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Modelling the dynamics of identity and fairness in ultimatum game

Modelling the dynamics of identity and fairness in ultimatum game
Modelling the dynamics of identity and fairness in ultimatum game
Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an \textit{subjective identity} and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. The sense of identity in agents is known to lead to responsible decision-making in non-cooperative, non-zero-sum games like Prisoners' Dilemma, and is a desirable feature to add into agent models. However, when it comes to allocation, the sense of identity can be shown to exacerbate inequities in allocation, giving no rational incentive for agents to act fairly towards one another. This lead us to introduce a sense of fairness as an innate characteristic of autonomous agency. For this, we implement the well-known Ultimatum Game between two agents, where their sense of identity association and their sense of fairness are both varied. We study the points at which agents find it no longer rational to identify with the other agent, and uphold their sense of fairness, and vice versa. Such a study also helps us discern the subtle difference between responsibility and fairness when it comes to autonomous agency.
cs.GT, cs.MA
arXiv
Chhabra, Janvi
e88c156f-06c9-43e6-9f17-5a8ca8423461
Deshmukh, Jayati
5903b0c1-b4d1-4fbf-b687-610d4fde3990
Malavalli, Arpitha
5d44f7c5-9577-4dee-b38e-bb6b4c6e49f0
Sama, Karthik
0f2edaf0-2a5b-4b75-9734-7fcfd45dcb70
Srinivasa, Srinath
b4e35d32-beae-4c6e-a4f8-3ee56e75d648
Chhabra, Janvi
e88c156f-06c9-43e6-9f17-5a8ca8423461
Deshmukh, Jayati
5903b0c1-b4d1-4fbf-b687-610d4fde3990
Malavalli, Arpitha
5d44f7c5-9577-4dee-b38e-bb6b4c6e49f0
Sama, Karthik
0f2edaf0-2a5b-4b75-9734-7fcfd45dcb70
Srinivasa, Srinath
b4e35d32-beae-4c6e-a4f8-3ee56e75d648

[Unknown type: UNSPECIFIED]

Record type: UNSPECIFIED

Abstract

Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an \textit{subjective identity} and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. The sense of identity in agents is known to lead to responsible decision-making in non-cooperative, non-zero-sum games like Prisoners' Dilemma, and is a desirable feature to add into agent models. However, when it comes to allocation, the sense of identity can be shown to exacerbate inequities in allocation, giving no rational incentive for agents to act fairly towards one another. This lead us to introduce a sense of fairness as an innate characteristic of autonomous agency. For this, we implement the well-known Ultimatum Game between two agents, where their sense of identity association and their sense of fairness are both varied. We study the points at which agents find it no longer rational to identify with the other agent, and uphold their sense of fairness, and vice versa. Such a study also helps us discern the subtle difference between responsibility and fairness when it comes to autonomous agency.

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Published date: 22 January 2024
Keywords: cs.GT, cs.MA

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 492185
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/492185
PURE UUID: bc5b8d72-bf23-4342-83e7-21c7deb7895e
ORCID for Jayati Deshmukh: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-1144-2635

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Date deposited: 19 Jul 2024 16:38
Last modified: 20 Jul 2024 02:14

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Contributors

Author: Janvi Chhabra
Author: Jayati Deshmukh ORCID iD
Author: Arpitha Malavalli
Author: Karthik Sama
Author: Srinath Srinivasa

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