Community Social Capital and Board Advising: Evidence from the Structure of Board Committees

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Forthcoming, British Journal of Management

Abstract

We investigate how community social capital, captured by the strength of cooperative norms and social networks within a geographical community, affects the internal structure of corporate boards. We find that firms headquartered in high-social-capital US counties have a more advising-intensive board structure, as they are more likely to set up specialised advisory committees and appoint more advisory directors. These findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and a battery of sensitivity tests. Our mediation analysis shows that the increased board advising intensity, induced by community social capital, reduces investment inefficiency. We further reveal that community social capital reduces board monitoring intensity and directors' monitoring efforts. Overall, our results are consistent with the argument that community social capital serves as a societal monitoring mechanism to reduce firms' need for board monitoring and, hence, firms' boards located in high-social-capital communities focus more on advising.

Keywords: Community Social Capital, Firm Location, Board Advising, Board Structure, Board Committee

JEL Classification: G30 G34 Z13

* We are most grateful to the Editor (Sofia Johan) and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments for improving the paper. We also thank participants at the 2021 European Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, 2022 Financial Management Association European Conference, Maggie Hu, and Anh Tran for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are authors' responsibility.

Introduction

Community social capital, captured by the confluence effects arising from the cooperative norms and the density of associational networks in a geographical community, is an important construct across various disciplines, including sociology, economics and management.[1] As individuals are susceptible to social influences in the geographical areas in which they reside, community social capital helps to build trust, reciprocity, information sharing and cooperation, thus encouraging honest dealings and discouraging individuals' unethical behaviours (Coleman, 1988, La Porta et al., 1997).[2] A burgeoning literature shows that community social capital matters in the corporate setting, as corporate managers are individuals subject to the influence of social capital in the community where their firms are headquartered (Jha and Chen, 2014). Managers' self-interested behaviours are contrary to the prescribed values of cooperative norms, and dense social networks compel individuals to comply with the codes of conduct associated with cooperative norms (Coleman, 1988). Therefore, community social capital disciplines managers and alleviates agency issues (Gao et al., 2019, Gupta et al., 2018, Hoi et al., 2019), an important responsibility of the board of directors. However, we still know little about how community social capital affects the functioning of corporate boards.

The board of directors, as an integral element, performs both monitoring and advising duties (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The monitoring function of the board oversees the management and guards against harmful conduct, while the advising function of the board guides the management to apply appropriate strategies and approves major expenditures

[1] Prior studies in these disciplines have found that community social capital reduces the crime rate (Paolo Buonanno et al., 2009), enhances local and national governmental performance (Knack, 2000) and facilitates economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997).

[2] For instance, Hong et al. (2004) and Hong et al. (2005) show that social interactions in local geographical areas affect stock-market participation and fund managers' trading behaviours. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) observe strong co-movement in the stock returns of companies headquartered in the same geographic area due to the trading patterns of local residents. A large number of previous studies, including Coleman (1988), Elster (1989), Guiso et al. (2004), and Spagnolo (1999) have found that strong cooperative norms and dense social networks in a community foster an environment that constrains narrow and self-interested behaviours and limits opportunistic behaviours.

(Adams et al., 2010). Although monitoring the management is essential for firm success, excessive board monitoring can be counterproductive. Increased focus on board monitoring not only comes at a substantial cost to board advising but also weakens the CEO's perception of board support (Adams and Ferreira, 2007, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), which leads to managerial myopia and poor performance (Faleye et al., 2011). While antecedents for effective board monitoring have been well established, the optimum way to structure the board for effective advising remains an essential but understudied issue. Randøy and Jenssen (2004) claim that board monitoring becomes less demanding, and even redundant, when external governance mechanisms discipline managers. Adams and Ferreira (2007) theoretically contend that a friendly board that does not monitor too much but focuses on advising is more optimal when other governance mechanisms exist. Therefore, we conjecture that firms headquartered in areas with higher levels of social capital can assemble a more advising-intensive board to avoid the adverse consequences of excessive monitoring and improve board efficiency.

To test our conjecture, we empirically explore the effect of social capital at the county level in the US on board advising intensity for firms headquartered in the county. Using a sample of 12,174 firm-year observations from S&P 1,500 firms over the period 2000 - 2018, we find that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of social capital are more likely to set up specialised advisory committees and appoint more directors devoted to advising, suggesting a positive relationship between community social capital and board advising intensity.

According to Adams et al. (2010), advisory directors offer strategic advice about the firm's investment opportunities. We expect that firms that receive better advice will invest wisely and efficiently (Kim et al., 2014). Our mediation analysis confirms that board advising intensity mediates the relationship between community social capital and firm investment efficiency. In other words, the increased board advising intensity, induced by higher levels of

community social capital, results in more efficient firm investments, suggesting that community social capital improves board advising efficiency.

We then conduct several tests to underpin the argument that community social capital reduces board monitoring need and allows for more advising. First, we corroborate previous studies by showing that community social capital reduces discretionary accruals, CEO compensation, and costs of equity. Second, we find that firms in high-social-capital counties appoint fewer monitoring directors and are less likely to form a monitoring-intensive board. Third, we use board meeting attendance as a proxy for directors' efforts (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) and show that community social capital significantly increases meeting absence among directors holding monitoring duties, but not among those specialising in advising. Collectively, these results provide strong evidence that board monitoring is less demanding for firms in high-social-capital counties, and suggest that the board may shift its focus from monitoring to advising.

To further strengthen our premise, we conduct two cross-sectional analyses to examine whether a firm's need for board monitoring plays a role in the positive relationship between community social capital and board advising intensity. As the firm's need for board monitoring is further reduced by the external market monitoring (Guo et al., 2015, Randøy and Jenssen, 2004), we find that the observed relationship is more prominent for firms covered by more analysts and for firms operating in highly competitive industries. The cross-sectional variation evidence further confirms the importance of reduced board monitoring needs in the interplay between community social capital and board advising intensity.

We also investigate an alternative interpretation of our results. Specifically, higher levels of community social capital develop trust and dense networks, which are considered valuable resources for strategic advising. As a result, the board can take advantage of these resources and increase its advising intensity. This proposes a direct effect of community social

capital on board advising, while our premise and previous results suggest an indirect effect of community social capital on board advising through a reduction in board monitoring. While our premise is consistent with the agency theory perspective of community social capital and board advising (Adams and Ferreira, 2007, Hoi et al., 2019, Masulis and Mobbs, 2014), the alternative explanation is consistent with the resource dependence theory, which argues that the board responds to the external environment and changes its composition directly (Hillman et al., 2009, Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). We do not consider the two interpretations mutually exclusive, as Hillman and Dalziel (2003) contend that board function can be explained by integrating the two perspectives. We perform a path analysis that supports our view. We find that community social capital is positively related to board advising intensity when board monitoring is held constant, confirming the direct effect. However, community social capital also indirectly improves board advising intensity through its effect on reducing board monitoring after taking into account its direct effect. Thus, both paths contribute to the positive relationship between community social capital and board advising intensity. However, since excessive board monitoring leads to inferior performance (Faleye et al., 2011), the indirect path is important for firm success.

Our main results hold when addressing the endogeneity concerns with the instrumental variable (IV) approach, propensity score matching (PSM) technique and difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, suggesting that our results are causal instead of correlational. The results also survive a battery of robustness tests relating to omitted variables and alternative measures of community social capital and advisory directors.

We first contribute to the limited research exploring the dynamics of the optimal internal structure of board committees (Chen and Wu, 2016, Faleye et al., 2013). As we show that community social capital is a key factor influencing internal board structure regarding committee setup and director assignments, we conform to the notion that optimal board

structure depends on a firm's operating environment (Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008). Second, we elaborate on the emerging literature on the dual role of board functions. We confirm that community social capital improves monitoring outcomes (e.g., mitigates earnings management and rent extraction) and show that the increased board advising intensity, induced by community social capital, enhances board advising effectiveness (e.g., reduces investment inefficiency). Third, we highlight the importance of recognising the heterogeneity of independent directors sitting on different board committees (Faleye et al., 2011, Zalata et al., 2019). By examining independent directors sitting on monitoring and advisory committees, rather than treating all independent directors homogenously, we add to the research that explores the different roles played by independent directors (Faleye et al., 2011, Faleye et al., 2013). Fourth, we extend the theoretical development of Adams and Ferreira (2007) by answering the call to investigate circumstances in which a friendly board that does not monitor excessively but focuses on advising is optimal. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the interactions between external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., community social capital) and the subordinate board structure regarding advising. Our findings suggest that firms can alleviate the competing tensions between board monitoring and advising when considering the community social capital surrounding their headquarters.

Theoretical background

Community social capital and opportunistic behaviours

The theoretical foundation of social capital was first systematically developed by Coleman (1988), who defines social capital as a variety of different entities generated by trust, information, norms, obligations and effective sanctions that facilitate individual or group actions. Coleman (1988) further perceives the use of social capital as a general theoretical strategy that involves taking rational action but rejects extreme individualistic premises.

Since then, social theorists have developed various operating definitions of social capital and argue that social capital encourages honest dealing and deters opportunistic behaviours (Adler and Kwon, 2002, Scrivens and Smith, 2013). Because the environmental secular of social norms and networks are at the core of social capital, two approaches are commonly adopted in previous definitions. In the 'norms' approach, Putnam (1993) sees social capital as a tendency of people within a group to collaborate to achieve socially productive outcomes and emphasises the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from connections between individuals. Fukuyama (2001) argues that social capital is the existence of the same set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that allows for cooperation. In the 'network' approach, social capital is modelled as a set of networks from which efficient information sharing and better communication are derived (Coleman, 1988, Lin, 1999, Payne et al., 2011). Given that individuals need to maintain a moral self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008), dense social networks intensify the costs and the punishment of unethical and opportunistic behaviours (Coleman, 1994, Spagnolo, 1999).[3] As a result, repeated interactions within a dense network promote greater trust among its members over time and foster the norms of cooperation and honesty (Coleman, 1988, Fischer and Pollock, 2004, Fukuyama, 2001, Putnam, 2000, Uzzi, 1996).

Economists, however, criticise the lack of conceptual and analytical frameworks in social capital, as it is difficult to disentangle the effects of cooperative norms and social networks (Sobel, 2002). Since individual behaviours are influenced by the community, economists characterise social capital as a community-level attribute that collectively reflects individuals' behaviours, beliefs and values (Rupasingha et al., 2006). Therefore, economics studies often do not distinguish between social norms and networks but instead adopt the

[3] These costs include external social sanctions (e.g., social ostracism and stigmatisation) (Coleman, 1988, Posner, 2000, Uhlaner, 1989), and internal psychological costs resulting from increased negative moral sentiments (e.g., anxiety, guilt and shame) (Elster, 1989, Higgins, 1987).

approach advocated by Knack and Keefer (1997), Woolcock (1998), and Guiso et al. (2004) to define social capital as the environmental element that jointly captures the confluence effects of cooperative norms and dense networks within a geographical community, a definition that we follow in this study.

Board committee reforms, monitoring and advising

Agency theory posits that, due to the separation of ownership and control, managers tend to engage in self-interested, opportunistic behaviours that benefit themselves but at the cost of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders thus appoint the board of directors to discipline managers and protect their interests. Given that board committees drive the functioning of the board (Adams et al., 2015, Kesner, 1988, Klein, 1998), regulators in the US have gradually turned their attention to the composition of board committees concerning monitoring.[4] After several major accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the Sarbanes - Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in order to scrutinise board monitoring. This Act mandates firms to set up several monitoring committees – namely the audit, compensation, governance and nomination committees, which are composed solely of independent directors.[5]

Early research, including Fama and Jensen (1983), acknowledges that the board also has an advising role as they provide counsel to the CEO, set strategy and approve major expenditures. However, it was not until 2004 that the Corporate Director's Guidebook of the American Bar Association explicitly recognised advising as one of the two basic functions of

[4] The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to require firms to establish an audit committee comprised of outside directors in 1940 (Birkett, 1986), and to mandate firms to disclose audit committee composition in the 1970s (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010).

[5] In response to SOX, major US stock exchanges (i.e. the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq) also issued requirements regarding board committees. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual Section 303A.03 requires complete independence of audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees. Nasdaq requires complete independence of these major committees or independent directors to oversee the executive compensation and requires a majority of independent directors to select or recommend director nominees if such committees do not exist.

the board (Adams, 2010). The advising role of the board guides the management to formulate strategies and assist with decision-making (Faleye et al., 2011). However, intensive board monitoring weakens board advising, as it creates an information conflict between the management and the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Since managers are concerned that information disclosed to the board can be used to monitor their behaviours, they become reluctant to share key strategic information with a board that monitors intensively. Consequently, the lack of valuable information provided to the board weakens strategic advising and reduces shareholder value. Adams and Ferreira (2007) developed a 'Theory of Friendly Boards', arguing that enhancing the advising function of the board by forming a management-friendly board, where managers are more willing to share information with directors, unambiguously increases shareholder value. Despite the importance of the theoretical construct on board advising, regulators in the US have not imposed any requirement on firms to establish advisory committees. To date, shareholders have the discretion to set up committees that are advisory in nature. For example, Morgan Stanley set up a technology committee to advise the management on Big Data technologies in stock trading, but not all firms have a technology committee.

Empirical literature review and hypotheses development

As previously discussed, the board of directors has monitoring and advising duties. Many prior studies adopt an 'inside-outside' approach to proxy for the strength of board monitoring and advising. It follows that independent directors mainly contribute to the monitoring function, since they are independent of the management, while inside directors primarily perform the advising duty, because they have more firm-specific knowledge (Duchin et al., 2010, Lehn et al., 2009, Linck et al., 2008). However, Baldenius et al. (2014) conclude that the 'inside-outside'

approach oversimplifies the role of independent directors and leads to inconclusive empirical evidence.[6]

The emerging literature has shifted the focus from the 'inside-outside' approach toward a holistic understanding of board committees when evaluating board monitoring and advising intensity. Since the board sets up committees that are either of an advising or a monitoring nature to address firms' specific needs (Klein, 1998), Faleye et al. (2011) propose that observing board committees is a better way to proxy for the strength of board monitoring and advising. Faleye et al. (2011) show that a monitoring-intensive board, where the majority of independent directors are allocated to monitoring committees, results in significantly weaker strategic advising and greater managerial myopia. Consistent with the theoretical prediction in Adams and Ferreira (2007), Faleye et al. (2011) confirm that the costs of weaker advising outweigh the benefits of intensive monitoring, as firm value is significantly lower for those with monitoring-intensive boards.

Due to the information conflict, weak advising also poses a threat to boards whose directors perform both monitoring and advising duties (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Faleye et al. (2013) argue that it is vital for the board to separate committees specialising in advising from those performing monitoring duties, because the separation alleviates information conflict and serves as a substitute for a commitment to not use the revealed information against the CEO (Laux and Laux, 2009). Zalata et al. (2019) show that directors appointed to monitoring committees mitigate managerial opportunism, but not those appointed to advisory committees, confirming that directors serving on advisory committees are minimally involved in monitoring

[6] The 'inside-outside' approach ignores two important facts. First, independent directors can acquire firm-specific information through board meetings and interaction with the management or other directors, to contribute to the advising function (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Second, prior studies have acknowledged that the independent director is a valuable source of expertise, as independent directors with specific characteristics and backgrounds can help to achieve superior performance (Dalton et al., 1999, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, Yermack, 1996). Hence, independent directors can not only monitor managers but can also provide strategic advice (Bhagat and Black, 1999, Chen et al., 2020).

activities. As information conflicts are alleviated by separating advising and monitoring committees, Faleye et al. (2013) show that firms with specialised advisory directors enjoy enhanced advising performance and have higher shareholder value.

'Friendly board theory' acknowledges that excessive board monitoring impedes information exchange between the CEO and the board, while a friendly board that does not monitor too much receives more valuable information and is better at advising (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). However, the 'friendly board theory' also argues that, in order for a management-friendly board to be optimal, other governance mechanisms need to pick up the slack of board monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) since managers may still engage in opportunistic behaviours that hurt shareholder value without being disciplined by other governance mechanisms. Prior research, including Cremers et al. (2008), Ferreira et al. (2011) and Guo et al. (2015), shows that external governance mechanisms, including stock price informativeness, market competition, and takeover threats, substitute for the internal governance imposed by directors. Therefore, strong external monitoring mechanisms provide a prerequisite for the board to reduce its internal monitoring and improve its advisory capacity. However, the current empirical literature has not systemically linked the strength of external monitoring mechanisms to the intensity of board advising.

Community social capital is a societal monitoring mechanism identified in a growing body of literature. Prior research shows that community social capital deters opportunistic corporate practices, such as auditing misconduct and litigation risk (Jha and Chen, 2014), tax avoidance (Hasan et al., 2017a) and conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (Hasan et al., 2017b), because corporate decisions are made by executives who are disciplined by social capital surrounding corporate headquarters (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Hilary and Hui, 2009). Since agency issues are caused by managerial opportunism and represent a violation of the trust vested by shareholders, social capital can mitigate this principal-agent problem. Indeed,

Gupta et al. (2018) document a negative relationship between the social capital of the county where the firm resides and the cost of equity, as equity holders require lower returns for firms with less severe agency issues. Gao et al. (2019) find evidence suggesting that community social capital induces managers to use corporate resources more efficiently. Hoi et al. (2019) conclude that high community social capital mitigates the agency issue by restraining managerial rent extraction. These studies demonstrate that community social capital is an external monitoring mechanism that ameliorates agency conflicts.

The monitoring role of community social capital suggests that the firm's need for board monitoring is low when community social capital already serves as an incremental monitoring mechanism that reduces the agency issue (Hoi et al., 2019). Based on the 'friendly board theory' (Adams and Ferreira, 2007), we conjecture that shareholders would increase board advising intensity when community social capital is high to prevent information conflicts and sustain efficient advising. We, therefore, develop our first hypothesis (*H1*) as follows:

H1: Firms headquartered in high-social-capital regions are associated with greater board advising intensity.

Because the majority of independent directors are full-time employees of other firms, the board takes a more hands-off approach when performing the advising duties. Thus, directors rely on the firm-specific information provided by the CEO to make advising decisions (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Therefore, the advisory performance depends on the completeness of the information that the management provides (Armstrong et al., 2010). According to the 'friendly board theory', a board that does not monitor too much receives more valuable information and is better at advising (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). If community social capital promotes a friendly board that has separated advising committees, managers will be more willing to provide valuable information to advisory directors (Faleye et al., 2013). The more firm-specific knowledge the management shares, the better the board's advisory performance

will be. Since advisory directors guide the CEO to set strategy and approve major expenditures (Adams et al., 2010), we should expect firms that receive better advice from the board to invest wisely and have lower levels of investment inefficiency (Kim et al., 2014). Therefore, we develop our second hypothesis (*H2*) as follows:

H2: The increased board advising intensity induced by community social capital results in lower investment inefficiency.

Data and research design

Data source

Our sample consists of S&P 1,500 firms for the period 2000 - 2018, excluding firms from the financial (SIC 6000 – 6999) and utility sectors (SIC 4900 – 4999).[7,8] We manually track firm' headquarters' counties during the sample period using the address information stated in firm 10-K filings from the SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. Firms headquartered outside the US are excluded. We use the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes for each firm headquartered in US counties to match county-level data. The social capital index for each county is constructed using data from the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD). We collect the county-level economic outputs and demographic profiles from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the United States Census Bureau. Firm fundamental variables are retrieved from Compustat, stock market price data are from CRSP, directors' committee assignments are from BoardEx and director meeting attendance is from ISS. Our final sample consists of 1,281 unique firms and 12,174 firm-year observations.

[7] We start from 2000 because data prior to 2000 are limited in BoardEx.

[8] Prior research provides inconclusive evidence on the long-term presence of social capital in societies (Paxton, 1999, Putnam, 1995). Researchers argue that the inconclusive evidence is mainly due to the lack of reliable data on measuring social capital (Rupasingha et al., 2006). Rupasingha et al. (2006) are the first to develop the most reliable measure of social capital that captures both cross-sectional and time-series variations in social capital based on US county-level data. The method is widely adopted in academic studies, including Hasan et al. (2017b) and Hoi et al. (2019). We, therefore, chose the US context for our study.

Variables used in the study

Dependent variables. Following Reeb and Upadhyay (2010), Faleye et al. (2011), and Faleye et al. (2013), we define finance, investment, strategy, acquisitions, science and technology and executive committees as advisory committees while audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees are considered monitoring committees.[9] *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the logarithm transformation of the number of advisory committees in a firm plus one. Following Faleye et al. (2013), we define independent directors who sit on at least one of the advisory committees but do not serve on any monitoring committee as advisory directors. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors to the total number of independent directors.[10]

Main independent variable: *SC_Index* Following Hoi et al. (2019), we define community social capital as the joint effect of cooperative norms and social networks within a US county. Following Rupasingha et al. (2006), we measure community social capital (*SC_Index*) as the first principal component of the voter turnout for the presidential election (*Pvote*), census mail response rate (*Pespn*), the aggregate number of social organisations (*Assn*) and the number of not-for-profit organisations (*Nccs*) for each county provided by NRCRD. The NRCRD only provides data for 1997, 2005, 2009 and 2014 over our sample period.[11] We, therefore, follow Hoi et al. (2019) to backfill the missing data using the available *SC_Index* from the most recent

[9] To identify committees devoted to the advising function and minimally involved in the monitoring function, committees that share both monitoring and advising responsibilities, such as the audit and finance committee, are considered monitoring committee, as in Faleye et al. (2013).

[10] Following Faleye et al. (2013), we focus on independent directors, because inside directors do not typically serve on board committees (Chen and Wu, 2016). In robustness tests, we use two alternative definitions of advisory directors that consider both independent and insider directors with advising duties as advisory directors.

[11] NRCRD reports the data for 1997 in a different data set than data for 2005, 2009 and 2014. To be consistent with the data reported after 2005, we follow Hasan et al. (2017b) to adjust the values of *ASSN* in 1997 by only keeping the 10 types of social organisations and using the trend method to adjust *NCCS* in 1997. Detailed procedures can be found in the Appendix of Hasan et al. (2017b).

preceding period.[12] A higher level of *SC_Index* corresponds to a stronger social capital of the county.

Control variables. Based on previous literature, including Coles et al. (2008), Linck et al. (2008), Ferreira et al. (2011), Hasan et al. (2017b) and Knyazeva et al. (2013), we employ five sets of control variables, covering firm operation complexity, information costs, CEO entrenchment, governance structure and geographic factors. *Firm_Size*, *Firm_Age*, *Leverage* and *N_Segments* are proxies for firm operation complexity. Information costs are measured by *Market-to-Book*, *R&D* and *Return_Volatility*. We then include *CEO_Tenure*, *CEO_Ownership* and *CEO_Duality* to control for CEO entrenchment. Governance structure is measured by *Institutional_Ownership*, *Blockholder_Ownership* and *Board_Independence*. Geographic factors include *Local_Director_Pool*, *Per_Capita_Income*, *Population_Growth*, *Population_Density*, *Education*, *Religiosity* and *County_Median_Age*. Detailed variable construction can be found in Table A1 from the Appendix.

Research design

We use the following empirical specification to test *H1*:

$$Advising\_Intensity_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 SC\_Index_{j,i,t} + \sum \delta Controls_{j,i,t} + \lambda_k + \lambda_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1} \quad (1)$$

where *Advising_Intensity* represents *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* or *Advisory_Director_Ratio*. We adopt the probit model to estimate Eq. (1) when the dependent variable is *Advisory_Committee*, and the ordinary least squares (OLS) model to estimate Eq. (1) when the dependent variable is *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*. The main variable of interest, $SC\_Index_{j,i,t}$, is the estimated social capital index for county *j* where firm *i* is headquartered at time *t*. $Controls_{j,i,t}$ is a vector of the five sets of variables described

[12] For example, we backfill the social capital data for each county from 2000 to 2004 with the estimated *SC_Index* from 1997. We also adopt several alternative proxies for social capital in our robustness tests.

in the previous section. λ_k and λ_{t+1} are industry and year dummies, respectively. Industry is defined by the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. *H1* predicts a positive and statistically significant coefficient on community social capital (β_1).

We perform a mediation analysis to test *H2*. The intuition behind the mediation analysis is illustrated in Figure 1. Path ABC represents the total effect of the treatment (community social capital) on the outcome (investment inefficiency), which can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects. Path A corresponds to the effect of the treatment on the mediator (board advising intensity) and Path B demonstrates the effect of the mediator on the outcome. Paths A and B comprise the indirect effect (mediating effect) of community social capital on investment inefficiency, while Path C shows the direct effect of community social capital on investment inefficiency.

[Insert Figure 1 Around Here]

We then follow Baron and Kenny (1986) and Li et al. (2021) to estimate the following structural equation models to test the mediation effect.

$$Inefficiency_{i,t+n} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 SC\_Index_{j,i,t} + \sum \varphi Controls_{j,i,t} + \varepsilon_{1_{i,t+n}} \quad (2)$$

$$Advising\_Intensity_{i,t+n} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 SC\_Index_{j,i,t} + \sum \gamma Controls_{j,i,t} + \varepsilon_{2_{i,t+n}} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Inefficiency_{i,t+n} &= \alpha_3 + \beta_3 SC\_Index_{j,i,t} + \pi_1 Advising\_Intensity_{j,i,t+1} \\ &+ \sum \varphi Controls_{j,i,t} + \varepsilon_{3_{i,t+n}} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where *Inefficiency* is the industry-adjusted investment inefficiency estimated from the Richardson (2006) model. Detailed explanations of the Richardson (2006) model are presented in Internet Appendix IA. The total effect of *SC_Index* on *Inefficiency* (β_1) can be decomposed into the direct effect of *SC_Index* on *Inefficiency* (β_3) and the mediation effect ($\beta_2 \times \pi_1$) through *Advising_Intensity*. Because the total effect (β_1) can be obtained as $\beta_3 + \beta_2 \times \pi_1$, only

Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) need to be estimated. Since *Inefficiency* is an inverse measure of investment efficiency, *H2* proposes that community social capital increases board advising intensity, which in turn reduces investment inefficiency. We, therefore, expect negative and significant $\beta_2 \times \pi_1$.[13]

Empirical results and discussions

Summary statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables. *SC_Index* has a mean value of -0.575, similar to that (-0.54) reported in Hasan et al. (2017b). Figure 2 depicts the average *SC_Index* for contiguous US geographical areas during our sample period. A darker shade reflects a higher level of community social capital. The figure is consistent with the official annual figures provided by NRCRD, as the community social capital is higher in upper Midwest and Northwest counties but lower in Southwest and Southeast counties.

[Insert Table 1 Around Here]

[Insert Figure 2 Around Here]

Advisory_Committee has a mean of 0.405, indicating that 40.5% of the firm-year observations have at least one advisory committee within the board. The mean value of *N_Advisory_Committee* is 0.320. However, the median value is zero for both *Advisory_Committee* and *N_Advisory_Committee*, suggesting that most firms do not set up advisory committees. The mean (median) value of *Advisory_Director_Ratio* shows that only 7.9% (0.000) of the independent directors specialise in advising. These findings reconcile with Faleye et al. (2013), who show that most firms do not have independent directors solely serving the advising role. In the correlation matrix reported in Internet Appendix IB.1, *SC_Index* is positively related to all three board advising intensity measures (*Advisory_Committee, N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*).

[13] The standard error and z-statistics for the mediation effect ($\beta_2 \times \pi_1$) are computed by following Sobel (1982).

The effect of community social capital on board advising intensity

Figure 3 visually displays the main findings of this paper. When firms are sorted into quartiles according to the social capital of the county in which they reside, we find that the values for all three board intensity measures increase with community social capital. Specifically, the average value of *Advisory_Committee* (*N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio)* is 0.362 (0.281 and 6.606) for firms in the bottom *SC_Index* quartile (Q1). This value, however, increases to 0.455 (0.364 and 9.470) for firms in the highest *SC_Index* quartile (Q4), implying that firms set up more advisory committees and allocate more directors to specialise in advising when the social capital surrounding their headquarters is high.[14]

[Insert Figure 3 Around Here]

Table 2 presents the multivariate baseline regression analysis on the effect of community social capital on the board advising intensity by estimating Eq. (1). Column (1) presents results from the probit model where the dependent variable is *Advisory_Committee*. As expected, the coefficient on *SC_Index* is positive (0.091) and highly significant ($p<0.000$), suggesting that firms residing in high-social-capital counties are more likely to set up committees that specialise in advising. Columns (2) and (3) present the OLS regression results when the dependent variable is *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisor_Director_Ratio*, respectively. The positive and significant coefficients on *SC_Index* present clear evidence that higher community social capital is related to more advisory committees within the board and more directors that specialise in advising. The effect of community social capital is also economically significant. For example, an interquartile increase in *SC_Index* leads to a 9.92% increase in the number of advisory committees and a 19.24% increase in the ratio of advisory directors from their mean.[15] Consistent with *H1*, our findings support the view that higher

[14] The increase from Q1 to Q4 for all three board advising intensity variables is statistically significant at the 1% level.

[15] The 25th (75th) percentile of social capital is -1.119 (-0.064). For *N_Advisory_Committee* in Column (2), an interquartile increase in social capital leads to a 0.033 (= (-0.064 – (-1.119)) × 0.031) increase in the logarithm of

levels of community social capital result in a more advising-intensive board. Our results also support the theoretical prediction from Adams and Ferreira (2007), which posits that the board should focus on advising when external governance mechanisms discipline the managers.

[Insert Table 2 Around Here]

The mediating effect of board advising intensity

Since community social capital results in a more advising-intensive internal board structure, we perform a mediation analysis to test whether increased advising intensity can reduce investment inefficiency.

Results from the mediation analysis are presented in Table 3. Panel A presents the results from the structural equations. Specifically, Columns (1), (3) and (5) examine Path A by estimating Eq. (3) and show that community social capital is positively related to board advising intensity, consistent with our main findings. Columns (2), (4) and (6) examine Paths B and C by estimating Eq. (4) and show that both community social capital and board advising intensity are negatively related to investment inefficiency (*Inefficiency*). These results suggest that, after taking into account the direct effect of community social capital on investment inefficiency, community social capital can also indirectly reduce investment inefficiency through its effect on increasing board advising intensity. Panel B presents and tests the significance of the indirect effect using Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach and shows the mediating effect that operates through *Advisory_Committee* (*N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*) is -0.034 (-0.043 and -0.048), accounting for 5.52% (7.08%, and 7.88%) of the total effect of *SC_Index* on *Inefficiency*. The z-statistics suggest that these

the number of advisory committees. Given that the mean value of number of advisory committees without logarithm is 0.504, an interquartile increase in social capital increases the number of advisory committees to 0.554 (=exp(ln(1+0.504)+0.033)-1), representing a 9.92% increase from its mean. For *Advisor_Director_Ratio* in Column (3), an interquartile increase in social capital leads to a 1.522 (= (-0.064 – (-1.119)) × 1.441) increase in the ratio of advisory director. With a mean value of 7.907 of *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, the 1.522 increase represents a 19.24% (=1.522/7.907) increase from its mean.

indirect effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are also illustrated in Figure 4. Overall, the mediation analysis supports *H2* and confirms that the increased board advising intensity, driven by community social capital, leads to reduced investment inefficiency.

[Insert Table 3 Around Here]

[Insert Figure 4 Around Here]

The effect of community social capital on board monitoring needs

We develop our hypothesis based on the 'friendly board theory' (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) and the premise that community social capital reduces board monitoring needs, allowing firms in high-social-capital areas to assemble an advising-intensive board. In this section, we strengthen this argument by confirming the negative effect of community social capital on board monitoring needs.

The disciplining effect of community social capital on managers' opportunistic behaviours is extensively documented in the literature (Gupta et al., 2018, Hoi et al., 2019, Jha, 2019). Notwithstanding the prior evidence, we corroborate the notion that community social capital reduces agency issues by examining its effect on discretionary accruals, CEO compensation and costs of equity in Internet Appendix IB.2. Consistent with prior studies, we find evidence suggesting community social capital reduces agency issues. Since monitoring the management to alleviate agency issues is one of the two primary responsibilities of the board of directors (Adams et al., 2010), less severe agency issues suggest lower board monitoring need (Randøy and Jenssen, 2004).

Next, we directly test our premise by examining the effect of community social capital on board monitoring intensity and director meeting attendance. We follow Faleye et al. (2011) to proxy for board monitoring intensity and test the effect of community social capital on board monitoring intensity in Panel A of Table 4. The coefficients of *SC_Index* are negative and

statistically significant for *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* (-0.025, p<0.000) and *Monitoring_Intensive_Board* (-0.088, p<0.000), suggesting that firms in high-social-capital counties appoint fewer monitoring directors and are less likely to assemble a monitoring-intensive board. Panel B shows the effect of community social capital on director meeting attendance, a proxy for directors' efforts (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). A director is considered to have an attendance problem if he/she attends less than 75% of board meetings in the year. The coefficient on *SC_Index* is positive and statistically significant for *Monitor_Attendance_Problem* (0.115, p<0.000) and *Monitor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio* (0.186, p<0.000) in Columns (1) and (2), but is negative, albeit statistically insignificant, for *Advisor_Attendance_Problem* (-0.000) and *Advisor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio* (-0.032) in Columns (3) and (4), suggesting that higher levels of social capital cause more monitoring directors to miss board meetings, but this is not the case for advisory directors.[16] Thus, the reduced efforts from the monitoring directors suggest that the directors perceive that the firm's need for board monitoring are low when their firms are headquartered in high-social-capital counties.[17]

[Insert Table 4 Around Here]

Taken together, the results from this section conform with previous literature by showing that higher levels of community social capital reduce the agency issue (Gupta et al., 2018, Hoi et al., 2019), and that the need for board monitoring is low (Randøy and Jenssen, 2004). The reduced board monitoring need for firms in high-social-capital counties reduces

[16] Director meeting attendance data are obtained from ISS. Unfortunately, ISS does not provide director board assignments other than the audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees, which makes it extremely difficult to accurately identify advisory directors from ISS data. Following Faleye et al. (2011) and Zalata et al. (2019), we assume that independent directors that are not classified as monitoring directors are advisory directors in this test only. We then examine board attendance using the director-year data from ISS. The results reported in Internet Appendix IB.3 also confirm that monitoring directors from firms in high-social-capital counties are more likely to miss board meetings, but advisory directors are not.

[17] Our results do not necessarily suggest that monitoring directors violate professional guidance, which requires them to monitor the management closely. Instead, it indicates that the extent of monitoring depends on the social capital surrounding their firms' headquarters.

monitoring intensity and suggests our findings are due to the board shifting its focus from monitoring to advising.

Cross-sectional analysis

In this section, we conduct several moderating tests on the interplay between community social capital and board advising intensity. If the positive effect of community social capital is more prominent when the firm operates in environments that are already subject to strict monitoring, then this provides further assurance that reduced board monitoring needs are the key to explaining our findings. In Table 5, we explore the interactive effect of external monitoring mechanisms imposed by financial analysts (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and market competition (Nickell et al., 1997) that make board monitoring less demanding (Randøy and Jenssen, 2004). We create *High_Coverage* to indicate firms with above-median analyst coverage in each industry each year and *High_Competition* for firms primarily operating in a competitive industry. We then interact *SC_Index* with the two dummy variables, respectively. The interaction term coefficients (*SC_Index*High_Coverage* and *SC_Index*High_Competition)* are positive and significant, suggesting a more prominent effect of community social capital on board advising intensity when strong external monitoring further reduces the firm's needs for board monitoring. Thus, results from Table 5 further confirm that the reduction in board monitoring needs is the key factor facilitating the positive relationship between community social capital and advising intensity.

[Insert Table 5 Around Here]

Path analysis

So far, our premise and results are consistent with the agency theory perspective on community social capital, which states that community social capital reduces board monitoring intensity through its effect on reducing board monitoring needs and intensity. In this path, board

monitoring is the mediator, and community social capital is perceived to have an indirect effect on board advising intensity through a reduction in board monitoring.

However, the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) proposes that the board changes its composition by responding to the external environment, as the board's capital can bring resources (e.g., advice and counsel, links to other organisations.) to minimize environmental dependence.[18] Given that trust and networks are the core components of community social capital, they may directly influence the board's capital regarding its advising capacity. For example, since the development of trust facilitates better information sharing that is essential for strategic advising (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009), managers in high-social-capital communities are influenced by the norms of trustworthiness and become more willing to share information with the board and more likely to trust and value external advice. In addition, the dense social network in high-social-capital communities may help to build the board's relational capital by increasing their social ties, which becomes a valuable resource for board advising. Therefore, in an environment where trust and networks are important, selecting directors that are trustworthy and can bring external resources will more effectively utilise directors' capital for board advising. As a result, shareholders may assemble a more advising-intensive board. Thus, the resource dependence perspective predicts a direct path from community social capital to board advising intensity.

To investigate the path through which community social capital affects board advising intensity, we adopt a mediating analysis and present the results in Table 6. We use *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* as the mediator.[19] The coefficients of *SC_Index* (the treatment) in Column (1) and *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* (the mediator) across Columns (2) to (4) are all

[18] It is worth noting that community social capital is different from the board's capital. Community social capital is the environmental factors arising from social norms and networks that influence an individual's behaviours (Rupasingha et al., 2006), while the board's capital refers to directors' human capital (i.e., experience and expertise) and relational capital (i.e., network of ties to external contingencies) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).

[19] Faleye et al. (2013) argue that *Advisory_Director_Ratio* and *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* capture distinct functions of the board and the two variables do not mirror each other.

significantly related to board advising intensity (the outcome), showing an indirect effect from community social capital to board advising intensity through board monitoring. Panel B of Table 6 tests the significance of the indirect effects with Sobel's (1982) statistics and finds that the indirect effects are all statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, Columns (2) to (4) in Panel A confirm that there is a direct effect from community social capital on all three measures of board advising intensity, as the coefficient on *SC_Index* is positive and significant when *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* is included in the regressions. Thus, firms in high-social-capital community can also increase board advising intensity independent of the monitoring intensity.

[Insert Table 6 Around Here]

Thus, the results support the agency theory perspective that community social capital indirectly affects board advising through its effects on mediating board monitoring, but also the resource dependence explanation that community social capital can directly affect board advising. The two effects are not mutually exclusive. This finding is consistent with Hillman and Dalziel (2003), who argue that integrating the two theories helps to explain findings in the research on boards of directors.[20] Despite the direct effect, we argue that the indirect effect is vital to board functioning and corporate governance reform. As Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Faleye et al. (2011) show that excessive board monitoring hurts firm value, it is crucial for the board to reduce its monitoring intensity and increase board advising when external monitoring mechanisms already discipline the managers.[21]

[20] Hillman et al. (2009) argue that, although the agency theory is the predominant theory used in board of directors studies (Dalton et al., 2007, Johnson et al., 1996), the resource dependence theory has an important construct on board studies that have often been dwarfed by applications of agency theory.

[21] In addition, we decompose *SC_Index* into *Cooperative_Norms* and *Social_Networks* and show that the trust captured by *Cooperative_Norms* can significantly reduce the agency issue, suggesting that trust can also influence board advising through the indirect channel. Furthermore, we additionally control for directors' network size and confirm that greater directors' relational capital does not drive our results. We also test whether risk aversion that is correlated with religion can explain our findings, as prior research recognises that religion can affect agency problems and the role of the board (Diaz, 2000, Miller, 2000). The results are discussed in Internet Appendix IB.4 to IB.6.

Endogeneity

Unlike monitoring committees that are required by regulation, firms have the discretion to set up advisory committees. As a result, the presence of advisory committees may be a function of observable and non-observable characteristics that correlate with community social capital. In addition, if the corporate headquarters location is self-selected and endogenously determined, community social capital could also be endogenous. We allay the potential endogeneity concerns in this section.

We first address the endogeneity concerns with an IV approach using the firm's distance to the US – Canadian border (*Border_Distance*) as the instrument for community social capital, because Putnam (2001) claims that areas closer to the border have higher social capital. The first-stage result, presented in column (1) of Table 7, confirms a negative relationship between *Border_Distance* and *SC_Index*.[22] The fitted value of community social capital (*Fitted_SC_Index*) is predicted, and its coefficient is positive and significant in the second-stage regressions in Columns (2) to (4).[23]

[Insert Table 7 Around Here]

Next, we control for the observable differences in firm attributes for firms that reside in high- and low-social-capital counties by employing a PSM technique as in Hoi et al. (2019). We sort counties with *SC_Index* in the top (bottom) quartile into the high-social-capital (low-social-capital) group. *High_Social_Capital* is a dummy variable set to one for firms in high-social-capital counties and zero for firms in low-social-capital counties. A propensity score is computed based on all firm-level controls in Eq.(1). We then match, without replacement, each firm located in high-social-capital counties with a unique firm residing in low-social-capital

[22] We have three second-stage regressions, and therefore, three corresponding first-stage regressions. The first-stage regression results are very similar. For brevity, Column (1) of Table 7 only reports the corresponding first-stage results for Column (2).

[23] In addition, we follow Hasan et al. (2017b) by adding *Racial_Diversity* as an additional instrument for *SC_Index* in Internet Appendix IB.7. We continue to find that the fitted value of community social capital results in a more advisory-intensive board.

counties using the closest propensity score within the 1% caliper. The regression results based on the matched samples in Panel A of Table 8 show that firms in high-social-capital counties are more advising-intensive, confirming our baseline results. The balance tests of the matching variables in Panel B reveal no significant difference in any variables across the two groups, suggesting a good match of the PSM sample.[24]

[Insert Table 8 Around Here]

We further address the endogeneity concern with a DiD analysis on firms that relocate headquarters to a different county.[25] Following Hasan et al. (2017b), we define a social-capital-changing relocation as a firm that moved its headquarters to another county, each with at least two years of available data before and after the relocation.[26] We create a dummy variable, *Increase_Relocation,* that equals one for firms relocated to counties with higher levels of social capital, and zero for firms relocated to counties with lower levels of social capital. *Post_Relocation* is a variable indicating years after relocation. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term (*Increase_Relocation*Post_Relocation*) across Panel A of Table 9 indicate that firms that relocated to counties with higher levels of social capital increased their board advising intensity. These results give us more confidence in inferring the causal relationship of our findings. Panel B shows that differences in board advising intensity and firm characteristics are insignificant for firms in the two groups in the year prior to the headquarters relocation, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption of DiD analysis is likely to be met in our analysis.[27]

[24] In unreported tables, we find that the results remain robust when using sample median or tertile as the benchmark to define *High_Social_Capital,* lifting the no replacement restriction or including county-level variables in the matching process.

[25] The DiD analysis can also address the concern that our results only capture the cross-sectional variations in community social capital due to the lack of mobility of firm headquarters' locations.

[26] We removed firms with multiple relocations to avoid the confounding effect. We identified 145 relocation events that meet our requirements, of which 65 firms moved to counties with higher social capital and 80 firms relocated to counties with lower social capital. These relocations yielded 1,496 firm-year observations, of which 611 are from the pre-relocation period and 885 are from the post-relocation period.

[27] We also obtain qualitatively similar results when addressing the endogeneity concerns with the generalised method of moments (GMM) models. Results are reported in Internet Appendix IB.8.

[Insert Table 9 Around Here]

Collectively, results from this sub-section attenuate the endogeneity concern of our study and confirm that high community social capital drives up board advising intensity.

Robustness

We address the concern that omitted variables drive our results in Table 10. In Panels A and B, respectively, we include the *State_GDP_per_Capita* and *Metro* in Eq. (1) to address the concern that state-level and metropolitan factors may plague our findings.[28] Following Hoi et al. (2019), we capture the influence of unknown omitted county-level factors by additionally controlling for the median value of our dependent variables in Panel C. Unknown firm-level variables are captured by the long-window change-on-change analysis in Panel D.[29] In Panel E, we address the related concern that board structure among firms located in the same county might be correlated by replacing the corresponding firm-level variables with county-median values.[30] The positive and significant coefficients on *SC_Index* (or *ΔSC_Index* in Panel D) across all panels confirm that our main findings are robust to unobserved state-, metropolitan-, county- and firm-level factors influencing internal board structure concerning advising intensity.

[Insert Table 10 Around Here]

We also show that our results are robust to 1) alternative proxies for community social capital and advisory directors; 2) Poisson and negative binomial models for the non-negative

[28] The related concern for controlling for the metropolitan setting is that firms headquartered in metropolitan areas enjoy agglomeration benefits such as lower communication and transportation costs and increased efficiency (Glaeser et al., 2010). It might be easier for firms to find suitable advisory directors.

[29] Since both the board structure and social capital of each county are relatively stable, the standard county fixed-effect or firm fixed-effect model is inappropriate and not applicable (Griffin et al., 2021). Zhou (2001) and Roberts and Whited (2013) point out that the firm fixed-effect model exacerbates measurement error problems and results in biased estimates with slow-moving variables. Previous studies in community social capital, including Hasan et al. (2017b), Hoi et al. (2019), and Gupta et al. (2018), do not use the standard firm fixed-effect model. Chen and Wu (2016) recognise the lack of variations when studying board committees and insignificant results from standard firm fixed-effect models. Similar to the standard firm fixed-effect model, the change-to-change analysis removes time-invariant unobserved firm-level variables.

[30] As in Hoi et al. (2019), industry dummies are dropped from this test because average industry dummies in a county are meaningless.

integer dependent variable; 3) extracted principal factors as the independent variables; and 4) separated cooperative norms and social networks components of community social capital. These results are reported and discussed in Internet Appendix IB.9 to IB.12, respectively.

Summary and conclusion

This study integrates two lines of research. The first one uncovers the role of community social capital in corporate settings and the second one explains the dynamics of board structure concerning committees. We find robust empirical evidence that firms headquartered in communities with higher levels of social capital are more likely to set up specialised advisory committees and appoint more advisory directors. The increased advising intensity of the board leads to improved investment efficiency.

We make several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the limited research that explores the dynamics of optimal internal board structure (Chen and Wu, 2016, Faleye et al., 2013) by investigating the impact of community social capital on advisory committees and directors. Building on the perspective that community social capital is a societal monitoring mechanism that alleviates the agency issue (Hoi et al., 2019), we show that social capital surrounding the firm's headquarters is a crucial factor influencing board internal structure regarding advising intensity. Our results refute the one-size-fits-all criterion that regulatory actions apply to board composition and conform with the notion that optimal board structure depends on the firm's operating environment (Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008).

Second, we elaborate on the emerging literature on the dual role of board functions and board effectiveness. We confirm that community social capital improves board monitoring effectiveness, as it reduces accounting manipulation and rent extraction. More importantly, we show that board advising intensity can mediate the relationship between community social capital and firm investment inefficiency, suggesting that increased board advising intensity, induced by community social capital, can improve board advisory effectiveness.

Third, we reveal the importance of investigating the heterogeneity of independent directors sitting on different board committees (Faleye et al., 2011, Zalata et al., 2019). By showing the important role of independent directors on advisory committees, we shed light on research proxying for board monitoring and advising from the internal structure of board committees, rather than adopting the 'inside-outside' approach that treats independent directors on the board as a homogenous element.

Fourth, our investigation advances the theoretical view of Adams and Ferreira (2007) by showing that community social capital is an important factor in optimising a friendly board. Specifically, we respond to the call from Adams and Ferreira (2007) to investigate circumstances in which external monitoring mechanisms substitute board monitoring for an advisory board to be optimal. We provide direct evidence showing that community social capital is an external monitoring mechanism that reduces board monitoring needs. We also confirm that an advising-intensive board for firms in high-social-capital areas is optimal as it can improve board advising effectiveness without impairing monitoring effectiveness.

Our findings have economic and policy implications regarding the optimal board structure. Shareholders face a trade-off when appointing directors to monitoring and advising duties as the increased focus on one responsibility is often at the cost of the other (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). Our findings suggest that firms can alleviate the competing tensions between board monitoring and advising when considering the social capital surrounding their headquarters. To corporate shareholders, we offer implications to help them maximise their values by allocating one of the scarcest corporate resources, directors' human capital, more effectively. The recent governance reform in the US (i.e. SOX), which emphasises the board's monitoring duties, can weaken its advising function and decrease shareholder value (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). To regulators, we provide valuable advice on how best to efficiently push governance reform that improves overall board effectiveness when board monitoring and

advising duties are considered. In addition, both the academic and popular press are debating whether social capital is declining in the US (Paxton, 1999, Putnam, 1995). To politicians, we highlight the important role of community social capital in the corporate world. As community social capital enhances corporate wealth creation and promotes economic development and democratic progress, politicians could consider developing social capital to benefit society as a whole.

We are conscious of the limitations of our study, which suggest potential avenues for future research. First, it is possible that a board may reduce the number of monitoring committees and directors if the community's social capital is high. Since the BoardEx data date back to 2000 and the SOX act, which limits the board's discretion in setting board committees, was enacted in 2002, we do not have sufficient data to examine the impact of community social capital on the presence of monitoring committees before SOX. We do, however, infer the impact of community social capital on board monitoring intensity by examining the allocation of monitoring directors and their board meeting attendance. Further research can employ hand-collected board composition data before 2000 to directly examine the impact of community social capital on the presence of monitoring committees.

Second, social capital is a broad concept as it is the aggregate effects of multiple entities that are difficult to disentangle (Coleman, 1988, Sobel, 2002). Although we have shown that the impact of social capital on board advising intensity is not driven by any core social capital entity (e.g., cooperative norms, dense network, and director network size), certain non-core social capital entities could potentially have an individual impact on board advising intensity. Future research would benefit from developing reliable measures of each social capital entity to investigate which elements of social capital may affect board advising differently.

Despite these limitations, our paper demonstrates a positive impact of community social capital on board advising intensity. Our findings not only add a new element to the list of

determinants of internal board structures but also contribute to an understanding of the board's trade-off between its monitoring and advising functions. Furthermore, we point to an important insight: that carefully designed board committees and director allocations are essential for board functioning.

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Appendix

Table A1 Variable Definition

Variable	Definition	Source
SC_Index	First principal component from the principal component analysis based on votes cast for presidential election (*Pvote*), census mail responses (*Pespn*), the aggregate number of 10 types of social organisations (*Assn*) and the number of not-for-profit organisations (*Nccs*) of a county.	Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD)
Advisory_Committee	Dummy variable coded to one if the firm sets up at least one advisory committee, and zero otherwise. Finance, investment, strategy, acquisitions, science and technology and executive committees are classified as advising committees. Overlapping committees that have both monitoring and advising functions are not considered advisory committees and are classified as monitoring committees.	BoardEx
N_Advisory_Committee	Natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one.	BoardEx
Advisory_Director_Ratio	Number of advisory directors to the total number of independent directors. An advisory director is an independent director sitting on finance, investment, strategy, acquisitions, science and technology, or executive committees, but not sitting on audit, compensation, nominating or governance committees.	BoardEx
Firm_Size	Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.	Compustat
Firm_Age	Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm has been recorded in COMPUSTAT plus one.	Compustat
Leverage	Long-term debt plus current liabilities, scaled by the book value of total assets.	Compustat
N_Segments	Number of business segments for the firm in a given year.	Compustat
Market-to-Book	Market value of equity to book value of equity.	Compustat
R&D	Maximum of research and development expenses and zero, scaled by the book value of total assets.	Compustat
Return_Volatility	Standard deviation of monthly stock return over the previous 12-month period.	CRSP
CEO_Tenure	Natural logarithm of CEO tenure in years plus one.	BoardEx
CEO_Ownership	Shares owned by the CEO to total shares outstanding.	ExecuComp
CEO_Duality	Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairperson, and zero otherwise.	BoardEx
Institutional_Ownership	Fraction of shares held by institutional investors.	Refinitiv Institutional (13f) Holdings
Blockholder_Ownership	Fraction of shares held by institutional investors who own more than 5% of the firm's shares.	Refinitiv Institutional (13f) Holdings
Board_Independence	Fraction of board directors classified as independent.	BoardEx

Local_Director_Pool	Natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-financial firms headquartered within 100 kilometres of the focal firm's headquarters.	Compustat
Per_Capita_Income	Natural logarithm of the income per capita of the county.	Bureau of Economic Analysis
Population_Growth (%)	Percentage of county population growth rate.	United States Census Bureau
Population_Density	Population per square mile of the county.	United States Census Bureau
Religiosity (%)	Percentage of residents in the county that adheres to organised religions.	Association of Religion Data Archives
Education (%)	Percentage of people who are 25-years-old or above in the county with a Bachelor's degree or higher.	United States Census Bureau
County_Median_Age	Natural logarithm of the population median age in the county.	United States Census Bureau
Inefficiency	Industry-adjusted investment inefficiency estimated from Richardson's (2006) model.	Compustat
Monitoring_Director_Ratio	Number of monitoring directors to the total number of independent directors. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees).	BoardEx
Monitoring_Intensive_Board	Dummy variable coded to one if the majority of independent directors are monitoring directors. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees).	BoardEx
Monitor_Attendance_Problem	Dummy variable that equals one if at least one of the monitoring directors of the firm attends less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, and zero otherwise. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees).	ISS
Monitor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio	Number of monitoring directors of the firm who attend less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, scaled by the total number of monitoring directors. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees).	ISS
Advisor_Attendance_Problem	Dummy variable that equals one if at least one of the advisory directors of the firm attends less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, and zero otherwise. An advisory director in this variable is defined as an independent director who is not a monitoring director. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees).	ISS
Advisor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio	Number of advisory directors of the firm who attend less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, scaled by the total number of advisory directors. An advisory director in this variable is defined as an independent director who is not a monitoring director. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees).	ISS
Ave_Director_Age	Natural logarithm of the average age of the board of directors.	ISS

Ave_Director_Tenure	Natural logarithm of the tenure of the board of directors plus one.	ISS
US_Director_Ratio	The ratio of US directors to the total number of board directors.	ISS
Female_Director_Ratio	The ratio of female directors to the total number of board directors.	BoardEx
Board_Size	Natural logarithm of the number of board directors.	BoardEx
Ave_N_Outside_Directorships	Average number of directorships the board of directors hold outside the focal firm.	ISS
ROA	Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, scaled by total assets.	Compustat
High_Coverage	Dummy variable that equals one if the number of analysts covering the firm is above the median in each industry each year, and zero otherwise.	I/B/E/S
High_Competition	Dummy variable that equals one if the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is below the sample median, and zero otherwise.	Compustat
Low_Education	Dummy variable that equals one if the county's *Education* is below the sample median, and zero otherwise.	United States Census Bureau
High_Religiosity	Dummy variable that equals one if the county's *Religiosity* is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.	Association of Religion Data Archives
Border_Distance	Natural logarithm of the shortest distance between the firm's headquarters county and the US - Canadian border.	EDGAR
High_Social_Capital	Dummy variable that equals one for firms residing in counties in the top quartile of social capital, and zero for firms residing in counties in the bottom quartile of social capital.	Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD)
Increase_Relocation	Dummy variable that equals one if the firm relocates to a county with higher social capital, and zero if the firm relocates to a county with lower or equal social capital.	EDGAR
Post_Relocation	Dummy variable that equals one in the year of headquarters relocation and afterwards, and zero for the years preceding the headquarters relocation.	EDGAR
State_GDP_per_Capita	Natural logarithm of per capita GDP of the state.	Bureau of Economic Analysis
Metro	Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located within a 250-kilometre radius of a metropolitan area with more than one million population in the 2010 census.	United States Census Bureau

Figures



Figure 1. Mediation Analysis. This figure depicts the intuition behind the mediation analysis. Path ABC represents the total effect of the treatment (Community Social Capital) on the outcome (Investment Inefficiency). Path A corresponds to the effect of the treatment on the mediator (board advising intensity) and Path B demonstrates the effect of the mediator on the outcome. Paths A and B comprise the indirect effect of community social capital on investment inefficiency, while Path C shows the direct effect of community social capital on investment inefficiency.



Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Community Social Capital. This figure depicts the average county-level community social capital index of 1997, 2005, 2009 and 2014 for contiguous US geographical areas. A darker shade reflects a higher level of community social capital and a lighter shade represents a lower level of community social capital.

Panel A: Presence of an Advisory Committee



Panel B: The Number of Advisory Committees



Panel C: The Advisory Director Ratio



Figure 3. Board Advising Intensity. This figure depicts the mean value for *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee*, and *Advisory_Director_Ratio* based on *SC_Index* quartiles in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Q1 represents the bottom quartile, and Q4 represents the top quartile. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1.



Figure 4 Mediation Results. This figure presents the mediating effect of board advising intensity on the relationship between community social capital (*SC_Index*) and firm investment inefficiency (*Inefficiency*). Panels A, B and C show the mediating effect that operates through *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively.

Tables

Table 1. Summary Statistics

This table presents the number of observations (N), the mean (Mean), the standard deviation (Std), the 25th percentile (P25), the median (Median) and the 75th percentile (P75) for the main variables used in this study. The sample consists of 12,174 firm-year observations for the period between 2000 and 2018. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers.

Variable	N	Mean	Std	P25	Median	P75
SC_Index	12,174	-0.575	0.749	-1.119	-0.509	-0.064
Advisory_Committee	12,174	0.405	0.491	0.000	0.000	1.000
N_Advisory_Committee	12,174	0.320	0.405	0.000	0.000	0.693
Advisory_Director_Ratio	12,174	7.907	11.234	0.000	0.000	15.789
Firm_Size	12,174	7.485	1.489	6.440	7.353	8.430
Firm_Age	12,174	24.882	15.772	12.000	20.000	37.000
Leverage	12,174	0.518	0.321	0.314	0.479	0.653
N_Segments	12,174	2.500	1.632	1.000	2.000	4.000
Market-to-Book	12,174	3.354	5.165	2.127	3.382	5.471
R&D	12,174	0.052	0.092	0.000	0.010	0.072
Return_Volatility	12,174	0.108	0.060	0.069	0.094	0.131
CEO_Tenure	12,174	7.423	7.187	2.000	5.000	10.000
CEO_Ownership	12,174	0.020	0.049	0.001	0.004	0.013
CEO_Duality	12,174	0.508	0.500	0.000	1.000	1.000
Institutional_Ownership	12,174	0.693	0.303	0.624	0.805	0.901
Blockholder_Ownership	12,174	0.262	0.135	0.160	0.250	0.347
Board_Independence	12,174	0.777	0.126	0.714	0.800	0.875
Local_Director_Pool	12,174	4.785	1.227	3.951	5.124	5.687
Per_Capita_Income	12,174	10.845	0.324	10.622	10.810	11.021
Population_Growth (%)	12,174	0.941	1.012	0.232	0.802	1.461
Population_Density	12,174	7.210	1.082	6.626	7.236	7.664
Religiosity (%)	12,174	57.218	11.892	46.692	57.704	65.205
Education (%)	12,174	34.461	10.388	27.164	32.300	43.472
County_Median_Age	12,174	36.809	2.896	34.800	36.600	38.600

Table 2. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Advising Intensity

This table presents the regression analysis for the effect of community social capital on board advising intensity. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Column (1) uses the probit model, and Columns (2) and (3) are OLS models. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.091***	0.031***	1.441***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.202)
Firm_Size	0.121***	0.048***	0.952***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.083)
Firm_Age	0.464***	0.128***	3.329***
	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.180)
Leverage	0.157***	0.035***	1.282***
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.303)
N_Segments	0.082***	0.018***	0.310*
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.175)
Market-to-Book	-0.002	-0.000	0.008
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.010)
R&D	-0.023	-0.037	0.796
	(0.185)	(0.041)	(1.318)
Return_Volatility	-0.255	-0.097	-1.161
	(0.266)	(0.066)	(1.946)
CEO_Tenure	0.015	0.001	0.040
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.114)
CEO_Ownership	-0.018***	-0.003***	-0.164***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.018)
CEO_Duality	0.049*	0.019***	0.717***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.197)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.083**	-0.029***	-0.489
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.318)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.385***	-0.125***	-2.237***
	(0.106)	(0.026)	(0.775)
Board_Independence	0.750***	0.212***	6.042***
	(0.122)	(0.032)	(0.915)
Local_Director_Pool	0.089***	0.028***	0.876***
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.134)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.202**	-0.085***	-1.337**
	(0.083)	(0.022)	(0.624)
Population_Growth	0.046***	0.011**	0.315**
	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.130)
Population_Density	0.058***	0.014***	0.250*
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.129)
Religiosity	0.001	0.000	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Education	-0.013***	-0.002***	-0.065***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.019)
County_Median_Age	0.755***	0.227***	3.852**
	(0.238)	(0.065)	(1.797)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.187***	-0.714***	-17.600**
	(1.029)	(0.277)	(8.016)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.138	0.199	0.166

Table 3: Mediating Effect of Board Advising Intensity on Investment Inefficiency

This table presents results for the mediating effect of board advising intensity on the relationship between community social capital and firm investment inefficiency. Panel A presents results from the structural equations. Columns (1), (3) and (5) estimate Eq. (3) when the dependent variable is *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. Columns (2), (4) and (6) estimate Eq. (4) when the mediator is *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Inefficiency* is the industry-adjusted investment inefficiency estimated from Richardson's (2006) model. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Panel B presents the total, direct, and indirect effect. The indirect effect is tested with Sobel (1982) z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Results from the Structural Equations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*Inefficiency*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Inefficiency*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*	*Inefficiency*
SC_Index	0.033***	-0.580***	0.031***	-0.571***	1.182***	-0.566***
	(0.007)	(0.154)	(0.005)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.154)
Advisory_Committee		-1.020***				
		(0.202)				
N_Advisory_Committee				-1.406***		
				(0.255)		
Advisory_Director_Ratio						-0.041***
						(0.009)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174

Panel B: Mediating Effects

Indirect effect - *SC_Index* × *Advising_Intensity*	-0.034***	-0.043***	-0.048***
Sobel z-statistics for the indirect effect	-3.48	-3.94	-3.95
Direct effect	-0.580	-0.571	-0.566
Total effect	-0.614	-0.614	-0.614

Table 4. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Monitoring Needs

This table presents the regression analysis for the effect of community social capital on board monitoring needs. Panel A presents the results for board monitoring intensity. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* and *Monitoring_Intensive_Board*, respectively. *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* is the number of monitoring directors to the total number of independent directors. *Monitoring_Intensive_Board* is a dummy variable that equals one if the majority of independent directors are monitoring directors. Column (1) uses OLS models, and Column (2) uses the probit model. Panel B presents the results for director meeting attendance. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (4) are *Monitor_Attendance_Problem*, *Monitor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio*, *Advisor_Attendance_Problem* and *Advisor_Attendance_Problem _Ratio*, respectively. *Monitor_Attendance_Problem* is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one of the monitoring directors of the firm attends less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, and zero otherwise. *Monitor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio* is the ratio of the number of monitoring directors of the firm that attend less than 75% of the board meeting during a year to the total number of monitoring directors. A monitoring director is an independent director sitting on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees). *Advisor_Attendance_Problem* is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one of the advisory directors of the firm attends less than 75% of the board meeting during a year, and zero otherwise. *Advisor_Attendance_Problem_Ratio* is the ratio of the number of advisory directors of the firm that attend less than 75% of the board meeting during a year to the total number of advisory directors. Columns (1) and (3) use the probit models and Columns (2) and (4) use OLS models. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Monitoring Intensity

	(1)	(2)
Dep. Var.	*Monitoring_Director_Ratio*	*Monitoring_Intensive_Board*
SC_Index	-0.025***	-0.088***
	(0.005)	(0.025)
Firm_Size	-0.047***	-0.217***
	(0.002)	(0.012)
Firm_Age	0.003	0.056***
	(0.004)	(0.021)
Leverage	-0.015*	-0.018
	(0.008)	(0.040)
N_Segments	-0.002	0.010
	(0.004)	(0.022)
Market-to-Book	-0.001**	-0.003**
	(0.000)	(0.001)
R&D	-0.148***	-0.801***
	(0.029)	(0.166)
Return_Volatility	-0.007	0.046
	(0.045)	(0.243)
CEO_Tenure	-0.003	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.014)
CEO_Ownership	0.000	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.003)
CEO_Duality	0.013**	0.028
	(0.005)	(0.028)
Institutional_Ownership	0.004	-0.050
	(0.008)	(0.042)
Blockholder_Ownership	0.006	0.096
	(0.018)	(0.099)
Board_Independence	-0.394***	-1.623***
	(0.023)	(0.120)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.011***	-0.059***
	(0.003)	(0.016)
Per_Capita_Income	0.018	0.100
	(0.015)	(0.078)
Population_Growth	0.008***	0.021
	(0.003)	(0.017)
Population_Density	0.002	0.024
	(0.003)	(0.016)

Table 4 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)
Dep. Var.	*Monitoring_Director_Ratio*	*Monitoring_Intensive_Board*
Religiosity	0.000**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Education	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.002)
County_Median_Age	0.075*	0.533**
	(0.042)	(0.221)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.694***	-0.126
	(0.186)	(1.009)
Observations	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.152	0.089

Panel B. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Director Meeting Attendance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*Monitor_Attendance _Problem*	*Monitor_Attendance _Problem_Ratio*	*Advisor_Attendance _Problem*	*Advisor_Attendance _Problem_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.115***	0.186***	-0.000	-0.032
	(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Ave_Director_Age	-0.843*	-1.633**	-1.039	-1.481*
	(0.469)	(0.820)	(0.676)	(0.867)
Ave_Director_Tenure	0.002	0.025	0.092	0.085
	(0.075)	(0.129)	(0.104)	(0.116)
US_Director_Ratio	0.008	0.015	-0.206	-0.288
	(0.144)	(0.182)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Female_Director_Ratio	-0.239	-0.702*	0.104	-0.032
	(0.302)	(0.395)	(0.457)	(0.465)
Board_Size	0.004**	0.010	0.003**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ave_N_Outside_ Directorships	0.115**	0.186**	0.082	0.095
	(0.051)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.089)
Institutional_Ownership	0.086	0.106	0.071	0.039
	(0.079)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.118)
Blockholder_Ownership	0.155	0.295	0.075	0.063
	(0.197)	(0.339)	(0.293)	(0.345)
Board_Independence	-0.124	-0.771	-1.908***	-1.790***
	(0.239)	(0.488)	(0.319)	(0.432)
ROA	0.154	0.006	-1.074***	-0.851**
	(0.258)	(0.439)	(0.389)	(0.377)
Firm_Size	0.061***	0.059*	0.090***	0.065**
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Firm_Age	-0.038	-0.109	-0.215***	-0.194***
	(0.047)	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.069)
Market-to-Book	-0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
R&D	0.507	0.665	-1.310*	-1.322**
	(0.352)	(0.688)	(0.727)	(0.557)
Return_Volatility	0.815*	2.155**	-0.605	-0.057
	(0.480)	(0.997)	(0.743)	(0.854)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.073	0.107	-0.355	-0.413
	(0.177)	(0.279)	(0.255)	(0.286)
Population_Growth	3.553	3.193	-6.390	-8.831**
	(3.093)	(5.606)	(4.316)	(4.297)
Population_Density	0.010	-0.037	0.014	0.010
	(0.033)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Religiosity	-0.000	0.052	0.298	0.320
	(0.207)	(0.375)	(0.311)	(0.341)
Education	0.005	0.007	0.019***	0.023***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)

Table 4 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*Monitor_Attendance _Problem*	*Monitor_Attendance _Problem_Ratio*	*Advisor_Attendance _Problem*	*Advisor_Attendance _Problem_Ratio*
County_Median_Age	-0.106	-0.696	0.124	-0.064
	(0.433)	(0.665)	(0.650)	(0.691)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.679	9.924**	5.811	12.082***
	(2.468)	(4.131)	(3.879)	(4.370)
Observations	9,137	9,137	9,137	9,137
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.063	0.030	0.120	0.018

Table 5. Cross-Sectional Analysis

This table presents the cross-sectional variations of the effect of community social capital on board advising intensity. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (4) is *Advisory_Committee*, in Columns (2) and (5) it is *N_Advisory_Committee* and in Columns (3) and (6) it is *Advisory_Director_Ratio*. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Columns (1) and (4) use the probit models and Columns (2), (3), (4) and (6) use OLS models. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. *High_Coverage* is a dummy variable that equals one if the number of analysts covering the firm is above the median in each industry each year, and zero otherwise. *High_Competition* is a dummy variable that equals one if the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2, the year and 2-digit SIC dummies. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.068**	0.020***	1.178***	0.047*	0.020**	1.108***
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.205)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.218)
*SC_Index*High_Coverage*	0.082**	0.039***	0.907***			
	(0.036)	(0.009)	(0.283)			
*SC_Index*High_Competition*				0.178***	0.048***	1.337***
				(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.278)
High_Coverage	-0.029	-0.002	-0.000			
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.346)			
High_Competition				0.051	0.013	0.646*
				(0.047)	(0.013)	(0.352)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.209***	-0.713***	-17.542**	-4.354***	-0.769***	-19.048**
	(1.030)	(0.275)	(7.961)	(1.041)	(0.275)	(7.959)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.138	0.201	0.167	0.139	0.201	0.167

Table 6. Path Analysis

This table presents results from the mediating analysis to test the path through which community social capital affects board advising intensity. In this analysis, community social capital (*SC_Index*) is the treatment, board advising intensity (*Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*) is the outcome, and board monitoring intensity (*Monitoring_Director_Ratio*) is the mediator. Panel A presents results from the structural equations. The dependent variable in Column (1) is *Monitoring_Director_Ratio*, and the dependent variable in Columns (2) to (4) is *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Monitoring_Director_Ratio* is the number of monitoring directors to the total number of independent directors. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialized advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Panel B presents the total, direct, and indirect effects. The indirect effect is tested with Sobel's (1982) z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Results from the Structural Equations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*Monitoring_Director_Ratio*	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	-0.018***	0.028***	0.026***	0.994***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.154)
Monitoring_Director_Ratio		-0.307***	-0.250***	-10.201***
		(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.371)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174

Panel B: Mediating Effects

Indirect effect - *SC_Index* × *Monitoring_Intensive_Ratio*	-	0.006***	0.005***	0.184***
Sobel z-statistics for indirect effect	-	4.733	4.740	4.815
Direct effect	-	0.028	0.026	0.994
Total effect	-	0.034	0.031	1.178

Table 7. Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Square Analysis

This table presents the regression analysis of the instrumental variable approach. Column (1) presents estimates from the first-stage analysis, where the dependent variable is *SC_Index*. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. The instrument for *SC_Index* is *Border_Distance*, measured as the natural logarithm of the shortest distance between the firm's headquarters county and US - Canadian border. Columns (2) through (4) present the second-stage analysis. The dependent variables in Columns (2) through (4) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	First-Stage	Second-Stage		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*SC_Index*	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
Fitted_SC_Index		0.202***	0.073***	2.724***
		(0.077)	(0.021)	(0.602)
Border_Distance	-0.194***			
	(0.005)			
Firm_Size	-0.037***	0.125***	0.049***	0.996***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.085)
Firm_Age	0.068***	0.454***	0.125***	3.237***
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.173)
Leverage	0.073***	0.147***	0.031***	1.164***
	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.324)
N_Segments	0.004	0.080***	0.017***	0.289*
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.162)
Market-to-Book	0.001*	-0.002	-0.000	0.008
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.011)
R&D	-0.227***	0.009	-0.025	1.183
	(0.057)	(0.175)	(0.044)	(1.291)
Return_Volatility	-0.482***	-0.209	-0.078	-0.583
	(0.084)	(0.253)	(0.066)	(1.908)
CEO_Tenure	-0.025***	0.018	0.002	0.073
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.113)
CEO_Ownership	0.000	-0.018***	-0.003***	-0.166***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.021)
CEO_Duality	0.041***	0.044	0.018**	0.661***
	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.209)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.028**	-0.081*	-0.029***	-0.468
	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.319)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.240***	-0.359***	-0.116***	-1.943**
	(0.034)	(0.102)	(0.026)	(0.771)
Board_Independence	0.240***	0.719***	0.201***	5.706***
	(0.039)	(0.120)	(0.031)	(0.905)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.331***	0.129***	0.043***	1.338***
	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.241)
Per_Capita_Income	0.527***	-0.239***	-0.099***	-1.780**
	(0.030)	(0.092)	(0.024)	(0.691)
Population_Growth	-0.100***	0.063***	0.017***	0.508***
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.151)
Population_Density	0.043***	0.050***	0.011**	0.159
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.137)
Religiosity	0.006***	0.000	0.000	-0.017*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Education	0.029***	-0.017***	-0.003***	-0.109***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.027)
County_Median_Age	1.494***	0.501*	0.134*	0.956
	(0.079)	(0.287)	(0.076)	(2.199)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-10.381***	-2.767**	-0.133	-1.121
	(0.341)	(1.399)	(0.395)	(11.484)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.630	-	0.197	0.163

Table 8. Propensity Score Matching Analysis

This table presents the results from a propensity score matching analysis. Each firm located in high-social-capital counties is matched with a unique firm that resides in a low-social-capital county based on *Firm_Size*, *Firm_Age*, *Leverage*, *N_Segments*, *Market-to-Book*, *R&D*, *Return_Volatility*, *CEO_Tenure*, *CEO_Ownership*, *CEO_Duality*, Industry and Year. The matching does not allow replacement and the propensity score has a caliper of 1%. Panel A presents the regression analysis using the matched sample. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Column (1) uses the probit model, and Columns (2) and (3) use OLS models. *High_Social_Capital* is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that reside in counties in the top quartile of social capital, and zero for firms that reside in counties in the bottom quartile of social capital. Panel B presents the balance tests between the two groups. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Regression Analysis of the PSM Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
High_Social_Capital	0.189**	0.067***	1.914***
	(0.077)	(0.021)	(0.597)
Firm_Size	0.175***	0.055***	1.098***
	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.167)
Firm_Age	0.367***	0.100***	2.856***
	(0.044)	(0.011)	(0.316)
Leverage	0.366***	0.086***	1.919***
	(0.085)	(0.024)	(0.623)
N_Segments	-0.001	0.001	-0.207
	(0.041)	(0.011)	(0.310)
Market-to-Book	-0.002	-0.000	0.019
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.023)
R&D	0.832**	0.192**	4.273*
	(0.335)	(0.085)	(2.537)
Return_Volatility	-0.634	-0.169	-3.244
	(0.486)	(0.122)	(3.550)
CEO_Tenure	0.041	0.008	-0.052
	(0.029)	(0.007)	(0.202)
CEO_Ownership	-0.012**	-0.001	-0.101***
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.029)
CEO_Duality	0.039	0.010	0.102
	(0.054)	(0.013)	(0.385)
Institutional_Ownership	0.001	-0.007	-0.319
	(0.077)	(0.020)	(0.544)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.540***	-0.130***	-3.562**
	(0.189)	(0.047)	(1.422)
Board_Independence	0.957***	0.302***	10.540***
	(0.229)	(0.057)	(1.651)
Local_Director_Pool	0.080**	0.028***	0.586**
	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.251)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.747***	-0.197***	-4.736***
	(0.185)	(0.048)	(1.277)
Population_Growth	0.081***	0.019**	0.551**
	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.228)
Population_Density	0.150***	0.032***	0.963***
	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.262)
Religiosity	-0.007***	-0.001**	-0.032*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.018)
Education	-0.010**	-0.002*	-0.034
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.032)
County_Median_Age	1.670***	0.388***	11.901***
	(0.477)	(0.126)	(3.452)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.804	-0.327	-20.259
	(1.990)	(0.495)	(14.667)
Observations	3,444	3,444	3,444
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.165	0.206	0.180

Table 8 (continued)

Panel B: Balance Test

	High Social Capital	Low Social Capital	P-value
Firm_Size	7.338	7.378	0.404
Firm_Age	3.000	2.992	0.724
Leverage	0.526	0.519	0.573
N_Segments	0.656	0.661	0.847
Market-to-Book	4.716	4.649	0.824
R&D	0.050	0.046	0.176
Return_Volatility	0.112	0.111	0.704
CEO_Tenure	1.711	1.693	0.571
CEO_Ownership	1.990	1.956	0.832
CEO_Duality	0.505	0.516	0.540
Institutional_Ownership	0.677	0.684	0.477
Blockholder_Ownership	0.261	0.263	0.595
Board_Independence	0.767	0.770	0.540

Table 9. Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Firm Headquarters Relocation

This table presents the results from the difference-in-difference analysis on 145 firms with headquarters relocations, of which 65 firms move to counties with higher social capital and 80 firms relocate to counties with lower social capital. Panel A presents the regression analysis using the sample with headquarters relocations. The dependent variable in Columns (1) through (3) is *Advisory_Committee, N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *Increase_Relocation* is a dummy variable that equals one for firms moving to counties with higher social capital, and zero for firms that move to counties with lower social capital. *Post_Relocation* is a dummy variable that equals one for years after headquarters relocation. Panel B tests firm characteristics prior to the headquarter relocations for firms that experienced social-capital-increasing relocation and firms that experienced social-capital-decreasing relocation. Column (1) uses the probit model and Columns (2) and (3) use OLS models. All columns include the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Regression Analysis of the DID Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
*Increase_Relocation*Post_Relocation*	0.462***	0.095***	3.421***
	(0.127)	(0.031)	(0.879)
Increase_Relocation	0.281**	0.070**	2.083***
	(0.128)	(0.029)	(0.777)
Firm_Size	0.166***	0.039***	1.015***
	(0.040)	(0.009)	(0.267)
Firm_Age	0.592***	0.113***	2.857***
	(0.089)	(0.019)	(0.487)
Leverage	0.319**	0.062	1.243
	(0.147)	(0.039)	(0.944)
N_Segments	0.300***	0.070***	0.866*
	(0.082)	(0.018)	(0.485)
Market-to-Book	-0.001	0.001	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.042)
R&D	1.247**	0.042	0.439
	(0.505)	(0.114)	(3.512)
Return_Volatility	0.156	0.119	4.203
	(0.798)	(0.179)	(5.092)
CEO_Tenure	-0.004	-0.002	-0.481
	(0.054)	(0.012)	(0.358)
CEO_Ownership	-0.024**	-0.003	-0.080
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.052)
CEO_Duality	0.122	0.017	1.452**
	(0.087)	(0.020)	(0.579)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.110	-0.013	-1.096
	(0.143)	(0.032)	(0.910)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.635*	-0.068	-2.062
	(0.343)	(0.074)	(2.101)
Board_Independence	-0.454	-0.066	-2.078
	(0.389)	(0.085)	(2.227)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.272***	-0.038***	-1.406***
	(0.050)	(0.012)	(0.336)
Per_Capita_Income	0.255	-0.008	5.956***
	(0.281)	(0.067)	(1.913)
Population_Growth	0.082*	0.016	0.228
	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.310)
Population_Density	0.226***	0.038***	0.591
	(0.053)	(0.013)	(0.395)
Religiosity	-0.008**	-0.001	-0.026
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.023)
Education	-0.022***	-0.003*	-0.098**
	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.050)
County_Median_Age	-0.138	0.059	-4.525
	(0.732)	(0.169)	(5.205)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.723	-0.465	-52.427**
	(3.114)	(0.727)	(22.218)
Observations	1,367	1,496	1,496
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.172	0.259	0.228

Table 9 (continued)

Panel B: Diagnostics of the Sample Firms

	Increase Relocation	Decrease Relocation	P-value
Advisory_Committee	0.391	0.358	0.740
N_Advisory_Committee	0.435	0.415	0.870
Advisory_Director_Ratio	7.297	6.842	0.837
Firm_Size	7.024	7.375	0.277
Firm_Age	0.639	0.913	0.041
Leverage	3.020	3.247	0.954
N_Segments	0.483	0.496	0.819
Market-to-Book	3.793	4.533	0.414
R&D	0.071	0.040	0.125
Return_Volatility	0.107	0.105	0.887
CEO_Tenure	1.547	1.493	0.772
CEO_Ownership	0.982	2.188	0.165
CEO_Duality	0.348	0.434	0.387
Institutional_Ownership	0.814	0.790	0.539
Blockholder_Ownership	0.264	0.248	0.561
Board_Independence	0.809	0.807	0.919

Table 10. Omitted Variables

This table presents the regression results controlling for the omitted state-, metropolitan-, county-, and firm-level factors. Panel A adds *State_GDP_per_Capita* to proxy for omitted state-level variables. Panel B adds a dummy variable, *Metro*, that equals one if the firm is located within a 250-kilometre radius of a metropolitan area with a population of more than one million in the 2010 census to control for the effect of metropolitan settings. Panel C uses the median value of dependent variables to capture the influence of unknown county-level factors. *Median_Advisory_Committee* (*Median_N_Advisory_Committee*, *Median_Advisory_Director_Ratio*) is the median value of *Advisory_Committee* (*N_Advisory_Committee*, *Advisory_Director_Ratio*) for other S&P 1,500 firms residing in the same county in a given year. Panel D presents the results of a long-window change-on-change analysis to remove time-invariant unobserved firm-level variables. The dependent variable is measured as the change from year *t* to *t+5*, while all independent variables are measured as the change from year *t-6* to *t-1*. Panel E replaces all firm-level variables with the corresponding median variables for firms located in the same county in a given year. Industry dummies are dropped in Panel E as it is not meaningful to use median industry dummies. Column (1) uses the probit model and Columns (2) and (3) use OLS models. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2, the year and 2-digit SIC dummies. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 from the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Omitted State-level Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.098***	0.033***	1.449***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.205)
State_GDP_per_Capita	-0.415***	-0.107***	-0.433
	(0.148)	(0.041)	(1.191)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.194	0.320	-13.420
	(1.751)	(0.482)	(14.133)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.138	0.200	0.166

Panel B: Omitted Metropolitan Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.048**	0.012***	0.610***
	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.150)
Metro	0.435***	0.081***	2.245***
	(0.073)	(0.017)	(0.494)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.855***	-0.849***	-21.349***
	(1.028)	(0.276)	(8.029)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.140	0.201	0.167

Panel C: Omitted County-level Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.087***	0.031***	1.415***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.200)
Median_Advisory_Committee	0.870***		
	(0.030)		
Median_N_Advisory_Committee		0.405***	
		(0.011)	
Median_Advisory_Director_Ratio			0.542***
			(0.014)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-3.930***	-0.753***	-20.722***
	(0.186)	(0.043)	(1.290)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.200	0.278	0.258

Table 10 (continued)

Panel D: Omitted Firm-level Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*ΔAdvisory_Committee*	*ΔN_Advisory_Committee*	*Δadvisory_Director_Ratio*
ΔSC_Index	0.058**	0.100***	2.049***
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.529)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.058	0.004	-1.594
	(0.054)	(0.063)	(1.116)
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.059	0.059	0.062

Panel E: County-Median Firm-Level Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.068***	0.028***	1.284***
	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.220)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.928***	-0.372	-8.722
	(1.076)	(0.309)	(8.881)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.042	0.097	0.092

Internet Appendix

Community Social Capital and Board Advising:

Evidence from the Structure of Board Committees

In this Internet Appendix, we present supplementary results to the paper. The content in this Internet Appendix is itemised as follows:

Contents

Item IA

Investment Inefficiency – Richardson (2006) Model

Firm investment inefficiency is estimated by following the Richardson (2006) framework. Firm total investment, *I_total*, is computed as the sum of research and development expenditure - *R&D* (Compustat item *xrd*), capital expenditure - *CAPEX* (Compustat item *capx*), and acquisition expenditure - *Acquisition* (Compustat item *aqc*), minus sale of property, plant and equipment - *SPPE* (Compustat item *sppe*), scaled by the previous year's book value of total assets - *Firm_Size* (Compustat item *at*).

$$I\_total_{i,t} = \frac{R\&D_{i,t} + CAPEX_{i,t} + Acquisition_{i,t} - SPPE_{i,t}}{Firm\_Size_{i,t-1}} \quad (1)$$

The total investment, *I_total*, is then split into two main components: (i) required investment to maintain assets in place, *I_maintenance*, and (ii) investment in new projects, *I_new*.

$$I\_total_{i,t} = I\_\text{maintenance}_{i,t} + I\_new_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

Where *I_maintenance* is amortisation and depreciation (Compustat item *dpc*), scaled by previous year's book value of total assets (Compustat item *at*).

I_new can then be decomposed into expected (or optimal) investments, I^{*}_{New}, and unexpected (or abnormal) investments, I^{ε}_{New} .

$$I\_new_{i,t} = I^{*}_{New} + I^{\varepsilon}_{New} \quad (3)$$

As in Richardson (2006), we estimate the expected investments using the following dynamic model:

$$\begin{aligned} I\_New_{i,t} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 V/P_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Leverage_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Cash\_Holding_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_4 Firm\_Age_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Firm\_Size_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 Stock\_Return_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_7 I\_New_{i,t-1} + Year\ Dummy_t + Industry\ Dummy_j + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Where *V/P* is a measure of growth opportunities, calculated as the ratio of the value of the firm (V_{AIP}) to the market value of equity (Compustat item *csho* × *prcc_f*). V_{AIP} is computed as $V_{AIP} = (1 - \alpha r)BV + \alpha(1 - r)X - \alpha r d$, where $\alpha = \frac{\omega}{(1+r-\omega)}$. r is set to 12%, and $\omega = 0.62$ is the abnormal earnings persistence parameter from the Ohlson (1995) framework. *BV* is the book value of common equity (Compustat item *ceq*), d is the dividends (Compustat item *dvc*) and X is operating income after depreciation (Compustat item *oiadp*).

Since the abnormal investments can be either positive or negative, the absolute value of the residual ($\varepsilon_{i,t}$) from Eq. (4) is our estimate for inefficient investment for firm *i* at year *t*.

Item IB.1
Correlation Matrix

We have a large set of control variables in our study. If some control variables are highly correlated, multicollinearity could be a potential concern for our empirical setting. We present the Pearson correlation matrix in Table IB.1. The correlation coefficients for each pair of control variables are at the level that does not raise significant multicollinearity concerns. More importantly, *SC_Index* is positively correlated with all three board advising intensity measures (*Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*), consistent with our theoretical prediction that firms which reside in high-social-capital areas focus more on board advising.

Table IB.1 Correlation Matrix

This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1. * indicates significance at the 10% level or better.

		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Advisory_Committee	A	1.000											
N_Advisory_Committee	B	0.8526*	1.000										
Advisory_Director_Ratio	C	0.9120*	0.9572*	1.000									
SC_Index	D	0.0899*	0.0568*	0.0659*	1.000								
Firm_Size	E	0.2432*	0.2607*	0.2845*	0.011	1.000							
Firm_Age	F	0.1483*	0.1754*	0.1733*	0.0563*	0.2798*	1.000						
Leverage	G	0.2940*	0.3115*	0.3244*	0.1392*	0.3779*	0.3700*	1.000					
N_Segments	H	0.0988*	0.1013*	0.1016*	0.0469*	0.2370*	0.0614*	0.009	1.000				
Market-to-Book	I	0.008	-0.013	-0.003	0.013	-0.001	-0.0649*	-0.0384*	-0.0364*	1.000			
R&D	J	-0.0851*	-0.1042*	-0.1129*	-0.0173*	-0.2442*	-0.1690*	-0.1908*	-0.0208*	0.1025*	1.000		
Return_Volatility	K	-0.1077*	-0.1144*	-0.1267*	-0.0841*	-0.2989*	-0.1290*	-0.2241*	0.0269*	-0.0351*	0.2165*	1.000	
CEO_Tenure	L	-0.0530*	-0.0499*	-0.0534*	-0.0223*	-0.1038*	-0.0533*	-0.0590*	-0.0813*	0.004	0.0447*	0.000	1.000
CEO_Ownership	M	-0.1249*	-0.1069*	-0.1082*	0.013	-0.2051*	-0.0662*	-0.1332*	-0.0825*	0.009	0.008	0.0603*	0.3806*
CEO_Duality	N	0.0592*	0.0576*	0.0686*	0.0567*	0.1197*	0.0267*	0.0582*	0.0569*	0.011	-0.0904*	-0.0251*	0.3187*
Institutional_Ownership	O	0.0407*	0.0392*	0.0368*	-0.010	0.1332*	0.0777*	0.1323*	-0.0426*	-0.006	-0.0406*	-0.1024*	-0.005
Blockholder_Ownership	P	-0.0678*	-0.0846*	-0.0926*	-0.010	-0.2088*	-0.0692*	-0.0764*	-0.0362*	-0.0860*	0.012	0.0167*	-0.0266*
Board_Independence	Q	0.1168*	0.1045*	0.1038*	0.0492*	0.1436*	0.1028*	0.2066*	-0.0284*	-0.0513*	0.009	-0.1426*	-0.0974*
Local_Director_Pool	R	0.014	-0.003	0.005	-0.2709*	-0.005	-0.0243*	-0.0775*	-0.0296*	0.0409*	0.2103*	0.0398*	-0.0295*
Per_Capita_Income	S	0.008	-0.0252*	-0.0190*	0.2471*	0.0719*	-0.012	0.014	-0.0703*	-0.007	0.1722*	-0.0989*	0.003
Population_Growth (%)	T	-0.0571*	-0.0565*	-0.0612*	-0.2649*	-0.008	-0.0791*	-0.1021*	0.002	-0.001	-0.0470*	0.0388*	-0.0275*
Population_Density	U	0.0673*	0.0607*	0.0647*	0.0427*	0.1137*	0.0179*	0.0537*	-0.008	-0.013	0.0168*	-0.0349*	-0.0621*
Religiosity (%)	V	0.0375*	0.0495*	0.0555*	0.2312*	0.0312*	0.0775*	0.1134*	0.0301*	0.0014	-0.1459*	-0.0418*	0.0122
Education (%)	W	-0.012	-0.0464*	-0.0329*	0.2916*	-0.0520*	-0.0459*	-0.0903*	-0.0249*	0.0641*	0.2297*	0.0326*	-0.0152*
County_Median_Age	X	0.0325*	0.0209*	0.0278*	0.3791*	-0.0391*	0.0246*	0.0331*	-0.011	-0.010	0.0850*	-0.0358*	0.0318*

		M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
CEO_Ownership	M	1.000											
CEO_Duality	N	0.2069*	1.000										
Institutional_Ownership	O	-0.0718*	0.0244*	1.000									
Blockholder_Ownership	P	-0.0920*	-0.0883*	-0.1469*	1.000								
Board_Independence	Q	-0.2045*	-0.002	0.0617*	0.1206*	1.000							
Local_Director_Pool	R	-0.0153*	-0.0379*	0.002	-0.0404*	-0.009	1.000						
Per_Capita_Income	S	0.002	-0.1004*	0.006	0.1218*	0.1881*	0.4524*	1.000					
Population_Growth (%)	T	0.006	-0.0361*	-0.0164*	0.0458*	0.0180*	-0.1351*	-0.0519*	1.000				
Population_Density	U	-0.0316*	-0.003	0.0172*	0.010	0.0398*	0.5233*	0.4631*	-0.2100*	1.000			
Religiosity (%)	V	-0.0210*	0.0658*	-0.0116	-0.0162*	-0.0136	-0.0101	0.0419*	-0.1396*	0.1154*	1.0000		
Education (%)	W	0.0249*	0.0278*	-0.0207*	-0.0430*	-0.008	0.3679*	0.4853*	0.0828*	0.3132*	1.0000*	1.000	
County_Median_Age	X	0.005	-0.013	-0.001	0.0393*	0.0305*	0.0240*	0.2776*	-0.3738*	-0.1496*	0.0864*	0.0864*	1.000

Item IB.2
The Effect of Community Social Capital on Agency Issues

Our hypothesis is based on the premise that social capital is a societal monitoring mechanism that mitigates the agency issue and, hence, reduces board monitoring needs. The monitoring role of community social capital has been extensively documented in the literature, including Gupta et al. (2018), Hoi et al. (2019), and Jha (2019). Notwithstanding the prior evidence, we corroborate the argument that community social capital reduces the agency issue by examining its effect on discretionary accruals, CEO compensation, and costs of equity in Table IB.2.

Following Kim et al. (2014), we measure discretionary accruals by adding lagged *ROA* to the modified Jones model. Specifically, discretionary accruals for firm *i* at year *t* are computed by estimating the following model cross-sectionally by two-digit SIC industry code and year:

$$TACC_{i,t} = \beta_0 \left(\frac{1}{TA_{i,t-1}}\right) + \beta_1 \frac{\left(\Delta REV_{i,t} - \Delta REC_{i,t}\right)}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta_2 \left(\frac{PPE_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}\right) + \beta_2 ROA + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (5)$$

where *TACC* is the total accruals, computed as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the cash flow statement (Compustat item *ibc*) and cash from operation (Compustat item *oancf*), scaled by the previous year's total assets (Compustat item *at*). *TA* is the book value of total assets (Compustat item *at*). Δ*REV* is total revenue (Compustat item *revt*) in year *t* minus that in year *t-1*. Δ*REC* is receivables (Compustat item *rect*) in year *t* minus that in year *t-1*. *PPE* is gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item *ppegt*). *ROA* is income before extraordinary items (Compustat item *ib*) to the average book value of total assets (Compustat item $\frac{at_{t-1}+at_t}{2}$). The absolute value of the estimation residual is the measure of discretionary accruals (*Discretionary_Accruals*). Thus, the higher values of *Discretionary_Accruals* indicate poorer earnings equality and more severe

agency issue. Column (1) of Table IB.2 confirms that community social capital reduces discretionary accounting accruals, thus improving accounting quality (Jha, 2019).

In Column (2) of Table IB.2, we examine the effect of social capital on *CEO_Total_Compensation*, measured as the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (Execucomp item *tdc1*) as in Hoi et al. (2019). The coefficient on *SC_Index* is negative and statistically significant, confirming that social capital alleviates the rent extraction problem, a form of agency issue.

The dependent variable in Column (3) of Table IB.2 is the firm cost of equity capital, measured from the modified PEG ratio model (Easton, 2004). *Cost_of_Equity* (R_{MPEG}) is solved from the following equation.

$$P_t^* = \frac{E_t(EPS_{t+1})}{R_{MPEG}} + \frac{E_t(EPS_{t+1})E_t[g_{st} - R_{MPEG} \times (1 - POUT)]}{(R_{MPEG})^2} \quad (6)$$

Where P_t^* is the closing price in the June following the latest fiscal year-end. EPS_{t+1} is the median forecasted earnings per share from IBES. g_{st} is the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds. $POUT$ is the current payout ratio.

Consistent with Gupta et al. (2018), community social capital significantly reduces the firm's cost of equity capital, implying that equity holders view firms in high-social-capital areas as having less severe agency issue, hence requiring lower returns.

In sum, results from Table IB.2 are consistent with previous studies showing that community social capital reduces agency issues. Since monitoring the management to alleviate the agency issues is one of the two primary responsibilities of the board of directors (Adams et al., 2010), less severe agency issues suggest lower board monitoring needs (Randøy and Jenssen, 2004). Hence, these results support our premise that community social capital reduces board monitoring needs.

Table IB.2. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Agency Issues

This table presents the regression analysis of the effect of community social capital on agency issues. The dependent variable in Column (1) is *Discretionary_Accruals*, measured as the absolute residual from the modified Jones model. The dependent variable in Column (2) is *CEO_Total_Compensation*, measured as the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation reported in Execucomp. The dependent variable in Column (3) is firm *Cost_of_Equity*, estimated from the modified PEG ratio model (Easton, 2004). *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Discretionary_Accruals*	*CEO_Total_Compensation*	*Cost_of_Equity*
SC_Index	-0.002**	-0.030**	-0.011**
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Firm_Size	-0.004***	0.396***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Firm_Age	-0.002**	-0.038***	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Leverage	-0.000	0.032	0.010
	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.007)
N_Segments	-0.003***	0.036***	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Market-to-Book	0.000***	0.005***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
R&D	0.070***	0.704***	-0.012
	(0.013)	(0.115)	(0.031)
Return_Volatility	0.052***	-0.631***	1.142***
	(0.015)	(0.151)	(0.100)
CEO_Tenure	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)
CEO_Ownership	-0.000	-0.030***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
CEO_Duality	-0.002*	0.065***	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Institutional_Ownership	0.002	0.008	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.008)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.022***	0.032	0.076***
	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.018)
Board_Independence	0.000	1.031***	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.069)	(0.022)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.002**	0.011	-0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Per_Capita_Income	0.021***	0.067	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.014)
Population_Growth	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Population_Density	-0.002***	0.013	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.000	-0.001	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	-0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
County_Median_Age	-0.039***	0.455***	0.097**
	(0.011)	(0.124)	(0.042)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.040	2.288***	-0.272
	(0.055)	(0.582)	(0.171)
Observations	12,147	12,153	6,010
Adj R-squared	0.151	0.467	0.233

Item IB.3

The Effect of Community Social Capital on Director Meeting Attendance – Director-level Regressions

In Panel B of Table 4 in the main text, we present regression results for the effect of community social capital on director meeting attendance at the firm level using firm-year data. In Table IB.3, we also present the regression results using director-year data.

Column (1) investigates the monitoring directors' sub-sample and Column (2) investigates the advisory directors' sub-sample. *Attendance_Problem* is a dummy variable that equals one if the director attends less than 75% of the board meetings during a year, and zero otherwise. Both columns use the probit model. Consistent with Panel B of Table 4, these supplementary results show a positive and significant relationship between community social capital and attendance problems for the monitoring director subsample, but not for the advisory director subsample. These results confirm that monitoring directors reduce their effort to monitor managers if their firms reside in high-social-capital counties, suggesting directors perceive that firms' need for intensive monitoring is low when community social capital is high.

Table IB.3. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Director Meeting Attendance – Director-level Regressions

This table presents the effect of community social capital on director board meeting attendance using director-year data from ISS. *Attendance_Problem* is a dummy variable that equals one if the director attends less than 75% of board meetings in the year. Monitoring directors are independent directors who serve on at least two monitoring committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees) within the board. Due to the data limitation of ISS, advisory directors in this table are assumed to be independent directors other than monitoring directors. Both columns use probit models. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Dep. Var.	(1)	(2)
	Attendance_Problem	
	Monitoring Director Subsample	Advisory Director Subsample
SC_Index	0.086**	0.156
	(0.036)	(0.131)
Director_Age	-0.051	-0.734
	(0.235)	(0.522)
Director_Tenure	-0.093**	0.041
	(0.037)	(0.089)
US_Director	0.098**	0.012
	(0.048)	(0.166)
Female_Director	-0.134**	0.293
	(0.055)	(0.218)
Board_Size	0.030**	-0.013
	(0.015)	(0.051)
N_Outside_Directorships	0.010	0.045
	(0.022)	(0.065)
Institutional_Ownership	0.024	0.279
	(0.076)	(0.284)
Blockholder_Ownership	0.418*	0.268
	(0.230)	(0.772)
Board_Independence	-0.403	-0.137
	(0.277)	(0.682)
ROA	0.143	-2.757***
	(0.349)	(0.866)
Firm_Size	0.001	-0.071
	(0.022)	(0.058)
Firm_Age	-0.099*	-0.414***
	(0.057)	(0.143)
Market-to-Book	0.000	-0.015*
	(0.004)	(0.009)
R&D	1.095**	-1.912
	(0.531)	(1.777)
Return_Volatility	0.696	-3.988**
	(0.634)	(1.903)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.172	-1.090**
	(0.153)	(0.481)
Population_Growth	3.627**	8.675**
	(1.667)	(3.683)
Population_Density	0.013	0.133
	(0.030)	(0.090)
Religiosity	-0.283	-0.076
	(0.176)	(0.695)
Education	0.004	0.022
	(0.005)	(0.016)
County_Median_Age	-0.196	1.365
	(0.426)	(1.112)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.997	8.962
	(1.868)	(5.684)
Observations	52,984	1,612
Pseudo R-squared	0.046	0.184

Item IB.4

The Relative Effects of Cooperative Norms and Social Networks on Agency Issues

Our path analysis shows that community social capital has a direct effect on board advising intensity. A potential explanation for this direct effect is that firms in high-social-capital counties are more likely to trust and value external advice, resulting in an advising-intensive board. However, we also show that the community social capital has an indirect effect on board advising intensity through its effect on board monitoring intensity. In this Internet Appendix Item IB.4, we test if trust can affect agency issues to support the agency theory perspective of our results (the indirect path).

Since voting in presidential elections and participating in census surveys are voluntary activities without direct material incentives, *Pvote* and *Pespn* can reflect the strength of cooperative norms (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). *Assn* and *Nccs*, on the other hand, measure repeated and face-to-face interactions that are likely to strengthen the network-associated norms (Coleman, 1988, Putnam, 1995). Following Hasan et al. (2017b), we measure the strength of *Cooperative_Norms* (*Social_Networks*) as the first principal component of *Pvote* and *Respn* (*Assn* and *Nccs*) in a county. In Table IB.4, we then examine the effect of the social norms and networks on discretionary accruals, CEO compensation, and costs of equity as in Table IB.2. We show that the coefficients on both *Cooperative_Norms* and *Social_Networks* are negative and statistically significant in all columns of Table IB.4. To the degree that cooperative norms capture the norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity (Putnam, 1993) while social networks facilitate efficient information sharing and better communication (Payne et al., 2011, Coleman, 1988, Lin, 1999), the results suggest that both trust and networks can significantly reduce the firm agency problems, supporting our premise and the agency theory perspective of community social capital. Thus, although trust may directly affect board

advising, it may also indirectly affect board advising through reducing the firm's monitoring needs.

Table IB.4. The Relative Effects of Cooperative Norms and Social Networks on Agency Issues

This table presents the regression analysis of the relative influence of cooperative norms and social networks on agency issues. The dependent variable in Column (1) is Discretionary_Accruals, measured as the absolute residual from modified Jones model. The dependent variable in Column (2) is CEO_Total_Compensation, measured as the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation reported in Execucomp. The dependent variable in Column (3) is firm Cost_of_Equity, estimated from the modified PEG ratio model (Easton, 2004). Corporative_Norms is from the principal factor analysis based on Pvote and Respn, while Social_Networks is from the principal factor analysis on Assn and Nccs. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in the parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Discretionary_Accruals*	*CEO_Total_Compensation*	*Cost_of_Equity*
Cooperative_Norms	-0.002*	-0.019*	-0.006*
	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.003)
Social_Networks	-0.002*	-0.030*	-0.008*
	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.005)
Firm_Size	-0.003***	0.387***	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Firm_Age	-0.002**	-0.036***	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Leverage	-0.000	0.036	0.008
	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.007)
N_Segments	-0.002***	0.038***	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.003)
Market-to-Book	0.000***	0.005***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
R&D	0.056***	0.678***	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.093)	(0.026)
Return_Volatility	0.052***	-0.622***	1.081***
	(0.011)	(0.140)	(0.040)
CEO_Tenure	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)
CEO_Ownership	-0.000	-0.030***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
CEO_Duality	-0.002**	0.074***	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Institutional_Ownership	0.002	0.009	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.007)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.017***	0.048	0.074***
	(0.004)	(0.055)	(0.016)
Board_Independence	-0.002	1.035***	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.065)	(0.018)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.003***	0.006	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Per_Capita_Income	0.017***	0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.051)	(0.016)
Population_Growth	-0.001	0.004	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Population_Density	-0.000	0.022**	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.000	-0.001	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	-0.000*	0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
County_Median_Age	-0.034***	0.545***	0.071*
	(0.010)	(0.132)	(0.040)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.048	2.600***	-0.209
	(0.046)	(0.590)	(0.175)
Observations	12,147	12,153	6,010
Adj R-squared	0.135	0.454	0.229

Item IB.5

The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Advising Intensity – Controlling for Director Network Size

We have shown that community social capital can directly affect board advising intensity as higher levels of community social capital may help directors to build relational capital (i.e. the network of ties to external contingencies). A related concern here is that the positive relationship between community social capital and board advising intensity could be driven by directors' relational capital, because the firm's directors have a greater network size and can find independent directors to serve on advisory committees at lower costs. Although we have controlled for the supply of directors using *Local_Director_Pool*, we address this concern further by controlling for *Director_Network_Size*, measured as the total number of overlaps for all directors of the firm through employment, education and other activities. Results reported in Table IB.5 show that a larger director network size is positively associated with board advising intensity. More importantly, the coefficient on *SC_Index* remains positive (0.091) and highly significant ($p<0.000$), suggesting that our results are not driven by a dense network related to a large director network size.

Table IB.5. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Advising Intensity – Controlling for Director Network Size

This table presents the effect of social capital on board advising intensity after controlling for director network size. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. *Director_Network_Size* is the natural logarithm of the total number of overlaps for all directors of the firm through employment, education and other activities. Column (1) uses the probit model, and Columns (2) and (3) are OLS models. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.091***	0.031***	1.420***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.200)
Director_Network_Size	0.209***	0.059***	2.349***
	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.159)
Firm_Size	0.057***	0.030***	0.233**
	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.094)
Firm_Age	0.466***	0.128***	3.350***
	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.179)
Leverage	0.164***	0.036***	1.319***
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.303)
N_Segments	0.075***	0.016***	0.227
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.175)
Market-to-Book	-0.002	-0.000	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.010)
R&D	-0.319*	-0.113***	-2.244*
	(0.190)	(0.041)	(1.293)
Return_Volatility	-0.297	-0.107	-1.594
	(0.267)	(0.066)	(1.936)
CEO_Tenure	0.027*	0.004	0.175
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.114)
CEO_Ownership	-0.016***	-0.002***	-0.142***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.017)
CEO_Duality	0.052**	0.020***	0.748***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.196)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.097**	-0.032***	-0.612*
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.316)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.381***	-0.123***	-2.169***
	(0.105)	(0.025)	(0.756)
Board_Independence	0.524***	0.151***	3.591***
	(0.126)	(0.033)	(0.928)
Local_Director_Pool	0.080***	0.025***	0.764***
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.133)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.207**	-0.085***	-1.343**
	(0.083)	(0.022)	(0.631)
Population_Growth	0.049***	0.011***	0.340***
	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.128)
Population_Density	0.054***	0.013***	0.206
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.130)
Religiosity	0.001	0.001*	-0.004
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Education	-0.014***	-0.002***	-0.079***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.019)

Table IB.5 (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
County_Median_Age	0.754***	0.226***	3.794**
	(0.238)	(0.065)	(1.802)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-5.290***	-1.029***	-30.184***
	(1.029)	(0.277)	(8.001)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.143	0.206	0.179

Item IB.6

The Role of Religiosity

We also test whether risk aversion correlated with religion can explain our findings. Prior research recognises that religious individuals are more risk-averse (Miller, 2000, Diaz, 2000), and managers of firms in religious areas are less likely to misbehave (McGuire et al., 2011). Therefore, it might be the case that risk-averse managers in high religious counties engage in fewer opportunistic behaviours, allowing shareholders to assemble an advising-intensive board. In addition, research on board and religion shows that a specific religious supervisory board imposes strong governance and restrains risk-taking behaviours (Mollah et al., 2021). Our results can then be driven by religious monitoring board members in high social capital areas that mitigate opportunistic risk-taking, hence, allowing more advising.

Although we have controlled for the strength of religiosity of the county with the variable *Religiosity* (measured as the percentage of residents in a county that adheres to organised religions) in our regressions, we address this concern more explicitly in Internet Appendix IB.6. We use the dummy variable, *High_Religiosity*, indicating counties with an above-median value of *Religiosity*. We then interact *SC_Index* with *High_Religiosity* in our regressions when examining board advising intensity. However, in Columns (1) to (3) of Table IB.6, we find that the coefficients on *High_Religiosity* and *SC_Index*High_Religiosity* are statistically insignificant, while coefficients on *SC_Index* remain positive and significant. Thus, our results are unlikely to be explained by the county-level risk aversion that is related to the religion of the county members.

Table IB.6. The Role of Religiosity

This table presents the role of religiosity on the effect of community social capital on board advising intensity. The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (3) is *Advisory_Committee*, N_*Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Column (1) uses the probit models, and Columns (2) and (3) use OLS models. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. *High_Religiosity* is a dummy variable that equals one if the county's *Religiosity* is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2, year and 2-digit SIC dummies. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The standard errors are presented in the parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.104***	0.029***	1.220***
	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.228)
*SC_Index*High_Religiosity*	-0.039	0.003	0.440
	(0.035)	(0.009)	(0.273)
High_Religiosity	-0.060	-0.003	0.161
	(0.051)	(0.014)	(0.405)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.388***	-0.697***	-16.859**
	(0.987)	(0.263)	(7.886)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.138	0.199	0.166

Item IB.7

Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Square Analysis with Two Instruments

We have used the firm's distance to the Canadian border (*Border_Distance*) as the sole instrument for community social capital in Table 7 because Putnam (2001) perceives that the best single predictor of US social capital is the distance to the Canadian border. Here in Table IB.7, we adopt an additional instrument for community social capital in the IV approach.

Glaeser et al. (2010) and Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that people are less likely to trust each other when they belong to different races. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) model that more homogenous communities witness higher levels of social interactions, which enhances social capital. Indeed, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) and Putnam (2007) provide evidence that social capital is lower in more racially and ethnically fragmented communities. These findings suggest that the racial heterogeneity of a county can affect its level of social capital. However, it is unlikely that racial diversity is correlated with the appointment of directors because directors are assigned to monitoring or advising committees based on their skills (Bhagat and Black, 1999, Faleye et al., 2011), rather than because of their race or ethnicity.

In light of the above discussions, we follow Gupta et al. (2018) and Hasan et al. (2017b) to adopt the measure of racial heterogeneity as our second instrument for social capital. We calculate the Racial Herfindahl Index across the ethnic categories reported in the US Census Bureau and adopted by Hasan et al. (2017b): Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black or African American, Asian and Hispanic. *Race_Diversity* is measured as one minus the Racial Herfindahl Index. Therefore, a higher value of *Race_Diversity* represents a higher level of racial fragmentation. Column (1) of Table IB.7 reports the first-stage result of the IV approach. As expected, we find a negative association between *Race_Diversity* and *SC_Index*. Columns (2) to (4) of Table IB.7 present the second-stage results on the three board advising intensity

measures. The results are consistent with our baseline analysis in Table 2 and the IV analysis in Table 7, as community social capital significantly increases board advising intensity. These results further accentuate the endogeneity concerns of our study.

Table IB.7. Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Square Analysis With Two Instruments

This table presents the regression analysis of the instrumental variable approach with two instrumental variables for social capital. Column (1) presents estimates from the first-stage analysis, where the dependent variable is *SC_Index*. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. The instrument for *SC_Index* is *Border_Distance*, measured as the natural logarithm of the shortest distance between the firm's headquarter's county and the US - Canadian border, and *Racial_Diversity* is computed as one minus the race HHI index of a county. The ethnic categories are Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black or African American, Asian, and Hispanic. Columns (2) through (4) present the second-stage analysis. The dependent variables in Columns (2) through (4) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	First-Stage	Second-Stage		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*SC_Index*	*Advisory_ Committee*	*N_Advisory_ Committee*	*Advisory_ Director_Ratio*
Fitted_SC_Index		0.161**	0.063***	1.868***
		(0.069)	(0.018)	(0.530)
Border_Distance	-0.165***			
	(0.005)			
Racial_Diversity	-1.038***			
	(0.046)			
Firm_Size	-0.036***	0.126***	0.049***	0.980***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.085)
Firm_Age	0.073***	0.462***	0.126***	3.328***
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.172)
Leverage	0.065***	0.165***	0.036***	1.321***
	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.324)
N_Segments	0.003	0.076***	0.016***	0.278*
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.162)
Market-to-Book	0.001**	-0.002	-0.000	0.007
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.011)
R&D	-0.068	-0.042	-0.037	0.844
	(0.056)	(0.175)	(0.044)	(1.287)
Return_Volatility	-0.513***	-0.144	-0.065	-0.734
	(0.082)	(0.253)	(0.065)	(1.907)
CEO_Tenure	-0.023***	0.021	0.003	0.073
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.113)
CEO_Ownership	-0.000	-0.019***	-0.003***	-0.166***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.021)
CEO_Duality	0.040***	0.046*	0.018**	0.698***
	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.209)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.023*	-0.073*	-0.027**	-0.481
	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.321)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.211***	-0.363***	-0.116***	-2.142***
	(0.033)	(0.102)	(0.026)	(0.769)
Board_Independence	0.251***	0.670***	0.188***	5.630***
	(0.039)	(0.121)	(0.031)	(0.906)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.318***	0.115***	0.040***	1.032***
	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.222)
Per_Capita_Income	0.572***	-0.228**	-0.097***	-1.464**
	(0.029)	(0.092)	(0.024)	(0.690)
Population_Growth	-0.123***	0.049**	0.013***	0.318**

	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.145)

Table IB.7 (continued)

	First-Stage	Second-Stage		First-Stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*SC_Index*	*Advisory_ Committee*	*N_Advisory_ Committee*	*Advisory_ Director_Ratio*
Population_Density	0.113***	0.050***	0.011**	0.179
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.135)
Religiosity	0.003***	0.000	0.000	-0.011
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Education	0.028***	-0.014***	-0.003***	-0.074***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.025)
County_Median_Age	0.897***	0.416	0.105	1.891
	(0.083)	(0.279)	(0.073)	(2.125)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-8.772***	-2.703**	-0.063	-8.717
	(0.345)	(1.345)	(0.378)	(11.016)
Observations	12,101	12,101	12,101	12,101
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.648	-	0.201	0.168

Item IB.8
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Model

We have addressed the endogeneity concern in our study with IV, PSM, and DiD analysis. We provide further results in Table IB.8 with the generalised method of moments (GMM) model. Although GMM is a powerful tool to address endogeneity concerns, the GMM estimator for a probit model with an endogenous regressor is not consistent (Dagenais, 1999, Lucchetti, 2002). We, therefore, only examine the effect of community social capital on the number of advisory committees and the allocation of advisory directors with the GMM model. In the GMM model, we treat all independent variables as potentially endogenous variables, and the first differences of these variables are lagged twice as additional instruments in the level equations of the GMM system. Results in Table IB.8 show that despite the significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, the coefficient on *SC_Index* remains positive and statistically significant.

Table IB.8. Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Model

The table presents the effect of social capital on board advising intensity using the generalised method of moments (GMM) models. The dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) are *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. All independent variables are treated as potentially endogenous variables, and the first-differences of these variables are lagged twice as additional instruments in the level equations of the GMM system. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)
Dep. Var.	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.001**	0.114***
	(0.001)	(0.029)
Lagged_N_Advisory_Committee	0.847***	
	(0.002)	
Lagged_Advisory_Director_Ratio		0.834***
		(0.003)
Firm_Size	0.007***	0.147***
	(0.000)	(0.018)
Firm_Age	0.012***	0.299***
	(0.001)	(0.027)
Leverage	0.008***	0.139***
	(0.000)	(0.015)
N_Segments	-0.005***	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.026)
Market-to-Book	-0.000***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
R&D	-0.023***	-0.311***
	(0.001)	(0.053)
Return_Volatility	0.005***	0.376***
	(0.001)	(0.087)
CEO_Tenure	-0.002***	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.008)
CEO_Ownership	-0.000***	-0.029***
	(0.000)	(0.002)
CEO_Duality	0.009***	0.136***
	(0.000)	(0.019)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.000	-0.019
	(0.000)	(0.017)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.002**	0.322***
	(0.001)	(0.051)
Board_Independence	0.006***	-0.443***
	(0.002)	(0.088)
Local_Director_Pool	-0.005***	-0.213***
	(0.001)	(0.034)
Per_Capita_Income	0.044***	1.531***
	(0.003)	(0.152)
Population_Growth	0.006***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.014)
Population_Density	0.007***	0.208***
	(0.001)	(0.044)
Religiosity	0.001***	0.028***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Education	-0.001***	-0.010***
	(0.000)	(0.003)
County_Median_Age	0.097***	0.520
	(0.010)	(0.472)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.952***	-20.902***
	(0.045)	(1.863)
Observations	12,172	12,172

Item IB.9
Alternative Measures for Community Social Capital and Advisory Directors

We test the sensitivity of our results by using alternative proxies for social capital and advisory director in Table IB.9. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), we follow Jha and Chen (2014) to use linear interpolation to fill the missing social capital data in-between years. Because the last *SC_Index* that is directly constructed from census data is for the year 2014, the sample period for interpolated social capital index is from 2000 to 2014. The linearly interpolated community social capital index (*SC_Index_Interpolated*) is positively related to all three board advising intensity measures. In addition, we follow Hasan et al. (2017a) to use the annual data on the number of total donors of all organ types, scaled by the total population in the state (*Organ_Donation*) as an alternative measure of community social capital. Organ donation data are obtained from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). To improve the readability of the alternative social capital measure, we follow Hasan et al. (2017a) to multiply the per capita organ donor by 1,000,000. In an unreported test, we find that the Pearson correlation coefficient between *Organ_Donation* and *SC_Index* is 0.34 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting a good fit for this measure. The coefficient on *Organ_Donation* is significantly positive in Columns (2), (4) and (6) in Panel A for all three board advising intensity measures. Thus, our key findings are robust to alternative community social capital measures.

In Panel B of Table IB.9, we employ two alternative measures for advisory director ratio. In our first alternative proxy, we define all independent directors that do not sit on monitoring committees as advisory directors. The dependent variable in Column (1) is *Advisory_Director_Ratio_Non-Monitor*, which is the number of the alternatively defined advisory directors, scaled by the total number of independent directors. In addition, it is argued

that inside directors may have more firm-specific knowledge and can be a valuable source of information for advising activities. Hence, in our second alternative definition of advisory director, we perceive both independent and inside directors (excluding the CEO) that serve on advising committees but do not serve on any monitoring committee as advisory directors. *Advisory_Director_Ratio_All* in Column (2) is computed as the number of the inside and independent advisory directors to the total number of board directors, excluding the CEO. In both columns of Panel B, we find that *SC_Index* remains positively related to our alternative measures of advisory director ratios, suggesting that our findings are not sensitive to the choice of advisory director measure.

Table IB.9. Alternative Measures for Community Social Capital and Advisory Directors

This table presents the regression results of the effect of social capital on the board advising intensity using alternative measures of social capital and advisory director. Panel A presents the results using two alternative measures of social capital. *SC_Index_Interpolated* is the *SC_Index* from linear interpolation for the missing social capital data between 1997, 2005, 2009, and 2014. *Organ_Donation* is the annual data on the number of total donors of all organ types scaled by the total population in the state. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. Columns (1) and (2) use the probit model, and Columns (3) through (6) use OLS models. Panel B presents the results using two alternative measures of the advisory director ratio. *Advisory_Director_Ratio_Non-Monitor* in Column (1) is the number of independent directors who do not sit on monitoring committees, scaled by the total number of independent directors. *Advisory_Director_Ratio_All* in Column (2) is the number of the inside and independent directors who serve on advisory committees, scaled by the total number of board directors, excluding the CEO. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Each column includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2, year and 2-digit SIC dummies. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Alternative Measure of Community Social Capital

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*		*N_Advisory_Committee*		*Advisory_Director_Ratio*	
SC_Index_Interpolated	0.092***		0.031***		1.430***	
	(0.030)		(0.008)		(0.234)	
Organ_Donation		0.013***		0.004***		0.129***
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.014)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-3.536***	-6.437***	0.181	-1.476***	-13.338	-46.507***
	(1.212)	(0.984)	(0.314)	(0.266)	(9.134)	(7.678)
Observations	9,802	12,174	9,883	12,174	9,811	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.144	0.140	0.211	0.202	0.172	0.167

Panel B: Alternative Measure of Advisory Director Ratio

	(1)	(2)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Director_Ratio _Non-Monitor*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio _All*
SC_Index	0.507***	0.381**
	(0.140)	(0.190)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.385	-15.880**
	(5.666)	(7.716)
Observations	12,174	12,174
Adjusted R-squared	0.067	0.100

Item IB.10.

Poisson and Negative Binomial Model

We use the log transformation of the number of advising committees and adopt the OLS model in Column (2) of Table 2 to test the effect of community social capital on the number of advising committees. Whilst this aids interpretation, the concern is that if the number of advising committees is a non-negative integer value, OLS may not be appropriate. Therefore, in Table IB.10, we estimate the Poisson and negative binomial models when the dependent variable is the number of advising committees without the logarithm. The results in Table IB.10 corroborate our OLS-based results by continuing to show a positive relationship between community social capital and the number of advising committees in the board.

Table IB.10. Poisson and Negative Binomial Model

This table presents the regression analysis of the influence of social capital on the number of advisory committees within the board. The dependent variable, *Number_Advisory_Committee*, in Columns (1) and (2) is the integer number of advisory committees within a firm in a given year. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. Column (1) estimates the Poisson model, and Column (2) estimates the negative binomial model. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Dep. Var.	(1)	(2)
	Number_Advisory_Committee	
	Poisson model	Negative binomial model
Fitted_SC_Index	0.109***	0.109***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Firm_Size	0.159***	0.159***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Firm_Age	0.476***	0.476***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Leverage	0.164***	0.164***
	(0.039)	(0.039)
N_Segments	0.030	0.030
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Market-to-Book	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
R&D	-0.812***	-0.812***
	(0.256)	(0.256)
Return_Volatility	-0.546*	-0.546*
	(0.288)	(0.288)
CEO_Tenure	0.014	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.016)
CEO_Ownership	-0.015***	-0.015***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
CEO_Duality	0.047*	0.047*
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.093**	-0.093**
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.382***	-0.382***
	(0.100)	(0.100)
Board_Independence	0.573***	0.573***
	(0.123)	(0.123)
Local_Director_Pool	0.113***	0.113***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.313***	-0.313***
	(0.082)	(0.082)
Population_Growth	0.032**	0.032**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Population_Density	0.033**	0.033**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Religiosity	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
County_Median_Age	0.997***	0.997***
	(0.233)	(0.233)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-5.042***	-5.042***
	(1.010)	(1.010)
Observations	12,174	12,174
Pseudo R-squared	0.103	0.103

Item IB.11.

The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Advising Intensity – Principal Factors for Independent Variables

We have a large number of control variables in our models. Concerns of multicollinearity arise if some independent variables are highly correlated. Although our correlation matrix in Table IB.1 does not reveal significantly high correlations among our variables, we replace our independent variables with their principal factors to increase the power of regression analysis and circumnavigate multicollinearity concerns (Coles et al., 2008). Specifically, *Complexity* is the first principal factor of *Firm_Size*, *Firm_Age*, *Leverage* and *N_Segments*. *Information_Costs* is the first principal factor of *Market-to-Book*, *R&D* and *Return_Volatility*. *CEO_Entrenchment* is the first principal factor of *CEO_Tenure*, *CEO_Ownership* and *CEO_Duality*. *Governance_Structure* is the first principal factor of *Institutional_Ownership*, *Blockholder_Ownership* and *Board_Independence*. *Geographic_Factor* is the first principal factor of *Local_Director_Pool*, *Per_Capita_Income*, *Population_Growth*, *Population_Density*, *Education*, *Religiosity* and *County_Median_Age*. The results are presented in Table IB.11. The coefficients on *SC_Index* continue to be positive and significant at 5% or better.

Table IB.11. The Effect of Community Social Capital on Board Advising Intensity – Principal Factors for Independent Variables

This table presents the regression analysis of the influence of social capital on the board advising intensity. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *SC_Index* is the county-level social capital measure based on data from the NRCRD. *Complexity* is the first principal factor of *Firm_Size*, *Firm_Age Leverage*, and *N_Segments*. *Information_Costs* is the first principal factor of *Market-to-Book*, *R&D* and *Return_Volatility*. *CEO_Entrenchment* is the first principal factor of *CEO_Tenure*, *CEO_Ownership* and *CEO_Duality*. *Governance_Structure* is the first principal factor of *Institutional_Ownership*, *Blockholder_Ownership* and *Board_Independence*. *Geographic_Factor* is the first principal factor of *Local_Director_Pool*, *Per_Capita_Income Population_Growth*, *Population_Density*, *Education*, *Religiosity* and *County_Median_Age*. Column (1) uses the probit model, and Columns (2) and (3) are OLS models. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
SC_Index	0.043**	0.013***	0.732***
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.135)
Complexity	0.438***	0.129***	3.031***
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.112)
Information_Costs	-0.073***	-0.020***	-0.156
	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.166)
CEO_Entrenchment	-0.021*	-0.003	-0.274***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.083)
Governance_Structure	0.018	0.001	0.273**
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.110)
Geographic_Factor	0.006	0.008***	0.256***
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.073)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.831***	0.140***	3.703***
	(0.103)	(0.028)	(0.799)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.116	0.153	0.125

Item IB.12.

The Relative Effects of Cooperative Norms and Social Networks

In our analysis, we do not distinguish between cooperative norms and social networks in our definition of community social capital. In Table IB.12 we test the possibility that cooperative norms and social networks may have distinct effects on board advising intensity.

We replace *SC_Index* with the two separate measures and present the results in Table IB.12. We show that the coefficients on both *Cooperative_Norms* and *Social_Networks* are positive and statistically significant. We test the difference between the coefficients on *Cooperative_Norms* and *Social_Networks* by using the chi-square test in Column (1) and the F-test in Columns (2) and (3). The results do not reveal significant differences between the two coefficients in all columns, suggesting that both the cooperative norms and dense social networks within a county can lead to increased board advising intensity.

Table IB.12. The Relative Effects of Cooperative Norms and Social Networks

This table presents the regression analysis of the relative influence of cooperative norms and social networks on board advising intensity. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (3) are *Advisory_Committee*, *N_Advisory_Committee* and *Advisory_Director_Ratio*, respectively. *Advisory_Committee* is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm sets up at least one specialised advisory committee, and zero otherwise. *N_Advisory_Committee* is the natural logarithm of the number of advisory committees within the board in a given year plus one. *Advisory_Director_Ratio* is the number of advisory directors scaled by the total number of independent directors. *Corporative_Norms* is from the principal factor analysis based on *Pvote* and *Respn*, while *Social_Networks* is from the principal factor analysis on *Assn* and *Nccs*. Column (1) uses the probit model, and Columns (2) and (3) are OLS models. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to eliminate the influence of outliers. Each column includes year and 2-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the county level to control for potential correlation in the error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Var.	*Advisory_Committee*	*N_Advisory_Committee*	*Advisory_Director_Ratio*
Cooperative_Norms	0.043*	0.018***	0.520***
	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.155)
Social_Networks	0.179***	0.037***	1.212***
	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.224)
Firm_Size	0.149***	0.048***	0.939***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.083)
Firm_Age	0.458***	0.127***	3.348***
	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.181)
Leverage	0.145***	0.035***	1.331***
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.304)
N_Segments	0.093***	0.018***	0.320*
	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.175)
Market-to-Book	-0.001	-0.000	0.008
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.010)
R&D	-0.128	-0.035	0.753
	(0.192)	(0.041)	(1.320)
Return_Volatility	-0.262	-0.092	-1.192
	(0.272)	(0.066)	(1.952)
CEO_Tenure	0.019	0.001	0.031
	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.114)
CEO_Ownership	-0.014***	-0.003***	-0.164***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.018)
CEO_Duality	0.029	0.019***	0.742***
	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.197)
Institutional_Ownership	-0.078*	-0.029***	-0.503
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.318)
Blockholder_Ownership	-0.365***	-0.123***	-2.286***
	(0.108)	(0.026)	(0.775)
Board_Independence	0.844***	0.211***	6.125***
	(0.125)	(0.032)	(0.919)
Local_Director_Pool	0.121***	0.032***	0.829***
	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.140)
Per_Capita_Income	-0.396***	-0.097***	-1.503**
	(0.093)	(0.023)	(0.659)
Population_Growth	0.059***	0.012***	0.282**
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.130)
Population_Density	0.040*	0.013**	0.250*
	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.147)
Religiosity	0.000	0.000	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Education	-0.010***	-0.002***	-0.054***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.020)
County_Median_Age	0.841***	0.224***	4.817***
	(0.253)	(0.067)	(1.799)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.773**	-0.574**	-19.698**
	(1.090)	(0.279)	(8.172)
Observations	12,174	12,174	12,174
Pseudo/Adj R-squared	0.151	0.200	0.165

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