

The Effects of Costs on Drone Uptake in Multi-Modal Logistics Systems within a Healthcare Setting

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1 **ABSTRACT**

2 Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs; commonly known as drones) have been gaining interest as a
3 potential transport mode for logistics (i.e., payload delivery), bringing suggested benefits such as
4 reduced transit times and improved access in hard-to-reach locations. However, drones have yet to
5 become widely established in routine logistics systems, with a postulated reason being that the higher
6 costs associated with operating drones relative to traditional surface transport modes (e.g., vans,
7 bicycle couriers) present a barrier to uptake. Based on case studies of two real-world logistics
8 networks transporting patient pathology samples in a healthcare setting in the United Kingdom, this
9 study investigated the effects of the relative costs of drones on mode choice in integrated, multi-
10 modal logistics systems. Results suggested that drones could be a financially viable option if their
11 costs reduced below ~19% of current values, although such a reduction may not be feasible, even in
12 a future involving increased drone automation. Drones reduced sample transit times by up to ~70%
13 compared to vans but benefits to the wider healthcare system were negligible because level of service
14 requirements for transit times could be achieved by all modes.

15 **KEYWORDS**

16 UAV; drone; logistics; cost; multi-modal; healthcare

17 **1 INTRODUCTION**

18 The drone industry has seen rapid expansion around the world in recent years, with Uncrewed Aerial
19 Vehicles (UAVs), often referred to as drones, being used by commercial operators for purposes such
20 as inspection, mapping, monitoring, video/photography, humanitarian aid, and emergency response
21 [1-6]. Drones have also been proposed as a potential mode of transport for the logistics industry (i.e.,
22 payload delivery), bringing suggested benefits such as reduced payload transit times, reduced
23 emissions, and improved access in locations that are hard to reach via existing surface infrastructure
24 (e.g., poor road networks, across bodies of water) [7-11].

25

26 However, there are very few examples of large-scale, commercially successful drone logistics
27 operations in existence. One potential reason why drones have yet to become established as a routine
28 mode in logistics systems is that the higher costs associated with operating drones relative to more
29 traditional surface transport modes, such as Light Goods Vehicles (LGVs; typically known as vans) or
30 bicycle couriers, could present a barrier to uptake [11-13].

31

32 The aims of this research were two-fold: (i) to investigate the effects of the relative costs of drones on
33 mode choice within multi-modal logistics systems; and (ii) to produce a quantified estimate of the
34 reduction in costs likely to be necessary for drones to be adopted for routine logistics purposes. These
35 aims were achieved by first developing a novel, multi-modal logistics model (Freight Optimisation with
36 RiSk, Energy, and mixed-mode Transport Integration; FORSETI), and then applying that model to real-
37 world case studies involving logistics within a healthcare setting.

38 **2 COSTS OF DRONES FOR LOGISTICS: A REVIEW**

39 Much of the previous research reported in the academic literature regarding the costs of drone
40 logistics was found to be centred on studies that investigated the development and/or assessment of
41 new or improved theoretical optimisation algorithms for logistics operations that involve drones [14-
42 18]. In particular, there has been interest recently in algorithms for optimising the ‘flying sidekick’
43 approach, whereby drones are launched from vans to make collections/deliveries before returning to
44 the van to land [19-24]. Moreover, a comprehensive review of drone logistics research by Moshref-
45 Javadi and Winkenbach [25] suggested that studies that considered the associated costs were in the
46 minority, with only ~30% of studies including an explicit costs minimisation objective in the algorithmic
47 solution method. Another review of the mathematical models and theoretical algorithmic solution
48 methods for optimisation of drone operations was carried out by Chung *et al.* [26]. This review

49 included all types of drone operations (i.e., not just logistics), concluding that the effectiveness and
50 efficiency of drone operations can be enhanced (and costs minimised) when drones are used in
51 combination with other vehicles (e.g., vans).

52

53 Colajanni *et al.* [27] evaluated an optimisation algorithm that maximises profit across an entire,
54 theoretical supply chain network for a company producing, storing, and shipping products to
55 customers using a fleet of trucks, with drones (payload capacity 4 kg) also available as an alternative
56 option for transport during the last mile for parcel deliveries. Results suggested that, by utilising
57 drones in the last mile, companies can reduce costs by up to 60%. However, this was based on a prior
58 assumption that drones are cheaper than trucks, which may not be the case in reality. Rave *et al.* [28]
59 assessed whether a combination of trucks and drones (payload capacity of one customer's parcel)
60 would be beneficial in reducing the costs of last mile parcel deliveries based on a computational
61 analysis of theoretical logistics networks. The study found that, in 58% of the network scenarios
62 investigated, a combination of launching drones both from dedicated drone depots (i.e., drones
63 serving customers independently of trucks) and from trucks (i.e., the flying sidekick approach) was the
64 best solution, leading to average cost reductions of 33% compared to using only trucks. However,
65 both fixed and variable costs for drones were assumed to be substantially cheaper than those for
66 trucks, which may not be achievable in practice. Meng *et al.* [29] proposed a new optimisation
67 algorithm to assess the impacts of drone-assisted (payload capacity 10 kg) truck deliveries (i.e., the
68 flying sidekick approach) for a logistics network in Guang'an, China, finding that total costs can be
69 reduced by 22% compared to traditional truck deliveries. The total costs included the truck drivers'
70 wages and the cost of energy consumption for drones (electric) and trucks (gasoline), along with the
71 carbon costs of emissions associated with energy consumption. However, no costs were allowed for
72 personnel to monitor drones, i.e., drones were assumed to fly autonomously whilst the driver was
73 driving the truck, which may not be feasible under current regulation and technology regimes.

74

75 In contrast to the theory-focussed research on algorithmic solution methods, some studies adopted a
76 more practical, real-world emphasis in the analysis. Using high-resolution land-use and population
77 data from across the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), Aurambout *et al.* [9]
78 investigated the optimal locations for delivery drone depots (termed drone-beehives in the study,
79 which are essentially depots where drones are loaded, launched and return to land post-delivery),
80 based on the assumptions that the drones used were similar to those being developed by Amazon
81 Prime Air parcel delivery service (payload capacity ~3 kg) and that 10% of online buyers would choose
82 parcel delivery by drone once per year. An assessment of the costs involved with building and

83 operating beehives versus expected returns from the population within range of beehive locations
84 suggested that drone delivery operations were likely to be most economically viable in Italy, Germany,
85 France and the UK. Dhote and Limbourg [30] modelled the potential for drones (payload capacity 3
86 kg) to be used in healthcare logistics, transporting biomedical products (e.g., blood for transfusion,
87 pathology samples) between facilities (e.g., hospitals, laboratories, blood transfusion clinics), based
88 on a real-world case study of Brussels, Belgium. Scenario analyses suggested that sharing drones
89 between facilities and the provision of recharging stations for use mid-mission could reduce the costs
90 of operations by ~55% compared to a drone logistics system without these features.

91

92 Also in healthcare logistics, Oakey *et al.* [11] used a real-world case study approach to investigate the
93 potential for drones (payload capacity 5 kg) to be used to transport pathology samples taken from
94 patients at doctors' surgeries (also known as doctors' offices) to an analysis laboratory located in
95 Southampton, UK. The study found that, whilst drones offered shorter journey times for samples
96 (average of 88 minutes for vans reduced to 24 minutes for drones), servicing 18% of surgeries by drone
97 instead of van (as used to service all surgeries in business-as-usual) increased total system costs by
98 56%. Roberts *et al.* [31] reviewed the evidence for drone delivery of time-critical medical supplies
99 (e.g., automatic external defibrillators (AEDs), naloxone, anti-epileptics, blood products) in out-of-
100 hospital emergency situations, finding several studies in which services were assessed as cost-effective.
101 For example, a study that modelled a service in Germany delivering AEDs using 800 drones to save an
102 additional 1,477 life-years, at a cost of ~18 million Euro per year [32]. However, these studies related
103 specifically to the provision of emergency medical services, where rapid interventions (i.e., delivery <
104 ~10 mins) were critical to patient survivability. Raghunatha *et al.* [33] adopted a systems analysis
105 approach to assess last-mile goods delivery by drones compared to vans, finding that drones could
106 reduce costs by over 50%. However, the drone used in the analysis was assumed to have a payload
107 capacity of 544 kg and to perform multi-drop delivery rounds (i.e., similar to how a logistics van might
108 operate). This is a large drone, with a rotor span of ~20 m, which could present practical challenges
109 (e.g., availability of suitable landing zones, noise pollution), and is not aligned with the prevailing
110 approach being adopted by the burgeoning drone logistics industry in reality, where much smaller
111 drones are preferred (span <~5 m and payload capacity <~5 kg) [34-37].

112

113 Instances of the actual implementation of routine drone logistics operations in the real-world often
114 occur in situations where there is a high value attached to rapid payload transit times in locations that
115 are harder to reach due to poor (less direct and often low speed) surface infrastructure [38]. For
116 example, the blood transport service in Rwanda provided by Zipline, which transports blood for

117 transfusion from distribution centres to hospitals/clinics using drones that make deliveries via
118 parachute. An average of ~200 flights per day are performed, with each drone capable of travelling
119 up to 120 km at speeds of ~100 km/h [39-44]. Compared to what would be achievable via land-based
120 modes that are subject to Rwanda's challenging topology and poor road conditions, the primary
121 benefit of the service is rapid payload transit times, leading to a reported 95% reduction in blood
122 wastage [45]. However, the cost effectiveness has not been demonstrated publicly, and cost
123 estimations of Zipline operations have suggested that drones are considerably more expensive than
124 surface modes and the service is understood to be viable only because it is heavily subsidised by the
125 government [44, 46].

126

127 Along with factors such as speed of delivery, reliability of service, accessibility of locations, energy
128 consumption and vehicle emissions, costs are likely to be one of the most important (if not paramount)
129 considerations in organisational decisions regarding appropriate transport modes for logistics. This is
130 true for commercial companies attempting to maximise profits, and for public sector bodies funded
131 by limited taxpayers' money, such as local government organisations or public healthcare systems
132 (often seen as a promising arena for initiating drone logistics services due to the social benefit involved,
133 e.g., the UK National Health Service; NHS), particularly in the challenging economic circumstances of
134 recent years in many areas around the world.

135

136 It has been suggested that higher costs relative to traditional modes mean drones are unlikely to be
137 used routinely for large-scale logistics purposes [11-13]. These higher costs may have been a
138 significant reason (coupled with difficulties in securing regulatory approval from the relevant National
139 Aviation Authorities; NAAs) why test programmes for development of drone deliveries by some high-
140 profile logistics companies (e.g., DHL, Amazon) have been reported in the media as being delayed or
141 abandoned in recent years [47, 48].

142

143 Conversely, some companies are persisting with the development of (or re-starting) drone delivery
144 services, with self-reported successes. For example: UPS announced in January 2022 completion of
145 10,000 flights in the USA using a delivery drone manufactured by Matternet; Wing, a subsidiary of
146 Alphabet (the Google parent-company), has completed over 300,000 commercial deliveries in
147 Australia, Finland and the USA (in Texas and Virginia); Amazon is attempting to re-start drone
148 deliveries in Lockeford, a town with ~3,500 residents in California, USA; and Walmart, in partnership
149 with Zipline, DroneUp and Flytrex, made over 6,000 commercial deliveries during 2022 across seven
150 states in the USA [49, 50]. In general, a recent review by Benarbia and Kyamakya [51] suggested that

151 the drone-based parcel delivery industry was still in its infancy, and that more steps (e.g., establishing
152 specific regulatory frameworks around the world to govern use of airspace by civil drones, overcoming
153 the technical and cost challenges of providing infrastructure such as drone ports and recharging
154 stations) were required to achieve the true integration of drones into this logistics sector.

155

156 Despite many real-world trials of drone deliveries being reported as successful, few services have
157 advanced beyond exploration of operational issues to the point of emerging as large-scale,
158 commercially viable services, and it is posited that higher relative costs of drones are a significant
159 contributing factor to this situation. Furthermore, the information that would be required to allow
160 verification of whether (or not) any of these drone delivery services are truly cost-effective tends not
161 to be available in the public domain.

162 **2.1 Summary of Review Findings**

163 Based on the literature reviewed, it is not clear whether drones are likely to be ruled-out as a viable
164 option in multi-modal logistics systems on the grounds that their costs are too high relative to
165 traditional modes, where costs and economic viability are well-established through years of recorded
166 experience. In general, studies that consider the costs of drone logistics operations tended to be
167 theoretical in nature, primarily concerned with the assessment of algorithm performance in terms of
168 ability to find the optimal solution. Typically, the objective of these algorithms was to minimise the
169 cost of utilising drones, but this was based on an implicit assumption that drones would actually form
170 part (or all) of the solution to a given logistics problem (i.e., assuming drones are utilised for logistics,
171 how best should costs be minimised), and so the question of whether or not drone costs (relative to
172 other modes) would preclude their use in the first place was not addressed. Instances of the
173 implementation of drone logistics services in the real-world do exist, but it is often difficult to verify if
174 these services are commercially viable in the long-term and on a large-scale.

175

176 The specific question of the effect of relative costs on the uptake of drones within multi-modal logistics
177 systems that are commercially viable has not yet been explored fully in the literature. Given the
178 general expectation of expanding drone delivery services around the world, this subject matter does
179 not appear to have received due attention, particularly in the context of the practical integration of
180 drones in realistic case study situations based on real-world logistics networks.

181

182 The contributions of this research were three-fold: (i) a novel, integrated multi-modal logistics model
183 (FORSETI) was developed to investigate the effect of the relative costs of drones on mode choice to
184 satisfy demand for payload transport within real-world logistics networks in a healthcare setting; (ii)

185 the model generated logistics solutions for case study situations involving a significant historic
186 database of actual movements of patient diagnostics samples from doctors' surgeries to pathology
187 laboratories in the Solent region of the UK; and (iii) guidance for the drone and logistics industries was
188 produced in the form of a quantified estimate of the scale of the reduction in current costs associated
189 with drone operations that are likely to be necessary if drones are to be adopted routinely for logistics
190 purposes.

191 **3 METHODOLOGY**

192 A study evaluating the implications of relative costs on the uptake of drones in multi-modal logistics
193 systems in a real-world healthcare setting was a novel undertaking, with no similar studies found in
194 the literature. Fundamentally, the methodological approach adopted was to investigate two testbed
195 logistics networks involving the transport of pathology samples within the UK NHS (Section 3.1). A
196 novel logistics model (FORSETI) was used to conduct the investigation (Section 3.2). Whilst those for
197 vans and bicycle couriers were held constant at current values, the cost parameters for drone
198 operations within FORSETI (Section 3.3) were varied (from current values down to a hypothetical
199 situation where drones were free to use) to assess the effects on drone uptake and estimate the
200 reductions in drone costs likely to be necessary to become a financially viable alternative to traditional
201 surface modes. In essence, this constituted a sensitivity analysis exploring the sensitivity of drone
202 uptake in multi-modal logistics systems to drone costs in two testbed logistics networks.

203 **3.1 Testbeds and Scenarios**

204 Across England and Wales, around 300,000 pathology tests are undertaken on each working day [52].
205 These pathology tests involve samples being taken from patients at doctors' surgeries which are
206 packed into insulated medical containers (brand name Versapak, Figure 1) by surgery staff, and then
207 collected and transported via networks of daily van rounds to central pathology laboratories (usually
208 located at large hospitals) for analysis. Typically, the accepted target for maximum elapsed time
209 between collection and delivery for samples to remain viable for analysis is 90 minutes (i.e., samples
210 must be delivered to the laboratory within 90 minutes of collection) [53], although there is no
211 universally agreed standard that governs required level of service in terms of maximum transit time,
212 and specific examples of more relaxed requirements do exist in practice (e.g., maximum of 120
213 minutes [54]). However, the most demanding circumstance (i.e., <90 minutes) was adopted in this
214 study because it was the most favourable for encouraging drone use, with their potential to provide
215 fast transit times.

216

217 The two pathology sample collection networks used as testbeds for this study were: (i) the 76 doctors'
218 surgeries sending samples to the pathology laboratory at Southampton General Hospital (SGH),
219 located in Southampton, a city on the South coast of the UK with a population of ~250,000 (Figure 2);
220 and (ii) the 22 doctors' surgeries sending samples to the pathology laboratory at Saint Mary's Hospital
221 (SMH), located in Newport, a town with a population of ~25,000 on the Isle of Wight (IOW), an island
222 off the South coast of the UK (Figure 3). Regarding the selection criteria for the case study areas, along
223 with data availability considerations, the two testbeds were chosen to provide contrasting analyses
224 between larger-scale (Southampton) and smaller-scale (IOW) logistics networks. The Southampton
225 testbed was chosen as a typical large surgery network, involving the majority of surgeries
226 concentrated in the urban area of the city itself, with a minority of surgeries in more remote, rural
227 locations outside the city towards the geographic periphery. The IOW testbed was chosen in contrast
228 to Southampton as a smaller surgery network, with no large city and a more even distribution of
229 surgeries across the area.

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
231 An assessment was made to determine which surgeries were suitable for service by drone based on
232 two criteria [11]: (i) a suitable landing zone in reasonable proximity to the surgery with sufficient space
233 to allow drones to perform vertical landings and take-offs when making collections of medical
234 containers (assumed drone type was a Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) and Fixed-Wing (FW)
235 hybrid, Figure 4 and Section 3.2), i.e., approximately 100 m² of open space on-site or on adjacent
236 public land, determined by inspection using Google Maps satellite imagery; and (ii) a suitable
237 flightpath routing available between the pathology laboratory and the landing zone based on
238 acceptable ground risk (maximum threshold of mean risk of a third-party fatality on the ground due
239 to a drone crashing along its flightpath of 1×10^{-7} fatalities/flight-hour), assessed using the SEEDPOD
240 drone risk route planning tool [55, 56]. As a comparison, the fatality risk for crewed general aviation
241 is $\sim 2 \times 10^{-5}$ fatalities/flight-hour [57]. Drone suitable surgeries (nine for SGH and twelve for SMH) are
242 shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

243




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Figure 1. Pathology sample and containers used for transport. Pathology sample (left) and insulated medical containers (right). Medium-sized containers (middle of the three pictured; dimensions 460×255×305 mm; empty mass 2.2 kg; mass when fully loaded with samples ~5 kg; [58]) are typically used to transport pathology samples.



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Figure 2. Map of the Southampton testbed region. Orange circles indicate doctors' surgeries; green ring around an orange circle indicates a surgery is drone suitable. SGH is Southampton General Hospital.



255
 256 **Figure 3. Map of the IOW testbed region.** White circles indicate doctors' surgeries; green ring around
 257 a white circle indicates a surgery is drone suitable. SMH is Saint Mary's Hospital.
 258



259
 260 **Figure 4. Drone type assumed in this study.** The drone is an electric VTOL/FW hybrid (5m wingspan).
 261 Cargo bay is sufficient to accommodate one medium-sized medical container. Source: adapted from
 262 Mugin [59].
 263

264 The characteristics of the different scenarios investigated in the study are shown in Table 1. Based on
 265 real-world historic data regarding the number of samples generated daily by doctors' surgeries, each
 266 scenario represented the demand for transport of samples during a four-hour morning shift (09:00-

267 13:00) on a typical weekday, which required every surgery to be visited once for one container of
268 samples (i.e., one medium Versapak) to be collected and transported to the relevant pathology
269 laboratory. The actual production times of samples recorded in the historic data (i.e., the time of day
270 when each sample was taken from a patient) were ignored because these are organised around the
271 extant van collection round schedules (i.e., the time when a van is scheduled to visit a surgery
272 determines when samples are taken from patients at that surgery), and therefore it was assumed that
273 it would be possible to reorganise sample production times around new collection times as scheduled
274 in any logistics solution that might be generated by FORSETI. In accordance with the preferred target
275 for maximum elapsed time between collection and delivery for pathology samples, maximum
276 allowable in-transit time (ITT) was assumed to be 90 minutes for all scenarios. Reverse logistics (i.e.,
277 delivering empty containers to surgeries) was assumed to be achieved during normal operations (i.e.,
278 a vehicle collecting a full container was assumed to drop-off an empty container and sample tubes
279 during the same visit).

280

281 Dwell time at each stop (for collections and deliveries by all modes) was assumed to be 2.5 minutes
282 [60]. Electric vans (eVans) were specified because the UK NHS has committed to a complete transition
283 away from using diesel vehicles [61]. Recharging of eVans and van driver breaks were assumed to
284 take place after the end of the four-hour shift. This was a reasonable assumption because all solutions
285 were checked to ensure the maximum distance travelled by any van during any shift was <125 km,
286 which provided a considerable buffer below the typical eVan ranges quoted by manufacturers (e.g.,
287 200+ km), even allowing for these ranges to be somewhat optimistic compared to those that can be
288 achieved in practice. The maximum driving time by any van during any shift was constrained by the
289 four-hour shift period, which complied with European Union (EU) rules on drivers' hours (breaks
290 totalling at least 45 min after no more than 4:30 h driving time).

291

292 A battery-swap system was assumed for drones, which involved replacing depleted with fully charged
293 batteries during dwell times at the pathology laboratory. An additional 10 minutes dwell time per
294 drone journey (FORSETI assumes drones only perform out-and-back journeys from the pathology
295 laboratory to a single surgery and return, Section 3.2) was assumed to accommodate these battery-
296 swaps (5 min), and also to allow a check of the drone's continued airworthiness (e.g., damage,
297 malfunctions) to be completed (5 min) at the pathology laboratory [62]. All solutions were checked
298 to ensure the maximum distance travelled by any drone during any shift before landing back at the
299 pathology laboratory was <75 km, which again provided a considerable buffer below the typical range
300 capabilities quoted by manufacturers (e.g., 150+ km) for a drone of the type assumed in this study

301 (i.e., electric VTOL/FW hybrid, Figure 4 and Section 3.2), including allowing for the energy expended
 302 to land/take-off to pick-up samples at a surgery.

303
 304 In every scenario, all surgeries were specified as available for service by van or bicycle courier. In two
 305 scenarios (Soton_Suit and IOW_Suit in Table 1), only those surgeries assessed as drone suitable were
 306 specified as available for service by drone. In the other two scenarios (Soton_All and IOW_All in Table
 307 1), all surgeries were specified as available for service by drone, representing an assumed expansion
 308 of routine drone logistics; for example, a situation where every surgery has made necessary provisions
 309 to create a drone landing zone, or where drone collections are achieved via a cable and winch system
 310 that removes the need for drones to land at surgeries.

311

312 **Table 1. Characteristics of the different scenarios investigated.**

Scenario ID	Time	Duration (h:m)	Path Lab	Number of Surgeries	Number of Drone Suitable Surgeries	Maximum ITT (minutes)	Dwell Time (minutes)
Soton_Suit	09:00-13:00	4:00	SGH	76	9 (12%)	90	2.5
Soton_All	09:00-13:00	4:00	SGH	76	76 (100%)	90	2.5
IOW_Suit	09:00-13:00	4:00	SMH	22	12 (55%)	90	2.5
IOW_All	09:00-13:00	4:00	SMH	22	22 (100%)	90	2.5

313

314 **3.2 Logistics Model Description and Application**

315 **3.2.1 Model Structure Overview**

316 The FORSETI model is a logistics planning tool designed to analyse the demand for transportation of
 317 goods during a particular shift period (e.g., morning, afternoon) and determine how best to deploy
 318 and integrate available transport assets to meet that demand (Figure 5). Transport modes available
 319 are vans, drones and bicycle couriers. FORSETI is configured primarily to analyse scenarios involving
 320 the transport of pathology samples from doctors' surgeries to central pathology laboratories.
 321 However, the underlying framework could be applied to other logistics operations through adaptation
 322 of the software.

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
324 An overview of the structure of FORSETI is provided in this section (Section 3.2.1), along with a
 325 flowchart depicting the modelling process (Figure 5). Subsequent sections describe the optimisation

326 approach (Section 3.2.2), transport mode elements (Section 3.2.3) and cost parameters (Section 3.3)
 327 within FORSETI in more detail, including the underlying assumptions. In addition, citations of
 328 references that provide further information about FORSETI are provided throughout Section 3.2 and
 329 Section 3.3.

330

331 Regarding Figure 5, the main module of FORSETI (Land-Air Logistics Optimiser; LALO) receives user
 332 inputs (Step 1) relating to surgery locations, parameters characterising the transport modes (e.g.,
 333 costs), and time constraints (e.g., shift start/end times). A matrix of all possible origin-destination (O-
 334 D) pairs (i.e., all possible combinations of surgeries and pathology laboratory) is created (Step 2). The
 335 support modules then identify the most likely best route between each O-D pair by the different
 336 transport modes, and calculate the associated costs, energy, emissions, and travel times/distances
 337 data (Step 3 and 4). The complete set of O-D pairs data is then fed back into LALO (Step 5). LALO
 338 analyses the optimal combination of vans, drones and bicycle couriers to satisfy the input logistics
 339 demand (Step 6), producing solution outputs based on optimising to minimise a (user defined) balance
 340 between operating costs, energy consumption, emissions, and maximum in-transit time (Step 7).

341



342

343 **Figure 5. Flowchart of the FORSETI logistics model.** Numbers indicate the sequence of steps within
 344 FORSETI. O-D is origin-destination. GM is Google Maps. SSCP is Sustainable Specimen Collection
 345 Problem.

346 3.2.2 Model Optimisation Approach

347 Logistics demand inputs to FORSETI consist of a list of surgeries (postcode locations) to be serviced
 348 during a shift (one collection from each surgery, Section 3.1), specification of whether (or not) each
 349 surgery is suitable for service by drone (Section 3.1), and the location of the destination pathology
 350 laboratory. Based on these inputs, FORSETI adopts a novel optimisation approach to solve an

351 extension of the Sustainable Specimen Collection Problem (SSCP), first proposed and described by
 352 Oakey *et al.* [63], with the additional introduction of drones as an available transport mode and
 353 scheduling of assets (i.e., a time-constrained mixed-mode two-echelon vehicle routing problem with
 354 scheduling). The objective function to minimise the sum of operational costs, energy consumption,
 355 carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, and maximum ITT is provided in Equation 1.

356

357 **Equation 1. FORSETI objective function.**

$$\begin{aligned}
 358 \quad \min: & \sum_{\bar{r}_k \in \bar{R}} \left(x_{\bar{r}_k} \left(\sum_{r_{v,k} \in \bar{r}_k \cap R^V} \theta_1 p_{r_{v,k}} + \sum_{r_{d,k} \in \bar{r}_k \cap R^D} \theta_2 p_{r_{d,k}} + \sum_{r_{c,k} \in \bar{r}_k \cap R^C} \theta_3 p_{r_{c,k}} + \theta_4 \epsilon_{\bar{r}_k} \gamma \right) \right) \\
 359 & + \theta_1 W^V A_{max}^V + \theta_2 (W^D A_{max}^D + W^O A_{max}^O) + \theta_5 u
 \end{aligned}$$

360

361 In the optimisation, collection rounds that combine a van or drone route with a set of consolidation
 362 bicycle courier routes are created where \bar{r}_k denotes one collection round, and \bar{R} denotes the set of all
 363 collection rounds. It should be noted that collection rounds do not necessitate the use of
 364 consolidation and can consist of solely one van or one drone route, and bicycle courier routes
 365 delivering directly to the pathology lab are also possible. Van, drone and bicycle courier routes are
 366 denoted by $r_{v,k}$, $r_{d,k}$ and $r_{c,k}$, respectively; whilst R^V , R^D , and R^C denote the full set of each route
 367 type; and $x_{\bar{r}_k}$ denotes a decision variable for whether a given collection is used. The variable costs
 368 (e.g., flight-duration/distance-based) of a given route are given by $p_{r_{v,k}}$, $p_{r_{d,k}}$ and $p_{r_{c,k}}$ (van, drone,
 369 bicycle courier, respectively). The fixed/standing costs of labour and/or vehicles per shift are denoted
 370 by the W values, whilst the A_{max} values denote a variable defining the number of
 371 drivers/operators/drones required in the shift period. The emissions of a collection round are denoted
 372 by $\epsilon_{\bar{r}_k} \gamma$ (energy consumed x constant emissions factor), and u denotes maximum ITT. Weighting
 373 values for the different constituents of the objective function are used to define the relative
 374 importance of: van contribution to total costs (θ_1); drone contribution to total costs (θ_2); bicycle
 375 courier contribution to total costs (θ_3); total emissions/energy consumption (θ_4); and maximum ITT
 376 (θ_5).

377 3.2.3 Transport Mode Elements

378 The van element of FORSETI models the costs, emissions/energy consumption and travel time (i.e.,
 379 the factors related to the objective function constituents) associated with van operations (i.e., LGVs
 380 with gross vehicle mass $\leq 3,500$ kg), with eVans specified in this study because this is a committed
 381 change for the UK NHS (Section 3.1). A full description of the estimation of energy consumption is
 382 given by Krol *et al.* [64]. The effects of road traffic congestion on journey times for vans at different

383 times of day are included in FORSETI through querying Google Maps Directions API [65] to obtain
384 driving time and distance between every O-D pair. Journey times are obtained for one-hour intervals
385 across the modelled period (e.g., journey times obtained from a query for 09:00 are assumed to apply
386 09:00-10:00 until updated by journey times from a query for 10:00). Van rounds are assumed to
387 start/finish at the pathology laboratory. All solutions were checked to ensure the maximum number
388 of medical containers carried by any van during any shift (either loaded with samples or empty for
389 reverse logistics, Section 3.1) was <20, which provided a considerable buffer below the typical payload
390 capacities of vans (~5 m³ and ~800 kg from manufacturers' specifications).

391

392 The drone element of FORSETI models the costs, emissions/energy consumption and travel time
393 associated with drone operations. The drone type assumed in this study was an electric VTOL/FW
394 hybrid drone (similar to the Mugin-5 Pro platform [59]), with a Maximum Take-Off Weight of 60 kg,
395 cruise speed of 65 km/h, and payload capacity for one medium-sized medical container (Figure 4). A
396 VTOL/FW hybrid drone is a drone that ascends vertically from take-off using copter-style rotors, before
397 transitioning to fixed-wing flight for the cruise, and then transitioning back to the rotors again for a
398 vertical descent to land. Drone flightpaths are planned in FORSETI based on a balance between energy
399 consumption and ground risk, with ground risk estimated as fatalities per journey based on the mean
400 risk of a third-party fatality on the ground due to a drone crashing along its flightpath, taking account
401 of land-use and how population densities vary during the day; a full description is given by Pilko *et al.*
402 [56]. Energy optimal flightpaths follow direct (i.e., straight line) routes, with such flightpaths often the
403 default assumption in other studies. In contrast, risk optimal flightpaths are not usually straight
404 because they tend to deviate around higher risk areas with higher population densities. In practice,
405 acceptable real-world drone routes are likely to be required to avoid higher risk areas wherever
406 possible, and hence the balance between energy and risk optimal flightpaths planned in FORSETI was
407 viewed as a more realistic approach than the assumption of direct routes.

408

409 Drone journeys in FORSETI are assumed to start/finish at the pathology laboratory. Drones only
410 perform out-and-back journeys (from the pathology laboratory to a surgery and return) and have
411 payload capacity for one medical container (either loaded with samples or empty for reverse logistics,
412 Section 3.1). It is expected that if/when drone logistics operations become established, mission
413 commanders will be able to monitor multiple drones simultaneously, and this is included in FORSETI
414 through the operator-to-vehicle ratio. This ratio defines the number of drones that can be operated
415 by a single mission commander, and was assumed to be 1:20 in this study in alignment with recently
416 reported real-world values [66]. The effect of the prevailing en-route wind on drone travel times was

417 assumed to average-out, which was reasonable because all drone routes are out-and-back journeys,
418 and therefore a headwind on the outbound leg would become a tailwind on the inbound leg, and vice
419 versa. The weather conditions during the modelled period (i.e., four-hour morning shifts) were
420 assumed to be acceptable for drone flight, i.e., both precipitation and wind speed were assumed to
421 be within the drone's weather tolerance (typically, 50 mm/h precipitation and 10 m/s wind speed
422 [11]).

423

424 The bicycle courier element of FORSETI models the costs and travel time associated with bicycle
425 courier operations. Journey times for bicycle couriers are included in FORSETI in a similar way as for
426 vans, i.e., through Google Maps Directions API queries. Bicycle couriers are limited to a maximum
427 journey distance of 8 km, a typical limit for cyclists completing deliveries as on-demand tasks [67], and
428 therefore predominantly collect samples from surgeries in close proximity to each other, consolidating
429 payloads at one of the surgeries for subsequent collection and onward transport to the pathology
430 laboratory by van or drone; although there is nothing in principle to prevent a bicycle courier
431 delivering directly to the pathology laboratory should this be an optimal deployment of resources.
432 FORSETI can accommodate the issue of precedence generated by consolidation (i.e., consolidation by
433 bicycle courier must be completed prior to collection for onward transport), whilst still maintaining
434 the 90-minute ITT constraint from the first collection in the collection round.

435

436 Bicycle courier rounds in FORSETI are assumed to start/finish at the surgery to which collections are
437 consolidated for onward transport by van/drone. For example, a bicycle courier would typically depart
438 from Surgery A, make collections (and deliveries of empty containers) from several nearby surgeries,
439 before returning to Surgery A, where the consolidated load is then collected by van/drone for onward
440 transport to the pathology laboratory. Bicycle couriers are assumed to have capacity for three medical
441 containers.

442

443 The application of FORSETI to analyse each scenario (Table 1) consisted of a parameter sweep that
444 varied the drone cost weighting (θ_2) incrementally (0 to 100 in steps of 0.5 generating 200 solutions
445 for each scenario). Current van and bicycle courier costs are well-established and known with relative
446 certainty, so their weightings (θ_1, θ_3) were held constant (at 100) to give an effective variation in
447 drone costs from 0 to 100% of current values across the sweep. For example, attaching no relative
448 importance to minimising the contribution of drones to total scenario costs (i.e., $\theta_2 = 0$) is effectively
449 equivalent to making drones free to use (i.e., 0% of current costs).

450

451 In this investigation, the emissions/energy consumption and maximum ITT weightings (θ_4 and θ_5 ,
 452 respectively) were set to zero throughout (i.e., no contribution to the objective function) in order to
 453 isolate the effect of the cost relationships, which was the focus of this study. In other words, although
 454 values for maximum ITT and emissions/energy consumption were calculated for each solution, it was
 455 assumed that cost was the driving factor in any organisation’s decision to select drones for use in a
 456 multi-modal logistics system, a reasonable assumption for profit-driven commercial companies and
 457 impecunious public sector organisations alike.

458 3.3 Cost Parameters

459 The cost parameter values used for the different transport modes in FORSETI were based on current
 460 (2022/23) estimates (Table 2). Not all cost parameters are required for each mode. Van cost values
 461 were obtained from the Manager’s Guide to Distribution Costs published in the UK by the Freight
 462 Transport Association (FTA) [68]. Van driver labour costs (GBP 11.93/h, including pay for overtime
 463 and productivity) were those for drivers of light rigid vehicles (gross vehicle mass $\leq 7,500$ kg). Vehicle
 464 running costs (GBP 0.34/mi, including fuel, tyres, and maintenance) and standing costs (GBP
 465 29.33/vehicle/day, including vehicle tax, insurance, depreciation, and overheads) were those for
 466 diesel vans with average annual mileage (36,000 miles/year). The FTA do not publish values for eVans,
 467 and therefore eVan cost values were assumed to be similar to those for diesel vans, which was
 468 reasonable as eVans continue to increase market share and are now competitive on a Total Cost of
 469 Ownership basis in Europe [69].

470

471 **Table 2. Cost parameters required for different modes.**

Cost Parameter	Description	Units	Van	Bicycle Courier	Drone
cost_mile	Vehicle running costs per mile	GBP/mi	0.34	1.01 ^a	-
cost_ph_lab	Labour costs per hour	GBP/h	11.93	-	175.64
cost_ph_veh	Vehicle running costs per hour	GBP/h	-	-	32.40
cost_task	Costs per task	GBP/task	-	7.07	-
cost_stop	Costs per stop in addition to the first stop	GBP/stop	-	2.78	-
cost_veh_day	Vehicle standing costs per day	GBP/veh./day	29.33	-	8.99

472 ^aBeyond a threshold distance of 0.5 mi.

473

474 Drone cost values were obtained from a combination of literature sources, commercial information,
475 and the drone expertise possessed by members of the FORSETI research and development team and
476 associated partners (e.g., <https://cascadeuav.com/>). A detailed breakdown of costs and sources is
477 provided in Appendix A. Drone labour costs (GBP 175.64/h) included: a mission commander in overall
478 command of multiple drones (up to 20 simultaneously in this study, Section 3.2); two safety pilots
479 prepared to take-over manual control should a drone's autopilot malfunction or other safety issues
480 arise (one responsible for departure/arrival operations at the pathology laboratory and the other
481 responsible for arrival/departure operations at GP surgeries); and two loader/technicians at the
482 pathology laboratory (one responsible for receiving, accepting and onward transfer within the building
483 of deliveries, and the other responsible for completing battery swaps and airworthiness checks).
484 Loading of drones at surgeries was assumed to be completed as an additional duty for existing surgery
485 staff, and hence incurred no extra cost.

486

487 Vehicle running costs (GBP 32.40/h) included the drone platform itself based on component life
488 expectancies (e.g., airframe, motors, propellers, autopilots, and communications equipment) and
489 electricity consumption. Vehicle standing costs (GBP 8.99/vehicle/day) included operational insurance
490 and UAV Traffic Management (UTM) fees for access to airspace managed by UTM service providers.
491 A profit margin was included for all drone costs based on the assumption that a public sector
492 healthcare organisation (such as the NHS) would be unlikely to operate their own-account fleet of
493 logistics drones (in contrast to own-account van fleets that many public sector organisations do
494 operate), and would instead opt to buy-in drone services from an external drone service provider. The
495 profit margin included was 3% (i.e., costs x 1.03), approximately in accordance with logistics industry
496 standards [70].

497

498 Labour costs for both vans and drones were assumed to be paid for the entire modelled period. For
499 example, for the four-hour morning shifts analysed in this study, van drivers and drone personnel were
500 paid for four hours work at their hourly rate. This is how such workers are likely to be paid in practice
501 (particularly in the UK public sector where the work force is ~50% unionised providing greater
502 guarantees for employment terms and conditions [71]), rather than just being paid for the time they
503 are actually engaged in operating a vehicle. In contrast, so-called gig economy workers, such as bicycle
504 couriers, are often paid on a per task basis.

505

506 Bicycle courier cost values in FORSETI were based on an analysis of the prices charged for a set of
507 journeys (n=293) in the UK by a real-world courier company (Stuart Couriers [67]), a provider of

508 independent bicycle (and motorcycle/car) couriers in several European countries. Worker costs are
509 charged on a per task basis (GBP 7.07/task), with a task defined as one bicycle courier journey starting
510 at a given surgery, making collections from one (or more) other surgeries in close proximity, before
511 returning to the start surgery to deliver a consolidated load for subsequent collection and onward
512 transport to the pathology laboratory by van or drone (Section 3.2). Additional costs are incurred: for
513 each extra collection stop (GBP 2.78/stop) in addition to the first collection; and for journey distance
514 (GBP 1.01/mi) beyond an initial distance threshold of 0.5 miles. Hence, the cost of a bicycle courier
515 journey (GBP) is given by: $Cost = 7.07 + 2.78(n_c - 1) + 1.01(d - 0.5)$, where n_c is the number of
516 collection stops and d is the journey distance in miles. For example, one courier journey of 2.5 miles
517 involving two collections would cost (1 task x GBP 7.07/task) + (1 additional stop x GBP 2.78/stop) +
518 (2.0 mi x GBP 1.01/mi) = GBP 11.87.

519 **4 RESULTS**

520 Through varying the drone cost weighting (θ_2) incrementally, whilst van and bicycle courier costs
521 weightings (θ_1, θ_3) were held constant (Section 3.2), the effect of the relative costs of drones on their
522 uptake in a multi-modal logistics network was analysed. An estimate of the amount by which drone
523 costs would need to be reduced from current values to achieve financial viability was produced for
524 each scenario listed in Table 1.

525


526 For the Southampton scenario with only drone suitable surgeries permitted (Soton_Suit in Table 1),
527 drones began to be selected in lower cost solutions when drone costs were reduced to 3.5% of current
528 values (Figure 6a). Below this tipping point (defined as the price point, as a percentage of current
529 drone costs, at which drones first start to be selected in a given scenario; i.e., 3.5% in this case), two
530 drones were selected (Figure 6b), servicing all nine drone suitable surgeries and allowing the removal
531 of one van, i.e., number of vans reduced from five to four (Figure 6c).

532

533 When all surgeries were permitted (Soton_All in Table 1), the tipping point occurred at 18.5% of
534 current values (Figure 6d). Ultimately, as the costs of drones approached 0% of current values (i.e.,
535 free to use), drones were the only mode selected, with 12 drones sufficient to service all surgeries
536 during the four-hour shift (Figure 6e) and the number of vans reduced to zero (Figure 6f). Compared
537 to using vans, transporting all samples by drone reduced maximum ITT from 81 to 33 minutes (60%
538 reduction), although the level of service requirement for sample transit times (i.e., <90 minutes) was
539 satisfied in any case. A map of routes for all modes in a solution involving partial uptake of drones

540 when all sites were permitted (i.e., Soton_All scenario) is shown in Figure 7. A summary of the key
 541 results for the Southampton (and IOW) scenarios is presented in Figure 8.

542




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544

(a)

(b)

(c)



545

546


(d)

(e)


(f)

547 **Figure 6. Southampton cost analysis plotted against drone costs relative to current values. Only**
 548 **drone suitable surgeries permitted: total scenario cost (a), drone uptake (b), and number of vans used**
 549 **(c). All surgeries permitted: total scenario cost (d), drone uptake (e), and number of vans used (f).**

550



551
 552 **Figure 7. Map of an example solution for Southampton with all surgeries permitted.** Blue, red and
 553 green lines indicate drone, van and bicycle courier routes, respectively. Pins indicate surgeries: road
 554 symbol is van served; aeroplane symbol is drone served; wheel symbol is consolidated by bicycle
 555 courier. Black pin with white house indicates Southampton General Hospital. Base map source:
 556 OpenStreetMap.
 557



558

559 **Figure 8. Tipping points and transit time reductions for Southampton and the IOW.** As drone costs
 560 were reduced, Tipping Point is the price point at which drones first started to be selected as a
 561 percentage of current drone costs. Only Suitable indicates scenarios where only drone suitable
 562 surgeries were permitted for service by drone; All Permitted indicates scenarios where all surgeries
 563 were permitted for service by drone. Reduction in Maximum ITT for Drones vs Vans is the reduction
 564 in maximum ITT when only drones served all surgeries as a percentage of when only vans served all
 565 surgeries.


566

567 For the IOW scenario with only drone suitable surgeries permitted (IOW_Suit in Table 1), drones began
 568 to be selected in lower cost solutions when costs were reduced to 12.0% of current values (Figure 9a).
 569 After this tipping point (i.e., 12.0% and below), one (and eventually two) drone(s) were selected
 570 (Figure 9b), servicing all twelve drone suitable surgeries and allowing the removal of one van, i.e.,
 571 number of vans reduced from two to one (Figure 9c).


572

573 When all surgeries were permitted (IOW_All in Table 1), the tipping point also occurred at 12.0% of
 574 current values (Figure 9d), i.e., the same percentage as in the IOW_Suit scenario. Again, as the costs
 575 of drones approached 0% of current values (i.e., free to use), drones were the only mode selected,
 576 with four drones sufficient to service all surgeries (Figure 9e) and the number of vans reduced to zero
 577 (Figure 9f). Compared to using vans, transporting all samples by drone reduced maximum ITT from
 578 66 to 19 minutes (71% reduction), although the level of service requirement (i.e., <90 minutes) was
 579 satisfied in any case. A map of routes for all modes in a solution involving partial uptake of drones
 580 when all surgeries were permitted (i.e., IOW_All scenario) is shown in Figure 10. A summary of the
 581 key results for the IOW (and Southampton) scenarios is presented in Figure 8.


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(a)




(b)




(c)


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(d)




(e)



(f)

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590
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Figure 9. IOW cost analysis plotted against drone costs relative to current values. Only drone suitable surgeries permitted: total scenario cost (a), drone uptake (b), and number of vans used (c). All surgeries permitted: total scenario cost (d), drone uptake (e), and number of vans used (f).



592
 593 **Figure 10. Map of an example solution for the IOW with all surgeries permitted.** Blue and red lines
 594 indicate drone and van routes, respectively. Pins indicate surgeries: road symbol is van served;
 595 aeroplane symbol is drone served. Black pin with white house indicates Saint Mary's Hospital. Base
 596 map source: OpenStreetMap.

597
 598 The noise evident in the plots of total scenario costs (Figure 6a & d for Southampton, Figure 9a & d
 599 for IOW) was due to randomness in the optimisation algorithm, which meant very small route
 600 variations were possible between solutions. The discontinuities evident in these same plots are
 601 associated with the progressive removal of each van from the solution, leading to a step-change
 602 reduction in total scenario costs. An exception to this was the first van removal in the IOW scenarios.
 603 This van had relatively low utilisation (operating for only 1h 40m during a four-hour shift), and even
 604 though the van's fixed (i.e., labour and vehicle standing) costs were saved, the overall effect of its
 605 removal on total scenario costs did not produce a large step-change in results.

606
 607 Bicycle couriers were rarely selected in any of the scenarios. This was because consolidation by bicycle
 608 courier was relatively expensive compared to the alternative of vans making additional stops. For
 609 example, if a diversion for an extra stop created an additional 2 km of van driving distance (a
 610 reasonable approximation of the additional distance required for a van to visit a nearby surgery that
 611 might otherwise be consolidated by bicycle courier), this would add GBP 0.42 to total costs (0.34

612 GBP/mi for vans in Table 2), whilst a bicycle courier journey costs a minimum of GBP 7.07. In fact,
613 bicycle couriers were never selected in any solution for either of the IOW scenarios because the
614 network layout meant that, in any cluster of surgeries that could present an opportunity for
615 consolidation, a van was likely to be passing very close to all surgeries in the cluster anyway, making
616 consolidation by bicycle courier the more costly option. Instead of cost reductions, the main benefit
617 of bicycle couriers tends to be associated with the potential they offer for reduction of CO₂ emissions
618 compared to vans and drones, making their selection more likely if organisations are more concerned
619 with the environmental impacts (rather than costs) of their operations [72-74].

620 **5 DISCUSSION**

621 The key points highlighted in the results of the study have been organised into three sections for
622 convenient discussion: (i) the implications of the scale of the drone cost reductions estimated to be
623 necessary to achieve financial viability (Section 5.1); (ii) the potential effects of network characteristics
624 on necessary drone cost reductions (Section 5.2); and (iii) the other factors that could influence the
625 viability of drone logistics (Section 5.3).

626 **5.1 Implications of Necessary Drone Cost Reductions**

627 From the results it was evident that, for the four case study scenarios (Table 1), there were tipping
628 points for reductions in drone costs (price points ranging from 3.5% to 18.5% of current drone costs)
629 below which drones can offer cost advantages in an integrated multi-modal logistics system as an
630 alternative to traditional surface modes (i.e., vans, bicycle couriers). However, these tipping point
631 values represented considerable cost reductions, suggesting drones are unlikely to be financially
632 viable under the cost structures currently prevailing in the logistics and drone industries.

633

634 The target for maximum elapsed time between collection and delivery (i.e., ITT) for samples to remain
635 viable for analysis (90 minutes, Section 3.1) was achieved in every scenario solution, and there was
636 therefore no meaningful benefit offered by drones in terms of reduced transit times compared to vans
637 and bicycle couriers. In other words, in all solutions (with or without drones) level of service
638 requirements for transit times were met, in large part due to the good accessibility of surgeries via a
639 well-developed and reliable surface network of roads in both testbed areas. Moreover, the
640 assumption in this study of 90 minutes as the maximum ITT represents the “gold standard” from the
641 literature (Section 3.1). In reality, level of service requirements in the NHS in the UK are often more
642 relaxed (e.g., maximum ITT of 120 minutes [54], or even as much as 240 minutes [75]), meaning there

643 is little doubt that level of service requirements could be satisfied comfortably by surface transport
644 modes without any need for the reduced transit times offered by drones.

645

646 Discussions with NHS staff suggested that, in terms of the wider patient diagnostic and treatment
647 system as a whole, the benefits of transit time savings in excess of level of service requirements were
648 likely to be negligible due to limitations elsewhere in the system. For example, samples may be
649 delivered more rapidly to the pathology laboratory but then remain unprocessed for a while (e.g.,
650 several hours) due to a lack of laboratory processing capacity, or samples may be delivered and
651 processed more rapidly (e.g., diagnosis within several hours rather than a day) but this is unlikely to
652 lead to patients commencing treatments any sooner than under the existing system without
653 considerable investment in the onward patient care process. The typical expectation within the NHS
654 for providing patients with the results of tests on routine pathology samples is that results may be
655 produced after a few days, and usually within a few weeks [76].

656

657 Essentially, reducing ITT for transport of routine pathology samples by minutes or hours (as is possible
658 through the use of drones instead of vans and/or bicycle couriers) is likely to be inconsequential in
659 terms of significant beneficial health outcomes for patients when waiting times for treatment in the
660 wider healthcare system are measured in days or often weeks [77]. In these circumstances, it is
661 unlikely there would be any significant value attached to the reduced payload transit times offered by
662 drones from the perspective of improved patient care outcomes through faster diagnostics, meaning
663 there is no additional benefit which could then be used to justify the additional cost of drones. In
664 contrast, for specific use cases involving the delivery of certain time-critical medical items (e.g., AEDs,
665 anti-epileptics) in out-of-hospital emergency situations (as opposed to the delivery of routine
666 pathology samples considered in this study), it is possible that the rapid transit times offered by drones
667 could improve patient outcomes and be cost-effective [31].

668

669 In general, it was the relatively expensive labour costs of drones (GBP 175.64/h, Table 2) compared to
670 vans (GBP 11.93/h) and bicycle couriers (equivalent to ~GBP 15.00/h based on completing two tasks
671 per hour) that had the largest effect on drones' lack of financial viability. It is reasonable to expect
672 that automation of drone logistics operations will increase as technologies advance and regulatory
673 environments mature, and this increased automation is likely to reduce drone labour costs.

674

675 For the purposes of discussing financial viability under a regime of increased automation, an estimate
676 of potential future drone costs was calculated (Table 3). These future drone costs were estimated in

677 terms of current (2022/23) currency (GBP) values (i.e., they are not true future drone costs taking in
678 to account an estimate of inflation in the logistics sector during the intervening years), which allowed
679 direct, like-for-like comparisons to be made with the current costs used elsewhere throughout the
680 study. As an emerging technology and potential new mode for logistics, drones are more likely to
681 experience considerable cost reductions as/when the drone logistics market matures and becomes
682 routine, compared to vans and bicycle couriers where the logistics market is already well-established
683 and cost trends known with relative certainty through years of recorded experience. One caveat to
684 this is that van costs may also experience cost reductions in the future due to factors such as the
685 maturing of the eVan market and the potential introduction of autonomous vehicles. Such cost
686 reductions for competing transport modes would negatively affect the financial viability of drones as
687 a potential alternative, meaning the drone cost reductions required may be even greater than they
688 were when compared to current van and bicycle courier costs.

689

690 Increased automation was assumed to result in employment as a mission commander becoming a less
691 skilled (and therefore lower paid) occupation (revised cost GBP 20.26/h [78]), and for the
692 requirements for safety pilots and loader/technicians to be reduced or removed completely. Future
693 labour costs (GBP 31.44/h in Table 3) included one mission commander (revised cost) and one
694 loader/technician (same cost as current; Appendix A). A linearly decreasing (from 3% per annum to
695 0% per annum over a 30-year period), compound annual rate of reduction (equivalent to $0.626 \times$
696 current cost) was applied to the drone platform (revised cost GBP 19.60/h) to account for the
697 evolution of technology and new manufacturing methods/processes, and for economies of scale in
698 manufacturing due to the forecast expansion of the global drone industry [79-81]. Future vehicle
699 running costs (GBP 20.33/h in Table 3) included the drone platform (revised cost) and electricity
700 consumption (same cost as current; Appendix A). Vehicle standing costs (GBP 8.99/vehicle/day in
701 Table 3) were assumed to remain as current. Additionally, as was the case for the original estimation
702 of current drone costs (Section 3.3), all future costs included a 3% profit margin.

703

704 **Table 3. Current and future values for drone cost parameters.**

Cost Parameter	Units	Current Values ^a	Potential Future Values
cost_ph_lab	GBP/h	175.64	31.44
cost_ph_veh	GBP/h	32.40	20.33
cost_veh_day	GBP/veh./day	8.99	8.99

705 ^aCurrent values are reproduced from Table 2.

706

707 The combined effect of the future reductions in the individual drone cost parameters (cost_ph_lab,
 708 cost_ph_veh and cost_veh_day in Table 3) was to reduce overall drone operating costs to an
 709 estimated 43% of current values (Table 4). This estimate was produced using FORSETI to calculate
 710 total scenario costs in the Southampton and IOW testbeds with only drones available to service all
 711 surgeries (i.e., vans and bicycle couriers switched off as possible transport modes), firstly with current
 712 cost parameter values, and then with estimated future values, giving: (Soton_Future +
 713 IOW_Future)/(Soton_Current + IOW_Current) = (GBP 881.96 + 344.96)/(GBP 1,843.66 + 1,030.54) =
 714 43% (Table 4). In contrast, even in the scenario most favourable to drone uptake (Soton_All in Table
 715 1), the tipping point did not occur until drone costs were reduced to 18.5% of current values. In other
 716 words, the estimated possible reduction in future drone costs (100% - 43% = 57% reduction) was still
 717 some way short of the reduction necessary for drones to become financially viable in multi-modal
 718 logistics systems (100% - 18.5% = 82.5% reduction).

719

720 **Table 4. Comparison of future and current drone operating costs.**

	Soton Testbed	IOW Testbed	Combined Overall	Combined Overall (Future Shared-Capacity Regime)
Current Cost (GBP)	1,843.66	1,030.54	2,874.20	2,874.20
Future Cost (GBP)	881.96	344.96	1,226.92	1,143.45
Max Simultaneous Drones	12	4	16	16
Mission Commander Capacity	20	20	40	20
Future as % of Current Cost	48%	33%	43%	40%

721
 722 If the maturing and expansion of the drone logistics market leads to a sufficiently high level of
 723 consistent demand, one other possible way to reduce drone labour costs in the future would be to
 724 improve utilisation of mission commanders. In this study, the operator-to-vehicle ratio for drones was
 725 set at 1:20 (Section 3.2; and this could conceivably increase further in a future involving more drone
 726 automation), but the maximum number of drones monitored simultaneously in any scenario solution
 727 was 12. Hence, spare monitoring capacity existed, which suggested there was potential to combine
 728 monitoring workloads (i.e., sharing mission commander capacity across multiple applications) to
 729 reduce the number of mission commanders required, and therefore reduce the fixed costs associated
 730 with labour.

731
 732 The potential for a shared-capacity regime to reduce future drone costs was explored in relation to
 733 the case study by assuming one mission commander could monitor both testbeds simultaneously (i.e.,
 734 the required number of mission commanders reduced from two to one), which increased utilisation
 735 to 80% of capacity (i.e., a maximum of 16 drones (12 in Southampton plus 4 in the IOW) monitored
 736 simultaneously out of a capacity of 20) and produced a reduction in overall drone operating costs to
 737 an estimated 40% of current values (Table 4). This estimate was calculated in the same way as for the
 738 non-shared-capacity regime, but with the (revised future) cost of one mission commander over a four-
 739 hour shift (GBP 20.26/h x 4 x 1.03 profit margin = GBP 83.47) deducted from the future costs, giving:
 740 (GBP 881.96 + 344.96 – 83.47)/(GBP 1,843.66 + 1,030.54) = 40% (Table 4). Again, the estimated
 741 reduction in future drone costs in a shared-capacity regime (100% - 40% = 60% reduction) was still

742 some way short of the reduction necessary for drones to become financially viable, even in the
743 scenario most favourable to drone uptake (100% - 18.5% = 82.5% reduction in Soton_All).

744 **5.2 Effects of Network Characteristics**

745 The effect of the proportion of drone suitable surgeries in the network can be seen by comparing the
746 two Southampton scenarios. Here, the tipping point occurred at a higher value when all surgeries
747 were permitted compared to when only drone suitable surgeries were permitted (Soton_Suit = 3.5%
748 vs. Soton_All = 18.5%). When drones were limited to only suitable surgeries (12% of surgeries in
749 Soton_Suit, Table 1), vans were still required to service the remaining surgeries. This increased the
750 likelihood that a van round would be passing close to any given drone suitable surgery, meaning it
751 tended to be cost advantageous for the van to service that surgery instead of using a drone; i.e., one
752 extra stop on a van round tended to be a less expensive alternative to sending a drone (this was true
753 as well for potential consolidation by bicycle courier, which was also relatively expensive compared to
754 the alternative of a van making an additional stop, Section 4). Hence, drone costs had to reach a lower
755 tipping point before drones started to be selected.

756
757 When the proportion of drone suitable surgeries was increased to all surgeries (100% of surgeries in
758 Soton_All, Table 1), the necessity for vans to be used anyway was removed, meaning drones could
759 offer cost advantages at a higher tipping point by eliminating vans from entire regions of the testbed
760 area. The first surgeries adopted for drone service tended to be those in more remote regions on the
761 far South and West of the area (on the far side of the New Forest National Park region), followed by
762 surgeries located in other geographical extremities, which can be seen in the example solution
763 involving partial uptake of drones shown in Figure 7.

764
765 Stem mileage and cost-per-collection is higher for van rounds in more remote regions compared to
766 the city region (where surgery density is higher and the pathology laboratory is less distant), and
767 therefore surgeries in these regions offered the greatest benefits from a cost perspective. In addition,
768 due to the interaction of the operator-to-vehicle ratio (1:20) with drone labour costs (Section 3.3), the
769 marginal cost of an extra drone (up to 20) was relatively small compared to the initial cost of the first
770 drone, and having all surgeries permitted provided greater scope for using extra drones at these
771 marginal costs compared to when only drone suitable surgeries were permitted (ultimately, a
772 maximum of 12 drones were used (Figure 6e) compared to a maximum of 2 when only drone suitable
773 surgeries were permitted (Figure 6b)).

774

775 In contrast, comparing the two IOW scenarios, the tipping point occurred at the same value in both
776 scenarios (IOW_Suit and IOW_All = 12.0%). This was due to a combination of two factors. Firstly, the
777 IOW had a relatively high proportion of drone suitable surgeries to start with (55% of surgeries were
778 drone suitable compared to only 12% in Southampton, Table 1), which meant that there was little
779 difference in how the progressive uptake of drones occurred in both IOW scenarios (i.e., similar
780 pattern of surgeries transferring from van to drone service) as drone costs were incrementally reduced;
781 and secondly, the first van to be removed had low utilisation, which meant it could be fairly easily
782 transferred to drone service at the same price point in both scenarios (Section 4).

783

784 Considering further comparisons between Southampton and the IOW suggested that other network
785 characteristics (as well as proportion of drone suitable surgeries) must also influence tipping point
786 values; for example, characteristics such as geographic scale, total number of surgeries, surgery
787 clustering, road types, road layout, etc. Comparing the two scenarios where the proportion of drone
788 suitable surgeries was the same (i.e., 100% of surgeries permitted in both Soton_All and IOW_All), the
789 tipping points were found to be different (Soton_All = 18.5% vs. IOW_All = 12.0%). Typically, due to
790 its larger geographic scale and road layout, the network in Southampton had more van rounds
791 involving high stem mileages than there were in the IOW network (e.g., van routes to service surgeries
792 located in geographically remote regions, a long distance from the SGH pathology laboratory, such as
793 the New Forest National Park). Such routes were relatively costly for vans due to the time and distance
794 associated with travelling the high stem mileage, which meant drones became financially viable at
795 higher costs in Southampton than in the IOW.

796

797 The influence of different network characteristics on the financial viability of drone logistics is an area
798 that requires further research. Ideally, this research should aim to produce generalisable findings, so
799 that they can be applied to any logistics network where the introduction of drones is under
800 consideration. In essence, such work would constitute sensitivity analyses exploring the sensitivity of
801 the financial viability threshold (i.e., tipping point) to varying network characteristics (e.g., network
802 size, clustering of surgeries, centrality of pathology laboratory).

803 **5.3 Other Influential Factors**

804 There are a number of other factors (other than costs) that could influence the viability of drone
805 logistics, and these are discussed in this section (Section 5.3). The closest that drones came to being
806 financially viable in this study was in scenarios where all surgeries were assumed to be suitable for
807 servicing by drones (i.e., Soton_All at 18.5% of current costs); although this would still require a large
808 reduction in current costs that may well not be achievable, even with reduced costs due to automation

809 in the future (future drone costs estimated to be ~43% of current costs, or 40% of current costs in a
810 shared-capacity regime). This assumption may be an overly optimistic prediction for the expansion of
811 drone landing zones. In reality, it could prove difficult for all surgeries to find suitable open space
812 (~100 m², Section 3.1) and gain the appropriate permissions from regulatory authorities (e.g., land-
813 use planning authority, National Aviation Authority), particularly in dense urban areas, that would be
814 required to enable safe drone collections, which in turn would limit the financial viability of logistics
815 drones.


816

817 The alternative of drone collections via cable/winch systems (i.e., avoiding the need for landing zones)
818 may prove impractical for reasons such as the difficulties of safely connecting medical containers via
819 a cable during collection below a hovering drone in all weather conditions. Wing (the Alphabet
820 subsidiary) has developed an automated cable/winch system that requires minimum human
821 intervention [82], but this involves much smaller packages (<1.5 kg) in purpose-built packaging and
822 does not need to allow for the issues associated with carrying payloads that could be classified as
823 dangerous goods when carried by air (e.g., pathology samples), requiring movement in a certified
824 crash-protected container [5, 83, 84].

825

826 Typically, logistics systems aim for certainty of delivery based on reliable modes of transport. In
827 comparison to established logistics modes such as vans and bicycle couriers, current limitations of
828 emerging drone technology could affect their reliability. The study assumed that drone flights were
829 never precluded by weather conditions exceeding a drone's weather tolerance (typically, 50 mm/h
830 precipitation and 10 m/s wind speed, Section 3.2). However, recent analyses of historical weather
831 data in the Southampton region by Oakey *et al.* [11] and Oakey and Cherrett [85] found that ~20% of
832 drone flights would not be possible due to poor weather involving strong winds (assuming typical
833 drone weather tolerance, Figure 11). Therefore, back-up arrangements to make collections when
834 drones cannot fly would be needed, and these would be likely to incur additional costs. For example,
835 discussions with NHS staff suggested that commercial taxi operators were often used on an ad-hoc
836 basis for pathology sample collections when other options were not available. Drone weather
837 tolerance needs to improve to increase service reliability levels and minimise the costs associated with
838 implementing back-up arrangements; although it will be challenging for drones to match the reliability
839 of vans and bicycle couriers that can operate in all but the most extreme weather conditions.

840



841
 842 **Figure 11. Ability to fly at different platform wind tolerances for a VTOL/FW hybrid drone.** The data
 843 are based on a weather window of 0800-1700 from Mar 2019 to Feb 2020 in the Solent region on the
 844 South coast of the UK. Source: adapted from Oakey and Cherrett [85].

845
 846 Being commercial aircraft, logistics drones are likely to be subject to more stringent and/or frequent
 847 serviceability testing regimes (e.g., airworthiness checks prior to every departure, Section 3.1)
 848 compared to vans or bicycles, with vans typically subject only to annual serviceability testing (e.g., the
 849 annual test of roadworthiness known as the MOT required in the UK) and bicycles typically not subject
 850 to any serviceability testing requirements at all. Hence, vans and bicycle couriers are more likely to
 851 be able to continue operating whilst carrying minor malfunctions, i.e., drones are more likely to be
 852 prevented from operating due to unserviceability than vans or bicycles. Again, this would require
 853 back-up transport arrangements to be in-place to make collections when drones cannot fly, incurring
 854 additional costs. The associated safety issue of drones suffering in-flight failures (even after passing
 855 pre-departure airworthiness checks) leading to crashes was addressed in this study through FORSETI
 856 producing drone trajectories balanced between energy and risk optimal flightpaths, which tended to
 857 deviate around higher risk areas with higher population densities (Section 3.2.3).

858
 859 The study assumed that only pathology samples were transported within the testbed logistics
 860 networks. In practice, other payloads such as paper records, bulky medical supplies or equipment
 861 (e.g., clean linen, cleaning equipment/products), and internal post may also need to be transported
 862 alongside the samples. In this situation, drones are unlikely to be a suitable option for carrying these
 863 heavy and/or bulky items, and vans and/or bicycle couriers with their greater payload capacities would

864 become more attractive options. The cost composition of the drone platform (Section 3.3 and
865 Appendix A) was based on the drone type assumed in FORSETI, which has sufficient payload capacity
866 for one medium-sized medical container (Section 3.2.3). If drones were required to carry payloads of
867 larger volumes/masses, then the cost composition of the drone platform would be likely to change,
868 which limits the universal applicability of model results, although the majority of drone costs were
869 associated with labour rather than the vehicle itself (Table 2). A drone of the type assumed in this
870 study had a range of ~150+ km (Section 3.1) which, although less than the range of a typical eVan
871 (~200+ km, Section 3.1), was sufficient to service all locations in the testbed logistics networks.
872 However, reaching all desired locations in geographically larger networks may be challenging without
873 the use of intermediate battery-swap and/or charging stations, particularly if drones are required to
874 carry larger payloads over longer distances.

875

876 The expansion of routine drone logistics operations still faces many regulatory and technological
877 challenges. For example, viable drone logistics is likely to require drones to be flown longer distances
878 beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) of operators, integrated in shared airspace alongside existing
879 crewed air traffic [10]. Typically, the way in which BVLOS flights are achieved currently is by drone
880 operators applying to the relevant NAA to activate a temporary Segregated Airspace Volume (SAV)
881 that excludes all other air traffic from the vicinity of the drone operations. However, SAVs are
882 inconvenient for other airspace users and are not a scalable solution [6]. Aviation regulators around
883 the world are aware of these challenges, and work to develop and implement fully integrated, shared
884 airspace solutions is on-going under the generic over-arching concept of UAV Traffic Management
885 (UTM), but all such solutions are likely to require reliable Detect-And-Avoid systems to be established
886 to provide inflight de-confliction between aircraft, based on fitting standardised electronic conspicuity
887 equipment to all aircraft involved [6, 10].

888

889 The effects on drone flightpaths of any airspace constraints were ignored in the study. For example,
890 zones of low-level controlled airspace that typically surround airports (e.g., Southampton airport) for
891 the protection of crewed aircraft where it may be difficult to obtain crossing clearances for drones, or
892 zones of designated UTM airspace involving pre-specified locations of corridors for drone operations.
893 These airspace constraints could extend route distances for drones; although UTM drone corridors
894 are likely to follow routings with low ground risk where possible, so there would be some alignment
895 expected with the drone routes used in this study.

896

897 The scope of this study was limited to exploring the financial viability of drones (i.e., a focus on the
898 effects of drone costs). Whilst costs are undoubtedly an important driver of organisational decision-
899 making, consideration of the environmental impacts of using drones for logistics compared to more
900 traditional transport modes may also become an increasingly important driver given the current global
901 focus on climate change and reducing carbon footprints. It has been suggested that drones could have
902 the potential to reduce the carbon emissions associated with logistics operations, and this potential
903 may start to receive similar attention to costs from some organisations, particularly when influenced
904 by carbon pricing schemes [29, 86].

905

906 Drones' potential to reduce carbon emissions should be treated with caution, however. For example,
907 the typical perception is that logistics drones are electrically powered, leading to the assumption that
908 they offer a low-emission alternative to existing diesel van fleets. This assumption may be somewhat
909 questionable, given that the transition to eVan fleets is a committed change in many cases [61, 86].
910 In addition, drones are assumed to be more appropriately sized with respect to their payloads, thereby
911 reducing the energy consumption and emissions associated with inefficient less-than-truckload
912 operations. Again, this assumption may be somewhat questionable, given the opportunities to
913 improve efficiency through consolidating payloads for transport by ground vehicles with larger
914 payload capacities (i.e., vans), producing economies of scale [8]. This study was focussed on isolating
915 the effects of drone costs on the uptake of drones in multi-modal logistics systems, but investigation
916 of the effects of environmental factors (e.g., energy consumption, carbon emissions, air pollutant
917 emissions, noise pollution) is important as well and is suggested as an area for further research.

918 **6 CONCLUSIONS**

919 Drones could be a financially viable option in some multi-modal logistics systems integrated with
920 traditional surface modes, but only in circumstances where their costs were considerably less
921 expensive than current values, i.e., a reduction below ~19% of current values would be necessary.
922 Reduced payload transit times are often suggested as a potential benefit of drone logistics, but in the
923 case study scenarios analysed, the level of service requirement for pathology sample transit times
924 (<90 minutes elapsed time between collection and delivery) was met in all solutions (with or without
925 drones), which meant it was unlikely there would be any value attached to faster delivery by drone in
926 the wider patient diagnostic and treatment system as a whole (e.g., improved patient care outcomes
927 through faster diagnostics) that could be used to off-set their additional costs.

928

929 In general, it was the relatively expensive labour costs of drones compared to vans and bicycle couriers
930 that had the largest effect on drones' lack of financial viability. In the future, drone labour costs could
931 be reduced by automation and drone platform costs could be reduced by evolution of technology and
932 economies of manufacturing scale. However, in combination, these reductions only achieved a
933 reduction in overall drone costs to ~43% (or 40% in a shared-capacity regime) of current values, which
934 suggested that necessary reductions to ~19% of current values may not be feasible at all.

935

936 Financial viability of drones also relied on several other factors that may be difficult to achieve in
937 practice. These factors included: that all sites in the logistics network were suitable for service by
938 drones; that the weather tolerance of drones was sufficient to allow them to operate in most weather
939 conditions; that there was little or no demand to transport bulky and/or heavy items, where vans
940 and/or bicycle couriers with their greater payload capacities would be more attractive options; and
941 that drone flightpaths were not significantly extended due to airspace constraints.

942

943 Network characteristics effected the financial viability of logistics drones. However, it is not possible
944 to generalise these effects based solely on the results of the four case study scenarios analysed in this
945 study. Further research is required to investigate the effect of varying network characteristics on
946 financial viability, with the aim of establishing general relationships that can be applied by any
947 organisation considering the potential for drone logistics operations.

948

949 The scope of this study was the financial viability of drones (i.e., a focus on drone costs). However,
950 organisations may also place importance on other factors (alongside costs) such as energy
951 consumption, air pollutant emissions, or transit times (or some weighted combination of all these
952 factors), and further research is required to investigate the interaction of these different objectives.

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958

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1304 **APPENDIX A**

1305 **Table A1. Drone cost values.**

Item	Cost (GBP)	Cost Basis
Mission Commander	50.00	Per Hour
Safety Pilot	50.00	Per Hour
Loader/Drone Technician	10.26	Per Hour
Operational Insurance and UTM Fees (including: third party liability, noise liability, invasion of privacy liability, product liability, employer’s liability, and professional indemnity)	2,200.00	Per Year
Electricity	0.17	Per kWh
Forward Motor (e.g., Dualsky XM6360EA-19 220KV, assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.10	Per Flight-Hour
Forward Electronic Speed Controller (ESC) (e.g., Hobbywing 100A 12s HV, assumed life 100 flight-hours)	1.00	Per Flight-Hour
Forward Propeller (e.g., 21” pusher propeller, assumed life 100 flight-hours)	0.50	Per Flight-Hour
VTOL Motor (e.g., 4x Eaglepower UA90 150KV, assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.32	Per Flight-Hour
VTOL ESC (e.g., 4x Hobbywing 80A 12S ESC, assumed life 100 flight-hours)	3.20	Per Flight-Hour
VTOL Propeller (e.g., 4x Eaglepower UC2480L 24” propeller, assumed life 100 flight-hours)	1.60	Per Flight-Hour
Servo (e.g., 2x Savox SC-1256TG, 2x Savox SC-1251MG, 2x Savox SH-0263MG, assumed life 250 flight-hours)	1.20	Per Flight-Hour
Li-Po Battery (e.g., 2x Tattu HV 32,000mAh 6S 10C, assumed life 500 flight-hours)	1.20	Per Flight-Hour
Airframe Base Platform (e.g., Mugin-5 Pro, assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	10.00	Per Flight-Hour
Autopilot (e.g., Distributed Avionics Masterless, assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	10.00	Per Flight-Hour
Satellite Receiver (e.g., Honeywell Satcom, assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.50	Per Flight-Hour

Terrestrial Mobile Network Receiver (LTE) (assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.20	Per Flight-Hour
Radio Communications (assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.20	Per Flight-Hour
Radio Control Unit (x2) (assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	0.30	Per Flight-Hour
Ground Control System (assumed life 1,000 flight-hours)	1.00	Per Flight-Hour

1306 Values were obtained from a combination of literature sources, commercial information, and the
1307 drone expertise possessed by members of the FORSETI research and development team and
1308 associated partners (e.g., <https://cascadeuav.com/>). Specific sources were: Lin *et al.* [87]; NHS [88];
1309 BEIS [89]; Distributed Avionics [90]; Honeywell [91]; and Mugin [59]. Example aircraft components
1310 are shown to provide an indication of how the costs for a drone were estimated. The generic drone
1311 modelled within FORSETI was not necessarily fitted with these specific components.