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Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US

Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US
Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US
This study examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory decision-making. Political influence is captured based on whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected official holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the banking and financial services industry. Using data of US commercial banks over the period 2000–2015, we show that our measure of political influence reduces a bank's probability of receiving a formal regulatory enforcement action. Results are robust to the use of alternative model specifications and the sample restrictions. However, we find that various bank and environmental characteristics are important conditional factors.
1572-3089
Papadimitri, Panagiota
b7edf14e-3b00-4317-a6ce-8741b593d5b0
Pasiouras, Fotios
48097419-7f9d-4bd4-93a0-6ae59bdf9a0e
Pescetto, Gioia
03e367fb-3a63-43c8-b4e4-ab38a418dd5a
Wohlschlegel, Ansgar
ab6e6de4-7d5b-44ee-9842-7bbeac54c7cc
Papadimitri, Panagiota
b7edf14e-3b00-4317-a6ce-8741b593d5b0
Pasiouras, Fotios
48097419-7f9d-4bd4-93a0-6ae59bdf9a0e
Pescetto, Gioia
03e367fb-3a63-43c8-b4e4-ab38a418dd5a
Wohlschlegel, Ansgar
ab6e6de4-7d5b-44ee-9842-7bbeac54c7cc

Papadimitri, Panagiota, Pasiouras, Fotios, Pescetto, Gioia and Wohlschlegel, Ansgar (2021) Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US. Journal of Financial Stability, 53, [100835]. (doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100835).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This study examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory decision-making. Political influence is captured based on whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected official holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the banking and financial services industry. Using data of US commercial banks over the period 2000–2015, we show that our measure of political influence reduces a bank's probability of receiving a formal regulatory enforcement action. Results are robust to the use of alternative model specifications and the sample restrictions. However, we find that various bank and environmental characteristics are important conditional factors.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 7 December 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 11 December 2020
Published date: April 2021

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 469682
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/469682
ISSN: 1572-3089
PURE UUID: 7afa6128-e67b-4e1a-9e70-703af3bd8f2f
ORCID for Panagiota Papadimitri: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-1857-6097

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Date deposited: 22 Sep 2022 16:35
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:13

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Contributors

Author: Panagiota Papadimitri ORCID iD
Author: Fotios Pasiouras
Author: Gioia Pescetto
Author: Ansgar Wohlschlegel

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