**Doing Politics Differently?**

**Applying a Feminist Institutionalist Lens to the UK Women’s Equality Party**

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**Abstract**

The UK Women’s Equality Party (WEP) was established in 2015 in order to ‘bring

about change by winning – support, votes and seats’. It has thus far recruited tens

of thousands of members and run candidates in national, devolved and local

elections. This article provides one of the first empirical analyses of this new actor in

UK politics. Adopting a feminist institutionalist lens we examine the extent to which

WEP ‘does things differently’ by looking at discourse, formal party rules and informal

ways of doing things ‘on the ground’. Drawing upon a set of semi-structured

interviews, observations of local and national party meetings, and document

analysis, we argue that while WEP has to some extent tried to set up alternative

participatory structures and new ‘ways of working’, it has also at times fallen back on

more traditional, centralised and hierarchical modes of party organising, as well as

informalized practices, which are more typically associated with male-dominated

parties.

The ‘story’ of women’s representation in the United Kingdom has been one of

promise unfulfilled. On the one hand, all of the major UK parties have made at least

rhetorical attempts to engage with both the descriptive (or numerical) representation

of women and the substantive representation of women’s issues and interests

(Childs 2008; Kenny 2018). There are also prominent women ‘at the top’ of British

politics – at time of writing including not only Prime Minister Theresa May, but also

First Minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon;

and the leader of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party Arlene Foster,

amongst others.

Yet whilst there has been some progress with respect to the feminization of

UK politics, this has stalled in recent years. Despite the presence of women in

leadership positions across UK legislatures, as well as a vibrant, visible and active

women’s movement (Evans, 2015), women remain under-represented at all levels of

UK politics. Recent political developments highlight the ways in which UK politics

continues to be coded as male in multiple and overlapping ways: women were

disproportionately selected in unwinnable seats in the 2017 general election1; a

recent report commissioned by MPs found that as many as one in five people

working in Westminster has experienced sexual harassment2; black and Asian

women MPs are disproportionately the target of online abuse3; and women

politicians are not only less likely to receive media coverage, but are also less likely

to be taken seriously (Ross et al, 2013). In short, there is some way to go toward

achieving equality of power between men and women in British politics.

In explaining the persistence of women’s political under-representation,

scholars have repeatedly pointed to the important gatekeeping role of political

parties, citing evidence of well-entrenched gender bias in British party politics,

including direct and indirect forms of gender-based discrimination against women

(Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Lovenduski, 2005; Childs, 2008). Work in the field has

increasingly focused on political parties as gendered organizations, highlighting the

ways in which both the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ often create an

inhospitable climate for women members and candidates (Lovenduski, 2005; Childs

and Webb, 2012; Kenny, 2013). As Lovenduski (2005: 56) famously notes: ‘If

parliament is the warehouse of traditional masculinity…political parties are its major

distributors.’

It is within this political context that the UK Women’s Equality Party emerged

in March 2015, driven by a desire to see ‘women enjoy the same rights and

opportunities as men so that all can flourish.’4 Later that year the party officially

registered with the Electoral Commission, and Reuters journalist Sophie Walker had

been appointed party leader5. By the end of the year, the party claimed to have

around 65,000 members and over 70 local branches across the UK, whilst also

fielding candidates in local, devolved and general elections. Women’s parties are not

new – there have been more than thirty formed in Europe in the last three decades –

but they provide important insights into the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion

within political parties, and can serve as channels of representation and mobilization

for women (Cowell-Meyers, 2016). Moreover, as female-dominated parties

specifically committed to challenging the unequal distribution of political power, they

offer the possibility of ‘doing things differently’ in party politics, potentially opening up

‘new pathways to political inclusion’ (AUTHOR REF).

This paper explores these questions through a qualitative case study of the

UK Women’s Equality Party (WEP), providing an in-depth analysis of the process of

‘building’ a women’s party on the ground. Using a feminist institutionalist lens, the

article assesses the party as a ‘new’ organization, mapping formal rules and

processes, as well as informal norms and practices in the first two years of the

party’s existence. It evaluates the extent to which WEP has managed to ‘do politics

differently’, in terms of its ideology, organizational structure, and ways of working.

We find that while WEP has attempted to formalize ‘new’ innovations in terms of

alternative participatory structures and feminist modes of organizing, these exist

alongside ‘older’ and more hierarchical modes of party decision-making and

leadership. Moreover, despite a rapidly developing formal rule book, the party has

tended to fall back on informalized practices, which are more typically associated

with male-dominated parties. In the case of WEP then, possibilities for ‘doing politics

differently’ have been constrained by institutional legacies, as well as ongoing

dynamics in the British political system (including gender regimes), which have

largely foreclosed opportunities for new political paths. This case study therefore

improves our understanding of both the general and gendered obstacles to

institutional innovation and party change.

GENDER, PARTIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Feminist scholars of party politics have begun to shift their focus from ‘women in’ to

‘gender and’ political parties (see, for example, Lovenduski, 2005; Hinojosa, 2012;

Bjarnegård, 2013; Kenny, 2013). In doing so, many of these scholars have drawn

upon the insights of ‘feminist institutionalism’, a variant of new institutional theory

which seeks ‘to include women as actors in political processes, to ‘gender’

institutionalism, and to move the research agenda towards questions about the

interplay between gender and the operation and effect of political institutions’

(Mackay et al., 2010: 574). We understand gender here as a constitutive element of

social relations based upon perceived differences between women and men, and as

a way of signifying and naturalizing relationships of power and hierarchy (cf. Scott,

1986). Feminist institutionalism (FI) is centrally concerned with the analysis of power:

institutions, in this view, are not gender-neutral, but rather they reflect and reinforce

power inequalities (Kenny, 2007). FI scholars conceptualize institutions as the ‘rules

of the game’, which provide a structure of incentives and disencentives to political

actors, but also express norms of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour

(Lowndes, 2014). They have also sought to evaluate how discourse shapes and is

shaped by institutions, highlighting the complex and gendered interplay between

‘interrelations of institutional arrangements, actor constellations and political

discourse’ (Kulawik, 2009: 267; see also Kantola, 2006).

Political parties, as gendered organisations, play an important role in shaping

the extent to which women (and indeed which women) are included or excluded from

the political process (Lovenduski, 2005). Much of the work on gender and party

politics has focused on formal regulations and party rules, demonstrating, for

example, how ‘new’ formal rule changes like electoral system reform and the

adoption of gender quotas can alter established party practices, leading to increases

in women’s political presence (see for example Dahlerup, 2006). Yet, research in the

field also points to the importance of comparing the content of formal rules to actual

practices (Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Formal

rule changes tend to have a larger impact on parties who are also ‘rule-followers’

(Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016), but may have very little effect on parties that are

more informalized; thus, we can never assess formal rules on their own. More

recent scholarship, then, has sought to investigate more explicitly both the specific

influence of informal institutions within political parties, as well as the interplay

between formal and informal rules.

Rather than look at formal and informal rules as separate and contrasting

elements of the institutional landscape then, an FI approach highlights the need to

consider a continuum from highly formal to informal, with many places in between

(Kenny, 2013; Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2015). On the one hand, informal practices

may reinforce change, ensuring that formal rules are actually complied with. Informal

networks and relationships can also be mobilized in favour of women, in order to

push for party and policy change (see for example Piscopo, 2016). Yet, on the other

hand, informal practices can often conflict with or override formal rule changes or

exist alongside formal arrangements as a parallel institutional framework (Helmke

and Levitsky, 2006). And when formal rules are not actively maintained or enforced,

political actors can also mobilize informal practices to resist formal rule changes

(such as gender quotas) that clash with their interests (Hinojosa 2012; Bjarnegård

and Kenny, 2015).

The UK Women’s Equality Party provides an interesting case through which

to interrogate the gendered dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in party politics and

evaluate the design of a new party from the ground up. As Kimberly Cowell-Meyers

(2016: 4) highlights, women’s parties are defined by their ‘explicit agenda to advance

the volume and range of women’s voices in politics’. Emerging in contexts where

women were unevenly empowered, these ‘new’ parties attempt to distinguish

themselves from ‘distrusted’ mainstream parties in a number of ways: including,

often emphasizing a non-partisan ideology; adopting non-hierarchical and

decentralized power structures; and implementing feminist modes of organizing and

consciousness-raising tactics (Zaborsky, 1987; Dominelli and Jonsdottir, 1998;

Cowell-Meyers, 2011, 2016; AUTHOR REF). Yet, both party politics and gender

scholars have raised “the question of what constitutes ‘newness’ and what qualifies

as ‘new’” (Barnea and Rahat, 2010: 304). Political organizations and institutions are

rarely created de novo; rather they are ‘nested’ within dense institutional

environments, including gender regimes (cf. Mackay, 2014). ‘New’ party

organizations are likely to be shaped by both the past as well ongoing interactions

with the existing and political party system; similarly ‘old’ parties are never static,

incorporating new elements, and reforming structures and rules (Barnea and Rahat,

2010). Institutional and organizational innovation, then, is often a case of bounded

change within an existing system, which can both open up, but also foreclose

opportunities for new paths and ways of working.

By investigating the extent to which WEP has built a ‘different’ kind of party,

we contribute to the burgeoning literature on women’s parties as a means through

which to increase the access and inclusion of marginalized groups (Cowell-Meyers,

2016, 2017, this issue; AUTHOR REF). Moreover, while this growing body of work

has often focused on the ‘demand side’ of the story around why women’s parties

emerge, we add an important dimension to this research by focusing on women’s

parties as organizational actors, focusing on the ‘inner life’ of political parties and the

design and implementation of formal and informal rules ‘on the ground’. By

highlighting the importance of attending to the ways in which ‘new’ parties are

enacted in gendered ways by gendered actors using formal and informal rules and

practices, this article therefore contributes to the ‘big questions’ with regards to party

organizations and the party and political system, highlighting both general and

gendered challenges to effecting change.

METHODS

Studying the emergence of the Women’s Equality Party in the United Kingdom

provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the ‘building’ of a new political party and

the design of and interplay between formal and informal rules in action. Formal rules

are consciously designed and specified in writing (Lowndes, 2014). Researching

formal party rules is relatively straightforward, then, involving the collection of party

documents and written material; although, as Bjarnegård and Kenny (2015) point

out, these are not always readily available to outsiders. In the case of WEP, a range

of documents were collected and analysed from the first two years of the party’s

existence, dating from the formation of the party in March 2015, until just after the

party’s first conference in November 2016. These documents were used in two

ways: first, as a source of thick description, setting the context and providing a ‘paper

trail’ of the sequence of events in WEP’s early formation, as well as the party’s

organizational architecture; and second, as temporally and historically situated

accounts that are receptacles of particular norms, meanings and values. These

included official party documents such as WEP’s policy manifestos for UK and

Scottish elections; the party’s constitution; and party guidelines for parliamentary and

other selections. Other documents – including candidate and party campaign

materials, minutes of meetings, internal party correspondence, and relevant media

coverage – were either obtained by the authors, or provided by party officials,

candidates and members.

Informal dynamics within political parties are more difficult to capture, partly

because of the often ‘hidden’ character of these practices (Hinojosa 2012;

Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2015). Accordingly, scholars working in the FI tradition have

tended to use more time-consuming and field-intensive qualitative methods to

identify the ‘rules-in-use’ in particular empirical contexts, including in-depth

interviews; participant and non-participant observation; and semi-ethnographic

methods (see for example Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Malley, 2012; Verge and de

la Fuente 2014). These kinds of approaches are important to understand the role

that informal practices and conventions play in particular party contexts, but also to

investigate whether formal rules and regulations really do structure behavior in

practice (Lowndes, 2014).

These issues were particularly important in the case of WEP, where during

the empirical time frame in question, relatively few rules were written down (or were

in the process of being written down at the time). Interviews were therefore often the

most effective method for understanding the how, what, when, where and why of

political decision-making (cf. Lowndes, 2014). We conducted twenty semi-structured

interviews (each lasting between one and two hours), undertaken between March

2015 and May 2018. The interview sample included central party officers and staff,

election candidates, and branch officers and members. We focused primarily on

branches in London and Scotland – as key sites in the run-up to the London mayoral

and Scottish Parliament elections, where the party ran candidates for the first time in

2016. To unearth the ‘real’ rules guiding party decision-making, we talked to actors

themselves about ‘how things are done around here’ and ‘why do you do X but not

Y?’ (cf. Lowndes, 2014; see Appendix 1). Alongside formal interviews and document

analysis, we also deployed ‘rapid ethnographic’ techniques (Galea et al, 2015),

observing party meetings and candidate campaign events at branch and national

level, as well as the party’s inaugural conference in Manchester in 2016 (with

observations and interactions recorded in field notes). As Schwartz-Shea and Majic

(2017) highlight, ‘getting close’ to the subjects under study can provide key evidence

that is not necessarily accessible by other means, and, in this case, yielded more

rich and detailed material about WEP’s internal party dynamics, the ‘rules-in-use’

within the party and their implementation in practice (see also Majic ,2017).

Our research design raised a number of challenges that are worth noting.

Semi-ethnographic methods require considerable effort to be expended in

developing relationships and building trust in order to gain access (Schwartz-Shea

and Majic, 2017). This presented challenges for us in terms of our position vis-à-vis

the party, where, as feminist scholars, it was sometimes assumed by research

participants that we were party members (we are not), or that we could offer advice

on party strategy or policy. We addressed these concerns by explaining the research

process and likely sites of publication, as well as formally presenting our initial

research findings to groups within the party, situating these within the wider body of

research on women’s parties. It was also agreed with all interviewees that they

would not be identified personally. Given the small number of candidates and branch

officers, this has also meant that we anonymized some interviewee roles and

locations. An additional challenge of studying WEP as a new party in the early

stages of its development was that internal consistency and levels of knowledge

varied widely regarding party rules, organizational structures, and policy positions.

This meant that as researchers it was essential to follow events ‘on the ground’ as

closely as possible; but also highlighted that divergent accounts from different

participants are themselves a part of the research ‘process’, shedding light into the

ways in which particular events and meanings are constructed at different times and

in different institutional sites6. Finally, our single case study design presents certain

trade-offs in terms of our ability to make wider theoretical and empirical claims.

However, it is important not to interpret these issues through the prism of statistical

methods; case studies make different claims to generalizability. Indeed, the goal for

feminist institutionalist scholars is to identify common causal mechanisms (of power,

continuity, change) – mechanisms which are often most visible at the level of single

case studies and which may have portability in other contexts (cf. Pierson, 2004;

Mackay et al, 2010).

WEP: DISCURSIVELY DIFFERENT?

Political parties are not singular organizations – they are, as Katz and Mair (2009)

note, akin to ‘political systems’, nested within wider institutional configurations and

composed of different ‘faces’ or aspects. One significant litmus test for ‘newness’ is

the party’s label and ideology; both are important ways that parties can distinguish

themselves from the political ‘status quo’ as they present themselves to the

electorate (Barnea and Rahat 2010). In terms of its label, WEP initially attracted

some criticism from within the feminist community for calling themselves a ‘women’s

party’ rather than a ‘feminist party’7. While the majority of our interviewees identified

as feminists, and felt that WEP was a feminist party, other members openly objected

to this in party meetings and events and preferred the ‘women’s party’ label: ‘I guess

initially there was a bit of effort not to use the word because it’s just so laden with lots

of stuff.’ However, party leader Sophie Walker and party co-founder Catherine Mayer

repeatedly self-identified as feminist during speeches and public interviews, and the

party has subsequently described itself as the ‘UK’s first feminist political party’ on its

website.

Despite contestations over the party’s label, the clearest difference between

WEP and other UK parties is its ideology. WEP’s claim that they were ‘borne out of a

demand for a different kind of politics’9 was echoed by party interviewees, who

regularly invoked the rhetoric of difference: ‘people are tired of the way in which

parties carry on, they want something new and something different and we are really

speaking to that’. Women’s parties are not women’s wings or branches of

established political parties, they are ‘self-conscious and explicit constructions

around gender’ that seek to disrupt male-dominated institutions and structures of

political power (Cowell Meyers, 2016: 5; see also Dominelli and Jonsdottir 1988). As

with other women’s parties, then, female dominance is not seen as problem for the

Women’s Equality Party, but rather as a given (see also Bjarnegård and Freidenvall,

this issue). Formally, WEP allows both men and women to join the party to stand as

candidates and does not use gender quotas. However, in practice, the overwhelming

majority of its candidates have been women. In 2016, for example, the party ran

twenty-six candidates in the devolved and London elections, only one of which was a

man (occupying the fourth of six positions on the party’s regional list in Glasgow).

The party has also tried to adopt an intersectional feminist praxis, seeing this

as a key point of differentiation from traditional male-dominated parties: ‘I don’t want

to be like those male political parties who are speaking for women’. Initially, however,

there were few formal rules around intersectionality, an issue which we return to in

the next section. According to London interviewees, the central party was keen to

ensure that a diverse range of candidates were selected for the London Assembly

elections in May 2016, with Central HQ instructing the London branches to nominate

three people for the list, at least one of whom should be a black or ethnic minority

candidate. However, in the time period under study, the party did not have any

formal rules on the books with regards to intersectional representation. Moreover,

while the party’s first leader Sophie Walker repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of

intersectional feminist politics during her tenure – for example, using her first speech

to party conference in 2016 to highlight the party’s commitment to women of colour,

disabled women and the LGBT community – she subsequently resigned from the

party in January 2019, citing her frustration with the ‘limits’ of her own work to

‘ensure that women of colour, working class women and disabled women see

themselves reflected in [WEP] and know they can lead this movement.’10

While all women parties use their party label to designate themselves as the

representatives of women, some are more preoccupied with inclusion and

representation than radical transformation (Cowell-Meyers 2016). In the case of

WEP, the party initially assumed a non-partisan label - a political strategy commonly

adopted by women’s parties in order to have an impact across the political spectrum

(Cowell-Meyers, 2011; Bjarnegård, and Freidenvall in this volume). The party’s nonpartisan

stance is formally entrenched in its core policy document, first published in

2015, which describes WEP as a ‘focused mainstream party’ that ‘will never take a

party line on issues outside our remit’ (Women’s Equality Party 2015). Formal

guidance for candidates seeking selection also states that WEP candidates are ‘nonpartisan’

and ‘free to express’ their own personal views on issues beyond the party’s

‘core goals and policies – driving women’s equality up the political agenda’

(Women’s Equality Party, 2016a).

In practice, however, the party leans left. Research on women and politics

overwhelmingly suggests that left parties are more likely to promote women’s

descriptive and substantive representation because they espouse egalitarian

ideologies that are centred on equality of outcome (Caul 1999; Lühiste and Kenny

2016). Parties of the right, on the other hand, promote an ‘equality of opportunity’

approach that centres on a gender-neutral understanding of political power, or that

emphasises a more traditional view of women’s roles. Yet while WEP’s left-of-centre

policy positions perhaps help to differentiate it further from traditional maledominated

parties, the party has largely adopted a liberal feminist perspective

centrally focused on equality, rather than wider structural change – although it did

adopt more radical positions on the controversial issue of prostitution, with a

commitment to the Nordic model (AUTHOR REF). In its first formal policy document,

the party outlined six core objectives around issues of equal representation, pay,

parenting and caregiving, education, treatment in the media, and an end to violence

against women (Women’s Equality Party, 2015). The party does not have an

economic policy or foreign policy. As such, in focusing on representation and

equality rather than radical transformation, the party has failed to convincingly

differentiate itself from established mainstream parties in the UK, which, as

previously highlighted, have become increasingly ‘feminized’ in terms of formal and

informal commitments to advancing women’s descriptive and substantive

representation, and have shifted towards a more liberally feminist position (Childs,

2008; Kenny, 2018). It also means that the party’s liberal gender frame is further

disconnected from the dominant ideologies of the UK women’s movement (Evans

2015, 2016).

WEP has also strategically employed discursive tactics used by maledominated

parties, in particular drawing on existing discourses around ‘anti-politics’

to differentiate themselves from mainstream ‘politics as usual’. Anti-politics refers to

‘negative sentiment towards the activities and institutions of formal politics’ (Clarke et

al, 2018: 17). Anti-politics should not simply be conflated with skepticism or apathy;

rather it describes an active negativity targeted towards politicians and parties in

general. It has been increasingly associated with support for populist parties, which

have sought to capitalize on anti-political sentiment by arguing that they represent

‘the people’ against ‘elite’ politicians and parties. In the United Kingdom, these

discursive strategies have been employed most obviously by the United Kingdom

Independence Party, a far-right Eurosceptic political party which has sought to

channel the frustrations of the so-called ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014;

Jennings et al, 2016).

WEP has repeatedly used the ‘out of touch’ trope to describe mainstream

parties, a discursive tactic common amongst populist parties who frame themselves

as ‘anti-political politicians’ (Clarke et al, 2018). For instance, the membership

section of WEP’s website declares that the ‘politics that dominate the UK are

unrepresentative, uninspiring and out of touch with everyday women's needs,’11

whilst leader Sophie Walker observed that ‘politics has become a word that means

distant people.’ 12 Some interviewees further confirmed that they were directly

‘inspired’ by UKIP’s strategy of appealing to the electorate: ‘if you like at UKIP and

their message, I mean I obviously don’t agree with them, but their message has

worked really well and I think we can use that.’ Meanwhile, another interviewee

observed that ‘UKIP gets its message across and makes it clear that the mainstream

parties are out of touch. We need to do that too, although you know, without the

racism.’ Yet, despite adopting similar tactics to UKIP, the party’s has still managed to

differentiate itself by adding a gendered dimension to anti-politics arguments. In

other words, the party argues that it is not just politicians and parties that are out of

touch, but that the political class is dominated by male politicians who are out of

touch with women’s interests, and who are therefore unable to advance women’s

equality: ‘when I’m speaking to people, they get that something’s gone wrong with

our politics and that politics don’t seem to understand what people want anymore,

and part of that is that it’s men who are the ones dominating politics.’

WEP: ORGANIZATIONALLY DIFFERENT?

As new parties, women’s parties are marked by a high degree of fluidity, both in

terms of their support base as well as their organizational infrastructure. ‘Newness’

can open up spaces for innovation and ‘doing things differently’, free from the

general and gendered biases and vested interests that can be found in existing

organizations and institutions. Yet these ‘moments’ of opportunity are then followed

by longer periods of institutionalization and uncertainty, as new structures, rules and

practices are either embedded and consolidated, or amended, neglected and

discarded (cf. Mackay, 2014). Moreover, as already highlighted, while women’s

parties are ‘new’ entrants to the political system, they are not free-floating; they

emerge from within and interact with wider institutional and party political

environments, constraining the potential for institutional innovation and limiting

possibilities for reform. New parties also face particular challenges in that they are

not just electoral vehicles, they are organizational actors who have to ‘reconcile

conflicting external and internal demands’ (of which vote-winning is only one) in

order to survive in the long run (Bolleyer, 2013: 3). These issues are particularly

acute for ‘rooted’ new parties emerging alongside social movements – such as

women’s parties or green parties – which must manage the relationship between

party and movement actors and structures (Dominelli and Jonsdottir, 1988; Bolleyer,

2013).

Panebianco (1988: 54) famously argues that ‘all parties must institutionalize to

a certain extent to survive.’ In other words, new parties need to build a viable

organizational infrastructure where the ‘rules of the game’ (both formal and informal)

are routinized and regularized within the party (cf. Levitsky, 1998). Studies of

women’s political representation add an important gendered dimension to these

dynamics, generally arguing that formally institutionalized and bureaucratized rules

and processes are more ‘women-friendly’ – that is, rules that are ‘detailed, explicit,

standardized, implemented by party officials, and authorized in party documents’

(Norris, 1996: 202; see also Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Procedures that are

rule-bound and formalized are easier for political ‘outsiders’ and traditionally underrepresented groups to identify and understand, and provide more grounds to appeal

if political actors feel unjustly treated. Informalized or patronage-based party

organizations, in contrast, are characterized by the lack of formal party rules, or rules

that are written down but not implemented. These kinds of party organizations are

generally less open to women and other marginalized groups, as power tends to be

passed on through networks to ‘insiders’, who are usually men from majority groups

(Bjarnegård, 2013).

Has WEP done things differently in terms of how it organizes? Our research

of the party presents a mixed picture. In the early days of the party’s formation, few

rules were ‘on the books’, and those that were formally codified were not necessarily

followed, or were inconsistently applied. For example, candidate selection operated

differently in different sites: some candidate lists were voted on by party members,

while other candidates were selected by the central party, with varying degrees of

vetting. WEP therefore resembles a more traditional male-dominated party, in that it

is highly informalized (AUTHOR REF; see also Bjarnegård and Freidenvall, this

issue). However, informality in male-dominated parties is often institutionalized and

routinized – for example in clientelist parties where behavior does not necessarily

correspond to formal rules, but nevertheless follows regularized patterns of behavior

that are ‘well established and widely shared’ amongst insiders (Levitsky, 1998;

Bjarnegård, 2013). WEP, in contrast, has been a party in flux, with few stable rules of

the game, either formal or informal.

Similar findings have been reported in other studies of women’s parties, which

further highlight that these parties are often reluctant to formalize party rules, not

only because they are ‘new’, but also because they do not want to reinforce and

entrench political hierarchies (Bjarnegård and Freidenvall, this issue). Women’s

parties therefore tend to adopt a feminist approach to organizing, one characterized

by non-hierarchical, decentralized and consensus-based decision-making (Zaborsky,

1987; Levin, 1999). Additionally, as organizationally new actors, they have had less

time to build up followers and supporters who might stay loyal, and need to also think

about ways to sustain and grow their initial support, while also building a sense of

belonging amongst their followers (Bolleyer, 2013).

WEP has implemented a number of innovations on this front, though some

have been more successful than others. At entry level, for example, the party has

introduced an ‘affiliate membership’ category, open to members of other political

parties sharing WEP’s aims. Several activists and members saw this as a distinctive

offer, citing the party’s official non-partisan stance and emphasis on collaborative

ways of working: ‘it gets us beyond partisan approaches which is really important.’

The party’s commitment to collaborative and cross-party politics is also formally

institutionalized in its mission statement’13, while subsequent iterations of its policy

document have explicitly encouraged other political parties to work with WEP to

deliver its policies, or ‘simply to steal them’ (Women’s Equality Party, 2017). Yet the

party’s political inexperience has caused tensions with some of the main UK political

parties, particularly on the left, most of which formally bar members from joining or

supporting other parties (AUTHOR REF). Indeed, in some reported instances,

individuals have been expelled from their original parties for registering as WEP

affiliate members.

WEP also have claimed to adopt an innovative approach with regards to

policy development, with members invited to actively participate in the party’s policymaking

process. This was formally highlighted in the party’s first policy statement,

described as being ‘shaped by our members and supporters…working

collaboratively with experts and policy-makers.’ While consultation was initially

facilitated via local branches (described by one party member as a ‘crowdsourcing’

approach), members are also able to vote on or propose policy changes at party

conference. The party’s constitution – adopted at WEP’s first conference in 2016 –

states that party conference is sovereign with regards to policy positions, excepting

those decisions taken by the Steering Committee in between conferences. Involving

members in party decision-making is not new in UK politics –the centrist Liberal

Democrats, for example, have involved members in the policy-making process for

many years (Evans, 2011). But, including members in this way can help party

leaders signal their commitment to openness and intra-party democracy, and

enhance their legitimacy. In practice, however, interviews and observations of WEP

meetings and events demonstrated that this ‘bottom up’ approach was not

straightforward. For example, interviewees highlighted that the party invites experts

to write sections of policy documents, without grassroots involvement, while

significant policy decisions (for example, around taking an initial position on Brexit)

were decided by the party leadership without recourse to member consultation.

Meanwhile, some members and branch officials highlighted the difficulties of

participating in party conference, citing the lack of political experience amongst

members, as well as a sense of confusion regarding both the substance and

implications of what members were being asked to vote on: ‘it was not always clear

what we were voting for or how that might play out in different branches across the

UK.’ This perspective echoed our own observations of party conference, during

which some delegates appeared unprepared by what they were being asked to

consider. Recognizing that for many of their members the process was new and

potentially confusing, conference chairs repeatedly assured members that they

would ‘learn by doing.’

Thus, while WEP has criticized mainstream parties for being elite and out of

touch, the party itself has continued to operate via a highly centralized and

hierarchical organizational structure, often making strategic and policy decisions

without the mandate of the membership. While the party’s initial structure was highly

informalized – with no equivalent of a national executive committee and most

decisions taken by staff and leadership at central HQ – subsequent formal rule

changes have served to further concentrate power in the hands of the leadership.

WEP’s first party conference in 2016 codified the role of two central and powerful

committees: the Steering Committee (SC), as the party’s main-decision-making body

between party conferences; and the Executive Committee (EC), responsible for

operational decisions. The SC is composed of a combination of the party’s leader;

lifetime members (the party’s co-founders) and appointees,; elected representatives;

and randomly selected members. It has significant powers enumerated in the party’s

constitution, including sole discretion over when and where to field election

candidates; determining when and where to hold party conference, as well as the

content of the conference agenda; and determining the timetable and process for

party leadership elections (Women’s Equality Party, 2016b). There is considerable

overlap in membership between the SC and the EC, which also includes the party

leader; the party’s two co-founders; as well as three members elected by the SC. In

interviews, some activists – especially those who were new to political organizing

and party politics – did not feel that this degree of centralization was problematic.

Others were more critical of the party’s power structures, comparing it to other more

hierarchical mainstream parties: ‘I was a member of the Labour Party before I joined

WEP and I feel like members there had a greater say, which isn’t saying much.’

The party has introduced additional formal rule changes in response to these

issues and criticisms. For example, the party has established a Policy Committee

which is directly elected by simple majority vote at party conference, encompassing

policy spokespeople and ‘movement-builders’ to shape the party’s key policy areas.

Some members, however, felt that policy was still being driven by staff at the center,

with one member of the committee stating that she was given no freedom to help

shape the policy area which she had been elected to lead. Others claimed that policy

was still being driven by staff at central HQ, with the Policy Committee expected to

promote these policies rather than lead on their development. The party has also

introduced term limits for the party leader, although the party’s first leadership

election did not take place until 2018, with Sophie Walker acting as appointed leader

for the first three years of the party’s existence. Although the election was not a close

run race – Walker won with over 90% of the vote – the contest itself highlighted

divisions within the party over power and decision-making structures, with her

opponent Magda Devas proposing a ten-point plan to enhance transparency and

accountability within WEP’s organizational structures.

The party has also responded to decentralizing pressures by creating regional

‘hubs’, which ‘oversee and coordinate the functioning of local branches in their

area.’ Yet there is no formal regional representation on the SC or the EC, and the

hubs framework falls well short of a fully federal party structure, which was proposed

by members of the Scottish branches in 2016, and subsequently defeated by a vote

of the party conference. Moreover, despite WEP’s espoused commitment to an

intersectional feminist ideology (as discussed previously), this is not institutionalized

in the party’s infrastructure. Indeed, requests for a black women’s caucus were

initially denied by the party leadership (described as an ‘own goal’ by one activist),

and, in contrast to several other UK parties, WEP does not set aside reserved seats

on its leadership organs for under-represented or marginalized groups.

Despite these tensions, however, there is some evidence of feminist

approaches to organizing – particularly at branch level, although this remains

informalized. As one interviewee expressed: ‘we keep having to go to HQ who just

make decisions without consultation and we’ve just decided we’re going to get on

with things here locally.’ While branch organizational structure has become more

formalized after the adoption of the party’s constitution, our initial observations of

party meetings in the early days of the party’s existence often saw members

discussing issues in a horizontal and collective manner in the absence of official

‘leaders.’ As one activist reflected: ‘Those first couple of meetings were so exciting, it

really felt like we had found our people, we were talking about all the ways in which

we could make women’s lives better and how we could do something new and

important.’ Similarly, another activist recalled the ‘energy and enthusiasm’ in those

early months and how many members had told her that they ‘had never experienced

anything like it’.

Local branch meetings have proven to be important sites for feminist

discussion, with many engaging in consciousness-raising techniques to explore a

range of issues from structural violence to educational inequality – a practice

identified in other women’s parties (Zaborszky, 1987; Dominelli and Jonsdottir,

1988). We witnessed members reflecting upon their own personal experiences,

encouraging each other to share their stories, and situating their experiences within

a wider feminist politics. Older members, especially those who had been active

within second wave feminism, spoke about how this reminded them of their previous

activism whilst an interview with a woman in her twenties revealed how

‘transformational’ she had found some discussions. We observed similar dynamics

at party conference in breakout discussions away from the main plenary voting

sessions; for example, the start of the workshop on sexual harassment in

Universities was spent talking through the principles of a consensus-based model of

discussion, explicitly drawing on techniques used by the Icelandic women’s party.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of the Women’s Equality Party in the United Kingdom raises

important questions about the dynamics of gender, power and change. As new

parties that are explicitly committed to challenging gender power relations, women’s

parties provide a lens through which to explore the bounded nature and often

contradictory outcomes of institutional innovation and design within established party

and political systems. In doing so, they improve our understanding of intra-party and

inter-party power dynamics, whilst also contributing to our knowledge of the general

and gendered mechanisms of institutional continuity and change.

The small but growing body of research on women’s parties to date has often

focused on questions about why these parties emerge and what electoral impact

they might have. Our analysis, in contrast, takes a party-centered and feminist

institutionalist approach, assessing the Women’s Equality Party as a ‘new’

organization, and mapping the formal architecture and informal practices of the party

on the ground. Our findings suggest that while some innovations have been

implemented by the party, possibilities for change have been limited, foreclosing

opportunities for the party to ‘do things differently.’

In terms of the party-in-the-electorate, we suggest that WEP can certainly

make a distinctive case for their ‘difference’ in terms of their label and ideology. Yet,

the extent to which the party has been able to position itself as a ‘new’ voice for

gender equality has been constrained by the party’s liberal feminist position and

policy platform, as well as the wider electoral and party context in the UK. Moreover,

the party has (at times, uncritically) adopted discursive tactics used by maledominated

political parties in order to establish its distinctiveness, particularly parties

of the radical right, though it has attempted to gender these wider discourses and

debates.

Our evaluation of the party-as-organisation similarly suggests that WEP has

taken few risks with regards to their organizational structure. Rule changes and

innovations have not always had their intended effect (for example, with regards to

party membership criterion); nor have they necessarily been ‘new’ (for example,

member involvement in policy development). And while the party remains largely

informalized, those formal rules that are ‘on the books’ have largely been used to

consolidate the power of the leadership within a hierarchical party structure.

Our analysis therefore highlights the importance of attending to the ‘gaps’

between the ‘rules of the game’ within parties and their actual interpretation,

enactment and enforcement on the ground. The Women’s Equality Party is not a

blank slate, but is instead ‘nested’ within a dense institutional environment that

includes established electoral systems, party systems, and complex ideas and

institutions of political representation. Rather than innovate from scratch, then, WEP

has, for the most part, simply replicated discourses, organizational patterns and

structures of existing mainstream and anti-establishment parties. Nevertheless, we

do highlight possibilities for creative agency and change, highlighting, for example,

the ways in which the ‘soft spots’ between party rules and their implementation have

opened up spaces for more horizontal and feminist approaches to party organizing,

particularly at the local level.

Our conclusions are, of course, necessarily partial, particularly given WEP’s

status as a new party in the early stages of its development. Questions remain about

its long-term viability, however, particularly given the recent resignation of leader

Sophie Walker, which will provide a critical test for the party’s future. More broadly,

the case of the Women’s Equality Party points to both the opportunities and tradeoffs

of working within institutional and party frameworks to advance women’s

descriptive and substantive representation, or whether alternative channels of

mobilization and participation might be more open to feminist concerns.

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