Defending sentientism
Defending sentientism
The last decade has seen an explosion of interest in the possibility of suffering in nonhumans, including animals only very distantly related to us, as well as artificial intelligence systems. Much of this research takes a stance that has come to be known as “sentientism”—that is, that a capacity to have negative or positive feelings is necessary (and, typically, sufficient) for moral status. Dissatisfied with this development, Shepherd (Citation2023) recently offered a series of arguments against the view that consciousness is necessary for moral status. However, as researchers involved in research on sentience in nonhuman animals and artificial intelligences, as well as ethics regarding nonhuman minds, we did not find his arguments very convincing. Here, we use this opportunity to defend sentientism, which we hope will clarify why the view is becoming ever closer to the mainstream position in the field and will eliminate some common misconceptions. We do so by addressing each of his arguments in order.
168-170
Veit, Walter
8137e8be-a04c-41c6-979e-87fe1a4010be
Browning, Heather
8d13aa04-7648-4403-b29c-11f7674f6618
Veit, Walter
8137e8be-a04c-41c6-979e-87fe1a4010be
Browning, Heather
8d13aa04-7648-4403-b29c-11f7674f6618
Abstract
The last decade has seen an explosion of interest in the possibility of suffering in nonhumans, including animals only very distantly related to us, as well as artificial intelligence systems. Much of this research takes a stance that has come to be known as “sentientism”—that is, that a capacity to have negative or positive feelings is necessary (and, typically, sufficient) for moral status. Dissatisfied with this development, Shepherd (Citation2023) recently offered a series of arguments against the view that consciousness is necessary for moral status. However, as researchers involved in research on sentience in nonhuman animals and artificial intelligences, as well as ethics regarding nonhuman minds, we did not find his arguments very convincing. Here, we use this opportunity to defend sentientism, which we hope will clarify why the view is becoming ever closer to the mainstream position in the field and will eliminate some common misconceptions. We do so by addressing each of his arguments in order.
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Defending_Sentientism_Preprint
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e-pub ahead of print date: 23 April 2023
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Funding Information:
This article is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [grant agreement number 101018533].
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Local EPrints ID: 477878
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/477878
ISSN: 2150-7759
PURE UUID: 3f03176a-eba9-4159-89ff-1b1df6bf5ffe
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Date deposited: 15 Jun 2023 17:01
Last modified: 25 Apr 2024 04:01
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Author:
Walter Veit
Author:
Heather Browning
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