Effects of asymmetric cost information on collection outsourcing of used products for remanufacturing
Effects of asymmetric cost information on collection outsourcing of used products for remanufacturing
Due to environmental and economic benefits from remanufacturing as well as an existing or potential take-back regulation, a manufacturer often implements remanufacturing, but it often delegates a third-party (3P) to collect used products. However, the collection efficiency is the 3P's private information while the prior distribution of the 3P's collection efficiency is possessed by the manufacturer. To maximize its expected profit, the manufacturer can design nonlinear pricing contracts to stimulate the 3P to select one that corresponds to its true type, where the nonlinear pricing contracts consist of the wholesale price and the collecting quantity. Specifically, our modeling analysis reveals that asymmetric information can result in the downward distortion of quantities collected by the 3P with low collection efficiency, whereas the quantities collected by the 3P with high collection efficiency remain unchanged. Besides, faced with information asymmetry and collection outsourcing, the manufacturer may also bring the new product quantity down if the 3P has low collection efficiency. Moreover, the take-back regulation will indirectly reduce consumer surplus, and this negative effect will be amplified by asymmetric information.
Asymmetric information, Collection efficiency, Collection outsourcing, Remanufacturing, Take-back regulation
Zhao, Senlin
0e2ffe1c-0476-47ca-8500-9c8a42e50c06
You, Zhuangzhuang
f924d3dd-ddc8-4dc1-bfe7-4667caaeb96a
Zhu, Qinghua
bb530b0b-16a0-481d-bc79-87e1c85b81cd
9 May 2022
Zhao, Senlin
0e2ffe1c-0476-47ca-8500-9c8a42e50c06
You, Zhuangzhuang
f924d3dd-ddc8-4dc1-bfe7-4667caaeb96a
Zhu, Qinghua
bb530b0b-16a0-481d-bc79-87e1c85b81cd
Zhao, Senlin, You, Zhuangzhuang and Zhu, Qinghua
(2022)
Effects of asymmetric cost information on collection outsourcing of used products for remanufacturing.
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 162, [102729].
(doi:10.1016/j.tre.2022.102729).
Abstract
Due to environmental and economic benefits from remanufacturing as well as an existing or potential take-back regulation, a manufacturer often implements remanufacturing, but it often delegates a third-party (3P) to collect used products. However, the collection efficiency is the 3P's private information while the prior distribution of the 3P's collection efficiency is possessed by the manufacturer. To maximize its expected profit, the manufacturer can design nonlinear pricing contracts to stimulate the 3P to select one that corresponds to its true type, where the nonlinear pricing contracts consist of the wholesale price and the collecting quantity. Specifically, our modeling analysis reveals that asymmetric information can result in the downward distortion of quantities collected by the 3P with low collection efficiency, whereas the quantities collected by the 3P with high collection efficiency remain unchanged. Besides, faced with information asymmetry and collection outsourcing, the manufacturer may also bring the new product quantity down if the 3P has low collection efficiency. Moreover, the take-back regulation will indirectly reduce consumer surplus, and this negative effect will be amplified by asymmetric information.
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Accepted/In Press date: 30 April 2022
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 May 2022
Published date: 9 May 2022
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Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd
Keywords:
Asymmetric information, Collection efficiency, Collection outsourcing, Remanufacturing, Take-back regulation
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 488704
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/488704
ISSN: 1366-5545
PURE UUID: 184d68a3-5680-4feb-92cb-41cf065f40dd
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Date deposited: 04 Apr 2024 16:44
Last modified: 10 Apr 2024 02:15
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Author:
Senlin Zhao
Author:
Zhuangzhuang You
Author:
Qinghua Zhu
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