Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist?
Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist?
Perception plays a central and wide-ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does.
Margaret Cavendish, perception, naïve realism, intentionalism, hallucination, illusion
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2023)
Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist?
European Journal of Philosophy.
(In Press)
Abstract
Perception plays a central and wide-ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does.
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Cavendish and naive realism EJP ACCEPTED
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Accepted/In Press date: 5 November 2023
Keywords:
Margaret Cavendish, perception, naïve realism, intentionalism, hallucination, illusion
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Local EPrints ID: 485404
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/485404
ISSN: 0966-8373
PURE UUID: 77a1a0e0-dd06-4300-8966-3dd718fb3139
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Date deposited: 06 Dec 2023 17:30
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 06:18
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