Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition
Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition
Should trade agreements also constrain domestic policies? We analyze this question from the perspective of models with monopolistic competition, potentially heterogeneous firms, and multiple sectors. We propose a welfare decomposition based on principles from welfare economics to show that, in a broad class of models, welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be exactly decomposed into consumption-efficiency, production-efficiency and terms-of-trade effects. Using this decomposition, we compare trade agreements with different degrees of integration and show how their performance is affected by the interaction between firm heterogeneity and the relative importance of production efficiency versus terms-of-trade effects. We consider several forms of shallow trade agreements, modeled according to GATT-WTO rules, and show that they are not sufficient to achieve the full benefits of globalization that can be obtained with a deep trade agreement coordinating both trade and domestic policies. Moreover, the distortions arising from uncoordinated domestic policies under shallow free trade agreements
increase when physical trade costs fall, thus raising the benefits of deep trade integration.
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Campolmi, Alessia
6e0d3c9e-09a7-4b69-900e-6953ab5c4cf0
Fadinger, Harald
174de952-49b6-4bd7-a00c-3b577b828b89
Forlati, Chiara
7be0a723-e9b7-4247-8d6f-bfe224d61845
October 2018
Campolmi, Alessia
6e0d3c9e-09a7-4b69-900e-6953ab5c4cf0
Fadinger, Harald
174de952-49b6-4bd7-a00c-3b577b828b89
Forlati, Chiara
7be0a723-e9b7-4247-8d6f-bfe224d61845
Campolmi, Alessia, Fadinger, Harald and Forlati, Chiara
(2018)
Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition
(Discussion Paper Series, 13219)
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Record type:
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Abstract
Should trade agreements also constrain domestic policies? We analyze this question from the perspective of models with monopolistic competition, potentially heterogeneous firms, and multiple sectors. We propose a welfare decomposition based on principles from welfare economics to show that, in a broad class of models, welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be exactly decomposed into consumption-efficiency, production-efficiency and terms-of-trade effects. Using this decomposition, we compare trade agreements with different degrees of integration and show how their performance is affected by the interaction between firm heterogeneity and the relative importance of production efficiency versus terms-of-trade effects. We consider several forms of shallow trade agreements, modeled according to GATT-WTO rules, and show that they are not sufficient to achieve the full benefits of globalization that can be obtained with a deep trade agreement coordinating both trade and domestic policies. Moreover, the distortions arising from uncoordinated domestic policies under shallow free trade agreements
increase when physical trade costs fall, thus raising the benefits of deep trade integration.
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Published date: October 2018
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Local EPrints ID: 486977
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/486977
ISSN: 0265-8003
PURE UUID: 0a60e82c-8792-4a7a-a8f6-aafdd7dfeef9
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Date deposited: 09 Feb 2024 17:31
Last modified: 22 Nov 2024 02:47
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Contributors
Author:
Alessia Campolmi
Author:
Harald Fadinger
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