Against Progress: Democratic Enactments and Embracing a Precarious Future

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# Abstract:

How can we reimagine a future that escapes dichotomies of progress and regress? What does such a radically reimagined future look like? This paper develops an answer in two parts by arguing for a vision of the future as unstable, calling for modes of response that are distinctly democratic. It sets out an imaginary of the future as inescapably precarious; composed of multiple actants in constant relations of collusion and conflict that escape human ordering or control; a future that we, as humans, must embrace precisely as precarious. Such an affirmation calls for a cultivated democratic sensibility. Following post-foundational perspectives, I identify democracy as constituted by contingency and plurality. This is not simply in terms of an openness to plurality, but a cultivated receptivity to modes of activity that operate below and beyond conscious human willing. An ethos that expresses affirming sensitivity to the uncertainties of a precarious future.

Keywords: futurity; democracy; precarity; Nietzsche; new materialism; democratic ethos.

# Introduction

There would appear to be a certain comfort in the future. Kautsky (and most of the Second International with him), for instance, basked in the glory of the immovable laws of history, progressing at their own pace and fixing places and roles of everyone and everything.[[1]](#footnote-1) Classless society was always a certainty, the outcome of the mechanical assembly line of history. The future, then, is a warm blanket on a winter morning – wrap yourself in it, curl up and go to sleep. The Marxists are not alone here. Allen shows us how both Habermas and Honneth – though in a less deterministic sense – build on a certain left-Hegelian imaginary of a progressive future – progress as imperative or fact.[[2]](#footnote-2) But, beyond progress – indeed, against it – is there another imaginary of the future that can emerge? One that subverts strict divisions and hierarchies in favour of practices of a certain “transformative resistance”.[[3]](#footnote-3) What sort of image is this? And what are the consequences of such an imagination on our thinking of that most futural of all human activity – politics?

This paper aims to develop – if only in outline – such an image, building on indigenous cosmologies of the *Bhilala* indigenous community[[4]](#footnote-4), a marginal tradition of western philosophy moving through Nietzsche and Deleuze, and a strand of materialist theory that recognises vitality and agency in forces below and beyond the register of conscious human willing. It argues for a future characterised by an inescapable precarity and uncertainty – susceptible to sudden moments of destabilisation that spur creative self-organisation on planes occupied by multiplicities of agents in constant relations of collusion and conflict that escape any human control, order, or progressive/regressive determination or teleology. A radical imaginary that recognises a fundamental incongruity between past and future, rendering the latter open to potentialities engendered by forces dispersed across a continuum of agential power.

But why adopt such an imaginary? To explode the binaries of progress/regress, to reveal a richer terrain of possibility lying beyond. To develop an attentiveness to processes by which novel modes of being and becoming emerge, that are incapable of capture within established modes of knowledge and perception.[[5]](#footnote-5) To reveal precarity as the positive condition of possibility of human agency and enactments embedded within larger assemblages of human and non-human forces.

At the same time, the aim is not to develop a conclusive theorisation of the future; only to explore possibilities tentatively, and to identify the consequences of accepting such possibilities on our shared imaginaries of it. I thus aim to map out a speculative story and our responses to such a story adopting what William E. Connolly calls an onto-political stance.[[6]](#footnote-6) I put forth what I believe is a compelling view of the future, while simultaneously recognising its contestability and partial nature.

The paper advances in two parts. In the first, I explore an imaginary of the future as precarious. In a first step, I lay out an account of vitality – of a world composed of multiplicities of actants with differing degrees of agential forces entering into and breaking apart from complex assemblages. Such a view problematises the notion of a fully-formed human subject/agent in favour of a dispersed materiality of agential capacities. Building on such an account, I then go on to argue for an image of the future as precarious precisely because it opens itself up – in durational moments – to the interinvolvements of heterogenous temporal registers (occupied by actants with differing degrees of agency), spurring unpredictable and novel modes of self-organisation. In the second part, I turn to the question of the relation between politics and such an imaginary of the future. Building on an essentially post-foundational account of democratic politics – identifying it as first and foremost an act of radical imagination –, I argue that an affirming relation to a precarious future demands a cultivated sensitivity towards radical plurality – a sensitivity embodied in democratic politics. The paper explores two dimensions of this relation: plurality (horizontality) and ethos (sensitivity) and then concludes.

# Mapping Precarity

I seek to begin by drawing a map – charting a set of resonances and affinities between disparate accounts of a world of complexity prone to moments of destabilisation. What are these resonances, and what sort of future do they enable us to imagine/recognise? I suggest an image of a future characterised by a certain flux – an element of chanciness, uncertainty, or instability as constitutive of the world and its future(s). But the first step to recognising such uncertainty is an expanded understanding of the sites and forces that act into and on the future. We must then, first of all, come to terms with a certain vitality in a complex and multi-layered world. Here, the *Bhilala* origin-myth – the *Gayana* – can orient us, helping us on our way.

## Vitality: Actants, Creativity, and Misbehaving Mountains

In the world of the *Gayana*, the mountains misbehave, animals run riot and rivers, in fits of rage, create mountains where there were only plains before.[[7]](#footnote-7) An intricate interweaving of human and non-human agents, forces and flows that move interchangeably across the artifice of subject/object. The forest, the mountains, the river are not just the stage on which human agents act but are – to a greater or lesser extent – actors alongside humans. As Baviskar points out, “For *Bhilalas*, affecting nature’s cycle is intrinsic to a cosmology that imbues all natural phenomena with a spiritual life, so that the hills, trees, stones and crops actively intervene in people’s daily lives”.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The *Gayana* paints a picture of the world – drawing relationships between human, forest, animal, river and mountain – not in terms of control or exploitation, but in a way that attributes and acknowledges agential capacities and consciousness within ‘nature’ itself.[[9]](#footnote-9) It is, after all, the mountains themselves that misbehave. It draws our attention to these multiple, overlapping agential processes constantly underway, to how they exceed human ordering or control and consequently how human enactments are themselves embedded within larger tapestries of agential forces.

One finds deep and profound resonances between the vivid imagery of the *Gayana* and strands of materialist thought that seeks to cultivate an attentiveness to vitality in things and their power to move us, to affect us, and to engender change. A thing-power characterised by “the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle”.[[10]](#footnote-10) The rivers and mountains act, decide, collude, or collide, and produce effects on other sites of agency, including the human. Thing-power: when the river as a jilted lover creates mountains out of fertile alluvial plains; or, more prosaically, when multiple agential forces (the seed, the soil, the rain) on different registers of temporality collude and collaborate to bring forth grain.

Four key dimensions of thing-power stand out vis-à-vis our discussion. First, animation; that things possess the ability to animate themselves, to come alive, to become-organic. Second, creativity; that things can self-organise in novel and creative ways.[[11]](#footnote-11) Creativity as autopoiesis – a bringing forth into presence of that which is concealed.[[12]](#footnote-12) But such creativity is also relational, and this is the third dimension. As Jane Bennett argues, “a material body always resides within some assemblage or the other, and its thing-power is a function of that grouping. A thing has power by virtue of its operating in conjunction with other things”.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The thing-power of rain (or the monsoon), for instance, within an autopoietic flow is specific to the assemblage/group seed-soil-rain-sunlight-plough-bull-farmer. For, the same rain can form a different assemblage: thunder-wind-rain-lightning-flood that can cause horrific devastation.

The point is not some crude equivalence between human and non-human. It is to build sensitivity towards the vitality of things below and beyond the register of conscious human thinking. A responsiveness to actancy (the fourth dimension), identified as that “which does something, has sufficient coherence to perform actions, produce effects and alter situations”.[[14]](#footnote-14) Agential forces and capacities operating below registers of conscious willing, but above that of a blind causality – “less intentional than participants, yet more autonomous than actors”.[[15]](#footnote-15) Indeed, the actant problematizes any conception of a fully-formed conscious agent, for lurking always below the surface is a multiplicity of interinvolved flows of agential processes at differing degrees of coherence and sophistication that are constitutive of the image of the whole. Heterogenous agential force-fields, not conscious, but not dead, in continuing processes of becoming that enable the emergence of novel modes of self-organisation.[[16]](#footnote-16)

We thus face a continuum of actants; each actant an animated site of agential energy, in conjunctions and interinvolvements with other such sites as they hurtle each other forwards. A flowing materiality capable of astonishing varieties of configurations through entering, subverting, infiltrating and disbanding assemblages. Affirming such vitality is to locate (seemingly human) agency itself as dispersed, diffused; to see, that is, “a halo of instinct in intelligence, a nebula of intelligence in instinct, a hint of the animate in plants and of the vegetable in animals”.[[17]](#footnote-17) Vital materialism, with its multiple sites of agency, provides insight into a world of complexity within which humanity and human agency is itself embedded.[[18]](#footnote-18) A vibrant world of criss-crossing and interinvolved forces brimming with possibility each time they come together or break apart. The flowing river, misbehaving mountains and animals running wild, all come together in complex assemblages that enable the *Bhilala* to subsist. Had the river never carved out its gorge through the ‘wild’ mountains, the *Bhilala* would have nowhere to live; and when the river ceases to flow again (as it soon will, with the aggressive damming of the Narmada[[19]](#footnote-19)), the *Bhilala* (and millions of others, too) will once again have no place to live.

# Flux – *Poojas*, Durationality, Virtuality

So, what sort of imaginary of the future/s emerges for us once, and if, we accept a world of such vitality? It is my argument that this is one of the future as radically uncertain, precarious, prone to destabilisation and sudden turns. For the moment we open ourselves up to agential forces that exceed human control or direction, we open ourselves to possibilities – engendered by such forces – of radical transformations of the future/s.

Consider, once again, the *Gayana*. As an origin-myth song, it is performed repeatedly as part of elaborate rituals at particular times of the year, notably just before the first rains of the monsoon (*Indal* *Pooja*), and right after the seasonal harvest (*Divaha*).[[20]](#footnote-20) But does not such repetition also point to the *Gayana* being more than an origin-myth? The misbehaving mountains of the *Gayana* are not just a primordial chaos – they are always looming, always a spectre. Uncertainty, a sudden twist or turn, is always around the corner. The *Indal* *Pooja* calls on the union of earth and rain that brings forth the grain on which the *Bhilala* subsist[[21]](#footnote-21); but such a union could just as easily not come about: the rains may fail, or they may be delayed, parching the earth and ruining the crop. The *pooja* is a recognition of such uncertainty. Singing and performing the *Gayana* during the *pooja* brings back to light this world of multi-layered agency that is susceptible to sudden moments of destabilisation.

This world, which the *Gayana* with its multiple agents occupies and (each in their own way) attempts to give order to, is always susceptible to being disordered. A future that is irreversibly precarious, escaping any capture by human control or direction. It can be stabilised, but always only at the risk of destabilisation not just through human hubris but the doings, actions, and processes of the natural world – of multiple actants with differing degrees of agency. A future that is Zarathustra’s dance floor playing up “the element of chance at pivotal moments when several dances of different kinds are active.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

Staying in step with Nietzsche’s Zarathustra for a while longer can help us more fully come to terms with a precarious future. Consider this exchange between Zarathustra and the Dwarf: “Two paths come together here, no one has yet walked them to their end. This long lane back: it lasts an eternity. And that long lane outward – that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they blatantly offend each other – and here at this gateway they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed at the top: ‘Moment’.”[[23]](#footnote-23)

Ah, the ‘Moment’ – this gateway where multiple paths come together; the moment as passage from past into future. But Nietzsche also draws attention to another dimension of this moment: a dissonant dimension; the meeting of the paths is a moment of contradiction. Dissonance introduces a gap here between the past and the possibilities of the future. There is no longer a smooth, linear progression from one to the other; the gateway where they remain inescapably contradictory means that this interstitial distance is always susceptible to infiltration by alternative temporal possibilities. The moment and its dissonant character bring us face to face with the precarious nature of the future, of the multiple possibilities latent there, and the contingency of ones that are actualised. Think, once again, of the *Indal* *Pooja*. A fundamental asymmetry or lack of synchrony marks the moment. This in turn is the marker of a precarious future, because the moment we accept this dissonance, imaginaries of the future, as a determined or overcoded outcome of the past, are conceded in favour a future of only incipient and uncertain possibilities. For, that is precisely what the moment augurs, an element of chanciness. Connolly identifies the fertile freedom of this moment “in which time flows into a future neither fully determined by a discernible past, nor fixed in its place in a cycle of eternal return, nor directed by an intrinsic purpose puling it along. Free time.”[[24]](#footnote-24) Yes, free time: freedom. Not only freedom from the weight of the past, but a freedom from creative control, from the possibility of ordering, directing, or structuring altogether. To borrow from Nietzsche once again, we are then “posted between today and tomorrow, stretched in the contradiction between today and tomorrow, we cannot be more than guessers of riddles”.[[25]](#footnote-25) Freedom as, or rather to become, guessers.

At the same time, recognising a world of vital materialities means coming to terms with multiplicities of temporal registers. The moment, then, when conceived in light of a world of vitality, exceeds chronological organisation precisely by stretching across, and so bringing together, multiple dissonant temporal registers. As opposed to chronological time, this dissonance is of a durational character. In durational moments, registers of chronological time infect, infuse, and resonate with one another to produce imbalances, or creative emergences, in one or all registers.[[26]](#footnote-26) The *Indal* *Pooja* marks precisely such a durational moment – the (contingent) coming-together of rain, seed, sunlight, nutrients, microbial life and so on. We no longer have a gateway, but a portal, one that leads to a plateau of multiplicities; assemblages that emerge and break apart as different temporal registers fuse into one another. We are faced, then, with a future of plurality, of radical possibility characterised by a certain simultaneity captured durationally. Where multiple temporal registers or trajectories collide into a “simultaneity of currents that evidence the capacity to be one and several at the same time”.[[27]](#footnote-27)

We can now see the beginnings of our account of a precarious future taking shape. The crucial point to bring forward from the preceding discussion is that durational dissonance involves interinvolvements across differences. It is this interjection that, as I hope to have shown, is generative of precarity as a condition of the future, precisely because it pushes back against structuration or determination of possibility. That is, it resists a singular Order or regime in favour of a moment of openness. Our concern here is with this durational moment not as rejection of stable foundation, but as the rejection of any such ground being given to us in advance as fixed, universal, or absolute. The durational moment then always encapsulates this tension, this essential strife, between determinate possibility and its radical transformation. We could speak of the durational moment as the interjection of the virtual, of that which “resists the actual and always threatens to dissolve it”.[[28]](#footnote-28) Such an interjection shows how ‘wide’ the gap is, bringing into view and attesting to the possibilities of the possible. Virtuality opens onto a durational plane – a plane of immanence – where multiple interinvolved agential forces within complex assemblages precariously come together or break apart, to spur creative self-organisation.[[29]](#footnote-29) As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the interjection of the virtual – the emergence of the durational moment – is the opening up of “a rhizomatic realm of possibility effecting the potentialisation of the possible, as opposed to the arborescent possibility, which marks a closure, an impotence”.[[30]](#footnote-30)

At the same time, the point is not chaos, as complete disorder, emptiness, nihilism. By recognising the future as precarious we instead recognise and draw our attention to an inescapable ‘flux’ in processes of becoming and their temporal registers – a flux that frustrates attempts at regularisation. Not an absence of all stability or order, but that despite all our efforts, stability may not arise, sudden turns and twists in intersecting temporal registers may engender transformations that actualise and neutralise possibilities of the future in unpredictable, uncontrollable ways.[[31]](#footnote-31) This is precisely the message of the *Gayana*: not simply to bring order to chaos, but to attempt stabilisation while simultaneously recognising the inevitability of destabilisation.

# Precarious Politics

So, what does such an account of the future say of our thinking of politics? In other words, what are possibilities of political enactment once we recognise and relate affirmingly to a future of precarity? What form of political thinking builds on such an affirmation and what resources/energies does it build on?

My suggestion, of course, is democratic politics, by which I refer to what can be loosely identified as “post-foundational theories of democracy”.[[32]](#footnote-32) Rejecting any absolute foundation for the social, post-foundational thought stresses the ultimate impossibility of any positive grounding of society, an absence/emptiness that opens up the possibilities of competing, contingent articulations or claims.[[33]](#footnote-33) On this reading, then, democratic politics is, on the one hand, that which keeps open and visible the relation to a contingent ground or decision[[34]](#footnote-34), and on the other, that which cultivates a sensitivity and responsiveness to multiple and heterogenous processes of becoming and self-transformation within such a contingent terrain. Contrary to the demand for rational institutional/procedural frameworks of liberal or deliberative democratic thought[[35]](#footnote-35), post-foundational accounts underscore radical plurality and contingency. At the same time, it is these two forces that enable democratic politics to respond affirmingly to a precarious future. Let us look at each in turn.

## Horizontality: Plurality/Physiology/Assemblage

First, horizontality (plurality). Democratic politics demands a receptivity and openness to alterity or difference, to multiplicities of agential forces and temporal registers each embodying possibilities for radical transformation. Openness to a protean diversity of being, an overflowing that exceeds any capture or determination.[[36]](#footnote-36) Radical pluralism. In this sense, we could speak, following John Protevi[[37]](#footnote-37), of a certain ‘physiological’ character of democratic politics; an understanding of political enactments not only as vertical frameworks of structural sedimentation or reactivation – such as the logic of representation –, but also horizontal assemblages. Political physiology accounts for and recognises thresholds and patterns that connect across differences within a “machinic network of finite automata (a rhizome)”.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Physiology, then, is nothing but the assemblage character of democratic politics. In contrast to a transcendent ordering, or determination, assemblages bring to the fore physiological connections across lines of difference. Processes of mutual interinvolvement and consolidation between disparate entities that spontaneously cohere or disintegrate. As Connolly points out: “An assemblage composed through relations of imbrication, infusion, and intercalation between heterogenous elements that simultaneously enter into one another to some degree, affect each other from the outside, and generate residual or torrential flows exceeding the first two modes of connection.”[[39]](#footnote-39)

As assemblage, democratic politics is thus a contingent holding-together of disparate elements without any signifying unity or totality – always (n-1), less than totality, a multiple.[[40]](#footnote-40) This horizontality, this responsiveness to the possibilities of connections across lines of difference, draws our attention to the durational portal, the interjection of the virtual. Democratic politics, in this sense, rejects and dissolves any linearity, direction or chronology. And it does this by reactivating the durational multiplicity of the moment, by bringing back to light – ‘making visible’ – incipient possibilities from heterogenous sites and, thus, an inescapable uncertainty.

## Ethos: Orientation/Attunement/Sensitivity

This brings us to the second reason. For, an understanding of political enactments as physiological implies a particular attunement to precarity. If the aim is to build on multiplicity and the creative energies emerging therefrom, then democratic politics must incorporate a certain affirming commitment to such processes. Nietzsche identifies this attunement as an orientation – a guiding thought driven by a “continual concern about our multiple futures”.[[41]](#footnote-41) Concern is crucial here: an orientation to the future not just in terms of a receptivity to otherness, but a cultivated sensitivity or active-responsiveness to difference and the fecund possibilities of dissonance. A *sensitivity* to the multiplicities incipient in durational moments and possibilities of sudden transformations of seemingly stable assemblages. *Care*. Orientation as care for “…what exists and might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one that is never immobilised before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way…”.[[42]](#footnote-42)

A care for multiplicity, for the possibilities incipient in durational moments – to recognise in this flux the *positive* condition of being and becoming. *Affirmation*. An affirmation of overflowing abundance. Nietzsche sketches out, cryptically, but more fully, what is at stake in such an affirming orientation when he says, “I am falling until I reach the ground – and do not want to say anymore ‘I am seeking for the ground’”.[[43]](#footnote-43) The point is that such an orientation to the future demands a letting go of all hold in any transcendent ground or principle. A distinct orientation to a future of chanciness and play, that affirms and responds with care to its fecund possibilities. An orientation that replaces a logic of progress with the force of the unexpected; that is guided by the music of the future which leads into its every labyrinth, rejecting “all crude, four-square opposites, which is proudly conscious of its practice in having reservations and which deals confidently with certainty and uncertainty”.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Echoing what was alluded to above, a post-foundational imaginary is not the rejection of all foundation – some form of crude antifoundationalism – but precisely a responsiveness to undercurrents, to fugitive rhythms and protean churnings that are always just below the surface, concealed by what is sedimented, settled. This is not an abdication of the need for ground/foundation/stability. It is, however, the renunciation of any absolute, universal ground. We are pushing back against an imaginary of democratic politics rooted in fixed, given, and unchanging normative principles, in just the way that we resist an imaginary of the future grounded in a vision of progress. The question is not of stability or instability, but of a certain middle ground, where normative principles or stable foundations are articulated at precisely the point where they embrace the principles of their own contestation.

Is this not precisely democratic? This openness to radical plurality constitutive of democratic politics entails a commitment to remain responsive and attentive to processes of becoming within such a plural terrain. A certain *ethical* commitment; a democratic ethos composed of a receptivity towards the otherness of the other, keeping open a relation to dissonance and difference, and recognising the other (an outside) as constitutive of oneself.[[45]](#footnote-45) But at the same time, this ethos does not and cannot be reduced to some transcendent law or universal maxim; for that, once again, introduces linearity and chronology. Instead, we must grasp a democratic ethos in terms “anchored first and foremost in presumptive care for the diversity of life and the fecundity of earth”[[46]](#footnote-46). We are speaking then not simply of following an ethical rule, but of cultivating an ethos of care and generosity that recognises and sustains not only the fact of differences, but the possibilities of emergence for that which is latent, incipient and concealed; an ethos that returns the virtual, the durational portal, that affirms and responds with care towards uncertainty and precarity. This is an ethos better grasped in terms of an existential attunement – a fundamental *orientation* to the future, as pointed out above. As we saw at the beginning of this paper, an uncertain future is not simply the result of human hubris, but the outcomes of complex and fragile assemblages constantly susceptible to moments of disruption and destabilisation. An ethical orientation that affirms such an imaginary, then, is also sensitive to such subterranean processes. And, most importantly, it responds to them with a cultivated care in terms of a keeping-open, a preserving of fragility; in other words, it responds in ways that “are not simply resilient and creative, but are so precisely in ways that maintain the conditions for future creativity”.[[47]](#footnote-47)

# Conclusion

Care for future creativity – this is the crucial bit. Recognising and affirming an imaginary of the future as uncertain and precarious is not to collapse into either an inert nihilism, or a vengeful demand for certainty. It is to express a care for precarity as possessing a certain positive, creative ontological value. Between complete surrender and proclamations of mastery, what is called for is a cultivated care (love, even) for this element of chanciness and play as constitutive of our possibilities to be who we are and explore what we can be. *In-between-ness*: precarity is not simply instability, it is only its risk, yet an inevitable risk.

This paper has sought to explore such an imaginary of the future, what it entails, and what the possibilities of political enactments within such an imaginary are. In this, it developed an account of a future marked by precarity (as opposed to one constituted by a logic of progress or technological control) – susceptible to sudden and radical transformation as multiple temporal registers interact spurring moments of creative self-organisation. Probing the possibilities of political enactments that build affirmingly on such an imaginary, the paper argued for a democratic politics for two reasons: One, the openness to radical plurality in terms of the assemblage character of democratic politics, and two, a cultivated ethos of care and sensitivity to processes of becoming, or agential forces across a multiplicity of sites as characteristic of democracy. Of course, such a democratic care (for future creativity) is not itself certain – precarity can also reinforce demands for order and certainty. But do we really want transcendent guarantees?

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1. Laclau and Mouffe: *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 8–23. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Allen: *Adorno, Foucault and the End of Progress*, 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ashcroft: *Post-Colonial Transformation*. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The *Bhilala* is an indigenous community belonging to Central India. Living in the mountainous terrain along the banks of the Narmada river, the *Bhilala* have been a central part of political activism, and the imagination of alternatives against the damming of the Narmada river. My discussion of the community here develops out of seminal ethnographic work carried out by Baviskar in *In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada Valley*. against the backdrop of *Bhilala* activism in the *Narmada* *Bachao* *Andolan* (Movement to Save Narmada). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Bennett and Connolly: *Contesting Nature/Culture*, 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Connolly: *Ethos of Pluralisation*, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Baviskar: *Belly of the River*, 284–294. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Baviskar: *Belly of the River*, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Baviskar: *Belly of the River*, 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Bennett: *Force of Things*, 351. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Bennett: *Force of Things*, 353. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 71; Heidegger: Origin of the Work of Art. In: *Basic Writings*, 139-212, here 197–203; Heidegger: The Question Concerning Technology. In: *Basic Writings*, 307–342, here 317–318. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Bennett: *Force of Things*, 353–354. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bennett: *Force of Things*, 355. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Bennett: *In Parliament with Things*, 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 22–30. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Deleuze: *Bergsonism*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Kothari and Bhartari: *Narmada Valley Project*; Dharmadhikary: *Death of a River*. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Baviskar: *Belly of the River*, 90, 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Baviskar: *Belly of the River*, 90, 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Nietzsche: *Zarathustra*, 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Connolly: *Nietzsche, Democracy, Time*, 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Nietzsche: *Gay Science*, 343. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 99–104. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Deleuze: *Bergsonism*, 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Smith: *Believing in This World*, 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Deleuze and Parnet: *Dialogues II*, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Deleuze and Guattari: *A Thousand Plateaus*, 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Bennett and Connolly: *Contesting Nature/Culture*, 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Marchart: *Post-Foundational Theories of Democracy*. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Lefort: *Democracy and Political Theory*, 17; Laclau and Mouffe: *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 135–137. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Laclau: *Democracy and the Question of Power*, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Habermas: *Between Facts and Norms*, 162–165; Rawls: *Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical*, 235–237; Rawls: *The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus*. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Connolly: *Capitalism and Christianity,* 66–67; Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Protevi: *Deleuze, Guattari and Emergence*. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Deleuze and Guattari: *A Thousand Plateaus*, 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Connolly: *Capitalism and Christianity,* 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Deleuze and Guattari: *A Thousand Plateaus*, 5; Tønder: *Inessential Commonality*, 205–206. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Stegmaier: *Nietzsche’s Orientation toward the Future*, 388. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Foucault: *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Stegmaier: *Nietzsche’s Orientation toward the Future*, 389. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Stegmaier: 392–393. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Norval: *Hegemony after Deconstruction*; Critchley: *Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity*; Connolly: *Ethos of Democratization*. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Connolly: *World of Becoming*, 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Protevi: *Deleuze, Guattari and Emergence*, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)