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There is no (Sui Generis) norm of assertion

There is no (Sui Generis) norm of assertion
There is no (Sui Generis) norm of assertion
There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn’t do, and things we should and shouldn’t say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be rejected. The phenomenon claimed to support them – the intuitive wrongness of certain assertions – does not in fact support them. Because assertion is an action, the wrongness of assertions can be explained purely by norms on action. And the specifically epistemic wrongness an assertion norm is typically supposed to explain can be explained by an uncontroversial norm on action: one shouldn’t act on epistemically faulty beliefs. No additional sui generis norm on assertion is needed.
0031-8191
337-362
Greenberg, Alexander
0f529d9c-1683-4f2d-94e5-2863e31a9c25
Greenberg, Alexander
0f529d9c-1683-4f2d-94e5-2863e31a9c25

Greenberg, Alexander (2020) There is no (Sui Generis) norm of assertion. Philosophy, 95 (3), 337-362. (doi:10.1017/S0031819120000169).

Record type: Article

Abstract

There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn’t do, and things we should and shouldn’t say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be rejected. The phenomenon claimed to support them – the intuitive wrongness of certain assertions – does not in fact support them. Because assertion is an action, the wrongness of assertions can be explained purely by norms on action. And the specifically epistemic wrongness an assertion norm is typically supposed to explain can be explained by an uncontroversial norm on action: one shouldn’t act on epistemically faulty beliefs. No additional sui generis norm on assertion is needed.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 29 May 2020
Published date: 1 July 2020

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Local EPrints ID: 478452
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/478452
ISSN: 0031-8191
PURE UUID: a846b79d-1827-44fd-bc50-5bdcea06dcde

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Date deposited: 03 Jul 2023 16:48
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 02:23

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