The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options

Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options
Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options
How do outside options affect cooperation? We examine the stability of cooperation and the reasons for exit in public projects with stochastic outcomes, imperfect monitoring and an exit option. We find that treatments with high barriers to exit generate higher welfare overall as they foster stability and prevent inefficient separation of pairs. There is excessive exit in treatments with low barriers to exit, driven in part by an overestimate of the likelihood that the peer will leave and a desire not to be left alone in the public project. We contrast long-term “strategic” and short-term “egoistic” drivers of exit and find that short-term cost-benefit considerations play a more important role in treatments with lower barriers to exit.
0167-4870
99-112
Gaudeul, Alexia
386eae3b-229a-4985-a904-d8a3eb887f24
Crosetto, Paolo
1df877fd-252e-4221-867f-689195ae08a0
Riener, Gerhard
8e8e27a6-4931-4e70-b223-688f3fd616c1
Gaudeul, Alexia
386eae3b-229a-4985-a904-d8a3eb887f24
Crosetto, Paolo
1df877fd-252e-4221-867f-689195ae08a0
Riener, Gerhard
8e8e27a6-4931-4e70-b223-688f3fd616c1

Gaudeul, Alexia, Crosetto, Paolo and Riener, Gerhard (2017) Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options. Journal of Economic Psychology, 59, 99-112. (doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.005).

Record type: Article

Abstract

How do outside options affect cooperation? We examine the stability of cooperation and the reasons for exit in public projects with stochastic outcomes, imperfect monitoring and an exit option. We find that treatments with high barriers to exit generate higher welfare overall as they foster stability and prevent inefficient separation of pairs. There is excessive exit in treatments with low barriers to exit, driven in part by an overestimate of the likelihood that the peer will leave and a desire not to be left alone in the public project. We contrast long-term “strategic” and short-term “egoistic” drivers of exit and find that short-term cost-benefit considerations play a more important role in treatments with lower barriers to exit.

This record has no associated files available for download.

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 18 January 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 22 March 2017
Published date: April 2017

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 479579
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/479579
ISSN: 0167-4870
PURE UUID: cb2fbac1-13e1-4925-925e-052a460d3f28
ORCID for Gerhard Riener: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1056-2034

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 26 Jul 2023 16:38
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:18

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Alexia Gaudeul
Author: Paolo Crosetto
Author: Gerhard Riener ORCID iD

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×