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Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer
Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

As the sustainable economy has become more of a consensus, supply chain members, both manufacturer (e.g., Apple, Huawei, Xiaomi, Nike, and P&G) and retailer (e.g., Uniqlo, Walmart, and Bravo), are concentrated on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The literature in this area has investigated the role of CSR, but the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members is not well understood, especially when manufacturer sells directly by implementing encroachment. This paper studies the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members with considering manufacturer encroachment. We develop the supply chain with a manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R), where the manufacturer sells products via a retail channel which in turn sells them to the final consumers. The manufacturer can also implement encroachment to meet consumers directly. Meanwhile, by considering the manufacturer or retailer may have CSR concern, we explore four scenarios using a game-theoretic framework. Several interesting findings are as follows. First, for the sake of profits, retailer CSR should be encouraged, which may achieve Pareto improvement under certain conditions. Notably, manufacturer encroachment may narrow the “win–win” situation. While for the sake of environmental protection and consumer well-being, manufacturer CSR should be encouraged. Second, manufacturer implementing encroachment may not be blind, because it may be worse for itself when retailer has CSR concern. Third, manufacturer CSR may aggravate the cannibalization effect of encroaching, while retailer CSR may relieve it.

0143-6570
1511-1527
Cheng, Yonghong
77481502-0b0e-448f-82f7-0a67141d8aa6
Pan, Jiaxin
b9d70726-a4ee-4bc3-b334-5af55068c7be
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c
Cheng, Yonghong
77481502-0b0e-448f-82f7-0a67141d8aa6
Pan, Jiaxin
b9d70726-a4ee-4bc3-b334-5af55068c7be
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c

Cheng, Yonghong, Pan, Jiaxin and Gong, Yu (2024) Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer. Managerial and Decision Economics, 45 (3), 1511-1527. (doi:10.1002/mde.4074).

Record type: Article

Abstract

As the sustainable economy has become more of a consensus, supply chain members, both manufacturer (e.g., Apple, Huawei, Xiaomi, Nike, and P&G) and retailer (e.g., Uniqlo, Walmart, and Bravo), are concentrated on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The literature in this area has investigated the role of CSR, but the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members is not well understood, especially when manufacturer sells directly by implementing encroachment. This paper studies the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members with considering manufacturer encroachment. We develop the supply chain with a manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R), where the manufacturer sells products via a retail channel which in turn sells them to the final consumers. The manufacturer can also implement encroachment to meet consumers directly. Meanwhile, by considering the manufacturer or retailer may have CSR concern, we explore four scenarios using a game-theoretic framework. Several interesting findings are as follows. First, for the sake of profits, retailer CSR should be encouraged, which may achieve Pareto improvement under certain conditions. Notably, manufacturer encroachment may narrow the “win–win” situation. While for the sake of environmental protection and consumer well-being, manufacturer CSR should be encouraged. Second, manufacturer implementing encroachment may not be blind, because it may be worse for itself when retailer has CSR concern. Third, manufacturer CSR may aggravate the cannibalization effect of encroaching, while retailer CSR may relieve it.

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Accepted/In Press date: 21 November 2023
e-pub ahead of print date: 8 January 2024
Published date: April 2024
Additional Information: Funding Information: The authors wish to express their sincerest thanks to the editors and anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions on the paper. This research was supported in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Province, China (No. 1908085MG224) and the Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of MOE, China (No. 16YJC630012).

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 486432
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/486432
ISSN: 0143-6570
PURE UUID: 6eb6e483-2937-46a4-96ee-70e915be73d0
ORCID for Yu Gong: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-5411-376X

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Date deposited: 22 Jan 2024 17:37
Last modified: 10 Apr 2024 01:55

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Contributors

Author: Yonghong Cheng
Author: Jiaxin Pan
Author: Yu Gong ORCID iD

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