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Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers

Record type: Article

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

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Citation

Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel (2004) Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4, (1), pp. 1-10.

More information

Published date: December 2004

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 47661
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/47661
ISSN: 1935-1704
PURE UUID: b8509216-2c0d-40f3-882d-c4634e25f1fb

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Date deposited: 07 Aug 2007
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:03

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Contributors

Author: David Gill
Author: Daniel Sgroi

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