A methodology for cybersecurity risk assessment in supply chains
A methodology for cybersecurity risk assessment in supply chains
Supply chain cyberattacks are on the rise as attackers increasingly exploit the intricate network of supplier connections between companies. Critical infrastructures too have been successfully targeted using this strategy, which
calls for cybersecurity risk assessment strategies to be revised to stress the focus
on threats originating from suppliers. This work proposes a novel supply chain
cybersecurity risk assessment tailored for companies with limited cybersecurity
expertise and constrained resources to execute risk assessment. Through a set of simple questions, this methodology first captures the perceived likelihood and impact of vulnerabilities and threats that derive from suppliers and target specific organisational assets, and then generates cybersecurity risk scores for each relevant threat. A preliminary validation of the methodology is carried out, where generated risk scores are compared to evaluations provided by cybersecurity experts.
The results show that the methodology produces risk scores that on average differ by 8% from those deriving from the experts’ assessment, which corroborates the hypothesis that the methodology is reliable even though it does not require detailed information about the suppliers’ cyber posture.
Gokkaya, Betul
7c7964ae-106f-4f4f-8ea4-01fb4c65caac
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Karafili, Erisa
f5efa31c-22b8-443e-8107-e488bd28918e
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
28 September 2023
Gokkaya, Betul
7c7964ae-106f-4f4f-8ea4-01fb4c65caac
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Karafili, Erisa
f5efa31c-22b8-443e-8107-e488bd28918e
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Gokkaya, Betul, Aniello, Leonardo, Karafili, Erisa and Halak, Basel
(2023)
A methodology for cybersecurity risk assessment in supply chains.
The 4th International Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security for Critical Infrastructures Protecstion, , The Hague, Netherlands.
28 Sep - 29 Oct 2023.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Supply chain cyberattacks are on the rise as attackers increasingly exploit the intricate network of supplier connections between companies. Critical infrastructures too have been successfully targeted using this strategy, which
calls for cybersecurity risk assessment strategies to be revised to stress the focus
on threats originating from suppliers. This work proposes a novel supply chain
cybersecurity risk assessment tailored for companies with limited cybersecurity
expertise and constrained resources to execute risk assessment. Through a set of simple questions, this methodology first captures the perceived likelihood and impact of vulnerabilities and threats that derive from suppliers and target specific organisational assets, and then generates cybersecurity risk scores for each relevant threat. A preliminary validation of the methodology is carried out, where generated risk scores are compared to evaluations provided by cybersecurity experts.
The results show that the methodology produces risk scores that on average differ by 8% from those deriving from the experts’ assessment, which corroborates the hypothesis that the methodology is reliable even though it does not require detailed information about the suppliers’ cyber posture.
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More information
Accepted/In Press date: August 2023
Published date: 28 September 2023
Venue - Dates:
The 4th International Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security for Critical Infrastructures Protecstion, , The Hague, Netherlands, 2023-09-28 - 2023-10-29
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 483927
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/483927
PURE UUID: fdddd5bf-2cbc-4bd8-bf84-8938ad7c2b9f
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Date deposited: 07 Nov 2023 18:30
Last modified: 08 Nov 2023 02:59
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Contributors
Author:
Betul Gokkaya
Author:
Leonardo Aniello
Author:
Erisa Karafili
Author:
Basel Halak
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