On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)
On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)
The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).
CNI model, deontology, moral dilemmas, moral judgement, multinational modeling, omission bias, utilitarianism
1054-1072
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Hütter, Mandy
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Luke, Dillon M.
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Armstrong, Joel
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Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Hütter, Mandy
98551599-ba14-4bef-b10f-3967788ebf0e
Luke, Dillon M.
07e7e707-7a04-4617-b57c-d5eded543e14
Armstrong, Joel
3ce3ebb8-12ff-43c9-98c8-99c7fbdbc7d6
Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Gawronski, Bertram, Conway, Paul, Hütter, Mandy, Luke, Dillon M., Armstrong, Joel and Friesdorf, Rebecca
(2020)
On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020).
Judgment and Decision Making, 15 (6), .
Abstract
The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).
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e-pub ahead of print date: 1 November 2020
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Keywords:
CNI model, deontology, moral dilemmas, moral judgement, multinational modeling, omission bias, utilitarianism
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Local EPrints ID: 472921
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/472921
ISSN: 1930-2975
PURE UUID: eb39d99b-1102-44af-adca-fb684670a84c
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Date deposited: 06 Jan 2023 12:40
Last modified: 07 Jan 2023 03:09
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Contributors
Author:
Bertram Gawronski
Author:
Paul Conway
Author:
Mandy Hütter
Author:
Dillon M. Luke
Author:
Joel Armstrong
Author:
Rebecca Friesdorf
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