Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being
Desire theories of well-being claim that how well our life goes for us is solely determined by the fulfilment and frustration of our desires. Several writers have argued that these theories are incorrect because they fail to capture the harms of self-sacrifice and severe depression. In this paper, I argue that desire theories of well-being can account for the harm of both phenomena by rejecting proportionalism about desire and motivation. This is the view that desires always motivate proportionally to their strength. If we reject this view, then we can explain the harm of many cases of self-sacrifice as arising when we act upon our weaker desires and thereby frustrate our stronger desires. Moreover, the harm of many cases of severe depression can be explained by its suppression of the motivational force of desires. This inevitably frustrates desires that we are left unmotivated to fulfil. I argue that this approach captures the experiential quality of self-sacrifice and severe depression better than rival views that seek to problematise these phenomena for desire theories of well-being. Moreover, these theories have sufficient conceptual resources to account for residual cases of self-sacrifice and severe depression that are less well explained by this approach.
Depression, Desire Satisfactionism, Preferentism, Self-sacrifice, Welfare, Well-being
1975–1994
Mariqueo-Russell, Atus
3b4d3f78-bd1d-46c4-b04f-3e9687fdea27
July 2023
Mariqueo-Russell, Atus
3b4d3f78-bd1d-46c4-b04f-3e9687fdea27
Mariqueo-Russell, Atus
(2023)
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being.
Philosophical Studies, 180 (7), .
(doi:10.1007/s11098-023-01966-y).
Abstract
Desire theories of well-being claim that how well our life goes for us is solely determined by the fulfilment and frustration of our desires. Several writers have argued that these theories are incorrect because they fail to capture the harms of self-sacrifice and severe depression. In this paper, I argue that desire theories of well-being can account for the harm of both phenomena by rejecting proportionalism about desire and motivation. This is the view that desires always motivate proportionally to their strength. If we reject this view, then we can explain the harm of many cases of self-sacrifice as arising when we act upon our weaker desires and thereby frustrate our stronger desires. Moreover, the harm of many cases of severe depression can be explained by its suppression of the motivational force of desires. This inevitably frustrates desires that we are left unmotivated to fulfil. I argue that this approach captures the experiential quality of self-sacrifice and severe depression better than rival views that seek to problematise these phenomena for desire theories of well-being. Moreover, these theories have sufficient conceptual resources to account for residual cases of self-sacrifice and severe depression that are less well explained by this approach.
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Mariqueo-Russell, A. - Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being
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Accepted/In Press date: 20 April 2023
e-pub ahead of print date: 6 May 2023
Published date: July 2023
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Funding Information:
A debt of gratitude is owed to Alex Gregory for comments on multiple full drafts of this paper. Thanks are also due to Brian McElwee, Giulia Felappi, Jonathan Way, Elliot Porter, Mariana Guerra, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on full drafts. Thanks also to St.John Lambert and Charlotte Unruh for feedback on sections of this paper. This paper has also benefitted from audience feedback from two postgraduate seminars at the University of Southampton and from the 2022 PhiGS Colloquium at the University of Kent. It was also made possible by generous funding from the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s Jacobsen scholarship.
Funding Information:
A debt of gratitude is owed to Alex Gregory for comments on multiple full drafts of this paper. Thanks are also due to Brian McElwee, Giulia Felappi, Jonathan Way, Elliot Porter, Mariana Guerra, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on full drafts. Thanks also to St.John Lambert and Charlotte Unruh for feedback on sections of this paper. This paper has also benefitted from audience feedback from two postgraduate seminars at the University of Southampton and from the 2022 PhiGS Colloquium at the University of Kent. It was also made possible by generous funding from the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s Jacobsen scholarship.
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© 2023, The Author(s).
Keywords:
Depression, Desire Satisfactionism, Preferentism, Self-sacrifice, Welfare, Well-being
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Local EPrints ID: 482849
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/482849
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 0ab99fef-67b9-445a-8f45-caa097b85044
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Date deposited: 13 Oct 2023 16:48
Last modified: 16 Aug 2024 17:26
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Atus Mariqueo-Russell
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