“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement
“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement
In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Janssen-Lauret, Frederique
12 September 2023
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Janssen-Lauret, Frederique
Felappi, Giulia
(2023)
“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement.
In,
Connell, Sophia M. and Janssen-Lauret, Frederique
(eds.)
Lost Voices : Women in Philosophy 1870–1970.
Routledge.
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Book Section
Abstract
In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.
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Accepted/In Press date: July 2023
Published date: 12 September 2023
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Local EPrints ID: 482380
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/482380
PURE UUID: 101da4b4-e1ab-43e8-af05-25e6f5906ec5
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Date deposited: 28 Sep 2023 16:43
Last modified: 29 Sep 2023 01:45
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Contributors
Editor:
Sophia M. Connell
Editor:
Frederique Janssen-Lauret
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