Knowledge and blameworthiness
Knowledge and blameworthiness
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LO
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
5 November 2018
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
[Unknown type: UNSPECIFIED]
Abstract
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
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Published date: 5 November 2018
Keywords:
cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LO
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 479357
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/479357
PURE UUID: ce3c4da1-96c7-4b56-a66e-f621d4825c88
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Date deposited: 20 Jul 2023 17:34
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10
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Author:
Pavel Naumov
Author:
Jia Tao
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