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Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach

Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach
Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach
Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.
0022-3514
216-235
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98

Conway, Paul and Gawronski, Bertram (2013) Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104 (2), 216-235. (doi:10.1037/a0031021).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.

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Published date: 1 February 2013

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Local EPrints ID: 473424
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/473424
ISSN: 0022-3514
PURE UUID: e281b63a-4841-4c99-b2d3-2db04716dd42
ORCID for Paul Conway: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4649-6008

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Date deposited: 17 Jan 2023 18:07
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:17

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Author: Paul Conway ORCID iD
Author: Bertram Gawronski

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