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On the heresthetics of salience:: Competing over voters' attention

On the heresthetics of salience:: Competing over voters' attention
On the heresthetics of salience:: Competing over voters' attention
We study a voting model in which two candidates compete for the attention of voters, who value both the spatial dimension of policy, as well as each candidate's personal attribute of valence. Candidates run in a winner-take-all election and draw voters' attention towards the attribute in which they enjoy a comparative advantage, by thus making it \emph{salient} in voters' mind. The paper offers three contributions. First, it provides novel and significant experimental evidence in support of salient behaviour in voting. Second, it fully characterizes policy salient political equilibria as well as valence salient political equilibria with salient voters. Third, it suggests ways in which the notion of salience can be made operational, and proffers empirical evidence from observational data that candidates internalize the externality that ensues from salient behaviour on the part of voters. Theoretical, experimental and empirical results show that the median voter paradigm and its implications are challenged if voters are salient.
Ianni, Antonella
35024f65-34cd-4e20-9b2a-554600d739f3
Ianni, Antonella
35024f65-34cd-4e20-9b2a-554600d739f3

Ianni, Antonella (2019) On the heresthetics of salience:: Competing over voters' attention

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

Abstract

We study a voting model in which two candidates compete for the attention of voters, who value both the spatial dimension of policy, as well as each candidate's personal attribute of valence. Candidates run in a winner-take-all election and draw voters' attention towards the attribute in which they enjoy a comparative advantage, by thus making it \emph{salient} in voters' mind. The paper offers three contributions. First, it provides novel and significant experimental evidence in support of salient behaviour in voting. Second, it fully characterizes policy salient political equilibria as well as valence salient political equilibria with salient voters. Third, it suggests ways in which the notion of salience can be made operational, and proffers empirical evidence from observational data that candidates internalize the externality that ensues from salient behaviour on the part of voters. Theoretical, experimental and empirical results show that the median voter paradigm and its implications are challenged if voters are salient.

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Published date: 2019

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 469092
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/469092
PURE UUID: 9db2ed2c-27ac-4214-8b82-b440c02e50df
ORCID for Antonella Ianni: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-5003-4482

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Date deposited: 06 Sep 2022 18:12
Last modified: 07 Sep 2022 01:35

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