Blameworthiness in strategic games
Blameworthiness in strategic games
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
2374-3468
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
17 July 2019
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
Naumov, Pavel and Tao, Jia
(2019)
Blameworthiness in strategic games.
In Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence: AAAI-19, IAAI-19, EAAI-20.
vol. 33,
AAAI Press.
.
(doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33013011).
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(Paper)
Abstract
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
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Published date: 17 July 2019
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Local EPrints ID: 479287
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/479287
ISSN: 2159-5399
PURE UUID: 8ee75db6-253a-4d14-8540-f497961eecc2
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Date deposited: 20 Jul 2023 16:53
Last modified: 14 May 2025 02:05
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Author:
Pavel Naumov
Author:
Jia Tao
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