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Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules.

0176-1714
Lombardi, Michele
b666b6e4-a2d5-485e-9cb1-4d8b23798df3
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b
Zivanas, Nikolas
98e393b4-2d95-472a-a6db-4b4f636841f0
Lombardi, Michele
b666b6e4-a2d5-485e-9cb1-4d8b23798df3
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b
Zivanas, Nikolas
98e393b4-2d95-472a-a6db-4b4f636841f0

Lombardi, Michele, Savva, Foivos and Zivanas, Nikolas (2022) Implementation in strong core by codes of rights. Social Choice and Welfare, 2022. (doi:10.1007/s00355-022-01425-3).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules.

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Accepted/In Press date: 18 July 2022
Published date: 10 September 2022
Additional Information: Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s).

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 471649
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/471649
ISSN: 0176-1714
PURE UUID: 3623545c-25fa-4cb5-af44-50541e722abb
ORCID for Foivos Savva: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-6613-8721

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Date deposited: 15 Nov 2022 18:00
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:09

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Contributors

Author: Michele Lombardi
Author: Foivos Savva ORCID iD
Author: Nikolas Zivanas

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