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When does feeling moral actually make you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior

When does feeling moral actually make you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior
When does feeling moral actually make you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior
According to the moral licensing literature, moral self-perceptions induce compensatory behavior: People who feel moral act less prosocially than those who feel immoral. Conversely, work on moral identity indicates that moral self-perceptions motivate behavioral consistency: People who feel moral act more prosocially than those who feel less so. In three studies, the authors reconcile these propositions by demonstrating the moderating role of conceptual abstraction. In Study 1, participants who recalled performing recent (concrete) moral or immoral behavior demonstrated compensatory behavior, whereas participants who considered temporally distant (abstract) moral behavior demonstrated behavioral consistency. Study 2 confirmed that this effect was unique to moral self-perceptions. Study 3 manipulated whether participants recalled moral or immoral actions concretely or abstractly, and replicated the moderation pattern with willingness to donate real money to charity. Together, these findings suggest that concrete moral self-perceptions activate self-regulatory behavior, and abstract moral self-perceptions activate identity concerns.
moral licensing, morality, identity, prosocial behaviour, temporal perspective, construal level
0146-1672
907-919
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Peetz, Johanna
870c1e41-f95c-4109-83a1-89ea80ca521d
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Peetz, Johanna
870c1e41-f95c-4109-83a1-89ea80ca521d

Conway, Paul and Peetz, Johanna (2012) When does feeling moral actually make you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38 (7), 907-919. (doi:10.1177/0146167212442394).

Record type: Article

Abstract

According to the moral licensing literature, moral self-perceptions induce compensatory behavior: People who feel moral act less prosocially than those who feel immoral. Conversely, work on moral identity indicates that moral self-perceptions motivate behavioral consistency: People who feel moral act more prosocially than those who feel less so. In three studies, the authors reconcile these propositions by demonstrating the moderating role of conceptual abstraction. In Study 1, participants who recalled performing recent (concrete) moral or immoral behavior demonstrated compensatory behavior, whereas participants who considered temporally distant (abstract) moral behavior demonstrated behavioral consistency. Study 2 confirmed that this effect was unique to moral self-perceptions. Study 3 manipulated whether participants recalled moral or immoral actions concretely or abstractly, and replicated the moderation pattern with willingness to donate real money to charity. Together, these findings suggest that concrete moral self-perceptions activate self-regulatory behavior, and abstract moral self-perceptions activate identity concerns.

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More information

Published date: 1 July 2012
Keywords: moral licensing, morality, identity, prosocial behaviour, temporal perspective, construal level

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 473422
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/473422
ISSN: 0146-1672
PURE UUID: 04568e2e-39cf-433f-85ac-2a25723b4eec
ORCID for Paul Conway: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4649-6008

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Date deposited: 17 Jan 2023 18:07
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:17

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Contributors

Author: Paul Conway ORCID iD
Author: Johanna Peetz

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