Reactionary Politics: Explaining the Psychological Roots of Anti Preferences in European Integration and Immigration Debates

Tereza Capelos iD
University of Birmingham

Alexia Katsanidou
GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and University of Cologne

The concurrent strong waves of anti-EU integration and anti-immigration preferences sweeping across Europe, capitalized on by populist discourses, reflect citizens' economic anxieties brought about by the financial crisis, dormant cultural fears, widespread suspicion towards international institutions, and frustration with "politics as usual." Extant electoral and public opinion research provide fragmented and conflicted accounts about the psychological origins of these anti preferences. In this article, (1) we articulate a novel overarching theoretical framework that focuses on reaction as a political orientation, and (2) we provide an empirical test of the propose theory using data from the 2004 and 2014 European Social Survey. Explication of political reaction as a driver of political preferences can move forward research on challenges to democratic representation, particularly political disengagement, violent protests, and populist and antiestablishment party vote in the context of the financial crisis.

KEY WORDS: EU integration, immigration, populism, reactionism, resentment, values

---

"The scale of attitudes which different men and women take toward social change may be compared to the solar spectrum. At the opposite ends stand extreme radicalism and uncompromising reaction." (Wolfe, 1923, p. 229)

This article has a twofold aim: to articulate theoretically the psychological properties of *reactionism* as a cluster political orientation in the context of the financial crisis and the rise of populist party politics and to provide an empirical test of reactionism as key driver of co-occurring anti preferences on EU integration and immigration. Wolfe (1923) identified r*eactionism* as the ideological counterpart of radicalism and progressivism. In its contemporary form, it is increasingly used by scholars to describe the discourse of right-wing populist parties and the political outlook of their supporters in the United States and western Europe (see Fraser, 2016; Gervais & Morris, 2018; Harrison & Bruter, 2011; Lilla, 2016; Robin, 2011; Sullivan, 2017; Tenenhaus, 2016; Wodak, 2015). References to the "reactionary mind," "reactionary mood," "reactionary heart," "reactionary tide," "reactionary voter," and "reactionary and xenophobic populist parties" recognize the conceptual links of *reaction*

with xenophobia, anti-immigration demands, racism, antiexpert skepticism, antiestablishment senti-ment, and anti-EU attitudes, but they leave its psychological properties largely unexplored.

Capelos, Katsanidou, and Demertzis (2017) defined "reactionism" as a cluster concept that de-scribes a complex political orientation, combining resentful affectivity with the forceful desire to return to the past. The reactionary orientation draws on conservation values and an aversion to what is new. Its affective undertone is the complex emotions of resentment and ressentiment, blending anger, fear, nostalgic hope, betrayal, and a sense of perceived injustice (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Lilla, 2016). Evidence of reactionism is empirically traced in engagement and dormant support of illegal and violent political actions, powered by a deepening sense of economic stagnation, anxiety brought about by the financial crisis, and economic and cultural fears of many citizens.

Our proposition to apply the concept of reactionism as a driver of bundled anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences rests on extant research showing them sharing affective and motivational psycho-logical properties (see also in this volume Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018; Curtis & Hassing Nielsen, 2018; Mahendran, 2018; Manners, 2018; Peitz, Dhont, & Seyd, 2018; Guinjoan & Rico, 2018), which invites the hypothesis that these preferences could stem from a common orientation. Anti-EU prefer-ences[1] are explained by affective attitudes towards the EU feeding from cultural and identity issues, authoritarian tendencies, and opposition to cosmopolitanism and openness (Boomgaarden & Freire, 2009; Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011; Evans, 2000; Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017; Teney, Lacewell, & De Wilde, 2014). And as the EU requires more transfer of national sovereignty, it triggers considerations of national identity and immigration.[2] In turn, anti-immigration preferences are linked to feelings towards outgroups (which also shape intergroup relations) and are dependent on socioeconomic vulnerability, such as low education, weak position in the labor market, and economic deprivation (Kriesi et al., 2008). And since immigration is portrayed by many right-wing parties as the central danger against the nation-state, anti-immigration preferences are used to explain right-wing voting (de Vreese, 2017; Gorodzeisky, 2011; Kunovich, 2004; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Sniderman, Peri, de Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000). Anti-immigration preferences are also linked to conservation values (Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008), EU identity considerations, and anti-EU attitudes (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2008). Many of those who see a threat from immigrants to their national identity dislike migrants and do not see any benefits in international cooperation even in the form of EU membership (Boomgaarden et al., 2011).

These models offer valuable insights to understanding anti-EU and anti-immigration prefer-ences but fail to account for their common core: the resentful reaction towards the present and the motivation to change it backwards—in other words the affective and motivational drivers of the reactionary orientation. We propose that analyzing these preferences under the conceptual lens of reaction when they co-occur, instead of considering them as independent phenomena, will allow for a clearer understanding of their complex psychological drivers. Reactionism consolidates under one cluster concept the current piecemeal approaches that examine only some of its parts, compart-mentalizing this complex political orientation. As such, it can provide valuable insights towards the understanding of contemporary challenges to democratic representation.

In Europe's current heightened populist environment, reactionism is on the rise. The bundling of anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences is frequent in political rhetoric of mainstream and new political parties, aimed at strengthening a sense of national sovereignty (Mudde, 2007; de Vries, Edwards, & Tillman, 2011). The nonspecific time where all was better, when the nation thrived using its own powers and was seemingly independent, is captured perfectly by Trump's slogan "Make

---

[1]Anti-EU attitudes are framed in the literature as Euroscepticism and are expressed as the negative preferences towards membership to the European Union and prospects of further integration.

[2]Support for the EU is also linked to utilitarian attitudes connected to economic performance. As a common market, the EU opens national borders to new economic regulations and immigrants, influencing many aspects of life. As the EU regulates economic conditions in its members on issues like wealth redistribution within a state and taxation and government inter-vention in the economy, it creates tensions for those opposing its economic policies (Kitschelt, 1994).

America Great Again" in the United States or UKIP's chant to "take back control" in the United Kingdom. In such populist narratives, ethno-cultural diversity, cultural assimilation, and globalization impinge upon the sovereignty of the homeland in ways that integrate cultural, economic, and political fears (Capelos, Exadaktylos, Chrona, & Poulopoulou, 2018). To be clear, these antipreferences can occur unbundled, and here there is no presumption that they necessarily draw on reactionary orientations. It is our hypothesis that when they co-occur, they are likely evidence of reaction.

We test this theory with data from the European Social Survey, which has been used extensively to study anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences (Bello, 2016; Hooghe, Huo, & Marks, 2007; Karreth, Singh, & Stojek, 2015). We find that the components of what we label "reactionary orientation" predict bundled anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences across electorates in Europe and perform particularly well after the financial crisis. Our contribution is twofold: We articulate a novel, overarching theoretical framework that focuses on *reaction as a political orientation*, and we empirically demonstrate that reaction sits at the heart of contemporary anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences, drawing on a combination of affective and motivational psychological properties.

Reactionism: Separating Reaction From Other -Isms

Defining concepts alongside neighboring terms provides construct clarity and is essential for theory development as well as empirical research. Here we briefly discuss the properties that distinguish reactionism from related -isms: populism, radicalism, conservatism, and progressivism.

First, reactionism is neither a by-product of nor a synonym for *populism*. Reactionism is a *political orientation* shared among citizens that adopt a back-route outlook for the present. Populism, approached either as a thin ideology or as a type of discourse, feeds on the tension between "the people" and the "corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004; Stavrakakis, 2017), and to this day, the literature has failed to demonstrate a single "populist" orientation or ideology among citizens (Rooduijn, 2018). Reactionism can be one such political orientation explaining why individual citizens support populist parties. We argue that populist parties harness the retrospective gaze of reactionism, combining it successfully with antiestablishment and antielite narratives. Reactionism will always look backwards (Wolfe, 1923); populist parties *are not necessarily reactionary* but can appeal to citizens' reactionary orientations; when the mood of the people rests strongly on reaction, populist narratives thrive.

Reactionism is also neither *right nor left*. Although the backward gaze of reactionism is often associated with right ideologies (Gervais & Morris, 2018; Harrison & Bruter, 2011), it is worth noting that left ideologies and narratives are not necessarily forward looking. As Tenenhaus (2016) notes, "the left has reactionaries too." Although they might not want to return *to the past*, they deploy memories and ideas *from the past* to articulate a particular kind of present and vision for the future (Robinson, 2016), for example, left-wing Eurosceptic arguments for the return of an old social Europe (Wallace, 2014). As a case in point, Capelos et al. (2017) identified left-leaning reactionary orientations in Greece during the financial crisis, demonstrating how reactionism is often confused with radicalism (particularly in references to "the radical right"). Both orientations advocate uprooting and a *break from the status quo*; they do, however do so in *opposing directions*. Radical politics harbor a desire for the new, whereas reactionary politics foster the desire to return things to the way they were (Capelos et al., 2017).

Reactionism is not *conservatism* either, because conservative politics support the status quo, want to keep things as they are, and oppose change (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010; Wolfe, 1923). The reactionary orientation celebrates the past, dislikes current political developments, and does not experience enjoyment in the present. Resentment and melancholy sit at the core of reactionary nostalgia (Demertzis, in press). Conservatives take comfort in the familiar and embrace tradition but from a different affective base: Their degree of life satisfaction can be high, and they

can be hopeful. *Conservatives gone sour* about current conditions could adopt a reactionary longing to return to the safety of the past once they abandon hope for the present.

Reactionism relates to traditionalism, which expresses the willingness to maintain beliefs and practices akin to one's familiar culture and a clear unwillingness towards change, but it adds resentful affect to traditionalist values. The frustrations of the reactionary orientation are consolidated in the determined desire for change backwards, the restoration of an undefined time in the past, combined with a resentful affectivity and sense of injustice. The preference for retreat and the preoccupation with what is lost sets reactionism at the opposite side of *progressivism*, evidenced clearly in alt-right verbal attacks against progressive elites.[3]

Reactionary Orientation: The Complex Cluster of Preferences, Desires, and Emotions

To appreciate the appeal of reaction, we engage with its psychological roots: its perceptions, understandings, and insights (cognitions) expressed as issue positions, the values and goals that drive it (motivations) with the aim to achieve goal-oriented outcomes, and the emotions that are inspired by it.[4]

Reactionary Issue Preferences in the Socioeconomic Environment of the Crisis

We postulate that the content of reaction is a function of the supply side of politics. Currently, reactionism is embedded in a political context where nationalist and populist parties thrive. Anti-immigration and anti-EU integration narratives are used by niche parties promoting nostalgic evocations of a glorious imagined past, where anxieties were not felt and uncertainties were calmed (Kenny, 2017; Lilla, 2016). While anti positions can originate in nonreactionary components, and reactionary positions can extend beyond anti-EU and anti-immigration policies, it is worth exploring *how much* the reactionary cluster of backward-gazing values and resentful affectivity can explain this anti-EU anti-immigration bundle. Determining other anti positions related to reactionism depends in part on the availability of data and opens up a significant potential for future studies. Climate skepticism, antiexpert sentiment, antiglobalization, anti-free trade, antiscience, and anti-political correctness are likely candidates in the current populist context.

Core Values as Motivational Drivers of Reactionism

Political values, like egalitarianism and equality, ethnocentrism, minimal government, economic security, law and order, and moral traditionalism reflect normative beliefs or ideals about political matters (Goren, 2005; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). They inform political behavior and serve as the foundation of political attitudes and individual preferences for government spending, abortion, campaign finance reform, social welfare, political culture trends, and orientations towards liberty (Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Davis, 2007; Grant & Rudolf, 2003; Inglehart, 1997; Jacoby, 2006; McClosky & Zaller, 1984).

The internal constraint of political values is traced to *core personal values,* which operate in all domains of life linking political preferences to life circumstances and choices (Ciuk & Jacoby, 2015). Core values (achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, and power) are enduring beliefs, connected to desirable goals and modes

---

[3]See the reactionary blog, *Unqualified Reservations*, and "An Open Letter to Open-Minded Progressives" at https://unqual-ified-reservations.blogspot.com/.

[4]Cognitions, emotions, and motivations are related constructs and intimately linked intrapsychic processes. Although conceptually not identical, these domains are intrinsically intertwined and frequently integrated, both in scientific inquiry and everyday life (Crocker et al., 2013; Locke, 2000). The complex nature of the reactionary orientation invites us to incorporate cognitive, motivational, and emotional components instead of focusing exclusively on one.

of conduct, and guide behavior and action. They exist in clusters spanning across openness versus conservation and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement[5] (Schwartz, 1992). For the average citizens who are not very engaged, not very ideological, and not very informed about political events and policies, political values might not be salient, but core personal values predict their political preferences (Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe, Shapiro, & Lindeman, 2004; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).

Core values operate across cultures (Bilksy, Janik, & Schwartz, 2011), are more consistent than transient preferences, but also change slowly over time according to societal and political conditions. They provide a stable but flexible basis for the study of reactionism. We theorize core values pointing to support for tradition and aversion to change as the central motivational elements of reactionism. There is an established link in the literature between core values (universalism, conformity, and tradition) and positions towards immigration (Davidov, Meulemann, Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2014). Moreover, since populist narratives label EU integration as a threat to the people, we expect anti-EU integration preferences are motivated by core values related to aversion to risk taking. Here, reactionism makes its clear distinction from economic conservatism, which draws on traditional values but positive risk taking. This is possibly why reactionary orientations which predict anti-EU preferences do not necessarily translate to (or originate only from) conservative votes but span across the right and left party preferences. Reactionism can combine left-wing protectionist opposition to the open-market forces, as well as traditionalist cultural opposition.

Competing Explanations: Reactionary Orientations Versus Personality Indicators

Extant studies find close associations between core values, ideology, political preferences, and personality measures. These constructs are interlinked and empirically difficult to distinguish: The desire for certainty and security (values) is high among conservatives (ideology) who also score high on conscientiousness and low on openness to experiences (personality) (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). *Authoritarianism* as a personality measure combines respect for tradition, conformity, obedience to authority, and a well-developed ideological outlook and might seem as the obvious predictor of support for populist parties. While authoritarianism and populist support appear to be linked in some countries, they are not in others (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012; Dunn, 2015). Authoritarianism might have a similar value base to reactionism, but it does not seem to employ or imply the resentful and sour desire to turn things back. Moreover, the reactionary orientation *is not a personality trait,* and thus it does not define individuals during their lifetime. Rather it is a self-ascribed way of relating to the political world: For some citizens, it is a meaningful orientation, for others less so (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). Over time, it is strengthened, moderated, and superseded based on how citizens interact with their political environment. It shapes how citizens experience politics, but it does not require a firm ideological outlook.

It follows that the conservative ideology, the authoritarian personality, and the reactionary orientation rest on core values that show preference for the familiar, that is, respect for tradition and conservation of the old family and religious norms. They are different in as much as the conservative would argue the status quo is worth preserving, and the authoritarian personality would obey authority and follow structured ideological preferences, whereas the reactionary orientation would position itself against the undesirable status quo and require urgent improvement by longing to moving backwards.

Low agreeableness is another personality measure linked to voting for populist parties in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands (Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016). Some studies see populist voting as an action congruent with one's personality and argue that low agreeable (labeled "skeptical") voters are sensitive to the antiestablishment messages of populist parties. But

---

[5]The Schwartz core values are discussed by Rokeach as terminal (nonreducible normative stipulations guiding personalities and society's organizational principles) and instrumental (means for the realization of terminal values).

let's pause here. Traits are *unobserved* character qualities measured by approximation with the use of behavioral indicators (Allport, 1961; Eysenck, 1975). So what is observed at best is a consistent pattern between political and nonpolitical behaviors. In addition, agreeableness, like all traits, is by definition a more-or-less permanent feature of personality. Does this mean that populist parties gain traction in societies of particular personality types? This is an unlikely scenario. Moreover, low agreeableness individuals are not necessarily "skeptics"; they could be disconnected, cynical, apathetic, or indifferent to politics, qualities with distinct psychological properties. It is more likely that the link between personality measures and political preferences is an artifact explained by values. We essentially see low agreeableness as a behavioral measure of individuals' desire to resist change, associated with low social and political trust, intolerance, lack of cooperation, and low altruism (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991; Mondak & Halperin, 2008), all compatible with the reactionary orientation. Our proposition is that deep-seated values (and not citizens' personalities) motivate reactionary orientations, which are cultivated, strengthened, or lessened; and in populist environments, they are expressed as bundled anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences.[6]

Resentful Affectivity: The Complex Emotional Origins of Reactionism

To capture the complex content of the reactionary orientation, we also need to engage with its affective core. Recent studies turn to emotions like anger and fear to explain anti-EU orientations, contributing to debates that focus on identity or cue taking (Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). Although valuable in highlighting how affect shapes political decision-making about the European Union, models that rely on discrete emotions are limited by the static operational boundaries of these measures.[7]

Capelos and Demertzis (2018) argue that reactionism is founded on *complex clusters of resentful affective experiences* that are fluid and ever-evolving rather than upon discrete emotions. Because the vision of reaction is located in the past, its emotional origins are not simple. Those who feel left behind want to turn backwards (Lilla, 2016). Reaction is a response to anxiety and uncertainty, the feelings of loss from thinking one is abandoned, which also generate anger and grievance. In other words, the reactionaries are not *just* or *mainly* angry. There is (ir)rational fear in the feeling of "being left behind," in experiencing the realization that one is not able to keep up with contemporary social and economic complexity (Kenny, 2017).

The sentimental talk of reactionaries harbors resentment. Reactionaries feel neglected by their own state and feel that their interests are overlooked (Sullivan, 2017). This resentful affectivity supplies an important resource to antiestablishment populism from which it also feeds (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). The populist nostalgic accounts of pride and feeling of strength, but also frustration and anxiety about the state of affairs, are an appropriate fit for the reactionary orientation which is already familiar with these emotions. Populist leaders and parties draw on this complex emotional environment promoting narratives and outlooks of national greatness and strong antiestablishment sentiments (Bakker et al., 2016; Magni, 2017). They invoke the affective power of resentment to highlight binary "us" and "them" distinctions. When political elites are repeatedly portrayed as evil (Mudde, 2004), citizens' sense of political efficacy and trust erodes, and political cynicism finds fertile ground (Bergh, 2004). It follows that citizens oriented towards reaction will be less hopeful and more agitated than conservatives, and when in contact with populist discourses, they will feel envious and less efficacious too. They would be unhappy with the present and want to retreat into the past. For the reactionary orientation, the solution is the liquidation of the present political order, the

---

[6]See Curtis and Hassing Nielsen (2018) for an interesting discussion of B5 interactions with ideology as predictors of EU attitudes.

[7]For an interesting discussion of affective reactivity (affective coping style) and attitudes towards the EU, see Nielsen (2018).

return to a past that no longer exists. Reactionism likes the predictable: traditional family structures, common culture, one sovereign nation-state, and strong border controls. But moving beyond traditionalism, *reactionism is hot*: Its resentful sentiment is expressed as xenophobia and veiled racism. It is acted out as support for populist parties but is not contained nor does it stop with populism. It can also be channeled into violent and extreme behaviors or lead to cynicism and disengagement (Capelos et al., 2017).

Towards an Empirical Investigation of the Political Psychology of Reaction

We theorize that the reactionary orientation carries resentful affective energy and is motivated by conservation promoting values. We also theorize that anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences, when bundled together, are a likely indicator of reaction. We therefore expect conservation values to be significant predictors of bundled anti preferences and their effects to be weaker when anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences are not coupled together. The reactionary resentful affectivity can be expressed as general dissatisfaction, negative sentiments towards a future that reproduces and preserves current trends, low efficacy, high sense of injustice, low levels of social trust, and distrust of national and international institutions. Resentment has not been studied in relation to anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences, due to the lack of available empirical measures, but its affective expressions have demonstrated links: Feelings of low external efficacy are linked to populist discourse; low trust towards individuals and political institutions is linked to Euroscepticism and anti-immigration preferences[8] (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). We thus expect their significant impact as predictors of bundled anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences.

Previous research demonstrates that the reactionary orientation predicts engagement in anomic political acts and lowers conventional participation (Capelos et al., 2017). We therefore expect that resentful reactionism would hold citizens back from engaging actively in mainstream politics, manifested as low participation in political demonstrations and low turnout rates.

In our theoretical model, the reactionary orientation is more than the sum of its parts. It is manifested as *a cluster of co-occurring components*: values that denote a preference for changing things back, resentful emotionality manifested as low interpersonal trust, low confidence in institutions, low efficacy particularly in populist times, and low participation (as vote frequency or demonstration potential). Naturally, some of these elements serve as determinants of unbundled opposition to immigration or opposition to the EU, but their effect should be stronger for *bundled* anti preferences. We also theorized that reactionary orientations are heightened in the aftermath of the financial crisis where populist discourses are prominent and traditional economic punishment models could not work (Nezi & Katsanidou, 2014). We therefore expect that the motivational and affective components of reactionism will be stronger predictors of bundled anti preferences in the post rather than the precrisis environment.

Empirical Test

To operationalize reactionism at pre- and postcrisis points, we used the European Social Survey (European Social Survey, 2016) which has been used extensively to study anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences.[9] We selected the 2004 and 2014 modules because they contain proxies needed to profile reactionary orientations: personal values of tradition and aversion to new experiences, resentful emotional dynamics connected to dissatisfaction, low trust, low efficacy and feelings of injustice, and controls of ideology and demographics. To ensure measurement equivalence, we included 17

---

[8]In precrisis times, levels of trust for national political institutions resulted in stronger support for the EU (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000).

[9]The ESS is widely used to study attitudes towards immigration (the ESS bibliography gives over 100 hits) and the EU including the seminal work of Hooghe et al. (2007).

countries where the same measures were available for both data points: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, and Sweden.[10]

Our dependent variable is categorical, capturing four combinations of preferences towards EU integration and immigration. The bundled anti-EU integration anti-immigration preferences (Anti-Anti), the anti-immigration pro-European (AntiIm-ProEU), the anti-EU integration proimmigration (AntiEU-ProIm), and the supporting views for EU integration and immigration (Pro-Pro baseline). To map empirically our theorized model of reaction, we employed proxies for its components.[11] To approximate backward-looking core values, we relied on *respect for tradition* and aversion towards *openness to change*. To account for resentful emotionality, we measured general satisfaction, sense of injustice, social and political trust, and sense of efficacy. To test active political engagement, we used vote and demonstration activity.

Analyses

Analyses of variance provided mean comparisons on the motivational, affective, and behavioral scores of the four preference bundles for 2014 and 2004 (Figures 1 and 2) with notable differences.[12] First, measures associated with reactionism changed significantly ($p < .05$) between 2004 and 2014. Respect for tradition increased, overall satisfaction dropped, and extreme ideological leaning increased. On the whole, social trust, institutional trust, internal political efficacy, vote, and participation in demonstrations increased, which shows that interrogating reaction requires a deeper look into its bundled preferences.

Noteworthy is the significant lead of the Anti-Anti bundle ($p < .05$) compared to the Pro-Pro on respect for tradition, and its lower scores on social and institutional trust, general satisfaction, internal efficacy, and perceptions of fairness. This was consistent with our expectations that see reactionary orientations reflected in the Anti-Anti preferences. The bundle of AntiIm-ProEU had higher scores on adventurousness, social trust, institutional trust, and general satisfaction ($p < .05$) compared to the Anti-Anti bundle and similar scores on desire for tradition, internal political efficacy, and left-right placement. The AntiEU-ProIm had similar scores for aversion to adventure with the AntiIm-ProEU and scored similarly to ProPro on everything else. The Anti-Anti and AntiIm-ProEU combinations had significantly lower scores on voting and participating in demonstrations compared to the AntiEU-ProIm and Pro-Pro bundles.

To examine differentiations between the Anti-Anti bundle, the Pro-Pro, and the anti-pro combinations, while accounting for country-level differentiations and individual differences, we run a multilevel fixed-effects multinomial logit using HLM 7 (Pforr, 2014). A multinomial logit is more adapted to analyze our dependent variable as it differentiates between the Pro-Pro bundle (baseline), and combinations of anti preferences (Anti-Anti, AntiIm-ProEU, and AntiEU-ProIm). We measured the effects of the reactionary values and affects and controlled for left/right placement, ideological extremity (folded left/right scale, extreme orientations at upper end), family income, subjective personal finances, age, education, and gender. Two dummy variables identified East European member countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) and countries hit hard by the financial crisis (Portugal, Ireland, Spain). The results appear in Tables 1, 2, and 3, organized as comparisons with the Pro-Pro baseline.

---

[10]The 2004 analysis excludes France, since the income variable was unavailable. For measurement equivalence, we run the analysis without France in 2014 (not presented here), and the results were robust.

[11]For detailed descriptions of the dependent variable, value orientations, and affective components, please see Appendix S1 in the online supporting information.

[12]Detailed description of the results of mean comparisons are available in Appendix S2 in the online supporting information.

Figure 1. Reactionary component scores 2004 for anti preference combinations 2004 European Social Survey, points are means (0–10 scales). For detailed data and significance tests, see Table S1 in the online supporting information.

Comparing Pro-Pro and Anti-Anti, we noted the significant effect of values that motivate reactionism. As respect for tradition and aversion to adventurousness increased, so did the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti. The weight of these values was comparable in 2004, but following the financial crisis in 2014, traditional values doubled in weight. On the affective factors, as overall satisfaction, social, and political trust declined, the probability of shifting from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti increased. Noteworthy is the direction change of efficacy from 2004 to 2014. Before the crisis, the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti increased as self-perceptions of efficacy increased. We expected declines in efficacy to be associated with reactionism, and indeed, in 2014, the negative efficacy sign increased the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti bundle. This is consistent with the mean comparisons showing a decline in efficacy from 2004 to 2014 for Anti-Anti preferences. In addition, a sense of injustice driven by the feeling that immigrants are treated better than oneself was a significant predictor of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti preferences in 2014. Voting and taking part in demonstrations decreased the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti in both years, but several demographic factors were significant push forces towards the anti-anti choices. Being right-wing, with lower levels of religiosity, lower income and education, and being older, all increased the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti

Figure 2. Reactionary component scores 2014 for anti preference combinations, 2014 European Social Survey, points are means (0–10 scales). For detailed data and significance tests, see Table S1 in the online supporting information.

preferences pointing to a particular demographic and ideological trend in reactionary orientations in Europe.

Overall, a complex mix of factors consistent with reactionary orientations contributed to moving to anti preferences, but psychological dynamics aside, context matters. In 2004, living in a former communist regime decreased the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti. In 2014, however, Eastern Europe was equally susceptible to the reactionary shift. Living in the bail-out countries (Portugal, Ireland, Spain) also decreased the probability of moving from Pro-Pro to Anti-Anti. This effect, which is consistently negative in 2014, suggests that economic deprivation on its own does not justify nor generate these policy preferences but rather mitigates them. The additive impact of psychological factors is what drove the move from support of immigration and the EU, to anti reaction.

In Table 2, we examined the factors that shifted immigration preferences from a pro- to anti-, while maintaining EU support. In 2004, traditional values and opposition to adventure together with negative affect (decline in overall satisfaction and social and political trust) increased the probability of moving from a pro- to an anti-immigration position, and being right-wing, male, with lower levels of education, voting less, and participating less in demonstrations contributed to this effect. As in Table 1, by 2014 traditional values become an even stronger predictor of anti-immigration preferences overall dissatisfaction increases its anti-immigration effect, lower efficacy and feelings of injustice become significant, and lower education and low participation have the expected effect.

In Table 3, we turn to the probability of change from pro- to anti-European positions while maintaining support for immigration across the two time points. In 2004, values were nonsignificant for

Table 1. Baseline Pro-Pro, to Anti-Anti: Reporting Coefficients (odds ratios in parenthesis)

	2004	2014
Anti Immigration & Anti EU		
Constant	3.04*** (20.88)	4.88*** (131.07)
PIGS	−1.37** (0.25)	−1.56** (0.20)
EAST	−1.25*** (0.28)	−0.89 (0.41)
Traditional values	0.04*** (1.04)	0.08*** (1.08)
Opposition for adventure	0.04*** (1.05)	0.04*** (1.04)
General satisfaction with life	−0.29*** (0.74)	−0.30*** (0.74)
Internal efficacy	0.16*** (1.78)	−0.11*** (0.90)
Feeling being treated unfairly (direction is immigrants are treated better to ... worst)	0.01 (1.01)	–
Government's treatment of new immigrants	–	−0.28*** (0.76)
Social trust	−0.22*** (0.80)	−0.20*** (0.82)
Institutional trust	−0.21*** (0.80)	−0.23*** (0.79)
Extreme ideology	−0.01 (0.99)	0.03*** (1.03)
Left-right self-placement	0.11*** (1.12)	0.12*** (1.13)
Vote in last election	−0.01 (0.99)	0.004 (1.00)
Lawful demonstration	−0.04*** (0.95)	−0.03*** (0.97)
Religiosity	−0.04*** (0.96)	−0.04*** (0.96)
Gender	0.03 (1.02)	−0.7 (0.93)
Age	0.01*** (1.00)	0.00* (1.00)
Education	−0.13*** (0.88)	−0.09*** (0.91)
Difficulty in Living comfortably	0.05 (1.05)	0.02 (1.02)
Variance component	0.52***	0.62***
N (countries)	16 (without France)	17
N (individuals)	18664	20530
Log Likelihood	−4.547738E+004	−4.954697E+004

Note. Data from 2014 and 2004 European Social Survey. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Eurosceptic preferences which were predicted by affective considerations (evident in the decline of general satisfaction and social and institutional trust), higher levels of internal efficacy, and moderate ideological orientations. Declines in voting and demonstrations and lower education also increased Eurosceptic preferences pointing to disengagement rather than reactionism. By 2014, the content of Euroscepticism changes significantly. Traditional values and aversion to adventure became relevant in the postcrisis setting. In addition, dissatisfaction and distrust maintained a Eurosceptic push, combined with feelings of being treated unfairly, ideological extremity, and right-wing positioning. With the above in mind, we would argue that the psychological profile of Euroscepticism underwent a significant change pointing to extreme ideological preferences, reactionary values, and resentful affect that operated above and beyond traditional education, age, and religion barriers. Similarly to Table 1, living in the bail-out countries or Eastern Europe consistently decreased the probability of adopting anti-European preferences.

Table 2. Baseline Pro-Pro, to AntiIm-ProEU: Reporting Coefficients (odds ratios in parenthesis)

Anti Immigration & Pro EU	2004	2014
Constant	1.61*** (5.00)	3.36*** (28.9)
PIGS	−0.23 (0.79)	−0.51 (0.6)
EAST	0.08 (1.09)	0.08 (1.09)
Traditional values	0.05*** (1.05)	0.08*** (1.08)
Opposition for adventure	0.02** (1.02)	−0.00 (0.99)
General satisfaction	−0.14*** (0.86)	−0.18*** (0.83)
Internal efficacy	0.03 (1.03)	−0.12*** (0.88)
Social trust	−0.16*** (0.85)	−0.17*** (0.84)
Institutional trust	−0.11*** (0.89)	−0.11*** (0.90)
Extreme ideology	−0.01 (0.99)	0.00 (1.00)
Left-right self-placement	0.10*** (1.11)	0.11*** (1.11)
Vote in last election	−0.01* (.99)	−0.01 (0.99)
Lawful demonstration	−0.04*** (.96)	−0.03*** (0.97)
Feeling being treated unfairly (direction is immigrants are treated better to … worst)	0.01 (1.01)	
Government's treatment of new immigrants	–	−0.21*** (0.81)
Religiosity		−0.01 (0.99)
Gender	0.13* (1.14)	0.04 (1.04)
Age	0.00 (1.00)	−0.00** (1.00)
Level of education achieved	−0.11*** (0.89)	−0.09*** (0.91)
Difficulty in Living comfortably	0.05 (1.05)	0.03 (1.03)
Variance Component	0.21***	0.25***
N (countries)	16 (without France)	17
N (individuals)	18664	20530
Log Likelihood	−4.547738E+004	−4.954697E+004

Note. Data from 2014 and 2004 European Social Survey. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Discussion: Reactionary Orientation and Anti Preferences

Evidence reviewed here established that the shift to anti-immigration and anti-EU integration preferences is driven by a complex combination of core values and emotions consistent with a reactionary orientation. We theorized that the backward gaze of reactionism rests on conservation and aversion for adventure. The Anti-Anti bundled preferences displayed the highest score on such value orientations. Unbundled anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences also showed traces of reaction: respect for tradition predicted anti-immigration alongside affective elements of dissatisfaction, sense of injustice, and low efficacy, and anti-EU preferences acquired a reactionary hue, driven by values, negative affect, sense of injustice, and low efficacy.

We also theorized that the affective tone of reactionism rests on resentment, a cluster emotion combining negative affect, feelings of perceived injustice, and low self-worth. Dissatisfaction combined with a sense of injustice explained anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences, and this warrants further investigation. Emotions can be directed to specific objects and acquire different

Table 3. Baseline Pro-Pro, to AntiEU-ProIm: Reporting Coefficients (odds ratios in parenthesis)

Anti EU & Pro Immigration	2004	2014
Contstant	0.49 (1.63)	1.22*** (3.38)
PIGS	−0.87* (0.41)	−0.91** (0.4)
EAST	−0.91** (0.40)	−0.66* (0.52)
Traditional values	0.01 (1.00)	0.03*** (1.03)
Opposition for adventure	0.01 (1.01)	0.03** (1.03)
General satisfaction	−0.14*** (0.86)	−0.12*** (0.88)
Social trust	−0.05* (0.95)	−0.07*** (0.94)
Internal efficacy	0.09* (1.09)	−0.01 (0.99)
Institutional trust	−0.10*** (0.90)	−0.15*** (0.86)
Extreme ideology	−0.02* (0.98)	0.02** (1.02)
Left-right self-placement	−0.01 (0.99)	0.03** (1.03)
Government's treatment of new immigrants	–	−0.06*** (0.94)
Feeling being treated unfairly (direction is immigrants are treated better to ... worst)	0.00 (1.00)	–
Vote in last election	−0.01* (1.01)	−0.00 (0.99)
Lawful demonstration	−0.01* (0.98)	−0.00 (0.99)
Religiosity	−0.01 (0.99)	−0.01 (0.99)
Gender	0.08 (1.09)	−0.09* (0.91)
Age	−0.00 (1.00)	0.00 (1.00)
Education	−0.02** (0.98)	−0.01 (0.99)
Difficulty in Living comfortably	0.05 (1.06)	0.04 (1.04)
Variance component	0.24***	0.23***
N (countries)	16 (without France)	17
N (individuals)	18664	20530
Log Likelihood	−4.547738E+004	−4.954697E+004

Note. Data from 2014 and 2004 European Social Survey. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

meanings for those experiencing them. Citizens who are anti-EU and proimmigration are likely to be sensitive to anxieties related to the unknown (economic) future of the EU and less to concerns about tradition and culture. Opposition to immigration combined with support for the EU is linked to concerns about the erosion of traditions. In both cases, citizens experience anxieties, but the *content* of their anxieties is different. This fits well with extant explanations of Euroscepticism suggesting that left-wing Euro-critical parties like Podemos and Syriza mobilize antiausterity sentiments, whereas right-wing parties like the National Front (France), the Danish People's Party, or the Freedom Parties in the Netherlands and Austria feed on anti-immigration anxieties (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016).

Our findings also reconcile the tension between studies that link risk propensity to increased support for UKIP in the United Kingdom and others that link populism with risk-aversion personality traits (Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). As we noted earlier, a reactionary orientation is not identical to conservatism, and not all reactionaries wish to avoid risk. For conservatives, the inertia of the status quo is significant. For reactionaries that oppose the status-quo but backwards, risk taking can be acceptable, and with risk comes anxiety. Anxiety can also result from fearing the unknown

that is deemed undesirable. And with it comes resentment (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017), feelings of betrayal, and nostalgic longing for restoring an (imagined) past (Lilla, 2016). The resentful emotionality of reactionism is complex, and our scholarship requires the design and use of sophisticated measures to capture its impact (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018).

Conclusion: The Need for a Theoretical Framework for the Political Psychology of Reaction

It has become clear that reactionism deserves its own entry as a tool to understand the challenges to democratic representation in Europe and the world today. The psychological foundations of this orientation can shed light on fundamental concerns involving the rising appeal of populism and nationalism, antiestablishment and antiliberal preferences, alienation, anomic or violent political action, societal polarization, and challenges of EU integration.

Party-politics scholars have noted that mainstream political classifications along the left-right spectrum no longer adequately capture the desires of many citizens. Instead, the deployment of an idealized past and social order and the desire for restoration of the past marks the broadly similar narratives of contemporary "radical" populist, neo-Nazi, and ethno-nationalist political parties like UKIP (UK), National Front (France), Freedom Party Geert Wilders (Netherlands), Golden Dawn (Greece), Jobbik Party (The Movement for Better Hungary), or the FPO (Freedom Party of Austria) (Bauer, Barberá, Ackermann, & Venetz, 2017). As often their names imply, these parties and movements deploy a patriotic and antiestablishment stance which promises to preserve and protect the values and interests of their supporters. Their candidates and leaders offer narratives that adopt and cultivate the desire for the restoration of a golden era, a return to a glorious past, by endorsing public anger and dismay and promising to get things done in the interest of the citizens "left behind." Instead of innovation, they naturally embrace *restoration*. Consider the "Take Back Control" message of the Brexit campaign. It contained the depiction of a stalled present and a future that is compromised by the unstoppable changes imposed by elites on the country against its will. Integral features of this antiestablishment discourse were references to national greatness and economic supremacy, as well as powerful anti-immigration and anti-EU integration arguments, offering the nostalgic return to the past as an alternative possibility (Kenny, 2017). These parties have increased their power in the recent years, and their inclusion in coalition governments is not as shocking as in the past. However, there is no underpinning theory that explains the psychological component of this vote across Europe (Rooduijn, 2018).

These political agendas resonate well with the voters who support them. They are upset with political elites, frustrated with "politics as usual," suspicious of multinational, international, and national institutions, feel personally and socially betrayed, and hold a strong sense of injustice. They are critical of globalization, despise the multicultural model, and favor restorative initiatives (Lilla, 2016; Sullivan, 2017). Their preferences are often descriptively referred to as *populist sentiment,* but the psychological undercurrent of this complex political orientation needs better understanding, because it is not entirely sentimental, nor it is *populist* per se, as it is by definition the supply side of politics that is populist. At the present, this orientation harnessed by populist rhetoric is reactionary in its core. By labeling it "populist," its complex affective and motivational properties remain largely overlooked.

While some voters find a home in the antiestablishment narratives of populist parties, others disengage, abstain from mainstream political activities, participate in grassroots movements like the "indignados" (Spain) or "aganaktismenoi" (Greece) (Dinas, Georgiadou, Konstantinidis, & Rori, 2016), engage in anomic and violent political actions that lie at the extremes, or remain passive supporters of hate narratives. These inclinations, often (mis)labeled the "new wave of political radicalism" (Taheri, 2015), have significant implications for democratic politics and are worth systematic exploration. If, as we suggest, they are reactionary in nature, their psychological origins, needs, and

aims will be very different to that of radical movements, and further work is needed to fully understand them (Capelos et al., 2017).

We close with the note to resist normative dualisms of good-bad that could label this reactionary orientation as harmful, dangerous, or a sign of political dysfunction. It is important to critically assess whether and when reactionism could serve as an informed and constructive force, providing a critical evaluation to the present. Characteristics that promote deliberative engagement with politics—for example, trust, efficacy, and hope—appear lower in the context of reaction. We have tried to connect the dots: The low efficacy of the reactionary orientation goes hand in hand with the willingness to adopt victimizing discourses that promote anti-immigration and anti EU integration arguments and can explain the current resurgence and increased appeal of populisms, nationalisms, and extreme party agendas. There is rich potential for further research here. The narratives that combine the power of the victimized people against elites, sentiments of injustice, nostalgia, betrayal, and resentment can be attractive for citizens holding reactionary fantasies of idealised pasts. We ought to investigate this further, and to start, we should approach the political psychology of reaction as an empirical and theoretical challenge.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

Allport, G. W. (1961). *Pattern and growth in personality*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Alvarez, R. M., & Brehm, J. (1995). American ambivalence towards abortion policy: Development of a heteroskedastic probit model of competing values. *American Journal of Political Science, 39*(4), 1055–1082.

Andreouli, E., & Nicholson, C. (2018). Brexit and everyday politics: An analysis of focus group data on the EU referendum. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1325–1340.

Arceneaux, K., & Nicholson, S. P. (2012). Who wants to have a tea party? The who, what and why of the Tea Party movement. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 45*(4), 700–710.

Bakker, B. N., Rooduijn, M., & Schumacher, G. (2016). The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany: The psychological roots of populist voting. *European Journal of Political Research, 55*(2), 302–320.

Bauer, P. C., Barberá, P., Ackermann, K., & Venetz, A. (2017). Is the left-right scale a valid measure of ideology? *Political Behavior, 39*(3), 553–583.

Bello, V. (2016). Inclusiveness as construction of open identity: How social relationships affect attitudes towards immigrants in European Societies. *Social Indicators Research, 126*(1), 199–223.

Bergh, J. (2004). Protest voting in Austria, Denmark and Norway. *Scandinavian Political Studies, 27*(4), 367–389.

Bilksy, W., Janik, M., & Schwartz, S. H. (2011). The Structural Organization of Human Values-Evidence from Three Rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42*(5), 759–776.

Boomgaarden, H. G., & Freire, A. (2009). Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct, indirect or no effects? *West European Politics, 32*(6), 1240–1265.

Boomgaarden, H. G., Schuck, A. R., Elenbaas, M., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support. *European Union Politics, 12*(2), 241–266.

Capelos, T., Exadaktylos, T., Chrona, S., & Poulopoulou, M. (2018). The emotional economy of the European financial crisis in the UK press. *International Journal of Communication, Special issue on News Media and the Emotional Public Sphere, 12,* 2088–2113.

Capelos, T., Katsanidou, A., & Demertzis, N. (2017). Back to Black: Values, ideologies, and the Black box of political radicalization. *Science and Society, 35,* 35–68.

Capelos, T., & Demertzis, N. (2018) Political action and resentful affectivity in critical times. *Humanity and Society, 42*(4), 410–433.

Ciuk, D. J., & Jacoby, W. G. (2015). Checking for systematic value preferences using the method of triads. *Political Psychology, 36*(6), 709–728.

Costa, P. T., McCrae, R., & Dye, D. A. (1991). Facets scales for agreeableness and conscientiousness: A revision of the NEO Personality Inventory. *Personality and Individual Differences, 12*(9), 887–898.

Crocker, L. D., Heller, W., Warren, S. L., O'Hare, A. J., Infantolino, Z. P., & Miller, G. A. (2013). Relationships among cognition, emotion, and motivation: Implications for intervention and neuroplasticity in psychopathology. *Frontiers of Human Neuroscience, 7,* https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00261

Curtis, A., & Hassing Nielsen, J. (2018). Predispositions matter…but how? Ideology as a mediator of personality's effects on EU support in five countries. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1251–1270.

Davidov, E., Meuleman, B., Billiet, J., & Schmidt, P. (2008). Values and support for immigration: A cross-country comparison. *European Sociological Review, 24*(5), 583–599.

Davidov, E., Meulemann, B., Schwartz, S. H., & Schmidt, P. (2014). Individual values, cultural embeddedness, and anti-immigration sentiments: Explaining differences in the effect of values on attitudes toward immigration across Europe. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 66*(1), 263–285.

Davis, D. W. (2007). *Negative liberty: Public opinion and the terrorist attacks on America*. New York, NY: Russell Sage.

de Vreese, C. H. (2017). How changing conditions make us reconsider the relationship between immigration attitudes, religion and EU attitudes. *European Union Politics, 18*(1), 137–142.

de Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Semetko, H. A. (2008). Hard and soft: Public support for Turkish membership in the EU. *European Union Politics, 9*(4), 511–530.

de Vries, C. E., Edwards, E. E., & Tillman, E. R. (2011). Clarity of responsibility beyond the pocketbook: How political institutions condition EU issue voting. *Comparative Political Studies, 44*(3), 339–363.

Demertzis, N. (in press). Populisms and the emotions. In P. Cossarini & F. V. Oña (Eds.), *Populism and passions: Democratic legitimacy after austerity*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Dinas, E., Georgiadou, V., Konstantinidis, I., & Rori, L. (2016). From dusk to dawn: Local party organization and party success of right-wing extremism. *Party Politics, 22*(1), 80–92.

Dunn, K. (2015). Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians. *Party Politics, 21*(3), 367–380.

ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data. (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

Evans, J. A. (2000). Contrasting attitudinal bases to Euroscepticism amongst the French electorate. *Electoral Studies, 19*(4), 539–561.

Eysenck, H. J. (1975). The structure of social attitudes. British. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 14,* 323–331.

Feldman, S. (2003). Values, ideology, and the structure of political attitudes. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 477–508). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Feldman, S., & Johnston, C. D. (2014). Understanding the determinants of political ideology: Implications of structural complexity. *Political Psychology, 35,* 337–358.

Fraser, N. (2016). Progressive neoliberalism versus reactionary populism: A choice that feminists should refuse. *Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 24*(4), 281–284.

Gervais, B. T., & Morris, I. L. (2018). *Reactionary republicanism: How the Tea Party in the House paved the way for Trump's victory*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Glynn, C., Herbst, S., O'Keefe, G. J., Shapiro, R. Y., & Lindeman, M. (2004). *Public opinion*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Goren, P. (2005). Party identification and core political values. *American Journal of Political Science, 49*(4), 881–896.

Gorodzeisky, A. (2011). Who are the Europeans that Europeans prefer? Economic conditions and exclusionary views toward European immigrants. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 52*(1–2), 100–113.

Grant, J. T., & Rudolf, T. J. (2003). Value conflict, group affect and the issue of campaign finance. *American Journal of Political Science, 47*(3), 453–469.

Guinjoan, M., & Rico, G. (2018). How European Union: Experimental and observational evidence. *Political Psychology, 36*(9), 1291–1305.

Harrison, S., & Bruter, M. (2011). *Mapping extreme right ideology: An empirical geography of the European extreme right*. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave McMillan.

Hirsh, J. B., DeYoung, C. G., Xu, X., & Peterson, J. B. (2010). Compassionate liberals and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology and moral values. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36*(5), 655–664.

Hobolt, S. B., & de Vries, C. E. (2016). Public support for European integration. *Annual Review of Political Science, 19,* 413–432.

Hooghe, L., Jing Huo, J., & Marks, G. (2007). Does occupation shape attitudes on Europe? Benchmarking validity and parsimony. *Acta Politica, 42*(2–3), 329–351.

Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization, postmodernization and changing perceptions of risk. *International Review of Sociology, 7*(3), 449–459.

Jacoby, W. (2006). Side payments over solidarity: Financing the poor cousins of Germany and the EU. ACES Cases No. 2006.

Karreth, J., Singh, S. P., & Stojek, S. M. (2015). Explaining attitudes toward immigration: The role of regional context and individual predispositions. *West European Politics, 38*(6), 1174–1202.

Kenny, M. H. (2017). Back to the populist future? Understanding nostalgia in contemporary ideological discourse. *Journal of Political Ideologies, 22*(3), 256–273.

Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The transformation of European social democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). *West European politics in the age of globalization*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Kunovich, R. M. (2004). Social structural position and prejudice: An exploration of cross-national differences in regression slopes. *Social Science Research, 33*(1), 20–44.

Lilla, M. (2016). *The shipwrecked mind: On political reaction*. New York, NY: New York Review of Books.

Locke, E. A. (2000). Motivation, cognition and action: An analysis of studies of task goals and knowledge. *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 49*(3), 408–429.

Loveless, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2011). Public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance. *Living Reviews in European Governance, 6*(2).

Magni, G. (2017). It's the emotions, stupid! Anger about the economic crisis, low political efficacy, and support for populist parties. *Electoral Studies, 50*, 91–102.

Mahendran, K. (2018). From polarized we/they public opinion on European integration towards social representations of public dialogue. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1339–1355.

Manners, I. (2018). Political psychology of European integration: The (re)production of identity and difference in the Brexit debate. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1213–1232.

McClosky, H., & Zaller, J. (1984). *The American ethos. Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mondak, J. J., & Halperin, K. D. (2008). A framework for the study of personality and political behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science, 38*(2), 335–362.

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition, 39*(4), 542–563.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Nezi, S., & Katsanidou, A. (2014). From valence to position: Economic voting in extraordinary conditions. *Acta Politica, 49*(4), 413–430.

Nielsen, J. H. (2018). The effect of affect: How affective style determines attitudes towards the EU. *European Union Politics, 19*(1), 75–96.

Otjes, S., & Katsanidou, A. (2017). Beyond Kriesiland: EU integration as a super issue after the Eurocrisis. *European Journal of Political Research, 56*(2), 301–319.

Peitz, L., Dhont, K., & Seyd, B. (2018). The psychology of supranationalism: Its ideological correlates and implications for EU attitudes and post-Brexit preferences. *Political Psychology, 36*(9), 1305–1322.

Pforr, K. (2014). Femlogit-implementation of the multinomial logit model with fixed effects. *Stata Journal, 14*(4), 847–862.

Robin, C. (2011). *The reactionary mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Robinson, E. (2016). Radical nostalgia, progressive patriotism and labour's "English problem." *Political Studies Review, 14*(3), 378–387.

Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review, 10*(3), 351–368.

Salmela, M., & von Scheve, C. (2017). Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. *Social Science Information, 56*(4), 567–595.

Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). The political basis of support for European integration. *European Union Politics, 1*(2), 147–171.

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25,* 1–65.

Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic personal values, core political values, and voting: A longitudinal analysis. *Political Psychology, 31*(3), 421–452.

Semyonov, M., & Glikman, A. (2009). Ethnic residential segregation, social contacts, and antiminority attitudes in European societies. *European Sociological Review, 25*(6), 693–708.

Sniderman, P. M., Peri, P., de Figueiredo, J. P., & Piazza, T. (2000). *The outsider: Prejudice and politics in Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). Discourse theory in populism research. Three challenges and a dilemma. *Journal of Language and Politics, 16*(4), 1–12.

Steenbergen, M. R., & Siczek, T. (2017). Better the devil you know? Risk-taking, globalization and populism in Great Britain. *European Union Politics, 18*(1), 119–136.

Sullivan, A. (2017). *The Reactionary Temptation: An open-minded inquiry into the close-minded ideology that is the most dominant political force of our time—and can no longer be ignored*. Retrieved from https://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/andrew-sullivan-why-the-reactionary-right-must-be-taken-seriously.html

Taheri, A. (2015, September 16). The west and the challenge of radicalism. *Asharq Al-Awsat*. Retrieved from https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/amir-taheri/features/the-west-and-the-challenge-of-radicalism

Tenenhaus, S. (2016). *Rise of the reactionary: How a handful of Weimar émigrés came to have an outsize influence on the ideology of the American right*. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/24/rise-of-the-reactionary

Teney, C., Lacewell, O. P., & De Wilde, P. (2014). Winners and losers of globalization in Europe: Attitudes and ideologies. *European Political Science Review, 6*(4), 575–595.

Vasilopoulou, S., & Wagner, M. (2017). Fear, anger and enthusiasm about the European Union: Effects of emotional reactions on public preferences towards European integration. *European Union Politics, 18*(3), 382–405.

Wallace, M. (2014). *Where are all the left-wing Eurosceptics*. Opinion, European Union. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/17/leftwing-eurosceptics-eu-british-left

Wodak, R. (2015). *Politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. London, United Kingdom: Sage.

Wolfe, A. B. (1923). *Conservatism, radicalism, and scientific method: An essay on social attitudes*. New York, NY: MacMillan.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Appendix S1. Dependent Variable, Measures of Fundamental Values and Affective Components in ESS
Appendix S2. Mean Comparisons on Key Components of Reactionism
Table S1. Mean Scores on Reactionism Components by Preference Combinations, 2004 and 2014 ESS