The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Weapons of clients: why do voters support bad patrons? Ethnographic evidence from rural Brazil

Weapons of clients: why do voters support bad patrons? Ethnographic evidence from rural Brazil
Weapons of clients: why do voters support bad patrons? Ethnographic evidence from rural Brazil
Current approaches to voting behavior in clientelist contexts either predict that clients leave their preferences aside for fear of having their benefits cut off or voluntarily support politicians they perceive to be reliable patrons. These two approaches cannot account for clients’ vote choices in the Sertão of Bahia, Brazil, where voters were free to choose among competing candidates but supported patrons they knew were unreliable. This article argues that clients voluntarily voted for bad patrons as a strategy to gain symbolic power in their negotiations with politicians. By explaining clients’ paradoxical choices in the Sertão, this article reveals how clientelism can persist without monitoring mechanisms or positive attitudes toward patrons. In addition, this study shows the importance of incorporating voters’ perspectives and their everyday survival strategies to better account for clients’ political behavior.

1531-426X
22-46
Borges Martins da Silva, Mariana
ea921c95-b54f-4a2f-928c-3d5b19ad07c2
Borges Martins da Silva, Mariana
ea921c95-b54f-4a2f-928c-3d5b19ad07c2

Borges Martins da Silva, Mariana (2023) Weapons of clients: why do voters support bad patrons? Ethnographic evidence from rural Brazil. Latin American Politics and Society, 65 (1), 22-46. (doi:10.1017/lap.2022.49).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Current approaches to voting behavior in clientelist contexts either predict that clients leave their preferences aside for fear of having their benefits cut off or voluntarily support politicians they perceive to be reliable patrons. These two approaches cannot account for clients’ vote choices in the Sertão of Bahia, Brazil, where voters were free to choose among competing candidates but supported patrons they knew were unreliable. This article argues that clients voluntarily voted for bad patrons as a strategy to gain symbolic power in their negotiations with politicians. By explaining clients’ paradoxical choices in the Sertão, this article reveals how clientelism can persist without monitoring mechanisms or positive attitudes toward patrons. In addition, this study shows the importance of incorporating voters’ perspectives and their everyday survival strategies to better account for clients’ political behavior.

This record has no associated files available for download.

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 22 December 2022
e-pub ahead of print date: 22 December 2022
Published date: February 2023

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 489847
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/489847
ISSN: 1531-426X
PURE UUID: 7057a575-fb8b-4857-9545-61f1aaf73524
ORCID for Mariana Borges Martins da Silva: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-2690-5006

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 03 May 2024 16:38
Last modified: 11 May 2024 02:13

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Mariana Borges Martins da Silva ORCID iD

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×