The intrapersonal level: Intrapersonal moral reasoning
The intrapersonal level: Intrapersonal moral reasoning
Sacrificial moral dilemmas comprise cases where people decide to cause some harm to prevent greater harm. Hence, they entail a trade- off between moral concerns about avoiding harming others and concerns about maximizing overall wellbeing. Though these dilemmas originated in philosophy, decades of research suggests that dilemma decisions arise from various psychological mechanisms. Here, I review the development of models of intrapersonal moral reasoning and decision- making, examining both traditional analytic approaches- measuring relative preferences for rejecting harm versus maximizing outcomes- and modelling approaches- which disentangle multiple response tendencies underlying relative decisions. Regarding theory, I raise doubts about the classic "hard" dual process model that contrasts rapid affective processing with slower deliberative processing. Instead, I suggest findings are best explained by a "soft" reinterpretation of the dual process model, where multiple processes contribute to each decision, but responses nonetheless reflect a different preponderance of affective and cognitive processing. • Research on moral reasoning examines how people prioritize clashing moral concerns in dilemmas where maximizing overall outcomes (upholding utilitarian perspectives) requires causing sacrificial harm (violating deontological perspectives). • Traditional approaches examine only relative preferences for rejecting harm versus maximizes outcomes. • Alternatively, modelling approaches independently estimate harm rejection and outcome maximization tendencies, allowing for more nuanced insight into empirical relationships. • Data raise doubts about the original "hard" dual process model contrasting rapid affective reactions to harm with slower deliberative evaluations of outcomes • Instead, data remain consistent with a "soft" dual process model, where multiple processes contribute to each judgment, with a different relative preponderance of affective and deliberative processing.
29-39
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
1 August 2023
Conway, Paul
765aaaf9-173f-44cf-be9a-c8ffbb51e286
Conway, Paul
(2023)
The intrapersonal level: Intrapersonal moral reasoning.
In,
The Routledge International Handbook of the Psychology of Morality.
1 ed.
Taylor & Francis, .
(doi:10.4324/9781003125969-8).
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Book Section
Abstract
Sacrificial moral dilemmas comprise cases where people decide to cause some harm to prevent greater harm. Hence, they entail a trade- off between moral concerns about avoiding harming others and concerns about maximizing overall wellbeing. Though these dilemmas originated in philosophy, decades of research suggests that dilemma decisions arise from various psychological mechanisms. Here, I review the development of models of intrapersonal moral reasoning and decision- making, examining both traditional analytic approaches- measuring relative preferences for rejecting harm versus maximizing outcomes- and modelling approaches- which disentangle multiple response tendencies underlying relative decisions. Regarding theory, I raise doubts about the classic "hard" dual process model that contrasts rapid affective processing with slower deliberative processing. Instead, I suggest findings are best explained by a "soft" reinterpretation of the dual process model, where multiple processes contribute to each decision, but responses nonetheless reflect a different preponderance of affective and cognitive processing. • Research on moral reasoning examines how people prioritize clashing moral concerns in dilemmas where maximizing overall outcomes (upholding utilitarian perspectives) requires causing sacrificial harm (violating deontological perspectives). • Traditional approaches examine only relative preferences for rejecting harm versus maximizes outcomes. • Alternatively, modelling approaches independently estimate harm rejection and outcome maximization tendencies, allowing for more nuanced insight into empirical relationships. • Data raise doubts about the original "hard" dual process model contrasting rapid affective reactions to harm with slower deliberative evaluations of outcomes • Instead, data remain consistent with a "soft" dual process model, where multiple processes contribute to each judgment, with a different relative preponderance of affective and deliberative processing.
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Published date: 1 August 2023
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© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Naomi Ellemers, Stefano Pagliaro and Félice van Nunspeet; individual chapters, the contributors. All rights reserved.
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URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/479040
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Date deposited: 19 Jul 2023 16:35
Last modified: 06 Jun 2024 02:15
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