Well-being and the problem of unstable desires

Mariqueo-Russell, Atus (2023) Well-being and the problem of unstable desires. Utilitas, 35 (4), 260-276. (doi:10.1017/S0953820823000171).

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Abstract

This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.

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Accepted/In Press date: 2023

e-pub ahead of print date: 7 August 2023

Published date: 7 August 2023

Additional Information: Funding Information: I am grateful to Alex Gregory, Brian McElwee, Maria Paradeisopoulou, Kurt Sylvan, three anonymous reviewers, and the editor of Utilitas, Ben Eggleston, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. This material has also benefitted from audience feedback at a postgraduate seminar at the University of Southampton in 2021. It was made possible by generous funding from the Royal Institute of Philosophy's Jacobsen scholarship.

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