The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: an experimental study of microfoundations
The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: an experimental study of microfoundations
While questions about the diplomatic effectiveness of hawkish or dovish policies are crucially important, little research has been conducted on the domestic political risks and benefits associated with a chosen policy. This paper provides evidence to suggest why elites avoid the use of inducements and focus on more hawkish policies. Specifically this article focuses on the public opinion risks associated with offering an inducement that does not result in a change in behaviour of a target state. Using an experiment embedded within a wider survey instrument, we assess public ex post evaluations of government behaviour towards a nascent nuclear power that is believed to threaten British national security. The study examines not only the rewards associated with successful policies and the costs of failure, but also whether those costs are particularly heavy when it is dovish policies that fail. The results indicate that the public does have a particular aversion for unsuccessful engagement policies. Successful policies are generally more popular than unsuccessful policies, but a hawkish failure wins more public sympathy than a failed inducement. These results provide an important explanation as to why inducements tend to be avoided on the international stage: the risks of failure are too severe.
Cooperation, experiment, inducements, public opinion, risk
343-360
Davies, Graeme A.M.
a60057a2-e466-429a-8634-a3a45fc45108
Johns, Robert
02861bc9-b704-49b1-bbc7-cf1c1e9b7a35
1 September 2016
Davies, Graeme A.M.
a60057a2-e466-429a-8634-a3a45fc45108
Johns, Robert
02861bc9-b704-49b1-bbc7-cf1c1e9b7a35
Davies, Graeme A.M. and Johns, Robert
(2016)
The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: an experimental study of microfoundations.
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33 (4), .
(doi:10.1177/0738894215577556).
Abstract
While questions about the diplomatic effectiveness of hawkish or dovish policies are crucially important, little research has been conducted on the domestic political risks and benefits associated with a chosen policy. This paper provides evidence to suggest why elites avoid the use of inducements and focus on more hawkish policies. Specifically this article focuses on the public opinion risks associated with offering an inducement that does not result in a change in behaviour of a target state. Using an experiment embedded within a wider survey instrument, we assess public ex post evaluations of government behaviour towards a nascent nuclear power that is believed to threaten British national security. The study examines not only the rewards associated with successful policies and the costs of failure, but also whether those costs are particularly heavy when it is dovish policies that fail. The results indicate that the public does have a particular aversion for unsuccessful engagement policies. Successful policies are generally more popular than unsuccessful policies, but a hawkish failure wins more public sympathy than a failed inducement. These results provide an important explanation as to why inducements tend to be avoided on the international stage: the risks of failure are too severe.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 8 July 2016
Published date: 1 September 2016
Keywords:
Cooperation, experiment, inducements, public opinion, risk
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 489707
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/489707
ISSN: 0738-8942
PURE UUID: 0803d408-a96f-4a6d-a7e4-0efe04d84e41
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Date deposited: 30 Apr 2024 16:58
Last modified: 01 May 2024 02:10
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Contributors
Author:
Graeme A.M. Davies
Author:
Robert Johns
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