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Using political connections to raise rivals’ costs: evidence from an emerging market

Using political connections to raise rivals’ costs: evidence from an emerging market
Using political connections to raise rivals’ costs: evidence from an emerging market
In this paper, we leverage resource dependency theory to examine the impact of political connections on rivals’ costs and how this impact is affected by rival-side and politician-side contingencies. Using panel dataset of Pakistani firms, our system GMM estimates show that politically connected firms can increase their rivals’ costs by influencing their rivals’ dependency relationship with the government. This impact is attenuated by the rivals’ strategic flexibility and social legitimacy, which provide some protection or insulation from political attacks in resource markets. Together, our findings extend the contingent dynamics of resource dependency in political markets from focal firms to competitors and offer significant contributions to the corporate political activity literature and resource dependency theory.
1045-3172
Saeed, Abubakr
9b178710-8c61-4298-809a-0d3f0b674ab9
Baloch, Saad
0baa859e-4d0d-4dda-8433-d813655c88b5
Liedong, Tahiru Azaaviele
00ee3b9a-7c2f-415c-83fa-2f8013f9fb61
Saeed, Abubakr
9b178710-8c61-4298-809a-0d3f0b674ab9
Baloch, Saad
0baa859e-4d0d-4dda-8433-d813655c88b5
Liedong, Tahiru Azaaviele
00ee3b9a-7c2f-415c-83fa-2f8013f9fb61

Saeed, Abubakr, Baloch, Saad and Liedong, Tahiru Azaaviele (2024) Using political connections to raise rivals’ costs: evidence from an emerging market. British Journal of Management. (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper, we leverage resource dependency theory to examine the impact of political connections on rivals’ costs and how this impact is affected by rival-side and politician-side contingencies. Using panel dataset of Pakistani firms, our system GMM estimates show that politically connected firms can increase their rivals’ costs by influencing their rivals’ dependency relationship with the government. This impact is attenuated by the rivals’ strategic flexibility and social legitimacy, which provide some protection or insulation from political attacks in resource markets. Together, our findings extend the contingent dynamics of resource dependency in political markets from focal firms to competitors and offer significant contributions to the corporate political activity literature and resource dependency theory.

Text
R2. Final Manuscript-BJM - Accepted Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only until 15 August 2025.
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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 15 August 2024

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 493727
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/493727
ISSN: 1045-3172
PURE UUID: 3e5c8d67-6478-458e-9b4d-593e2f3d9502
ORCID for Saad Baloch: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-0630-3841

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 11 Sep 2024 17:21
Last modified: 12 Sep 2024 02:07

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Contributors

Author: Abubakr Saeed
Author: Saad Baloch ORCID iD
Author: Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong

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