Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers


Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel (2004) Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4, (1), pp. 1-10.

Download

[img] PDF sequential.pdf - Version of Record
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (125kB)

Description/Abstract

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 1935-1704 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects:
ePrint ID: 47661
Date :
Date Event
December 2004Published
Date Deposited: 07 Aug 2007
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 18:29
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/47661

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item