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Clarifying gender differences in moral dilemma judgments: The complementary roles of harm aversion and action aversion

Clarifying gender differences in moral dilemma judgments: The complementary roles of harm aversion and action aversion
Clarifying gender differences in moral dilemma judgments: The complementary roles of harm aversion and action aversion
Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies (N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.
1948-5506
353-363
Armstrong, Joel
3ce3ebb8-12ff-43c9-98c8-99c7fbdbc7d6
Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Armstrong, Joel
3ce3ebb8-12ff-43c9-98c8-99c7fbdbc7d6
Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286

Armstrong, Joel, Friesdorf, Rebecca and Conway, Paul (2019) Clarifying gender differences in moral dilemma judgments: The complementary roles of harm aversion and action aversion. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (3), 353-363. (doi:10.1177/1948550618755873).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies (N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 16 February 2018
Published date: 1 April 2019

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 473510
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/473510
ISSN: 1948-5506
PURE UUID: 0960be34-d084-4db4-956a-cdbb0332a248
ORCID for Paul Conway: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4649-6008

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Date deposited: 20 Jan 2023 18:06
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:17

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Contributors

Author: Joel Armstrong
Author: Rebecca Friesdorf
Author: Paul Conway ORCID iD

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