

Artificial Life Manuscript Submission

The effects of information on the formation of migration routes and the dynamics of migration

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Abstract. Most models of migration simply assume that migrants somehow make their way from their point of origin to their chosen destination. We know, however, that - especially in the case of asylum migration - the migrant journey often is a hazardous, difficult process where migrants make decisions based on limited information and under severe material constraints. Here we investigate the dynamics of the migration journey itself using a spatially explicit, agent-based model. In particular we are interested in the effects of limited information and information exchange.

We find that under limited information, migration routes generally become suboptimal, their stochasticity increases and migrants arrive much less frequently at their preferred destination. Under specific circumstances self-organised consensus routes emerge that are largely unpredictable. Limited information also strongly reduces the migrants' ability to react to changes in circumstances.

We conclude, first, that information and information exchange is likely to have considerable effects on all aspects of migration and should thus be included in future modelling efforts, and second, that there are many questions in theoretical migration research that are likely to profit from the use of agent-based modelling techniques.

Keywords: migration, communication, beliefs, migration routes, agent-based modelling

1 Introduction

International migration has important economic, humanitarian and cultural consequences not only in countries of origin and the destination but also in countries that lie on common migration routes (Castles et al., 2014). Nevertheless migration is to date one of the least well understood demographic processes (Bijak et al., 2021). The majority of older theoretical efforts to understand migration follow the economic tradition where migrants' behaviour is typically described as an optimisation process that weighs the costs of migration against a combination of push and pull factors in the countries of origin and destination, respectively (Greenwood, 2005). While some of these models have become quite sophisticated and have in some cases even been empirically validated, the approach has repeatedly been criticized for oversimplifying many aspects of the system (Klabunde & Willekens, 2016).

In particular, it is usually assumed that migrants' decisions follow a simple and rational process. Furthermore variation between individuals as well as interactions between them are usually not taken into account. Why these assumptions might limit the applicability of these models is amongst others demonstrated by empirical results that show that in many cases prospective as well as actual migrants are substantially misinformed concerning the conditions in the country of destination (A. Gilbert & Koser, 2006). It has also been found that connections to and opinions of a country within an individuals' social network can play an important role in the migration decision, thus making interactions between individuals relevant for the process (Sačer et al., 2017).

Some of these concerns have been adressed in newer modelling efforts, in particular those using agent-based modelling (Frydenlund & Kock, 2020). By explicitly simulating single individuals, agent-based models (ABMs) make it straightforward to model variation and interactions within a population. Furthermore, since these models are usually computational there is no inherent limit to the complexity of behaviour that can be modelled (for

27 an overview see Hinsch & Bijak, 2021).

28 An aspect of migration that has not received much attention amongst modellers, even
29 in newer studies, is the migration journey itself. The main reason for this is probably
30 that in most models of migration the focus lies on the decision to migrate and then on
31 the choice of destination. Some predictive models tailored to a specific time and place
32 explicitly include the migrants' travels (e.g. Frydenlund et al., 2018; Hébert et al., 2018;
33 Suleimenova & Groen, 2020) but apart from our own earlier work (2019) we are not aware of
34 any theoretical models that directly investigate or take into account individuals' movement.
35 Migrants are instead assumed to make their way from origin to destination without further
36 complication.

37 We know, however, that migrants' journeys are anything but simple, direct movements from
38 a country of origin to a destination (Crawley et al., 2016; Kingsley, 2016). More importantly,
39 the specificities of the journey might have consequences in other areas as well. They
40 can be relevant in a practical context, as for example, political as well as humanitarian
41 reactions to migration depend on timely localizing migrants. In a theoretical context on
42 the other hand they might affect our understanding of migration itself, as decisions made
43 during travelling might have profound carry-over effects on other aspects of migration
44 such as choice of destination (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015). Furthermore the difficulty of
45 the journey a migrant expects will change the perceived attractiveness of destinations and
46 might therefore itself affect their choice of destination or even the decision to migrate in
47 the first place (Bertoli & Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013).

48 While the effect of limited information about migrants has been considered at least in the
49 economic literature (Katz & Stark, 1987), migrants themselves are usually assumed to be
50 perfectly informed. Information can, however, be an important yet often scarce resource
51 for migrants during their journey. Surveys of migrants show that knowledge about the des-
52 tination and the ways to reach it is often limited and might come from unreliable sources

53 (Borkert et al., 2018; Dekker et al., 2018; A. Gilbert & Koser, 2006). In some cases this in-
54 formation precarity is exacerbated by a general distrust towards information sources other
55 than personal contacts (Emmer et al., 2016). If, however, migrants base their travel deci-
56 sions on incomplete or erroneous information it can be expected that they will experience
57 difficulties on their journeys leading to delays, detours or failure.

58 As we showed in an earlier theoretical simulation study, this scarcity of information and the
59 way knowledge is obtained and exchanged can indeed strongly affect the development of
60 migration routes. We found that under limited information, migration routes can become
61 an emergent effect of the migrants' communication, which makes them unpredictable and
62 leads to sub-optimal travel (Hinsch & Bijak, 2019). This suggests that the assumption of a
63 straightforward, successful migration journey might often be misleading.

64 Here we expand on this effort using an improved version of the model. Our aims in this
65 are twofold. First we want to test the robustness of our previous results in a more general
66 context and with a better model. Mainly, however, we are interested in how misleading
67 we expect the assumption - as made in most migration models - of a simple journey with
68 perfect information to be. Our question therefore is: How different are migration journeys
69 under perfect information from those in a scenario with limited information? What might
70 the consequences of these differences look like?

71 It is important to note that as with our previous study this is a purely theoretical work. We
72 are not modelling a specific real-world situation but perform "computational sociology"
73 (Macy & Willer, 2002) by attempting to understand the effect of certain assumptions on
74 the behaviour of an entire class of systems.

2 Model description

The model described below is a strongly modified version of a model we have presented before (Hinsch & Bijak, 2019). Along with many smaller modifications we transitioned from step-wise updates to a continuous-time, event-based paradigm (with commensurate changes from probabilities to rates and updates to processes) and simplified the model by removing capital, resources and the two-tier link system.

An earlier version of the model the present study is based on was also used as a didactic running example in our book (Bijak et al., 2021).

Since a full description of the model would exceed the available space, we provide in the following only a brief overview. The source code and detailed documentation for the model can be accessed on Comses (<https://www.comses.net/codebase-release/4802f909-66b2-4e95-9e35-a021dbafc670/>). Please note that a few of the mechanisms described in the full documentation (risk, resources and capital) were not used in the current study and were therefore switched off in the simulation runs by setting the appropriate parameter values. A full list of model parameters including default values can be found in the appendix.

Overview

In our model a population of migrants travels from a location of origin to a destination, crossing a landscape of cities and transport links. Agents attempt to navigate this world optimally based on their subjective knowledge that is not necessarily complete or correct. They gain additional knowledge through experience and by exchanging information with other agents.




Figure 1: Diagram of the entities in the model and their relationships.

96 **Entities**

97 The simulated world consists of *locations* ('cities') that are connected by *links* (see Fig. 1).
98 Cities and links are static entities with properties that do not change over the course of
99 the simulation. Cities have a 2-dimensional position and a *quality* that determines their
100 *attractiveness* to agents. Quality represents for example the (lack of) presence of police,
101 the availability of resources or the level of safety. Links connect two cities and have *friction*
102 as their only property. Friction affects the time it takes for an agent to transverse the link
103 and is determined by the link's length as well as a stochastic component.

104 Nearly the entire behaviour of the model consists of the *actions* of agents or their interac-
105 tions with each other or the world (see below). Agents are at all times positioned either in
106 a city or on a link unless they have arrived at their destination. Agents have some amount
107 of *information* about the world (see below) as well as a number of *contacts* among the
108 population of travelling or arrived agents.

109 **World**

110 The simulated world is constructed as a random geometric graph (E. N. Gilbert, 1961) of 600
111 cities connected by transport links. Cities have a random quality $q \sim \mathcal{U}_{[0,1]}$. The positions
112 of cities are distributed uniformly on a unit square. Any two cities that are closer than a
113 threshold distance are connected by a transport link. In addition one departure location
114 at $x = 0, y = 0.5$ and ten exit locations placed in regular intervals at $x = 1$ are added to the
115 world. Departure and destination locations are connected by links to the 5 closest cities,
116 respectively.

117 Links' only property is *friction* which is calculated from distance d as $f_i = d_i r$ with random
118 $r \sim \mathcal{U}_{[0.75,1.25]}$.

119 **Actions and interactions**

120 All events in the model are assumed to be Poisson processes in continuous time. With
121 the exception of the creation and departure of new agents all changes of model state are
122 the result of the action of an agent. Which actions an agent can perform and their rates of
123 occurrence depends on its state, in particular on whether it is currently travelling on a link
124 or staying in a city.

125 **create agents** Agents are created with a fixed time-dependent rate. They enter the world
126 at the departure location. Unless noted otherwise agents start out without contacts
127 and without any knowledge.

128 **plan** During planning an agent either plans a route to an exit or, if it does not have suffi-
129 cient knowledge decides to which neighbouring city to go next.

130 **explore** An exploring agent gains new knowledge about closeby cities and links.

131 **add contact** An agent adds agents that are currently situated in the same city to its list
132 of contacts.

133 **forget contact** An agent unilaterally forgets a randomly selected contact.

134 **exchange information** An agent communicates with one of its contacts and exchanges
135 information about the world topology, i.e. the existence and connectedness of cities
136 and links, as well as their properties.

137 **depart** An agent departs from its current location and starts travelling to the next location
138 in its plan.

139 **arrive** A travelling agent finishes traversing a link.

140 **Information**

141 We are interested in how reliance on and exchange of possibly incomplete or wrong infor-
142 mation affects the agents' decision making. Therefore we decided to explicitly model the
143 agents' knowledge of the world as well as the information exchange between agents. The
144 submodel on information exchange presented in this section is largely identical to earlier
145 versions published elsewhere (Bijak et al., 2021; Hinsch & Bijak, 2019).

146 An agent's knowledge is comprised of a number of information items each of which repre-
147 sents a city or a link. Topologically this information is accurate - all connections an agent
148 knows about are correct - but not necessarily complete - an agent may know only a small
149 number of cities and links. Information items have the same properties as the real-world
150 entities they represent, however their values may be inaccurate.

151 To model this, the real values of properties are in their subjective counterpart replaced
152 by an estimate of the value together with a certainty that the value is correct. Agents
153 can gain information either directly from the world by "exploration" (action 'explore') or
154 by communicating with other agents (action 'exchange information'). As explained in the
155 following, both processes can add new information items and update estimate as well as
156 certainty of an information item's properties.

157 If agents encounter unknown (to them) cities or links (through exploration or communi-
158 cation) they add a new information item corresponding to that entity to their knowledge,
159 setting property estimates to a default value and certainty to 0. When exploring a known
160 entity, values are updated, with the new value being a weighted mean between the previous
161 estimate or certainty and the real value (or 1 in case of certainty).

162 Information exchange between agents is more complicated as it needs to exhibit a num-
163 ber of specific properties: if two interacting agents have similar estimates for a property
164 their corresponding certainty should increase. If, on the other hand, their estimates differ,
165 both individuals should decrease their certainty. At the same time an agent should always

166 adapt its estimate in direction of that of its interaction partner, however, it should do so
 167 in proportion to its relative certainty. That is, in an exchange between an agent with high
 168 and one with low certainty, the one with the low certainty should change its estimate more.

169 While there is a substantial theoretical literature on belief and opinion dynamics, previ-
 170 ous models seem to focus largely either on adversarial exchange of opinions, i.e. situa-
 171 tions where individuals attempt to convince each other, or on situations where individuals
 172 change their beliefs according to social norms or consensus (e.g. Duggins, 2017). An in-
 173 teresting approach by Martins (2009) and extended by (among others) Adams et al. (2021)
 174 uses Bayesian inference to derive updating rules for beliefs about the value of continuous
 175 real-world variables. The resulting model is, however, computationally quite expensive. We
 176 therefore designed our own model of information exchange.

177 We based our information model on the well-known mass action dynamics (Horn & Jackson,
 178 1972). To understand the model it is best to imagine that an agent’s belief consists of
 179 two “substances”, certainty and doubt, in proportion t and $d = 1 - t$. When two agents
 180 interact a “reaction” between their respective belief components takes place, potentially
 181 transforming them: doubt reacting with doubt produces doubt. Certainty of one agent
 182 interacting with the other agent’s doubt can “convince” the latter, changing parts of its
 183 doubt into certainty. Depending on the difference in estimate certainty interacting with
 184 certainty can lead to confusion and increased doubt or just change the estimate.

185 More formally, for an interaction between agents A and B with an estimate v we define
 186 difference in estimate as

$$\delta_v := \frac{|v_A - v_B|}{v_A + v_B}. \quad (1)$$

187 Using parameters c_i (“convince”), c_u (“confuse”) and c_e (“convert”) we then calculate the
 188 new doubt value d'_A based on the previous values of certainty t . and doubt d . as

$$d'_A = d_A d_B + (1 - c_i) d_A t_B + c_u t_A t_B \delta_v. \quad (2)$$

189 The estimate v_A changes accordingly:

$$v'_A = \frac{t_A d_B v_A + c_i d_A t_B v_B + t_A t_B (1 - c_u \delta_v) ((1 - c_e) v_A + c_e v_B)}{1 - d'_A} \quad (3)$$

190 It is important to note that this is a purely phenomenological model. It was chosen for
191 being based on a well-known, simple formalism and showing all required properties, but
192 does not claim to be psychologically or empirically accurate. As we can see, for the special
193 where different opinions do not lead to doubt, i.e. $c_u = 0$, doubt will disappear, i.e. d will
194 approach 0 (as long as $c_i > 0$), and the model reverts to a simple weighted mean (as in e.g.
195 Nordio et al., 2018):

$$v'_A = (1 - c_e) v_A + c_e v_B \quad (4)$$

196 **Decisions**

197 Agents attempt to find the least costly route from their current position to an exit, based
198 on their current knowledge. The cost of a route is a function of the links' friction and the
199 quality of cities visited on the way. If they are not able to find a complete path they instead
200 select the best city in the vicinity based on distance (friction), quality and proximity to the
201 destination.

202 **Setup**

203 We are investigating the effects of (limited) information and information exchange on the
204 formation of migration routes. In order to obtain a baseline with which to compare our
205 results, we first ran all scenarios under the assumption of perfect information. That is,
206 agents received full and perfect knowledge about every link and city in the simulated world.
207 In order to avoid any additional effects through communication errors we also switched
208 off communication in these scenarios entirely (see Appendix A).

209 To test the effects of information exchange we then ran the model under various levels
210 of communication frequency and intensity (see table in Appendix A). We also varied the
211 strength of communication error and the fidelity of the information agents receive through
212 exploration.

213 We explored further potential real-world consequences of information in additional sce-
214 narios where agents had a preference for a specific destination (scenario 'preferred des-
215 tinations') or where after a certain amount of time some links became difficult to navigate
216 (scenario 'intervention').

217 We ran ten random replicates for each parameter combination. As preliminary runs showed
218 that the simulation approaches equilibrium after 300-500 time units, we ran all simulation
219 up to $t = 750$.

220 **3 Results**

221 We wanted to know whether discrete migration routes form in the first place and, if so, how
222 predictable and optimal they are. For this we used three key measurements:

223 **route concentration** We calculate the relative standard deviation of transit counts across
224 all links as a proxy for the degree to which travel routes are similar between agents.

225 **optimality** We determine the correlation coefficient between realised transit counts for
226 all links and transit counts in a hypothetical scenario where each individual travelled
227 optimally.

228 **unpredictability** The unpredictability of transits for a given city is measured as the stan-
229 dard deviation across all replicates of the proportion of transits for that city. We
230 calculate overall unpredictability as average unpredictability of arrivals over all exits.

231 **Baseline scenario**

232 If individuals are perfectly informed, every agent is able to find and travel on the optimal
233 route, resulting in maximum route concentration and predictability (Fig. 2). With imperfect
234 or incomplete information agents do not necessarily know enough to find the objectively
235 best route and will instead travel suboptimally (Fig. 3). This leaves scope for variation
236 between individuals as well as between replication runs (see Figure 4), therefore route
237 concentration as well as route predictability are substantially lower in scenarios without
238 perfect knowledge (Fig. 2).

239 As we can see in Figure 2, however, for anything but perfect exploration the unpredictabil-
240 ity of agent arrivals decreases when changing from low to medium communication but
241 increases again for high communication. Together with the increase in route concentra-
242 tion with communication this indicates that what we observe is a phase transition between
243 two regimes:

244 For low communication agents receive only little input from each other. On the other hand
245 exploration is not sufficient to produce a reliable map. Routes therefore differ between
246 agents and from the optimal route, leading to strong stochasticity across replicates (and
247 thus high unpredictability).

248 For medium communication information transfer between agents is high enough that a
249 relatively accurate and complete consensus map emerges in the population. This leads to
250 the emergence of similar, predictable and relatively optimal routes in most replicate runs.

251 For high communication the consensus between agents is even stronger. However, now
252 the effects of information transfer override the effects of exploration so that unreliable
253 consensus maps emerge. Therefore, while most agents take a similar route, that route is
254 less optimal than for medium communication and can vary from case to case (implying
255 lower predictability).




Figure 2: Route concentration (top, see text for definition) and unpredictability (bottom, see text for definition) for different values of exploration, communication and communication error. The black line indicates values in a scenario where individuals have perfect information and do not communicate. We see that while higher levels of communication lead to an increase in route concentration, arrivals are most predictable at intermediate levels of communication.




Figure 3: Average travel time (top) and route optimality (bottom, for definition see text) for different values of exploration, communication and communication error. The black line indicates values as obtained in a scenario where individuals have perfect information and do not communicate. Travel time is high and increases with error for low communication while it is low and decreases with error for medium and high communication. Routes are generally closer to the optimum for intermediate levels of communication.




Figure 4: Migration trajectories for different scenarios. Thickness of the lines indicates traffic, colour represents friction (red - high). The top left panel shows the result for a full knowledge scenario (and thus the optimal path), the other panels are taken from communication scenarios. Top right: no error, low exploration, low communication; bottom left & right: low error, high exploration, high communication, different random seeds.




Figure 5: Proportion of agents arriving at their preferred destination for different values of exploration, communication, communication error and strength of preference. The black line indicates values as obtained in a scenario where individuals have perfect information and do not communicate. Only for high error rates during communication and if agents are willing to incur an additional cost of 30% (bottom graph) do substantial proportions arrive at their preferred destination.

256 **Preferred destinations**

257 With our second set of scenarios we investigated how information and communication
 258 affect the chances of migrants to reach their preferred destination. For this we assumed
 259 that each agent at random picks one of the ten destinations as its preferred target. The
 260 strength of preference then indicates the increase in travel costs an agent is willing to incur
 261 in order to arrive at that destination.

262 Except for decreased route concentration (due to agents attempting to reach their target

263 exits) adding preferences has little effect on the behaviour of the model as presented above
264 (not shown). With respect to the ability of agents to follow their preferences, we find that
265 if agents have perfect information a preference of 30% is sufficient to let the vast majority
266 reach their preferred destination (Figure 5). Without prior information, however, in most
267 scenarios less than half of the agents manage to arrive at their target. As before, agents
268 travel most optimally for medium communication and high exploration, but even under
269 these conditions arrival at target remains below 70%.

270 **Interventions**

271 A common response to a sudden increase in migration is the erection of physical or ad-
272 ministrative barriers in the form of e.g. border closures or transport restrictions (Andersson,
273 2014). In our third set of scenarios we investigate how the reaction of migration routes
274 to the sudden appearance of barriers depends on the information regime. We implement
275 barriers by, at timestep 500, increasing friction in all links that intersect with a vertical
276 line across 80% (see Figure 7) of the world to 0.9 (which corresponds to an increase in
277 travel time of about 8 time units). As we can see in Figures 6 and 7 migration routes in
278 scenarios with full knowledge change to accommodate the barrier, so that neither quality
279 nor travel time are substantially affected, although the number of agents reaching their
280 preferred destination decreases as an effect of the detour.

281 In information-limited scenarios on the other hand, migration routes are largely unable to
282 adapt. The quality of routes plummets and travel times increase substantially.

283 **4 Discussion**

284 We have shown that limitation and exchange of information can have a strong influence
285 on the formation of migration routes. Migration routes can become less optimal, less pre-
286 dictable and less centralised if migrants do not have perfect knowledge. Furthermore the




Figure 6: Properties of migration routes for an intervention scenario (see text for definitions). The black line indicates values from an equivalent scenario with full knowledge. After the intervention the quality of routes decreases dramatically while travel times increase substantially (cf. Figures 2, 3).




Figure 7: Migration trajectories for scenarios with interventions. Thickness of the lines indicates traffic, colour represents friction (red - high). The vertical dashed line represents the barrier. Shown are the results for full knowledge (left) and limited knowledge (right) with high error, perfect exploration and low communication; both with a preference value of 30%. While agents easily manage to circumvent the obstacle when they are fully informed, only a small proportion of agents does so in the limited-information scenario.

287 proportion of migrants reaching their preferred destination is substantially lower in sce-
 288 narios with more realistic informational logistics and migrants find it much more difficult
 289 to adapt their routes to changing circumstances. The exchange of information in particular
 290 has a counterintuitive effect in that under certain conditions higher levels of communica-
 291 tion can lead to less predictable routes (see also Hinsch & Bijak, 2019).

292 Even though this is a relatively simple, theoretical model, we can already at this stage
 293 draw a number of conclusions concerning migration modelling as well as the real-world
 294 dynamics of migration.

295 First and foremost we can conclude that information and information exchange are likely
 296 to be relevant for the formation of migration routes in the real world. In our model, how
 297 much information the agents have available and the frequency and accuracy of information
 298 exchange can lead to qualitatively different properties of the migration routes observed
 299 in the system. We know that in reality migrants do in fact often make travel decisions

300 based on limited knowledge (Borkert et al., 2018; Crawley et al., 2016). It has also been
301 found that (depending on country of origin) official sources of information are often met
302 with very little trust and that in these situations most information is gathered from peers
303 (Emmer et al., 2016; Prike et al., 2022). It seems therefore reasonable to expect that
304 effects similar to those observed in our model can be found in reality. Consequently any
305 modelling attempting to predict migrants' movement in detail or on a small scale will need
306 to incorporate these effects. This is particularly salient where models are meant to be used
307 to support humanitarian measures in crisis situations. Previous modelling efforts in this
308 area assume perfect knowledge (albeit sometimes with a limited range of perception) and
309 thus optimal decision making (e.g. Frydenlund et al., 2018; Hébert et al., 2018; Łatek et al.,
310 2013; Suleimenova & Groen, 2020). We expect that including the effects of information in
311 these models would change at least some of the observed results.

312 We also see that the migration journey itself not only shows considerable variations in
313 dynamics depending on which scenario we assume but can also have important effects on
314 other aspects of migration. Our results show that introducing a (more) realistic information
315 regime can halve the number of migrants that arrive at their preferred destination. This
316 contradicts the assumption of many models of migration that migrants *always* arrive at
317 their chosen destination (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016). We can conclude that
318 while the situation might be different for voluntary migration, at least models of forced
319 migration should assume that a considerable proportion of migrants will be diverted on
320 their journey and that this depends on the information regime in the population. Similarly
321 the effects of introducing a barrier to migration differ considerably depending on whether
322 we assume perfect information or not. Models that for example attempt to extrapolate the
323 effect of border closures on migration will risk vastly overestimating the effectiveness in
324 steering migration streams unless the role of information is included.

325 The situation becomes even more complicated when we look in more detail at how the spe-

326 cific variables we modelled correspond to aspects of real-world situations. The frequency
327 and accuracy with which migrants communicate might be a result of cultural factors but
328 will also depend on simple practical aspects of their circumstances, such as availability of
329 mobile phones, opportunities to charge them and accessibility of service in the travel area
330 (Gillespie et al., 2018). Similarly the access to local information (exploration in our model)
331 can be strongly affected by something as straightforward as a language barrier. Empirical
332 studies furthermore show that how well informed migrants are about their journey and their
333 destination as well as their capacity to obtain information can vary dependent on factors
334 such as country of origin (Dimitriadi, 2018; Emmer et al., 2016). Based on our results it can
335 therefore be expected that migrant populations will differ for example with respect to how
336 predictable their travel routes turn out to be or how likely it is that migrants end up at their
337 planned or preferred destination. Modelling studies aiming at predicting migrant arrivals
338 therefore have to take the specific properties of the modelled population as well as how
339 they relate to the situation into account.

340 Even though the importance of networks for migration decisions has been recognised
341 in previous studies (Gurak & Caces, 1992), many models that explicitly include networks
342 simplify them in at least one of two ways - by assuming that networks do not change
343 over time (e.g. Simon, 2019), or, if so, then deterministically and/or or by summarising the
344 effects of networks as a single numerical value (e.g. 'strength' or 'number of connections',
345 e.g. Lin et al., 2016) that then is used during decision making. Our results show that the
346 situation can be considerably more complicated. We find that not only the existence and
347 strength of the network matters, but also what individuals use it for. In our case that is
348 information, but it does not seem implausible that other, known, network effects such as
349 monetary support or logistic aid have similarly fine-grained dynamics that affect the other
350 parts of the system and therefore need to be taken into account.

351 **Limitations and future work**

352 While our results clearly show that informational logistics affect the migration journey it
353 is difficult to judge how exactly the scenarios we investigated relate to specific real-world
354 situations. At this point our modelling efforts therefore have to remain a proof of principle.
355 However, given the wide range of parameter values we tested we can assume that similar
356 dynamics will take place in real systems. Nevertheless, additional effort will be required to
357 calibrate the model to empirical data in order to test the relevance of our results.

358 We intentionally kept our model of information and information exchange simple and ab-
359 stract, partially due to a lack of reliable empirical information and partially in order to
360 investigate the simplest scenarios first. At this point the model is therefore clearly “unre-
361 alistic” in many aspects. The two biggest simplifying assumptions concerning information
362 in our model have to be first, that agents (in the “communication” scenarios) have no prior
363 knowledge and second, that information is retained and exchanged entirely indiscrimi-
364 nately. Strictly speaking both assumptions are clearly wrong. In the absence of empirical
365 data on either aspect, however, any attempt at making the model more realistic would
366 have lead to a massive increase in number of potential realisations and in the size of the
367 parameter space. As it is, this version of the model and the scenarios we tested serve to
368 describe both extremes of what is possible in reality. Any real population will likely to be
369 somewhere between our “full knowledge” and “no knowledge” scenarios.

370 In this version of the model we assume for the sake of simplicity that the only choice agents
371 have, is which route to take. We know, however, that in reality migrants have more options
372 available. For one they may decide that they would be better off returning to their country
373 of origin when for example faced with an obstacle. More importantly, however, there are
374 many situations where it can be prudent or even necessary to delay the continuation of
375 the journey (Anam et al., 2008; DeVoretz & Ma, 2002). If included this would add timing
376 of migration decisions as an important dimension to the model.

377 We also completely ignored the heterogeneity that every human population shows. We
378 know that means and circumstances often differ between early and late migrants on the
379 same route (Lindstrom & López Ramírez, 2010). If we assume that access to information
380 differs in a similar way we can easily imagine that well- or better-informed early migrants
381 serve as “trailblazers”, choosing good routes and transmitting their experiences to followers
382 who a priori might not be as well-informed.

383 Another aspect worth exploring in the future that was out of scope for this study is the
384 role of network structure and density in information transmission and - ultimately - route
385 formation. To a certain degree we can assume that for example the effects of an increase
386 in information exchange due to higher network density are analogous to the effects of
387 increased information exchange we modelled in our scenarios. However, new dynamics
388 might emerge if networks interact with other aspects of the system, for example if people
389 have a tendency to travel in groups (Collins & Frydenlund, 2016) or if pre-existing networks
390 are stratified by social status and thus access to information and capital.

391 We also - again for the sake of simplicity - did not include many of the additional factors
392 known to be important in real-world migration systems. There are for example good indi-
393 cations that at least in some situations smugglers play an important role in maintaining
394 or even shaping migration routes, in particular when there are pre-existing non-migration-
395 related smuggling routes (Triandafyllidou, 2018). We also completely ignored the effects
396 of material means on the availability of information and transportation (see the point on
397 temporal heterogeneity above).

398 Furthermore the difficulty of the journey a migrant expects might itself affect their choice of
399 destination or even the decision to migrate in the first place. However, that difficulty itself
400 might decrease over time if a migration route emerges and leads to the establishment
401 of supporting infrastructure. In this case the migration decision is therefore part of a
402 feedback loop and can not be understood without taking into account the journey.

403 **Conclusions**

404 We can conclude that information is an important, yet largely neglected aspect of migra-
405 tion that deserves more attention in the future. This is likely to apply to all stages of the
406 migration journey, from the decision to leave to the journey itself to the decision to remain
407 in the country of arrival or to move on, and finally in the decision to return if the opportunity
408 arises. Our model is a simple first step in exploring this issue that - as discussed above -
409 leaves ample scope for extension. We are looking forward to seeing the interesting future
410 developments in this area.

411 Our work also confirms that - as is the case for many other social phenomena - small-scale
412 interactions between individuals can have substantial effects in the context of migration.
413 While it might for a given situation be possible to find macroscopic approximations for the
414 effects of microscopic interactions this can be a difficult and time-consuming process. If
415 we assume that information exchange is not the only relevant interaction between migrants
416 (others include direct interactions such as transfer of capital and indirect interactions via
417 environmental factors, such as economic effects of transit zones or the establishment of
418 smuggling services) we have to conclude that in many if not most situations some form of
419 bottom-up modelling strategy will be required when dealing with the dynamics and effects
420 of migration (Willekens, 2018). This further strengthens the case for the use of agent-based
421 modelling in the social sciences (Chattoe, 2013).

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558 **A Scenario parameters**

559 Parameters that vary between scenarios. Scenarios 'preferences' and 'obstacle' were run in
560 combination with all configurations for 'full info' and 'communication', respectively. Some
561 parameters were changed as a set (indicated as '{}'). Error level for example changes both,
562 *error* and *error_friect*. A value of '{0.12, 0.015}' then corresponds to a value of 0.12 for *error*
563 and 0.015 for *error_friect*.

parameter	explanation	full info	communication	preferences	obstacle
<i>n_ini_contacts</i>	initial number of contacts	0	5	var	var
<i>p_know_target</i>	prob. to know an exit at the start of the simulation	1.0	0.0	var	var
<i>p_know_link</i>	“ link “	1.0	0.0	var	var
<i>p_know_city</i>	“ city “	1.0	0.0	var	var
<i>speed_expl_ini</i>	exploration on departure	1.0	0.0	var	var
<i>n_contacts_max</i>	maximum number of contacts	0	20	var	var
<i>p_drop_contact</i>	prob. to lose a contacts	0	0.05		
<i>pref_target</i>	preference for specific destination	1.0	1.0	1.1, 1.3	1.0, 1.3
<i>convince</i>	see section 2	0.0	0.5	var	var
<i>convert</i>	see section 2	0.0	0.1	var	var
<i>confuse</i>	see section 2	0.0	0.3	var	var

564

parameter	explanation	full info	communication	preferences	obstacle
<i>error, error_frict</i>	communication error	n.a.	{0.0, 0.0}, {0.12, 0.015}, {0.36, 0.045}	var	var
<i>rate_explore_stay,</i> <i>p_find_links,</i> <i>p_find_dests,</i> <i>speed_expl_stay,</i> <i>speed_expl_move</i>	rate of exploration and quality of information gained when exploring	0	{1.0, 0.1, 0.1, 0.5, 0.5}, {4.0, 0.8, 0.5, 1.0, 1.0}, {10.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0}	var	var
<i>p_keep_contact,</i> <i>p_info_contacts,</i> <i>p_transfer_info</i>	probability to gain contacts, rate of information exchange	0	{0.1, 0.1, 0.1}, {0.3, 0.3, 0.3}, {0.6, 0.6, 0.6}	var	var

565

566

B Default parameter values

567

Values of all parameters that do not change across scenarios. The submodels on risk and

568

resources, respectively were not used and corresponding parameters have been omitted.

parameter	default	parameter	default
<i>n_cities</i>	600	<i>n_nearest_exit</i>	5
<i>link_thresh</i>	0.12	<i>qual_entry</i>	0.0
<i>n_exits</i>	10	<i>res_entry</i>	0.0
<i>regular_exits</i>	true	<i>qual_exit</i>	1.0
<i>n_entries</i>	1	<i>res_exit</i>	1.0
<i>regular_entries</i>	true	<i>dist_scale</i>	1.0
<i>exit_dist</i>	1.0	<i>frict_range</i>	0.5
<i>entry_dist</i>	0.0	<i>p_unkown_city</i>	0.0
<i>n_nearest_entry</i>	5	<i>p_unknown_link</i>	0.0
<i>rate_dep</i>	20.0	<i>move_rate</i>	0.0
<i>rate_plan</i>	100.0	<i>move_speed</i>	0.1
<i>res_exp</i>	0.5	<i>p_notice_death_c</i>	0.0
<i>qual_exp</i>	0.5	<i>p_notice_death_o</i>	0.0
<i>frict_exp</i>	1.25	<i>qual_bias</i>	1.0
<i>qual_weight_x</i>	0.25	<i>path_penalty_loc</i>	1.0
<i>qual_weight_res</i>	0.0	<i>path_penalty_risk</i>	0.0
<i>qual_tol_frict</i>	2.0		

569