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Public reason and the need to identify state-relevant desert

Public reason and the need to identify state-relevant desert
Public reason and the need to identify state-relevant desert
Plausible retributivist justifications for punishment assert that the commission of a moral wrong creates a pro tanto reason to punish the person who committed it. Yet there are good case-based and theoretical reasons to believe that not all moral wrongs are the proper subjects of criminal law or that they are within the proper domain of the state. This article provides these reasons, which suggest that a plausible retributivist justification for punishment must make distinctions between state-relevant and non-state-relevant moral wrongs and (consequently) state-relevant and non-state-relevant desert. The article makes the case for Rawlsian public reason as a plausible method for making these distinctions.
Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law Theory, Retributivism
0731-129X
129-154
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182

Da Silva, Michael (2014) Public reason and the need to identify state-relevant desert. Criminal Justice Ethics, 33 (2), 129-154. (doi:10.1080/0731129X.2014.943977).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Plausible retributivist justifications for punishment assert that the commission of a moral wrong creates a pro tanto reason to punish the person who committed it. Yet there are good case-based and theoretical reasons to believe that not all moral wrongs are the proper subjects of criminal law or that they are within the proper domain of the state. This article provides these reasons, which suggest that a plausible retributivist justification for punishment must make distinctions between state-relevant and non-state-relevant moral wrongs and (consequently) state-relevant and non-state-relevant desert. The article makes the case for Rawlsian public reason as a plausible method for making these distinctions.

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More information

Published date: 13 July 2014
Keywords: Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law Theory, Retributivism

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Local EPrints ID: 469661
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/469661
ISSN: 0731-129X
PURE UUID: 77b910b0-6165-4c24-9f06-6f8ed283b6c5

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Date deposited: 21 Sep 2022 17:04
Last modified: 21 Sep 2022 17:04

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Author: Michael Da Silva

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