Cellular games, nash equilibria, and Fibonacci numbers
Cellular games, nash equilibria, and Fibonacci numbers
The paper introduces a notion of cellular game that is intended to represent rationally behaving cells of a cellular automaton. The focus is made on studying properties of functional dependence between strategies of different cells in a Nash equilibrium of such games. The main result is a sound and complete axiomatization of these properties. The construction in the proof of completeness is based on the Fibonacci numbers.
149-161
Harjes, Kristine
28d95190-59f7-4399-bc0e-af0670b0600a
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
12 October 2013
Harjes, Kristine
28d95190-59f7-4399-bc0e-af0670b0600a
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Harjes, Kristine and Naumov, Pavel
(2013)
Cellular games, nash equilibria, and Fibonacci numbers.
In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction - 4th International Workshop, LORI 2013, Proceedings.
vol. 8196 LNCS,
Springer.
.
(doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_12).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
The paper introduces a notion of cellular game that is intended to represent rationally behaving cells of a cellular automaton. The focus is made on studying properties of functional dependence between strategies of different cells in a Nash equilibrium of such games. The main result is a sound and complete axiomatization of these properties. The construction in the proof of completeness is based on the Fibonacci numbers.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: 12 October 2013
Venue - Dates:
4th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2013, , Hangzhou, China, 2013-10-09 - 2013-10-12
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 476004
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/476004
ISSN: 0302-9743
PURE UUID: 79e53c94-a04f-4213-8bf3-0891ea1f215a
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 04 Apr 2023 16:31
Last modified: 06 Jun 2024 02:12
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Kristine Harjes
Author:
Pavel Naumov
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics