Joseph Raz on morals and law : with special reference to a concept of punishment
Joseph Raz on morals and law : with special reference to a concept of punishment
Over the last twenty seven years Joseph Raz has written, mainly in a series of articles, a considerable amount in relation to Law, Authority, Morals, Ethics and Freedom. Yet he has not ventured upon the subject of Punishment. It is an object therefore to investigate Raz's philosophy with a view to extending into this field.
In order to do this it is first necessary to establish the general suppositions requisite in a concept of Punishment and this is covered in part I. From there it is necessary to examine Raz's philosophy to establish corresponding base positions. This process, which is in part II, itself reveals possible areas of conflict with other approaches.
In part III the device of extrapolation is used first. Extrapolation, in the way I use it, is a dual procedure in which one first deduces starting points or foundations within the philosophy; from there one can then proceed by parallel reasoning to an extended field. Extrapolation has a dual advantage for it not only enables us to glean an insight into the allied field within the framework of the defining philosophy, but it tests that very philosophy itself.
The test by extrapolation is more rigorous than mere critical examination, for it requires both analysis to establish relevant foundations, but then requires a building upon them. By putting weight on the foundations it affords a practical test of their strength. Where a weakness occurs it may, as I have done with respect to Intentionality, be possible to suggest a means of rectifying it, and thus strengthening the philosophy. Alternatively it may simply reveal intractable omissions or flaws.
Next I proceed to check the extrapolation by providing an answer to the same question using methodological deduction.
Finally, in the Critique and Annexe A, I seek to provide an alternative approach whereby the weaknesses revealed in Raz's philosophy, which relate to the definition of 'Rights' and 'Interests', and the lack of functionality of jural relations between 'rights' and 'duties', may be overcome.
University of Southampton
Humphris-Norman, David Ove
6041d677-16c6-4c54-830a-a19487d7d54c
1997
Humphris-Norman, David Ove
6041d677-16c6-4c54-830a-a19487d7d54c
Humphris-Norman, David Ove
(1997)
Joseph Raz on morals and law : with special reference to a concept of punishment.
University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis.
Record type:
Thesis
(Doctoral)
Abstract
Over the last twenty seven years Joseph Raz has written, mainly in a series of articles, a considerable amount in relation to Law, Authority, Morals, Ethics and Freedom. Yet he has not ventured upon the subject of Punishment. It is an object therefore to investigate Raz's philosophy with a view to extending into this field.
In order to do this it is first necessary to establish the general suppositions requisite in a concept of Punishment and this is covered in part I. From there it is necessary to examine Raz's philosophy to establish corresponding base positions. This process, which is in part II, itself reveals possible areas of conflict with other approaches.
In part III the device of extrapolation is used first. Extrapolation, in the way I use it, is a dual procedure in which one first deduces starting points or foundations within the philosophy; from there one can then proceed by parallel reasoning to an extended field. Extrapolation has a dual advantage for it not only enables us to glean an insight into the allied field within the framework of the defining philosophy, but it tests that very philosophy itself.
The test by extrapolation is more rigorous than mere critical examination, for it requires both analysis to establish relevant foundations, but then requires a building upon them. By putting weight on the foundations it affords a practical test of their strength. Where a weakness occurs it may, as I have done with respect to Intentionality, be possible to suggest a means of rectifying it, and thus strengthening the philosophy. Alternatively it may simply reveal intractable omissions or flaws.
Next I proceed to check the extrapolation by providing an answer to the same question using methodological deduction.
Finally, in the Critique and Annexe A, I seek to provide an alternative approach whereby the weaknesses revealed in Raz's philosophy, which relate to the definition of 'Rights' and 'Interests', and the lack of functionality of jural relations between 'rights' and 'duties', may be overcome.
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Published date: 1997
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Local EPrints ID: 467199
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/467199
PURE UUID: 9a0960a8-42a0-40b8-8be2-3a166e656bbf
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Date deposited: 05 Jul 2022 08:16
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 21:02
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Author:
David Ove Humphris-Norman
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