# The Role of Managerial Ownership in Dividend Tunneling: Evidence from China

**Abstract**

*Research Question/Issue:*

We examine the role of corporate executives in dividend tunneling activity by controlling shareholders, and whether the correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is influenced by internal and external governance mechanisms.

*Research Findings/Insights:*

We find increased managerial ownership may lead to a higher level of dividend tunneling. This is further strengthened by our finding that the positive effect of executive ownership on dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with weaker minority shareholder protection. In addition, our results show that higher degrees of state ownership may further intensify this positive association. Finally, we find that analyst coverage has a moderating effect and constrains the collusion between controlling shareholders and executives in dividend tunneling activity.

*Theoretical/Academic Implications:*

Our study contributes to the literature on the role of managerial ownership in controlling shareholders’ dividend tunneling activity. We fill a gap in the literature on the corporate agency problem by providing evidence that dividends have been employed by controlling shareholders as a means of tunneling, and that executives with higher ownership are more likely to collude with controlling shareholders in dividend tunneling activities.

*Practitioner/Policy Implications:*

This study contributes to the debates around the promotion of the cash dividend policy in China, as our findings show that cash dividends are used as a tunneling vehicle. Providing important evidence to regulators, our findings support the argument that external monitoring by financial analysts can effectively constrain dividend tunneling by dominant shareholders, especially in the context of emerging stock markets with high ownership concentration, weak minority shareholder protection, and an underdeveloped legal system.

*JEL Classifications:* D22; G18; G30; G32; G35

*Keywords:* Dividend payouts; Tunneling; Executive ownership; Ownership concentration; State ownership; Financial analysts

## Introduction

Tunneling, a specific type of financial fraud, is a phenomenon by which controlling shareholders use their power to expropriate minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Although tunneling cannot be directly observed, prior studies have found activities associated with tunneling behaviour by controlling shareholders, such as advantageous transfer pricing to parties related to controlling shareholders, executive perquisites, excessive compensation, loan guarantees, directed equity issuance, favourable lending terms, and outright theft of corporate assets (Faccio et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Jiang et al. (2010) point out that the salient institutional features of Chinese stock markets, including high ownership concentration, weak minority shareholder protection, and the under-developed legal system, facilitate tunneling activities by controlling shareholders. In particular, they revealed that the scale of the tunneling in China is astonishing, based on evidence that over one-third of Chinese listed firms had suffered expropriation via intercorporate loans. In 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) developed regulations to completely ban controlling shareholders from making intercorporate loans. Given that the motivators behind tunneling activity in China, being deeply rooted within the nature of the institutional settings, was not eradicated, we expect that controlling shareholders will seek alternative vehicles for tunneling, and dividend tunnelling may have become the prevailing form of expropriation especially after the intercorporate loan ban of 2006.

Due to the distinctive features of the institutional landscape of Chinese listed firms, prior studies indicate that tunneling behaviour has not been eliminated in China after the introduction of the intercorporate loan regulations in 2006 (Allen et al., 2005; Bai et al., 2004; Braendle et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Kuo et al., 2014). Huang (2016) finds that the balance of outstanding related-party loan guarantees, as a measure of tunneling, even increased after China’s 2008 enterprise income tax reform. More importantly, prior studies indicate that controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms routinely enjoy absolute control over the decision-making of executive appointments, remuneration, and dismissals (Conyon & He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006b). In the same vein, Zhang et al. (2014) find that concentrated ownership reduces executives’ performance‐based incentives, so managers may be driven to collude with controlling shareholders in tunneling activities. Although the direct impact of ownership and identities of controlling shareholder on tunneling activity have been addressed in the literature, the understanding of the influence of executive ownership remain limited, particularly in the context of emerging markets.

In addition, dividends may have been used as a means of tunneling by controlling shareholders. Atanassov and Mandell (2018) indicate that master limited partnerships (MPLs) with weaker corporate governance mechanisms tend to have more dividend tunneling. Chen et al. (2009) find evidence of dividend tunneling by controlling shareholders through investigating the relationship between IPO price discounts of non-tradable shares and firms’ dividend payouts in China. Lv et al. (2012) indicate that dividend tunneling increases in firms with weaker minority shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Moreover, in October 2008, the CSRC issued new regulations governing dividend payments, which specify that total cash dividend in the previous three years should be above 30% of the average annual distributable profits during the same period, with the intention of protecting the interests of minority shareholders in China.[[1]](#footnote-1) In November 2013, further guidance was issued to protect minority shareholders and request that they should be sufficiently consulted before any changes to a current dividend policy. It also was designed to encourage firms to adopt cash dividends in rewarding shareholders so long as the conditions are met for this.[[2]](#footnote-2)

These previous findings in dividend tunneling and the promotion of cash dividend policy have inspired us to conduct further investigation into dividend tunneling in the Chinese stock markets. We aim to fill a gap in the literature on the corporate agency problem by examining the role of corporate executives in dividend tunneling activities by controlling shareholders, and whether the correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is influenced by internal and external governance mechanisms.

In this study, we investigate the impact of managerial ownership on divided tunneling using firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2020. Our data covers the periods when the two aforementioned regulation documents were released. This sheds light on the implications of dividend policies in China. Prior literature suggests that the Type I agency problem can be partly resolved by increasing executive ownership in firms when the ownership is low (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Core & Larcker, 2002; Denis et al., 1997a, 1997b; McConnell et al., 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto & Takada, 2010; Zhou, 2001; among many). However, the role of executive ownership in the Type II agency problem regarding the conflicts in interests between controlling and minority shareholders has not been fully addressed.[[3]](#footnote-3) Our results show that dividend tunneling is positively related to executive ownership. The finding implies that executives may collude with controlling shareholders and extract resources through dividend payouts for the interests of controlling shareholders under the institutional settings of Chinese stock markets.

Lv et al. (2012) claim that dividend payment may be used as a vehicle for tunneling by controlling shareholders to extract corporate resources for their own benefit when the level of minority shareholder protection, measured by the shareholder balancing mechanism (SBM), is lower. In line with this argument, our results further show that the positive correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with weaker minority shareholder protection. Our results offer further support to the finding that a more balanced ownership structure can limit expropriation from majority shareholders (Berkman et al., 2009; Maury & Pajuste, 2005).

We also examine whether dividend tunneling has been employed as a substitute for the major tunneling activity, intercorporate loans, in the Chinese stock markets. In particular, it is noteworthy that intercorporate loans have been restricted by the CSRC since 2006. Jiang et al. (2010) provide evidence of tunneling via intercorporate loans, but they believe the magnitude of the overall problem to be certainly greater. Given that the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders is not eliminated, controlling shareholders may use dividends as new means of tunneling. Our results suggest that dividend tunneling has been used as a substitute for intercorporate loans and become the prevailing form of expropriation since intercorporate loans were restricted by regulatory measures in 2006.

In addition, we examine the effect of state ownership on the relation between managerial ownership and dividend tunneling. State shareholders, one of the main types of Chinese shareholders, do not enjoy the same opportunity to benefit from share price appreciation, so they may support tunneling activities for their own interests. Our findings indicate that an increase in state ownership could intensify the positive relation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. Finally, analyst coverage as an external monitoring mechanism can reduce the potential conflict between corporate managers and shareholders. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that financial analysts may improve corporate transparency through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, which may in turn constrain managerial opportunism. Dyck et al. (2010) report that such analysts can detect about 10% of corporate fraud cases among their sample, suggesting they are the most effective whistle-blowers and not even corporate insiders. Ding et al. (2013) also suggest that analyst coverage is a particularly effective external monitoring mechanism in China since financial analysts can enhance the corporate information environment in regions where minority investor protection is weak. In line with previous findings, our results confirm that financial analysts can indeed play an external monitoring role and constrain managerial opportunism since we find that a higher level of analyst coverage can weaken the positive correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling.

This study contributes to the literature on the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders, especially the role of managerial ownership in controlling shareholders’ dividend tunneling activities. We fill a gap in the literature on the corporate agency problem by providing evidence that dividends have been employed by controlling shareholders as a means of tunneling and executives with higher ownership are more likely to collude with controlling shareholders in dividend tunneling activities. Specifically, we show that dividend tunneling is positively correlated with executive ownership. In addition, we further show the correlation to be strengthened by lower minority shareholder protection as well as state ownership. Our study also contributes to the debate around the promotion of cash dividend policy in China, as our findings show that cash dividends are used as a tunneling vehicle and dividend tunneling has displaced other tunneling activity via intercorporate loans. Although the regulations promoting cash dividend payout are used to protect the interests of minority shareholders, they also have the side effect of enabling dividend tunneling. In particular, we show that dividend tunneling has a substitution effect with intercorporate loaning, which has been restricted since 2006. In other words, our findings indicate that regulators need to take into account the adverse effect of future regulations on dividend tunneling, due to the high ownership concentration prevalent in Chinese listed firms. Finally, our findings provide evidence to the regulators supporting the argument that external monitoring by financial analysts can effectively constrain dividend tunneling by dominant shareholders.

Our study distinguishes from Brown et al. (2007) in the following ways. Firstly, as one of our main contributions, we examine the effect of executive ownership on abnormal dividend payout, while Brown et al. (2007) examine this effect at the level of dividend payout. Secondly, we look into the issue of dividend tunneling in China while Brown et al. (2007) investigate the impact of US market regulation. There are fundamental differences in the institutional settings between the US and Chinese markets. The most important is the degree of ownership concentration, it being much higher in Chinese listed firms than in US listed firms. In fact, under high concentrations of ownership, the abnormal dividend payout is considered to be dividend tunneling behaviour in China as it may only benefit a small number of large shareholders. This viewpoint is further strengthened by our results showing that the positive relationship is more pronounced when the minority shareholder protection is weaker. Thirdly, although Brown et al. (2007) find that firms with higher executive ownership tend to increase dividend payout, they show that the level of total dividends remains unchanged as there is a substitution effect between dividend payout and share repurchase. However, Chinese listed firms do not use share repurchase, and we demonstrate that firms with higher executive ownership tend to increase abnormal dividend payout.

The findings in this paper could be well applied to other emerging markets. First, concentrated corporate ownership may easily lead to conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders. Second, weak institutional protection of minority shareholder concerns serves to reduce the likelihood of tunneling behaviour being disclosed or detected and may increase associated legal costs. In addition, managers may be driven to collude with controlling shareholders in tunneling activities for their own interests as concentrated ownership reduces executives’ performance‐based incentives and dominant shareholders have control over executive appointments, remuneration and dismissals (Conyon & He,2011; Zhang et al., 2014). Nevertheless, emerging markets do share the salient institutional features as the Chinese stock markets (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2014; Atanassov and Mandell, 2018), and our findings are likely to be well applied to other emerging markets.

The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the hypotheses. The sample construction and methodology are described in Section 3. We present the primary results of our empirical analysis in Section 4, and offer robustness checks in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides the policy implications and concludes the paper.

1. **Related literature and hypothesis development**

**2.1 Dividend payout**

The fundamental argument of theories related to shareholder protection indicates that dividends are considered a means of protecting the interests of all shareholders. Specifically, dividend signalling theory suggests that the announcement of a dividend payout increase is an indication of positive prospects, which is beneficial to all shareholders (Miller & Rock, 1985). Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend disbursement can diminish internal perquisite consumption and consequently reduce agency costs. In the same vein, Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Jensen (1986) further argue that dividends, as a form of free cash flow, should be paid to all shareholders in the interests of wealth maximization.

However, following Johnson et al. (2000)[[4]](#footnote-4), the tunneling theory argues that the use of dividends can be employed by controlling shareholders to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012). Lv et al. (2012) suggest that dividends can be treated as a vehicle for tunneling, in particular, when minority shareholder protection is weak. This implies that a dividend payout increase, in particular an abnormal dividend payout, is positively related to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Most evidence of dividend tunneling has been identified in firms with concentrated ownership structures, less independent boards, inactive external takeover markets, and low-quality disclosure (Atanassov & Mandell, 2018; Chen et al., 2009; Chiou et al., 2010).

### 2.2 Dividend tunneling and managerial ownership

The relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payouts may be explained by two contradictory theories: alignment theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and entrenchment theory (Morck et al., 1988). The main agency issue between managers and shareholders is associated with free cash flow potentially used by self-serving managers for their own interests at the expense of shareholders, such as in empire-building or for personal benefit (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). Alignment theory indicates that managerial ownership may serve as a governance mechanism and its increase helps align interests between managers and shareholders, since mangers holding more firm equity will be incentivized to act as owners and make decisions more clearly in shareholders' interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen et al., 1992; Lee, 2011). Florackis et al. (2015) find that, in line with the alignment effect of managerial ownership, the relationship between dividend payout and managerial ownership is negative when managerial ownership is below a certain threshold.

By contrast, entrenchment theory argues that managers may entrench themselves at the expense of shareholders and pursue their own interests when their ownership level is high (Morck et al., 1988; Shlerifer & Vishny, 1989). A higher level of managerial ownership provides them with more power and influence, and they may even disregard the threat of replacement or the discipline of the market when they have sufficient power to protect their employment or control the board (Lafond & Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto & Takada, 2010).

However, supporting evidence for this is mainly found in developed markets where firms tend to have more balanced shareholder ownership structures and stronger minority shareholder protection mechanisms. Unlike in developed markets, the majority of publicly listed firms in the Chinese stock markets have a controlling shareholder with a substantial shareholding (Jiang et al., 2010). Firth et al. (2006b) and Conyon and He (2011) also note that the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms can decide on executive remuneration, appointments, and dismissals. Zhang et al. (2014) report that dominant shareholders have absolute control over board composition since they can determine member nomination. Cullinan et al. (2012) extends this by noting that those nominated or successfully remaining on firms' boards may be affiliated with the controlling shareholders. In their sample, affiliated directors occupied about 40% of board seats. This is in line with the finding that even boards containing supervisory directors may not conduct independent and effective monitoring in all decision-making processes (Firth et al., 2006b). Consequently, managers may collude with controlling shareholders for their own interests, such as protecting their position and advancing their careers. In other words, the alignment effect may be dominated by the entrenchment effect in the Chinese stock markets where the ownership concentration is high.

In sum, due to weak minority shareholder protection and the high ownership concentration in Chinese listed firms, dominant shareholders tend to have controlling power and can affect executive remuneration, appointments, and dismissals as well as board composition. Thus, we argue that the entrenchment effect may have stronger impact on executives' decision making and executives may have the motivation to participate in dividend tunneling along with controlling shareholders, to protect their jobs and careers and pursue their own interests. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

***H1: Executive ownership is positively related to dividend tunneling.***

Jiang et al. (2010) and Chizema et al. (2020) indicate that most Chinese listed firms have concentrated ownership structures, and the Chinese capital markets have weak minority shareholder protection and underdeveloped legal systems. Prior research reveals that a more concentrated ownership structure may lead to expropriation of minority shareholders by insiders (Farinha & López-de-Foronda, 2009; Lemmon & Lins, 2003). Using firm-year observations of Chinese listed companies, Zhang et al. (2014) find that concentrated ownership reduces executives’ performance‐based incentives and thus controlling shareholders and executives may collude in tunneling behaviour. By contrast, Maury and Pajuste (2005) document that a larger number of shareholders with similar shareholdings can compete with each other and maintain a balanced ownership structure. Similarly, Berkman et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between private non-controlling shareholder ownership and the likelihood of expropriation by a controlling shareholder. Barroso et al. (2016) also find that firms with several large shareholders have stronger shareholder protection and they are more able to prevent a large shareholder from trying to extract rents at the expense of others.

In particular, controlling shareholders in the Chinese markets commonly enjoy absolute control by directly affecting the nomination of board members as well as decisions around senior appointments, remuneration, and dismissals (Conyon & He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006b; Zhang et al., 2014). Furthermore, using the shareholder balancing mechanism (SBM) of non-controlling large shareholders’ ownership as a measure of minority shareholder protection, Lv et al. (2012) reveal that dividends have been employed as a mean of tunneling activity by controlling shareholders and such activities may be more pronounced in firms with weaker minority shareholder protection. As a result, we conjecture that it is more likely for executives in the firms with weaker minority shareholder protection to collude with controlling shareholders in the process of dividend tunneling, and we have the following hypothesis:

***H2:******The relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced in firms with weaker minority shareholder protection.***

Berkman et al. (2009) shows that the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms may use related-party loan guarantees to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2010) indicate that controlling shareholders have been able to conduct tunneling through intercorporate loans recorded on balance sheets as “other receivables” in the majority of Chinese listed firms. They argue that intercorporate loan tunneling siphoned large amounts of firms’ cash to controlling shareholders who disregarded the associated prospects for their firms. Such tunneling activities by controlling shareholders have been more pronounced among Chinese listed companies due to their split share structure. This is because controlling shareholders held non-tradable shares that were restricted in trading, and consequently controlling shareholders have been barely able to enjoy the benefits of share price appreciation, which further motivated them to conduct tunneling activities before the split share structure reform (Chizema et al., 2020).

Although intercorporate loans have been largely prohibited by the Chinese regulators since 2006, the diminished incidence of intercorporate loan tunneling has not been the death-toll of tunneling behaviour. Weak minority shareholder protection and the intention of controlling shareholders to siphon resources still remain. Huang (2016) shows that tunneling through related party loan guarantees increased in Chinese listed firms after the enterprise income tax reform of 2008. Cash dividends, used as a new tunneling method by controlling shareholders, have been gradually recognized by researchers such as Chen et al. (2009), Lv et al. (2012) and Atanassov & Mandell (2018). Consequently, we conjecture that dividend tunneling is used as a substitute for intercorporate loans for the same purposes, in the Chinese stock markets, since these became less feasible for controlling shareholders, and with dividend tunneling being comparatively more difficult to detect. Therefore, we present the following hypotheses:

***H3(a): “Other receivables” are negatively related to dividend tunneling.***

***H3(b): The positive relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with lower “other receivables”.***

### 2.3 State ownership and the expropriation of minority shareholders

Tunneling activities observed in China have been the subject of debate, in light of the institutional environment of the Chinese stock markets. A primary consideration is that most large Chinese listed firms are carve-outs or splits from massive state-owned enterprises (Jiang et al., 2010). Yuan et al. (2008) find that the average shareholding by the government remains very high in Chinese listed firms, and Wang and Xiao (2011) show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, indicating that state ownership remains widespread in Chinese stock markets.[[5]](#footnote-5) Moreover, state shareholders may need to retain their shares for the purpose of corporate control and pursue their political agenda. The lack of free trading of state-owned shares prevents shareholders from benefiting from stock price appreciation, and thus state shareholders have greater incentives to engage in dividend tunneling (Jiang et al., 2010; Lv et al., 2012).

Prior studies find that large state shareholders, with their majority voting rights, can exert a strong influence on firms’ business operations in China. Hou et al. (2012) show that firms with higher state ownership have lower corporate transparency since state shareholders may focus their effort on acquiring political credits and ensuring their firms carry out government policies. Some studies indicate that dominant state shareholders have divergent interests from those of minority investors, and thus state ownership may negatively contribute to corporate operational efficiency, and in turn reduce firm performance (e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta 2001; Gul 1999; and Yuan et al. 2008). Similarly, Boateng and Huang (2016) investigate the effects of contestability of multiple large shareholders on tunneling and indicate that government-associated controlling shareholders reduce the monitoring effects of multiple larger shareholders.

In addition, Firth et al. (2006b) and Conyon and He (2011) conclude that state shareholders retain corporate control by carrying weight in the appointments and tenure of senior executives. In order to retain their positions, executives may assist tunneling activity by the controlling state shareholders (Zhang et al., 2014). Berkman et al. (2009) also find tunneling through loan guarantees to related parties are more likely when the controlling shareholder is a state corporate entity. Similarly, Jian and Wong (2010) show that state-owned firms are more likely to prop up corporate resources to their controlling shareholders. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

***H4: The positive relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with higher state ownership.***

### 2.4 External monitoring of financial analysts

Prior studies find that financial analysts play an effective monitoring role on managerial behaviour in listed firms, strengthen corporate governance and transparency, and reduce agency costs (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Firms followed by higher numbers of financial analysts are subject to more intensive monitoring, so the expropriation by controlling shareholders may be constrained by the ensuing pressure from greater transparency. Dyck et al. (2010) show that financial analysts can monitor fraudulent behaviour in firms effectively. Yu (2008) argues that earnings management manipulation and related agency costs can be reduced by an increased density in analyst coverage (measured by the frequency of analyst investigations). In other words, the more intensive the climate of analysis, the lesser the agency costs related to earnings management, by constraining executive and controlling shareholder misconduct and fraudulent behaviour.

More specifically, Healy and Palepu (2001) show that analysts are familiar with financial and industrial knowledge, so they can scrutinise managerial behaviour and financial reports to provide recommendations for market participants. They also point out that combining or convergence of the alternative formats used by external monitors such as brokers could increase the effectiveness of external screening of firms. We conjecture, therefore, that the interests of minority shareholders could be more effectively protected in a market with strong external monitoring, and specifically that, when dividend payouts are used as a tunneling method in China, analyst coverage can mitigate the positive relation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. Consequently, we have the hypothesis below:

***H5: The positive relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage.***

## Methodology and Data

### 3.1 Multivariate regressions

To examine therelationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling, we have the following baseline regression:

 (1)

The dependent variable, *Abn\_DividPayout*, denotes the abnormal dividend payout which is employed as a proxy for dividend tunneling. Following Holder et al. (1998) and Rozeff (1982), the abnormal dividend payout is computed using the residuals of the Equation (A.1) (see Appendix 2). Distinct from the method used by Lv et al. (2012), which only captures the extreme cases when the dividend per share is positive and the earning per share is negative, we define the abnormal dividend payout as the dividend payout which deviates from the firm’s expected dividend payout. More specifically, we first obtain an individual firm’s expected dividend using Equation (A.1) and the residuals are defined as the abnormal dividend payout ratio. There are two advantages of our method. First, we allow the model to self-decide what is abnormal dividend payout, rather than relying on the arithmetic mean or median of the industry dividend payout ratios. Second, the method has filtered the increase of dividend due to a company’s normal and sound growth. Consequently, the value of the abnormal dividend we derive can be a more accurate and reliable proxy for controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviour, in particular when tunneling is rarely observed directly (Berkman et al., 2009).

Executive ownership, *ExeOwnerhip*, is defined as the number of executive shares divided by the number of total shares. In this study, we surmise that executives may collude with their controlling shareholders since most Chinese listed firms have a dominant controlling shareholder who can influence the appointments and tenure of executives (Conyon & He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006b). Prior studies also show that executives may collude with controlling shareholders to protect their positions or performance-based incentives (Wang & Xiao, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014). Therefore, we expect a significant and positive coefficient on *ExeOwnerhip*  if our first hypothesis holds.

Following Lv et al. (2012), we incorporate *FirmSize, TangAsset, MTBV, Leverage,* and *Cash* in Equation (1) to control for their impact on abnormal dividend payout. *FirmSize* is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Hoberg & Prabhala, 2008; Iman & Conover, 1979). Some studies provide supportive evidence of a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio and firm size (Berzins et al., 2019; Grennan, 2019; Lv et al., 2012). Lv et al. (2012) argue that the acquisition of fixed assets can reduce cash levels in firms, and in turn reduce the dividend payout ratio; thus we also include the tangible assets to total assets ratio in the regression. *MTBV* is the market-to-book ratio of a firm, defined as the market value of the firm divided by its book value, which reflects the firm’s efficiency and growth opportunity (Harakeh et al., 2020). *Leverage* is the ratio of long-term debt of a firm divided by its total equity, as widely used in previous studies (Barclay et al., 1995; Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; Kumar & Vergara-Alert, 2020; Rozeff, 1982). A higher leverage ratio may lead to a lower probability of controlling shareholders’ expropriating from the firm if dividend payout is used as a method of tunneling. *Cash* is the cash and cash equivalents scaled by the total assets, and the relationship between *Cash* and *Abn\_DividPayout* are expected to be positive since firms with more cash may be able to pay more abnormal dividends.

We also incorporate other control variables related to firm characteristics, namely *CashFlowVol, FirmAge, SME, TotalCompensation, COX,* and *HIndex*. *CashFlowVol* is the volatility of firms’ cash flows measured by the standard deviation of ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows over the previous five years, as Bradley et al. (1998) suggest this to be an important determinant of dividend payout policy. More specifically, senior managers may pay lower dividends when future cash flows are more uncertain. For the independent variable assessing firm age, *FirmAge*, we have followed Loderer et al. (2016) and Loughran & Ritter (2004) and used the firm establishment age, namely the number of years since a firm is founded. *SME* is an indicator variable which equals one if the first three digits of a stock code are either 002 or 300, and zero otherwise. We incorporate these two variables because, in the Chinese stock markets, young firms may be more likely to pay dividends than old firms, and firms listed on the small-medium and entrepreneur boards (SME) tend to pay more dividends. *TotalCompensation* is defined as the natural logarithm of the total compensation received by the top three executives and is used to control for the effect of executive compensation*. COW* represents the divergence between shareholders’ cash flow rights and their control rights over firms. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that separating voting rights from cash flow rights is common in East Asian markets. Their results show that this divergence motivates controlling shareholders to undertake self-interested activities. Francis et al. (2005) also find that the prominence of dividends can be affected by separating cash flow rights and voting rights. Finally, we follow Renneboog (2000) and employ *HIndex* to measure the level of ownership concentration, defined as the square of the shareholding percentage owned by the top shareholder.

Following Kuo et al. (2014), we also consider some variables related to board characteristics which may influence managerial decisions on dividend payout. *BoardSize* is the number of board members. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that larger boards may be less effective in monitoring since having more members may associate with greater difficulty in reaching consensus and making decisions. *BoardMeeting* is the number of board meetings in a year as a higher board meeting frequency may indicate stronger supervision by a board over their firm’s operations, so it may be negatively related to tunneling activities. To reduce potential endogeneity problems, we control for year- and industry-fixed effects across all the regressions in this study.

We also investigate whether minority shareholder protection affects the sensitivity between executive ownership and the dividend tunneling behaviour of controlling shareholders. Lv et al. (2012) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that a balanced shareholder structure with a high SBM (shareholder balancing mechanism) can help protect firms’ minority shareholders and reduce the potential tunneling behaviour. Following this approach, we use the reciprocal of SBM (*RSBM*) to test the moderating effect of minority shareholder protection on the correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling, and a higher value of *RSBM* indicates weaker minority shareholder protection.The *RSBM* is defined as follows:

 (2)

The notations $l\_{2}$, $l\_{3}$, $l\_{4}$, and $l\_{5}$ are the proportions of the shares held by the second to the fifth largest shareholder. The denominator is the sum of the square of the shareholding fractions of these shareholders. The numerator is the square of the shareholding fraction of the controlling shareholder. According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), a higher level of shareholding by multiple shareholders (*l2, l3, l4, l5*) indicates a higher degree of corporate shareholder balance structure, which plays an important role in corporate governance since competition among large shareholders can limit the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth.

 (3)

In Equation (3), a positive coefficient of the interaction of *RSBM* and *ExeOwnership* implies that, an increase in *RSBM* (i.e. weaker minority shareholder protection) may lead to a stronger effect of executive ownership on dividend tunneling. Following Jaccard et al. (1990), the component variables of the interaction terms between *RSBM* and *ExeOwnership* are standardised for their industry-year means and standard deviations to mitigate the effects of multicollinearity.

For the third hypothesis, we include *OtherReceivs,* which is defined as “other receivables” to the total asset ratio in the regression since intercorporate loans are recorded as “other receivables” in the balance sheet and can be considered a measure of controlling shareholders’ tunneling activities (Jiang et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010). The purpose of including *OtherReceivs* is to test whether dividend tunneling is used as a substitute for other tunneling activities such as intercorporate loans. The substitution effect of dividend tunneling for intercorporate loans implies that the coefficient of *OtherReceivs* as well as the interaction term between *OtherReceivs* and *ExeOwnership* are negative as dividend tunneling and intercorporate loan tunneling both transfer benefits to the controlling shareholders.[[6]](#footnote-6) As a result, the regression is expressed as Equation (4) below:

(4)

Furthermore, we incorporate *StateOwnership* and its interaction term with the executive ownership to test the moderating effect of state ownership on the association between dividend tunneling and executive ownership. The regression equations are expressed as follows.

(5)

*StateOwnership* is the fraction of state-owned shares, calculated as the state-owned shares divided by the total shares outstanding. *StateOwnership* and *ExeOwnership* are standardised for their industry-year means and standard deviations. Given the premise that state shareholders have greater incentive to expropriate from minority shareholders for their own interests, we expect a positive coefficient of the interaction term between dividend tunneling and executive ownership as well as *StateOwnership* in Equation (5).

Finally, we examine whether external monitoring by financial analysts can affect the impact of managerial ownership on dividend tunneling. We express the following, Equation (6):

  (6)

*Analyst* is the number of analysts following a firm.[[7]](#footnote-7) The more analysts on a firm, the greater the likelihood that the tunneling behaviour of controlling shareholders in the firm may be constrained. In other words, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term ($β\_{2}$) to be negative, which indicates a negative moderation effect of *Analyst* on the positive correlation between dividend tunneling and executive ownership. In addition, we follow Xu et al. (2013) and Ding et al. (2013) and use two alternative measures for this monitoring effect of financial analysts, the number of brokers *(Broker)* and the number of reports (Analyst*Report)*, to test Hypothesis 5. Ding et al. (2013) suggest that the number of brokers reflects the range and scope of monitoring on target firms. Moreover, Hong and Kubik (2003) argue that brokerage firms might have a particular tie with a target firm, such as underwriting their stocks, which implies that analysts’ reviews may not always be conducted independently. Consequently, it may be necessary to consider the number of brokers to reduce the biases caused by such business relationships. We replace *Analyst* with *Broker* and *AnalystReport* in Equation (6) respectively. *Broker* is defined as the number of brokers covering a firm, and *AnalystReport* is the number of analyst reports covering a firm. *Broker* and *AnalystR**eport* indicate the frequency of forecasting and how often a firm is reviewed. The detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 1.

### 3.2 Data and sample

We obtain the firm-year observations from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database for the sample period 2003 to 2020.[[8]](#footnote-8) We include all the listed firms on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Following Berkman et al. (2009) and Lv et al. (2012), we exclude the financial and banking sectors since the firms therein tend to have significantly different governance. The total firm-year observation is 24,511.

Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure and the distribution of executive ownership in Panel A and B respectively. Panel A shows that our original full sample from 2003 to 2020 has 43,484 firm-year observations. After excluding the observations in the financial and banking sectors and those with missing financial statements, or stock market and corporate governance variables, we are left with 24,511 firm-year observations. A detailed distribution of executive ownership is reported in Panel B. About 78% of the firm-year observations have executive ownership between 0% and 1%. The observations with executive ownership between 1% and 10%, between 10% and 30%, and between 30% and 50% accounts for about 21% of our total observations. The distribution of executive ownership is consistent with other findings that it is relatively lower in emerging markets (Coles et al., 2012; Core & Larcker, 2002; Mehran, 1995). According to the year distribution, the number of firms with positive executive ownership gradually increases from 521 in 2003 to 2,392 in 2020. This indicates the importance of examining the association between executive ownership and dividend tunneling.

[Insert Table 1 around here]

Table 2 displays the summary statistics for all the variables used in this study. The explanatory variable, *ExeOwnership*, has an average of 0.034, which implies that there are on average 3.4% of shares in the hands of executives in our sample firms. The median is well below the mean. The average dividend payout ratio, *DividPayout*, is 0.247 while the standard deviation is 0.306. The mean of *Abn\_DividPayout* is 0.004 and the standard deviation is 0.306. Table 2 shows the mean of *OtherReceivs* to be 0.015, which implies that other receivables on average account for 1.5% of total assets among Chinese listed firms.[[9]](#footnote-9) The median is 0.006 and below the mean, and the standard deviation is small, equal to 0.029. These imply that most observations are close to the mean and slightly right-skewed. Jiang et al. (2010) useother receivables as a proxy for tunneling activities by controlling shareholders in China. Their sample range is from 1996 to 2004 with a mean of 0.081 and median of 0.048, which suggests that the value of *OtherReceivs* has dropped significantly in the Chinese stock markets since 2005. Meanwhile, the mean and median of state ownership are 8.9% and 0%, respectively. This indicates that considerable state ownership exists in a certain proportion of listed firms.

[Insert Table 2 around here]

## Empirical results

**4.1 Ownership structure and dividend tunneling**

Table 3 presents the results of the relationship between executive ownership (*ExeOwnership*) and dividend tunneling (*Abn\_DividPayout*). Columns (1) and (2) report the results when the explanatory variable *Abn\_DividPayout* is included and the impact of firm characteristics is controlled for, while all the control variables, including firm characteristics and corporate governance variables, are incorporated in columns (3) and (4). In columns (2) and (4), we control for the year-fixed effects and industry-fixed effects.[[10]](#footnote-10) Overall, the results reported in columns (1) to (4) consistently show that *ExeOwnership* is significantly and positively correlated with *Abn\_DividPayout.* This implies that under higher levels of executive ownership, we observe more dividend tunneling.

[Insert Table 3 around here]

Consistent with our first hypothesis, our results show a positive correlation between abnormal dividend payout and executive ownership. In line with the findings of Chen et al. (2009), Atanassov and Mandell (2018), and Chiou et al. (2010), this implies that firms’ dividend policy leans towards controlling shareholders’ interests and executives may collude with their controlling shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders through abnormal dividends. Consistent with our expectation, we observe that managerial ownership has a positive effect on the dividend tunneling by controlling shareholders.

Regarding firm characteristics, the coefficients on *TangAsset, Cash* and *SME* are significant and positive at the 1% level, while the *MTBV*, *Leverage*, *CashFlowVol* and *FirmAge* coefficients are significant and negative. These results are in line with the findings in prior studies. Lv et al. (2012) suggest that dividend payout ratio and firm size are positively related since larger firms have more cash to make more dividend payments. Similarly, the relationship between *Cash* and *Abn\_DividPayout* is expected to be positive as firms with more cash may be able to pay more dividends. Meanwhile, a higher leverage ratio means a larger proportion of debt financing, which can induce more effective monitoring from debtors and in turn a reduction in dividend payouts. In addition, Bradley et al. (1998) suggest that dividends are paid less when the uncertainty of future cash flows is higher.

Among the corporate governance variables, regressions (3) and (4) show that *HIndex* is positively related to *Abn\_DividPayout* at the 1% significance level. This implies that higher ownership concentration leads to a higher abnormal dividend payout ratio, which is consistent with the argument of Lv et al. (2012). *BoardMeeting* demonstrates a significant and negative relation with *Abn\_DividPayout*. This is consistent with the argument of Jensen (1993) that a higher board meeting frequency may lead to stronger supervision of the board on the firm’s operations, and thus it may be negatively related to tunneling activities. Finally, *COW*, and *BoardSize* show no statistically significant impact on *Abn\_DividPayout* in columns (3) and (4).

**4.2 The impact of minority share protection**

Table 4 shows how minority share protection affects the sensitivity of executive ownership on the abnormal dividend payout. The impact of *RSBM* on *Abn\_DividPayout* is not statistically significant in columns (3) and (4) when corporate governance variables are also included, while the coefficient of the interaction term between *RSBM* and *ExeOwnership* is positive and significant across all four regressions. This implies that the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with weaker minority shareholder protection, which supports our Hypothesis 2. These results are in line with those of Lv et al. (2012), that the greater the ownership of controlling shareholders, the more dividends may be paid out for tunneling purposes. Since we directly measure dividend tunneling by *Abn\_DividPayout*, our results provide supportive evidence for their findings that dividends have been used as a means of tunneling in Chinese listed firms, whereby firms’ resources have been extracted to benefit controlling shareholders. This type of expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth may be more severe in markets with weak minority shareholder protections and underdeveloped legal systems. Lv et al. (2012) further indicate that minority shareholders may consider dividend issuance as a signal of expropriation against their interests, and thus may sell their shares to avoid further exploitation, making the firm’s shareholder ownership structure even more unbalanced.

[Insert Table 4 around here]

**4.3 The substitution between dividend tunneling and other tunneling activities**

We report the results of the relationship between *OtherReceivs* and *Abn\_DividPayout* and the impact of *OtherReceivs* on the relation between *ExeOwnership* and *Abn\_DividPayout* in Table 5. The results show that the *OtherReceivs* coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level across all the regressions. Given that a firm’s resource is limited, an increase in intercorporate loans results in less dividend tunneling. More importantly, the coefficients of the interaction term between *OtherReceivs* and *ExeOwnership* are negative at the 1% significance level for regressions (1) – (4). These results indicate that dividend tunneling is considered as a substitute for intercorporate loans.

[Insert Table 5 around here]

There are two implications from this finding. On the one hand, since 2006, tunneling activities generally may not have been entirely eliminated, despite intercorporate loans being largely prohibited by the CSRC in China. Other means of tunneling, such as dividend tunneling, may be emerging as the new modus operandi. On the other hand, although retail investors in China support the CSRC’s recent guidance on cash dividend policy, it may be necessary to call for a more balanced policy, which, at the same time, might be able to effectively prevent minority shareholders from dividend expropriation.

We further examine whether the 2006 reform has provided incentives for controlling shareholders and executives to switch their tunneling activity from intercorporate loans to dividends, given that the reform aims to cease tunneling in the form of intercorporate loans by controlling shareholders. To test this, we incorporate the interaction term between *ExeOwnership*, *Otherreveivs*, and *Reform 2006* in Equation (3).[[11]](#footnote-11)

We provide the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. The results show that the coefficient of *OtherReceivs* is still negative. This implies that, consistent with the results in columns (1) - (4), there is a substitution effect between the tunneling of intercorporate loans and dividends over the full sample period. Furthermore, the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term of *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs\*2006reform* implies that after the reform in 2006, the positive association between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with lower other receivables. These results offer further evidence to our argument that due to the restrictions on intercorporate loans by the CSRC since 2006, corporate insiders have shifted their tunelling activities from intercorporate loans to dividends. In other words, dividend tunneling has become the prevailing form of expropriation by controlling shareholders after the 2006 reform.

In addition, the sum of the coefficients of the two interaction terms, *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs* and *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs\*2006*, is still negative although the coefficient on *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs* is positive. These suggest that the significantly negative coefficient of *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs* in columns (1) - (4) is mainly driven by the negative coefficient on *ExeOwnership\*OtherReceivs\*2006*.These imply that the substitution effect between other receivables and dividend tunneling exists only after the 2006 reform. Before the restriction of intercorporate loans imposed in 2006, firms intended to use both intercorporate loans and dividends as the means of tunneling. This further stresses the importance of examining the dividend tunneling after the reform in 2006 which restricts the tunneling of intercorporate loans.

**4.4 The impact of state ownership**

To investigate whether higher state ownership of a firm moderates the positive association between managerial ownership and dividend tunneling, we incorporate *StateOwnership* and its interaction term with *ExeOwnership* in the regressions. The results in Table 6 show that both the coefficients on state ownership, *StateOwnership*, and the interaction term between *ExeOwnership* and *StateOwnership* are positive and significant at the 1% level for all four regressions. This implies that state ownership has a positive effect on firms’ abnormal dividend payouts and the positive correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with higher state ownership. In line with the findings of Zhang et al. (2014), this reflects that state shareholders may have their own agenda which compromises their attention paid to firm performance, and executives may collude with controlling shareholders for their own benefits. All the results in Table 6 are robust to the control of firm characteristics, board features and both industry and year fixed effects.

[Insert Table 6 around here]

**4.5 External monitoring and dividend tunneling**

Table 7 shows the moderating effect of financial analysts on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling, when *Analyst* and the interaction term between *Analyst* and *ExeOwnership* are both included in the regression. The results in Table 7 show that the coefficient of *Analyst* is negative at the 5% or 1% significance level in columns (1) to (4). This suggests that a higher number of analysts following a firm can exert more effective monitoring on its executives to reduce agency costs (Degeorge et al., 1999; Yu, 2008). Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between *ExeOwnership* and *Analyst* is significantly and negatively related to *Abn\_DividPayout* across all regressions. These results support our Hypothesis 5 that external monitoring moderates the positive correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. Therefore, we can suggest that firms with more analysts following are less likely to conduct dividend tunneling. The results are consistent among the models when *ANALYST* is replaced by *BROKER,* or *REPORT* as the alternative proxies for analysts following, and these results are reported in the Appendix 3 and 4.

[Insert Table 7 around here]

1. **Robustness checks**

**5.1 Endogeneity concerns**

To address the potential endogeneity issues caused by reverse causality and the persistence of the impact of executive onwership, we further test whether a higher level of abnormal dividend payouts is driven by a higher level of managerial ownership, by regressing future abnormal dividend payout in the periods at *t+1, t+2 and t+3* on the managerial ownership in the period at *t*. Table 8 shows that the impact of managerial ownership on future dividend tunneling is still significant and positive.[[12]](#footnote-12) The results reported in Table 8 are consistent with those in the previous tables and our hypotheses are supported.

[Insert Table 8 around here]

We also re-examine the relationship between the abnormal dividend payout ratio and executive ownership using *propensity score matching* (PSM) to further address the concerns of endogeneity due to systematic differences between the treatment and control firms. This PSM method attributes the observed effects on the abnormal dividend payout ratio to varying executive ownership levels, rather than to other observable or unobservable factors associated with executive ownership levels (Bowen et al., 2010). Following Focke et al. (2017), we estimate the probability that firms have higher levels of executive ownership by running the probit regression below:

 (7)

where the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if executive ownership, *EXEOWN,* is above the median, otherwise zero. This model is employed to predict the probability of firms having above-median executive ownership levels compared to other firms. The independent variables are the previously defined control variables. The results of estimating Equation (7) are applied to obtain firms’ propensity scores, and then we match pairs of firms having the closest propensity scores, where one has an above-median executive ownership and the other has a below-median executive ownership. Finally, we compare the levels of abnormal dividend payout, *Abn\_DividPayout*, between the matched firms.

[Insert Table 9 around here]

Different matching techniques (such as, one-to-one nearest neighbourhood, one-to-four nearest neighbourhood) are used, and the results are reported in Table 9. In Panel A, regardless of the matching methods, we find that the difference in the abnormal dividend payout ratio between matched firms with above-median and below-median executive ownership is significantly positive at the 1 % level. In Panel B of Table 9, we report the coefficients and t-statistics for all regressions over the matched sub-sample. The matched sub-sample is based on firms’ propensity scores and the one-to-one nearest neighbourhood matching method. This analysis allows us to investigate how differences in abnormal dividend payout ratios of these firms are explained by variations in the full spectrum of varying executive ownership levels. In line with our expectations, the results are consistent with our previous findings.

We further address the potential concern about omitted variables using different model specifications, including firm fixed effect, multi-level fixed effects, and two-way (firm and year) clustered standard errors to further address the issue of omitted variables. The results are reported in Table 10. In column (1), we estimate our baseline regression and control for firm and year fixed effects. In column (2), we estimate our baseline regression with firm, year and industry fixed effects. In column (3), we adopt a two-way (firm and year) cluster strategy in the baseline model. The results reported in Table 10 show that the coefficient on executive ownership remains positive and significant at the 1% level.

[Insert Table 10 around here]

Finally, we follow Hoeche et al. (2012), Abdallah et al. (2015), and Cremers et al. (2017) and conduct the estimation of dynamic system GMM to further address the issue of omitted variables. In the differenced equation of the GMM system, we take the first difference of all the endogenous variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity and reduce the omitted variables concern. We use instruments in levels, with the fourth lag for the equations in first differences and first-differenced instruments, with third lag for the equations in levels. The results of the dynamic system GMM for abnormal dividend payout are reported in column (4) of Table 10. The results of the Hansen test of over identification are all insignificant, implying that we do not reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The results of a Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity show that the instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. The results of an AR(2) test show no concerns about autocorrelation in the residuals, given that the equations are in first differences. More importantly, the coefficient on executive ownership is positive and significant at 1% level. This suggests that the results of our baseline regression are robust to the biases caused by omitted variables, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity.

**5.2 The one-step estimation of Chen et al. (2018) and sensitivity tests**

Chen et al. (2018) argue that a two-step approach may generate biased estimation. To address this issue, following Chen et al. (2018), we include all the independent variables in the first and second stages in a single regression under the one-stage approach. We use abnormal dividend payout and dividend payout as the dependent variable in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Consistent with the results in the previous tables, the coefficient on the executive ownership measure is still positive and significant for abnormal dividend payput in column (1) and we also find similar results for dividend payout in column (2).

[Insert Table 11 around here]

We also conduct some sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our results. We replace the abnormal dividend payout with abnormal cash dividends in our baseline regression and the results remain similar. We also include additional dummy variables to control for the impact of the financial crisis and the related regulatory changes in 2006, 2008 and 2013, and the results remain materially unchanged. For brevity, we do not report these results, but they are available upon request.

## Conclusion

We study the role of managerial ownership in dividend tunneling activity by controlling shareholders. The striking finding depicted by our data is that higher executive ownership increases dividend tunneling activity in China. This implies that executives may collude with controlling shareholders to engage in dividend tunneling. Our results also provide further supportive evidence to the view of Lv et al. (2012) that controlling shareholders tend to use dividend payouts for tunneling purposes in the Chinese stock markets. We find that the relation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is stronger for firms with weaker minority shareholder protection. In particular, our results show dividend tunneling to be increasingly used as a substitute for the formerly predominant tunneling activity, intercorporate loans.

Our results also show that higher levels of state ownership may further strengthen the positive correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. In line with previous studies, state shareholders have more motivation to engage in dividend tunneling for their own interests since they may have their political agendas that pay less attention to firm value maximization than other shareholders’. Moreover, they may retain their shares for the purpose of corporate control and thus share price movements have no direct impact on their shareholdings. Consequently, they could not enjoy the benefits of stock price appreciation.

Finally, the results on the external monitoring of financial analysts indicate that analyst coverage plays an effective monitoring role and moderates the positive relation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. Considering the underdeveloped legal system and concentrated ownership structure in China, external monitoring by independent third parties enhances minority shareholder protection in the stock markets. Given the burgeoning emerging evidence that dividends are among the main vehicles for controlling shareholders’ tunneling activity in China, companies with continuous abnormal dividend payouts should be under the radar of the regulator, the CSRC. How to identify and regulate this collusion between executives and controlling shareholders is worthy of greater attention by both academic scholars and policymakers.

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**Table 1. Sample selection and the distribution of executive ownership**

***Panel A. Sample selection***

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | N |
| Total firm-years covered by the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database(CSMAR), 2003-2020 | 43,484 |
| Less firm-years: |  |
| Excluded the financial and banking sectors observations | (1,322) |
| Excluded missing financial statement data  | (14,914) |
| Excluded missing stock market data | (148) |
| Excluded missing corporate governance data | (2,589) |
| Total sample | 24,511 |

***Panel B. The distribution of executive ownership***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ExeOwnership | 0-1% | 1%-10% | 10%-30% | 30%-50% | >50% | N |
| 2003 | 521 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 521 |
| 2004 | 776 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 777 |
| 2005 | 760 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 763 |
| 2006 | 815 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 829 |
| 2007 | 832 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 854 |
| 2008 | 836 | 27 | 19 | 2 | 0 | 884 |
| 2009 | 863 | 34 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 915 |
| 2010 | 946 | 50 | 23 | 4 | 0 | 1,023 |
| 2011 | 1,034 | 87 | 36 | 17 | 2 | 1,176 |
| 2012 | 1,131 | 91 | 48 | 16 | 3 | 1,289 |
| 2013 | 1,119 | 127 | 67 | 29 | 10 | 1,352 |
| 2014 | 1,140 | 233 | 115 | 69 | 22 | 1,579 |
| 2015 | 1,177 | 293 | 174 | 95 | 31 | 1,770 |
| 2016 | 1,368 | 309 | 227 | 91 | 27 | 2,022 |
| 2017 | 1,375 | 321 | 225 | 86 | 26 | 2,033 |
| 2018 | 1,431 | 362 | 223 | 78 | 31 | 2,125 |
| 2019 | 1,456 | 378 | 245 | 101 | 27 | 2,207 |
| 2020 | 1,544 | 415 | 274 | 131 | 28 | 2,392 |
| Total | 19,124 | 2,755 | 1,702 | 723 | 207 | 24,511 |

Panel A reports the sample selection procedure. Our sample period is from 2003-2020 since the executive ownership data only available after 2003. Panel B presents the yearly distribution of execution ownership. *ExeOwnership* is executive ownership. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.

**Table 2. Summary statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | p25 | Median | p75 |
| *Abn\_DividPayout* | 24,511 | 0.004 | 0.306 | -0.195 | -0.069 | 0.109 |
| *DividPayout* | 24,511 | 0.247 | 0.306 | 0.000 | 0.172 | 0.348 |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 24,511 | 0.034 | 0.094 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.005 |
|  *FirmSize* | 24,511 | 22.236 | 1.297 | 21.362 | 22.093 | 22.967 |
|  *TangAssets* | 24,511 | 0.239 | 0.175 | 0.100 | 0.204 | 0.345 |
|  *MTBV* | 24,511 | 1.963 | 1.302 | 1.168 | 1.523 | 2.226 |
|  *Leverage* | 24,511 | 0.255 | 0.389 | 0.022 | 0.102 | 0.319 |
|  *Cash* | 24,511 | 0.161 | 0.111 | 0.084 | 0.134 | 0.208 |
|  *CashFlowVol* | 24,511 | 0.702 | 1.767 | 0.111 | 0.237 | 0.565 |
|  *FirmAge* | 24,511 | 16.777 | 5.726 | 12.000 | 17.000 | 21.000 |
|  *SME* | 24,511 | 0.305 | 0.461 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
|  *TotalCompensation* | 24,511 | 14.144 | 0.903 | 13.641 | 14.222 | 14.710 |
|  *COW* | 24,511 | 6.259 | 8.401 | 0.000 | 0.073 | 12.336 |
|  *HIndex* | 24,511 | 0.145 | 0.121 | 0.053 | 0.106 | 0.206 |
|  *BoardSize* | 24,511 | 10.194 | 2.567 | 9.000 | 9.000 | 11.000 |
|  *BoardMeeting* | 24,511 | 9.643 | 3.925 | 7.000 | 9.000 | 12.000 |
|  *InsiderOwnership* | 24,511 | 0.044 | 0.103 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.006 |
|  *SalesGrowth* | 24,511 | 0.143 | 0.189 | 0.039 | 0.126 | 0.226 |
|  *BETA* | 24,511 | 1.130 | 0.277 | 0.954 | 1.131 | 1.301 |
|  *SHR* | 24,511 | 10.578 | 0.821 | 10.021 | 10.548 | 11.092 |
|  *FreeCashFlow* | 24,511 | 0.003 | 0.107 | -0.031 | 0.015 | 0.057 |
|  *Sales* | 24,511 | 21.561 | 1.460 | 20.612 | 21.451 | 22.427 |
|  *ROE* | 24,511 | 0.078 | 0.080 | 0.031 | 0.068 | 0.115 |
|  *STD* | 24,511 | 0.129 | 0.063 | 0.087 | 0.115 | 0.155 |
|  *RSBM* | 24,511 | 0.464 | 1.901 | 0.003 | 0.013 | 0.094 |
|  *OtherReceivs* | 24,511 | 0.015 | 0.029 | 0.002 | 0.006 | 0.015 |
|  *StateOwnership* | 24,511 | 0.089 | 0.182 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.041 |
|  *Analyst* | 24,511 | 6.569 | 9.221 | 0.000 | 2.000 | 9.000 |
|  *Broker* | 24,511 | 5.244 | 6.939 | 0.000 | 2.000 | 8.000 |
|  *AnalystReport* | 24,511 | 12.979 | 20.614 | 0.000 | 4.000 | 17.000 |

This table reports the summary statistics for variables used in the paper. Our sample consists of 24,511 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2020. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *RSBM* is in thousands. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

**Table 3. Executive ownership and dividend tunnelling**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *ExeOwnership* | 0.304\*\*\* | 0.294\*\*\* | 0.302\*\*\* | 0.291\*\*\* |
|  | (8.017) | (7.722) | (8.011) | (7.648) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.004 | 0.003 |
|  | (4.283) | (3.906) | (1.151) | (0.867) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.146\*\*\* | 0.128\*\*\* | 0.117\*\*\* |
|  | (8.402) | (7.290) | (6.869) | (5.836) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.005\*\* | -0.006\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.183) | (-2.413) | (-2.975) | (-3.569) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.077\*\*\* | -0.076\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* | -0.061\*\*\* |
|  | (-10.427) | (-10.139) | (-8.929) | (-8.375) |
|  *Cash* | 0.184\*\*\* | 0.201\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* |
|  | (6.255) | (6.821) | (5.210) | (5.735) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\* |
|  | (-1.586) | (-1.551) | (-2.087) | (-1.940) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* |
|  | (-6.437) | (-3.444) | (-5.536) | (-2.479) |
|  *SME* | 0.030\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* |
|  | (3.900) | (3.491) | (4.097) | (4.304) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.108) | (6.391) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.777) | (-0.894) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.208\*\*\* | 0.202\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (7.216) | (6.939) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.479) | (-0.045) |
|  *BoardMeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|   |  |  | (-8.303) | (-8.535) |
|  Constant | -0.285\*\*\* | -0.300\*\*\* | -0.357\*\*\* | -0.441\*\*\* |
|   | (-3.997) | (-3.692) | (-4.896) | (-5.130) |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.050 | 0.065 |

This table presents the impact of executive ownership on dividend tunneling. The dependent variable is the abnormal dividend payout representing dividend tunneling. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 4. The influence of minority shareholder protection**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.043\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (13.757) | (12.783) | (13.569) | (12.255) |
|  *RSBM\* ExeOwnership* | 0.019\*\* | 0.020\*\* | 0.022\*\* | 0.022\*\* |
|  | (2.274) | (2.414) | (2.539) | (2.540) |
|  *RSBM* | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.004 | 0.004 |
|  | (3.750) | (3.805) | (1.282) | (1.444) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004 |
|  | (8.334) | (6.754) | (2.588) | (1.467) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.129\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* |
|  | (13.448) | (11.066) | (11.050) | (8.810) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.002 | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (-1.558) | (-3.096) | (-2.907) | (-4.847) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.085\*\*\* | -0.081\*\*\* | -0.072\*\*\* | -0.066\*\*\* |
|  | (-17.379) | (-16.213) | (-14.650) | (-13.200) |
|  *Cash* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.204\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.170\*\*\* |
|  | (9.488) | (10.275) | (7.790) | (8.565) |
|  *CashFlow* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.297) | (-2.886) | (-3.933) | (-3.353) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (-7.803) | (-5.670) | (-7.421) | (-4.355) |
|  *SME* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (9.293) | (6.262) | (8.724) | (7.150) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (8.650) | (10.342) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.867) | (-1.270) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.199\*\*\* | 0.195\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (10.565) | (10.255) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.649) | (-0.243) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-11.730) | (-11.834) |
|  *Constant* | -0.335\*\*\* | -0.297\*\*\* | -0.422\*\*\* | -0.438\*\*\* |
|   | (-7.634) | (-5.981) | (-9.305) | (-8.456) |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.040 | 0.053 | 0.052 | 0.066 |

This table presents the results for the moderating effect of minority shareholder protection on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 5. The influence of other receivables**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) | (5) | (6) |
| *ExeOwnership* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.304\*\*\* | 0.300\*\*\* |
|  | (7.952) | (7.270) | (8.192) | (7.191) | (6.854) | (6.806) |
|  *OtherReceivs\* ExeOwnership* | -0.709\*\*\* | -0.673\*\*\* | -0.748\*\*\* | -0.723\*\*\* | 40.507\*\*\* | 40.545\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.121) | (-2.973) | (-3.376) | (-3.243) | (3.831) | (4.093) |
|  *OtherReceivs* | -1.077\*\*\* | -1.113\*\*\* | -0.943\*\*\* | -0.976\*\*\* | -0.678\*\*\* | -0.579\*\*\* |
|  | (-11.200) | (-11.572) | (-10.013) | (-10.371) | (-11.407) | (-9.970) |
|  *ExeOwnership\* OtherReceivs\* 2006Reform* |  |  |  |  | -42.307\*\*\*(-3.997) | -42.018\*\*\*(-4.237) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.001 |
|  | (4.523) | (3.235) | (1.307) | (0.413) | (2.930) | (0.196) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.116\*\*\* | 0.121\*\*\* | 0.094\*\*\* | 0.113\*\*\* | 0.091\*\*\* |
|  | (7.654) | (5.797) | (6.489) | (4.695) | (5.614) | (4.535) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.004\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.006\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.018) | (-3.377) | (-2.776) | (-4.323) | (-2.473) | (-3.550) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.078\*\*\* | -0.072\*\*\* | -0.066\*\*\* | -0.059\*\*\* | -0.071\*\*\* | -0.058\*\*\* |
|  | (-10.706) | (-9.718) | (-9.322) | (-8.117) | (-9.546) | (-7.981) |
|  *Cash* | 0.160\*\*\* | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.132\*\*\* | 0.145\*\*\* | 0.171\*\*\* | 0.143\*\*\* |
|  | (5.432) | (5.864) | (4.549) | (4.982) | (5.816) | (4.945) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.003\* | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.002 |
|  | (-1.192) | (-0.779) | (-1.682) | (-1.180) | (-0.799) | (-1.197) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* |
|  | (-4.826) | (-3.329) | (-4.320) | (-2.440) | (-3.252) | (-2.367) |
|  *SME* | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* |
|  | (5.695) | (3.619) | (5.513) | (4.404) | (3.444) | (4.220) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.024\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* |  | 0.030\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.344) | (6.065) |  | (6.014) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |  | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.574) | (-0.829) |  | (-0.743) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.192\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* |  | 0.190\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (6.680) | (6.570) |  | (6.551) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.001 | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.800) | (0.037) |  | (0.078) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* |  | -0.005\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-7.866) | (-7.947) |  | (-7.834) |
|  *Constant* | -0.295\*\*\* | -0.231\*\*\* | -0.381\*\*\* | -0.373\*\*\* | -0.198\*\* | -0.382\*\*\* |
|   | (-4.140) | (-2.872) | (-5.208) | (-4.369) | (-2.304) | (-4.062) |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y | Y | Y |
|  Year FE | N | Y | N | Y | Y | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.056 | 0.070 | 0.059 | 0.070 |

This table presents the results for the relationship between other receivables and dividend tunnelling and the moderating effect of other receivables on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 6. The influence of state ownership**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |
| *ExeOwnership* | 0.050\*\*\* | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.050\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* |
|  | (9.671) | (8.840) | (9.661) | (8.515) |
|  *StateOwnership\* ExeOwnership* | 0.053\*\*\* | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* |
|  | (4.748) | (4.631) | (4.214) | (4.001) |
|  *StateOwnership* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.024\*\*\* | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* |
|  | (5.010) | (4.900) | (2.849) | (2.714) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.006\* | 0.003 |
|  | (4.810) | (3.620) | (1.672) | (0.873) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.162\*\*\* | 0.144\*\*\* | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.120\*\*\* |
|  | (8.765) | (7.223) | (7.543) | (5.990) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.003 | -0.006\*\* | -0.005\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* |
|  | (-1.313) | (-2.494) | (-2.349) | (-3.715) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.080\*\*\* | -0.076\*\*\* | -0.068\*\*\* | -0.062\*\*\* |
|  | (-11.001) | (-10.232) | (-9.527) | (-8.522) |
|  *Cash* | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.168\*\*\* |
|  | (6.219) | (6.706) | (5.274) | (5.750) |
|  *CashFlowVo* | -0.003\* | -0.003 | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\* |
|  | (-1.743) | (-1.451) | (-2.318) | (-1.926) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* |
|  | (-4.463) | (-3.152) | (-4.195) | (-2.374) |
|  *SME* | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* |
|  | (5.635) | (3.577) | (5.311) | (4.269) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.676) | (6.369) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.570) | (-0.797) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.194\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (6.535) | (6.367) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.810) | (0.062) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-8.385) | (-8.537) |
|  *Constant* | -0.330\*\*\* | -0.279\*\*\* | -0.435\*\*\* | -0.439\*\*\* |
|   | (-4.562) | (-3.417) | (-5.876) | (-5.090) |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.040 | 0.053 | 0.052 | 0.065 |

This table presents the results for the moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 7. The influence of analyst coverage**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |
| *ExeOwnership* | 0.045\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (8.895) | (7.994) | (9.030) | (7.863) |
|  *Analyst\* ExeOwnership* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.009\*\* | -0.009\*\* |
|  | (-2.763) | (-2.701) | (-2.454) | (-2.314) |
|  *Analyst* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.008\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.972) | (-2.577) | (-2.985) | (-3.120) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.018\*\*\* | 0.010\*\* | 0.008\* |
|  | (5.635) | (4.390) | (2.439) | (1.871) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.119\*\*\* |
|  | (8.954) | (7.334) | (7.527) | (5.948) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.003 | -0.006\*\* |
|  | (-0.401) | (-1.446) | (-1.322) | (-2.342) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.083\*\*\* | -0.078\*\*\* | -0.070\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* |
|  | (-11.131) | (-10.319) | (-9.691) | (-8.733) |
|  *Cash* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.203\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.170\*\*\* |
|  | (6.398) | (6.867) | (5.330) | (5.810) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\* | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\*\* |
|  | (-1.974) | (-1.756) | (-2.441) | (-2.124) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.214) | (-3.473) | (-4.732) | (-2.594) |
|  *SME* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (5.414) | (3.682) | (5.268) | (4.542) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.026\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.772) | (6.642) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.629) | (-0.867) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.201\*\*\* | 0.198\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (6.961) | (6.766) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.001 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.523) | (-0.191) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-8.358) | (-8.478) |
|  *Constant* | -0.423\*\*\* | -0.376\*\*\* | -0.514\*\*\* | -0.556\*\*\* |
|   | (-5.404) | (-4.195) | (-6.396) | (-5.794) |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.039 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.065 |

This table presents the results for the moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunneling. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 8. Persistence of the impact of executive ownership on dividend tunneling**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   | t+1 | t+2 | t+3 | t+1 | t+2 | t+3 |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |  (5) |  (6) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.242\*\*\* | 0.227\*\*\* | 0.221\*\*\* | 0.244\*\*\* | 0.233\*\*\* | 0.234\*\*\* |
|  | (5.614) | (4.649) | (4.058) | (5.622) | (4.770) | (4.310) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.007\* | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* | -0.005 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
|  | (1.717) | (3.033) | (3.048) | (-1.190) | (0.392) | (0.593) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.139\*\*\* | 0.127\*\*\* | 0.125\*\*\* | 0.110\*\*\* | 0.101\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* |
|  | (6.526) | (5.964) | (5.690) | (5.117) | (4.689) | (4.570) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.004 | 0.002 | -0.014\*\*\* | -0.006\*\* | -0.000 |
|  | (-4.029) | (-1.372) | (0.642) | (-5.218) | (-2.212) | (-0.062) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.063\*\*\* | -0.068\*\*\* | -0.065\*\*\* | -0.050\*\*\* | -0.056\*\*\* | -0.054\*\*\* |
|  | (-7.376) | (-8.008) | (-7.480) | (-5.890) | (-6.690) | (-6.286) |
|  *Cash* | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.157\*\*\* | 0.179\*\*\* | 0.146\*\*\* | 0.132\*\*\* |
|  | (6.466) | (5.373) | (4.634) | (5.578) | (4.568) | (3.916) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.001 | -0.003 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
|  | (-0.662) | (-1.023) | (-0.359) | (-1.037) | (-1.452) | (-0.708) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* | -0.002\*\* | -0.002\* | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (-2.962) | (-2.381) | (-2.173) | (-1.959) | (-1.423) | (-1.290) |
|  *SME* | 0.027\*\*\* | 0.019\* | 0.011 | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.026\*\* | 0.017 |
|  | (2.687) | (1.746) | (0.900) | (3.488) | (2.381) | (1.376) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  |  | 0.030\*\*\* | 0.026\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (5.470) | (4.682) | (4.265) |
|  *COW* |  |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (-1.004) | (-0.706) | (-0.095) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  |  | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.191\*\*\* | 0.170\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (6.897) | (5.990) | (5.121) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  |  | 0.002 | 0.002\*\* | 0.003\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (1.471) | (1.978) | (2.055) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  |  | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (-6.173) | (-5.435) | (-4.944) |
|  *Constant* | -0.100 | -0.273\*\*\* | -0.299\*\*\* | -0.224\*\* | -0.376\*\*\* | -0.396\*\*\* |
|   | (-1.098) | (-2.919) | (-3.077) | (-2.303) | (-3.784) | (-3.807) |
|  Industry FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|  Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|  Observations | 20431 | 18201 | 16150 | 20431 | 18201 | 16150 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.043 | 0.035 | 0.033 | 0.055 | 0.045 | 0.042 |

This table presents the results for the effect of executive ownership on future dividend tunneling. The future dividend tunneling is abnormal dividend payout at time *t+1* in columns (1) and (4), time *t+2* in columns (2) and (5) and time t+3 in columns (3) and (6). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 9. Propensity-score matching**

|  |
| --- |
| ***Panel A: Difference in the abnormal dividend payout ratio for matched samples*** |
|   | Matching with Firm’s Characteristics  |
|   | NN 1:1 | NN 1:4 |
| Abn\_DividPayout | 0.068\*\*\* | 0.070\*\*\* |
|   | (8.12) | (4.13) |
| ***Panel B: Baseline regressions for matched sample*** |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.372\*\*\* | 0.370\*\*\* | 0.385\*\*\* | 0.381\*\*\* |
|  | (6.395) | (6.344) | (6.608) | (6.508) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.011\*\* | 0.010\* | 0.003 | 0.002 |
|  | (2.081) | (1.930) | (0.613) | (0.415) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.122\*\*\* | 0.121\*\*\* | 0.108\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* |
|  | (4.609) | (4.166) | (4.043) | (3.489) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.007\* | -0.008\*\* |
|  | (-1.348) | (-1.391) | (-1.949) | (-2.057) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.081\*\*\* | -0.082\*\*\* | -0.066\*\*\* | -0.065\*\*\* |
|  | (-7.431) | (-7.453) | (-6.159) | (-5.994) |
|  *Cash* | 0.239\*\*\* | 0.247\*\*\* | 0.208\*\*\* | 0.216\*\*\* |
|  | (5.221) | (5.393) | (4.633) | (4.776) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.003 | -0.004 | -0.003 | -0.003 |
|  | (-1.319) | (-1.379) | (-1.284) | (-1.284) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\* | -0.002\*\* | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (-2.288) | (-2.170) | (-1.169) | (-1.003) |
|  *SME* | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.017 | 0.016 |
|  | (1.603) | (1.518) | (1.388) | (1.303) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (2.585) | (2.667) |
|  *COW* |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.755) | (0.625) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.271\*\*\* | 0.275\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.482) | (5.503) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.067) | (0.125) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-5.746) | (-5.608) |
|  *Constant* | -0.221\* | -0.204\* | -0.302\*\* | -0.285\*\* |
|   | (-1.889) | (-1.739) | (-2.382) | (-2.250) |
| Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Observations | 9256 | 9256 | 9256 | 9256 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.058 | 0.059 |

Panel A shows the results of the propensity score matching in order to test whether difference in abnormal dividend payout ratios is significant between firms with above-median executive ownership and matched firms with below-median executive ownership. The one-to-one nearest neighbourhood (NN 1:1) and one-to-four nearest neighbourhood (NN 1:4) matching methods are both displayed in this table. Panel C presents the impact of executive ownership on dividend tunnelling based on propensity-score-matched sample. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 10. Alternative model specification and dynamic system GMM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout*  |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  *Abn\_DividPayout (t-1)* |  |  |  | 0.162\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (3.105) |
|  *Abn\_DividPayout (t-2)* |  |  |  | 0.036\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (2.275) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.195\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.291\*\*\* | 0.502\*\*\* |
|  | (3.364) | (2.852) | (6.715) | (3.031) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.003 | 0.008 |
|  | (6.774) | (6.277) | (0.692) | (0.705) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.091\*\*\* | 0.117\*\*\* | 0.096 |
|  | (3.947) | (3.353) | (4.609) | (1.457) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.009\*\* | -0.009 |
|  | (-0.321) | (-1.492) | (-2.683) | (-1.350) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.076\*\*\* | -0.072\*\*\* | -0.061\*\*\* | -0.006 |
|  | (-9.463) | (-9.035) | (-7.606) | (-0.265) |
|  *Cash* | 0.100\*\*\* | 0.116\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.255\*\*\* |
|  | (3.416) | (3.970) | (5.066) | (2.788) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.004\* | -0.004 |
|  | (-0.764) | (-0.638) | (-1.794) | (-1.018) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.007\*\*\* | 0.005 | -0.002\*\* | -0.007\*\* |
|  | (-6.970) | (0.627) | (-2.433) | (-1.975) |
|  *SME* |  |  | 0.039\*\* | 0.023 |
|  |  |  | (2.581) | (0.758) |
|  *TotalCompensation* | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.032\*\*\* | 0.006 |
|  | (-0.554) | (0.863) | (5.481) | (0.413) |
|  *COW* | -0.001\* | -0.001\* | -0.000 | -0.001 |
|  | (-1.860) | (-1.877) | (-0.832) | (-1.226) |
|  *HIndex* | 0.206\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.202\*\*\* | 0.273\*\* |
|  | (5.068) | (4.283) | (4.296) | (2.296) |
|  *BoardSize* | -0.001 | -0.002\*\* | -0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (-1.108) | (-2.461) | (-0.042) | (0.081) |
|  *Boardmeeting* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.002 |
|  | (-3.937) | (-4.027) | (-6.644) | (-0.856) |
|  *Constant* | -0.659\*\*\* | -0.778\*\*\* | -0.441\*\*\* | -0.180 |
|   | (-5.399) | (-5.563) | (-3.845) | (-0.688) |
|  Firm FE | Y | Y | N | N |
|  Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|  Industry FE | N | Y | Y | Y |
|  Observations | 24213 | 24213 | 24511 | 17478 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.250 | 0.264 | 0.065 | - |
|  F-stat (p-value) |  |  |  | 14.93 |
|  p-value for AR(1) |  |  |  | 0.000 |
|  p-value for AR(2) |  |  |  | 0.381 |
|  Hansen test ( p -value) |  |  |  | 0.233 |
|  Hensen test diff. p-value |  |  |  | 0.220 |

This table presents the impact of executive ownership on dividend tunneling based on alternative model specifications. In column (1), to mitigate concerns of endogeneity and unobservable omitted variables concern, we re-estimate our baseline regression further control for firm fixed effects. In column (2), we further use of multi-level fixed effects. In column (3), we adopt a two-way (firm and year) cluster strategy in the baseline model. Column (4) presents the results for the system GMM dividend tunneling regression on executive ownership, allowing for two lags of the dependent variable. Regressions use instruments in levels dated t − 4 for the equations in first differences and first-differenced instruments dated t − 3 for the equations in levels. The AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Table 11. The one-step estimation of Chen et al. (2018)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Abn\_DividPayout* | *DividPayout* |
|   | (1) | (2) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.329\*\*\* | 0.242\*\*\* |
|  | (8.404) | (6.135) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* |
|  | (3.753) | (3.807) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.112\*\*\* |
|  | (5.714) | (5.666) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.564) | (-3.449) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.064\*\*\* | -0.066\*\*\* |
|  | (-9.031) | (-9.130) |
|  *Cash* | 0.256\*\*\* | 0.257\*\*\* |
|  | (8.862) | (8.829) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.364) | (-3.451) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.002\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.543) | (-2.636) |
|  *SME* | 0.014 | 0.011 |
|  | (1.459) | (1.180) |
|  *TotalCompensation* | 0.345\*\*\* | 0.215\*\*\* |
|  | (7.099) | (4.346) |
|  *COW* | 0.227\*\*\* | -0.100\*\*\* |
|  | (18.126) | (-7.834) |
|  *HIndex* | -0.178\*\*\* | -0.012 |
|  | (-18.210) | (-1.160) |
|  *BoardSize* | 0.028\*\*\* | -0.001 |
|  | (6.026) | (-0.298) |
|  *Boardmeeting* | 0.253\*\*\* | 0.093\*\*\* |
|  | (13.835) | (4.979) |
|  *InsiderOwnership* | -0.036\*\*\* | -0.007 |
|  | (-7.505) | (-1.401) |
|  *SalesGrowth* | -0.469\*\*\* | 0.090\*\*\* |
|  | (-16.236) | (3.033) |
|  *BETA* | 0.248\*\*\* | -0.360\*\*\* |
|  | (6.332) | (-8.722) |
|  *SHR* | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.047\*\*\* |
|  | (9.456) | (9.505) |
|  *FreeCashFlow* | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.587) | (0.651) |
|  *Sales* | 0.245\*\*\* | 0.246\*\*\* |
|  | (8.524) | (8.460) |
|  *ROE* | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.408) | (0.300) |
|  *STD* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (-10.672) | (-10.604) |
|  Constant | -0.476\*\*\* | -0.701\*\*\* |
|   | (-5.588) | (-8.121) |
|  Industry FE | Y | Y |
|  Year FE | Y | Y |
|  Observations | 24511 | 24511 |
|  Adjusted R-squared | 0.115 | 0.084 |

This table presents the impact of executive ownership on dividend tunneling based on the one-step procedure. Following Chen et al. (2018), we re-estimate our baseline model in a single regression in column (1). We also regress the dividend payout on the combination of all the second-step regressors and all the ﬁrst-step regressors in column (2). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Appendix 1. Variable definitions**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  Variable | Definition |
| *Abn\_DividPayout* | Abnormal dividend payout, computed using the residuals of Equation A.1 (Table A2) (Holder et al., 1998; Rozeff, 1982). |
|  *DividPayout* | The ratio of dividends per share to earnings per share. |
|  *ExeOwnership* | The proportion of a firm's total number of outstanding shares held by executive officers. |
|  *FirmSize* | Natural logarithm of total assets. |
|  *TangAssets* | Tangible assets scaled by total assets. |
|  *MTBV* | Market value of common equity plus book value of debt, scaled by book value of total assets. |
|  *Leverage* | Long-term debt to total equity. |
|  *Cash* | Cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets. |
|  *CashFlowVola* | Standard deviation of ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows over the previous five years. |
|  *FirmAge* | Number of years since the year of the firm is founded.  |
|  *SME* | An indicator equaling one if the firm’s first three stock code digits are either 002 or 300, and zero otherwise. |
| *TotalCompensation* | The natural logarithm of the total compensation received by the top three executives. |
|  *COW* | The separation between cash flow rights and control rights, which is the divergence of control rights and cash flow rights of shareholders. |
|  *HIndex* | The Herfindahl Index: the sum of the squares of the percentage ownership by the top shareholder. |
|  *BoardSize* | Number of board members. |
|  *BoardMeeting* | Number of board meetings annually. |
|  *InsiderOwnership* | The proportion of a firm's total number of outstanding shares held by directors and executive officers. |
|  *SalesGrowth* | The average growth rate of revenues over the last five years (Rozeff, 1982).  |
|  *BETA* | Beta value of the firm.  |
|  *SHR* | The number of shareholders. |
|  *FreeCashFlow* | Free cash flow scaled by total assets. |
|  *Sales* | The natural logarithm of sales. |
|  *ROE* | Net profit divided by net assets.  |
|  *STD* | Standard deviation of monthly stock returns of a firm in a given calendar year. |
|  *RSBM* | The reciprocal of shareholder balancing mechanism. |
|  *OtherReceivs* | Other receivables scaled by total assets. |
|  *StateOwnership* | The proportion of a firm's total number of outstanding shares held by state. |
|  *Analyst* | The number of analysts covering the firm. |
|  *Broker* | The number of brokers covering the firm. |
|  *AnalystReport*  | The number of analyst reports covering the firm. |
|  *2006Reform* | Dummy variable equaling 1 after year 2006 and zero otherwise. |

**Appendix 2. Abnormal dividend payout**

|  |
| --- |
| Dependent Variable: *Dividend Payout* |
|   |  |
|  *Insider Ownership*  | 42.632 |
|  | (0.840) |
|  *Sales Growth* | -0.103\*\*\* |
|  | (-4.760) |
|  *BETA* | 0.040\* |
|  | (1.830) |
|  *SHR* | -0.013\* |
|  | (-0.191) |
|  *Free Cash Flow* | 0.008 |
|  | (0.210) |
|  *Log Sales* | 0.027\*\*\* |
|  | (5.150) |
|  *ROE* | 0.096 |
|  | (1.300) |
|  *STD* | -0.634\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.500) |
| Constant | -0.171 |
|   | (-1.640) |

This tale reports the regression results using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation. The abnormal dividend payout is measured by the residual derived from the regressions of expected dividend payouts. Following Holder et al. (1998) and Rozeff (1982), we include *Insider Ownership, Sales Growth, BETA, SHR, Free Cash Flow, Log Sales, ROE and STD* in the regression. We obtain the residuals by running the regressions in the industry-year group. A similar method has been used in Jiang and Lie (2016). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The equation is as follows:

 (A.1)

**Appendix 3. The influence of broker coverage**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.045\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (8.831) | (7.941) | (8.971) | (7.821) |
| *Broker\* ExeOwnership* | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.010\*\* |
|  | (-2.884) | (-2.785) | (-2.587) | (-2.410) |
|  *Broker* | -0.008\*\* | -0.007\*\* | -0.008\*\* | -0.009\*\* |
|  | (-2.349) | (-1.990) | (-2.403) | (-2.568) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.017\*\*\* | 0.009\*\* | 0.007\* |
|  | (5.323) | (4.080) | (2.210) | (1.648) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.146\*\*\* | 0.140\*\*\* | 0.119\*\*\* |
|  | (8.921) | (7.321) | (7.488) | (5.929) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.001 | -0.004\* | -0.003 | -0.006\*\* |
|  | (-0.632) | (-1.687) | (-1.528) | (-2.557) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.082\*\*\* | -0.078\*\*\* | -0.069\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* |
|  | (-11.014) | (-10.213) | (-9.584) | (-8.638) |
|  *Cash* | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.202\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* |
|  | (6.364) | (6.837) | (5.301) | (5.788) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\* | -0.005\*\* | -0.004\*\* |
|  | (-2.000) | (-1.766) | (-2.479) | (-2.151) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\* |
|  | (-5.084) | (-3.451) | (-4.598) | (-2.565) |
|  *SME* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (5.396) | (3.606) | (5.272) | (4.485) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.720) | (6.553) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.652) | (-0.885) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.202\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (6.992) | (6.797) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.001 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.566) | (-0.153) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-8.354) | (-8.478) |
|  *Constant* | -0.401\*\*\* | -0.351\*\*\* | -0.493\*\*\* | -0.532\*\*\* |
|   | (-5.088) | (-3.889) | (-6.095) | (-5.497) |
| Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.039 | 0.052 | 0.051 | 0.065 |

This table presents the results for the moderating effect of broker coverage on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. The component variables of the interaction terms are standardized to reduce the effects of multicollinearity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

**Appendix 4. Analyst report Coverage**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Dependent Variable: *Abn\_DividPayout* |
|   |  (1) |  (2) |  (3) |  (4) |
|  *ExeOwnership* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (8.900) | (8.003) | (9.019) | (7.852) |
| *AnalystReport\*ExeOwnership* | -0.009\*\* | -0.009\*\* | -0.007\*\* | -0.007\*\* |
|  | (-2.479) | (-2.471) | (-2.142) | (-2.048) |
|  *AnalystReport* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.723) | (-3.337) | (-3.572) | (-3.712) |
|  *FirmSize* | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.010\*\*\* | 0.008\*\* |
|  | (5.975) | (4.762) | (2.617) | (2.054) |
|  *TangAssets* | 0.166\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* | 0.120\*\*\* |
|  | (9.002) | (7.356) | (7.580) | (5.979) |
|  *MTBV* | -0.000 | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.005\*\* |
|  | (-0.147) | (-1.157) | (-1.139) | (-2.145) |
|  *Leverage* | -0.084\*\*\* | -0.079\*\*\* | -0.071\*\*\* | -0.065\*\*\* |
|  | (-11.287) | (-10.467) | (-9.816) | (-8.845) |
|  *Cash* | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.204\*\*\* | 0.156\*\*\* | 0.171\*\*\* |
|  | (6.448) | (6.915) | (5.371) | (5.847) |
|  *CashFlowVol* | -0.004\* | -0.003\* | -0.004\*\* | -0.004\*\* |
|  | (-1.851) | (-1.664) | (-2.301) | (-1.991) |
|  *FirmAge* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.335) | (-3.477) | (-4.838) | (-2.600) |
|  *SME* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (5.454) | (3.798) | (5.284) | (4.622) |
|  *TotalCompensation* |  |  | 0.026\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.816) | (6.734) |
|  *COW* |  |  | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (-0.599) | (-0.843) |
|  *HIndex* |  |  | 0.201\*\*\* | 0.197\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (6.946) | (6.752) |
|  *BoardSize* |  |  | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (0.468) | (-0.242) |
|  *Boardmeeting* |  |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-8.301) | (-8.409) |
|  *Constant* | -0.445\*\*\* | -0.404\*\*\* | -0.530\*\*\* | -0.576\*\*\* |
|   | (-5.750) | (-4.564) | (-6.676) | (-6.082) |
| Industry FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Observations | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 | 24511 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.039 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.066 |

This table presents the results for the moderating effect of analyst report coverage on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. The component variables of the interaction terms are standardized to reduce the effects of multicollinearity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

1. For details, please see the Decisions on Amending Some Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Companies Order No. 57 [2008] of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For details, please see the Guidelines No.3 on the Supervision and Administration of Listed Companies – Distribution of Cash Dividends of Listed Companies, Announcement No. 43 [2013] of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The role of executives in tunneling by controlling shareholders has not been investigated in the prior tunneling literature, e.g.,Lv et al. (2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. There are a wide range of activities associated with tunneling, including outright theft, loan guarantees, and deviation from market prices when selling assets or products. For instance, tunneling through intercorporate loans and related party transactions has been discussed by Jiang et al. (2010), Aharony et al. (2010), and Du et al. (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Yuan et al. (2008) find that the controlling shareholders and state-owned shareholders belong to the same state-owned holding groups at most times. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Following Jaccard et al. (1990), the component variables of the interaction term between *OtherReceivs* and *ExeOwnership* are standardised for their industry-year means and standard deviations to mitigate the effects of multicollinearity. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. A few studies focusing on the Chinese market have selected the number of analysts as the measure of external monitoring. Sun (2011) studies analyst coverage and the income-smoothing relationship. Meanwhile, Chan and Hameed (2006) study the synchronicity and the analyst coverage relationship. Yu (2008) tests the relationship between earnings management and analyst coverage. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This dataset has been used widely in studies related to listed firms in China (Firth et al., 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b; Firth et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. We used the “other receivables” account in the CSMAR database, derived from the financial footnote catalogue. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. A Hausman test suggests the industry and year-fixed effects should be employed. For brevity, the Hausman results are not reported in the paper but are available upon request. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. We also include the *2006Reform* dummy, but it is omitted by the Stata computer package when year fixed effects are controlled as the year fixed effect absorbs the effect of the 2006 reform. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Duchin et al. (2010) measure firms’ financial position with the lags of variables to ensure there is no chance the dependent variables and the independent variables can affect each other. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) design their regressions to have independent variables lagged one year to control for potential endogeneity problems. Similarly, McCarthy et al. (2017) use regressions with one lag of all independent variables to avoid simultaneity, which can cause potential endogeneity. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)