's special military units, see for example, Kazuhisa Ogawa (1996), 'Kita Chosengun no Kirifuda wa Sekai ni Rei no nai Tokushu Butai', *Economisuto*, (December 3, 1996), pp.50-53.

[115] *Yomiuri Shimbun,* June 10, 1998. See also Joseph Bermudez, Jr. (1990), *Terrorism: The North Korean Connection* (NY: Crane Rusak), pp.146-54. Since the 1970s, North Korea has allegedly engaged in terrorists activities related to Japan. For example, the Japanese Red Army during the 1970s were said to be trained both in North Korea and in Lebanon by North Koreans.

[116] For details on Japan's counter-terrorism measures, see Japanese Defence Agency (1995), *Defence of Japan 1995,* pp.172-3.

[117] A Japanese journalist points out that the government's concern on terrorism can be seen in the emphasis on the terrorism in the Defence White Paper since 1995 and the renewed (second) Guidelines. No.28, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, January 1998)

[118] Aso (1994), p.205

great number of military-related as well as non-military related problems.[119] Even non-military issues, such as the mass flood of Korean refugees into Japan, would cause domestic instability within Japan, as Japanese society has very limited experience in dealing with large numbers of refugees from abroad. In addition, there would be a high possibility that some refugees were trained terrorists in disguise.[120]

Dealing with North Korean issues requires a sensitive and subtle political strategy on the part of any Japanese government. On the one hand, the government must protect its citizens from possible North Korean terrorist activity inside Japan, hence the monitoring of the movements of a small number of extremists and the flow of money from Japan to North Korea; on the other hand, however, the government must guarantee the human rights of innocent North Koreans living in Japan. In addition, some influential LDP politicians have well-established close financial links with North Korean organisations. This often takes the form of political donations, which can make the whole issue even more complicated to handle.[121]

5.2. Japan's Civil Nuclear Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Implications of Japan's Plutonium Programme vis-à-vis Nuclear Proliferation[122]

This section will analyse Japan's plutonium as well as the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) policy in the context of international nuclear proliferation discussions. Japan's civil nuclear programme did attract international attention during the Cold War, yet critical views on this programme have drastically increased in the 1990s. It will be argued that this has served to heighten the perception gap between Japan and the outside world on the nature of the nuclear programme, which Japan still views essential for its long-term energy

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[119] Ibid., p.210

[120] There are some counter-arguments on the prediction of a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula. See for example, Toshimitsu Shigemura (1996), 'Chosen Hanto 'Yuji' wa nai', *Chuo Koron* (July 1996), p.86.

[121] In response to Taepodong-1, the LDP cancelled its participation in events to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the state of North Korea which were organised by groups of the North Korean minorities living in Japan. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 15, 1998.

[122] This section is heavily drawn from Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye (1995), *International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programmes*, (Cambridge, MA.: Working Paper from the Centre for International Studies, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), CIS Archive No. 2614, C/95-5, pp.13-26.

security. And as background for this discussion, two major developments in Japan's civil nuclear programme in the 1990s will be outlined as these are indicative of both the changes and the continuities that have been underway within this context: first, the 8th Long Term Programme (LTP) was published in 1994; and second, the FBR discussion group was formed in the wake of the infamous 1995 *Monju* accident.

The 1994 LTP is different from the previous 1987 one in two points. First, the programme aims to improve the transparency of Japan's plutonium programme, and which has subsequently led to the voluntary disclosure of plutonium inventories.[123] This was made in response to the growing international concerns about Japan's nuclear fuel recycling programme and proliferation concerns. The programme officially confirmed the 'no plutonium surplus' policy, under which Japan will not ship the plutonium home faster than it can use it as fuel.[124] The JAEC officially estimates that the plutonium equation in relation to supply and demand will be balanced by 2010.[125] Second, the 1994 Programme emphasises the importance of Japan's further participation in the discussions and establishment of an international management regime for plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).[126] However, the Japan's commitment to recycling and breeder reactors remains the same.[127]

The FBR discussion group was set up in January 1997 as a response to the negative impact of the December 1995 *Monju* accident. Organised by the JAEC, this land-mark discussion group consists of 16 members with different backgrounds, the intention being to bridge the gap between JAEC and the Japanese public. The final report of this group

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[123] The annual White Paper on Atomic Energy published in 1994 (by the JAEC) disclosed its plutonium inventory. Since then, the disclosure has been made on a regular basis. For example, the latest inventory (1997) can be found in JAEC (1998), *Genshiryoku Hakusho* (Atomic Energy White Paper) (1998), p.394.
[124] JAEC (1994),'Basic Long Term Programme for Development and Utilization of Asian Energy', p.25. See also Naotaka Oki (1995), 'Waga Kuni no Kaku Nenryo Resaikuru Seisaku', *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu*, Vol.8:12, pp.10-13.
[125] Toichi Sakata (1992), 'Kagaku Gijytsucho wa Kokangaeru- Wagakuni no Plutoniumu no Riyoseisaku ni tsuite', *Sekai* (November 1992), pp.81-2.
[126] For example, in July 1993, the STA's Council for an International Plutonium Management System (headed by H.Kurihara, Executive Director of the PNC) made a proposal for an international management scheme for plutonium and HEU in order to improve transparency in the use of the materials for peaceful purposes. Under the scheme, participants would register the inventory of the materials. Skolnikoff *et al.*, (1995), p.12.
[127] 'FBR Development is an Unchanged Policy of Japan', *Plutonium*, No.12 (Winter 1996), pp.1-2.

was published in December 1997 after repeated meetings with public responses.[128] Although interpretations vary on the report,[129] at least two developments can be pointed out. First, while the 1994 Long-Term Programme regards FBR as 'the main stream of nuclear energy' in the future,[130] the FBR report defines it as 'one of the options' for non-fossil energy in the future, downgrading FBR from its previous pedestal as the 'lifeline' for Japan's future. Second, the report also emphasised the 'flexibility' of the FBR programme, particularly in terms of the proposed time-table. Although it is difficult to assess to what extent the FBR report has actually influenced Japan's FBR programme so far, the JAEC has taken the suggestion of the FBR report into consideration.[131]

So while some assessments of Japan's civil nuclear programme in the post-Cold War era have highlighted its positive implications, many have focused on its alleged negative aspects.[132] And although the implications of domestic factors, such as those related to nuclear energy policy-making and the technical aspects of the programme are important, the main focus in the remainder of this section will be on its international implications.[133]

The mere existence of Japan's plutonium programme, due to Japan's technological capability in general, has been often been considered by observers outside Japan as the harbinger of a possible nuclear weapons capability. This assessment prevails even though the technical knowledge to build nuclear weapons is widely available, and is something not unique to Japan.[134] While all nuclear facilities inside Japan are safeguarded, some still argue that the authority of the IAEA inspection is limited to those in declared nuclear

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[128] The summary of the report by FBR discussion group can be found in JAEC (1998), *Genshiryoku Hakusho*, p.15 and p.367.

[129] The interpretations on the report vary amongst the members of nuclear community. No.22, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, December 1997)

[130] JAEC (1994), Long Term Programme, p.24.

[131] A critical view on the FBR report by one of the participants to the FBR discussion group, Hitoshi Yoshioka, can be found in Yoshioka (1997), 'Kosoku Zoshokuro Kondankai no Hokokushoan ni tsuite', *Genshiryoku Shiryo Jyohoshitsu Tsushin*, No.281 (October 1997), pp.4-6.

[132] Although minority, international pressure to encourage Japan's programme does exist, mainly amongst the European nuclear community. They regard *MONJU* as the pioneer for the next electric generation. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1995. Some suggestions have been made that Japan and Europe could co-operate in recycling plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads in the US and the former USSR. Frank von Hippel, Marvin Miller, Harold Feiveson, Anatoli Diakov, and Frans Berkhout (1993), 'Eliminating Nuclear Warheads', *Scientific American*, 269 (August 1993), p.47.

[133] For a discussion on the issues related to the technical aspects or the domestic political aspects, see Peter Dauvergne (1993), 'Nuclear Power Development in Japan', *Asian Survey*, 33 (June 1993), pp.576-591.

[134] David Kay (1994), 'The IAEA', in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press), p.312.

facilities, as was the case with Iraq and North Korea. Others claim that the 1988 US-Japan Nuclear Agreement, which gave comprehensive approval to Japan's plutonium programme for the next 30 years, might have drastically decreased the US's leverage over Japan. These commentators also conjecture that, as was the case with President Carter's anti-recycling policy in 1977, opposition from pro-nuclear energy groups inside the US might eventually loosen the US's grip over Japan's nuclear programme.[135] However, the basic argument is that the link between the reprocessing programme and weapons production capability has increased international apprehension about Japan's intention to acquire nuclear weapons and this will further increase with the progress of Japan's plutonium operations.

In the post-Cold War era, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, has been given the priority in the US foreign policy due to the increased proliferation concerns stemming from what have been referred to the 'rogue' states, as evidenced by the cases of Iraq and North Korea. While maintaining "its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan", the US has opposed any other programmes both domestically and internationally, as announced by President Clinton in September 1993.[136] Clinton also made it clear that the US would pursue its plan of eliminating international plutonium stockpiles. In September 1994, the US decided to phase out technological co-operation in plutonium reprocessing and FBR development, responding to Greenpeace's claims that the transfer of such technology was illegal.[137] However, as noted below, the various concerns over Japan's plutonium and FBRs are not only stemming from the US but also from states in Europe and Asia.

5.2.1. Demonstration Effect

The first proliferation concern caused by Japan's plutonium programme is its

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[135] American Nuclear Society (1995), *Protection and Management of Plutonium,* (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society Special Panel Report, August 1995), cited in Motoya Kitamura (1996), 'Japan's Plutonium Programme', *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.3:2 (Winter 1996), p.10.

[136] See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993, 'Fact Sheet: Non-proliferation and Export Control Policy'. (Reprinted in US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Nuclear Proliferation Factbook*, pp.195-6). The summary of this policy can be found in Eiichi Katahara (1997), 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Fall 1997), Vol.5: 1, p.55.

[137] Kitamura (1996), p.8

demonstration effects. Whether genuine or not, Japan's plutonium programme is used as a precedent for other states to launch their reprocessing and breeder programmes.[138] This is particularly the case in East Asia with, for example, South Korea claiming the importance of the programme stemming from similar rationales to those argued by Japan.[139]

However, it is not axiomatic that the spread of civil plutonium programmes is a desired end in itself. First, other states, which are genuinely interested in plutonium-based civil nuclear programme, might not regard safety and proliferation concerns as important, and/or they might not have the financial or technical capabilities to implement the tasks required for the safe operation of a civil plutonium programme,[140] such as a reliable national system to control plutonium and physical protection measures.

Second, the proliferation of civil plutonium programmes in volatile Northeast Asia would increase the possibility of regional nuclear proliferation, or what Robert Manning calls 'a virtual nuclear arms race' (i.e., a competition amongst those states with nuclear weapons manufacturing capability).[141] North Korean officials are said to be sceptical about Japan's fuel cycle capabilities, which they think might become an actual nuclear threat to the North.[142] South Koreans as well have been long concerned about the possibility of Japan's nuclearisation. Some South Korean academics regard Japan's nuclear policy as a 'multi-purposed nuclear policy implementation process' through which Japan can possess the capability of producing nuclear weapons without actually having nuclear warheads in hand.[143]

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[138] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.13-17.
[139] No.9, a STA bureaucrat. Interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, November 1997) Tatsujiro Suzuki (1996) 'Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (ASIATOM)', paper presented at an IGCC Study Commissioned for the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, (Beijing: January 8-10, 1996); and Taewoo Kim (1996), 'Japanese Ambitions, US Constraints, and South Korea's Nuclear Future', in Slig S. Harrison (ed.), *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp.87-109. See also Reinhard Drifte (1997), 'Proliferation in Northeast Asia: South Korea's Dual-Use Technology Imports from Japan', *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Spring/ Summer 1997), pp.72-82.
[140] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.13-7.
[141] Robert A. Manning (1997), 'PACATOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia', *The Washington Quarterly,* 20, (Spring 1997), p.222.
[142] *PPNN Newsbrief*, (Spring 1992), Vol.17, p.11.
[143] Taewoo Kim (1993), 'The United States and North Korea: A South Korean Perspective', a paper presented at the symposium on 'The United States and North Korea: What Next?', sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., (November 16, 1993), in Skolnikoff *et al.*

The concern over possible nuclear proliferation, prompted by Japan's plutonium programme, can be found in the arguments presented by close observers of Japan's policy. One commentator, for example, raised these concerns in the following way:

> [T]he accumulation of plutonium by Japan, which could be used to produce nuclear weapons, is of concern to its neighbours, particularly North Korea. If North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, South Korea will probably follow suit. Taiwan may also do so. And China will probably feel obliged to improve the size and quality of its nuclear arsenal. Of particular concern is the plutonium produced by the *Monju* breeder reactor because it is of a quality which makes it suitable for use in the most effective nuclear weapons...The world would be a safer place if the *Monju* reactor was abandoned.[144]

5.2.2. Plutonium Stockpiles

The second proliferation concern is the problem associated with the accumulation of Japan's plutonium stockpile.[145] This was clearly expressed by William Dircks, then Deputy Director General of the IAEA in 1992. At the annual meeting of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum in 1992, Dircks stated,

> Even if one disregards the fissile material from nuclear warheads, the excess of isolated fissile plutonium from civilian nuclear programs poses a major political and security problem world-wide. As a result of nuclear fuel reprocessing, and potentially as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling, in the foreseeable future the supply of plutonium will far exceed the industrial capacity to absorb plutonium into peaceful, commercial nuclear industrial activities.[146]

International concerns over the surplus of Japan's plutonium have resulted in a certain amount of change in Japan's plutonium policy. As mentioned before, Japan introduced a 'no plutonium surplus' policy in 1991, which was emphasised in the 1994 Long Term Programme. However, it is predicted that international suspicion over Japan's plutonium

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(1995), p.14.

[144] Frank Barnaby (1994), Chapter 4 'Nuclear Programmes in Japan and North Korea', in Oxford Research Group, *Current Decision Report*, No.14 (August 1994), p.22. See also Shaun Burnie (1994), Chapter 3 'Plutonium and Nuclear Weapons in North-east Asia', Ibid., pp.8-20.

[145] See for example, Frans Berkhout, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and William Walker (1990), 'The approaching plutonium surplus: a Japanese/ European predicament', *International Affairs*, Vol.66: 3, pp.523-543.

[146] William J.Dircks (1992), 'Nuclear Fuel Recycling- The IAEA Perspective', Presentation at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum. (Tokyo, Japan, March 17, 1992)

surplus would continue, despite Japan's policy change. This is because the amount of plutonium produced is currently supply-driven due to the link with the European reprocessing companies and possibly to the operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. This is also due to the delay of the development of MOX fuel in LWRs and breeder programmes. However, the basic point is that in the steady state of the reprocessing cycle, substantial amounts of plutonium are required as 'running stock' until actually used.[147]

Not only the evaluation on Japan's 'no plutonium surplus' policy but also the explanation on the plutonium stockpiles differ inside Japan.[148] The JAEC argues that for the research and development at the Rokkasho Mura plant, PNC (now JNC) needs 0.6 to 0.8 tons of plutonium annually, which is more than the Tokaimura plant can supply. Hence, foreign supplies of plutonium are needed to make up for the 'shortage'.[149] It is also claimed that the surplus is a 'running stock', an inevitable part of the nuclear recycle programme, and this is not what the opponents of the FBRs call as unnecessary plutonium 'surplus'.[150]

Opponents also point to the growing plutonium surplus in Japan. According to the plutonium inventory published by the STA in 1998, there was a total plutonium inventory of 24.1 tons at the end of 1997, of which 22.2 tons can be regarded as surplus, with a 4.2-ton increase in the surplus in 1997.[151] Most of this increase is attributed to reprocessing in Europe. Even before the December 1995 *Monju* accident, there were delays in the FBR project, and the *Monju* accident has further delayed the entire project (the operation of the *Monju* has been suspended since the accident). It is estimated that the cumulative

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[147] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.19. The inventory of separated plutonium has been increasing, according to the JAEC White Paper of 1994. In December 1993, the total inventory of separated plutonium owned by Japan was 10.8 tons, with 4.6 tons in Japan and 6.2 tons in Europe. In 1992, the total inventory was 6.4 tons, with 2.3 tons in Japan and 4.1 tons in Europe.

[148] There are three sources of Japanese plutonium: the Tokai mura reprocessing plant, the Rokkasho mura reprocessing plant, and the overseas reprocessing services contracted (the foreign reprocessing contractors will be commissioned to supply a cumulative total of about 30 tons of fissile plutonium through the year 2010).

[149] Atsuyuki Suzuki (1996), pp.52-3. For a summary of annual supply/ demand balance in Japanese plutonium through the year 2010, see the JAEC (1998), p.89 (table 2-3-6).

[150] A STA bureaucrat denies the idea of 'plutonium balancing' by claiming that the 'no-surplus policy' is a ridiculous international public promise which is not doing any good for Japan's FBR full-cycle programme. No.9, interview with the author. (Tokyo, Japan, November 1997)

[151] The breakdown of these figures can be found in the JAEC (1998), *Genshiryoku Hakusho*, p.88 (table 2-3-5). The way to assess surplus is adopted from Jinzaburo Takagi (1996), 'Japan's Plutonium Programme: A Critical Review', in Selig S. Harrison (ed.), *Japan's Nuclear Future*, (Washington, D.C.: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp.70-74.

plutonium surplus will grow to between 50 to 80 tons by the year 2010.[152]

Japan's plutonium programme was also under further suspicion in 1994 due to the revelation of a large amount of plutonium 'held-up' at the Tokai reactor. The IAEA found that as much as 70 kg of plutonium had accumulated inside a part of the reactor known as the 'glove boxes' at Tokai. The STA and the PNC argued that the plutonium was not what is called 'material unaccounted for', but could be defined as 'held-up' material. Despite the elaborate counting system of the Tokai facility, the nominal measurement error of the system is said to be 10-15 per cent. This means that with 70kg of 'held-up' plutonium inside the glove boxes, more than 8kg of plutonium, which is estimated to be sufficient to make at least one nuclear bomb, could be overlooked if it were missing. It was also reported that IAEA officials were not convinced with Japan's assurance of non-diversion of the plutonium.[153]

In the face of the increasing international concerns over the existence of Japan's plutonium stockpiles, many Japanese nuclear scientists argue that Japan's plutonium is reactor-grade, hence different from weapons-grade plutonium.[154] They agree that reactor-grade plutonium could be used to make nuclear weapons, admitting the fact that the US did perform nuclear test using reactor-grade plutonium in 1962 as stated by the Secretary of US Department of Energy in June 1994.[155] However, they argue that a clear distinction

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[152] Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai (1994), *Koritsu suru Nihon no Genshiryoku Seisaku,* (Tokyo: Jikkyo Shuppan), p.81.

[153] *Nuclear Fuel,* (October 10, 1994), p.15.

[154] Ryukichi Imai (1995), 'Post-Cold War Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Japan', included as background document, No.3, in Report of the US-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Cold War, 'The United States, Japan and the Future of Nuclear Weapons', co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the International House of Japan (1995).

[155] Hiroyoshi Kurihara (1995), 'Reactor-grade Plutonium', paper presented for the Japan-US Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Cold War, co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and International House of Japan (Tokyo, Japan, September 28-30, 1995). In 1976, the US revealed an official judgement that reactor-grade plutonium can produce nuclear explosives. A 1976 telegram from Washington to US embassies world-wide, sent after the India's nuclear test make from reactor-grade plutonium in 1974 reads, "[T]he basic arguments against the usefulness of reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons are that it is highly radioactive, hence difficult to handle, and that it contains isotopes which spontaneously fission, releasing neutrons that would cause pre-initiation of the chain reaction before the nuclear device was completely assembled. The result would be little or no nuclear yield. In answer to the first point, although plutonium of any isotopic composition is inherently difficult to handle, several nations have developed techniques and equipment to work with plutonium of all isotopic compositions. With only a marginal increase in difficulty, nations so inclined could adapt these same methods to handling plutonium in the fabrication of nuclear weapons. As to pre-initiation, it is more likely to occur in a device using plutonium with a large content of undesirable isotopes that spontaneously fission, but a device specifically designed to use reactor-grade plutonium could produce an effective nuclear explosion.

should be made between reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium. While 'weapons-grade' plutonium has more than 90 per cent fissile content, plutonium recovered from spent civilian fuel has a lower content (about 70 per cent) of fissile plutonium (60 per cent Pu-239, 8 per cent Pu-241).[156] They highlight that nuclear explosives made with reactor-grade plutonium offer poor reliability of explosive yield and have a short life as a nuclear explosive due to various factors, such as Pu 238 heat generation, and the neutron background problem. Hence, they conclude that although there is no theoretical difficulty in producing a nuclear explosive device using reactor-grade plutonium, nuclear explosives made from reactor-grade plutonium are not 'reliable as weapons'.[157]

However, others argue that the distinction between reactor-grade plutonium and weapons-grade plutonium is not as significant as many Japanese nuclear experts argue. The 1994 report written by the US National Academy of Science took such a view:

> ...Using reactor-grade rather than weapons-grade plutonium would present some complications. But with relatively simple designs such as that used in the Nagasaki weapon, which are within the capabilities of many nations and possibly some sub-national groups, nuclear explosives could be constructed that would be assured of having yields of at least 1 to 2 kilotons. Using more sophisticated designs, reactor-grade plutonium could be used for weapons having considerably higher minimum yields.[158]

So, the distinction many Japanese nuclear scientists make between reactor-grade and

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All grades of plutonium must be considered strategically important." quoted in Atsuyuki Suzuki (1995), 'Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: Where to Draw the Line', a paper prepared at the Japan-US Meeting on Non-proliferation and Arms Control after the Cold War, co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the International House of Japan (Tokyo, Japan, September 28-30, 1995), p.1.

[156] The higher the burnup rate, the lower the fissile content. Frans Berkhout *et al.* (1992), 'Disposition of Separated Plutonium', *Science and Global Security*, Vol.3, Table 3, p.10.

[157] Ryukichi Imai (1994), 'Plutonium Issues: The View from Japan', *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol.1:1, pp.13-37; (1997), 'Call for More Active and World Wide Debate over Plutonium of Different Isotopic composition- Would they or Would they no make effective weapon?' (a draft for a conference paper). See also Hiroyoshi Kurihara (1995), 'Genshirokyu Plutoniumu ni tsuite', a paper presented at the Japan-US Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation after the Cold War, co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and International House of Japan. (Tokyo, Japan, September 28-30, 1995), p.5.

[158] National Academy of Science, Committee on International Security and Arms Control (1994), 'Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium', Executive Summary, (Washington, D.C), p.4; Mark, J.C. (1993), 'Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium', *Science and Global Security* Vol.4:1, pp.111-128, both cited in Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), p.18. See also Christopher E. Paine (1996), 'The Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium' (Appendix A), in Harrison (ed.) (1996), *Japan's Nuclear*

weapons-grade plutonium is not fully accepted by analysts outside their own nuclear community. In theory, a counter-argument can be made: yet, when faced with various international scientific evidence that reactor-grade plutonium can produce nuclear weapons, in reality these Japanese nuclear scientists are unable to provide counter-evidence. With an estimated 50 to 80 tons of plutonium to be accumulated by 2010, which is considered sufficient to produce about 7,500 nuclear bombs, an international 'perception' of a link between Japan's plutonium programme and a potential nuclear weapons option will continue to exist.[159]

5.2.3. Plutonium shipments

The third international concern is related to plutonium shipments from Europe to Japan. Not only environmental factors[160] but also the potential for the seizure of plutonium by terrorists have raised proliferation concerns.[161] Japan's shipment of about 190 kg of plutonium from France in 1984, for which Japan needed 'prior consent' from the US, caused a heated debate in the US. This resulted in the inclusion of tougher conditions on plutonium shipment in the 1988 revised bilateral nuclear agreement. A 1988 study by the US Department of Defence warned of the terrorist possibility during the shipment from Europe to Japan by sea which takes a couple of months.[162] Ironically, this concern will decline if and when Japan's own reprocessing capability expands.[163]

Furthermore, it has also been suggested there is a danger of Japan damaging the credibility of existing international safeguards and physical protection systems by its large amount of plutonium accumulation and its transfer from abroad.[164] The existing international safeguards are not adequate enough to deal with such a large amount of plutonium stockpiles owned by a NNWS,[165] or its international transfer which takes a couple of months. So according to some assessments, this will inevitably make the implementation of effective international safeguards activities difficult. Since the disclosure of possible

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Future, pp.111-116.
[159] Yunkon Kim (1994), 'Dakara Nihon wa Kakubuso wo Utagawareru', *Sekai Shuho*, (August 9, 1994), pp.26-31.
[160] Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai (1994), pp.77-81.
[161] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.17-9.
[162] Walker and Berkhout (1992), p.7.
[163] Kitamura (1996), p.11
[164] Skolnikoff *et al.* (1995), pp.19-22.
[165] Note that other states with large sum of plutonium stockpiles are NWSs, such as the US and Russia.

covert nuclear programmes of Iraq and North Korea in the 1990s, both of which were subject to IAEA safeguards, the credibility of the IAEA has been shaken.[166] In light of this, it might be conceded that there is a potential for Japan's current plutonium programme to do more harm to the IAEA than good.

5.3. Conclusion

North Korea's Nuclear (1993/4) and Missile (1998) Crises have thus presented a microcosm of the change and continuity that can be observed in Japan's post-Cold War nuclear debate. What is still apparent, however, is that Japan's traditional close security ties with the US remains the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security in the post-1989 environment. The importance of this was clearly seen by the Japanese government's immediate and full support for the US's air attack on Baghdad in mid-December 1998, while there was no consensus on the issue even amongst the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.[167] Japan's support arose from the similarity between the security developments in Iraq and North Korea: both states have ballistic missiles and suspected nuclear weapons programmes, and both remain determined to refuse any international on-site inspection to their suspected military facilities.[168] With the gloomy prospect that a repetition of the Nuclear Crisis could always occur, Japan has thus felt an increasing necessity to further strengthen its already close security ties with the US. Such developments are aimed to reassure domestic opinion while at the same time deterring the leadership in North Korea. From the US's perspective as well, this security tie is considered the 'linchpin' of its security strategy in the region.[169] This was reaffirmed by President Clinton when he stated that the US "has no more important relationship in the world than our relationship with Japan for common security concerns, to advance democracy and peace."[170]

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[166] For an account for the deficiencies of the IAEA safeguards, see for example, Mitsuru Kurosawa (ed.), (1996), Chapter 2, *Gunshuku Mondai Nyumon*, (Tokyo: Toshindo).

[167] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 18, 1998.

[168] According to defence officials from the US and Japan, North Korea is constructing at least five new underground military facilities, which can be used for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and for launching ballistic missiles. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 3, and 8, 1999.

[169] The US perspectives on the importance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, see Section 2, 'Enhancing Our Regional Relationships', *The United States Security Strategy in the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998*, (US Government Printing Office), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/

[170] US President Clinton, in the meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi in New York, on September 22, 1998. Quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri*, September 24, 1998.

As for new security developments, the increasing intimate defence co-operation between South Korea and Japan, triggered by the two North Korean Crises, deserves closer attention. It has taken over half a century, since the end of Japan's rules over the Korean Peninsula, for both Japan and South Korea to realise, beyond their decades-old hostility and distance, the benefit of their security co-operation. By increasing the security ties between South Korea and Japan, the tri-lateral relationship of the US, South Korea and Japan, accordingly, will be enhanced. This, in turn, would further contribute to the stability in this fluid and unpredictable security environment of Northeast Asia. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile crises have ironically awakened what otherwise might have been a dormant possibility. This newly launched South Korea-Japan security co-operation, though still at its infancy, along with the tri-lateral approach, consequently has a great potential to become one of the major key factors for the stability of this volatile region.

Regarding the US ED in the post-Cold War era, as highlighted in the analysis of the North Korean Crises, Japan has taken the position that there is no alternative but to rely upon the US ED towards Japan for its own security. This was re-confirmed in the renewed 1995 NDPO. However, faced with new security developments, such as the drastic change of the security threats towards the US, from the former Soviet Union to the unpredictability of the Northeast Asia region, the perception gap between the US and Japan has drastically increased. The US itself seems to be having difficulties in implementing security measures to deal with the new nuclear threats, but neither has Japan been able to propose any concrete policy responses. Under such circumstances, the credibility of mutual deterrence, which was formed in the context of the East-West confrontation during the Cold War, seems to be questioned in the post-Cold War era. As seen in the further research on TMD and the US's doubt on the credibility of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis 'rogue states', which has led to the debate over US's counter-proliferation measures (i.e., defence measures, in case of the failure of deterrence). It is questionable, for example, whether a situation of mutual deterrence exists between the US and North Korea: some see a contrary scenario where the US is almost deterred by the nuclear behaviour of North Korea. The original form of mutual deterrence between East and West, where there was a learning curve of restraints on both sides, might thus have been replaced by a new form of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War era where, ironically, the only remaining nuclear

superpower is forced to behave with caution.

North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Crises have also revealed the various dimensions of Japan's vulnerability, both militarily and politically, as well as internally and externally. In response, it is suggested that to maintain its security policy towards nuclear weapons Japan must explore a multi-dimensional security approach to deal with the unpredictable and uncertain security threats in the region. This is also viewed as necessary in order to compensate for the unavoidable security perception gap between Japan and other states, particularly the US. Among the multi-dimensional security measures which might be pursued are both a carrot approach (for example, in the form of economic aid and Japan's encouragement for involving a 'rogue state' into the existing international system) and a stick approach (for example, in the form of economic and military sanctions).

Finally, in assessing whether strategic culture can be said to supplant or supplement neo-realism, it is apparent that the end of the Cold War may not have given Japan more room for manoeuvre in the context of its potential nuclearisation. For despite the prediction made by neo-realists that the end of the Cold War has changed Japan's attitude towards nuclear weapons, the 'Japanese way' of dealing with nuclear issues remains essentially unchanged. As seen in Japan's responses to the two North Korean Crises, while relying upon the US ED for Japan's ultimate national security, the anti-nuclearism still prevails amongst the Japanese public. But that said, the importance of the US ED towards Japan, even though the credibility of rational deterrence between the US ED and a 'rogue state' is being questioned, appears to still be the linchpin of Japan's security, a situation that is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Japan has thus maintained its security policy towards nuclear weapons by relying on the structural relationship between itself and the US, while at the same time dealing with new and sensitive nuclear issues domestically through a culturally-coded filter.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has discussed why and how, despite the volatile regional security environment in Northeast Asia and Japan's potential to develop its own nuclear weapons, Japan has maintained its security policy towards nuclear weapons from 1945 until the end of 1998. As was pointed out in the *Introduction*, it is noteworthy that international speculation concerning the possibility of Japan's nuclearisation has drastically increased since the end of the Cold War. When viewed within the context of Japan itself, however, this speculation is deemed to have potentially adverse implications because it does not contribute to the establishment of a stable international environment upon which Japan's national security as a 'trading state' (*'Tsusho Kokka'*) depends. This thesis has therefore tried to provide a detailed insight into the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons in order to assess both the theoretical and empirical issues that have arisen in this context.

Traditionally, the majority of Japanese works on these issues have been written from a 'victim perspective'. To that extent, these accounts often end in an emotional appeal for the immediate and total abolition of nuclear weapons from the earth. International academics and journalists have either resorted to radical speculation regarding Japan's nuclearisation or instead have placed inordinate emphasis on the constraining effects of Article 9 of the 'Peace Constitution', which they claim has prevented Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. While noting the significance of all these, often competing arguments, this thesis has tried to give a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons by focusing on the methods that successive Japanese governments have used in order to implement a credible security policy in the nuclear context. It was argued in the thesis that this has been accomplished by charting a pragmatic course between a range of positions and alignments. In so doing, this thesis has also utilised an extensive array of both Japanese and English sources to highlight the six core themes identified as being of vital importance to an understanding of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. To re-state them, these core themes are as follows: 1) certain aspects of neo-realist theory; 2) Japan's strategic culture as a supplementary factor; 3) conflicting Japanese views on the US ED towards Japan; 4) the

costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation; 5) the dual role of the US ED towards Japan; and 6) the civil-military debate over nuclear energy use.

The first core theme relates to the theoretical debate surrounding neo-realism and its capacity to explain certain features concerning Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. To evaluate the extent to which neo-realism can enhance our understanding of the issue, the following question must be addressed: under what circumstances would Japan's 'dual-track' nuclear policy change in a neo-realist context? According to the rigid neo-realism presented by Waltz, it has been predicted that Japan would go nuclear after the end of the Cold War, i.e., the end of the rigid bi-polar world. The pursuit of power politics in an anarchic international system is an inevitable outcome in order for a state to survive: now that the decades'-old Cold War enemy disappeared, the role of the 'anti-Soviet' military alliance between the US and Japan is over, and the US has started considering Japan as a new competitor in the anarchy. Yet, ten years has passed since the end of the Cold War, and Waltz's prediction has not been materialised, and it seems unlikely to happen for the foreseeable future. Then, what is wrong with Waltz version of neo-realism?

As has been discussed throughout the thesis, only when a new nuclear threat towards Japan suddenly emerges, concurrently with a radical deterioration, or collapse, of the US-Japanese security relationship, Japan would be forced to re-consider its current 'dual-track' nuclear policy. Then, how the collapse of a stable US-Japanese security relationship would occur and how various versions of neo-realism regard the nature of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, becomes a crucial question. Here, it becomes apparent that Waltz's rigid neo-realism defines the nature of the US-Japanese security treaty not in a sufficiently convincing way. This is because Waltz purely focuses upon the international structural constraints as the only major theoretical variable, ignoring other factors that are also of great significance. The validity of Waltz's arguments on the proliferation dynamics of nuclear weapons is limited, and its prediction is misleading. Yet, it does not mean that Waltz's arguments are totally meaningless. As emphasised, no theory can ever explain all about a given phenomenon. How limited a theory's explanationary potential can be when applied to a certain empirical analysis, the very process of identifying the area where a

selected theory is more relevant than others, in order to give an insight into the empirical case studies, is of crucial importance. This is because through this process of identifying the strengths and the weaknesses of each theory and judging the relevance of each theory to explain a given phenomenon (i.e., locating of theory), theoretical development can be made possible thereby furthering our understanding.[1]

Buzan's Structural Realism improves our understanding of international relations by expanding the definition of some key concepts, adding an extra variable, connecting one level of analysis to another. But he does so by taking Waltz's neo-realism as the starting point. It is much easier to criticise and modify an existing theory than to create an entire theory from a scratch. If accept the argument that no theory is perfect and every theory has its limits in its explanatory power, Waltz's neo-realism has had its role as a starting point to be criticised. Waltz's version of neo-realism presents an extremely abstract picture of the international system, failing to give an insight into a state's foreign policy because this requires an analysis of many more factors than Waltz is prepared to consider. Perhaps Katzenstein is right in pointing out the importance of rigid neo-realism as a broad orienting framework for the analysis of international relations.[2]

As has been repeated, however, there are many variations amongst neo-realism, ranging from the most rigid and structure-focused neo-realism, such as Waltz's version, and the one which takes the unit level into account, such as Structural Realism as presented by Buzan. Being a more flexible and operational version, Structural Realism would argue that the US-Japanese security relationship is multi-dimensional, and this nature can be explained by Buzan's expanded definition of 'power'. While polarity is considered as the single important factor (which is formed by 'relational power') by Waltz, the nature of a state which can be determined by 'attributive power' (i.e., the attributes of a state, such as socio-political cohesion, political system, political institution, and technological capability) is also considered crucial in Buzan's analysis. Hence, the bi-lateral relationship

[1] Tanya Ogilvie-White (1998), *Theorising Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Nuclear Policies of India, South Africa, North Korea, and Ukraine*, (Ph.D.thesis, University of Southampton, U.K.), p.248.
[2] Katzenstein (1996-b), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, (NY:

is a military alliance, yet at the same time, an alliance to maintain and protect the 'shared norms' between these two politically stable states in the Asia-Pacific region where a better alternative does not exist. Due to its character as a 'strong state' as well as an 'economy-focused state',[3] Japan has been a member of the 'core' group, in which norms and various institutions are shared, and the structural effects of static anarchy is weakened (hence creating a 'mature' anarchy where the element of conflict is mitigated).[4] So, it can be said that, unless a drastic change in both polarity (as 'relational' power points out) and the nature of Japan as a 'strong' state within the 'core' group (as 'attributive' power highlights) occur simultaneously, the treaty will remain an attractive option for both states. The point is this: the US-Japanese Security Treaty, upon which the US ED is based, is a multi-dimensional alliance, and this has served the national interests of both states for half a century. The collapse of the US-Japanese Security Treaty would mean the end of the most significant bi-lateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific region (where there is no multi-national security organisation exists) and, simultaneously, the collapse of 'mature' anarchy. Therefore, the collapse would be caused by several or all the multi-dimensional factors, ranging from balance of power factors to shared norms and shared institutions. Would such a collapse occur so easily in a foreseeable future?

Although having more analytical variables and being more operational than Waltz's form of neo-realism, like any other theories, Buzan's Structural Realism cannot be defined as the single theory for explaining the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. The weakness of Structural Realism derives from its rationalist's assumption. Buzan's Structural Realism, which ignores ideational aspects of the unit level and the factors at sub-state level, fails to account for complicated domestic processes of foreign policy-making. As Japan's case study has shown, the process of how Japan perceives threats towards its national security and how Japan implements its security policy against the perceived threats, involves both materialistic and ideational factors, which derive from structural, unit (state), and sub-state levels. Structural Realism could explain the materialistic side of the debates, yet fails to

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Cornell University Press), pp.18-9.

[3] Buzan argues that the international anarchic system can be composed of 'functionally differentiated units'. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (NY: Columbia University Press), pp.78-9.

[4] Buzan et al. (1993), Chapter 4. This is the category Buzan uses in identifying 'weak' and 'strong' states.

account for the ideational side. As Buzan's Structural Realism has tried to highlight, the nature of a state matters, as this is the place where one can find the key to answer some 'puzzling' questions which the rationalist's approach cannot account for. The nature of a state has much to do with the way a state constructs its security perception and how it responds to its perceived insecurity. While non-ideational aspect (i.e., material aspects) of the nature of a state can be identified and categorised by the use of attributive power and relational power as Structural Realism has demonstrated, the ideational aspect of a state is difficult to define and quantify.

As seen in Japan's response towards North Korea's nuclear crises of 1993/4 and 1998 there were many domestic factors that needed to be considered, ranging from the human rights of North Korean minorities living in Japan, the static nature of Japan's bureaucracy, some business- industry related accounts over its counter-measures towards North Korea's missile threat, considerations of domestic laws, etc. Neo-realism fails to explain the complexity of foreign policy making, even with the help of Structural Realism. A similar evaluation can be made in the case of Japan's delay in ratifying the NPT in 1976. Rigid neo-realism would argue that Japan was hesitant in the ratification because it wanted to maintain the option of a 'nuclear free-hand' for national security. However, as argued in Chapter 4, the biggest domestic obstacle for Japan's early ratification of the NPT was Japan's quest for equality in the application of safeguard inspections by the IAEA for the civil use of nuclear energy. Having said that, this factor would not have been the major one without the US security guarantee towards Japan in the first place. In addition, though less important than the safeguard issue, the Japanese government's consensus-building in the pluralist nature of Japan's democracy system added extra complications which should not be ignored.[5] If a comprehensive account for the delay in the NPT ratification is to be given, all these factors should be taken into account, and these have no significance in the eyes of Waltz.

See Buzan (1991), *People, States and Fear* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), Chapter 2.

[5] Joseph Frankel (1977), 'Domestic Politics of Japan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', *British Journal of International Studies*, (1977, No.3), p.262.

The decision-making process of a state's non-/ nuclear policy involves various factors ranging from security factors, economic factors, power struggle amongst different domestic organisations, the collective identity of a society, and negotiations with a state's military ally, and so on, and various theories such as strategic culture, neo-liberal institutionalism[6], organisational theory,[7] and so on, could give a better insight into a specific area of a given phenomenon. The point is this: a muti-dimensional as well as multi-level theory is required to give a satisfactory account for the process of a state's non-/ nuclear policy-making, which includes structural, unit and sub-unit level factors, discussed both in material and ideational terms. Yet, no single theory is able to achieve this task. As repeated, every theory has its strengths and weaknesses, and has a limited explanatory power. Therefore, the second best option is to choose a complementing theory/ theories to help understand the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. What this thesis has tried to do is to make the most of what various versions of neo-realism can provide, and borrowed a great help from strategic culture approach to provide a better insight into a given phenomenon.

By doing so, however, the theoretical arguments of this thesis inevitably contain contradictions and the overall argument therefore lacks a neat logic. This is because, similar to what Soeya has done in inventing the concept of Japan's 'Post-WWII Realism', the thesis has tried to include as many theoretical variables as possible to give some insight into the evolution of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. The concept of Japan's 'Post-WWII Realism' seeks to bridge the gap between neo-realism and strategic culture, indicating how Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-militarism' significantly influenced the construction of the domestic debate. By doing so, however, it fails to have a logical theoretical standing point. Theoretically speaking, combining rationalist approaches and ideational approaches is a convenient way of escaping from a complicated theoretical maze, hence avoiding further theoretical development. Yet, any attempt to maintain a neat logic of a theory by manipulating empirical information regarding a state's behaviour would never help our understanding.[8] Having numerous variables for analysis

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[6] For example, Glenn Shafetz (1993), 'The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Alternative to the Neo-realist Perspective', *Security Studies*, Vol.2: 3/4 (Spring/ Summer 1993), pp.127-158.

[7] Scott Sagan (1993), *The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

[8] Ogilve-White (1998), p.248.

may be more important in choosing a theory to explain international relations. As this thesis has done, it is perhaps better to use neo-realism, in particular Structural Realism, as the first stage of an analysis in order to have a 'rough' general idea about the international system in which units exist, then use the strategic cultural approach and/or other theories as a second stage (or perhaps even third) for a detailed analysis which can give a far better insight into the internal debates of a state.

So, if neo-realism is incapable of presenting a sufficient account of the circumstances under which Japan's current 'dual-track' nuclear policy might change, some evaluation should be given to the strategic cultural approach which has been used as a complementary theory in the thesis. As repeated, strategic culturalists have argued that Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons would not change just because of Japan's 'anti-nuclearism' amongst its population. This is a significant, yet complementary factor. Japan's 'dual-track' nuclear policy has been implemented through a culturally-coded lens, yet this has been made possible within the material restrictions imposed by the external environment. The critics of neo-realism may argue that strategic culture is the starting point of the entire argument as it constructs a culturally-coded lens through which an actor (a state) perceives security threats, makes a judgement, and implements its security policy. However, this process can be implemented only within the existing structural constraints as repeatedly emphasised. As such, the US-Japanese Security Treaty has provided the most fundamental external framework for Japan's national security, and, to a large extent, under US military protection, Japan's 'anti-militarism' was allowed to develop. If Japan were situated next to the South Pole or New Zealand which is not geo-politically attractive to the US, and if Japan were a 'weak' state with a low level of socio-political cohesion and low economic capability, Japan may not have obtained US extended deterrence. Japan's geo-political significance in the region, in addition to its national character as a 'strong state', makes Japan the most attractive ally for the US in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although there is some indication of a waning of the anti-nuclear sentiment amongst the Japanese population, it is difficult to foresee its complete disappearance from Japanese society. This sentiment is deeply embedded in Japan's post-war culture, and it has certainly played its role as a constraining factor in the debate over Japan's possession of

nuclear weapons. What is also noticeable is that the memory of 1945 has formed the basis for what might be termed a 'nuclear perception gap' between Japan and the outside world. This is especially the case between Japan and the US, however politically close their security ties have become. This 'nuclear perception gap' between Japan and the US might be explained by reference to their respective histories, although care must still be taken in not over-emphasising this point: the US was assisted in its victory in 1945 due to the advent of nuclear weapons while Japan ultimately suffered defeat as a result of these weapons. In Japan, the memory of 1945 initially caused abhorrence, hatred, and rejection towards nuclear weapons. Later, this turned to indifference and what some have identified as a lack of any real sense of security or '*Heiwa Boke*', which has prevailed in the US protected 'peace island'. The imposition of the US-Japanese Security Treaty after seven years of the GHQ occupation of Japan which, started in 1945, was an imposed 'given' to Japan's national security as the external structure eventually allowed the development of '*Heiwa Boke*'. Due to its historical experience of 1945 and the emergence of the 'victim' mentality in the society, it is common for the majority of Japanese not to see any 'virtue' in nuclear weapons, such as the possibility of war prevention stemming from nuclear deterrence. As demonstrated in the deliberations over SDI and TMD, any new development in Japan's security policy must pass the 'non-nuclear' verdict imposed by Japan's social norm of anti-nuclearism. Quite often, this self-imposed social norm has had more significance than the central questions relating to the strategic implications of the new security programmes.

The point is this: it can be asserted that Japan's strategic culture of 'anti-nuclearism' has significantly influenced the way Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons has been constructed and implemented. The debate over this policy has distinct elements that are culturally-coded, and to overlook this would be to miss a vital aspect of the domestic debate in Japan. However, it has also been asserted that there remain limits to its utility in explaining all dimensions of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons. 'Unarmed neutrality' without nuclear weapons, the sheer expression of Japan's strategic culture, has never been practically possible due to Japan's geo-strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific region: in particular, its position between the Soviet Union and the US in the context of the Cold War. This material/ external factor has also influenced Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons.

To conclude the theoretical debate of the thesis, a summary was made to locate the theories dealt with in the thesis (Table 3). This is by no means to firmly define the fit between a theory and a given phenomenon. It has to be clarified that the number of theories dealt with in the thesis is intentionally limited. This is because exploring all the possible theories regarding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation is not the purpose of the thesis. This task is of great importance and requires a separate research project.

Table 3. Theories that can help our understanding of Japan's security policy towards nuclear weapons

	Non-ideational approach (rationalists approach)	Ideational approach (non-rationalists approach)
Structural level	Refined versions of neo-realism Structural Realism	
State (Unit) level	Structural Realism	Strategic Culture
Sub-state level		(Strategic Culture?)

A third observation stemming from this thesis can also be made. This concerns the conflicting Japanese views on the US ED. On one side of the spectrum, the Left idealists regard the US ED towards Japan as inherently detrimental to Japan's security, since Japan might be involved in a military conflict in which the US is engaged (*'Makikomare ron'*). On the other side, the minority Right nationalists view the US ED either as not providing sufficient protection for Japan's national security or as an affront to Japan's national pride. Between these two extremes, the Yoshida Line Pragmatic Centrists, the successive Japanese governments since 1945, have sought to maintain their security policy towards nuclear weapons. The Pragmatic Centrists regard the maintenance of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, particularly the US ED towards Japan, as the ultimate security guarantee of Japan's national security. They have taken the view that, judging from the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation, both strategically and politically, as well as domestically and internationally, the Pragmatic security policy towards nuclear weapons

has been the only realistic security option for Japan since 1945.

Furthermore, the concept of 'extended deterrence' itself has often been misunderstood within Japan. An 'effective' nuclear deterrence greatly depends on the 'uncertainties' placed in the mind of any potential aggressor (the deteree) vis-à-vis to the consequences of its aggression. Therefore, to argue whether Japan, which is protected under the US's nuclear umbrella, wants the umbrella or not is irrelevant. It is interesting to observe that the two extreme positions both argue against the US ED: on the one hand, the minority Right nationalists regard the US's nuclear umbrella as a 'broken' umbrella towards Japan; on the other hand, some Left idealists argue that Japan needs no nuclear 'umbrella', since its reliance upon the US conventional forces are sufficient enough to deter any external aggression. Underlying these positions there lies an interesting cultural factor: the lack of opportunity in Japan to learn about nuclear issues due to Japan's anti-militarism. This in turn has made it quite difficult for the Japanese population to acquire any basic knowledge about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, issues that are commonly discussed in the other developed states. This re-affirms the point made earlier that the memory of 1945 has consequently formed a culture of anti-nuclearism amongst the Japanese population that has enduring significance for discussions related to nuclear issues.

Some comment on the costs and benefits of Japan's nuclearisation can also be made in this concluding chapter. As observed throughout the thesis, it has been suggested that it is highly unlikely that Japan would resort to a reversal of its security policy towards nuclear weapons whilst the current security situation prevails. This policy continues to be underpinned by two factors: the US-Japanese Security Treaty and the Japanese population's anti-nuclear sentiment. The only benefit of a nuclear-Japan, regardless of whether its nuclear weapons could establish a credible deterrence or not, would be that Japan does not have to question the credibility of the US ED and no longer has to be the US's 'little brother'. Here, the issue of 'national pride' would seem to be an important variable: yet, as discussed in the thesis, the costs of Japan's nuclearisation have overrode these considerations as it is acknowledged by successive governments that economically, militarily, and above all, politically, there is little benefit in Japan acquiring its own nuclear weapons.

It is also acknowledged that Japan's nuclearisation would likely trigger a severe regional arms race, resulting in the deterioration of the stable international environment Japan deems essential for its position as a 'trading state'. This is why securing a stable international environment has been a crucial security issue for Japan: this is viewed as essential for acquiring those natural resources which Japan lacks. It is also understood that a nuclear-Japan would be perceived as a serious security threat by nearly all the states in the Asia-Pacific region. Already, the security environment in the Asia-Pacific contains numerous sources for a potential arms race. Regional territorial disputes include the Spratley Islands, Takeshima Island (between South Korea and Japan), the Senkaku Islands (between China and Japan), and Japan's four northern islands off Hokkaido occupied by Russia; and the political situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense. In addition, unlike Europe, there is no multilateral security scheme in the Asia-Pacific where these issues can be aired. Recent efforts to create confidence-building-measures in the region, such as the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, must still be regarded as being only their formative stages as far as security functions are concerned.

More fundamentally, there is little doubt that a nuclear-Japan would severely harm the US-Japanese relationship. As has been emphasised throughout the thesis, the importance of this bilateral relationship, not only for Japan's security policy but also for the security of the region, cannot be overemphasised. The role of the US-Japanese security alliance has been a mixture of defending Japan as well as containing Japan's resurgence as a great military power. Furthermore, the role of this bilateral security relationship in the post-Cold War era has increased not decreased: on the one hand, it serves as an 'alliance against uncertainty', i.e., to deter unexpected chaos in Asia; on the other hand, it serves as an 'alliance for regional co-operation', as only via this alliance is co-operation between the two states and China, ASEAN states, and the two Koreas possible.[9] It may be conjectured that the collapse of this bilateral relationship would have immense implications for the entire region.

The 'dual role' of the US ED towards Japan – to 'protect' or to 'contain' Japan – has also

[9] G.Curtis, R.Dore, and S.Sato (1996), 'Nani ga Nihon no Kokueki Nanoka?', *Chuo Koron* (February, 1996), pp.33-4

been frequently observed. The officially unspoken role of the US-Japanese Security Treaty has been to put a 'cap on the bottle' (i.e., to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism). But, since the end of the Cold War, critical voices concerning the Treaty have been on the increase. A number of so-called 'revisionists' school of Japan experts within the US have accused Japan of either being a 'free-rider' or a potential threat to the US's national interests. This is why the maintenance of a stable US-Japanese relationship is so important: as repeated, if the US security commitment was seen to be declining drastically, especially at a time when there was a deteriorating regional security environment, the pressures on Japan to consider revoking its security policy towards nuclear weapons are likely to become considerable.

What should not be overlooked, however, are the benefits the US has accrued from the Treaty: first, Japan's strategic position in the region in the context of the Cold War was important for the US in terms of forward bases: second, Japan's economic and technological capability also provided vital assets for the US; and third, due to the lack of the existence of any definite military adversary towards Japan (though the Soviet Union was regarded as a potential aggressor towards Japan) the US was free from the concerns over '*makikomare*' by being a military ally of Japan. The third factor is not well recognised but is still significant as other US allies in the region had more proximate concerns: the US-South Korea security alliance was mainly targeted towards North Korea while the US-Taiwan alliance was intended as a deterrent towards China.

Due to its multifunctional nature, as repeatedly emphasised, both parties have supported the US-Japan Security Treaty for over half a century. As noted already, unlike in Europe, there was no clear confrontation between the Western and Eastern bloc in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. Under this international structure (of not having a clear bloc confrontation), the role of the treaty has been to provide the basis for the development of a flexible security arrangement. During the Cold War, one of the main functions was to deter the aggression of the Soviet Union and to fight against Moscow in case of an actual military conflict. In the post-Cold War era, the major role of the treaty is now to deter uncertain and unpredictable developments within the regional situation. Furthermore, some have noted the positive effect of the US 'cap on the bottle' for Japan's security. The US's military presence within Japan has contributed to the avoidance of any possible

China-Japan rivalry. It can reasonably be speculated that without the treaty Japan would have been forced to drastically increase its military spending in order to compete with China's military capability.[10]

Ironically, however, due to the multifunctional nature of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, Japan will continue to face a dilemma. On the one hand, if Japan emphasises threats from any particular state too much, in order to help strengthen the US-Japanese security relationship, be it China or North Korea, the treaty would be considered by many both within and outside Japan as having only one goal. This in turn would lead to an argument, with the demise of the particular threat, that the treaty should be terminated now that the threat is gone. On the other hand, it is easier for the Japanese government to emphasise a visible threat towards Japan to enhance further co-operation with the US and to also gain the support of the public. What cannot be underestimated, however, is the fundamental nature of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the context of Japan's national security, in particular, in that vis-à-vis nuclear weapons.

The final concluding observation stemming from this thesis is the importance of the civil-military aspects concerning Japan's nuclear energy use, especially as this is viewed outside Japan. It has been pointed out in the dissertation that Japan's civil nuclear programme has resulted from a combination of factors, ranging from concerns over obtaining assured energy supplies to environmental considerations. Many of these factors have no direct relevance to military issues. However, the mere existence of Japan's plutonium programme, and Japan's technological capability in general, has often been considered by observers outside Japan as the harbinger of a possible nuclear weapons capability. This assessment prevails even though the technical knowledge to build nuclear weapons is widely available, and is something not unique to Japan. However, the perceived link between the reprocessing programme and weapons production capability has led to an increased international apprehension concerning Japan's intentions regarding nuclear weapons acquisition. It must be surmised that this will further increase with the development of Japan's plutonium operations. Furthermore, it has also been suggested there is a danger of Japan damaging the credibility of existing international safeguards and

[10] Koji Murata (1999), 'Nichibei Domei wo Do Ichizukeruka', *AERA Mook: Shin Kokusai Kankeigaku ga Wakaru*, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha), p.134.

physical protection systems by its large amount of plutonium accumulation and its transfers from abroad. The existing international safeguards are considered as not being adequate enough to deal with such a large plutonium stockpile, and which is owned by a non-nuclear weapons state, or in dealing with international transfers of this materials. The distinction many Japanese nuclear scientists make between reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium is not fully accepted by other analysts who suggest that reactor-grade plutonium can be used to produce nuclear weapons. It seems likely, therefore, that with an estimated 50 to 80 tons of plutonium accumulation by 2010, which is considered sufficient to produce about 7,500 nuclear bombs, an international 'perception' of a link between Japan's plutonium programme and a potential nuclear weapons option will continue to exist unless concerted efforts are made by all involved with this programme to dispel these concerns.

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