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Protecting TCP services from denial of service attacks

Protecting TCP services from denial of service attacks
Protecting TCP services from denial of service attacks

In this paper, we present a scheme that protects legitimate traffic from the large volume of attackers packets during a DDoS attack. Legitimate packets can be recognized by the tokens they carry in the IP header. Obtaining a token does not require protocol additions or changes, rather it is automatically obtained when a TCP connection is established. We believe that the Implicit Token Scheme (ITS) has numerous advantages: (1) It is totally transparent to clients. (2) No new protocols or modification of existing ones is needed to implement ITS. (3) Operations required by intermediate routers are computationally not more intensive than a couple of addition operations which could be easily done at wire-speed. (4) Does not lead to false positives. (5) Can sustain server availability even during attacks involving hundreds of thousands of attackers.

DDoS defense, Path identificatio, Syn cookie
155-160
Farhat, Hikmat
4b7583f4-d03c-425e-a65a-82c0e157e7e6
Farhat, Hikmat
4b7583f4-d03c-425e-a65a-82c0e157e7e6

Farhat, Hikmat (2006) Protecting TCP services from denial of service attacks. In Proceedings of the 2006 SIGCOMM Workshop on Large-scale Attack Defense, LSAD'06. vol. 2006, pp. 155-160 . (doi:10.1145/1162666.1162674).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a scheme that protects legitimate traffic from the large volume of attackers packets during a DDoS attack. Legitimate packets can be recognized by the tokens they carry in the IP header. Obtaining a token does not require protocol additions or changes, rather it is automatically obtained when a TCP connection is established. We believe that the Implicit Token Scheme (ITS) has numerous advantages: (1) It is totally transparent to clients. (2) No new protocols or modification of existing ones is needed to implement ITS. (3) Operations required by intermediate routers are computationally not more intensive than a couple of addition operations which could be easily done at wire-speed. (4) Does not lead to false positives. (5) Can sustain server availability even during attacks involving hundreds of thousands of attackers.

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More information

Published date: 11 September 2006
Venue - Dates: ACM SIGCOMM 2006 - Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, , Pisa, Italy, 2006-09-11 - 2006-09-15
Keywords: DDoS defense, Path identificatio, Syn cookie

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 492296
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/492296
PURE UUID: f4858a01-1863-4414-95be-ac41de04c397
ORCID for Hikmat Farhat: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-5043-227X

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Date deposited: 23 Jul 2024 17:12
Last modified: 24 Jul 2024 02:06

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Author: Hikmat Farhat ORCID iD

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