Conway, Paul (2023) Moral Judgment. In, The Oxford handbook of social cognition (2nd edition). Oxford University Press. (In Press)
Abstract
Moral judgment often examines sacrificial dilemmas where causing limited harm will prevent greater harm. Such dilemmas entail a trade-off between moral concerns about avoiding harming others and concerns about maximizing overall wellbeing. Such dilemmas originated in philosophy, but research examines the psychological mechanisms that drive judgments. Yet, theorists often conflate philosophical theory with dilemma decisions and decisions with underlying mechanisms. In the current work I discuss the origins of dilemma research and distinguish between philosophical, judgment, and process levels of analysis. I consider the original ‘hard’ dual process model and a ‘softer’ version that better meshes with evidence. I also consider single process models and social perception models. I tour evidence obtained by examining judgments and via the process dissociation and consequences norms inaction modelling approaches. Finally, I consider the dangers of mixing levels of analysis and the utility of clarity for the goals of dilemma research.
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