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Sensitivity to moral principles predicts both deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in sacrificial dilemmas

Sensitivity to moral principles predicts both deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in sacrificial dilemmas
Sensitivity to moral principles predicts both deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in sacrificial dilemmas
When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing it (action principle), causing harm directly than indirectly (contact principle), and causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others (intention principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis (N = 1,218), we examined whether individual differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome-maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes similar to people high in other measures of moral concern.
moral dilemmas, process dissociation, deontology, utilitarianism, rules, principles, action principle, contact principle, intention principle
1948-5506
Bostyn, Dries H.
4a1da7df-27cd-4d34-9953-a573d2fbc605
Roets, A.
d73dffbb-1371-4291-b2d8-870942a7124f
Conway, P.
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Bostyn, Dries H.
4a1da7df-27cd-4d34-9953-a573d2fbc605
Roets, A.
d73dffbb-1371-4291-b2d8-870942a7124f
Conway, P.
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286

Bostyn, Dries H., Roets, A. and Conway, P. (2021) Sensitivity to moral principles predicts both deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in sacrificial dilemmas. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 13 (2). (doi:10.1177/19485506211027031).

Record type: Article

Abstract

When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing it (action principle), causing harm directly than indirectly (contact principle), and causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others (intention principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis (N = 1,218), we examined whether individual differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome-maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes similar to people high in other measures of moral concern.

Text
Bostyn et al, 2021, Sensitivity To Moral Principles Predicts Deon & Util Responding, SPPS Preprint - Accepted Manuscript
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e-pub ahead of print date: 29 July 2021
Keywords: moral dilemmas, process dissociation, deontology, utilitarianism, rules, principles, action principle, contact principle, intention principle

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Local EPrints ID: 472617
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/472617
ISSN: 1948-5506
PURE UUID: 26c35abe-4da7-4fe3-8753-a9869f54473c
ORCID for P. Conway: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4649-6008

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Date deposited: 12 Dec 2022 17:42
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:17

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Contributors

Author: Dries H. Bostyn
Author: A. Roets
Author: P. Conway ORCID iD

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