Quality choice for product recovery considering a trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing competition
Quality choice for product recovery considering a trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing competition
As an effective mode for product recovery, trade-in programs have been widely implemented in practice. With a trade-in program, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) often faces a dilemma of determining the quality of new products, where quality is defined as an observable characteristic that increases consumers' willingness to pay for a product. On the one hand, for the OEM, a choice of higher quality can increase the perceived value of new products; on the other hand, it can also raise the cost of product recovery. In response, we develop game models considering the duopoly situation where an OEM offers a trade-in program to collect used products and faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Specifically, the proposed models capture how an OEM utilizes product quality to compete with a TPR under the presence and absence of a trade-in program. We derive the OEM's optimal quality choice and investigate the effect of the trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing in the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we examine how firms' profits and consumer surplus change in the trade-in program through a numerical study. Results indicate that the OEM almost always increases product quality in the trade-in context. Therefore, it is profitable for the OEM to implement the trade-in program to exploit repeat consumers and achieve price discrimination. Interestingly, the trade-in program is a profitable strategy against the TPR, but it is not necessarily detrimental to the TPR. Besides, the trade-in program can offset the positive effect of third-party remanufacturing on consumer surplus.
Zhao, Senlin
0e2ffe1c-0476-47ca-8500-9c8a42e50c06
1 October 2021
Zhao, Senlin
0e2ffe1c-0476-47ca-8500-9c8a42e50c06
Zhao, Senlin
(2021)
Quality choice for product recovery considering a trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing competition.
International Journal of Production Economics.
(doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108239).
Abstract
As an effective mode for product recovery, trade-in programs have been widely implemented in practice. With a trade-in program, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) often faces a dilemma of determining the quality of new products, where quality is defined as an observable characteristic that increases consumers' willingness to pay for a product. On the one hand, for the OEM, a choice of higher quality can increase the perceived value of new products; on the other hand, it can also raise the cost of product recovery. In response, we develop game models considering the duopoly situation where an OEM offers a trade-in program to collect used products and faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Specifically, the proposed models capture how an OEM utilizes product quality to compete with a TPR under the presence and absence of a trade-in program. We derive the OEM's optimal quality choice and investigate the effect of the trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing in the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we examine how firms' profits and consumer surplus change in the trade-in program through a numerical study. Results indicate that the OEM almost always increases product quality in the trade-in context. Therefore, it is profitable for the OEM to implement the trade-in program to exploit repeat consumers and achieve price discrimination. Interestingly, the trade-in program is a profitable strategy against the TPR, but it is not necessarily detrimental to the TPR. Besides, the trade-in program can offset the positive effect of third-party remanufacturing on consumer surplus.
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Accepted/In Press date: 12 July 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 3 August 2021
Published date: 1 October 2021
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 488918
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/488918
ISSN: 0925-5273
PURE UUID: 76e2f8f1-12b9-496d-98cf-c5a1f7f63c68
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Date deposited: 09 Apr 2024 16:42
Last modified: 10 Apr 2024 02:15
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Author:
Senlin Zhao
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