Equilibria interchangeability in cellular games
Equilibria interchangeability in cellular games
The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria. This article studies properties of Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behaviour of infinite chain of homogeneous economic agents. The article shows that there are games in the which strategy of any given player is interchangeable with strategies of players in an arbitrary large neighbourhood of the given player, but is not interchangeable with the strategy of a remote player outside of the neighbourhood. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing universal properties of interchangeability common to all cellular games.
axiomatization, completeness, interchangeability, Nash equilibrium, Strategic game
1637-1661
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Protzman, Margaret
0df4e2d7-fd8e-4703-ba0c-bd224e31175e
1 October 2016
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Protzman, Margaret
0df4e2d7-fd8e-4703-ba0c-bd224e31175e
Naumov, Pavel and Protzman, Margaret
(2016)
Equilibria interchangeability in cellular games.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 26 (5), .
(doi:10.1093/logcom/exu054).
Abstract
The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria. This article studies properties of Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behaviour of infinite chain of homogeneous economic agents. The article shows that there are games in the which strategy of any given player is interchangeable with strategies of players in an arbitrary large neighbourhood of the given player, but is not interchangeable with the strategy of a remote player outside of the neighbourhood. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing universal properties of interchangeability common to all cellular games.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 23 September 2014
Published date: 1 October 2016
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© 2014 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
axiomatization, completeness, interchangeability, Nash equilibrium, Strategic game
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Local EPrints ID: 475903
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/475903
ISSN: 0955-792X
PURE UUID: 8ab78005-b0dc-4eea-a4ca-403eb16d5b5f
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Date deposited: 30 Mar 2023 16:33
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10
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Author:
Pavel Naumov
Author:
Margaret Protzman
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