Incoherence, inquiry, and suspension
Incoherence, inquiry, and suspension
I consider two possible evidentialist responses to Schmidt. According to the first, all of the reason-giving work in the relevant cases is being done by evidence. According to the second, even if the ‘incoherence fact’ sometimes provides a reason, what it provides a reason for is not a doxastic attitude, or at least not one that is an alternative to belief. I argue that the first response is not satisfying, but the second is defensible.
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
Abstract
I consider two possible evidentialist responses to Schmidt. According to the first, all of the reason-giving work in the relevant cases is being done by evidence. According to the second, even if the ‘incoherence fact’ sometimes provides a reason, what it provides a reason for is not a doxastic attitude, or at least not one that is an alternative to belief. I argue that the first response is not satisfying, but the second is defensible.
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Accepted/In Press date: 27 October 2023
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 November 2023
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Local EPrints ID: 484593
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/484593
ISSN: 2731-4642
PURE UUID: 004d6586-7eb9-4eb9-80b7-616d2f6fa058
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Date deposited: 17 Nov 2023 17:56
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 05:53
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