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Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: the CNI model of moral decision-making

Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: the CNI model of moral decision-making
Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: the CNI model of moral decision-making
Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions.
0022-3514
343-376
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98
Armstrong, Joel
3ce3ebb8-12ff-43c9-98c8-99c7fbdbc7d6
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Hütter, Mandy
98551599-ba14-4bef-b10f-3967788ebf0e
Gawronski, Bertram
157e7cc7-62b1-464e-a024-7925fd8b3a98
Armstrong, Joel
3ce3ebb8-12ff-43c9-98c8-99c7fbdbc7d6
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Friesdorf, Rebecca
9ecf5373-139d-43c6-837c-44cf087ad33a
Hütter, Mandy
98551599-ba14-4bef-b10f-3967788ebf0e

Gawronski, Bertram, Armstrong, Joel, Conway, Paul, Friesdorf, Rebecca and Hütter, Mandy (2017) Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: the CNI model of moral decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113 (3), 343-376. (doi:10.1037/pspa0000086).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions.

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Published date: 1 September 2017

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 473523
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/473523
ISSN: 0022-3514
PURE UUID: 8713c868-3412-4114-9520-792a75e750cc
ORCID for Paul Conway: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4649-6008

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Date deposited: 20 Jan 2023 18:06
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:17

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Contributors

Author: Bertram Gawronski
Author: Joel Armstrong
Author: Paul Conway ORCID iD
Author: Rebecca Friesdorf
Author: Mandy Hütter

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