Is Aristotelian friendship disinterested?: Aristotle on loving the other for himself and wishing goods for the other's sake
Is Aristotelian friendship disinterested?: Aristotle on loving the other for himself and wishing goods for the other's sake
It has been not atypical for commentators to argue that Aristotelian friendship features disinterested concern for others, that is, concern for others that is completely independent of one's own happiness. Often, the relevant commentators point to some normative features of Aristotelian friendship, wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself, where these are assumed to be disinterested. While the disinterested interpretations may be correct overall, I argue that wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself constitute a dubious foundation for disinterested interpretations. For wishing goods for the other's sake does not involve a reason for action on the other's behalf, and the primary point of loving the other for herself is the role of the other in facilitating one's own happiness, specifically conceived of by Aristotle in terms of one's own virtuous activity.
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Kim, Bradford Jean‐Hyuk
70cbecb5-ac2b-4a4a-946e-1ef9bf68c81c
16 March 2022
Kim, Bradford Jean‐Hyuk
70cbecb5-ac2b-4a4a-946e-1ef9bf68c81c
Kim, Bradford Jean‐Hyuk
(2022)
Is Aristotelian friendship disinterested?: Aristotle on loving the other for himself and wishing goods for the other's sake.
European Journal of Philosophy, 30 (1), .
(doi:10.1111/ejop.12650).
Abstract
It has been not atypical for commentators to argue that Aristotelian friendship features disinterested concern for others, that is, concern for others that is completely independent of one's own happiness. Often, the relevant commentators point to some normative features of Aristotelian friendship, wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself, where these are assumed to be disinterested. While the disinterested interpretations may be correct overall, I argue that wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself constitute a dubious foundation for disinterested interpretations. For wishing goods for the other's sake does not involve a reason for action on the other's behalf, and the primary point of loving the other for herself is the role of the other in facilitating one's own happiness, specifically conceived of by Aristotle in terms of one's own virtuous activity.
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Accepted/In Press date: 23 February 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 20 April 2021
Published date: 16 March 2022
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Local EPrints ID: 489184
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/489184
ISSN: 0966-8373
PURE UUID: b2700e08-7e34-495b-b22d-9b188cae2afd
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Date deposited: 17 Apr 2024 16:30
Last modified: 24 Apr 2024 02:11
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Bradford Jean‐Hyuk Kim
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