**Affluence, Vividness, and Blame**

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Introduction

Expressions of blame serve to alert us to moral wrongdoing and can motivate morally improved behaviour. But the absence of blame does not reliably indicate that no wrongdoing has occurred. Reflection on past injustice reveals examples of behaviour, such as institutionalised slaveholding in the ancient world, which today we confidently class as seriously wrong, but for which wrongdoers at the time were not faced with expressions of blame. Such observations should shake us from any complacent assumption that how we live now is morally innocent. Might there be aspects of our current lifestyles that future generations will look back on with moral abhorrence, even though they rarely prompt expressions of blame in the present day?[[1]](#footnote-1)

Given the litany of grievous moral wrongs that mark human history, it would be surprising if our conduct turned out to be morally innocent. Moreover, even cursory reflection on existing social practices generates significant cause for concern. Most obviously, the fact that people continue to starve or die from malnutrition in a world of material abundance – and the fact that people in affluent countries do little to address the plight of the world’s poorest – is deeply problematic.[[2]](#footnote-2) Faced with preventable suffering on such a monumental scale, many philosophers have concluded that it is seriously wrong not to do more – with Peter Unger coining the phrase ‘living high and letting die’ to describe the conduct of the affluent.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Nonetheless, expressions of blame towards the affluent for their inaction are strikingly rare. A range of considerations may lead us to believe that although the inaction of the affluent is morally problematic, it is excusable. For examples, a staple of ‘common-sense’ morality is that while individuals have stringent duties not to harm, omissions that lead to foreseeable death and suffering are different. We might also wonder whether it matters that the suffering of the global poor often takes place at a distance, in ways that are not clearly visible and that result from causal patterns that are diffuse and sometimes hard to discern. More generally, it might be proposed that the affluent are typically non-culpably ignorant of relevant moral and empirical facts concerning global poverty, given the minimal role that their plight plays in the everyday consciousness of affluent citizens. Might these factors excuse inaction – even if our failure to assist is morally wrong?

This paper aims to answer this question. After a brief survey of the facts about poverty, we note the significant agreement among ethicists that more should be done to help people living in severe poverty, and that the present efforts of the affluent are insufficient to discharge these duties. We then defend three substantive claims.

First, we cannot convincingly appeal to the phenomenon of *non-culpable moral ignorance* to argue that the affluent are not seriously blameworthy for their inaction. The content of common-sense moral thinking notwithstanding, affluent people are either *not* ignorant regarding the relevant truths about global poverty, or else they are *culpably* ignorant. Second, however, a parallel phenomenon of *non-culpable lack of vivid awareness* of the relevant truths does have some purchase in mitigating blame. We suggest that the affluent’s inaction regarding global poverty is explained to a large degree by an absence of persistent vivid awareness of relevant facts. Moreover, we are able to take steps to make these truths more vivid to ourselves, but doing so is generally costly and difficult. Although this diminishes blame to some degree, significant blame is still appropriate given the seriousness of the wrong in question, and given that vivid awareness is to some extent under our control. Finally, on a sociological level, there is good reason to believe that expressions of appropriate blame regarding global poverty are systematically suppressed. Potential blamers often lack the capacity, incentive or moral awareness needed to articulate appropriate blame. Therefore, the absence of blame does not indicate the absence of blameworthy behaviour.

I. Poverty and Inaction

According to recent studies, over 700 million people, or one-tenth of the world’s population, live in extreme poverty on less than $1.90 per day.[[4]](#footnote-4) Such poverty constitutes a crushing burden for those whose lives it afflicts. At this level of material deprivation, basic needs go unmet, and core human capabilities are underdeveloped or lost altogether. Families living in this condition often cannot afford enough food to live on, are unable to access healthcare, and lack shelter or basic articles of clothing. Over one-third of all human deaths (around 18 million people annually) result from poverty-related factors – with half these fatalities occurring among children under five.[[5]](#footnote-5) These children die in large part because they, or their parents, lack the resources needed to keep them alive. Taken together, the prevalence of extreme poverty is a human catastrophe of vast magnitude.

At the same time, the world is a plentiful but unequal place. Recent estimates suggest that even when we adjust for price differentials between countries, the ratio between the income of the richest 10 per cent and the poorest 10 per cent of humankind stands at a staggering 271 to 1. The wealth gap is greater still. While the bottom half of the world’s population currently own 1 per cent of the world’s valuable assets, the top 10 per cent own 85 per cent.[[6]](#footnote-6) The major upshot of this is that while some people live in the most desperate need, others live lives untouched by unmet need altogether.

Significantly, affluent people appear to be in a position to make a significant difference to the welfare of some of those living in extreme poverty. By contributing money and resources to effective aid, development, or campaigning organisations they can ensure that essential goods and services are provided to some of the people who need them most. For example, one top-ranked charity, GiveDirectly, facilitates direct cash transfers to many of the world’s poorest people. Their recipients have an average daily income of 65 cents, and numerous independent studies have demonstrated the significant improvement additional income makes to their lives.[[7]](#footnote-7) Another organization, the Against Malaria Foundation, can purchase and deliver for just $5.14 an insecticide-treated mosquito net to someone living in a country affected by malaria, a leading cause of infant mortality.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Nonetheless, the vast majority of affluent people do not act. Fewer than one in three people living in the United Kingdom report doing *anything at all* to help people living in extreme poverty overseas, and private giving by US citizens to organisations working in this area is pitifully low.[[9]](#footnote-9) Information provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) shows that inhabitants of the United States contribute around 7 cents to overseas aid and development for every $100 of income earned.[[10]](#footnote-10) According to a study undertaken by the Centre for Global Prosperity, which defines contributions more expansively, private philanthropy directed at such goals amounts to $12 billion annually. If this is correct, then the average personal contribution of each American citizen to global causes is around $50 per annum or one-thousandth of the average person’s annual income.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Simply in light of such facts, we may wonder whether, in doing so little to assist, the average person living in a wealthy nation is party to a disastrous moral failure comparable to those that have blighted human history. It is notable that strong cases have been made by proponents of many leading ethical theories – act-consequentialism, rule-consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics – for the claim that there are, in fact, substantial duties to help the global poor: duties which the vast majority of the affluent fail to fulfil.[[12]](#footnote-12) More generally, a clear majority of philosophers writing on the subject agree that we have significant duties of aid towards the global poor.

We proceed here on the assumption that this majority philosophical view – that we have significant obligations to aid the global poor – is correct.

More philosophical controversy instead concerns whether so-called ‘extremists’, like Peter Singer and Peter Unger, are correct in claiming that we must devote almost all of our spare time and money to helping the poor, or whether instead ‘moderates’ are correct to argue that we need only devote a significant, but not life-changing, amount.[[13]](#footnote-13) We are neutral here between the ‘extremist’ and ‘moderate’ views. Among those in the moderate camp, Kwame Anthony Appiah writes that ‘the shallow pond theorists are wrong about what we owe but surely right to insist that we owe more… the richest people in the world can do better. *This is a demand of simple morality.*’[[14]](#footnote-14) Richard Miller similarly notes that morality ‘still requires significant giving from most of the non-poor’.[[15]](#footnote-15) And Thomas Nagel writes that ‘there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and early death from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in dire poverty are… [S]ome form of humane assistance from the well-off to those in extremis is clearly called for quite apart from any demand of justice, if we are not simply ethical egoists”.[[16]](#footnote-16) Thus, even if the moderates were correct, our present conduct would fall well short of what morality demands. These accounts also seem to place us clearly on the hook for significant blame, unless some defeating considerations of the kinds to be discussed shortly are convincing.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Bearing these considerations in mind, what should we say about the conduct of individual people living in rich countries? We do not assume that they bear *primary* responsibility for the condition of extreme poverty. Those living in poverty are often failed by their own governments and by intergovernmental organisations, or harmed by private actors.[[18]](#footnote-18) In fact, duties to help the global poor may largely be generated by the non-compliance of others with *their* duties. But the notion that the affluent have such duties is widely accepted by moral philosophers. If that is correct, then it is also likely that they generally fall significantly short of what their duties of beneficence require in present circumstances.[[19]](#footnote-19)

II. Moral Ignorance

Even if inaction by the affluent constitutes a significant moral failure, it might be thought that their moral-epistemic environment serves to make this inaction non-culpable. Although there is substantial *philosophical* agreement that we have significant duties to assist the global poor, it may seem a commonplace of contemporary moral culture that charity is a matter of personal discretion and that beneficent acts are supererogatory. Very few people seem to think we do something seriously morally wrong in failing to respond to appeals to donate from organisations operating in poor countries.[[20]](#footnote-20) Conventional morality places extreme weight on the actions-omissions distinction, something that is reflected in the background assumption prevalent in many affluent countries which holds that it is permissible to let unrelated, distant people die, and that the provision of assistance is not morally required. In this section, we ask whether such a moral-epistemic environment defeats or mitigates blameworthiness.

Recent philosophical writing has seen an upsurge of interest in the topic of moral ignorance. It has long been acknowledged that non-culpable *factual* ignorance can make blame inappropriate even when wrongdoing has occurred. Gideon Rosen and Miranda Fricker (among others) argue that *moral* ignorance can likewise make blame for wrongdoing inappropriate, when this ignorance is non-culpable. On Rosen’s account, a person can fail to know that people have certain rights, or that they have certain duties, without being at fault. Ancient slaveholders, for example, according to Rosen, lacked the intellectual and cultural resources needed to understand that what they did was wrong. Indeed, it would have taken a ‘moral genius’ to work out that this was the case.[[21]](#footnote-21) As a result, such slaveholders were non-culpably morally ignorant and it would be unfair to blame them for their wrongful behaviour. More broadly, Rosen defends what he calls the “parity thesis” which holds that ‘whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, he is culpable for the act only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts.’[[22]](#footnote-22)

Given conventional wisdom about beneficence and charity, it might be thought that the present-day affluent blamelessly hold false moral beliefs that lead them astray. Accepting the parity thesis would then entail that they should not be blamed for their inaction in the face of extreme poverty.

We should first note that Rosen’s view is itself controversial.[[23]](#footnote-23) We propose, however, that even if we *accept* the parity thesis, the line of thinking that would render the affluent blameless for their inaction is unconvincing. In order for such a line of thought to be successful, two component claims would need to be true: namely, that affluent people *are* ignorant of moral duties owed to the global poor, and that they are *not culpable* for this ignorance. We think this conjunction of claims implausible: affluent people are either aware of the morally relevant facts, or their ignorance of these facts is culpable. So even if the parity thesis is correct, this does not protect the affluent from meriting blame.

The claim that affluent people are generally ignorant of the facts in question is unconvincing. When surveyed, people generally recognise the existence of a moral case for supporting people in developing countries,and their language patterns in discussing global poverty are often suggestive of feelings of guilt about their own personal failure to do more.[[24]](#footnote-24) This sort of recognition, and attendant moral sentiments, one imagines, would have been wholly absent in the ancient slaveholders. Someone who really is morally ignorant of duties owed to the global poor would be expected to feel concern – but not *guilt* – when confronted with a picture of a starving child. That this is not the case today suggests that the permissive cultural and moral norms in question result primarily from motivated cognitions, such as denial and wishful thinking, which become harder to sustain when confronted with the facts.

There is reason to believe then that many people do not take the staples of public moral culture at face value, and are aware that we do have significant moral duties to assist the global poor. But suppose some section of the population really does take common-sense views at face value and truly believes on that basis that they are not morally required to assist. Would their moral ignorance mitigate blame? This depends crucially upon whether the moral ignorance was culpable or not. According to Rosen, moral ignorance is non-culpable when the epistemic route from one’s present epistemic state to the moral truth is especially difficult, and when we have done our best to try and traverse it (‘or at least, everything required’).[[25]](#footnote-25) For example, moral truth is hard to uncover when there is unquestioned social consensus about the legitimacy of wrongful practices, when there is no known criticism of these phenomena or contradictions that arise from holding mistaken moral beliefs, and when it would require radical insight to arrive at the correct conclusions. These conditions were plausibly met for the ancient slaveholder. However, this is clearly not the situation of present-day affluent people. Any social consensus about the permissibility of inaction is fragile, permissive views of charity are routinely challenged by critics and campaigning organizations, and it is hard *to avoid* these competing moral viewpoints – given that we are continuously subject to exhortation by charities and NGOs to provide assistance.[[26]](#footnote-26)

In light of how accessible moral knowledge about poverty is, we suggest that the failure to question common-sense attitudes is often *morally negligent*. An epistemically negligent person fails to know what she ought to know given her general intellectual capacities and level of education. The present failure occurs because people fail to pay even minimal attention to salient features of the world around them which have deep moral importance, namely the serious suffering of innocent people whom we are in a position to help without bearing significant costs. Such inattentiveness is generally wrongful because it makes it unlikely that people will meet their moral obligations. Confronted with this kind of moral epistemic carelessness, we can imagine future people looking back and insisting ‘You should have tried harder – the facts were right there in front of you’. Furthermore, when ignorance is not negligent, it is likely to be *reckless*. The morally epistemically reckless person is aware of countervailing moral arguments, and knows that if they are correct then they would be doing something seriously wrong, but refuses to try and discover whether this is the case or not (even when the cost of doing so is low). By refusing to re-examine their own preconceived notions about personal obligations, they adopt a blasé attitude to morality and take an unacceptable ‘moral risk’ – one that predictably leads to moral error.

We believe that this kind of culpable error is best characterised as a failure to successfully meet one’s standing moral epistemic obligations. These obligations may be hard to define with great precision.[[27]](#footnote-27) But in general, we can think of the rationality of seeking out new information as depending on the ‘expected value’ of discovering new information weighed against the costs of doing so. When the expected *moral* value of new information is sufficiently great, then we are morally required to seek out that information. Building upon this insight, we suggest the following general principle:

We have a general moral duty to seek out morally relevant information when we have sufficient evidence that something of great moral importance may be at stake.[[28]](#footnote-28)

To the extent that we violate this duty, we are culpable for our ignorance of the relevant facts concerning global poverty, and thus are similarly culpable for our inaction. Crucially, in the present case, affluent people have at least a second-order moral awareness that their own permissive attitudes regarding the morality of assistance may be wrong. When faced with charity appeals, they must ask themselves: Is it really okay to do nothing? They will also have access to the thought that if a refusal to help is wrong, then it could be *seriously* wrong. In light of their standing epistemic moral obligation, the decision to stop at this point and not to inquire further, or to assume that they may proceed as normal, is something that they are morally culpable for.

Finally, suppose that affluent people do reflect further, but come to the conclusion that morality does not require them to do any more. Would they *then* be non-culpably morally ignorant? On Rosen’s line of thinking, one might think so. He argues that the moral ignorance of a run-of-the-mill sexist in 1950s America, who sends his sons but not his daughters to college, is non-culpable for this decision even when he encounters the alternative viewpoint.[[29]](#footnote-29) Crucially, this person fails to see through a ‘pervasive and well-protected ideology’. Rather than being negligent or reckless, he is simply ordinary and non-culpable for that reason.[[30]](#footnote-30) In a similar vein, Miranda Fricker argues that even when there are people who challenge the routine moral thinking of the day, what is routine sets the appropriate standard for blame.[[31]](#footnote-31) In the present case, our attitudes to giving to the poor are plausibly underpinned by social structures and norms of the kind that Fricker believes are exculpatory, such as those of the nation (which encourage us to prioritise the well-being of co-nationals) and the consumer economy (which encourages certain lifestyle choices).[[32]](#footnote-32) On this view, it follows blame would not be appropriate.

However, this line of argument moves too quickly. We should note, firstly, that epistemic culpability for moral ignorance is not an all-or-nothing affair. Rather it is a gradient property given that agents have lesser or greater ability to access moral truth. Our assessments of a person’s blameworthiness will be affected both by their society’s degree of moral progress on a particular issue and by where the person is located within their society’s moral epistemic landscape. People will be liable for more or less blame, depending on how difficult it is to adopt the correct moral perspective and the opportunity costs of doing so.[[33]](#footnote-33) Indeed, it follows from this that moral philosophers are particularly morally culpable for failure to help the poor because of their privileged position and exposure to heterodox moral argument. Moreover, judgments of blameworthiness cannot straightforwardly be indexed to what is normal or routine because this supposes that people can never be blamed for participating in widespread harmful practices. This is not only intuitively unacceptable, but is also incompatible with any plausible view about a person’s standing moral epistemic obligations. It cannot be morally blameless simply to always conform to whatever the majority of people in your society believe. Consequently, we believe that there must be some standing obligation, perhaps limited to certain conditions, to question the moral orthodoxies one is surrounded by. Among the conditions under which one obliged to do so is when one experiences ‘moral alerts’ – flashes of evidence that something of great moral importance is at stake. Perhaps the most obvious kind of moral alert is a flash of vivid awareness of avoidable intense suffering. Witnessing such suffering and turning away without investigating looks like a clear failure of our moral epistemic obligations.

To summarise, in this section we have argued that the affluent are not non-culpably morally ignorant when it comes to global poverty. They are either not morally ignorant, or they are blamefully so. In the event that they do not know what is morally required, any such ignorance will almost always be culpable because they have a second-order awareness that their inaction *might* be seriously wrong. It is therefore negligent or reckless not to inquire further, notwithstanding widespread moral attitudes and the cultural structures affluent people inhabit. Consequently, no appeal to non-culpable moral ignorance looks promising as a way of arguing that their inaction itself is wrong but non-culpable.[[34]](#footnote-34)

III. Vividness Awareness

Lack of relevant knowledge then does little to mitigate blame for inaction with regards to global poverty. But that is not to say that there are no relevant cognitive barriers which serve to reduce the culpability of the affluent. Widespread inaction may be explained, to a large degree, by an absence of *persistent vivid awareness* of the plight of the poor and of the compelling moral reasons to come to their aid. People struggle to engage properly with moral choices that involve large numbers of unknown people. Disturbingly, psychologists have found that the average person’s willingness to assist people in need peaks when the situation concerns a single identified victim and declines steeply when the numbers of people involved rise or the identity of recipients is obscured.[[35]](#footnote-35) We should thus consider whether lack of persistent vivid awareness – of the relevant empirical and moral facts – is non-culpable. If it is, that may serve to diminish to some degree the blame merited by the affluent for their current conduct.

A typical person in an affluent country is reminded of the plight of the poor only intermittently, and this plight is far less consistently salient than the exigencies, pressures and temptations of ‘everyday life’.Someone living in a wealthy society may be struck on occasion by the desperate need of the distant poor and the strength of the moral reasons to do more to help, only to be distracted by their screaming baby, by their mother’s illness, by a work deadline to be met, by an attractive invitation to a night out with friends, or by an advert for the latest computer that peers are urging them to buy. This point is re-enforced by studies from experimental psychology that demonstrate people have only limited cognitive bandwidth when addressing multiple challenges simultaneously, and also that we all tend to discount the implications of our conduct when these effects are diffuse and occur at a distance.[[36]](#footnote-36)

As a result of these biases and distractions, our knowledge of global poverty tends to be what Shelly Kagan calls *pale knowledge*, which is ‘displayed to the mind in such a way that the individual does not fully appreciate their import’, rather than *vivid knowledge*, ‘whose significance we fully comprehend’.[[37]](#footnote-37) As Kagan puts it:

‘When the needy individual is directly in front of me, my awareness of his suffering is fairly vivid. I can see the pain of his face, and hear the plea in his voice... In a thousand ways the reality of his need – and the necessity of my action – is driven home to me, and I am able to feel the force of the considerations which support my making the sacrifice. In unfortunately sharp contrast, when the needy individual is not in my presence, my awareness of his suffering is all too pale. Even though I may know of the individual’s need, I may only picture a stick figure, if I do that – barely appreciating the fact that it is a genuine human being who faces a real death… My belief in his need is genuine – yet there is something of an air of unreality: his suffering is barely anything more to me than something I read about in a storybook.’[[38]](#footnote-38)

Because the impact on our consciousness of the suffering caused by extreme poverty is generally marginal and infrequent, it is all too easy to fail to respond appropriately. Were such suffering on our doorstep, constantly impinging vividly upon our consciousness, our pattern of responses would be quite different; our feelings that we must help would be more persistent and more intense.[[39]](#footnote-39)

Not only is the plight of the poor not vivid to us, but neither is the moral force of their claim to assistance. This is in large part because of factors we will detail in the final section of the paper: it is often extremely difficult and costly for the world’s poorest people to express blame towards us in acts of moral protest. Because of their poverty, it is very hard for them to make more vivid to us the consequences of our inaction, or to *demand* a change in our behaviour.[[40]](#footnote-40) Consequently, in the case of inaction over global poverty, we are not faced with the persistent protest which often accompanies morally wrong behaviour.[[41]](#footnote-41)

This second feature of our relation to global poverty – the absence of blame – likewise makes it *all too easy* for us to fail to respond appropriately. An agent who fails to rescue a drowning child right in front of him, as in Peter Singer’s famous example, will be faced with reactions of abhorrence and outrage from those who witness his inaction. By way of contrast, an agent who fails to make efforts to save the lives of distant poor people will *not* generally be faced with much moral criticism at all. It is, of course, much easier for us to be motivated to act altruistically in cases where we know we would be subject to moral outrage if we fail to do so. What is relevant here is not just the responses of people when they observe the agent failing to help, but also the fact that the agent knows clearly what such responses would be, were his failure to help be observed. A typical agent would be strongly motivated to help in the pond scenario, not just by the disapproval of actual onlookers, but by the thought that *were* there any onlookers, they would condemn a failure to help. The thought that this is the sort of behaviour which elicits condemnation provides a strong motivation to act accordingly.

In the present case, a lack of persistent vivid awareness of relevant features of our moral situation – exacerbated by a dearth of blame – makes it considerably more *difficult* than it otherwise would be for us to respond appropriately. Frequently, when it is difficult to act morally well, blame for failing to act well is mitigated.[[42]](#footnote-42) As the comparison with the pond case suggests, it looks like a mistake to feel the same level of moral indignation towards wrongdoing agents to whom the morally relevant features of their situation were relatively obscure as would be appropriate towards agents to whom the morally relevant features of their situation were persistently salient. In assessing the extent to which blame is appropriate for any sort of behaviour, we must take account of the perspective of these agents, what is salient to them in their daily lives, what pressures and temptations they face, how those around them behave, and whether they meet with moral protest for acting as they do.

Such thoughts might prompt us to conclude that the affluent, to whom the morally relevant facts are not persistently vivid, are not especially blameworthy for their inaction over global poverty. But this conclusion would be premature. We noted above that when the affluent are ignorant of the relevant moral facts regarding global poverty, this ignorance is generally *culpable* ignorance, and so it does little to mitigate blame for inaction. By analogy, we must consider whether the lack of vividness of the affluent’s knowledge is non-culpable, before determining whether this lack of vividness can serve to mitigate blame.

IV. Vividness and Blame

In this section, we make two claims. The first is that we have a general duty not to avert our gaze from morally relevant facts when we have sufficient evidence that something of great moral importance may be at stake. Second-order moral obligations to make things vivid arise for the same reason we have a general moral obligation (considered in Section II) to investigate moral questions and acquire moral knowledge, namely that absent such requirements, we would inevitably fail to fulfil a wide range of first-order moral obligations and therefore act wrongly. If affluent people violate these ‘duties of attentiveness’, they are culpable for their lack of vivid awareness with regard to the plight of those in poverty, and are thus similarly culpable for inaction.[[43]](#footnote-43) Our second claim is that there are nevertheless important asymmetries between moral knowledge and vivid awareness that bear directly upon judgments of moral culpability in the present context.

Taking these point in turn, it seems clear that a person would be blameworthy for deliberately making it the case that they were not persistently vividly aware of the plight of the needy, taking active measures to blot out their situation, in order to avoid feeling that they must change their ways or else merit guilt and blame. It would be wrong to take a pill, for instance, that allowed a person to completely forget what they had learned about the desperate need of others, in order to avoid feeling obligated to help. More prosaically, however, we also plausibly have a positive obligation, when we do get an inkling of the great harms at stake (a ‘flash’ of vivid awareness, perhaps), not to shy away from them. A consistent refusal to look the needs of others in the face is a serious moral fault, akin to the moral-epistemic recklessness considered previously – notwithstanding the fact that this fault may be quite widespread within a particular culture. As Susan Sontag says, ‘No one after a certain age has the right to this kind of innocence, of superficiality, to this degree of ignorance, or amnesia.’[[44]](#footnote-44)

More generally, we propose that responsible moral agency requires us to make an effort to take up the perspective of those affected by our behaviour. Taking up their perspective imposes on us an awareness of clearly morally relevant features of our actions which are not generally vivid to us from our own more natural point of view. This can figure for us as an active protection against self-deception and against a tendency to make moral judgements which are merely self-serving. In imaginatively and effortfully taking up the perspective of the needy, we are able to gain extra traction on what our obligations really are. It is because of the importance of vivid awareness of others’ situation, that novels or films, or histories that are imaginatively and vividly brought to life, are often better in providing moral insight than many moral philosophical discussions, careful and precise though they may be, with their sometimes curt, under-described, one-sentence thought-experiments.[[45]](#footnote-45)

Most of us manifestly *do* shy away from the relevant facts about world poverty, actively putting them to the back of our minds. It follows from this that we may merit significant blame. Yet, despite certain similarities with the question of moral ignorance, the dynamics at work in this case are not identical to those considered above. As we have noted, it is quite possible for us to take measures to make pale knowledge more vivid.[[46]](#footnote-46) Sometimes, simply taking the time to reflect on a situation is enough. More often though, it will require working to overcome natural psychological biases and habitual patterns of attention. It may require the development of relationships with the victims of injustice. Significant *effort* may thus be required to maintain a state of persistent vivid awareness. It is also typically more *costly* to remain persistently vividly aware than it is to acquire moral knowledge. Maintaining regular vivid awareness of the relevant facts may also require deliberate exposure to new painful stimuli. Vivid awareness requires regular stimulation and engagement with events that can cause anger, sadness or grief on the part of those who meaningfully engage with them. The obstacles then to maintaining persistent vivid awareness that affluent people encounter generally appear significantly harder and more costly to overcome than the limits on moral knowledge. Though it may be relatively easy and painless to *find out* about other people’s situation in the first place, it is generally more difficult and burdensome to maintain a state of regular emotional connection with them – given the distances involved and the structure of our social world.

So where does this leave the affluent in relation to blame for inaction in response to extreme poverty? To the extent that effective means of increasing the vividness of our knowledge are costly and difficult, blame for failing to take such measures is plausibly mitigated to some degree. Indeed, culpability for having only pale knowledge of the facts about global poverty is plausibly much less than culpability for fully-fledged ignorance, since the difficulty and the costs of acquiring moral knowledge are less arduous than those of remaining persistently vividly aware. However, given the seriousness of the moral reasons at stake, those generated by the preventable death and suffering of people living in extreme poverty, we are plausibly still significantly blameworthy for too readily turning our attention away and for failing to adequately put ourselves in the shoes of those in desperate need. If we are to be responsible moral agents, who discharge our moral responsibilities to the global poor successfully, and lead lives that are in this important respect morally blameless – then we must not only take action to address extreme poverty, but also put in place the foundations needed to remain alert, conscientious and morally engaged.

How much cost or effort can be reasonably required of us, on pain of meriting blame? No easy formula is available in answering this question. However, it seems likely to us that most citizens of affluent countries fall short of what can be reasonably demanded. The duty in question is not one that requires us to be *continuously* vividly aware of the plight of the poor. A lifestyle that makes room for the pursuit of projects, hobbies, and close personal relationships to a significant degree seems compatible with fulfilling our duties of moral attention. Such a duty requires us to make efforts to maintain at least moderately *regular* attention to matters of great moral importance. In practice, this requires affluent citizens, for example, to read and watch relevant news stories and documentaries, to occasionally investigate and seek out more detail, to take the time and make the effort every so often to imagine the daily struggles of those in severe poverty, and to listen where possible to their testimony.[[47]](#footnote-47) In short, it *is* blameworthy to always take the easy option, giving in to temptation, and to fail to leave significant room in our lives for some focus on uncomfortable matters of great moral import.

V. Why No Blame?

If we are correct in claiming that typical citizens of affluent countries merit significant blame for their inaction in response to severe poverty, why do we observe so little blame in practice? The dearth of blame in response to such inaction may be interpreted by some as *prima facie* evidence that such inaction is not blameworthy. If it *were* blameworthy, would we not see more blaming?

To say that someone is blameworthy for his or her conduct, whether it involves an act or omission, is to hold that it warrants a certain kind of *negative reaction*. Such reactions toward an agent include (i) emotions of resentment or indignation on the part of others (and guilt on the part of the agent herself), and (ii) the expression of such blame-feelings in acts of protest.[[48]](#footnote-48) However, blame is not always forthcoming just because it is warranted. Sometimes, the impulse to blame is inhibited by other morally relevant considerations. For example, blaming may be counterproductive. On other occasions, people will fail to understand that wrongdoing has occurred. This could be the result of factual ignorance or moral ignorance, as discussed above. Finally, appropriate expressions of blame may be *silenced* or *suppressed*, despite recognition that blame is warranted by at least some of the affected parties. The upshot of all this is that silence around blame does not reliably indicate that nothing blameworthy has occurred.

We believe that, in the case of inaction over global poverty, at least three identifiable causes together serve to create something akin to a ‘conspiracy of silence’, such that warranted blame goes systematically unexpressed.

To begin with, there are often positive *disincentives* to express blame with regard to global poverty. This is particularly true of people living in affluent societies. Even among those who are morally concerned, fear of being charged with hypocrisy often prevents them from broaching a topic that would lead to recrimination or resentment. Indeed, even those who are *relatively* conscientious in aiding the poor may lack standing to criticise their compatriots, if their own conduct falls short of what morality requires.[[49]](#footnote-49) By broaching the question, a person who speaks from a position of weakness therefore risks being condemned twice over: first as a moral hypocrite and second as someone whose own failure to assist has become conspicuous to others.[[50]](#footnote-50) On both these counts, resentment may be fostered among the general population towards those who express blame. Few people possess the degree of moral consistency or confidence required to speak about blame merited by the affluent; few are prepared to expose themselves to the likely backlash. These factors exacerbate the standard costs and difficulties involved in any ‘confrontational’ expression of moral criticism.

People living in extreme poverty face similar obstacles. If expressions of blame provoke a negative reaction on the part of affluent citizens, then this threatens the assistance upon which their livelihood frequently depends.[[51]](#footnote-51) Neither they, nor their political representatives (when such exist), have much incentive to express blame, given that they may well be reliant upon the good will of Western donors in order to meet basic needs, and that acts of blaming may put at risk future assistance.

Those harmed by poverty face further constraints. On the one hand, they frequently lack the *capacity* to publicly express blame towards those who fail them. The global poor tend to be out of sight, voiceless and disenfranchised, lacking forums in which to express moral criticism of the affluent, even when they believe it is warranted. These obstacles to successfully articulating blame are greater still when this sentiment must be communicated at distance. On the other hand, victims of injustice sometimes suffer from *adverse socialization*, so that they fail to see that blame is even warranted to begin with.[[52]](#footnote-52) These people have a strong claim to assistance. Yet if they become accustomed to their situation and mistakenly believe that they have no moral claim to improved standards of living, then they will not realise that blame is an appropriate response.

In the light of these considerations, public silence around blame cannot be taken as evidence that failure to tackle extreme poverty is not morally blameworthy. Indeed, given the seriousness of the apparent moral failure in question, public expression of blame towards the affluent for their inaction is disturbingly uncommon. This silence is disturbing because of the importance of blame in motivating compliance with our moral duties. Beyond this, affluent people may further damage their relationship with those living in poverty by refusing to accept responsibility for their own conduct and by refusing to blame others who fail the poor in this way.[[53]](#footnote-53) In large part because of the dearth of actual expressions of blame regarding inaction over extreme poverty, members of affluent societies seem particularly vulnerable to underestimation of the extent to which they are *blameworthy* for this aspect of their conduct.

Conclusion

When we look back at widespread wrongdoing from the past, we may feel a sense of shock and ask ‘How *could* they have behaved as they did?’ It is easy to imagine, however, future generations looking back at the present-day affluent and being similarly horrified by our failure to respond to the desperate plight of the world’s poorest today. On this question, we are lulled into an unwarranted feeling of moral innocence by an absence of blame. Given the limited capacity, incentives and awareness of potential blamers regarding our inaction, this dearth of blame is deeply misleading. We have argued that appeal to non-culpable moral ignorance fails to undermine the claim that blame is merited for our inaction. Appeal to a lack of persistent vivid awareness of the relevant facts – awareness which is to some degree costly and difficult to maintain – may go some way to mitigate blame. These considerations should not be over-stated, however. Given the gravity of the moral reasons in question, we clearly do merit significant blame if we do nothing, or next to nothing, to help those living in severe poverty.

1. A similar question is raised by Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What will future generations condemn us for?’, *Washington Post*, 26/9/2010,

   [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404113.html.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404113.html.A) Accessed 16/11/2020. His suggested answers, within a US context, are: the prison system, industrial meat production, institutionalisation and isolation of the elderly, and our treatment of the environment. Tim Mulgan adopts a similar framing in his climate-focused *Ethics for a Broken World*, Routledge, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In the period 2010-2011, around 870 million people were chronically undernourished (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP), *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012: Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition* (Rome: FAO, 2010), pp. 8, 55). In sub-Saharan Africa, 70 per cent of the population live in a condition of hunger (Hill RV, Smith LC, Wiesmann DM, Frankenberger T, Gulati K, Quabili W, Yohannes Y. *The world's most deprived: Characteristics and causes of extreme poverty and hunger* (Intl Food Policy Res Inst, 2007), p. 35). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Peter Unger, *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusions of Innocence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. World Bank, *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016), pp. 33, 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. According to United Nations, 18,000 children under five lose their lives each day due to poverty-related causes (You D, Bastian P, Wu J, Wardlaw T. *Levels and trends in child mortality*: *estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation* (2013)). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Branko Milanovic, *Worlds Apart: Measuring Global Inequality* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 107, 126-133. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <http://www.givewell.org/charities/give-directly#promisingapproach> Accessed 15/11/20. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/charity/against-malaria-foundation/>. For some reservations about the confidence that donors can have regarding the difference their donation will make, see Leif Wenar, ‘Poverty is no Pond: Challenges for the Affluent’, in *Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy*, eds. Illingworth, Pogge, Wenar, OUP 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. When members of the British public were asked to report their own giving patterns, 15% claimed to donate to organisations that address global poverty and 21% reported giving to humanitarian causes. Our figure assumes a degree of overlap between these two groups given that the categories were not exclusive (TNS, *Public Attitudes Towards Development* (TNS Report prepared for COI on behalf of the Department for International Development, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Peter Singer, *The Life You Can Save: Doing Your Part in Ending World Poverty* (London: Picador, 2010), p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Patricia Miller, *The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2011* (Centre for Global Prosperity: The Hudson Institute, 2011), pp. 9, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (3rd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 199; Shelly Kagan, *The Limits of Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); T.M Scanlon, *What We Owe To Each Other* (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1998); Elizabeth Ashford, ‘The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism’ *Ethics*, Vol. 113 (2003), pp .273-302; Brad Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Christine Swanton, ‘Virtue ethics and the problem of demandingness’, in *The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.104-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. For a more complex conception of this debate that distinguishes between extreme and moderate views about *principles*, and extreme and moderate views about *morality’s demands in a world like ours*, see B. Berkey, ‘The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium’, *Philosophical Studies* (2016), 173: 3015-3035. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (London: Penguin, 2006), pp. 173-4; (italics ours). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Richard W. Miller, ‘Beneficence, Duty and Distance’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 32 (2004), p. 363. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33 (2005), p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. If the moderate view is correct, then we fail to fulfil our obligations, *even though* they do not require life-changing degrees of sacrifice; and if the extremist view is correct, then we fall *dramatically* short of what our obligations require, failing to reach even moderate levels of sacrifice which are themselves well-short of what morality requires. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Leif Wenar, *Blood Oil*, OUP USA, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Our duties to aid the global poor may not be exhausted by ‘positive’ duties of beneficence. We may also have significant negative duties to compensate for our complicity in actively harming the poor through sustaining legal, political and economic institutions which cause global poverty to persist. See Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Consider, for example, Unger’s *Envelope Case*. Unger (1996), 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Gideon Rosen, ‘Culpability and Ignorance’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 103 (2002), p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid,. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. For counter-arguments, see, e.g., Elizabeth Harman, ‘Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?’ *Ratio* 24 (4), 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. In the United Kingdom, one study found that 79 per cent of people consider that they have ‘some responsibility, as a human being, to help people in poor countries.’ Follow-up workshops elicited comments such as: ‘we have a responsibility to help those less fortunate, in the country and abroad, simply because they are fellow human beings. For all our difficulties we are amongst the most fortunate in the world and it is easy to take this for granted – we are guilty of doing that’ (Spencer Henson, *Public Perceptions of International Development and Support for Aid in the UK: Results of a Qualitative Enquiry* (IDS, 2010), p. 32). For similar results, see Andrew Glennie, Will Straw, and Leni Wild, L, ‘Understanding Public Attitudes to Aid and Development’, *Institute for Public Policy Research & Overseas Development Institute* (2012), esp. pp. 10-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Rosen, ‘Culpability’, p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Onora O’Neill goes further and argues that our present conduct generates personal contradictions between the conscious adherence to the claim that every life has value and the simultaneous belief that it requires nothing of us in practice (Onora O’Neill, ‘Distant Strangers, Moral Standing, and Porous Boundaries’, in *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Rosen (2008) suggests that they may be impossible to define (see Gideon Rosen, ‘Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 105 (2008)). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. As is plausibly the case with many moral duties, it may be that such a general, *prima facie* duty can de defeated by considerations of welfare cost or difficulty for the agent. Below, we consider these considerations in the present case. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Rosen, ‘Culpability’, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. ibid. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Miranda Fricker, ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 84(2010)*.* In one respect Fricker’s account of non-culpable moral ignorance is narrower than Rosen’s. She focuses on structural rather than personal moral epistemic incapacity (165). People are not excused if their moral ignorance results from personal stupidity or unfortunate conditioning. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. David Axelsen, ‘The State Made Me Do It: How Anti-Cosmopolitanism is Created by the State’, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 21 (2013), pp. 451-472; Robert E Lane, *The Market Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Cost and difficulty are not the same. A surgeon may fail to perform an operation because it is difficult, and be blameless for that reason. This is true even though he would incur no cost by succeeding. For detailed discussion of the relation between costs and difficulty, and views on the relevance of each to blameworthiness and moral obligation, see G. A. Cohen, *If You’re and Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?*, Ch. 10 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000); and B. McElwee, ‘Cost and Psychological Difficulty: Two Aspects of Demandingness’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, published online, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Our focus here has been on moral ignorance, but might it be argued that *factual* ignorance concerning our ability to help might get us of the hook of blame? In particular, some forms of *aid scepticism* are endorsed by prominent experts (e.g. Angus Deaton, *The Great Escape*, Princeton 2013). We think this does little to mitigate blame for inaction. It would only do so if plausible forms of aid scepticism supported the claim that there is nothing we can do to assist those living in severe poverty. However, plausible forms of aid scepticism establish at best that much aid is ineffective or counter-productive, rather than that all aid is. In particular, direct cash transfers to the poor of the kind facilitated by GiveDirectly seem immune to the concerns commonly raised about traditional aid. More generally, this line of defence against blameworthiness for our inaction overlooks the availability of forms of action besides giving aid – in particular, campaigning for reforms to global institutions and practices that serve to perpetuate severe poverty. It is worth noting that such campaigning efforts can be engaged in to ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ degrees, just like giving aid. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Paul Slovic, ‘“If I look at the mass I will never act”: psychic numbing and genocide’, *Judgment and Decision Making*, vol. 2 (2007), p. 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. World Bank, *The World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society and Behaviour* (World Bank, 2015), p. 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Kagan, *Limits of Morality*, p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. ibid., 295. See also Karen Jenni and George Loewenstein, ‘Explaining the identifiable victim effect’, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, vol. 14 (1997). pp. 235-257; Tehila Kogut and Ilana Ritov, ‘The “identified victim” effect: An identified group, or just a single individual?’ *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 18 (2005), pp.157-167. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. It is clear that spatial proximity to those in need is not always sufficient to motivate people to act more altruistically, as evidenced by the phenomenon of vast wealth existing cheek by jowl alongside crippling poverty in so many of the world’s major cities. Spatial proximity to those in need is no guarantee of having a persistent vivid awareness of what their lives are like. When we are near to suffering, vividness may fade over time; we adapt to it as something normal. The phenomenon of ‘compassion fatigue’, and the possibility of de-sensitisation in the face of suffering, attest to the implausibility of the very strong claim that persistent vivid awareness is itself in all circumstances sufficient to motivate people to act better. Our claim is simply that one of the main explanations of our inaction is a lack of persistent vivid awareness of the suffering of the global poor. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Pogge, *World Poverty*. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. It is notable that the difficulty of moral protest is shared by other plausible instances of widespread moral wrongness. In the cases of the impact on future people of our contribution to world-risking climate change, and our complicity in the maltreatment of animals in the food industry, victims are unable to express blame and demand a change in behaviour. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Some forms of ‘motivational’ difficulty clearly *don’t* get us off the hook of blame – e.g. difficulty caused by misanthropy and/or repeated acts of self-indulgence. But when the explanation of the motivational difficulty is universal features of human psychology – e.g. the single identifiable victim effect – this plausibly mitigates, or may even eliminate altogether, appropriate blame. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Compare here the principle and corollary implications set out in Section II above regarding duties to seek out knowledge in the first place. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (Penguin, 2004), p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. We might question whether the most useful perspective to take up in determining proper moral assessment of an agent’s behaviour is not instead one of someone quite *un*affected – an impartial, disinterested spectator. After all, someone in need is, like the agent himself, just another affected party, with interests and biases of her own. To be clear, what we are recommending is not taking up a partial standpoint *at the expense of* taking up an impartial standpoint, but rather coming to an impartial judgement *by means of* taking up a second, partial standpoint which is *supplementary* to the initial partial standpoint (our own) which is our more natural perspective. The impartial spectator best placed to make fully-informed moral judgements is not one who is emotionally disengaged and distanced from each party, but one who is emotionally engaged consecutively from the standpoint of *each* of the relevant parties - agent and patients alike - and then comes to a considered judgement which attempts to do justice to how things appear from each perspective. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Kagan notes that even when we can’t make the relevant beliefs especially vivid, we can be motivated by the thought that *if we could*, then we would be motivated accordingly (*Limits of Morality*, p. 285). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Taking relevant *action*, when one has acquired the relevant vivid awareness, need not, of course, be a continuous process. One can set up a standing order that allows one’s commitment to assist to carry on through time. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See D. J. Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (eds), *Blame: Its Nature and Norms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), for contemporary discussion of blame and blameworthiness. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Being in a position to assert a well-grounded moral truth may not suffice for being in a good position to condemn. (G. A. Cohen, ‘Casting the first stone: Who can, and who can't, condemn the terrorists?’ *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, vol. 58 (2006), p. 121). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. To be a hypocrite is to apply a standard to others which my own conduct shows that I do not accept (ibid. 175-176). The force of this charge is diminished by recognition of one’s own failure in this area. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Tomohisa Hattori portrays aid-giving as a gift relationship. It is essential to this practice that those who receive aid respond with gratitude and affirm the beneficence of those who assist (Hattori, ‘The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid’, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 29 (2003), pp. 233, 237). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Numerous studies have shown that under situations of great hardship, one way in which people respond is by changing their explicit preferences or revising judgements about what they are entitled to. Adaptive preference formation may be a rational response to one’s situation, when there is little prospect of more expansive preferences being fulfilled or when an appreciation of injustice causes further suffering to the agent (Serene Khader, ‘Must theorizing about adaptive preferences deny women’s agency?’ *Journal of Applied Philosophy* vol. 29 (2012)). However, such adaptive preferences serve to disguise morality proper: baseline expectations are altered in such a way that victims no longer recognise that they are wronged. This can be seen in the case of a kidnapping victim who comes to identify with her captor, or with widows during the 1944 Bengal famine who reported higher levels of well-being than their male counterparts largely because they did not view themselves as entitled to an adequate diet. A similar phenomenon may be expected with regard to those living in extreme poverty today. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. According to the theory endorsed by Thomas Scanlon, unwillingness to blame members of a group that inflicts wrongful harm upon another group impairs our relationship with the victims of injustice (T. M. Scanlon, *Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame* (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2008), p. 175). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)