

**Regional Professionals, American Activists and the Iron Curtain.**

**Transnational Heritage Work during the Cold War in the Jewish Quarter  
of Kraków.**

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### **Transnational Heritage Work during the Cold War in the Jewish Quarter of Kraków.**

In the search for the roots of the cosmopolitanisation of Polish memory in the 2000s, this article looks past the horizon of post-Communist Poland. It identifies the regional memory professionals as the key scale in the transnational heritage work. It demonstrates that the present state of the Jewish heritage of Kraków is the outcome of transnational work conducted from as early as the 1970s. It is the effect of competition and collaboration between Jews from the American diaspora, Polish Jews and Polish regional memory professionals.

In a field regulated by the Polish Communist Party-State, diaspora Jews tried to impose on their Polish collaborators their vision of Jewish sites. Polish Jews fought to protect those same sites as the key component of their identity projects. Prompted by local and transnational Jewish pressures, ethnically Polish professionals discovered the Jewish relics for themselves. They started from protecting Jewish sites, to later turn them into valuable parts of the heritage of Poland and eventually into a constitutive element of *Polish* heritage. This article claims that it was precisely the regional memory professionals who are the key to our understanding of transnational memory work.

Key words: transnational memory; scales of memory; Communism; Poland; Kazimierz; Jewish heritage

Taking part in the meeting on the side of the hosts, J. Kossowski and S. Wojak expressed [...] their displeasure with regards to the form, tone and content of some of prof. dr [sic] Lewin's statements.<sup>1</sup>

On September 10<sup>th</sup> 1976 a meeting took place in Kraków Town Hall, in Communist Poland. During that meeting, Professor Isaac Lewin, a rabbi from the United States, berated his Polish

interlocutors, a group of gentlemen representing city agencies dealing professionally with heritage and memory, for the condition of Jewish relics in Kraków and its broader region. It was one of the first meetings between a Western Jewish activist and Polish Communist authorities. In time, they became a regular feature and in 1983 the International Commission for Jewish Cemeteries was created. Yet, there is little trace of this transnational activism in research on Polish collective memory under Communism. Michael Meng, in his groundbreaking study of Jewish heritage, notes that the visits took place but seems to believe the “meddling” of Westerners only stoked the anti-Semitism of Polish Communists. He identifies only one revitalisation project that might be linked to international pressure.<sup>2</sup> Approaching the problem from a local perspective, Monika Murzyn-Kupisz claims that heritage preservation under Communism was doomed to fail. Before 1989, preservationists could either be “powerless admirers of historic monuments, or authoritarian visionaries ruthlessly implementing” the expectations of central authorities.<sup>3</sup> Needless to say, those expectations had little to do with the revitalisation of historic (especially Jewish) relics and everything to do with forced modernisation. For these and multiple other authors, it was the fall of Communism that released the pent-up potential and allowed for the proper maintenance of Jewish heritage, both through local efforts and with transnational input. In fact, Meng and Murzyn-Kupisz are amongst the very few scholars who attempt to trace heritage projects organised before 1989. Most of the analysis of Polish memory began in the 1990s, assuming that collective memory was somehow reset on April 4<sup>th</sup> 1989, the symbolic date of the fall of Polish Communism.<sup>4</sup>

This article aims to challenge this image. My research insists that we should move away from presenting the pre-1989 (transnational) activism as futile; historic relics (Jewish or otherwise) as consigned to gradual disintegration, and pre-1989 memory work as the sole domain of the Communist State. Instead, the present article balances the story of isolation and decay by tracing the impact of transnational activists and identifying successful (if small-scale)

projects undertaken decades before the fall of Communism. It demonstrates how those projects set the tone for commemorations of the Jewish past in the 1990s and 2000s and eventually led to the cosmopolitanisation of Polish memory. The main objective of this article is to bring to scholarly attention a missing scale of memory work: the regional professionals. It is people like Jerzy Kossowski and Sławomir Wojak, who met with Lewin, who initiated memory work under Communism and continued it after 1989. Moreover, they form the key nodal point in transnational memory work. It is at the scale of the regional professionals that the negotiation between the transnational, national and grassroots takes place. Regional professionals translate narratives produced by state governments and national elites into tangible, local solutions. They interpret the ideas floating through global networks and feed back to those global and national networks the interpretations stemming from the grassroots efforts.

What allows regional professionals to execute this key role is their position at the centre of regional networks and their relative independence. The regional professionals are people who occupy positions in heritage and memorial authorities at important regional centres. This means they can directly influence the work of grassroots activists. Their influence reaches from their city towards their broader region, towards the places, which otherwise have no direct link to national and transnational scales. Moreover, regional professionals are typically unelectable officials, they are heads and deputy heads of institutions charged with memory work and preservation. They tend to stay in their posts longer than politicians. This guarantees a level of stability. Finally, operating within vast and often inefficient bureaucracies, the regional memory professionals exercise a considerable level of independence. As this article demonstrates, they creatively reinterpret instructions coming from political actors and conduct their own memorial projects, which often contradict the state or party line.

The research into scales of memory has recently become a fruitful field of investigation. Thus far there has been a tendency in this research to focus on the most obvious levels: on local,

national and global scales<sup>5</sup>, where “local” is typically equated with “grassroots,” with activists who on the ground organise small scale memorial projects.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the existing research reveals the need for focus on the regional scale. Nowak, Kapralski and Niedźwiedzki’s recent investigation into mechanisms of transmission of memories provides a good example. The authors noted that the cosmopolitan, inclusive vision of the Polish past, recently promoted in Poland, has not transmitted well into one of the more conservative regions of the country. They claimed that a link between the centre and peripheries is missing. They identify the national elites who create the memorial narrative and local audiences who potentially consume those ideas. However, they claim that in Poland there are no activists who serve as a conduit between the scales.<sup>7</sup> While the research of Nowak, Kapralski and Niedźwiedzki is at best patchy (they have failed to locate even the grassroots activities so widespread in this region of Poland<sup>8</sup>), it is nevertheless clear that systematic focus on scale in-between the transnational, national and local is necessary.<sup>9</sup> It is precisely the regional professionals who link all the other scales together.

By focusing on the scale of regional professionals and analysing the transnational links, this article enters the burgeoning field of transnational memory studies. The field emerges from what Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney call a gradual retreat from “methodological nationalism.”<sup>10</sup> Early research in memory studies took the nation-state as the most obvious, if not the only, container of memories. What follows, it made the nation-state, implicitly or explicitly, the main subject of investigation. In recent years, this trend started to diminish to make space for transnational optics in which global flows and connections are spotlighted. As De Cesari and Rigney note, “[g]lobalized communication and time-space compression, post-coloniality, transnational capitalism, large-scale migration, and regional integration: all of these mean that national frames are no longer the self-evident ones they used to be in daily life and identity formation.”<sup>11</sup> As accurate as it is, this statement also reveals the limitations of the

current transnational approaches, one that this article sets out to address. De Cesari and Rigney take for granted the close link between the transnational memory and later stages of globalisation; the link with capitalism is also overt. This line of thinking aligns with most other studies into transnational remembrance. Leavy and Sznajder, the precursors of the transnational approach, who observed the entwining of global memory with cosmopolitanism, assume that this merger developed in Western capitalist countries and was later spread across borders.<sup>12</sup> Equally, Assmann and Conrad note that globalisation of memory took place only after 2000, though they do allow that some global connections developed earlier.<sup>13</sup> A number of recent studies took as their cases the most contemporary memory processes, often in and around the European Union.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the few recent texts offering analysis of Polish case studies from a transnational perspective focus on either on the twenty-first century or reach back to the early 1990s.<sup>15</sup>

The present study insists that a correction is needed to this presentist, often Western-centric approach. “Globalized communication and time-space compression” do not necessarily link to “transnational capitalism, large-scale migration, and regional integration.”<sup>16</sup> As recent research into the global dimensions of Eastern European Communism suggests, transnational links were successfully forged across the Iron Curtain. Censorship, limits on international travel and on intellectual exchanges (the most well-known characteristics of the life under Communism) never fully blocked transnational flows. In fact, as Mark et al. demonstrate persuasively, “from the late 1960s, with the relaxation of tensions between East and West, reflected in the so-called Helsinki Process, gradual integration occurred economically and culturally.”<sup>17</sup> The present article demonstrates that transnational flows in memory can also be traced back to the “Helsinki period” of the Cold War. Nascent transnational memory work took place both across the Iron Curtain and between Communist countries. Inspirations were shared, power was exerted, networks were created and ideas flowed from West to East and from East

to West decades before Communism crumbled and Eastern European countries experienced “transnational capitalism, large-scale migration, and regional integration.”<sup>18</sup>

### **The 1976 Meeting – Transnational Memorial Networks under a Microscope**

The 1976 meeting serves as a perfect example of early transnational memory work. It brought together activists from either side of the Iron Curtain to plan the preservation of Jewish ruins and turning those ruins into heritage.<sup>19</sup> The meeting was organised to accommodate Isaac Lewin, a Polish-born American rabbi. Chairing the discussion, and later committing it to paper, was Józef Duśko from the Department of Religious Affairs (Wydział Wyznań – WW), a regional branch of the Warsaw-based Office of Religious Affairs, an infamous entity charged with controlling, and curtailing, religious life in Poland. Also present were Jerzy Kossowski, the head of the Historical Museum of the City of Kraków (Muzeum Historyczne Miasta Krakowa – MHK) and Sławomir Wojak representing the municipal Department of Heritage Preservation (Wydział Ochrony Zabytków – WOZ). All three gentlemen were ethnically Polish. The Polish-Jewish side at the meeting was represented by Maciej Jakubowicz, the head of Congregation of Mosaic Faith in Kraków, and by Mojżesz Finkelstein, his silent counterpart from Warsaw. The group discussed the state of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues, both in Kraków and its broader region, and laid plans for their renovation. Isaac Lewin started off by berating his interlocutors for the state of Jewish sites in the region, proceeded to praise them for maintaining some relics in Kraków, and finished by accusing the authorities of profaning one of the city’s synagogues. Polish officials defended their decisions, tried to prove their best intentions and to interest Lewin in (financially) supporting their revitalisation plans.<sup>20</sup> Finally, Maciej Jakubowicz, who for most of the meeting stayed quiet, uttered a couple of sentences praising local authorities for supporting his tiny and impoverished Congregation.<sup>21</sup>

The reading of this event I propose might not seem the most straightforward. I want to go beyond the interpretation proposed by Meng based on his Warsaw and Wrocław case studies. The conversation with Lewin was not doomed to be a failed attempt by a Western activist to affect the situation in Poland, an attempt that met only with dismissal by the Polish authorities. In my view, the 1976 meeting was a conversation (tense at times) between three distinct groups of memory activists involved in preserving the Jewish past. Diaspora Jews, Polish-Jews, and ethnic Poles presented a set of very concrete agendas, which lead to very concrete short- and long-term results. All three agendas were distinct and informed by different priorities, sets of values and knowledge systems, and constrained by different social and political contexts, hence the tensions during the meeting. They aligned in that they all wanted to redefine Jewish ruins as heritage that could be used in the processes of identity-building.<sup>22</sup> They differed, however, as each of them planned on using this heritage to build identities of their own groups. The final effect of their efforts was the creation of multifaceted heritage sites, which eventually served as a focal point of civic pilgrimages of Western Jews trying to rediscover their Eastern European roots, helped to recreate Polish-Jewish identities, and supported the cosmopolitanisation of Polish identity.

Coming to the meeting, all three groups had well-established priorities but also exhibited different sensibilities and knowledge systems. Attesting to the fact that they shared the conviction of the importance of Jewish heritage (but defined this heritage differently) is the selection of sites that Lewin was shown while he toured Kazimierz, the Jewish Quarter of Kraków, before the meeting. During the meeting itself, he complained repeatedly about the state of Wysoka Synagogue, a site that was indeed run-down; however, he never mentioned Kupa Synagogue, which was in far worse shape and which he was not allowed to see.<sup>23</sup>

In the 1970s, there were seven remaining synagogues in Kazimierz. The neighbourhood itself was on the verge of becoming a no-go zone. However, as of 1976 most of the synagogues



there were in relatively good condition, if nowhere close to their past glory. Lewin was shown the two active synagogues, Temple and Remuh, and the Old Synagogue, which now hosted a Judaica museum. Later, this became the most typical itinerary of Western visitors to Kazimierz.<sup>24</sup> Lewin was allowed to see the Heritage Restoration Workshop in the Wysoka Synagogue, yet remained unaware of the slipper factory in Kupa Synagogue. He was allowed to see a workshop where works of art were renovated but not a factory that was using heavy machinery and potent chemicals that were destroying the building.<sup>25</sup>

Kupa Synagogue is located almost exactly opposite Temple Synagogue. Avoiding it was possible, but it required effort on part of Polish guides. It required choosing the most roundabout route between the other sites and meandering down shabby Kazimierz back-alleys. This very deliberate choice demonstrates the difference in sensibilities between the Polish Jews and Polish officials, and Lewin. Polish activists operated in a reality where there was almost no Jews left to take advantage of the seven sites. As an alternative to cult use, they allowed use for, very loosely defined, cultural purposes. Lewin's standards differed. In principle, he agreed with the use of synagogues for cultural purposes, but for him this meant museums.<sup>26</sup> A workshop restoring works of art was a step too far.

This difference in sensibilities and knowledge, made clear during Lewin's visit, sheds light on the nature of transnational memory work. The 1976 meeting thus offers a unique entry point into the histories of transnational connections during the Communist era, seen through the prism of scales of memory. The concept of scales of memory work is particularly useful as it links to the issues of power and borders. There is a strong tradition in memory studies that sees memory work as a competition.<sup>27</sup> The transnational approach defines this competition as taking place locally, in spaces delineated by political and cultural borders, where activists representing different scales jostle for power over representations of the past. In Jenny Wüstenberg's view, looking towards different scales of memorial practices allows us to

perceive the challenges to the nation-state made by local and transnational activists. At the same time, these optics retain the nation-state as an active, important entity.<sup>28</sup> Her approach is instructive. The Communist Party-State was indeed one of the most important players and activists representing other scales had to orient themselves vis-à-vis this supposedly all-powerful entity.<sup>29</sup>

In fact, it was due to a decision made in Warsaw, in the centre of Communist power, that the 1976 Kraków meeting could take place at all. Only eight years earlier, in 1968, the Polish Communists expelled the vast majority of the Jews still living in Poland in the third and final wave of postwar expulsions. The reorientation of the PZPR policy was due to a change in leadership that took place in 1970. The newcomer, Edward Gierek, had little patience for ideologies. A technocrat himself, Gierek was, however, fully capable of utilising ideologies and popular sentiments for his own goals.<sup>30</sup> In a bid to gain legitimacy, he supported heritage work and reoriented identity politics accordingly.

In the 1950s and the 1960s, Polish identity was created along antagonistic lines. The conflict with Germany, and later anti-Semitism, were highlighted.<sup>31</sup> Historic sites were renovated rarely. When renovation took place, as in Warsaw where the historic city centre was rebuilt after World War II, efforts were made to obscure more problematic aspects of the heritage. In the case of Warsaw, the Royal Castle was not rebuilt with the rest of the Old Town. Equally, Jewish ruins were at best neglected and at worst demolished to make space for streets, car parks or housing estates.<sup>32</sup> Kraków followed similar patterns: the historic Old Town was maintained but lacked substantial investment. Kazimierz and its relics were consigned to oblivion.

Gierek pushed the antagonistic line to the background and instead focused on the achievements of the past. Spotlighting the rich Polish heritage was part of this strategy. Amongst the first decisions of his team was the rebuilding of the Royal Castle in Warsaw. “For

a brief moment the performance of power has been transferred to the new symbolic space tied to, up until now alien for Polish Communist, royal tradition”, comments one author.<sup>33</sup> This experience of working with “alien” heritage proved to be ground-breaking for the Party. Soon, it prioritised the preservation of historical sites in Kraków, of which the majority represented the royal and bourgeois past.<sup>34</sup>

At the same time, however, the government remained ambivalent in its approach toward Jewish relics. Anti-Semitism was still rife both in the Party and the country (although it was now downplayed). It informed the worldviews of the PZPR leaders but was subsumed to economic and political interests. In fact, Polish officials laboured under the old stereotypes about an all-powerful Jewish lobby controlling world affairs: a lobby that could be persuaded to support Poland financially.<sup>35</sup> A stereotype of an uncanny Jewish banker remained strong in the PZPR and across the country, with many Poles believing that they could cosy up to this powerful figure.

The central Office of Religious Affairs, immediately superior to the regional Department, insisted from the 1970s onwards on maintaining “appearances of Jewish authenticity.”<sup>36</sup> Importantly, it only wanted to create an illusion. It was never interested in supporting Jewish communities or restoring Jewish sites. The Offices’ head suggested *exhibiting* efforts to maintain Jewish sites, but at the same time did not provide any funding for actual projects. He proposed only that the Jewish cemeteries not be demolished any further, but did not care about the revitalisation of either cemeteries or synagogues.<sup>37</sup> The only exception was the Nożyk Synagogue in Warsaw, “an important showpiece”, to use his phrasing.<sup>38</sup> Together with the highly controlled and politicised commemorations of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, these were the only state-sponsored interventions into maintaining traces of the Jewish past.<sup>39</sup> Michael Meng highlights the insincerity of Communist officials, who were only interested in commemorating the Jewish past insofar as it helped to avert the “negative

political consequences” of the propaganda of Western and “aggressive representatives from Jewish circles”, as the head of the Office of Religious Affairs put it.<sup>40</sup>

Paradoxically, it was the widespread anti-Semitism of Polish authorities that spurred a growing interest in the Jewish past. It was precisely due to the anti-Semitic campaign of 1968 that Polish intellectuals were confronted with the Jewish past of their country. The slander campaign and expulsions reminded the intelligentsia that their country was not always mono-ethnic. These intellectuals started to explore the Jewish past and examine Polish-Jewish relations.<sup>41</sup> Semi-independent and samizdat periodicals started to publish articles on this shared past, bringing memories of peaceful coexistence were brought to the fore.<sup>42</sup> As Geneviève Zubrzycki has recently noted “‘resurrection of the Jew’ [...] is also part of a broader and long-standing effort by both Jewish and non-Jewish cultural elites, social activists, ordinary citizens, and some state agencies to soften, stretch, and reshape the symbolic boundaries of Polishness [...].”<sup>43</sup> This process began in the 1970s. Representations of the Jewish past, in particular the Jewish heritage of Polish cities, have the potential to cosmopolitanise Polish memory, to make it more open and inclusive.

The situation in Kraków to an extent followed the national pattern. On the one hand, the Communist mayor of the city allowed for the destruction of Jewish ruins. As late as 1974 he authorised the burning of tenements on Józefa Street, the street adjacent to the Old Synagogue in Kazimierz, to shoot a realistic fire scene for a film.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, Duśko, Wojak or Kossowski started to accommodate the ideas coined by national elites. They rediscovered local Jewish ruins and used those sites to challenge the mono-ethnic vision of Polishness proposed (or forced at times) by the authorities.

*Isaac Lewin – the Face of Transnational Influence*

The heated discussion that took place in 1976 has to be read against the backdrop of developments on the national scale but it reveals the motivations and agendas of three different groups operating in Kraków. Representing one of these was Isaac Lewin, standing for the Western and especially American Jewish diaspora. Just as Jakubowicz and the ethnic Poles did, he saw himself as the co-heir of Jewish sites in Kraków. In fact, he came at a moment when the American diaspora was at a crossroads, searching for a new linchpin for its identity. In the 1960s, American Jewish leaders, faced with the decline of the importance of religion as an identity carrier, started to look for new ideas that American-Jewish identity could be centred around. The 1968 anti-Semitic campaign of the Polish government marked a turning point in those endeavours. Jewish expellees settled largely in the United States and in the process reminded American Jews of Poland. Following their arrival came a period of yearning for the homeland of *Yiddishkeit*, which American community leaders tried to harness for the purposes of identity building.<sup>45</sup>

Lewin was amongst the first to travel to Poland with the intention to both explore and affect the heritage there. In the post-Cold War era, this kind of civic pilgrimage became widespread but, as this article demonstrates, they mirrored 1970s practices.<sup>46</sup> Lewin informed his interlocutors that he himself was of Polish origin and that the graves of his ancestors were in Poland. This justified his claims to authority over Jewish relics. Furthermore, he also informed Poles that he planned to bring his son to Poland.<sup>47</sup> In so doing, he placed the Jewish ruins in a global chain of inheritance spanning continents. Polish officials were reminded that they preserve the synagogues not only because those sites serve local Jews or because they represent an important historical artefacts of Polish culture. Lewin made those points as well but focused on the importance of Jewish sites in Poland for the diaspora. A diaspora which, taking advantage of the detente and relaxation of Cold War tensions, could exert direct pressure over its heritage.

Lewin proved to be one of the animators of this transnational movement. Not only did he started to meet with Polish authorities himself, he also incentivised other Western rabbis and community leaders to do the same. Between 1976 and 1979 nine meetings took place between groups of rabbis and top Polish officials.<sup>48</sup> Eventually, in 1983, an International Commission for Jewish Cemeteries was created. It brought together Polish, American, Israeli and Western European Jewish leaders, and Polish officials, and was a platform through which Western activists exerted pressure on Polish authorities.<sup>49</sup> In the case of Kraków, this pressure was often invoked by local preservationists to justify their work on Jewish relics.

### ***Polish Jews – the Invisible Activists***

Another partner in the transnational heritage work and identity production was Maciej Jakubowicz, head of the local Congregation of Mosaic Faith. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Polish Jews were the quietest party at the table. The representative of the Warsaw-based Religious Association of Mosaic Faith never uttered a word; Jakubowicz joined the discussion only once to, quite randomly, praise the authorities for “creating positive circumstances for Jews and for institutions [sic] like ritual slaughter, bathhouses, kosher canteen”.<sup>50</sup> His exclamation was strategic: Kraków’s Congregation survived on the Party concession and Jakubowicz needed the support of local authorities to ensure the functioning of his organisation. It is, then, hardly surprising that he expressed his gratitude in the presence of an American guest. In fact, similar small gestures helped him to build his position and to find a successful *modus operandi* in the Communist reality.

Maciej Jakubowicz headed the Congregation until his death in 1979. Already in 1984, he and one of his close collaborators were praised for the “heart and time” they invested into the “passionate fight for the revitalisation of synagogues and cemeteries”.<sup>51</sup> Under their

management, the Congregation proved to be very skilful in negotiating with the State, at times openly disregarding the authorities, to achieve its goals. Kraków was, as far as we know, the only place in Poland where the formal ownership of the most important Jewish sites stayed with the Congregation. Through a string of new laws, the Communist government took over ownership of Jewish relics across the country, a process finalised in 1956. Jakubowicz opposed and sued the government. His case went as far as the Supreme Court, which miraculously recognised his claims. Fourteen sites legally become the property of the Congregation.<sup>52</sup> This was contested throughout the postwar period but nevertheless eventually bore fruit. After the fall of Communism, ownership was recognised not only formally but also in practice.

Fighting for ownership was not the only activity through which the Congregation tried to maintain a Jewish presence and visibility in Polish cultural life, especially in heritage- and memory-scapes. Jakubowicz initiated commemorations of the Holocaust both in Kraków and the broader region. He was responsible for the creation of the Holocaust memorial in Plaszow, the concentration camp located in Kraków.<sup>53</sup> Later he erected similar monuments in the Kraków region, in its towns and hamlets.<sup>54</sup> Finally, as I elaborate below, with his Polish partners (precisely the same regional officials present at the 1976 meeting with Lewin), he devised a scheme to renovate synagogues and Jewish sites in Kraków without attracting the attention of central authorities.

Importantly, for Jakubowicz, Jewish relics were relics of *his* community. During one of the Congregation meetings, he passionately stated that “we, Jews, are a community not because of [nonreligious Jewish institutions] but because of the synagogues.”<sup>55</sup> Thus, fighting for the Jewish heritage equated for Jakubowicz to fighting for Jewish identity. His work proved successful in the long run. The Jewish revival that Kraków witnessed in the late 1990s and especially in the 2000s took place at the sites Jakubowicz helped to protect. However, his

efforts had unforeseen consequences, including bringing Jewish relics to the attention of ethnic Poles who eventually came to recognise those sites as part of Polish heritage.

### *Ethnic Poles – the Regional Memory Professionals*

The third and final group present at the 1976 meeting were ethnically Polish regional memory professionals. Duško, Wojak and Kossowski, were mid-ranking officials. They were heads of their respective offices and institutions, but their work was in theory overseen by the mayor or the central authorities. This placed them half-way between Polish society and the Communist authorities. In this Venn diagram of overlapping identities, Duško, Wojak and Kossowski were also part of Kraków intelligentsia, a group strongly affected by oppositional, intellectual elites. It was in Kraków that the semi-independent journals which promoted the new understanding of the Polish-Jewish relations were located. Duško, Wojak and Kossowski were thus, part of the same intellectual milieu that started to stretch the definition of Polishness.

During the 1976 meeting the regional professionals complained about Lewin's brusque manner, but at the same time they tried to work with him. They informed the American of their plans and explained how their efforts were constrained by Party-State policies. At the same time, they decided to use Lewin to widen the scope of their actions. They channelled his disappointment, passed it on to the political decision-makers above them, and used it as a pretext to enact their own plans.

Amongst the ideas laid out to Lewin was the expansion of the Jewish branch of the MHK, first opened in 1959 in the Old Synagogue. The museum was unique at a national scale: only one other Jewish museum existed in Poland during the Communist era.<sup>56</sup> It also had grand ambitions, which to an extent were stoked through transnational links, especially its contacts with the Prague Jewish Museum.<sup>57</sup> Evoking the example of the multisite Prague Jewish



Museum, MHK tried obtaining Izaaka, Kupa and Wysoka Synagogues.<sup>58</sup> This was seen as a perfect solution to multiple issues that the city, the Jewish Congregation and the Museum grappled with. Organising museum branches in the defunct synagogues would ensure the sites were well maintained and that they were used for cultural (and therefore “appropriate”) purposes. This met the expectations of the Congregation, which otherwise was not capable of maintaining all the sites it owned. It would also solve the Museum problems with space, offering multiple, convenient exhibition spaces. Finally, it had potential to serve as an impulse for the revival of Kazimierz.

The idea to expand the Museum ultimately failed, but was only one of the multiple projects developed by the regional activists. Faced with a lack of political interest or the destructive impulses of their superiors, regional activists had to learn to manoeuvre around the Party-State. They devised a system allowing for under-the-radar renovations of Kazimierz’s relics. Paradoxically, as correspondence between the regional activists reveals, it was Duško, representing the infamous Department of Religious Affairs (WW), who creatively reinterpreted the instructions of his superiors. After all, keeping “appearances of Jewish authenticity”, as the message from Warsaw read, was a nebulous idea.

Most of the Jewish sites in Kazimierz were listed as protected heritage sites and therefore the Congregation, which owned the sites, was obliged to take care of them. However, the Congregation was impoverished and unable to undertake even the smallest works alone. Thus, the Department of Heritage Preservation (WOZ), executing its legal powers, would periodically inspect temples, and select works of art, decorations or stained glass windows for renovation. It would then write to the Congregation, ordering it to renovate selected heritage objects, and the same letter would also be directed to the WW, the agency charged with control of the Congregation’s activities. The next step was for either the Congregation or the WW to inform the WOZ that the Congregation lacked funds, but also agreeing that the works had to

be conducted. Sometimes, the fact that the heritage site was in danger of destruction was cited as a reason. After 1976, international pressure, a clear mark of Lewin's success and a sign of the impact of transnational networks of memory work, was used as an excuse. Stepping in as an emergency funding body, the WOZ would then use the funds at its disposal to cover the cost.<sup>59</sup> On occasions, WW would suggest alternative sources of funding or help to obtain funding from Warsaw.<sup>60</sup> Both the Department of Heritage Preservation and of Religious Affairs overstepped their official instructions. As noted, the message coming from the centres of political power was only to *pretend* to maintain Jewish heritage.

There were limits to this system, as a closer look at the story of Kupa Synagogue reveals. The site was occupied by a slipper factory. The company devastated the building and openly admitted to the WOZ and the Congregation that it had no intention of ceasing to do so.<sup>61</sup> Preservationists tried to reason with the company and sought alternative users for the site. The Congregation, nominally the owner of the building, favoured the Museum but a local theatre was suggested as well. At one point, the WOZ listed the building as protected heritage.<sup>62</sup> None of the initiatives helped to protect the Synagogue. Even quoting the pressure coming from Lewin and the International Commission for Jewish Cemeteries did not help. To relocate the company, political backing from the mayor at least was necessary. Unsurprisingly, high-ranking, Communist officials were not interested in investing major funds in Jewish heritage. The chronic economic crises that gripped Poland in the mid-1970s explain their decisions to an extent but disregard for Jewish relics was also a factor.

Ad hoc renovations were the most tangible sign of the transnational memory work in Kazimierz before 1989. However, at the same time, regional activists embarked on a project which had even more profound and long-lasting consequences. Starting in the late 1970s they redefined and reimagined Kazimierz. The constant pressure coming from Jakubowicz, and eventually also from Lewin, made them realise their responsibility for the Jewish relics in the

city. Since there were almost no Jews left in Kraków and the Congregation was far too impoverished to maintain all the sites, it was down to ethnic Poles to do so. They started to recognise the Jewish relics, first, as an important part of the heritage of Poland and, eventually, as *Polish* heritage. This process of reimagining the relationship between Poles and Jews, symbolically expressed via the heritage, first began in the Museum in the Old Synagogue and was continued by heritage preservationists. The heritage preservationists translated the Museum's vision into the practical language of city planning, which enabled the revitalisation and commodification of heritage that started in the 1990s. The image of Kazimierz created in the Museum and redeveloped by the heritage preservationist, reflected the ideas developed by the national intellectual elite. Thus, the regional professionals served as the conduit of abstract ideas developed on the scale of the nation down towards the local scale.

In 1980, the Museum in the Old Synagogue reopened after refurbishment. The new exhibition was one of the most tangible, and accessible to Kraków denizens, interventions of the regional memory professionals. It offered a comprehensive, albeit somewhat fantastical, image of Kazimierz and of its Jewish minority. The exhibition presented scores of *talits*, *yadim* and *tefillins*, neatly arranged in glass cases. Complementing the objects were paintings that provided an interpretation of the Jewish past. Both the objects and the paintings were historical, mostly from the nineteenth century. This in itself marked the temporal distance between present-day Polish society and the long-gone Jewish world. Moreover, it marked the Jewish culture as alien. The objects represented rituals that ethnic Poles did not understand or witness, highlighting the difference, the Otherness of the previous owners of these items. It was hard, probably impossible, for visitors to the Museum to grasp what a *tefillin* was. An average visitor would not be able to relate it to any object she knew from 1980s Poland. Thus, the rows of *talits*, *yadim* and *teffilins* placed the Jews firmly in the past and outside of the realm of known culture.

The paintings chosen to illustrate the exhibition complemented that image. They depicted Jewish Orthodox life as it existed in the *shtetls*, small Jewish-dominated towns in Eastern Poland. This was an inaccurate choice. Kraków, a bustling municipal centre and a medieval capital of Poland, was never a *shtetl*. Nevertheless, paintings like “Jewish Merchant Breaking in a Horse” and photographs of “Jewish Types”, presented Orthodox Jews with stereotypical features, dressed in black, typically in a poor, *shtetl*-like setting.<sup>63</sup> The official guidebook only strengthened this impression of cultural and temporal distance between the visitors and Jews. Introducing one of the painters, it explained:

It was that [Orthodox – JG] world that has been painted on numerous occasions by Waław Koniuszko (1854-99), who was fascinated by the romantic colour of the Jewish district, for which he found the best depiction in the moody, nocturnal oil painting of old architecture of ragged [*postrzępionych*] houses with windows illuminated by a yellowish glow of candles.<sup>64</sup>

The “ragged” houses, the candlelight, the romantic colours of the moody and nocturnal paintings all placed the Jews in a different country, in a different time.

To describe the image of the past created by the curators at the Old Synagogue, I borrow Magdalena Waligórska’s term “shtetl-romance” which she originally coined to talk about the recent klezmer revival in Central Europe. Waligórska reminds us that originally the *shtetl* Jew in a *yarmulke*, a long black kaftan, and with side-locks stood for a plethora of anti-Semitic stereotypes, from uncanny business skills to a proclivity toward ritual murder.<sup>65</sup> As such, it exemplified the threatening Other for ethnic Poles. In the postwar years, cut off from the sources of their angst as there were almost no Jews left in the country, Poles developed a more sympathetic variation of this stereotype. In this representation, *shtetl* stood for quaint, old-worldly, and peaceful space. Most importantly, it stood for a shared space where Poles and

Jews could live together.<sup>66</sup> Historically, ethnic Poles and Jews were neighbours who lived together-apart. There was little meaningful contact between the two groups other than competition for resources and markets.<sup>67</sup> Waligórska demonstrates that in the new vision of “shtetl-romance” those problems were disregarded and only the positives aspect of the past were highlighted.<sup>68</sup> The image of the “shtetl-romance” created in the Old Synagogue has indeed disregarded uncomfortable historical truths and instead suggested the potential for peaceful cohabitation with a Sympathetic, no longer Threatening, Other.

The vision coined in the MHK was soon translated into the language of city planning and preservation. This work, conducted by the regional professionals, affected the heritage work in Kraków and the region for decades to come. In the early 1980s, WOZ produced a multivolume work entitled “Kraków. Kazimierz with Stradom and Former St Sebastian Meadow. Historic and Urbanistic Study. Preservation and Urbanistic Study” (hereafter “Study”). On the one hand, the plan was never directly implemented; indeed some commentators complained about it as late as in the 2000s.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, its vision was enacted by the grassroots activists who commodified Kazimierz’s heritage in the 1990s and 2000s. The real importance of the “Study” lay not in how far it was implemented but in the powerful vision of the cityscape it offered. Not following the prescriptions of the plan directly, heritage grassroots activists of the 1990s and 2000s nevertheless followed it in spirit, realising its overall idea if not its specific directives.

The declarative purpose of the “Study” was to revitalise the whole of Kazimierz and bring it back to life.<sup>70</sup> However, what the “Study” truly suggested was not a simple revitalisation, but a reimagining of Kazimierz as an open-air museum, a neighbourhood frozen in an imagined version of the nineteenth century. The “Study” began by insisting on stringent protection of the buildings, street plans and skylines.<sup>71</sup> It then called for the reintroduction of cobblestones, and lampposts with a design consistent with nineteenth-century gas lamps.<sup>72</sup> It

advocated rebuilding destroyed tenements to resemble the originals as closely as possible.<sup>73</sup> At the same time, however, it suggested further demolitions: “unimportant” buildings seen as having low heritage value would be pulled down to improve the visibility of “important” sites, e.g. synagogues.<sup>74</sup> In sum, the “Study” envisioned Kazimierz as a tourist destination: a theme park of its nineteenth-century self.<sup>75</sup> The similarities between the “Study” and the exhibition in the Old Synagogue were striking. The Museum reimagined Kazimierz as a *shtetl* full of “ragged” architecture, nocturnal charm and romantic colour. The “Study” called for the restitution of ragged cobblestones, and the introduction of lamppost resembling gas lights to add to the “romantic” colour to the streets and charming lighting to the newly exposed synagogues.

Importantly, both iterations of the vision of the “shtetl-romance” reproduced similar ideas and assumptions about the place of Jews in Kraków, and by extension in Polish, society. Jewish heritage was valued and highlighted. It was not a heritage of a Threatening Other. On the contrary, Jewish objects and sites were imagined as a valuable part of the history of Poland, if not yet Polish history. Such an approach suggests that they belong in Kraków and deserve to be recognised and celebrated. However, they still stood out as the heritage of the Other. Just like the objects in the Museum, the synagogues in the “Study” were divorced from their original use. There were no Jews to pray in the seven synagogues. There were no Jews left in Poland to light the plethora of menorahs exhibited in the Museum; indeed, there were almost no people in Poland who understood what the menorah represents or when it is used. The meticulously curated exhibitions and potential revitalisation projects, therefore, restored Jewish heritage but also highlighted Otherness and the distance between Jews and ethnic Poles. It would be only in the 1990s and 2000s that Jewish life (first as a simulacrum, then as reality) would be rebuilt in Kazimierz and Jewish heritage could be envisaged as part of Polish heritage.

## **Postscript: Between Jewish Disneyland and Cosmopolitan Memory**

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the memory work in Kazimierz started well before 1989. Thus far, I have investigated the role the regional professional played in the transnational memory during the Cold War. I have also dissected the vision of Kazimierz they have created in the 1970s and the 1980s. The postscript to this analysis, traces the legacies of their efforts in the post-Communist Poland.

One of the core arguments put forward in the research insisting on the importance of 1989 is that tangible changes in Kazimierz took place only after the fall of Communism. This is in part true. Kazimierz lay neglected for decades and it was only in the 1990s that the Jewish heritage underwent commodification. Proof of the speeding up of memory work after 1989 is supposed to be found in the renovation of the synagogues. For example, thorough, costly and prolonged revitalisation works in the Temple Synagogue started as early as 1992 and lasted until 2000.<sup>76</sup> In fact, between 1992 and mid-2000s all Kazimierz's synagogues underwent at least partial renovation and their use changed as well. Three were used for cult purposes; community centres operated in two; one hosted a museum; and one a bookshop.

Yet this picture needs to be problematised. The 1990s indeed witnessed a series of revitalisation projects of synagogues. However, all these sites were first rebuilt during the Cold War. Most of them were maintained in relatively good shape through the under-the-radar efforts of regional memory professionals. Moreover, it was the same ethnically Polish professionals who, utilising the expertise developed in the 1970s and the 1980s, were responsible for shaping Jewish sites in the 1990s. When major works were undertaken in Temple, Kupa and Isaaca Synagogue in the 1990s, they drew up the plans. The contemporary form of Jewish heritage was decided not by Polish-Jewish owners of the synagogues, or the

American-Jewish funders of their revivals<sup>77</sup> but ethnically Polish regional professionals.<sup>78</sup>

The idea that it was only after the fall of Communism that the revitalisation of Kazimierz took place stems not only from the improved state of the synagogues but also from the changes taking place in and around Szeroka Street. Szeroka is one of the main streets in the Jewish neighbourhood and some of the most important relics (Remuh, Old and Poppera Synagogues) are located there. It was also the site of what in the 1990s became widely criticised as “Jewish Disneyland”.<sup>79</sup>

The first Jewish-themed restaurant in Kazimierz (Ariel) opened in 1993 and so did a bookshop specialising in Judaica. Ariel was soon followed by establishments with names such as Alef, Austeria (meaning a Jewish Inn), Klezmer Hois (meaning Klezmer House), all run by ethnic Poles and all referencing Jewishness in name, decor, (non-kosher) menus and sometimes even the uniforms of the waiters.<sup>80</sup> The entrance to one of these restaurants was adorned with a six-foot apparently electric menorah and plaster lions of Judah.<sup>81</sup> The changes were so rapid, and initially so garish, that as early as 1998 anthropologist Eve Jochowitz noted that “Cracow’s politicians and entrepreneurs have produced Szeroka Street as a Jewish theme park in a country where no Jews survive.”<sup>82</sup> Unsurprisingly, Jochowitz tied those changes to the rise of democratic rule, the free market, and the mass influx of international tourists.<sup>83</sup> In this, she has not only anticipated ideas recently put forward by De Cesari and Rigney but also dismissed the heritage work in Kazimierz as meaningless simulation.<sup>84</sup> Jochowitz was not alone in her criticism. Kazimierz has been often branded a “Jewish Disneyland” and the blame was ascribed to the post-1989 grassroots activists and entrepreneurs.<sup>85</sup> It is hard not to agree with some of this criticism in the face of electric menorahs and gigantic, plaster lions of Judah.

However, this criticism is, to an extent, misplaced. Firstly, it misidentifies the origins of the heritage work. The tacky yet cosy image of Kazimierz was not an original creation of



the grassroots activists operating there in the 1990s. References to Jewish inns, the decor of the new restaurants and even their names were all tied to the image of the “shtetl-romance” first elaborated in the 1980s by the regional memory professionals. In fact, the heritage preservationist worked hard to disseminate their vision of Kazimierz. Passages from the “Study” describing the importance of Jewish sites were copied in later city master plans.<sup>86</sup> They were also reflected in the letters, plans, decisions and memos of heritage preservation services.<sup>87</sup> In the late 1990s and 2000s, they were outlined in coffee-table books about Kraków and Kazimierz.<sup>88</sup> The author of the “Study” disseminated his vision through his academic teaching and public speaking.<sup>89</sup> The prevalence of the ideas in the planning documents and their congruence with the images presented in the Old Synagogue explains how the vision of “shtetl-romance,” the only vision of Kazimierz past, was enacted in the 1990s and 2000s. Secondly, dismissing Kazimierz as a “Jewish Disneyland” obscures the function it fulfills for diaspora Jews, Polish Jews and ethnic Poles. All the groups used Kazimierz’s heritage as a resource in their identity-building. For diaspora Jews, it was the site of a negotiation of civic identity and communal history.<sup>90</sup> For Polish Jews, Kazimierz offered a platform for the rediscovery and recreation of Polish-Jewish identities. At the time of Jochnowitz’s research, Kazimierz was undergoing what Gruber termed a “virtual” Jewish revival.<sup>91</sup> It was a site of simulation of Jewish presence, but this simulation was built around real Jewish sites and ruins. Moreover, the simulation was only one (very visible and very garish) part of a broader process. In parallel to the creation of a Jewish theme park on Szeroka Street, synagogues were renovated, and more and more Jews were coming to use them. In fact, as the example of the Festival of Jewish Culture demonstrates, the virtual revival blended with the actual one. The Festival was initiated in 1988 by ethnic Poles interested in Jewish culture. Similarly to places like Klezmer Hois or Alef, it offered an accessible experience of stylised Jewish culture, but it soon started to bring diaspora and Israeli Jews to Kazimierz. In other words, it also offered an insight into real,

contemporary Jewish culture in all its guises. In the late 1990s and 2000s, the “Jewish Disneyland” still existed but had started to be overshadowed by spaces of real Jewish life. Currently, Kazimierz has two different Jewish community centres, three of its synagogues are used for cult purposes, and in 2014 the first rabbi since the war was appointed. Amongst the people now participating in the Jewish space are members of the Community (as the Congregation was renamed in 1994) and Western Jewish tourists. Also present are the descendants of so-called “hidden Jews,” people whose parents and grandparents obscured their Jewishness during the early postwar decades. The visibility of Jewish heritage and of Jewish life in Kazimierz were amongst the factors that helped hidden Jews rediscover their identities.<sup>92</sup>

For ethnic Poles, Kazimierz offered an opportunity to witness and experience real, lived Jewish culture in its contemporary (not only historical) garb. This in turn allowed for further dismantling of Jewish Otherness and potentially also for redefining Polishness. As mentioned above, in mono-ethnic and heavily anti-Semitic Poland, the figure of the Jew is used “to soften, stretch, and reshape the symbolic boundaries of Polishness”.<sup>93</sup> From the point of view of ethnic Poles, the function of Jewish heritage is similar, regardless of whether it is garish as in some restaurants on Szeroka or high-brow as in the meticulously renovated Temple Synagogue. It reminds them that multiple definitions of Polishness are possible. The Jew from the 1980 exhibition in the Old Synagogue was a Sympathetic Other of the Polish nation. She looked different, prayed differently and even ate differently. In the 1980s, the Polish audience could not confront the image of historical Jews with the real, contemporary Jewish minority but it could learn that Jews were not uncanny bankers who plotted to dominate the world. Jews from Klezmer Hois, Austeria and Alef still looked differently, ate differently and listened to different music but ethnic Poles were invited to participate in and enjoy this difference. Finally, the rise of actual Jewish life offered a chance for Poles to witness the difference between the two groups but also appreciate that such difference does not amount to Otherness.

The efforts of regional professionals thus enabled the cosmopolitanisation of Polish memory. Cosmopolitan memory is grounded in a conviction that all human beings are equal. It supports openness, tolerance and inclusivity and aims to recognise the difference between human beings, and at the same time to prevent stigmatisation or alienation.<sup>94</sup> Cosmopolitan memory projects tend to pluralise memorial narratives, they support the transition from narratives centred on a nation's heroes to those focused on the victims of a nation's crimes. They are in fact built through the "proliferation of decontextualized and universalised historical narratives."<sup>95</sup> The cosmopolitan memory is typically tied to the remembrance of the Holocaust. The focus on the suffering caused, as opposed to received, by the members of a nation comes from the recognition of the fact that during the war some Europeans killed Jews, while other Europeans and Americans let them down. Cosmopolitan memory is seen as a Western invention that in the post-Cold War reality was spread across Europe and indeed the globe. Since it became the standard of "Westernness" and certainly of "Europeanness", a number of scholars pointed out that its acceptance, especially in Eastern Europe, was superficial.<sup>96</sup> Meng neatly sums up the problem when he states that,

[i]n public, political discourse, some Germans and Poles turn Jewish spaces into signifiers of what I call redemptive cosmopolitanism, a performative embrace of the Jewish past that celebrates the liberal, democratic nation-state rather than thinking critically about its past and present failures.<sup>97</sup>

In some cases, this reading is certainly true. There were Poles who used Jewish heritage as a screen onto which to project their openness and tolerance, precisely because this is expected of them. Moreover, using the heritage of a long-lost community without engaging with that community is easy. However, the present article agrees with Geneviève Zubrzycki and Erica

Lehrer. In their view, the figure of a Jew is used in current political struggles over the definitions of the Polish nation as a proxy for other minorities and groups.<sup>98</sup> Accepting that Jews belong(ed) to the Polish nation opens up the possibility that contemporary minorities can belong to it as well. Therefore, even passive participation in the Jewish revival serves as a base for the *potential* cosmopolitanisation of memory. It allows the celebration of differences between peoples and fosters the recognition that difference does not have to equate to Otherness. The existence and celebration of Jewish heritage are therefore preconditions of the cosmopolitanisation of Polish memory. As I elaborate elsewhere, this process was often challenged. It never achieved the ideal version of cosmopolitan memory as described by Levy and Sznajder.<sup>99</sup> As of 2020, the year in which I am writing these words, it is still ongoing and the recent rise of a right-wing government may have put it in jeopardy.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, the revitalisation of Kazimierz and its Jewish relics serves as one of its bases.

## **Conclusion**

In 1968, in an outburst of anti-Semitism that was not atypical for postwar Poland, the Communist authorities expelled almost all Jews still living in the country. By 2010 Jewish life was once again present in Poland, and especially in the old Jewish Quarter of Kazimierz in Kraków. In some parts of Polish society, Jewishness was celebrated; in some merely tolerated. However, state-sponsored anti-Semitism was replaced by an attempt to redraw the boundaries of Polishness to include the Jewish Other. This Jewish revival was centred around the heritage sites of Kazimierz. Those Jewish sites had potential to serve as a platform for the cosmopolitanisation of identities.

In search for the roots of the cosmopolitanisation of memory in the 2000s, this article looks past the horizon of post-Communist Poland and towards the efforts of regional memory professionals in the 1970s and the 1980s. It demonstrates that the Jewish heritage of Kazimierz

was the outcome of transnational memory work conducted from as early as the 1970s. It was the effect of competition and collaboration between transnational activists; in this case, diaspora Jews and a number of different Polish activists. In a field regulated by the Polish Party-State, Polish Jews worked in opposition to the State, but often hand-in-hand with its regional representatives. Polish activists protected Jewish ruins and eventually developed them into heritage. This article claims that it was precisely these regional memory professionals who are the key to our understanding of transnational memory work. In the scholarship, the leaders of preservation services (museums, and various city departments) are most often seen, if they are noticed at all, as technical experts who merely implemented the ideas of political actors.<sup>101</sup> In fact, they not only realise their own agendas but are also one of the key nerve centres in transnational memory work. They mediate between the transnational, national and grassroots scales. In this process, they coin and enact their own ideas. If their powers are limited, as in the case of Kazimierz, they nevertheless produce powerful visions that shape the local, regional and national memory. As this article attests, to fully understand the transnational memory work, we have to spotlight the forgotten scale of memory work, the regional memory professionals.

Word count (including notes): 9463

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 221.

<sup>2</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 174-178.

<sup>3</sup> Murzyn, *Kazimierz*, 72.

<sup>4</sup> For example: Holc, *The Politics*; Korzniewski, *Transformacja*; Orla-Bukowska, “New Threads;” Szpociński, “Formy.”

<sup>5</sup> Kennedy and Nugent, “Scales of Memory,” 61; De Cesari and Rigney, “Introduction,” 5.

<sup>6</sup> Törnquist-Plewa, “The Transnational;” Narvselius “Spicing Up.”

<sup>7</sup> Nowak et al., “On Banality,” 234.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 234.

<sup>9</sup> Wloszyca, “The Holocaust;” Törnquist-Plewa, “The Transnational;” and Holc, *The Politics*.

<sup>10</sup> De Cesari and Rigney, “Introduction,” 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>12</sup> Levy and Sznajder, *The Holocaust*, 5.

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- <sup>13</sup> Assmann and Conrad, "Introduction," 1 and 7.
- <sup>14</sup> See the following special issues: Sierp and Wüstenberg, "Linking;" Wüstenberg, "Locating;" and Kennedy and Nugent, "Scales of Memory."
- <sup>15</sup> Törnquist-Plewa, "The Transnational;" Narvselius "Spicing Up;" Lehrer, "Repopulating."
- <sup>16</sup> De Cesari and Rigney, "Introduction," 2.
- <sup>17</sup> Mark et al., "1989," 9.
- <sup>18</sup> De Cesari and Rigney, "Introduction," 2.
- <sup>19</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 9 and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, *Destination*, 149.
- <sup>20</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 217-19.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 219.
- <sup>22</sup> Gillis, "Introduction," 3; Lehrer, *Jewish*, 382.
- <sup>23</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 217-19.
- <sup>24</sup> See for example: APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/410, 33.
- <sup>25</sup> AWUOZ, „Synagoga Wysoka;" AWUOZ, „Synagoga Kupa."
- <sup>26</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 219.
- <sup>27</sup> Irwin-Zarecka, *Neutralizing*, 104 and Ashplant et al., "Preface," xi.
- <sup>28</sup> Wüstenberg, "Locating," 378.
- <sup>29</sup> On use of a phrase 'Party-State' see Zubrzycki, *The Crosses*, 61.
- <sup>30</sup> Zareba, *Komunizm*, 358.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 362.
- <sup>32</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 5 and Kapralski, „Battlefields," 45.
- <sup>33</sup> Zareba, *Komunizm*, 359.
- <sup>34</sup> Gaczol, *Kraków*, 154.
- <sup>35</sup> Kobylarz, *Walka*, 317.
- <sup>36</sup> As quoted in Meng, *Shattered*, 175.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 175.
- <sup>38</sup> As quoted in Meng, *Shattered*, 177.
- <sup>39</sup> Kobylarz, *Walka*.
- <sup>40</sup> As quoted in Meng, *Shattered*, 178.
- <sup>41</sup> Irwin-Zarecka, *Neutralizing*, 86-89.
- <sup>42</sup> Steinlauf, *Bondage*, 94-103.
- <sup>43</sup> Zubrzycki, "Nationalism," 69.
- <sup>44</sup> Murzyn-Kupisz, "Reclaiming," 129.
- <sup>45</sup> Novick, *The Holocaust*, 150-153.
- <sup>46</sup> Lehrer, *Jewish*, 320.
- <sup>47</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 219.
- <sup>48</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 174.
- <sup>49</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/408, 461.
- <sup>50</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 219.
- <sup>51</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/410, 197-199.
- <sup>52</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 55-56.
- <sup>53</sup> Gryta, „Polityka," 168.
- <sup>54</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/410, 63.
- <sup>55</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/410, 129.
- <sup>56</sup> Gruber, *Virtually Jewish*, 28.
- <sup>57</sup> AMHK, „Wystawa," Sig. 157/3.
- <sup>58</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/409, 219; AWUOZ, „Synagoga Izaaka;" AWUOZ, „Synagoga Kupa."
- <sup>59</sup> See for example: AWUOZ, "Synagoga Remuh;" AWUOZ, "Synagoga Tempel."
- <sup>60</sup> APK, „UMK Wydział,” Sig. 29/1431/408, 443-451.
- <sup>61</sup> AWUOZ, „Synagoga Kupa."
- <sup>62</sup> AWUOZ, „Synagoga Kupa."
- <sup>63</sup> AMKH, "Wystawa Stała," Sig. 157/3.
- <sup>64</sup> AMHK, "Stara Synagoga Kazimierska," Sig. I 17949 fol 12.
- <sup>65</sup> Waligórska, *Klezmer's Afterlife*, 143-146.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.
- <sup>67</sup> Nowak et al., "On Banality," 170.
- <sup>68</sup> Waligórska, *Klezmer's Afterlife*, 148.
- <sup>69</sup> Szczypiński, „Polityka," 34; Gaczol, *Kraków*, 163.
- <sup>70</sup> AWUOZ, „Kraków," Sig. 9897/85, 3 and 33-34.
- <sup>71</sup> AWUOZ, „Kraków," Sig. 9897/85, 4.

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- <sup>72</sup> AWOUZ, „Kraków,” Sig. 9897/85, 28-29.
- <sup>73</sup> AWOUZ, „Kraków,” Sig. 9897/85, 57.
- <sup>74</sup> AWOUZ, „Kraków,” Sig. 9897/85, 54-56.
- <sup>75</sup> AWOUZ, „Kraków,” Sig. 9897/85, 28.
- <sup>76</sup> Kraków, AWUOZ, ‘Synagoga Tempel.’
- <sup>77</sup> Gruber, *Preservation Priorities*, 1996
- <sup>78</sup> AWUOZ, „Synagoga Izaaka;” AWUOZ, „Synagoga Kupa;” AWUOZ, „Synagoga Wysoka.”
- <sup>79</sup> Murzyn, *Kazimierz*, 450-452.
- <sup>80</sup> Murzyn, *Kazimierz*, 440-442.
- <sup>81</sup> Lehrer, *Jewish*, 2786.
- <sup>82</sup> Jochnowitz, “Flavors,” 225.
- <sup>83</sup> Jochnowitz, “Flavors,” 225.
- <sup>84</sup> De Cesari and Rigney, “Introduction,” 2.
- <sup>85</sup> Murzyn, *Kazimierz*, 450-452.
- <sup>86</sup> ABPP, „Kazimierz,” Sig. 210.
- <sup>87</sup> AWUOZ, “Kazimierz,” Sig. 453.
- <sup>88</sup> Krasnowolski, *Odnova* and Gaczol, “Program”.
- <sup>89</sup> For a list of his lectures see: Bieńkowski, *Strażnicy*, 331-332, examples of popular journal articles: Krasnowolski, „Problematyka konserwatorska;” Krasnowolski, „Ochrona konserwatorska.”
- <sup>90</sup> Lehrer, *Jewish*, 460.
- <sup>91</sup> Gruber, *Virtually Jewish*, 11.
- <sup>92</sup> Datner, :Współczesna społeczność,” 663., ?.
- <sup>93</sup> Zubrzycki, “Nationalism,” 69.
- <sup>94</sup> Meng, *Shattered*; Macdonald, *Memorylands*; Ochman, “Memory of War;” Guibernau, *The identity*.
- <sup>95</sup> Ochman, *Post-Communist Poland*, 8.
- <sup>96</sup> Nowak, “Political Correctness,” 38; Nowak et al., “On Banality,” 232.
- <sup>97</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 250.
- <sup>98</sup> Zubrzycki, „Nationalism,” 79; Lehrer, *Jewish*, 475.
- <sup>99</sup> Gryta, *Jews and Poles*.
- <sup>100</sup> Wóycicka, „Global Patterns.”
- <sup>101</sup> Meng, *Shattered*, 148.

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