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Nietzsche On Genealogy, Knowledge, and Critique

by

Maria Mourtou-Paradeisopoulou

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<u>Doctor of Philosophy</u>

NIETZSCHE ON GENEALOGY, KNOWLEDGE, AND CRITIQUE

by Maria Mourtou-Paradeisopoulou

<u>Abstract</u>

The subject of this thesis is Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogy. To explore Nietzsche's genealogy, I examine three central questions: (1) *Is genealogy* identical to history? (2) If genealogy is not identical to history, what is an alternative interpretation? (3) What types of knowledge and critique arise from it? By addressing these questions, which correspond to the three parts of this thesis, I aim to present a critical understanding of genealogy and the types of knowledge and critique arising from it, contributing to the on-going discussion.

My working hypothesis posits that Nietzschean genealogy can plausibly be perceived as a mechanism incorporating fictional and historical elements regarding the genesis and evolution of moral values. It is constructed through artistic-rhetorical means and aims to elicit an affective response from its readership. This affective response and the concealments the artistic discourse provides activate a critique of the values internalised by readers by fostering a sense of scepticism generated by the genealogical narratives.

In Part I, I delve into genealogy's challenging relationship to history. In Part II, I suggest an alternative interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy: rather than describing actual historical events which led to the creation and development of moral values, genealogy offers new perspectives, blending actual and fictional elements and various rhetorical means to evoke affects in readers. In Part III, I delve deeper into Nietzsche's genealogical approach, focusing on its outcome beyond the affective engagement as an invitation to an open-ended inquiry and as the activation of critique *in practice*.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Maria Mourtou-Paradeisopoulou, declare that the thesis entitled *Nietzsche On Genealogy, Knowledge, and Critique* and the work presented in the thesis are both my own and have been generated by me as the result of my original research.

I confirm that:

♣ this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

♣ where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

♣ where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

♣ where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. Except for such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

♣ I have acknowledged all sources of help;

♣ where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

♣ none of this work has been published before submission.

Signed: Maria Mourtou-Paradeisopoulou

Date: 31/05/2024

A note on Translations and Abbreviations

Unless otherwise stated, I have used the following translations of Nietzsche's works, referring to them with the following abbreviations.

A   *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, And Other Writings*. Norman, J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

BGE   *Beyond Good and Evil*. Norman, J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002

BT   *The Birth of Tragedy*. Speirs, R. (trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

D   *Daybreak*. Hollingdale, R. J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

EH   *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, And Other Writings*. Norman, J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

GM   *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Diethe, C. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007

GS   *The Gay Science*. Kauffman, W. (trans.), New York: Vintage Books, 1974

HAH   *Human, All too Human.* Hollingdale, R. J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986

HL   *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*. Preuss, P. (trans.), Indianapolis· Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company INC, 1980

R   *Lecture Notes on Rhetoric*. Blair, C. (trans.), in Philosophy & Rhetoric, Penn State University Press

TI   *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, And Other Writings*. Norman, J. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

TL   *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*. Breazeale, D. (trans.), New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993

WP   *The Will to Power*. Kaufmann, W. and Hollingale, R. J. (trans.), New York: Vintage Books, 1968

Z   *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Kaufmann, W. (trans.), Penguin Books, 1978

References to Nietzsche's works are by section number, **except for BT, HL, TL and R**, where I refer to page numbers. German texts of Nietzsche referred to is (KSA*) Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Colli G. and Montinari, M. (eds.), Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1967.

"But what mortification if someone stood beside me and heard a flute from afar and I heard nothing; or someone heard a shepherd singing, and I heard nothing. Such happenings brought me close to despair; I was not far from ending my own life — only art, only art held me back. Ah, it seemed impossible to me that I should leave the world before I had produced all that I felt I might, and so I spared this wretched life..."

— Beethoven, *Heiligenstadt Testament*

"Apart from that, what cannot be borne in the way of need, deprivation, bad weather, disease, toil, solitude? Basically we can cope with everything else, born as we are to an underground and battling existence; again and again we keep coming up to the light, again and again we experience our golden hour of victory, — and then there we stand, the way we were born, unbreakable, tense, ready for new, more difficult and distant things, like a bow that is merely stretched tauter by affliction."

— GM I 12

"Before they came the air was calm enough.

Coming and going, breath by breath, without any fuss.

Then the tulips filled it up like a loud noise.

Now the air snags and eddies round them the way a river

Snags and eddies round a sunken rust-red engine.

They concentrate my attention, that was happy

Playing and resting without committing itself. […]

The water I taste is warm and salt, like the sea,

And comes from a country far away as health."

— Sylvia Plath, *Tulips*

"I created my philosophy from out of my will to health, to *life*."

— EH "Why I am so wise" 2

Introduction

C'est cela, et ce n'est pas cela. Qu'y manque-t-il ?

un rien, mais ce rien est tout.

— Honoré de Balzac, *Le chef-d'oeuvre inconnu*

According to the Nietzschean scholarship, Nietzsche's genealogy is "a central category in Nietzsche's work".[1] That is a matter about which numerous scholars of Nietzsche have been concerned. However, it is recognised genealogy "has become popular despite a lack of clarity about what it is"[2] while the use of it in Nietzsche is "complex and not easy to understand".[3]

There are multiple diverse perspectives on genealogy. Leiter sees genealogy as a form of ideology-critique directed to freeing "nascent higher beings from their false consciousness" about contemporary morality.[4] Geuss sees genealogy as an attempt to master Christianity by showing Christians in terms they can accept that the perspective composed by Nietzsche's values can give a better historical account of morality than the Christian perspective.[5] Janaway advocates Nietzsche's genealogy aims to account for our current moral values, beliefs, and feelings by tracing their origins back to fundamental psychological states.[6] Reginster, in his turn, claims Nietzsche's genealogy aims "to uncover" morality's function "by identifying the particular problems this practice was 'designed' to solve" and "to form an assessment of morality by making it possible to ask how well, if at all, it solves these problems".[7] Blondel contends: "Nietzsche adopts a genealogical perspective to render problematic the 'ideals' of our

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[1] Saar, M. (2002). "Genealogy and Subjectivity." *European Journal of Philosophy,* 10 (2), pp. 231-245, p. 231.

[2] Guay R. (2011). "Genealogy as Immanent Critique: Working from the Inside." p. 168.

[3] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 231.

[4] Leiter, B. (2002). *Nietzsche on Morality*. New York: Routledge, p. 176.

[5] Geuss, R. (1994). "Nietzsche and Genealogy." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2, pp. 275–92.

[6] Janaway, Ch. (2007). *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[7] Reginster, B. (2021). *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12.

culture as they are revealed in our morals, science, religion, and philosophy and in the political assumptions that have been dominant for more than twenty centuries".[8]

A consensus among scholars is the contingent character of morality the Nietzschean genealogy reveals. According to Nehamas, genealogy demonstrates that morality is subjected to interpretation.[9] More specifically, it "reveals the very particular […] origins from which actually emerge the views that we have forgotten are views and take instead as facts".[10] Saar maintains Nietzsche through his genealogy tries to construct a web of relations between realms so far understood to be worlds apart, as "culture and violence, morality and aggression, religion and self-negation".[11] Lorenzini takes the Nietzschean genealogy to be "unmasking",[12] as it presents values, beliefs and judgements emerging in a "contingent way" or "as a consequence of ignoble historical events".[13] Merrick highlights the Nietzschean genealogy reveals that "the values […] emerge from within certain sociopolitical and historical circumstances and attend to very specific psychological needs".[14]

Along with the above well-discussed issues, various scholars highlight the impact genealogy has — or, at least, aims to have — *on its readership*. There is an — implicit or explicit claim here — on what Nietzsche seeks to achieve *through* his genealogy as a mechanism regarding his readership. Janaway claims we need to reflect "not only on what Nietzsche says but on how he says it, what moods and feelings he is out to foster in the reader, and what new self-exploration he may require of us".[15] Gemes writes the target "is us, his readers".[16] Specifically, according to him, the objective of genealogy is to provoke us to question who we are.[17] According to the

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[8] Blondel, E. (1994). "The Question of Genealogy." In Schacht, R. (ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, California: University of California Press, pp. 306-317, p. 306.

[9] Nehamas, A. (1994). "The Genealogy of Genealogy: Interpretation in Nietzsche's Second *Untimely Meditation* and in *On the Genealogy of Morals*". In Schacht, R. (ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, California: University of California Press, pp. 269-283, p. 276.

[10] Nehamas, A. (1985). Nietzsche: *Life as Literature*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.

[11] Saar, M. (2008). "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self." *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2, pp. 295–314, p. 310.

[12] Lorenzini, D. (2020). "On possibilising genealogy." *Inquiry*, p. 6.

[13] Lorenzini, "On possibilising genealogy", op. cit., p. 2.

[14] Merrick, A. (2021). "Knowing Ourselves: Nietzsche, the Practice of Genealogy, and the Overcoming of Self-Estrangement." *Genealogy*, 5 (41), p. 2.

[15] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, op. cit., p. 33.

[16] Gemes, K. "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood." SAS-SPACE, p. 1.

[17] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves", op. cit., p. 2.

same lines, Merrick argues the Nietzschean genealogy, among else, "aims to engender the overcoming of states of self-estrangement, to help make us known to ourselves".[18] Owen, in his turn, claims genealogy is "a practice of critical reflection",[19] and specifically of a kind of self-reflection regarding our subjectivity.[20] Saar notices, Nietzsche by his genealogy not only reveals morality's contingent character but also constructs it as a "methodological hyperbole" that attempts to engage his audience's affects,[21] and in turn "stir up doubts and questions". [22] Huddleston argues Nietzsche's goal is "to change (at least some) hearts and minds, and if he is to accomplish that goal, he must take into account what his audience is going to find persuasive (both intellectually and rhetorically)". In that sense, his "fulminations are often an exercise in provocation, meant to shake up our complacent attitudes and get us to reevaluate our commitments".[23] In this light, there is an emphasis on "self-understanding", on the affective impact genealogy has on its readership, and genealogy as initiating critique, as *Infragestellung*, in practice.

The above discussions pertain to three fundamental questions, which can be categorised as follows: (1) Is genealogy identical to history? (2) If genealogy is not identical to history, what is an alternative interpretation? (3) What types of knowledge and critique arise from it? By addressing these questions, which correspond to the three parts of this thesis, the thesis aims to present a critical understanding of genealogy and the types of knowledge and critique arising from it and contribute to the on-going discussion on what genealogy is.

My working hypothesis posits that Nietzschean genealogy can plausibly be perceived as a mechanism incorporating fictional and historical elements regarding the genesis and evolution of moral values. It is constructed through artistic-rhetorical means and aims to elicit an affective response from its readership. This affective response and the concealments it provides through the artistic discourse activate a

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[18] Merrick, "Knowing Ourselves: Nietzsche, the Practice of Genealogy, and the Overcoming of Self-Estrangement", op. cit., p. 7.
[19] Owen, D. (2002). "Criticism and Captivity: On Genealogy and the Critical Theory." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (2), pp. 216–230, p. 216.
[20] Owen, D., "Criticism and Captivity: On Genealogy and the Critical Theory", op. cit., p. 223.
[21] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 310.
[22] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 311.
[23] Huddleston, A. (2015). "What is enshrined in morality? Understanding the grounds for Nietzsche's Critique." *Inquiry* 58 (3), pp. 281-307.

critique of the values internalised by readers by fostering a sense of scepticism generated by the genealogical narratives.

In Part I, accordingly, I delve into genealogy's relationship with history and assume genealogy's identification to history is challenging. By distancing Nietzsche's approach from conventional historical research methodologies, I present an analysis of the second *Untimely Meditation* and argue that reading genealogy as the narrative regarding the psychological prehistory of the agents, although facing some difficulties, would be a more plausible interpretation than the strict historical one. Then, I unfold two examples of Nietzschean genealogy, guilt and (intellectual) conscience, highlighting the polemical character and psychological nuances they embed. While Nietzsche challenges conventional beliefs about the origins of guilt and conscience, a closer examination reveals how the evolving narratives of bad conscience and intellectual conscience provoke scepticism and critical introspection among his readers.

In Part II, I suggest an alternative interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy: rather than a mere description of historical events, genealogy offers new perspectives, blending actual and fictional elements and various rhetorical means to evoke affects in readers. By exploring Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, I provide an interpretation regarding the position from which Nietzsche functions, aiming to stimulate passions in his audience and *for that reason*, he has knowledge of the psychological structures of the agents and the effects each type of discourse has in his audience. Therefore, the rhetorical strategy of Nietzsche's genealogy intends to create an affective response to the readership. It also highlights the relationship between affect and knowledge, underlining the pivotal role of affective engagement in problematising established beliefs, judgements, and values.

In Part III, I delve deeper into Nietzsche's genealogy, focusing on its outcome beyond the affective engagement. By emphasising the generative nature of values and challenging the belief in their immutability, Nietzsche presents as *possible* the critique and revaluation of values. I explore Nietzsche's views on knowledge, highlighting his critique of fixed knowledge and his advocacy of an open-ended inquiry, encouraging readers to actively engage in a sceptical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge, including their values. I then claim that genealogy, apart from undermining

established conventional notions prevalent in the 19th century regarding morality, prompts a critique *in practice* to the readers. This happens due to the activation of a sceptical attitude in Nietzsche's readership towards the narratives genealogy presents, which will equal a "schooling in suspicion", a critique *in its beginnings*. The activation of critique is facilitated by Nietzsche's positing his genealogy within the artistic discourse, as, in that sense, genealogy is detached from the unquestioned normativity of the value of truth, by which philosophical-scientific discourse is bound, thereby enabling a necessary deception needed for the expression of challenging truths relating to individuals' values through the concealment which art offers.

Concerning methodology, I read Nietzsche's works in English translations, the original German versions, and a wide range of secondary texts. The importance of reading the works in the original German language emerges from the divergence of the translations concerning the German texts — for instance, *Affekt*, apart from "affect", is translated as "impulse", "emotion", "instinct" — and of the style of Nietzsche's writings.

Regarding the use of Nietzsche's works, two observations are necessary. Firstly, in examining the working hypothesis, I reference works across Nietzsche's entire corpus, from his early notes to Rhetoric and the second *Untimely Meditation* to *Ecce Homo*. This choice relies on the premise that these early writings contain valuable insights into Nietzsche's later work. While I will explore this in greater detail, it is worth noting that Breazeale argues for the significance of the second *Untimely Meditation*, which Nietzsche recognised "as essential documents for understanding the *development* of his thought" and

> described them as — and, indeed claimed, that he had explicitly intended them
> to serve as — 'lures' or 'fish hooks' for attracting and capturing the intention
> of the readers he was so desperately trying to reach.[24]

Likewise, Gilman, Blair, and Parent advocate for the importance of the notes on Rhetoric, noting that their significance lies in that "the problem of rhetoric has been a decisive influence on [Nietzsche's] thought", influencing "much of his 'philosophical'

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[24] Breazeale, D. (1997), (ed.) *Introduction. In Untimely Meditations, by Friedrich Nietzsche*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. vii-xxxii.

terminology".[25] Especially concerning genealogy, while a more systematic development is evident in the publication of the *Genealogy* in 1887, I argue that traces of it can already be found in these early texts. Furthermore, I anchor my argument in this extensive array of Nietzsche's works as, for instance, topics such as Nietzsche's rhetorical style and the impact of affects in shaping knowledge, judgements, beliefs, and evaluations are themes that span Nietzsche's entire body of work.

Secondly, concerning the collection of aphorisms titled *The Will to Power*, I dissent with Heidegger's interpretation that designates this work as Nietzsche's "planned *magnum opus*"[26] or — even worse — that there is where the genuine ideas of Nietzsche are expressed and with Heidegger's position that "[w]hat Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground".[27] While I certainly disagree with Heidegger, as well as with those who utilise *The Will to Power* without any critical reflection, I also do not agree with the position that we must entirely dismiss the aphorisms it contains. My methodological approach lies in utilising excerpts from it when they align with Nietzsche's positions and methodology already present in his published works to augment and support the latter.

One final note regarding the methodology is that the nature of this project is twofold. On the one hand, it presents a philosophical argument, interpreting Nietzsche's genealogy as a rhetorical-artistic mechanism, aiming not at establishing a new truth but evoking an affective engagement of the readers and initiating critique towards Nietzsche's genealogical narratives regarding the emergence of values. It ultimately prompts readers to *question* the value of their values. This approach positions Nietzschean genealogy as a form of critical exercise. Additionally, the analysis gradually explores the limitations of the scientific field in fostering critical thinking and the potential supremacy of the artistic realm — a topic of broader interest beyond Nietzschean scholarship. On the other hand, the project is necessarily, to a specific extent, a textual exegesis concerning the analysis of Nietzschean theoretical terms.

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[25] Gilman, Sander, L· Blair, Carol· Parent, David J. (1989). "Introduction". *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. xvi.
[26] Heidegger, M. (1981). *Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*. Krell, D. F. (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 7.
[27] Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

PART I

Genealogy, History, Psychological Pre-History

We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers and with good reason.

We have never looked for ourselves,

— so how are we ever supposed to find ourselves?[28]

— GM P 1

This part aims to initiate genealogy's exploration. I start by elaborating genealogy's relationship to pedigree, following Geuss' analysis.[29] This analysis is valuable as an initial grasp of genealogy as it highlights the main differences between Nietzschean genealogy and other pedigree-type genealogical research. The most substantial feature of the Nietzschean genealogy that Geuss highlights through this comparison is the objective of delegitimising the objects under consideration — in this case, moral values.

Then, I examine genealogy's relationship to history. According to Guay, who observes the ambiguity of the Nietzschean concept of genealogy, "Nietzsche hardly ever uses the word 'genealogy', let alone identifies a method that is supposed to be distinct from historical method in general".[30] A widely — if not the most — accepted interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogical method is that it is a reconstruction of the historical events that led to the creation of moral values. However, a literal historical reading poses challenges, while a more plausible reading of genealogy would be to interpret it as a description of hypotheses concerning the agent's psychological prehistory and the emergence of related moral beliefs, judgements, and values, a direction which resides with Nietzsche's early thoughts in his second *Untimely Meditation* on the value of history for life. Genealogy's psychological reading, while more plausible than the purely historical approach, also faces challenges which I elaborate upon in Chapter 6.1.1.

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[28] GM P 1.
[29] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275–92.
[30] Guay, "Genealogy as Immanent Critique", op. cit., p. 170.

I then introduce two genealogical inquiries Nietzsche offers: that of guilt [*Schuld*] and (intellectual) conscience [*Gewissen*]. The examination of these genealogical examples aims to highlight the "psychological" nuances of genealogy. At the same time, these illustrations lay the foundation for later discussions on the "rhetorical" reading of genealogy in Part II and on the kind of knowledge and critique that emerges from Nietzschean genealogy in Part III.

Chapter 1: Nietzsche's genealogy. Preliminary remarks

To give the context of Nietzsche's interrogation regarding genealogy, he remarks, in the Preface to his work, *On the Genealogy of Morality* [1887], what genealogy is, or better said, what it is not. As he states:

> I was given the initial stimulation to publish something about my hypotheses on the origin of morality by a clear, honest [*sauberes*] and clever, even too-clever little book, in which I first directly encountered the back-to-front and perverse kind of genealogical hypotheses, actually the *English* kind, which drew me to it — with that power of attraction which everything contradictory and antithetical has. The title of the little book was *The Origin of the Moral Sensations*; its author was Dr Paul Rée; the year of its publication 1877. I have, perhaps, never read anything to which I said 'no', sentence by sentence and deduction by deduction, as I did to this book: but completely without annoyance and impatience.[31]

According to Nietzsche, his genealogical task is opposed to English kind of genealogical hypotheses. Two seem to be his opponents, Paul Rée and "the *English* kind" of genealogical investigation, which he describes as "the back-to-front and perverse kind of genealogical hypotheses"[32] and from which he explicitly distinguishes his genealogical method. *Who* are these genealogists of the "*English* kind"? While Hoy suggests Nietzsche's critique targets not only Rée but also Spencer,[33] Clark and Swensen argue that Nietzsche denotes the utilitarian tradition including figures like Hume, Hartley, Bentham, and Mill. Janaway opposes these views and contends that Nietzsche refers solely to Paul Rée.

One of the pieces of evidence Janaway provides is that when Nietzsche criticises the position that good is what is useful, he does not use the word "utility" [*Utilität*] but instead the term "usefulness" [*Nützlichkeit*], which Rée places at the heart of his work, *The Origin of the Moral Sensations*, to explain the origins of the moral concept

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[31] GM P 4.
[32] GM P 4.
[33] Hoy, D. (1986). "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method." In Yovel, Y. (ed.), *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker. Papers Presented at the Fifth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter*, p. 20.

"good" [*Gut*] and its opposites "bad" [*Schlecht*] and "evil" [*Böse*].[34] More importantly, Janaway draws attention to the fact that Nietzsche's exposition of what the English psychologists say is a close summary of Rée.[35] I concur with Janaway's assertion that Nietzsche primarily directs his discourse towards Rée, supported by two additional reasons, as will become apparent throughout the thesis. I contend that the core of Nietzsche's critique in this context lies in Rée's genealogy's inability to disengage from certain presuppositions about values — such as the assumption that things we now value have always had value — and in that, Rée's methodology completely overlooks the readers' affective engagement, both of which are crucial elements in Nietzschean genealogy.

Nietzsche's departure from the "English kind" of genealogy starts earlier than the publishing of *Genealogy*, in which the Nietzschean genealogy takes its more complete form. It traces back to the period when Nietzsche was composing *Human, All Too Human*.[36] At that time, he stated that he was "preoccupied with something much more important than the nature of hypotheses […] on the origin of morality […] it was a question of the *value* of morality".[37] In that moment, the reaction to the Schopenhauerian acceptance of the value of the "unconditionality" of some values, such as, for example, compassion, found its expression. Against these "instincts", as Nietzsche calls them, arose in himself "mistrust" [*Argwohn*] and "skeptisicm" [*Skepsis*].[38] The emergence of the sceptical stance towards the value of moral values is linked to the recognition of a tendency of anything "unconditional" to refuse life, in the sense of affirming a different world than the one we live in, and to the downplaying of the importance of acknowledging the intuitive and instinctive elements of human beings.

Starting from the issue of the value of compassion [*Mitleid*], Nietzsche widens his reference scope. It is not merely a critique of the value of compassion that he seeks,

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[34] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p.78-79. In the same direction, Leiter argues that Nietzsche uses the term "English psychologists" "extremely loosely". According to him, the central position discussed in GM I 1 is Rée's. See, Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, op. cit., p. 198.
[35] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy,* op. cit., p. 78-79.
[36] GM P 4.
[37] GM P 5.
[38] GM P 5.

but a broader critique of the unquestioned value of moral values,[39] including a critique of the value of truth itself.[40] In this context, Reginster observes that Nietzsche's critique "refers to a broad but distinctive evaluative outlook, which has its roots in Christianity and has become so dominant that it claims exclusivity for the label 'morality'".[41] That includes "evaluative beliefs", such as the belief that compassion is a good quality — as Janaway puts it, "that the unegoistic is constitutive of morality and is something of positive value"[42] — or "descriptive beliefs" about the agency, such as that "moral agency is causally free".[43] Indeed, Nietzsche's focus lies not on the examination of the *validity* of the assumptions, whether his own or those of other philosophers, concerning the true origin of moral values, beliefs and judgements, but on the *value* they have for the lives of the agents. Genealogy's final target, then, is the questioning of the value of the values, namely their *critique*.[44] We should read closely and more carefully what he writes in the Preface to the *Genealogy*:

> but whoever pauses over the question and *learns* to ask [*wer aber einmal hier hängen bleibt, hier fragen lernt*], will find what I found: — that a vast new panorama opens up for him, a possibility makes him giddy, mistrust [*Misstrauen*], suspicion [*Argwohn*] and fear of every kind spring up, belief in morality, all morality, wavers, — finally, a new demand becomes articulate. So let us give voice to this *new demand*: we need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined* [*wir haben eine Kritik der moralischen Werthe nöthig, der Werth dieser Werthe ist selbst erst einmal in Frage zu stellen*] — and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed [*und dazu thut eine Kenntniss der Bedingungen und Umstände noth aus denen sie gewachsen, unter denen sie sich entwickelt und verschoben haben*].[45]

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[39] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 29. For Nietzsche's critique of compassion, see also GS 271.

[40] GM III 24.

[41] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 11.

[42] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 40.

[43] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 11.

[44] GM P 6.

[45] GM P 6.

Initially, our exploration will delve into the context surrounding the emergence and evolution of the moral values, essentially embarking on the endeavor to map out their genealogy. Then we will question their value and thus will amount to the "*critique* of moral values". Genealogy, being the method of tracing the origins of the circumstances in which these values were created and developed, is the most crucial task of the philosophers of his era. The genealogical investigation is far from simple; it presents significant challenges, as its object is the "long, hard-to-decipher hieroglyphic script of man's moral past!".[46]

It is worthwhile to comment on the genealogy-critique relationship. There are at least two interpretative approaches. On the one hand, Nietzsche's genealogical method is often portrayed as inherently critical. Habermas, for example, claims that "[t]he [Nietzshean] genealogical localisation of the powers" serves a critical objective, as "the reactive powers of later and lower descent express a perverted will to power".[47] Saar, respectively, explicitly credits Nietzsche as the "founder and inventor"[48] of the critical method of genealogy. According to him, genealogies can fundamentally be viewed as "critical" because they "describe social phenomena in terms of power".[49] What genealogy does, is that it

> places the variety of moral practices, judgments and beliefs in their historical, social and cultural context and therefore destroys any illusion one might have about the naturalness or unity of the moral world.[50]

Hence, the revelation of the historicity of moral values, beliefs and judgements, which implies the collapse of the belief in their "naturalness", concurrently brings about a critical effect of dismantling any preconceptions about these values, beliefs and judgements. However, this interpretative approach seems to overlook the letter of GM P6, according to which the genealogy of values appears as a precondition of the critique, i.e. the *Infragestellung* of the value of the values.[51]

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[46] GM P 7.
[47] Habermas, J. (1982). "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment." *New German Critique*, pp. 13-30, p. 28.
[48] Saar, M. (2007). *Genealogie als Kritique. Geschicte und Theorie des Subjekts nach Nietzsche und Foucault.* Frankfurt and New York, p. 296.
[49] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 298.
[50] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy…", op. cit., p. 301.
[51] GM P 6.

On the other hand, there is the view of genealogy's chronological and logical precedence over critique. For a *critique* of the value of values to emerge, a thorough understanding of the circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed is imperative. Therefore, genealogy is critique's precondition. However, a passage in the fifth book of *Gay Science* confirms the distinction between the origin of morality and its subsequent critique. In this passage, Nietzsche initially criticises the inadequate work of previous "historians of morality" for conflating the "history of origins" and critique. We read:

> The mistake made by the more refined among them is that they uncover and criticize the perhaps foolish opinions of a people about their morality, or of humanity about all human morality — opinions about its origin, religious sanction, the superstition of free will, and things of that sort — and then suppose that they have criticized the morality itself. But the value of a command "thou shalt" is still fundamentally different from and independent of such opinions about it and the weeds of error that may have overgrown it […]. Even if a morality has grown out of an error, the realization of this fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value.

> Thus nobody up to now has examined the *value* of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality; and the first step would be — for once to *question* it [*in Frage stellt*]. Well then. Precisely this is our task. —[52]

The distinction between origin and value is supported in the *Genealogy*. There, we read in the Preface:

> Actually, just then I was preoccupied with something much more important than the nature of hypotheses, mine or anybody else's, on the origin of morality (or, to be more exact: the latter concerned me only for one end, to which it is one of many means). For me it was a question of the *value* of morality […].[53]

Therefore, if we follow the second interpretative approach and perceive genealogy as the process leading to the knowledge of the actual origins of values, then the critique of their value seems impossible to take place. Consequently, genealogy not only fails to function as a critique but also seems inherently unable to lead to it. This conflict will

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[52] GS 345.
[53] GM P 5.

be temporarily set aside, to be revisited in Part III of the thesis, where an argument supporting an interpretation that resolves this tension will be presented. Briefly, my response stems from the question of whether Nietzsche contradicts himself. On the one hand, he appears to emphasise the necessity of a knowledge of the genealogy of values for critique to take place; on the other hand, he seems to suggest that even if morality had been born of an error, this realisation would not address the issue of its value. The proposed solution offered in this thesis asserts that this seeming contradiction is not a contradiction after all. Nietzsche's aim is not to provide knowledge of the actual origin of values himself; instead, what he does is that he constitutes genealogy as a rhetorical-artistic phenomenon that stimulates, firstly, the affective world of his readership and then the activation of critique, as critical thinking towards his genealogical narratives themselves.[54] Thus, critique refers not only to Nietzsche's undermining of prominent positions regarding morality and its value, but also to the activation of critique in its readers towards the narratives it presents without falling into the genetic fallacy since it does not intend to present *truth claims* on the *actual* conditions of the genesis and development of values, judgements and beliefs.

For now, let us deal with the questions: *What is the Nietzschean genealogy?* And, given the subtitle of the book "A Polemic" ["*Eine Streitschrift*"], a second question arises: *What type of genealogical investigation is Nietzsche's genealogy opposing?*

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[54] In *Gay Science* 307, we read in the aphorism entitled "In favor of criticism [*Kritik*]":

> Now something that you formerly loved as a truth or probability strikes you as an error; […] But perhaps this error was as necessary for you then, when you were still a different person — you are always a different person — as are all your present "truths", being a skin, as it were, that concealed and covered a great deal that you were not yet permitted to see. […] When we criticize something, this is no arbitrary and impersonal event; it is, at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm — something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet. —This is said in favor of criticism [*Diess zu Gunsten der Kritik*].

In GS 345, Nietzsche claims no one "up to now has examined the *value* of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality; and the first step would be — for once to *question* it [*in Frage stellt*]", echoing GM P 6, that we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should for once be put into question. From the combination of these aphorisms, it appears that Nietzsche, through the term "critique", alludes not just to the critique he formulates but also to the critique he seeks to instigate in his readers on a personal level.

1.1. What the Nietzschean genealogy is and what it is not: Genealogy vs. Pedigree

A good starting point is a distinction that Raymond Geuss makes, referring to what is Nietzsche's genealogy, between genealogy and pedigree.[55] In English, discussions around genealogy can be approached through two distinct terms, the first of which is the term "genealogy". The other is the term "pedigree", often used in association with the phrase "trace a pedigree". To grasp Nietzsche's approach, it can be insightful to look at the juxtaposition of these two terms. According to Geuss, the Nietzschean genealogy is the exact opposite of what "tracing a pedigree" is.[56]

Tracing a lineage, akin to establishing a pedigree, is a practice that spans back to the earliest forms of Western literature. An illustrative example can be found in the second Rhapsody of *Iliad*, where Homer delineates a genealogy (in the sense of a pedigree) of the sceptre of Agamemnon. We encounter the following passage:

> Powerful Agamemnon stood up holding the sceptre Hephaistos had wrought him carefully. Hephaistos gave it to Zeus the king, son of Kronos, and Zeus in turn gave it to the courier Argeiphontes, and lord Hermes gave it to Pelops, driver of horses, and Pelops gave it to Atreus, the shepherd of the people. Atreus dying left it to Thyestes of the rich flocks, and Thyestes left it in turn to Agamemnon to carry and to be lord over many islands and over all Argos. Leaning upon this sceptre he spoke […].[57]

According to Geuss, this example shows the main features of genealogy in the pedigree sense. Two are the central elements of the genealogy here: the *legitimising* succession and the attribution of *positive value* to a person, institution, or object. The words of Agamemnon attain authority because "he has inherited such an ancestral sceptre".[58] The genealogy of the sceptre, starting from its possession by Agamemnon, traces a sequence of giving and holding. Hephaistos gave it to Zeus, Zeus to Hermes, Hermes to Pelops, Pelops to Atreus, Atreus to Thyestes, and Thyestes to Agamemnon. The

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[55] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., 274-292.
[56] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 274.
[57] Homer (1951). *The Iliad*. Lattimore, R. (trans.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Book 11, lines 100 ff.
[58] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275.

sceptre found its last holder, Agamemnon, while the series of succession goes back to a single origin. For genealogy in the pedigree sense, the origin from which the object comes/derives "must be an actual source of positive value", and the succession's steps must retain the value or even reinforce it. In this particular kind of genealogy, one should be able to "trace the ownership of the sceptre back to Hephaestus and Zeus", where the former guarantees the quality of the construction, while the latter, i.e. Zeus, guarantees the associated claim to political power.[59]

Five main features of this kind of genealogy are summarised in one long sentence:

(i) In the interest of yielding *positive* value

(ii) the object whose genealogy we seek begins from a *unique* origin

(iii) that is, the *real* source of that value

(iv) traces an unbroken line of succession from the origin to the object

(v) with a line of succession that preserves or augments the value under discussion.

That is, the longer the genealogy, in other words, the further away into time I can locate the source of the object, the greater its value.[60] Geuss brings a successful example here:

> A family that could trace its patent of nobility back to the 15th century might think that this pedigree showed it to be more noble than a family whose patent went back only to the 19th century.[61]

Therefore, according to the genealogical investigation in the sense of pedigree, the older we trace the origin of the object, the greater its value is. This appreciation in value is contingent upon the quantity of successions.

The significance of Geuss' analysis lies in the codification of what genealogy consists of for Nietzsche by explaining what it is not. It is indeed the antithesis of pedigree. As he advocates, genealogy, as practised by Nietzsche, has nothing to do with

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[59] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275.
[60] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275.
[61] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275.

the pedigree. It differs from the latter in terms of all the steps mentioned above. Firstly, the Nietzschean genealogy does not have the aim of "legitimizing any present person, institution, or act".[62] Instead, it does exactly the opposite. It aims to reveal the foundations of the constitution of moral values, beliefs and judgements and to delegitimise them.[63]

Secondly, genealogy "does not discover a single origin of the object of its investigation".[64] Turning to Geuss' analysis, the genealogy which, according to him, has historical nuances, reveals the process of the genesis of moral values, judgements and beliefs and ultimately of (Christian) morality itself, without any single point which could be called the origin in-itself.[65] One application of this position is Nietzsche's analysis of the genesis and development of guilt, which we will investigate in detail in Chapter 3.1. Summarily, the latter arises from the combination of many different and perhaps disparate elements; guilt traces back to the juridical relationship between a debtor and a creditor — at this point, guilt isn't distinguished from debt.[66] It also derives from the innate tendency of agents to justify, their need to give meaning.[67] Also, guilt traces back to the function of the ascetic priest. The latter, wanting to exercise his will to dominate, subordinates the masses by making them believe they are guilty by default.[68]

Moreover, the further back the genealogy goes the less likely it is to detect any clear, intrinsic positive value that could be transmitted through the genealogical line to the present. Indeed, this comment is in line with the Nietzschean motif that, at least concerning moral beliefs, judgements, and values, whatever we find morally right or good, has a different, and not necessarily "good" — in terms of value — origin. In Nietzsche's words:

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[62] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 276.
[63] Along with Geuss, the delegitimising function of Nietzsche's genealogy is accepted by various scholars. According to Williams, for example, Nietzsche's genealogical account has an "unsettling or destructive effect", rather than being "vindicatory" concerning the value of values. See, Williams, B. (2002). *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 37.
[64] Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method", op. cit.
[65] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit.
[66] GM II 4-8.
[67] GM III 28. See also TI "The Four Great Errors" 4.
[68] GM III 15.

In *this* sphere of legal obligations, then, the moral conceptual world [*die moralische Begriffswelt*] of 'debt', 'conscience', 'duty', 'sacred duty', has its breeding ground — all began with a thorough and prolonged bloodletting, like the beginning of all great things on earth. And may we not add that this world has really never quite lost a certain odour of blood and torture? (not even with old Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty…).[69]

Thus, Nietzsche's genealogy challenges the idea that the further we move up the chain of genealogical succession, the more the value of the object under consideration increases. For example, as Hoy notes, Nietzsche criticises and rejects the perverse conception of "Rée's social-Darwinian hypothesis that the most recent product of human evolution is, because of the survival of the fittest, also the highest product of human evolution".[70] This particular hermeneutical approach is correct and is supported by the Nietzschean corpus, since Nietzsche characterises as a prejudice of metaphysicians the judgement that "[t]hings of the highest value must have another, separate origin *of their own*, — they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire".[71] Instead, what we now value as good might have its origin in something we now value as bad. For example, "[t]he good conscience has as a preliminary stage the bad conscience — the latter is not its opposite: for everything good was once new, consequently unfamiliar, contrary to custom, *immoral*, and gnawed at the heart of its fortunate inventor like a worm".[72] In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I present a detailed analysis of two examples whose Nietzsche constitutes their genealogy, guilt and conscience, where I further clarify the 'lower' value origin of values recognised as having a higher moral value.

This line of thought opposes "the sentimental assumption that things we now value (for whatever reason) must have had an origin of which we would also approve".[73] Finally, regarding the line of successions, Nietzsche emphasises that the history of the genesis and development of a moral value is not composed of linear processes. For example, according to the narrative of GM II 17, the emergence of bad

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[69] GM II 6. See also GM III 9 ("[a]ll good things used to be bad things at one time; every original sin has turned into an original virtue"), and BGE 2.

[70] Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method", op. cit. Nietzsche's argument lies in GM P 7.

[71] BGE 2.

[72] HAH II 90. In his earlier writings, like the aforementioned, of course, bad conscience hasn't taken the form and the completeness of content that will be given in *Genealogy*.

[73] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit.

conscience was not a "gradual and voluntary" transformation. It was "a breach, a leap, a compulsion, an inescapable fate".[74]

[74] GM II 17.

Chapter 2: Genealogy's readings: the historical and the psychological

In any case I hate everything that merely instructs me

without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.

— Goethe

The error of almost every philosophy is a lack of knowledge of humans,

an inaccurate psychological analysis.

— NF-1877,22[107]

2.1. Genealogy as history

Given Geuss' account of Nietzsche's genealogy, a question emerges: if genealogy means to expose the hidden origin of moral values, beliefs, and judgements, what is its relation to a typical historical discourse? Geuss emphasises the historical aspect of Nietzsche's genealogy. For example, concerning the emergence of Christianity, he states:

> Christianity at a given point in time will be a 'synthesis' of the various different 'meanings' imposed on it in the past and which have succeeded in remaining embedded in Christian feeling, forms of action and belief, etc. There will be nothing necessary or even particularly coherent about such a 'synthesis': What 'meanings' it will contain and how they will be related to each other will be just the result of history, and this history will be contingent in a number of ways. It will be contingent which wills encounter and try to 'interpret'/master Christianity at what times and under what circumstances, and it will be contingent how much force, energy, and success they will have in imposing their 'meaning'. The history of Christianity will 'crystallize itself into a kind of

unity which is difficult to dissolve, difficult to analyse, and, it must be emphasized, utterly undefinable' (GM n.13).[75]

The question is: does genealogy literally concern history? How seriously must we take Nietzsche's historical claims? In this context, it is needed to investigate the question of what Nietzsche means by "history" and the significance he attributes to it within the context of genealogical analysis.

The 19th-century German historian, Leopold von Ranke, who aimed to establish history as science, in his Preface to his book, *History of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494–1514*, says that history concerns "what actually happened" [*wie es eigentlich gewesen*], and that is what his book is going to show.[76] The "supreme law" of history in that sense is "[t]he strict presentation of facts, contingent and unattractive though they may be".[77] Is it possible to situate Nietzsche in this tradition of thinking about history? Does Nietzsche mean by the genealogy the *description* of the *actual* historical facts that lead to the construction of morality as we know it? With the first reading of *Genealogy*'s Preface, one could answer directly "yes". As we read there:

> At any rate, I wanted to focus this sharp, unbiased eye in a better direction, the direction of a **real** [*wirklichen*] *history of morality*, and to warn him, while there was still time, against such English hypothesis-mongering *into the blue*. It is quite clear which colour is a hundred times more important for a genealogist than blue: namely *grey*, which is to say, that which can be documented, **which can actually be confirmed and has actually existed** [*das Wirklich-Feststellbare, das Wirklich-Dagewesene*], in short, the whole, long, hard-to-decipher hieroglyphic script of man's moral past![78]

In a similar way, in the second Treatise of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche addresses the genealogy of guilt, and claims he describes "*what* has really gone with all this and *behind* all this" [*was eigentlich mit dem Allen und unter dem Allen geschehen ist*].[79]

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[75] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 282.
[76] Ranke, L. "*Preface: History of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494–1514*". In Stern, F. (1956). *The Varieties of History*. New York: Meridian Books, p. 57.
[77] Ranke, "*Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494–1514*", op. cit., p. 57.
[78] GM P 7. The words in bold are my emphasis.
[79] GM II 22.

Of course, reading the above, one can affirm Nietzsche belongs to the tradition of Ranke. Before answering positively to all the above questions based on GM P 7, we should not overlook, first of all, *Genealogy*'s subtitle as "Polemic". As Babich sarcastically notes, "the title-page hint concerning the challenging dimension of the book has not prevented scholars from reading *On the Genealogy of Morals* as a *Tractatus* or straightforward account of Nietzsche's thinking on moral philosophy".[80] Along the same lines, we should not overlook Nietzsche's advice that to understand him, it is not enough to read an aphorism, but we must interpret it,[81] or his reservation regarding the "tyranny of the actual [*gegen die Tyrannei des Wirklichen*]" and his concomitant direction "*against history*, that is, against the blind power of the actual [*gegen die Geschichte, das heisst gegen die blinde Macht des Wirklichen*]",[82] as expressed in the second *Untimely Meditation*. Especially concerning *Genealogy*, Nietzsche recognises the readers might find it "incomprehensible and hard on the ears", and warns us that:

> An aphorism, properly stamped and moulded, has not been 'deciphered' just because it has been read out; on the contrary, this is just the beginning of its proper *interpretation*, and for this, an art of interpretation is needed.

In order for someone to "practice this *art* of reading", one thing is needed as its prerequisite: "*rumination*" [*das Wiederkäuen*].[83] Interestingly, *Wiederkäuen* appears also in the second *Untimely Meditation*, where it is equated with "historical sense [*historischem Sinne*]", [84] which, in turn, relates to an "impulse to art [*Kunsttrieb*]".[85]

I will turn in Parts II and III to this topic. At this stage, let us accept as a hypothesis the historical reading of the genealogy, proceeding to examine its validity. As we saw from the previous analysis, Geuss' understanding of genealogy belongs to that view. He maintains "the appropriate historical account is a genealogy",[86] or even

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[80] Babich, B. (2006). "The genealogy of morals and right reading: On the Nietzschean aphorism and the art of the polemic." In Acampora, Ch. (ed*.), Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays*. USA: Lanham, pp. 177-190, p. 177.
[81] GM P 8.
[82] HL, p. 49.
[83] GM P 8.
[84] HL, p. 10.
[85] HL, p. 35.
[86] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 282.

equates the two terms.[87] Leiter[88] belongs to the scholars who suggest that Nietzsche uses history in a literal sense when he conducts the genealogical investigation. Stern, in his turn, advocates Nietzsche feels "inclined to write a history of Christian morality".[89] Nehamas argues that the Nietzschean genealogy shows "traditional moral institutions" as "they really are",[90] while Saar is in favour of the view that "genealogy is history differently practiced".[91]

The historical reading of genealogy is indeed supported from textual evidence, such as the aphorism 7 from the Preface of the *Genealogy* or BGE 186. In GM P 7, we read,

> [s]uffice it to say that since this revelation, I had reason to look around for scholarly, bold, hardworking colleagues (I am still looking). The vast, distant and hidden land of morality — of morality as it really existed and was really lived [*der wirklich dagewesenen, wirklich gelebten Moral*] — has to be journeyed through with quite new questions and as it were with new eyes: and surely that means virtually *discovering* [*entdecken*] this land for the first time?[92]

There he suggests he is interested in *discovering* morality "as it really existed and as really lived". Analogously, in BGE 186, he declares that instead of dealing with morality as all the previous philosophers, as something "given", he aims at *describing* [*Beschreibung*] the historical process of the genesis and development of moral events [*moralischen facta*].[93]

Upon initial examination, a historical approach of genealogy may seem appealing; however, this strict historical approach encounters several problems. There are at least three reasons why this reading is challenging. Firstly, Nietzsche directly criticises the traditional history as an objective description of events that actually took place, a critique to be explored further in Chapter 2.2. Secondly, Nietzsche demonstrates selectivity in his descriptive inquiries. His selectivity concerns the

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[87] Geuss, "Nietzsche and Genealogy", op. cit., p. 286.
[88] Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, op. cit., p. 167.
[89] Stern, T. (2020). *Nietzsche's Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30.
[90] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature,* op. cit., p. 129.
[91] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 297.
[92] GM P 7.
[93] BGE 186.

emergence of "psychological" structures of the human agency and their relation to moral values, judgements, and beliefs. That is in line with a psychological reading of genealogy I address in Chapter 2.3. Thirdly, Nietzsche's historical inconsistencies, fictitious narratives, and rhetorical means are incompatible with a strict historical description of events. That is in line with a rhetorical approach of genealogy, a subject to be delved into in Part II of the thesis.

Here, of course, it needs to be pointed out that the rejection of genealogy as history, in the sense of the actual and objective description of events, does not mean that Nietzsche rejects the *importance* of history. He explicitly recognises that values, beliefs and judgements do not appear in a vacuum; on the contrary, they are constituted socio-historically, as I discuss in detail in Chapter 7. Indeed, his critique of ahistorical conceptions of morality is explicit. For example, in *The Twilight of the Idols*, we read:

> You want to know what the philosophers' indiosyncrasies are? ... Their lack of historical sense for one thing, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egypticity. They think that they are showing *respect* for something when they dehistoricize it, *sub specie aeterni* — when they turn it into a mummy.[94]

Apart from the recognition of the importance of history, as the recognition of the socio-historical constitution of objects, in this case values, beliefs and judgements, it is essential to note that Nietzsche does provide descriptions of historical events in precise terms in his genealogy. For instance, the description of the relationship between the Christian Crusades and the Assassins is historically accurate.[95] However, the mere presence of actual historical facts in his narrative and the recognition of the socio-historical constitution of values are insufficient for labeling his genealogy as a historical method. This conclusion is supported by the reasons mentioned earlier above — Nietzsche's understanding of history in the second *Untimely Meditation*, his emphasis on the psychological prehistory of the agents, and the choice to include rhetorical means and historical inconsistencies in his narrative — which we will now develop and elaborate further.

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[94] TI "Reason in Philosophy" 1.
[95] GM III 24.

2.2. Nietzsche's understanding of History: The case of the Second *Untimely Meditation*

Nietzsche opens his Preface to his more "systematic" work on the topic of History, the second *Untimely Meditation*, or else *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, with the following words of Goethe:

> "Moreover I hate everything which merely instructs me without increasing or directly quickening my activity." These are Goethe's words with which, as with a boldly expressed *ceterum censeo*, we may begin our consideration of the worth and worthlessness of history. Our aim will be to show why instruction which fails to quicken activity, why knowledge which enfeebles activity, why history as a costly intellectual excess and luxury must, in the spirit of Goethe's words, be seriously hated; for we still lack what is most necessary, and superfluous excess is the enemy of the necessary. Certainly, we need history. But our need for history is quite different from that of the spoiled idler in the garden of knowledge [*Garten des Wissens*], even if he in his refinement looks down on our rude and graceless requirements and needs. That is, we require history for life and action, not for the smug avoiding of life and action [...].[96]

The aim of the essay is "to show why instruction which fails to quicken activity, why knowledge which enfeebles activity, why history as a costly intellectual excess and luxury must, in the spirit of Goethe's words, be seriously hated".[97] What do we observe in this respect? Firstly, that guidance of any kind leads to a narcosis of the activity (of thought), and secondly, that knowledge and history acting as such guidance should be avoided. Nietzsche recognises moreover that "we still lack what is most necessary",

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[96] HL, p. 7.

There exists an ambiguity surrounding Nietzsche's interpretation of "life", a point acknowledged in secondary literature. For instance, Nehamas posits that Nietzsche consistently remains "intolerably vague about what 'life' is supposed to be". See, Nehamas, "The Genealogy of the Genealogy", op. cit., p. 269-270. Indeed, what Nietzsche means by life is somewhat abstract. According to GS P 3: "Life — that means for us constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame." In any case, we cannot avoid recognising a connection between life, the bodily constitution of the human agency, and a tendency to grow. For example, life is "the self-preservation, and energy accumulation of the body" (EH "Daybreak" 2). Analogously, according to BGE 259:

> life itself is *essentially* a process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least, exploiting, – but what is the point of always using words that have been stamped with slanderous intentions from time immemorial? […] life *is* precisely will to power.

[97] HL, p. 7.

while excess (which seems to accompany history as it was perceived and performed in the 19th century) is the opposite of the necessary. What is this necessary that we still lack and need? In the antithesis of history, as shaped in the 19th century, we need "history for life and action".[98]

What is the problem with modern conception of history, according to Nietzsche? Through his characteristic sarcasm, he explicitly opposes the dominant historical perception, education and practice of his time when he describes himself as "unworthy of the mighty historical orientation of the age which, as is well known, has been evident for two generations particularly among the Germans".[99] The problem with history as the traditional understanding of it during the 19th century begins with the "naive historians" perceiving "past opinions and deeds" as "objectivity".[100] The reduction of a "historical phenomenon clearly and completely […] to an intellectual phenomenon", meaning detached from "the mania, the injustice, the blind passion, and in general the whole earthly darkened horizon" accompanying it, renders it "dead" for its observer.[101] We read:

> History, conceived as pure science and become sovereign, would constitute a kind of final closing out of the accounts of life for mankind.[102]

Why? Because modern historical education "rejects with a shrug of the shoulders everything in the process of becoming and spreads over it the feeling of being very late arrivals and epigoni, in short, of being congenitally grey haired".[103] That has, as a result, created a historical consciousness that wants to be *stable*,[104] rejecting becoming, an attitude expressed in the stance that "it is good to know all that has been since it is too

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[98] HL, p. 7.
[99] HL, p.7.
[100] By "objectivity" Nietzsche means:
> a condition in the historian in which his view of an event with all of its motives and consequences is so pure that it has no effect at all on his subjectivity: one has in mind the aesthetic phenomenon, that detachment from all personal interest with which the painter sees his inner picture in a stormy landscape amid lightning and thunder or on a rough sea, one has in mind the total absorption in things: yet it is a superstition to believe that the picture which things produce in a man in such a state of mind reproduces the empirical essence of those things. Or is one to think that things in such moments, as it were, retrace, counterfeit, reproduce themselves photographically on a pure passivity through their own activity.

See, HL, p. 34-35.
[101] HL, p. 14.
[102] HL, p. 14.
[103] HL, p. 45.
[104] There is a parallel between the need for historical consciousness to be "stable" and the tendency of the knower to acquire fixed knowledge, as we will see in detail in Chapter 8.1.

late to do something better".[105] In that sense, history is nothing more than "disguised theology".[106] Even worse, the bearers of that kind of historical perception, who are "descendants" of earlier ages, "grave diggers" of past generations, "the apologists of the actual",[107] and "living memories"[108] are unable to act. That is to say, by insisting on past events and avoiding living "unhistorically", agents suspend the possibility of creating something new, of creating themselves.

Also, Nietzsche rejects the philosophical understanding of history in the Hegelian sense as "a late arrival of the ages",[109] which is "deified […] as the true meaning and purpose of all that has happened earlier".[110] That understanding of history leads to a "knowing misery" [*wissendes Elend*].[111] History is rejected also in the sense of Tacitus, meaning "[t]o take everything objectively, not to be angered by anything, to love nothing, to comprehend everything".[112] It concerns the approach of history that rejects any personal involvement with it and indignation in it, "*sine ira et studio*".[113] These "historians" and philosophers dealing with history, "find the canon of all truths; their work is to make the past fit the triviality of their time".[114] Thus, he opposes his modern "historical education",[115] which has even led to an over-trophy of "historical sense". Objectivity is nothing more than a sign of indifference regarding the object under consideration.[116]

If history is rejected in all the above forms, what is the kind of history Nietzsche advocates? As with his discussion on aesthetics and, as we will see in Part III, his elaborations on knowledge and critique, the kind of history Nietzsche advocates is the one which is helpful for the affirmation of life. To understand history's function and impact on the affirmation of life, I suggest we should turn our sight to the following elements: the necessity of the unhistorical sense and the plastic power of agents.

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[105] HL, p. 45.
[106] HL, p. 45.
[107] HL, p. 48.
[108] HL, p. 46.
[109] HL, p. 47.
[110] HL, p. 47.
[111] HL, p. 47.
[112] HL, p. 48.
[113] HL, p. 48.
[114] HL, p. 34.
[115] HL, p. 8.
[116] HL, p. 37.

Regarding the former, it might be surprising for Nietzsche's reader to encounter the thought of the importance of living unhistorically in an essay dealing with history. Nietzsche elucidates the idea of unhistorical living in a comparison between animals and humans. We read:

> Man may well ask the animal: why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only look at me? The animal does want to answer and say: because I always immediately forget what I wanted to say — but then it already forgot this answer and remained silent: so that man could only wonder.[117]

Then, he turns his attention to the way humans function regarding their past — as we said earlier, it is Nietzsche's explicit recognition that humans live within history in the sense that they carry the past, their own and that of their ancestors. Therefore, they are bound by it. He continues regarding the human being:

> But he also wondered about himself, that he cannot learn to forget but always remains attached to the past: however far and fast he runs, the chain runs with him [...]. Again and again a page loosens in the scroll of time, drops out, and flutters away — and suddenly flutters back into man's lap. Then man says "I remember" and envies the animal which immediately forgets and sees each moment really die, sink back into deep night extinguished forever.[118]

Human beings are living historically by necessity because they have a past. However, they often deny that past as they do not want to face it because it is a burdensome element. At a coincidental moment[119] and without anticipating it, while observing, for example, the play of a little child, who as a little child still has no past, there comes a flash of a moment when one realises the meaning of "the phrase 'it was', that password

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[117] HL, p. 8.

[118] HL, p. 8-9.

[119] A note on the role of chance is worth being made here. On the one hand, in Eckermann's work, *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret*, a book in which Nietzsche revisits in the Second *Untimely Meditation* and greatly admires, we encounter the following:

> It is said that animals are taught by their senses; and in the same way, it might be said of man that, as regards the noble inclinations which lie latent in him, he is often taught by chance incidents. Something similar happened to me, and as it gave a new turn to my whole life, though unimportant in itself, it made an indelible impression on my memory.

Goethe, J. W.; Eckermann, J. P. (1875). *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret*. Exenford, J. (trans.). London: G. Bell & sons.

Similarly, Lacan, referring to Aristotle, defines chance as "the encounter with the real". In Nietzschean terms, we can thus perceive the accidental encounter as an event that surprises us, resurrecting elements from our past that may prove challenging or even unbearable to confront.

with which struggle, suffering and boredom approach the agents to remind them what their existence basically is — a never to be completed imperfect tense".[120] The ability to forget, or as Nietzsche puts it, the human capacity to live unhistorically, is a prerequisite for the possibility of happiness.[121] There is, therefore, a point of intersection, which, if overcome, can make the past "the gravedigger of the present".[122] What does this point depend on? Nietzsche here becomes enigmatic once again. It depends on the amount of "plastic power" each person has.[123]

What does Nietzsche mean by this plastic power? He clarifies he means "the power distinctively to grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself",[124] or phrased differently "the power to use the past for life and to refashion what has happened into history".[125] Later in the same work, he gives implicitly another definition of the "plastic power", when writing "to think everything in conjunction, to weave a whole out of the isolated: everywhere with the presupposition that a unity of plan must be put into things if it is not there".[126] Interestingly, this is characterised by Nietzsche as "an impulse to art [*Kunsttrieb*]".[127] And, later on in the text, he clarifies that "only if history can bear being transformed into a work of art, that is, to become a pure art form, may it perhaps preserve instincts or even rouse them".[128] Here, we need to proceed with caution. Firstly, considering the period during which this work was written, the parallels with the perception of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon, as expressed in *The Birth of Tragedy*, are evident. Secondly, we observe a creative power in agents to manage their past experiences in such a way that they benefit their lives and health in the present. The similarity to the psychoanalytic process in this regard is inevitable. History has clear personal connotations on the one hand. On the other hand, it is not its content so much as its function for life and health that is emphasised, in a similar way to the valorisation of aesthetics in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where what weighs in is its function

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[120] HL, p. 9.
[121] HL, p. 9.
[122] HL, p. 9.
[123] HL, p. 9.
[124] HL, p. 10.
[125] HL, p. 10.
[126] HL, p. 35.
[127] HL, p. 35.
[128] HL, p. 39.

for life and health.[129] We read in the *Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* that:

> As long as we constantly learn to improve our ability to do history for the sake of life. So long as we may always be sure of more *life* [...].[130]

Similarly, the personal character of the reception of history is also evident in the following passage, where we read that:

> There are men who have this power to so small a degree that they will incurably bleed to death over a single experience, a single pain, frequently over a single delicate injustice, as from quite a small bleeding laceration.[131]

That is an idea that we can associate with the notion of the historical instinct, as it appears in *Genealogy* when Nietzsche writes that "[a]nd with this we return to our genealogists of morality. I'll say it again — or maybe I haven't said it yet? — they are no good. No more than five spans of their own, merely 'modern' experience; no knowledge and no will to know the past; still less an instinct for history [*ein historischer Instinkt*], a 'second sight' ['*zweites Gesicht*'] so necessary at this point".[132]

So, how can this plastic power transform memories into something beneficial to life? A possible answer would be the following, inspired by psychoanalytic theory and practice. The past, even in its most remote infantile and archaic forms, is ever-active and ever-present. Through interpretation and psychoanalytic construction, a past is *transformed*. Reconstruct, recompose, and recreate become synonyms here of construct, i.e. *invent* and create in the sense that the aim is not to reconstruct an image but to invent a missing meaning. Interpretation does not reveal a meaning imprisoned in some dark part of the soul nor brings to light some buried truth waiting for the agent to discover it. On the contrary, *by shaping and naming the past, interpretation makes*

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[129] Regarding the emphasis on the role of aesthetics on health and life rather than on its content, I agree with Stern's interpretation that what Nietzsche "illuminates is not primarily the content of the aesthetic but what we might call its foreign relations — the place of the aesthetic in the man's being. This above all — the place and meaning, that is the function of the aesthetic in life — is what *The Birth of Tragedy* is about". See Stern, J. P. (1975). "Nietzsche's Aesthetics." *Journal of European Studies*, 5, 213-222, p. 215.

[130] HL, p. 14.

[131] HL, p. 10.

[132] GM II 4. An interesting note is the use of the signifier "Gesicht" to denote "sight" since "Geschichte" means "history". Although terms are unrelated in their meanings, the free association prompted by the choice of such similar signifiers can easily be considered a rhetorical trick with aesthetic value.

new meaning exist where hitherto there has been an immovable meaning that has been traumatising and painful.

When the plastic element is missing, insurmountable difficulties inherent in the past and its effects appear. The past, that is, appears unchanged. Memory is memory without recollection as a first form of processing (it narrates events, nothing else), and the traumatic experience, like a boulder of the real, occupies the psychic scene, literally crushing any attempt at fabrication, imaginative reinterpretation and historicisation of psychic events. The agent thus runs up against a painful experience left unlived, an experience past but without a past, a void of meaning and, above all, the psychic pain of something that did not take place, even though it did. Without a place, then, without a psychic location, time and history, the traumatic experience is experienced as an eschatological present, and as long as it is not processed, as long as it is not transformed into a psychic event, so much does it repeat, so much does it persist, so much does it traumatise. And for that reason, we need a "plastic power" as "the power distinctively to grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself".[133]

An other comment concerning that plastic power is that it seems that the ability to manage the past in favour of life also depends on something of the order of "nature"[134] since Nietzsche writes that the stronger the roots of the agents' "inmost nature", the better their chances of managing and controlling their past in their favour. This "nature" discards whatever it perceives as non-manageable and forgets it. The plastic power and the possibility of forgetting function constitutively in terms of the horizon that each person chooses and plans for herself while, at the same time, this horizon is a prerequisite of health. This horizon, in turn, implies a limit within which the horizon is constituted as such. Or, in Nietzsche's words, the horizon consists of "there being a line which distinguishes what is clear and in full view from the dark and unilluminable".[135] When we are in the light and when we are in the dark, in turn, is a "choice", at least to a certain extent, of the agents and even a crucial choice for their

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[133] HL, p. 10.
[134] Regarding "nature", see HL, p. 23: "to know that his first nature also was, at some time or other, a second nature and that every victorious second nature becomes a first". Nehamas also supports the idea that, according to Nietzsche, first nature is already a second nature, as "everything seemed fixed has been at some point introduced into history". See, Nehamas, "The Genealogy of Genealogy", op. cit., p. 275.
[135] HL, p. 10.

life and health. In Nietzschean terms, thinking and acting "historically", meaning recognising and processing our past, is as necessary for our health and life, as thinking "unhistorically", that is, in oblivion, as if some things never happened.[136] As Nietzsche states, "there is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of historical sense which injures every living thing and finally destroys it, be a man, a people or a culture".[137]

After his analysis on the importance of living unhistorically and the necessity of the agents' "plastic power", Nietzsche distinguishes between three kinds of history, the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical. As he states:

> History belongs to the living man in three respects: it belongs to him so far as he is active and striving, so far as he preserves and admires, and so far as he suffers and is in need of liberation. To this triplicity of relations correspond three kinds of history: so far as they can be distinguished, a monumental, an antiquarian and a critical kind of history.[138]

Each of them has specific characteristics and different functions regarding the lives of the agents. The first kind of history, the monumental, is intended to provide agents with a sense of security that even something that seems unlikely is possible since it has been possible in the past. We read that:

> it is the belief in the affinity and continuity of the great of all ages, it is a protest against the change of generations and transitoriness [...] for now the doubt which assails him in moments of weakness, that he may perhaps want the impossible, has been conquered.[139]

Therefore, "fundamentally what was possible once could only be possible a second time", for example, if the stars were again in a certain position relative to each other, then Columbus would rediscover America, Nietzsche sarcastically notes.[140] Although he recognises that this kind of history would have the advantage of providing a sense of security and giving the impression that achieving something great is possible,[141] its core disadvantage is the reduction of the particular to general and, therefore, the

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[136] HL, p. 10. We might be able to trace some similarities between this idea of oblivion and the myth of Er from Plato's *Republic*.
[137] HL, p. 10.
[138] HL, p. 14.
[139] HL, p. 16.
[140] HL, p. 16.
[141] HL, p. 18-19.

creation of arbitrary schemes, just as is the case with the issue of fixed knowledge, as we will discuss in Chapter 8. We read:

> And yet — at once to learn another new thing from the same example — how flowing and elusive, how imprecise would such a comparison be! How much that is different must be overlooked, how ruthlessly must the individuality of the past be forced into a general form and have all its sharp edges and lines broken for the sake of agreement, if the comparison is to have that powerful effect![142]

The second kind of history is the one Nietzsche calls "antiquarian", which corresponds to "the preserving and revering soul",[143] the bearers of which "look back" on their origins to "preserve the conditions" from which they grew up "for those who will come after" them, and this practice is serving life. This antiquarian history leads the agents to perceive themselves through the historical configuration of their environment, whether it is the city, the genus, or the "German soul", thus reducing the individual ego to a community, to a "we". If the Nietzschean genealogy were a pedigree-type genealogy, we might say that it would correspond to this kind of history.[144] That kind of history corresponds to:

> [...] the contentment of a tree with its roots, the happiness of knowing oneself not to be wholly arbitrary and accidental, but rather as growing out of a past as its heir, flower and fruit and so to be exculpated, even justified, in one's existence.[145]

This sense of belonging, as an antidote to the randomness of existence, is the virtue of this historical genre. The psychological connotations of the perception of history, in the sense of phylogenesis, are evident, as is the binding of the historical discourse, again by a psychological need of the agents.

The third and final kind of history is critical history, a "judging and condemning history", which corresponds to the one "who is oppressed by some present misery and wants to throw off the burden at all cost".[146] That is a kind of history that is "clear how

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[142] HL, p. 16.
[143] HL, p. 19.
[144] HL, p. 19.
[145] HL, p. 20.
[146] HL, p. 18-19.

badly man needs".[147] Nietzsche, quoting Goethe once again, states: "For 'whatever has a beginning *deserves* to have an undoing; it would be better if nothing began at all'. It takes a great deal of strength to be able to live and to forget how far living and being unjust are one".[148] That kind of history seems most directly related to the plastic power discussed above, as its function is to activate both the remembering and the forgetting when necessary. In this case, history is advantageous for life, as sometimes forgetting is useful for life, while other times the memory of the past must emerge, be constructed and reinterpreted. As Nietzsche states:

> Occasionally, however, the same life which needs forgetfulness demands the temporary destruction of this forgetfulness; then it is to become clear how unjust is the existence of some thing, a privilege, a caste, a dynasty for example, how much this thing deserves destruction. Then its past is considered critically, then one puts the knife to its roots, then one cruelly treads all pieties under foot.[149]

According to this passage, therefore, critical history entails a temporary and necessary destruction of forgetfulness, the activation of the historical sense, of "rumination", accomplished by examining the origin of the objects in question. In other words, the critical examination of an object from the point of view of history, in the sense of an *invention* as described here, means the construction of their genealogy. Of course, we are still in 1874, so we cannot make any claim to a coherent genealogical method such as in 1887, but it seems that the seeds of Nietzsche's genealogy are already present in this early text.

Critical history, like antiquarian history, also reveals that we are a continuum of previous generations, "we are also the results of their aberrations, passions and errors, even crimes".[150] The revelation of our historicity and integration in a genealogical chain has, however, in this case, a different function from the second kind of history. Rather than aiming to defuse the randomness of our appearance in the world, it *reveals* the *relations and dynamics that constitute us and the traumas they bear*. And not necessarily through a literal recognition of what has actually been, but in a more heuristic way, forming an interpretation of what existed, whether it actually existed or

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[147] HL, p. 21.
[148] HL, p. 22.
[149] HL, p. 22.
[150] HL, p. 22.

not. Nietzsche addresses our inclusion in the collective as if he was talking about intergenerational trauma. Again, what is of interest is not an impersonal description and documentation of events but rather the incorporation of agents within these events and the mastery of their impact since "it is not possible to free oneself from this chain".[151] Or, as mentioned earlier, there is a moment in which an agent "comes to understand the phrase 'it was', that password with which struggle, suffering and boredom approach man to remind him what his existence basically is — a never to be completed imperfect tense". The connection with genealogy, and in particular with a genealogy within a rhetorical realm as we will see shortly, which does not aim at the actual description of the circumstances under which moral values emerged but instead at the construction of a new interpretation capable of being liberating from the previous, even harmful, interpretations, is also supported by the term 'critical history'. As we read:

> It is an attempt, as it were, *a posteriori* to give oneself a past from which one would *like* to be descended in opposition to the past from which one is descended.[152]

Hence, history erodes in this respect the temporality: past and present become one, precisely through the "plastic power"[153] of the agents, for healing old wounds for the sake of life. Exactly in the contrary direction, that is in the direction against life, Nietzsche locates this "strange star" that intervened between life and history, that is "science [*Wissenschaft*], the demand that history be a science".[154] In that sense, history destroys the "health of a people [*Gesundheit eines Volkes*]".[155] Nietzsche postulates the restoration of that health, which will be achieved by recovering people's "instincts" and thereby their "integrity", which has been split into internal and external, "of the contradiction of content and form".[156]

The value of history "is just this, to describe with insight a known, perhaps common theme, an everyday melody, to elevate it, raise to a comprehensive symbol and so let a whole world of depth of meaning, power and beauty be guessed in it".[157] Requirement for which are "a great artistic capacity, and creative overview, a loving

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[151] HL, p. 22.
[152] HL, p. 22. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[153] HL, p. 23.
[154] HL, p. 23.
[155] HL, p. 25.
[156] HL, p. 25.
[157] HL, p. 36.

immersion in the empirical data, a poetic elaboration of given types".[158] The value of history is directed towards the future, and, therefore towards creation and life.[159] Nietzsche addresses his readers:

> "Draw about yourselves the fence of a great and embracing hope, a hopeful striving." [160]

In that sense, Nietzsche is in favour of those who do not "carry their generation to the grave but" aim at founding "a new generation — that drives them forward incessantly: and even if they are born as latecomers — there is a way of living which will erase this from memory — the coming generations will only know them as firstcomers".[161] And, to do that, they must detach themselves from the historical instructions and the historical justice which "always undermines the living and brings it to ruin: its judging is always annihilating".[162] In that sense,

> [i]t almost seems as though the task were to guard history so that nothing could come of it but stories, but by no means history-making events! —to prevent its making personalities "free", that is, sincere toward themselves, sincere towards others, and that in word and deed. Only through this sincerity will the distress, the inner misery of modern man reach the light of day and the timidly hidden convention and masquerade can then be replaced by art and religion as true helpers, together to plant a culture which is adequate to true needs and not, like contemporary general education, only teach to lie to oneself about these needs and thus to become a walking lie.[163]

To conclude this chapter, history is rejected as an objective enterprise which has as its aim the actual description of events as took place in time. Nietzsche advocates it as a *creative enterprise* that will search in the agents' past and recreate whatever needs recreation. In other words, everything past is subjected to interpretation, an interpretation which has healing value. Of course, the psychological nuances of Nietzsche's elaborations on history are evident in terms of (i) the personal engagement of the agents, as history is regarded and has value as *their* history, (ii) the activation of

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[158] HL, p. 36.
[159] HL, p. 38.
[160] HL, p. 38.
[161] HL, p. 49.
[162] HL, p. 38.
[163] HL, p. 29.

their instinctual/affective life and (iii) the purpose of history, which is a healing process of past wounds and traumas. All these three elements will open the space for the creation of something new.

2.3. Genealogy of the personal pre-history. The psychological reading

A more cautious approach than treating Nietzsche's genealogy as history in the sense of objectively describing the actual events that lead to the creation of moral values, would claim that equating genealogy with history is risky as there are "some notable differences between genealogy and other forms of history".[164] Most notable would be the selectivity of Nietzsche's genealogy. As Janaway rightly notes, "Nietzsche's genealogy[…] is extremely selective", as Nietzsche's main concern is to investigate "[h]ow did we come to feel and think in these ways of ours", while the genealogical investigation Nietzsche suggests is performed "in the first-person singular".[165] Along the same lines, Gemes claims that genealogy leads us to question who we are.[166]

There are two ways of understanding genealogy's psychological reading. On the one hand, it is plausible to claim Nietzsche aims to highlight the psychological account in an impersonal and universal sense, related to a diagnosis regarding subjectivity's emergence. Towards this direction, Richardson claims Nietzsche constructs types of people as analogous to "types of directed behavior", which are "basic different ways the complex practices making up a person's life can be organised and enacted".[167] We can understand these impersonal and universal psychological observations as related to the general processes by which psychological structures emerge. Such a reading finds evidence already in the second *Untimely Meditation*. Nietzsche clearly situates history on the level of the individual, perceiving it as the

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[164] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 10. To this direction see also, Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 303: "the first major difference between genealogy and more traditional historiography is the rather specific range of objects genealogy singles out for criticism".
[165] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 11.
[166] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves", op. cit., p. 2.
[167] Richardson, J. (1996). *Nietzsche's System*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 52.

personal history of the agents.[168] Similarly, concerning moral beliefs, we read in GS 345,

> [w]hy is it then that I have never yet encountered anybody not even in books, who approached morality in this personal way and who knew morality as a problem, and this problem as his own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion? […] I see nobody who ventured a *critique* [*Kritik*] of moral valuations [*Werthurtheile*]; I miss even the slightest attempts of scientific curiosity, of the refined, experimental imagination of psychologists and historians that readily anticipates a problem and catches it in flight without quite knowing what it has caught. I have scarcely detected a few meager preliminary efforts to explore the *history of the origins* of these feelings and valuations [*einer Entstehungsgeschichte dieser Gefühle und Werthschätzungen zu bringen*] (which is something quite different from a critique and again different from a history of ethical systems) [*die Geschichte der ethischen Systeme*]. In one particular case, I have done everything to encourage a sympathy and talent for this kind of history — in vain, as it seems to me today.[169]

Nietzsche here distinguishes between the history of moral feelings [sentiments] and valuations from the "history of moral systems". By claiming he tried to encourage a performance of "this kind of history", he means the former, the psychological one, not the history of moral systems. In that sense, Nietzsche refers to history as a personal history of the emergence of moral valuations and feelings and not the history of morality as a system.[170]

This emergence of moral valuations and feelings is related to the constitutive role drives and affects have for the human agency in the Nietzschean corpus. A central position of Nietzsche is that the human psyche is composed of multiple drives whose relation defines agency. This idea becomes explicit for example in GM I 13. We read that "there is no 'being' behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 'the doer'

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[168] HL, p. 3.
[169] GS 345.
[170] Berry recognises that Nietzsche's interest is this discovery. As she mentions, Nietzsche's interest lies "in moral psychology and the question of the origin of moral sentiments and values (scientific interests, on Nietzsche's view)". Berry, J. N. (2011). *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 78.

is invented as an afterthought, — the doing is everything".[171] Or, as we read in D 109, "[w]hile 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive *which is complaining about another*; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the *vehemence* of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a *struggle* is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides".[172] The struggle of the drives is an unconscious process, following D 120: "I have no idea how I am *acting*! I have no idea how I *ought to act*!"— you are right but be sure of this: *you will be acted upon*! at every moment! Mankind has in all ages confused the active and the passive".[173] More broadly, the totality of conscious thinking is controlled by the conflict of the drives, while intellect "is only the blind instrument of *another drive*".[174] This reading fits Nietzsche's general self-references as a "psychologist"[175] and observations on the way the psyche of the agents comes into being.[176] Along with his comments on the instinctual life constituting the agents,[177] we can also include here the observations on unconscious desire and its fulfilment through the dream[178] (an observation Freud extends into theory in his work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*), and on the origin of conscience from the internalisation of the instinct of aggression[179] (corresponding to the creation of the Superego in Freud). In the same context, considering GM II 22, Nietzsche addresses guilt as a psychological underlying event and ultimately reconstructs the conditions under which the moral concept of guilt was born, modified, and evolved as a psychological structure.

Despite Nietzsche's lack of interest in establishing a science, some of his observations fit contemporary psychological or psychoanalytical theory and clinical

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[171] GM I 13.

[172] D 109.

[173] D 120.

[174] D 109.

[175] For example, we read in EH that *Genealogy*'s Treatises are in fact "decisive preliminary studies by a psychologist for a revaluation of values". See also BGE 196; GM III 20; TI "Preface" 35.

[176] Maybe one of the most characteristic examples regarding the diagnosis of the genesis of the agent's psychological structures is GM II 16, where we read: "All instincts which are not discharged outwardly *turn inwards* — this is what I call the *internalisation* of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 'soul'. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was *obstructed*".

[177] See, for example, GM II 16, II 17.

[178] D 119: "the meaning and value of our *dreams* is precisely to *compensate* to some extent for the absence of 'nourishment' during the day."

[179] GM II 16.

practices. There is, thus, an albeit subtle, systematic reflection of human nature in an impersonal and general sense. It might be difficult and maybe wrong to accept that Nietzsche composes a philosophy of mind or a psychology in strict terms. However, we cannot help but acknowledge his strong interest in the psychological structures of the agents and their relation to moral valuations, and the fact that there are germs of the science of psychology in his thought.[180]

On the other hand, a psychological reading of the genealogical constitution of moral values could address the very personal way in which these values are understood, embodied, and perpetuated by the agents in particular cases. As Janaway notes, "[t]he individual is the target for the kind of historical scrutiny Nietzsche describes".[181] In other words, Nietzsche is not only interested in offering the psychological structures as "projected or imagined generic psychology, not properly localized to times, places, or individuals".[182] Analogously, he does not just rely on describing general and abstract psychological structures, as I suggested above. Nietzsche, further, often invites his readers to *actively reflect on and reconstruct* how their beliefs and judgements concerning moral values, which are inextricably linked to the constitution of the psyche, arose. He invites us actively, on a personal level, to think about our very own psychological constitution. The question is *how exactly does this invitation take place*? This movement is related to the rhetorical reading I discuss in Part II, and to the role of artistic discourse for the activation of critique, discussed in Part III of the thesis.

The task of self-knowledge is repeated by Nietzsche in the form of the diagnosis of its absence. Characteristically, in the opening aphorisms of *Genealogy*'s Preface, we encounter the thought that:

> We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers [*Wir sind uns unbekannt, wir Erkennenden, wir selbst uns selbst*]:[183] and with good reason. We have never looked for ourselves, — so how are we ever supposed to *find* ourselves?[184]

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[180] To this direction, see, for example, Leiter, B. (2019). *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[181] Janaway*, Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 11.
[182] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit.
[183] The word "Erkennenden" might also be translated as "inquirers", denoting more of a process rather than a steady state.
[184] GM P 1.

Along the same lines, the aphorism 335 from the *Gay Science* begins with the question: "How many people know how to observe something? Of the few who do, how many observe themselves?". This idea of the necessity of self-observation is the dominant element of the aphorism. Nietzsche claims that this absence becomes loud through the "manner in which everybody talks about the essence of moral actions", which is the manner he criticises and describes as follows:

> when a human being judges *'this is right'* and then infers *'therefore it must be done'*: and then proceeds to *do* what he has thus recognized as right and designated as necessary, then the essence of his action is *moral*.[185]

In this absurd and unprocessed way, agents, in general, are disposed towards their moral judgements. The most explicit example, which I think Nietzsche provides here, concerns conscience [*Gewissen*], which orders moral judgements, which, in turn, the agent in each case follows. Addressing his readers, Nietzsche writes:

> Your judgment "this is right" has a pre-history [*Vorgeschichte*] in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences. "How did it originate there?" you must ask, and then also: "What is that impels me to listen to it? […] that you take this or that judgment [*Urtheil*] for the voice of conscience [*als Sprache des Gewissens*] — in other words, that you *feel* [*empfindest*][186] something to be right, — may be due to the fact that you have never thought much about yourself and simply have accepted blindly that what you had been told ever since your childhood was right.[187]

So, what matters here, and is inextricably linked to the problem of "who we are", is "the understanding of the manner in which moral judgements have originated", which in its turn will "spoil" the agents' granted and wrong understanding concerning these terms.

This psychological-type genealogical search for the self is also formulated as a demand in the opening lines of the *Genealogy*. The ignorance of the self (the diagnosis

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[185] GS 335.
[186] To feel is to take something as right.
[187] GS 335.

of this state is repeated throughout the Nietzschean corpus)[188] is inextricably linked to the assertion that we never examine our experiences [*Erlebnisses*], which in turn is linked to our moral prejudices [*unserer moralischen Vorurtheile*],[189] as emerges from the textual sequence of the *Preface*. Thus, the origin of our moral prejudices, *our* own moral prejudices, is, according to Nietzsche, the problematisation of this polemic, which finds its seeds already in Nietzsche's early works.

Already at least from the early *Daybreak*, the demand for self-knowledge, the diagnosis of its absence and its connection with the formation of moral beliefs, judgements and values are evident. In D 18, Nietzsche discusses the enjoyment of cruelty and its evolution into the realm of morality. He concludes the aphorism: "Do you think all this has altered and that mankind must therefore must have changed its character? Observers of mankind, learn better to observe yourselves!".[190] As he claims, "we *misunderstand* ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread ourselves [*verkennen uns*]".[191] What would we have discovered if we would have investigated ourselves? That our judgements are inherited,[192] that we are doing nothing about our ego but keep chasing the "phantom of our ego",[193] that the battle of the drives is the forming formula of ourselves.[194] Finally, we would have discovered that our emotions can be traced back to judgements of our ancestors — which in turn can be traced back to judgements of their own emotions, which in turn can be traced back to judgements of their ancestors in a cyclical way. We read, in D 34:

> *Feelings and their origination in judgments.* – "Trust your feelings!" – But feelings are nothing final or original; behind feelings there stand judgments and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions). The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a judgment —and often of a false judgment!— and in any event not a child of your own! To trust one's

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[188] For example, GS 110

[189] GM P 2. See also, for example, GS P1, P2, 319, 333, 335, 343, 344, 345; GM III 24: "Does he know the Minotaur of this cave from *experience*? [*kennt er den Minotauros dieser Höhle aus Erfahrung*]. . . I doubt it, indeed, I know otherwise"; Z I 7: "Now I am light, now I fly, now I am seeing myself beneath myself, now a god is dancing through me."

[190] D 18.

[191] D 115.

[192] D 104.

[193] D 105.

[194] D 109.

feelings —means to give more obedience to one's grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents than to the gods which are in *us:* our reason and our experience.[195]

Therefore, our lack of self-knowledge, the fact that we misread ourselves (and here, as in D 115 mentioned above, the choice of the German *verkennen*, in opposition to the German term *erkennen*, is thought-provoking), refers to a more general inability to understand ourselves, which includes the inability to recognise how our moral beliefs, judgements and values are produced. In Nietzsche's words, "that which from the earliest times to the present moment, men have found so hard to understand is their ignorance of themselves!".[196]

Nietzsche, in various parts of his works, affirmatively expresses this task. For example, in the famous passage from *Gay Science*, he invites his reading audience to "become who they are", namely "human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves".[197] Analogously, *Ecce Homo*'s subtitle is *Wie man wird, was man ist*, meaning "How one becomes what one is". There is an exhortation, we might say of substance, that recurs intermittently within the Nietzschean corpus,[198] that of exploring ourselves and becoming ourselves — and we cannot avoid, at this moment, recognising that the idea of self-realisation seems to be a normative element of Nietzsche's philosophy, namely a *παραίνεσις*[199] to self-creation, which might be related to health and life.

Considering the above, these two psychological perspectives, — the description of generic psychological structures and the invitation to think on ourselves and relate our psychological constitution with the emergence of moral valuations — are by no means mutually exclusive but constitute an organic unity to which Nietzsche refers. Therefore, "[t]he history provided by Nietzschean genealogy is to a large extent psychological",[200] and relates the emergence of the subjectivity in psychological terms with morality. In that sense, Saar rightly notes Nietzsche's genealogical narratives "all

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[195] D 34.
[196] D 116.
[197] GS 335.
[198] See for example, GM P 1; GS 335.
[199] Advice or exhortation.
[200] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy,* op. cit., p. 11.

relate […] to the historical self or the subject".[201] It "hinges on the explication of moral subject formation" and in that sense "[t]o write its history is, therefore, to write (part of) the history of subjectivity".[202] History is presented as the pre-history of the emergence of psychological structures and the related values and presents the personal construction and analysis of moral beliefs or judgements through a psychological scope.[203] It offers a new narrative regarding the way by which moral beliefs, judgements, and values and the related psychological structures of the agents that create these beliefs, judgements, and values emerge. It also actively invites the readership to reflect upon moral values as a personal matter, as an almost psychological category. In that sense, in GS 345, Nietzsche diagnoses the importance of treating morality in a "personal way", and know morality "as a problem", as one's "own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion [*Noth, Qual, Wollust, Leidenschaft]*".[204] He invites us to examine morality as an almost *psychological category*, "as result, as symptom, as mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as misunderstanding"[205] and indeed as *our* own personal experience. To further illustrate the psychological aspect of the Nietzschean genealogy, I will now turn to the presentation of two genealogical narratives Nietzsche constructs and presents: guilt and conscience.

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[201] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 298.
[202] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 301.
[203] Ressentiment is one example of that.
[204] GS 345.
[205] GM P 6.

Chapter 3: Two cases of genealogy: guilt and (intellectual) conscience

> *And heaved and heaved, still unrestingly heaved the black sea,*
> *as if its vast tides were a conscience;*
> *and the great mundane soul were in anguish and remorse*
> *for the long sin and suffering it had bred.*
> — Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*

> *The earth, this weary earth, ye bring us*
> *To guilt ye let us heedless go,*
> *Then leave repentance fierce to wring us:*
> *A moment's guilt, an age of woe!*
> — Goethe

In this chapter, I present two cases whose genealogy Nietzsche draws up: guilt and conscience, focusing on one kind of conscience, intellectual conscience. Concerning guilt, his analysis follows a dual path. Its genealogy is constituted on the levels of individuals and society. Guilt has a negative connotation. It is a disease, a tool in the hands of the ascetic priest[206] for the enslavement of people, something which, if overcome, will have healing effects on the individuals.[207]

The narrative he provides is part of the polemical dimension of his works, it opposes a specific opinion: *that guilt exists immanently, and we feel guilty because of the original sin*. On the other hand, he continuously urges his readers to recognise, somehow, they ground their feeling of guilt on an erroneous foundation. Another moral

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[206] The figure of the ascetic priest appears in the Third Treatise of Nietzsche's work, *On the Genealogy of Morality*. It is preceded, in the First Treatise, by Nietzsche's discussion of the ordinary priests. According to the Nietzschean narrative, priests were merely members of the class of "masters" and enjoyed certain privileges. Gradually, they became associated with asceticism and realised they could exploit it to exercise their dominion over the people. The ascetic priest is the principal representative of this tactic, that is, the transformation of the existential suffering of people into an instrument of their enslavement. See GM III 11: "It must be a necessity of the first rank which makes this species continually grow and prosper when it is *hostile to life, – life itself must have an interest* in preserving such a self-contradictory type. For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled *ressentiment* rules, that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will that want to be master, not over something in life, but over life itself".

[207] Guilt is perceived as something negative that is directed against life. See for example aphorisms D 114, 563; GM II 19, III 28.

value he examines is that of conscience. Against the view conscience is "the voice of God in us", Nietzsche reconstructs the context in which conscience emerges, tracing back to an intriguing point: a very bodily, very human circumstance: the internalisation of the instincts. Then, he provides a developmental account of conscience, which I explore in detail.

As for the structure of this part, in Chapter 3.1., I discuss Nietzsche's genealogy of guilt, and in Chapter 3.2., the narrative concerning the genealogical account of conscience.

3. 1. Nietzsche's understanding of guilt

Throughout Nietzsche's works, his preoccupation and interest in guilt are evident. His occupation with guilt as part of the polemical disposition that distinguishes his work fights a specific position: namely, guilt in the context of Christianity, and particularly our belief that we are guilty because of Christianity's narrative of human nature's reduction to the original sin. Nietzsche constructs a counter interpretation, according to which, guilt arises from the legal notion of debt — in its primary form is simply equivalent to the concept of debt as understood within contractual relations — and is moralised by being intertwined with Christianity and pushed back into conscience. The ascetic priest uses the moralised form of guilt to exercise his dominion over people. Finally, due to a general, immanent need for agents to justify, guilt is, at the same time, founded on a psychological level. I will explore these ideas step by step.

3.1.1. The genesis of guilt

In his *Genealogy*, Nietzsche claims that the moral concept of guilt emerges from the legal concept of debt. In aphorism II 4, we read that "the main moral concept [*Hauptbegriff*] '*Schuld*' ('guilt') descends from the very material concept of '*Schulden*' ('debts')".[208] What does this mean? Nietzsche is making here an etymological comment

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[208] GM II 4.

on which he initially bases the relationship between the two terms.[209] Taking the etymological relationship of the terms as a springboard, Nietzsche conducts a genealogical review of guilt. To clarify this thought, he uses an example, that of the relationship between creditor and debtor. Supposing there is a debtor, D, who wants the object X and a creditor, C, who owns and gives the X to D, in exchange for an agreed Y. D acquires the X from C and is obliged, due to the agreement, to hand Y in return. In case D cannot fulfil his debt to C, i.e., to hand Y, he will have to provide something else, as compensation for C, "something that he still 'possesses' and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life".[210]

Nietzsche gives special attention to the idea that the creditor can use violence against the debtor as compensation,[211] pointing out that it is strange enough that "the equivalence is provided by the fact that instead of an advantage directly making up for the wrong (so, instead of compensation in money, land or possessions of any kind), a sort of *pleasure* is given to the creditor as repayment and compensation, — the pleasure of having the right to exercise power over the powerless without a thought".[212] In this regard, Nietzsche makes the provocative claim that humans sadistically enjoy making other humans suffer. However, in the end, that is not strange at all. Nietzsche claims that for the human species "*to make* someone suffer is pleasure in its highest form".[213] This idea evolves in GM II 16, in which Nietzsche claims that all humans have an innate

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[209] The German language reveals the etymological relationship between the two terms. This relationship is also evident in the Greek language, where guilt and debt can be expressed by the same word, which is "ενοχή".

[210] GM II 5. The full passage is:

> The debtor, in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honoured, in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise, and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience, pawns something to the creditor by means of the contract in case he does not pay, something that he still 'possesses' and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life (or, in certain religious circumstances, even his after-life, the salvation of his soul, finally, even his peace in the grave: as in Egypt, where the corpse of a debtor found no peace from the creditor even in the grave – and this peace meant a lot precisely to the Egyptians).

[211] As he suggests in GM II 4:

> every injury has its *equivalent* which can be paid in compensation, if only through the *pain* of the person who injures. And where did this primeval, deeply-rooted and perhaps now ineradicable idea gain its power, this idea of an equivalence between injury and pain? I have already let it out: in the contractual relationship between *creditor* and *debtor*, which is as old as the very conception of a 'legal subject' and itself refers back to the basic forms of buying, selling, bartering, trade and traffic.

Nietzsche claims that through the historical formation of the debtor-creditor relationship and the corresponding "punishment" imposed in case of non-fulfilment of the promise, the memory of the punishment took shape.

[212] GM II 5.

[213] GM II 6.

instinct to impose cruelty on others, and punishment is a lawful channel through which this instinct discharges.[214] In this legal relationship the notions of guilt and pain were first combined — the latter arises as a punishment from the case of non-fulfilment of the promise.[215]

Later, although without specifying exactly when, in the stages of civilization, the community firstly and then the ancestors take successively the role of the creditor.[216] As he writes:

> Within the original tribal association — we are talking about primeval times — the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation towards the earlier generation, and in particular towards the earliest, which founded the tribe (and this was not just a sentimental tie: this latter could, with good reason, be denied altogether for the longest period of the human race). There is a prevailing conviction that the tribe *exists* only because of the sacrifices and deeds of the forefathers, — and that these have to be *paid back* with sacrifices and deeds: people recognize an *indebtedness* [*Schuld*], which continually increases because these ancestors continue to exist as mighty spirits, giving the tribe new advantages and lending it some of their power.[217]

Nietzsche places the development of the idea of debt in the belief that individuals exist only because of the sacrifices and actions of their ancestors. As Assoun notes, "we recognize a debt that only grows because our ancestors (who survive as powerful spirits) never cease to interest themselves in the tribe and accord it, through their force, new advantages, and new advances".[218] Therefore, according to Nietzsche, in prehistoric times, each generation reproduced a debt towards the previous generation, and more specifically to the founders of the tribe. This sense of indebtedness swelled as the tribe became more powerful. At some point, however undefined, this feeling was

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[214] GM II 16.
[215] GM II 6: "it was here that the uncanny and perhaps inextricable link-up between the ideas of 'debt and suffering' was first crocheted together".
[216] GM II 9.
[217] GM II 19.
[218] Assoun, P.L. (2002). *Freud and Nietzsche*. Collier, Jr., R.L. (trans.), London/ New York: Continuum, p. 149.

attributed to the gods, or, more accurately, the members of the tribe ascribed the debt they felt to gods who were equal to the primitive ancestors.[219]

There is an escalating change in who occupies the position of the creditor. Starting from the fundamental legal relationship between debtor and creditor, as a relationship between two individuals, according to Nietzsche, the community,[220] the ancestors[221] and finally the Gods[222] are placed in the position of the creditor. So, that is why Nietzsche states that "[i]n *this* sphere of legal obligations, then, the moral conceptual world of 'guilt'[223], 'conscience', 'duty', 'sacred duty', has its breeding ground [*In dieser Sphäre, im Obligationen-Rechte also, hat die moralische Begriffswelt „Schuld", „Gewissen", „Pflicht", „Heiligkeit der Pflicht" ihren Entstehungsheerd*]".[224]

Nietzsche makes it clear that he has not yet talked about the moralisation of guilt. In GM II 21, we read that:

> I have so far intentionally set aside the actual moralization [*die eigentliche Moralisirung*] of these concepts (the way they are pushed back into conscience; more precisely, the way *bad* conscience is woven together with the concept of God), and at the conclusion of the last section I actually spoke as though this moralization did not exist, consequently, as though these concepts would necessarily come to an end once the basic premise no longer applied, the credence we lend our 'creditor', God.[225]

Guilt is moralised through its association with internalised cruelty (bad conscience in its beginnings).[226] It is necessary to briefly explore the ideas of internalisation of instincts and bad conscience [*schlechtes Gewissen*], even though I will analyse them in detail below. In summary, Nietzsche starts from the premise that inherently agents have an instinct to cruelty, a tendency towards destruction, aggression, tension. That includes

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[219] GM II 19.
[220] GM II 9.
[221] GM II 19.
[222] GM II 19.
[223] *Italics* represent that I modified the translation. Diethe translates the word "Schuld" as "debt". However, I believe that the word "guilt" is not only more appropriate regarding the textual evidence but also considering Nietzsche's analysis of the word in GM II 4.
[224] GM II 6.
[225] GM II 21.
[226] GM II 16.

the pleasure of inflicting suffering on others, which we cannot avoid recognising as a surprising claim. Within civilization, this instinct is restricted for the sake of the reproduction of society. Exactly as the sea animals were obliged to adapt to the ground conditions and carry by themselves their weight, instead of being "carried by the water", human beings were forced to carry the weight of their repressed instinctual needs.[227] In other words, the latter, in their primordial condition, were free to express their aggressive instincts, but by the entrance to the civilization, they become obliged to repress them.[228]

However, the enjoyment of war, tension, destruction and the "will to torment",[229] the pleasure of inflicting pain on another, is a standard and imperishable characteristic of humans, according to the Nietzschean narrative, which is thus placed in direct opposition to Western philosophy that wants the intellect to prevail over materiality, to the affirmation of "another world",[230] the metaphysical world of ideas, or the hypothesis of the divine origins of human conscience. I return to this topic in the next chapter. Regarding the internalised cruelty, the discharge of this instinctual energy is inevitable, and thus instead of inflicting the cruelty on an external object, humans internalised and projected their cruelty onto themselves. This internalisation of cruelty is the foremost origin of what Nietzsche calls "bad conscience" [*schlechtes Gewissen*].[231] As the entrance into society was an unavoidable event, it follows that every individual will possess a bad conscience, due to the necessary repression of the expression of his/her instincts.[232]

Returning to the subject matter of the current chapter, according to GM II 21, the "actual moralization of these concepts" is achieved by their pushing "back into conscience".[233] Why, however, are bad conscience and guilt united? In other words,

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[227] GM II 16.

[228] GM II 16.

[229] GM II 21.

[230] GS 151.

[231] GM II 16. See also GM III 20. Nietzsche remarks the higher the levels of civilization, the more humans internalise their inherent aggressiveness. This argument resonates with a distinction he makes in *Daybreak*, where he discusses the difference between the "ascetic" and the "barbarian". He claims that the former enjoys enduring the suffering while the latter "inflicts on the other" the pain. D 113.

[232] Ridley, A. (1996). "Nietzsche's Conscience." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 11, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, pp. 1-12, p. 10.

[233] GM II 21. For the moralised form of guilt as internalisation and indebtedness towards Gods, see Risse's analytic account in Risse, M. (2001). "The Second Treatise in *On the Genealogy of Morality*: Nietzsche on the Origin of the Bad Conscience." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 9, p. 62.

why does bad conscience as an internalisation of aggression coalesce with guilt as a debt to deified ancestors and ultimately to gods? Nietzsche explains this process by utilising two elements: 1. agent's inherent tendency to justify, and 2. the role of the ascetic priest.

3. 1.2. *Ursachentrieb*,[234] meaning and the ascetic priest

As seen above, one of Nietzsche's core positions is that agents suffer within the civilization because — at least — of the "internalisation" of their instincts. The stimulus induced in the organism creates a tension that makes the agent suffer. What is noteworthy in this regard is the question that Nietzsche poses and answers: what makes suffering intolerable? Not the pain per se, but the meaninglessness of pain. The inability to explain it, or, in other words, to attribute meaning to it, becomes intolerable for the human beings. We read in GM II 7:

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[234] When encountering the term "drive" [*Trieb*], one usually thinks of Freud who notoriously claimed that this concept is "the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research". See, Freud, S. (1964). *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. S.E., Vol. 18, London: The Hogarth Press, p. 34. However, this concept was a topic for research for other philosophers, such as Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Nietzsche, himself saying that through his writings a "*psychologist* without equal speaks" (EH 5), couldn't be missing from this set. His self-references as a "psychologist" are various: BGE 23, 45, 222, 269; EH 5, Destiny 6; GS P 2; TI Ancients 3; GM 3, 19, 20. He probably uses the term "drive" in a broader sense than Freud, involving activities that otherwise pertain to reason, such as philosophy. (BGE 9)

It is worth making some remarks regarding Nietzsche's drive psychology. Nietzsche's interest in drives is strong, and more importantly, the role that drives play in the constitution of subjectivity. A central position of the Nietzschean philosophy is that the human psyche is composed of multiple drives whose relation defines the agent. This idea becomes explicit in GM I 13, in which we read that "there is no 'being' behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 'the doer' is invented as an afterthought, — the doing is everything". In other words, drives constitute the agent. However, the latter does not know or is not fully conscious of these "powers", but for the most part, remains unaware of these unconscious procedures, acquiring a more passive role towards them. As Nietzsche states in D 120: "I have no idea how I am *acting*! I have no idea how I *ought to act*!"— you are right but be sure of this: *you will be acted upon*! At every moment! Mankind has in all ages confused the active and the passive" (D 120). More broadly, the totality of conscious thinking is controlled by the conflict of the drives, by "*a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another*" (GS 333).

Drives, therefore, are dispositions agents have, to a large extent unconscious, which influence how they feel, think and act. Various Nietzschean commentators had dealt with this topic. According to Janaway, a drive is "a relatively enduring disposition to behave in certain ways, which is not within the full rational or conscious control of the agent". See Janaway, Ch. (2012). "Morality, Drives and Human Greatness." In Robertson, S. & Janaway, Ch. (eds.) *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 187. Katsafanas, along the same lines, argues that drives are dispositions manifesting themselves by creating evaluative orientations. The agent, furthermore, is not aware of this procedure. Katsafanas, P. (2013). "Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology." In Richardson J. and Gemes, K. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 727–55, p. 748.

What actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself, but the senselessness of suffering: but neither for the Christian, who saw in suffering a whole, hidden machinery of salvation, nor for naive man in ancient times, who saw all suffering in relation to spectators or to instigators of suffering, was there any such *senseless* suffering. In order to rid the world of concealed, undiscovered, unseen suffering and deny it in all honesty, people were then practically obliged to invent gods and intermediate beings at every level in short, something that also roamed round in obscurity, which could see in the dark and which would not miss out on an interesting spectacle of pain so easily.[235]

We observe from this that humans have a general tendency to justify everything that happens to them and the world. Nietzsche even gives the example of the "naive man in ancient times" [*den naiven Menschen älterer Zeiten*], who also wants to interpret things. We can imagine, for example, people in times when science has not developed enough to explain natural phenomena attributing earthquakes or floods to the wrath of the gods.[236] In *the Twilight of The Idols*, Nietzsche claims that humans have an "causal instinct" [*Ursachentrieb*]. That means "we want there to be *a reason why* we are in the particular state we are in, — why we are feeling good or bad. […] The memory that unconsciously becomes active in such cases in what leads back to earlier states of the same type and the associated causal interpretations, — *not* their causality".[237] This *Ursachentrieb*, the instinct to assign causes to things is based on people's innate fear of the unknown.[238] To this context, guilt is introduced here in response to the lack of cause or meaning of pain, which "was the curse that has so far blanketed mankind".[239]

Why, however, introduce guilt as the remedy to the meaninglessness of pain? While up until now, the Nietzschean analysis concerns the level of the individual, at this point, the genealogy at the "socio-historical" level is crucial. As I claimed before, while a strict historical reading of the genealogy is not plausible, some historical documentation exists in the Nietzschean works. That is probably a plausible example of the coexistence of actual and fictional elements in Nietzsche's narratives since although Christianity is indeed a historical event, the ascetic priest, as described by

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[235] GM II 7. In the same direction, see also GM III 15, III 20 and III 28.
[236] TI "The Four Great Errors" 4.
[237] TI "The Four Great Errors" 5.
[238] TI "The Four Great Errors" 5.
[239] GM III 28.

Nietzsche, is not a real person but the reconstruction of a type in which the power relations that constitute and shape Christianity are personified. In this sense, it is unlikely that Nietzsche views himself as documenting an actual historical fact when he claims guilt exists as a juridical category or as an instinct of justification, which is then appropriated and transformed into sin by the ascetic priest. Nietzsche introduces Christianity and, specifically, its representative, the ascetic priest to the discussion of the moralisation of guilt. Following his narrative, in the *Genealogy*, we read:

> The main contrivance which the ascetic priest allowed himself to use in order to make the human soul resound with every kind of heart rending and ecstatic music was — as everyone knows — his utilization of the *feeling of guilt* […] Only in the hands of the priest, this real artist in feelings of guilt did it take shape — and what a shape! 'Sin' — for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal 'bad conscience' (cruelty turned back on itself).[240]

The Christian priest's assumption of guilt has the effect of bringing the feeling of guilt to its climax, sin, a "painful feeling of 'guilt before God"[241] that tortures the agent. The ascetic priest, by exploiting the agent's instinct to explain and interpret grounded guilt as the cornerstone of human's suffering. Nietzsche states in GM III 15 that every agent says: "I suffer: someone or other must be guilty" and the ascetic priest responds,

> 'Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, *you yourself alone are to blame for yourself*'.[242]

In other words, "suffering was interpreted".[243] Humans attributed the pain they felt to guilt; guilt is the cause of their suffering, they themselves are the cause of their suffering. Eventually, this method resulted in "new suffering with it, deeper, more

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[240] GM III 20.

[241] GM II 22. Among Nietzschean commentators, Janaway and Risse notice the role of Christianity in the moralisation of guilt and the foundation of the feeling of guilt. See Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., pp.138-154; Risse, M. (2001). "The Second Treatise in On the Genealogy of Morality: Nietzsche on the Origin of the Bad Conscience." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 9 (1), pp. 55-81. However, they differ in their analysis in that, according to Janaway, bad conscience proper includes the internalised aggressiveness and the guilty content serving as meaning, while Risse concludes that bad conscience proper equals internalisation plus the feeling of indebtedness towards Gods.

[242] GM III 15.

[243] GM III 28.

internal, more poisonous suffering, suffering that gnawed away more intensely at life", which is nothing more than putting any pain under the perspective of guilt.[244] This feeling of guilt in its most intense expression, which is guilt in the light of the gaze of the Christian God, according to Nietzsche, is something that is directed against life. It tortures and poisons humans who are eventually led to close themselves in the labyrinth of "obsessions", that is, the belief that they are guilty by definition.

3.2. Conscience's genealogy

What does your conscience say?

—"You shall become the person you are."

— GS 270

Maybe you become a little better

if you just let yourself be what you are.

— I. Bergman, *Persona*

Nietzsche's genealogical narrative of conscience presents complexities, for several reasons. Firstly, "conscience" [*Gewissen*] in the Nietzschean corpus acquires many forms and meanings. It includes different types and transformations — bad conscience, good conscience, intellectual conscience, the conscience of the sovereign individual.[245] Secondly, Nietzsche aims to deconstruct the classic dichotomy of conscious rationality and unconscious drives. One move towards this direction is the idea that the capacity of reason is a product. It is not primary in human beings because it must be explained by something more fundamental, that is the battle of the drives.[246] Thus, one must

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[244] GM III 28.

[245] For more on the types of conscience, see, for example, Ridley, "Nietzsche's Conscience", op. cit.· Alfano, M. (2019). *Nietzsche's Moral Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cox, Ch. (1991). *Nietzsche Naturalism and Interpretation*. Berkley· Los Angeles· Oxford: University of California Press.

[246] As seen above, Nietzsche often undermines the conscious activity of the human mind. What lies at the core of every human action is an unconscious activity, the activity of drives.

examine conscience as a particular counter-type of conscience as understood in the specific socio-historical context Nietzsche lives and writes.

What happens in the context in which Nietzsche lives and writes? It is the middle of the 19th century, an era defined by instability expressed both in politics and in the discipline of Philosophy. Concerning the scope of morality, the sovereign element, according to Nietzsche, is the decadent Christianity,[247] and the "event" of the "death of God".[248] Furthermore, it is significant that we are in the 19th century, since during the 18th and 19th centuries, several religious thinkers such as Butler and philosophical thinkers such as Smith proclaimed a hopeful view of an accessible and socially benevolent conscience. At the opposite end of this tendency is Nietzsche, and, beyond him, both Freud and Dostoevsky do not simply accept that conscience is an authoritative voice of God or an enlightened social consensus but that it is a much more complex issue, which can even be a burden for agents.

Nietzsche explores it throughout almost the totality of his theoretical corpus, however, in *Genealogy*, his account of conscience reaches its full development, where a thorough analysis of the conditions under which it originated, developed and changed is held, thus its genealogy is constructed.

3.2.1. Conscience's origins

In the aphorism 335 of the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche poses the question of conscience's origins. He states that we shall not unconditionally accept the existence of a faculty that commands us what is right and wrong, what is moral and immoral, but we must question its origins, we shall ask, "*How* did it originate there?".[249] A relatively coherent response to this question comes in 1887, with the publication of the *Genealogy*. It is evident through the text but also noticed by many Nietzschean scholars, that there are — at least — two sources that count as conscience's origins: the internalisation of cruel or aggressive instincts and the creditor-debtor relationship. In this chapter, I proceed to an

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[247] GS 357; GM III 27.
[248] See for example, GS 343.
[249] GS 335.

analysis of these two sources of conscience, explain their "contradictory" relationship and aim to provide a solution to this tension.

3.2.1.1. Internalisation of aggressiveness

In *Genealogy*'s second Treatise, which is entitled "'Guilt', 'bad conscience' and related matters", Nietzsche explicitly describes bad conscience's origins and content. He states:

> I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of all changes which he experienced, — that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace. It must have been no different for these semi-animals, happily adapted to the wilderness, war, the wandering life and adventure than it was for the sea animals when they were forced to either become land animals or perish — at one go, all instincts were devalued and 'suspended' […]. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing, and destroying — all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: *that* is the origin of 'bad conscience'.[250]

And he continues in the aphorism GM II 17, by saying that:

> This *instinct of freedom*, forcibly made latent — we have already seen how — this instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and finally able to discharge and unleash itself only against itself: that, and that alone, is *bad conscience* in its beginnings.[251]

It is evident from both passages that bad conscience is closely related to two "facts"; the entrance into society and the concomitant repression of the innate instinct of freedom, which includes an inclination to cruelty.[252] The entrance into society wasn't a voluntary and gradual alteration, but "a breach, a leap, a compulsion, an inescapable fate".[253] Exactly as the sea animals were obliged to adapt into the ground conditions and carry by themselves their weight, instead of "being carried by the water", human

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[250] GM II 16.
[251] GM II 17.
[252] The instinct of freedom, if not being equated with, at least includes the instinct of cruelty.
[253] GM II 17.

beings were forced to carry the weight of their repressed instinctual needs.[254] In other words, the latter, in their primordial condition, were free to express their aggressive instincts, but by the entrance to the society, they were obliged to repress them. As the entrance into society was an unavoidable event, it follows that every individual will possess a bad conscience, due to the necessary repression of the expression of their instincts.[255] The enjoyment of war, tension, destruction, and the "will to torment",[256] the pleasure of inflicting pain to another, is a standard — according to Nietzsche — and imperishable characteristic of humans. The discharge of this instinctual energy is inevitable, and thus instead of inflicting cruelty on an external object, humans internalised and projected their cruelty onto themselves. This internalisation of cruelty is the foremost origin of bad conscience.[257] It is a bold claim, namely that at our core, there is an instinct of aggression and, even worse, the pleasure of inflicting pain on others. Nietzsche initiates the genealogy of conscience, which has a predominantly positive value, by reducing it to a characteristic which has negative value: the infliction of pain on others and the enjoyment of this practice. He reveals the disguised core of conscience as having predominantly moral value since it determines what is considered morally good and bad. As readers of the Nietzschean *Genealogy*, we realise that Nietzsche is talking about us, and, therefore, we can only wonder if this is the case and, if it is, how well we conceal it.

Bad conscience, then, according to the Nietzschean approach, is generated through the internalisation of aggressiveness and, in its simplest form, is defined as the instinct of cruelty or destruction turned inwards.[258] As mentioned above, an essential aspect of conscience that is emphasised is the naturalism[259] that permeates it.

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[254] GM II 16.
[255] Ridley, "Nietzsche's Conscience", op. cit., p. 5
[256] GM II 22.
[257] GM II 16. See also GM III 20; D 113.
[258] GM II 16. Adding to this, Nietzsche's exegesis for the birth of conscience possibly constitutes an echo of Paul Rée's view. For the latter, conscience is the result of the inability of the agent to express herself externally, leading her to direct her aggressive instincts inward.
[259] An insightful comment on Nietzsche's naturalism is the one articulated by Berry. She writes: "As Charles Taylor once described it, 'naturalism' is 'not just the view that man can be seen as a part of nature — in one sense or other this would surely be accepted by everyone — but that the nature of which he is a part is to be understood according to the canons which emerged in the seventeenth-century revolution in natural science" (Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 75). This discussion is linked to the well-discussed Nietzschean position of "translating humanity back into nature" (BGE 230; GS 109). Another useful position is that "as Brian Leiter has pointed out, there is little or no textual evidence to suggest that Nietzsche is at all sympathetic to the kind of substantive naturalism embraced by physicalists and other contemporary 'substantive' naturalists" (Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 89). And, in that sense, naturalism denotes that "human beings

Conscience does not have a divine or rational root. Instead, it stems from something wholly bodily; human/animal instincts that are internalised. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche provides a synopsis of GM II, as follows:

> The *second* essay gives the psychology of the *conscience*: conscience is *not*, as is believed, "the voice of God in man" — it is the instinct of cruelty turned inwards after it cannot discharge itself outwards anymore. Cruelty is first brought to light here as one of the oldest and most persistent underpinnings of culture.[260]

Interestingly, Nietzsche does not refer here to the instinct of cruelty as the origin *merely* of bad conscience, but of conscience in general. As we shall see, this is due to the developmental character of conscience, in Nietzsche's narrative.

Although explicitly articulating that bad conscience's roots are to be found in the internalisation of aggressiveness, Nietzsche, in aphorism II 4 of the *Genealogy,* at first sight, seems to hold the view that bad conscience's origins trace back to the history of the legal contract between the debtor and the creditor. This debtor-creditor relationship is, thus, related to what Nietzsche calls the "mnemotechiques of punishment",[261] and consequently with the emergence of conscience. Through the memory of punishment, which was created after all the cases when the debtor was incapable of fulfilling the contract, human beings learned to obey some "I will nots",[262] in front of the memory of the fear of punishment.

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are not of any higher order than the rest of the natural world" (Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 94). This interpretation finds evidence, for example, in the second *Untimely Meditation*. There, Nietzsche is being sarcastic regarding human arrogance and their supposed superiority over the animal kingdom. Nietzsche states:

> High and proud he stands on the pyramid of the world process; by placing the keystone of his knowledge on top he seems to be calling to nature listening round about: "we are the goal, we are the goal, we are the completion of nature".
> Overproud European of the nineteenth century, you are mad! Your knowledge does not complete nature but only kills your own. (HL, p. 50).

Along the same lines, in one of the passages where he discusses history, he makes no distinction between humans and animals. On the contrary, history is perceived as the "history of animals and men". HL, p. 56.

[260] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

[261] GM II 3.

[262] In this sense, Reginster argues that conscience, as analysed in the *Genealogy,* is "a particular kind of memory". See Reginster, B. (2017). "What Is the Structure of Genealogy of Morality II?" *Inquiry,* 61 (1), pp. 1–20, p. 4.

3.2.1.2. Internalisation of aggressiveness or contractual relationship?

It is evident from the above, that Nietzsche takes, on the one hand, as conscience's origins the internalisation of aggressiveness, but, on the other hand, he lays conscience's foundations to the creditor-debtor relationship. Is this a contradiction? And if yes, how can this contradiction be resolved? I shall argue that both the raw "contractual" reading,[263] according to which conscience is constructed from the debtor-creditor relationship and readings that consider merely the internalisation of aggressiveness for conscience's creation are both inadequate. Regarding the contractual reading, there is a definite flaw with it; it *presupposes* conscience's origins as something already explained. If one looks closely at GM II 5, one will notice Nietzsche claiming that the debtor guarantees something to the creditor, in case he does not pay what was agreed, "in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience".[264] Taking this at its face value, conscience is already presupposed as existent, even before the debtor-creditor relation. Along the same lines, Snelson rejects the creditor-debtor relationship as conscience's place of origin, as the debtor must be already capable of giving promises — and accordingly of understanding what a promise is — even before his entrance to the legal relationship.[265] On the other hand, attributing the origin of conscience exclusively to the internalisation of aggressiveness overlooks the role of the creditor-debtor relationship in this genealogy.

A way of dealing with this "problem" is not to consider it a problem, taking into account both the element of the multiplicity of descent that permeates the Nietzschean genealogy, according to the above analysis, and the polemical character of the Nietzschean positions. As demonstrated above, the Nietzschean genealogy does not trace back to a single root from which the object under consideration arises. This polemic against genealogies that refer back to a single source highlights the plurality of power dynamics that each time constitute the object under consideration. Moreover, the *ambivalence* created by the multiplicity of the origin of conscience can be interpreted as a conscious choice by Nietzsche precisely to provoke an affective response, a feeling

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[263] Reginster, "What Is the Structure of Genealogy of Morality II", op. cit., p. 4. See also, Reginster, B. (2011). "The Genealogy of Guilt." In May, S. (ed.), *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–77, p. 59.

[264] GM II 5.

[265] Snelson, A. (2019). "Nietzsche on the Origin of Conscience and Obligation." *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 50 (2), Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, pp. 310-331, p. 312.

of uncanniness in his readership — as he admits in his summary of the *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo* —[266] a theme that we will examine in detail in Part II. Furthermore, the tension is mitigated if it can be shown that the different 'sources' of the object under consideration, in this case, conscience, can be integrated into an organic unity. The understanding of conscience as an evolutionary process advocates this organic unity. The position that conscience is an evolutionary process, as we will see in detail, in addition to its attachment to corporeality and the corresponding rejection of its divine origin has a second function: the underlining of the historicity of moral values, judgements, and beliefs. Not only is conscience secularised, but its constitution within "history" is also highlighted. I consider this second way more intriguing and compatible with the Nietzschean philosophy since it avoids the confusion arising from textual references that suggest that the root of conscience belongs to the juridical relationship between the creditor and the debtor and to the internalisation of aggressiveness.[267]

3.2.2. Conscience's development from bad conscience

In GM II 3, Nietzsche affirms that conscience is a concept with a "long history and metamorphosis behind it".[268] This is evident with a closer look at the whole corpus of the *Genealogy*. What Nietzsche calls the conscience of the "*sovereign individual*",[269] is presented as the apogee of conscience's development. It is the "*will's memory*",[270] which is in no case identified with a bad conscience, but on the contrary, contrasted with it.[271] While the conscience of the sovereign individual is characterised by Nietzsche as a conscience of "a highest, almost disconcerting, form",[272] bad conscience is a necessary illness,[273] which nonetheless will lead to the emergence of something other/new. From the textual interpretation of the first four aphorisms of *Genealogy*'s second Treatise, it seems as if the latter is a presupposition for the former's emergence. The "ripe", but also "late" fruit that the conscience of the sovereign individual is has gone through a process of alteration, a process which "began with a thorough and

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[266] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[267] For example, GM II 6.
[268] GM II 3.
[269] GM II 2.
[270] GM II 2.
[271] GM II 4.
[272] GM II 3.
[273] GM II 19.

prolonged bloodletting, like the beginning of all great things on earth".[274] The emergence of a moral value from its opposite is consistent with the genealogical analysis presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. By explicitly turning against the naïve position that the things we now value as having value have always had that value, Nietzsche argues — in an *exaggerated* way, as "all great things on earth" begin with a "bloodletting"— that ultimately what has value comes from its opposite, from a very dark root.

In the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche refers also to another kind of conscience that he calls "intellectual conscience". The term "intellectual conscience" appears at face value only once in the *Genealogy,* in aphorism III 24. There, it is attributed to the "free, *very free spirits*", the "last idealists of knowledge", but no mention of the content or function of intellectual conscience is made explicitly throughout the whole book. Having said this, I will now examine bad conscience's development and its relation to conscience and to intellectual conscience.

3.2.2.1. Bad conscience's development

According to the Nietzschean analysis, bad conscience involves internal stages of evolution, as at some point it reaches its "most terrible and sublime peak".[275] Firstly, bad conscience is equated with the internalisation of aggressiveness, and to this a "meaning" is added, which is the guilty content/the debt. In other words, firstly the internalisation of aggressiveness takes place, which results in the creation of bad conscience. This "internalized raw aggressiveness" is conceptualised, it takes meaning, through the addition of the parameter of guilt, and only then we reach the complete form of bad conscience.

Reginster argues that "moral guilt emerges from the combination of indebtedness with bad conscience", and he continues by saying that we cannot explain the feeling of guilt if we take bad conscience "as nothing more than self-directed raw aggression".[276] However, bad conscience is in no case "nothing more […] than raw aggression". Only *in its beginnings* it is merely raw aggression. Janaway notes that

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[274] GM II 6. Along the same lines, see BGE 2.
[275] GM II 19.
[276] Reginster, "On the Structure of the Genealogy of Morality II", op. cit., p. 12.

cruelty is internalised, but gains *meaning* only as a legitimate debt. The internalised cruelty "takes the form of a putative redress for transgression or payment of what is owed".[277] He claims that the possessor of a bad conscience at its maximum level, "tortures himself with the painful feeling of 'guilt before God'".[278] According to him, it is then evident, that while internalisation of aggressiveness is a "preliminary and necessary element of bad conscience",[279] in other words constitutes its very first origins, "it is not bad conscience as such",[280] namely bad conscience in its complete form. If we turn our attention to *Genealogy,* it is indeed understood that bad conscience *in its beginnings* is merely "the instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and finally able to discharge and unleash itself only against itself".[281] In the same direction, Katsafanas holds the view, that guilt is a conceptualising tool for of bad conscience, an interpretation of the pain we experience because of the internalised aggressiveness towards ourselves.[282] These readings are in line with the Nietzschean claim, that what causes distress is not suffering or pain per se, but the meaninglessness of suffering.[283] By ascribing the already internalised aggressiveness or cruelty to a legitimate "cause", the agents give meaning to the suffering, which comes to the surface as the sense of guilt[284] that the agents experience exactly because they firstly directed the cruelty against themselves. This interpretative approach is plausible and closer not only to the textual evidence but also to basic Nietzschean motifs — such as the developmental character of values.

Particularly, the process of the metamorphosis of one kind of conscience to another is not alien to Nietzschean thought. For example, Nietzsche, in *Human, All Too Human*, states:

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[277] Janaway, Ch. (2007). "Guilt, bad conscience and self-punishment in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*." In *Nietzsche and Morality,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 138-154, p. 146.
[278] Janaway, "Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment", op. cit., p. 143.
[279] Janaway, "Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment", op. cit., p. 144.
[280] Janaway, "Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment", op.cit.
[281] GM II 17.
[282] Katsafanas, P. (2005). "Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization." *European Journal of Philosophy,* 13 (1), pp. 1-31, p. 21.
[283] GM III 28.
[284] Janaway, "Guilt, bad conscience and self-punishment", op. cit., p. 144. On the contrary, Ridley argues that bad conscience "precedes the moralization of the concepts of guilt and duty". See, Ridley, "Nietzsche's Conscience", op. cit., p. 6. I argue that indeed bad conscience precedes the moralisation of guilt but only *in its beginnings*, namely in the form of internalised aggressiveness.

The good conscience has the evil conscience as its preliminary stage — not as its opposite: for everything good has at one time been new, hence unfamiliar, contrary to custom, immoral, and has gnawed at the heart of its happy discoverer like a worm.[285]

That means that he holds the view that an evil conscience constitutes the presupposition for the emergence of a good conscience, exactly as bad conscience is perceived as the "true womb of ideal and imaginative events".[286] Thus, bad conscience is in no case internalised "raw aggression" in general, but only *in its beginnings*, and takes its complete form as bad conscience only with its combination with the element of guilt, as presented in detail in Chapter 3.1.2.

According to Nietzsche, the latest form of the bad conscience is the Christian conscience. Bad conscience reaches its highest form and expression in Christianity or under the influence of the ascetic ideal. As Nietzsche puts it:

Only in the hands of the priest, this real artist in feelings of guilt, did it take shape — and what a shape! 'Sin' — for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal 'bad conscience' (cruelty turned back on itself).[287]

Thus, bad conscience being reinterpreted reaches another form: that of the Christian conscience. While, as we have seen, guilt merges with the bad conscience as the justifying basis of suffering, it is eventually reinterpreted and turned into sin, thus leading both it and the bad conscience to their apogee. The idea of reinterpretation and the importance of reinterpretation for the evolution of objects, in this case, conscience, is supported within *Genealogy*. We read in GM II 12,

that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of *overpowering*, *dominating*, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which

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[285] HAH, 90. In his earlier writings, like the aforementioned, of course, bad conscience hasn't taken the form and the completeness of content that will be given in *Genealogy*.
[286] GM II 18.
[287] GM III 20.

their former 'meaning' [*Sinn*] and 'purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.[288]

Only on a second level then, bad conscience takes its complete form, by the agents' interpretation of their experience of internal suffering as guilt, and, on a third level, — under the guise of Christianity — its highest expression, sin. Between guilt and sin, there is a matter of qualitative difference: sin is original, a permanent state of guilt under the sight of God.

However, bad conscience's evolution is not only an internal evolution of the same kind. Nietzsche, in the *Gay Science* writes,

> You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, the father confessor's refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience [*wissenschaftlichen Gewissen*], into intellectual cleanliness [*intellektuellen Sauberkeit*] at any price.[289]

Thus, bad conscience in its highest expression — that is Christian conscience — is transmutable into something else, specifically into something which is called "scientific conscience". Alfano points to the transition from bad conscience to this "scientific conscience", or "intellectual cleanliness" — which is an equivalent expression for intellectual conscience, as we will see later — happens due to a sublimation of cruelty, which "is transmuted to the epistemic domain".[290] Along the same lines, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche explicitly claims that another signifier denoting intellectual conscience, that of honesty [*Redlichkeit*], "is sublimated cruelty".[291] According to Nietzsche's position here, Christian conscience ultimately undermines its foundations since driven by its will for truth, it eventually turns against itself. The idea of the sublimation of the Christian element in the scientific domain recurs at the end of

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[288] GM II 12.

[289] GS 357.

[290] Alfano, *Nietzsche's Moral Psychology,* op. cit., p. 257. This discussion is relevant to Katsafanas' interpretation that bad conscience would not be of the same intensity if an individual's aggressive instincts were directed towards an external activity that permits their discharge, such as the competitions of the Ancient Greeks.

[291] BGE 230. See, also Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 218.

the *Genealogy*.[292] As we will discuss in detail in Part III of this thesis, according to the last aphorisms of *Genealogy*, scientific discourse, with the will for truth pervading it, takes its "fire" from the truth that the Christian God has kindled, since it replaces God with truth. It is, therefore, plausible to claim that the intellectual conscience, which, as we shall see, is the power of agents to make judgements on the grounds of the pros and cons regarding validity of an object, also "take its fire", in other words, should arise from the Christian conscience, substituting in turn God for Truth.

A "split" is observed in the genealogy of conscience. On the one hand, intellectual conscience is created, following the path of transition from "Christian conscience" to "scientific conscience", which is synonymous with the intellectual. On the other hand, it seems that "bad conscience" is simultaneously the original version of conscience in general. This is based on the summary of genealogy in *Ecce Homo*, in which Nietzsche explicitly mentions that conscience has its roots in the internalisation of aggression (that is, "bad conscience *in its beginnings*").[293] Although it is tempting to consider intellectual conscience and conscience in general as different manifestations of the same term (with conscience being the final form), GS 335 prevents us from doing so, since there intellectual conscience appears as a conscience "behind our conscience", which not everyone possesses. [294]The two terms, therefore, are differentiated. I suggest we can read this very ambiguity that Nietzschean genealogy itself creates not as some naïvety on Nietzsche's part but instead as an implicit construction with a specific function within Nietzschean genealogy, the activation of our affective world and the subsequent stimulation in us of a certain mistrust towards the Nietzschean narrative itself.

3.3. The case of intellectual conscience

To begin with, in this chapter, I focus on Nietzsche's intellectual conscience. I firstly refer to all the passages in which the term "intellectual conscience" appears in the Nietzschean writings. This transcription is a prerequisite for further analysis. Then, I

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[292] GM III 24, 27.
[293] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[294] GS 335.

draw some conclusions and use secondary literature to further elucidate the function of intellectual conscience.

3.3.1. Textual references

Intellectual conscience *[intellectuales Gewissen]* is a Nietzschean term that emerges from his early works. Starting with *Human, All Too Human*, intellectual conscience makes its first appearance in the aphorism I 109. In Nietzsche's words, "for, given the current state of knowledge [*Stande der Erkenntniss*], one can no longer have any association with it without incurably dirtying one's intellectual conscience and prostituting it before oneself and others".[295] From here emerges the incompatibility of intellectual conscience with the current (to the 19ᵗʰ century) *state* of knowledge. (I) In HAH II 26, Nietzsche refers to intellectual conscience, as the phenomenon [*Phänomen*] that censures the thoughts and actions of its agents.[296] (II)

In *Daybreak*, intellectual conscience makes its appearance in aphorisms 149 and 298. In aphorism 149, Nietzsche states that intellectual conscience is "lulled to sleep" when someone acts without thinking, following "mighty, anciently established and irrationally recognised custom".[297] One of the examples Nietzsche brings here is that of an atheist, who, though he does not believe in God, baptises his child, or marries his wife in a church not because he is the one who desires this ceremony, but because he follows the desire and the request of her relatives, without thinking. So, one might observe the same as in (I) above, namely the incompatibility of intellectual conscience with common knowledge and practice. In D 298, intellectual conscience is represented as the "one who knows" the fictive character of the idealisation of a person [*es giebt Einen, der darum weiss, wie das zugegangen ist, sein intellectuelles Gewissen*]. Nietzsche claims humans tend to idealise others· they construct an imaginary version of them, perceiving the imaginary other as the real one. The same happens with the

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[295] HAH I 109.
[296] HAH II 26. This aphorism ends with "[t]hus here too something moral of the highest sort has blossomed out of a black root". What could this mean? As mentioned above, conscience has a history of long metamorphoses behind it; at the first level, it takes the form of bad conscience. Thus, it is plausible this "something moral of the highest sort" refers to intellectual conscience and the "black root" of which the former "has blossomed" is bad conscience. In other words, this suggests that intellectual conscience is a higher form that emerges from something "lower" and "worse", which, according to the letter of the *Genealogy,* seems to be the "bad conscience" [*schlechtes Gewissen*].
[297] D 149.

objects. Intellectual conscience is "the one" [*Einen*] that "knows" the fictive character of this construction, therefore can discern the truth about an object. There is a deepening concerning (II). Intellectual conscience does not rest in censuring the thoughts and actions of its agent. It also proceeds to a thorough examination of their validity. (III)

Gay Science is Nietzsche's work in which the most complete account of intellectual conscience [*das intellectuale Gewissen*] is given. In GS 2 Nietzsche claims that most people lack an intellectual conscience. As he states, "*the great majority of people* does not consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly without first having given themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con, and without even troubling themselves about such reasons afterwards".[298] Intellectual conscience is a conscience behind one's conscience,[299] identified with a kind of rationality, a "*desire of certainty*" [*das Verlangen nach Gewissheit*] of believing something only after having become aware of the reasons for believing it or not (IV).[300] A culmination of Nietzschean thinking concerning (II) and (III) is evident here. The sequence, as far as the function of intellectual conscience is concerned, is as follows: censure of thoughts → disclosure of the nature of the conceptual constructs placed in the agent's mind → call, on the part of intellectual conscience, for a thorough examination on the part of the agent of the nature and origin of the objects. It is worth noting that intellectual conscience is linked to the process of open inquiry. Although it stems from or is identified with the desire for certainty [*das Verlangen nach Gewissheit*], certainty itself is constrained or bounded by mistrust and its counterparts. It is helpful to briefly explore the relationship between certainty and open inquiry, as both elements relate to intellectual conscience and, at first glance, seem contradictory. How can intellectual conscience prompt certain conclusions on the one hand, and, on the other, lead agents to continue "troubling themselves about" their reasons for their certainty after it reaches the conclusions? I suggest that a plausible interpretation is that the *inherent* characteristic of intellectual is its drive to lead to certainties. However, precisely because "convictions are prisons", these certainties *must* be accompanied by the qualities of mistrust and its counterparts, which compel intellectual conscience to

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[298] GS 2. In GS 335, intellectual conscience appears to be the power that questions the validity of our moral judgements and values, with a focus on our inner selves.
[299] GS 335.
[300] In this direction, Jenkins identifies intellectual conscience with the will to knowledge. See, Jenkins, S. (2012). "Nietzsche's Questions Concerning the Will to Truth." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 50 (2), The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 265-289.

question the certainties it attains. That explains its association, as we shall see in more detail below, with a sceptical tendency towards objects — for instance, it leads the philosopher to "hesitate" and "slow down" while they are on the path to knowledge — [301] while at the same urging for the acquisition of some certainties.

Returning to *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche claims two drives actualise spirit: the drive to knowledge and the drive to ignorance. These two tendencies of the spirit are in a constant fight. The former leads the agent to "gain control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic text of *homo natura* so far", while the latter functions as "a defensive state against many knowable things".[302] As Nietzsche puts it, the "will to appearances, to simplification, to masks, to cloaks, in short, to surfaces […] meets *resistance* from the sublime tendency of the knower, who treats and *wants* to treat things in a profound, multiple, thorough manner".[303] This function of the sublime tendency of the knower is what Nietzsche calls "a type of cruelty on the part of the intellectual conscience and taste" [*als eine Art Grausamkeit des intellektuellen Gewissens und Geschmacks*]. Thus, it becomes clear that intellectual conscience is responsible for resisting the innate tendency to ignorance, appearances, and simplification, a tendency which Nietzsche characterises "cruel" (V). Here, the function of intellectual conscience agrees with the above-mentioned (IV).

In *Genealogy*, intellectual conscience as a term appears only once, in GM III 24. Nietzsche claims that it "dwells and is embodied" to the "last idealists of knowledge". However, he argues that although they possess intellectual conscience, they remain captured by the ascetic ideal, "*because they still believe in truth*".[304] Therefore, Nietzsche indicates that intellectual conscience is related to the ascetic ideal. Such an observation aligns with the genealogy of intellectual conscience, which is inherited from Christianity. The capacity for rational evaluation of our judgements, beliefs, and values faces a particular challenge: its attachment to the unconditional value of truth. Indeed, as Nietzsche acknowledges, at least up to the point of his writing,

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[301] BGE 205.
[302] BGE 230.
[303] BGE 230.
[304] This position is related to the Nietzschean conception of cognitive procedure and knowledge as its outcome. This idea is developed in Part III of the thesis. Regarding Nietzsche's critique of the unconditional see also BGE 31, 198; A 9. See also, Gemes analysis on Gemes, K. (1992). "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* LII (1), p. 54-57.

intellectual conscience is driven by the value of truth and operates in its name. However, according to GM III 25, this binding to the unconditional value of truth — the principle that one must not deceive even oneself — becomes an obstacle not only to the critique of the value of truth[305] and, as I will elaborate in Part III, to the critique of the value of values in general. Therefore, while intellectual conscience is a necessary element for the envisioned critique because of its rational function regarding belief formation, it is not a sufficient condition.

Finally, intellectual conscience appears in aphorism 12 of Nietzsche's work, *The Antichrist*. The lack of intellectual conscience is characterised as a "form of corruption". Interestingly, this corruption consists of taking "beautiful feelings" for "arguments".[306] Thus, again, intellectual conscience is related to the rationality and the ability to form a belief, not following what is already posited as truth or value, but according to one's own rational thinking. (VI) That reflect the ideas of (I) and (V) above.

To sum up, intellectual conscience is presented as a phenomenon in the inner world of agents, as a reduplicated conscience which stands "behind our conscience" and is incompatible with simply believing in what is accepted as knowledge of truth regarding beliefs, judgements and values. This phenomenon, having rational nuances, functions as an investigator with respect to the agent. That is, it exercises the function of censure, but — as we proceed chronologically in Nietzsche's thought — also of examining the validity of established and dominant moral judgements and beliefs.

3.3.2. Intellectual Conscience and the relationship to other terms

As noted by secondary literature,[307] intellectual conscience is not always present in its nominative form but corresponds to other signifiers such as "honesty" [*Redlichkeit*] and "intellectual integrity" [*Rechtschaffenheit*]. Concerning "honesty",[308] one of the central aphorisms which proves the equation of the two terms is GS 335. As seen above,

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[305] GM III 25.
[306] A 12.
[307] See the detailed account given by Cox in Cox, C., *Nietzsche Naturalism and Interpretation*, op. cit., p. 20-21. Berry links intellectual conscience to honesty and scepticism. See, Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 105.
[308] For this discussion see Alfano, *Nietzsche's Moral Psychology,* op.cit., p. 259. See also Page, J. (2019). "Nietzsche on Honesty." *The Monist*, 102, pp. 349–368, p. 353.

intellectual conscience is an examining power of the validity of our moral beliefs, judgements, and values. In the same context, honesty is presented as the power allowing us to become "physicists" and then "creators" of ourselves and thus leads to the Nietzschean demand of becoming those that we are[309] — a task which according to GS 270 is ascribed to conscience.[310] Cox argues that Nietzsche uses interchangeably the terms "European conscience", "intellectual conscience" [*Gewissen*], "intellectual integrity", and "honesty" [*Redlichkeit*]. He suggests that one might add to this list even Nietzsche's notion of "Justice" [*Gerechtigkeit*]. Jenkins, in this direction, identifies intellectual conscience with honesty, suggesting that the content of the term "requires us to collect evidence *prior* to believing this or that (*GS* 2), thus serves to limit the influence of untruth on our belief structure".[311] Indeed, intellectual conscience and honesty in terms of function are the same. In GS 319, Nietzsche writes:

> One sort of honesty [*Redlichkeit*] has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind: — they have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. "What have I actually experienced? What happened in me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceits [*Betrügereien*] of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?". None of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear religious people ask them even now. On the contrary, they thirst after things that *go against reason*, and they do not wish to make it too hard for themselves to satisfy it. So they experience "miracles" and "rebirths" and hear the voices of little angels! But we, we others who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences [*Erlebnissen*] as severely as a scientific experiment, hour after hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs.[312]

While, in *The Antichrist,* Nietzsche argues that:

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[309] GS 335. One may notice the relationship between honesty's quality to push agents to become who they are, and conscience's quality, presented in GS 270, which impels the agents to become who they are. The relationship between honesty and *Gewissen* adds to the argument made above concerning conscience as a developmental process.

[310] GS 270.

[311] Jenkins identifies intellectual conscience with "honesty", and with "integrity in matters of the spirit". See, Jenkins, "Nietzsche's Questions Concerning the Will to Truth", op. cit., p. 268.

[312] GS 319.

What does it mean then to be *honest* [*rechtschaffen*] in spiritual matters? That you are strict with your heart, that you look down on "beautiful feelings," that you make your conscience from every yes and no![313]

Another term identified with intellectual conscience is intellectual integrity. This term is also related to a constant "doubt", "mistrust", and "skepticism" regarding convictions, faiths, and beliefs, especially that one holds dearest.[314] The identification becomes explicit in the aphorism 12 of the *Antichrist*, where Nietzsche states the following:

I will make an exception for a couple of the sceptics, the decent types in the history of philosophy; but the rest of them have no conception of the basic demands of intellectual integrity [*intellektuellen Rechtschaffenheit*]. […] they think that "beautiful feelings" constitute an argument […]. In the end Kant even tried, with "German" innocence, to take this form of corruption, this lack of intellectual conscience, and render it scientific under the concept of "practical reason".[315]

Are the above identifications valid? It seems that at the level of substance, indeed, different terms are utilised by Nietzsche to denote the same content: a *critical examination* of well-founded and unexamined moral beliefs and judgements and our "experiences and lack of experiences"[316] led to these judgements. Correspondingly, these terms are consistently implicated as those that convey to their possessors the capacity to distinguish "beautiful feelings" from arguments and examine their experiences that led to specific beliefs, judgements, and values.

A question here is why Nietzsche chooses to use so many different terms, even if they are connotative, instead of just one. This ambiguity in terms, all referring to a kind of rationality — believing something only after becoming aware of the reasons for believing it or not — highlights his departure from a strict historical method, which would describe objects in an accurate and precise manner. The multiplicity of terms

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[313] A 50.
[314] See BGE 34, 39; GM I 1, III 24; A 12–13, 54.
[315] A 12.
[316] GS 319.

may serve to create a particular style intended to awaken affects in readers through the condition of the *uncanny* produced by the play of signifiers.

3.3.3. Comments on Intellectual Conscience

Until now, it is explicit that intellectual conscience permits the agents to examine their experiences and, through that, inquire into the way their moral beliefs, judgements and values emerged and resist any deception. Agents who possess an intellectual conscience tend to believe something and live accordingly, only after "having first given themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con" for believing it and "even troubling themselves about such reasons afterwards".[317] Intellectual conscience is thus presented as a kind of rationality, of believing something only after having become aware of the reasons for believing it or not.

Page, following Reginster[318] and Alfano[319], notes that intellectual conscience is the power that enables us to acquire a critical position concerning our "evaluative orientation" and *potentially to revise or create our values*.[320] This is following Jenkins' point of view that intellectual conscience is "an element governing belief formation and retention".[321] This reading suggests that intellectual conscience enables us to reflect upon our convictions and beliefs and guides us to believe something only when there is evidence for it. Therefore, intellectual conscience is a power that *uncovers the veil of deceit*, which resembles, according to Jenkins, the quality of "scepticism" that is attributed to the character of Zarathustra, with the aim of "freeing himself from the influence of mere conviction".[322] Indeed, intellectual conscience takes part in the questioning of what has been unconditionally accepted as truth by the agents.[323] In that sense, it has a reflective and evaluating role concerning one's assumptions and values on what one "ought" or "ought not" to do,[324] and thus leads to one's emancipation from

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[317] GS 2.

[318] Reginster, B. (2011). "The Genealogy of Guilt." In May S. (ed.), *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–77.

[319] Alfano, *Nietzsche's Moral Psychology*, op. cit.

[320] Page, "Nietzsche on Honesty", op. cit., pp. 349–368, p. 353.

[321] Jenkins, "Nietzsche's Questions Concerning the Will to Truth", op. cit., p. 267.

[322] Jenkins, "Nietzsche's Questions Concerning the Will to Truth", op. cit., p. 268.

[323] GS 319.

[324] This evaluating role of intellectual conscience has been highlighted by Nietzsche's commentators to be the same as the quality of "honesty", mentioned in the aphorism 230 of *Beyond Good and Evil*.

their "self-deception".[325] It is what enables an agent to question the origins of these judgements and ask: "*How* did it originate there?" and "What is it that impels me to listen to it?"[326] As Jenkins notes, intellectual conscience urges the individual to make a judgement of what is true or false, right or wrong, "in accordance with evidence and argument".[327]

Admittedly, the above positions of the secondary literature are right to emphasise the function of intellectual conscience as that conscience which allows the uncovering of *every* veil of deceit, and the construction and deconstruction of beliefs and judgements based on evidence and thus has a critical connotation towards objects; however, in *Genealogy*, intellectual conscience, is presented as the expression of the idealists of knowledge and consequently bound by the ascetic ideal. I claim this is a crucial moment not discussed by secondary literature as Nietzsche presents a limit on intellectual conscience, in that it functions in the scientific-philosophical realm, thus presupposing the value of truth.

As I discuss in detail in Chapter 9 of the thesis, the unwavering commitment to the absolute value of truth — the tenet that one must not deceive, not even oneself — becomes an impediment not only to the examination of the value of truth but also to the critique of values at large. It is plausible to posit that, to critique our values and question their value, it is often necessary to obscure the "truths" concerning these values to render them more accessible and open to critique. That requires allowing ourselves a degree of self-deception. However, intellectual conscience, which is inextricably bound to the unconditional value of truth, mandates that deception is impermissible, even towards oneself. Consequently, while intellectual conscience is an *indispensable* element for critique due to its capacity for rational and evaluative discernment, it remains insufficient on its own as it precludes the very possibility of deception.

Also, as I argue in detail in Part III of the thesis, intellectual conscience appears functioning supplementarily with *Misstrauen*. We thus return to the paradox of how it is possible, on the one hand, for intellectual conscience to be driven by the desire for

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[325] Page, "Nietzsche on Honesty", op. cit., p. 354.
[326] GS 335.
[327] Jenkins, "Nietzsche's Questions Concerning Will to Truth", op. cit., p. 267.

certainty and to reach a conclusion only after having considered the most *certain* reasons for it, and at the same time to associate itself with an open-ended inquiry. We can argue that a solution to this paradox occurs if the function of intellectual conscience — as the rational processing for holding a belief, judgement, or value — is considered *in conjunction* with a multitude of signifiers that usually accompany it, such as "mistrust", "scepticism", and "suspicion".[328] We can read these signifiers not necessarily as its inherent qualities but rather as external elements that *must* accompany it. In other words, we can interpret this conjunction to mean that the certainties to which intellectual conscience leads, through the process of reasoning, *must* always be under the supervision of mistrust and its counterparts, according to Nietzsche.[329] In that sense, I argue that the conjunction between these two qualities, the thorough examination of the validity of a belief, judgement, or value which leads to a "certainty" (as thematised in intellectual conscience and its peers) and the open-ended mistrustful attitude towards every certainty, even the ones that emerge from intellectual conscience's function (as thematised in mistrust and its peers) not only solves the tension between certainties and open-ended inquiry but also encapsulates the Nietzschean notion of critique, a position in which I return in detail in Part III of the thesis.

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[328] See HH 631, 633, 635; GS 2, 4, 113, 293, 319, 344, 346, 357; BGE 25, 34, 39, 209–10, 212, 230; GM III 24; A 12–13, 47, 50, 54; WP 452.
[329] GS 344.

PART II

Towards a rhetorical reading of Nietzsche's genealogy

What I want is more; I am no seeker.

I want to create for myself a sun of my own.

— GS 320

The folly of mistaking a paradox for a discovery, a metaphor for a proof,

a torrent of verbiage for a spring of capital truths,

and oneself for an oracle, is inborn in us.

— Paul Valéry, *Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci*

I argued that a strict historical reading of genealogy as presented above faces some serious challenges. Instead, a *rhetorical* reading of genealogy would be more plausible. Under this light, genealogy rather than aiming at a *literal* description of the *actual* historical events that led to the genesis and development of the moral values and corresponding beliefs and judgements of the agents, offers new interpretations — which include actual and fictional elements and various rhetorical tropes — of the circumstances under which moral values emerged to arouse the affective world of Nietzsche's readers. This reading, tracing to Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, would be more plausible as it would be more compatible with the fundamental Nietzschean position that knowledge, beliefs, judgements and affects are interrelated, it would explain why Nietzsche exploits numerous historical ambiguities in his genealogy and would be consistent with the letter of *Ecce Homo* regarding Nietzsche's emphasis on expression, intention, the art of surprise about his genealogy. In this context, the metaphors and contradictions that Nietzsche utilises in his genealogical

narratives do not read as random moments but as conscious choices with a specific effect on the reading audience.

In this Part, I start by discussing three preliminary issues, relevant and necessary for this reading: Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, the use of metaphors and contradictions as examples of Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy and the affects-knowledge relationship. I then explore the rhetorical reading of genealogy which aims, at first, at the readers' affective stimulation. To support this reading, alongside the three preliminary remarks of Chapter 4, I read as components of his rhetorical technique Nietzsche's choice to include fictitious narratives to his "historical investigation of genesis of the moral beliefs" and use of historical facts in an approximate or indeterminate way. I continue by addressing the target of the genealogy in that sense, which is the affective engagement of his readers, corresponding to the affective knowledge presented in Chapter 4.3. The part continues with an examination of main objections towards the psychological and the rhetorical reading and by investigating their relationship.

Chapter 4: Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, metaphors and contradictions as examples of rhetorical means, and the affect-knowledge relationship

I start this part with a necessary consideration of three essential elements for the rest of the research issues: (4.1.) Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric and their continuity and relevance to his later works, (4.2.) the use of metaphors and contradictions in Nietzsche's corpus, and (4.3.) the relation of affects to knowledge, beliefs and judgements.

4.1. Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric and their relevance to his later works

For my reading, I ground a significant part of my argument on Nietzsche's lecture notes on Rhetoric. As their relevance to Nietzsche's later works and their importance are disputable, it is a matter of necessity to justify this choice and explain why these notes might shed light on central Nietzschean positions and specifically on the way he constructs his genealogy.

While Nietzsche was teaching at the University of Basel, he wrote notes for a series of lectures on Rhetoric. These notes, calculated to be written between 1872 and 1874, contain intriguing information on Nietzsche's thoughts on rhetoric. While their originality mainly consists of the relationship of language to rhetoric,[330] they probably constitute a useful interpretative tool concerning central forms in his published works. Among these, I indicatively refer to the importance and repetition of the terms 'style',[331] 'taste',[332] 'ear' and its relation to the linguistic 'rhythm'[333] or the introduction of the idea that "man who forms language, does not perceive things or procedures, but

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[330] Gilman, Sander, L· Blair, Carol· Parent, David J. (1989). "Introduction". *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. xi.

[331] R., p. 105, 106, 112, 113.

[332] R, p. 103, 106, 108.

[333] R, p. 117. When it comes to rhythm, Scheier raises an intriguing question: "Why should anyone, let alone a philosopher, busy himself with such an exotic geometrical contrivance?". He then goes on to address the fragmented nature of aphoristic writing style by stating: "This, in its turn, clearly had to be guided by a self-conscious judgment of what in each case was indispensable concerning the context, as well as what would be digestible — and, moreover, alluring — to the reader". See, Scheier, C. A. (1994). "The Rationale of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals." In Schacht R. (ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, California: University of California Press, pp. 450-451.

impulses".[334] There, he also gives a straightforward definition of the term "rhetorical", as "a conscious application of artistic means of speaking".[335] Finally, Nietzsche even provides a justificatory basis for writing in an aphoristic style, as, analogously to the ancient "verse", aphorisms provide "space for breathing",[336] and thus the eloquence and then the persuasion increases. These are essential and dominant motives of the Nietzschean thought in his published work. So, it seems as if these early unpublished manuscripts are a repository of tools he later develops and incorporates.

Several scholars do not acknowledge the relevance of rhetoric in Nietzschean work, reducing its function and his style in general to exclusive ornamentation without constitutive importance.[337] Others advocate that rhetoric is prominent in the Nietzschean work, however, without referring to these early manuscripts.[338] According to them, Nietzsche uses rhetorical devices in his genealogy, which aim for an affective response from the readers. Of those who acknowledge both the importance of rhetoric and the insights provided on Nietzsche's use of it in the early lecture notes,[339] most refer to the issue of language: rhetoric is perceived as fundamental, inherent to language itself, thus undermining the rhetorical element, as "a conscious application of artistic means of speaking".[340] More specifically, Paul De Man deals with metonymy's role as the "substitution of cause and effect".[341] De Man "views Nietzsche's deconstruction of many of the traditional philosophical oppositions (subject/object, inner world/outer world, cause/effect) in the collection of aphorisms, *The Will to Power* as being grounded on Nietzsche's reversal of the metonymic false inferences which have

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[334] R, p. 107.
[335] R, p. 106.
[336] R, p. 117.
[337] Katsafanas, P. (2013). "Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's 'Genealogy', by Christopher Janaway." (Book review), *Mind*, 122 (486); Aumann, A. (2014). "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*." *Nietzsche Studies,* 45 (2), pp. 182-195.
[338] Allison, D. B. (2000). *Reading the New Nietzsche : The Birth of Tragedy, the Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and on the Genealogy of Morals*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated;
Janaway, *Beyond Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit.; Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit.; Nehamas, A. (1985). *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985, chapter 1.
[339] Blondel, E. (1991). *Nietzsche, the body and culture: philosophy as a philological genealogy*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; Kofman, S. (1994). *Nietzsche and Metaphor*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; De Man, P. (1979). *Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Schrift, A. (1985). "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 23(3), pp. 371-395.
[340] R, p. 106.
[341] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit.

animated Western metaphysical thinking since Plato".[342] Schrift, continuing De Man's line of thought, claims that Nietzsche's discussion of metonymy applies to various aphorisms from his later writings. He writes, "one could show, without much trouble, Nietzsche's discussion in *Twilight of the Idols* of 'The Four Great Errors' (the errors of 'mistaking cause for consequences', of 'false causality', of 'imaginary causes', and of 'free will') to be in each case an instance of the metonymic 'false inference' from effect to cause".[343] He, furthermore, observes that in the early lecture notes Nietzsche forms two crucial elements for his rejection of the "two traditional doctrines of epistemology", which are "the correspondence theory of truth and the referential theory of meaning",[344] and "the view of language as a human creation which remains essentially separate from 'reality' and the view of the world as a process of becoming".[345] These two elements, altered in the way of their expression, still exist on the totality of Nietzsche's corpus. He notes that while Nietzsche's interest shifts from the clear forms of "metaphor" and "tropes" to words and grammar in a broader sense, there is still an underlying, critical engagement with "the epistemological illusions inherent in words and grammar". [346]

Gilman, Blair, and Parent, in their introduction to *Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, also recognise this continuity of the early lecture notes to his later works and their usefulness in unlocking enigmatic aspects of fundamental notions. As they mention, the perspective on language of these early notes "actually pervades Nietzsche's thought". Being in the same direction to Schrift and De Man, the authors claim, "Nietzsche's philosophy can be reread productively with a more central place given to his conception of language".[347] Again, language is the main highlighted aspect of these early lecture notes. However, these authors turn our attention to another

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[342] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit., p. 382.
[343] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit.
[344] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit., p. 383.
[345] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit.
[346] Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit. Among other examples, Schrift mentions GS 354, concerning the inadequacy of consciousness, which practically emerges as a necessary tool for social organisation, and GS 355 and TI 26, concerning the inadequacy of language to transmit knowledge of things as they are. Instead, language generalises the personal, the specific, the unknown to something familiar. He also addresses GS 111, in which we read that: "language contains a hidden philosophical mythology which, however careful we may be, breaks out afresh at every moment". Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology", op. cit., p. 389.
[347] Gilman, Sander, L· Blair, Carol· Parent, David J. (1989). "Introduction". *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. xvi.

possible import of these fragments: Nietzsche's contribution to an understanding of rhetoric's relationship to philosophy. Or, to put it differently, rhetoric's *position in* Nietzsche's philosophy, as they remark,

> [t]his text in particular, and Nietzsche's philosophy in general, suggests that he shared many substantive concerns with contemporary rhetoricians. The claims that Nietzsche advanced are worth noting in their own right, but a secondary issue arises in considering Nietzsche's work in relation to the history of rhetorical studies: Nietzsche's historical impact *upon the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy*.[348] […] One can even say that the problem of rhetoric has been a decisive influence on his thought and that *much of his 'philosophical' terminology is derived from the classical rhetorical tradition*.[349]

What exactly might this relationship between rhetoric and philosophy be? Why might rhetoric be a crucial, and even constitutive, element of his method and philosophical terminology?

Along with the discussion on the nature of language, I argue that the early lecture notes on Rhetoric provide insights about how Nietzsche *performs* and, specifically, about the modus he constructs in his genealogy. To express it better, I claim it is plausible to read a passage from these early lecture notes as an explanatory apparatus for the Nietzschean genealogy, echoing *Genealogy*'s synopsis in *Ecce Homo*, in which Nietzsche as a "psychologist" creates the effect of uncanniness, therefore an affective reaction, through the way he constructs his genealogical narratives in terms of "expression", "intention" and the "art of surprise".[350] Of particular interest is the following passage he mentions, referring to Plato's *Phaedrus*:

> He [the orator] should set himself in possession of that which is true in order to have command of what is probable as well, so that he is able to deceive his audience. Then, it is required that he know how to inspire the passions [*die Leidenschaften*] of his audience, and to be master of them by this means. To that end, he must have accurate knowledge of the human soul [*er eine genaue Kenntniss der menschlichen Seele haben*] and be acquainted with the effects of

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[348] Gilman· Blair· Parent. "Introduction", op. cit., p. xii. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[349] Gilman· Blair· Parent. "Introduction", op. cit., p. xvi. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[350] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

all forms of discourse upon the human mind. The development of a true *art* of speaking *[einer wirklichen Redekunst]*, therefore, presupposes a very profound and extensive education.[351]

Apart from the striking resemblance of the expression "a true *art* of speaking" with the "art of surprise" [*Kunst der Überraschung*] characterising *Genealogy* according to *Ecce Homo*,[352] and the relationship between artistic discourse and rhetoric that this passage indicates, I suggest the decisive elements of this passage are the following: (1) that the orator aims to evoke passions in his audience, (2) to do this, what is needed is a systematic knowledge of the soul [*Seele*] of the agents and an acquaintance "*with the effects of all forms of discourse upon the human mind*". In that sense, (3) *a true art of speaking* is the means for the arousal of the passions, described of the passage. I claim that Nietzsche indeed aims at evoking passions (or, using his later terminology, affects) in his audience and, for *that* reason, he has a knowledge of the psychological structures of the agents and of the effects that each type of discourse would have upon them. His genealogy might be read as a plausible example, or even application, of that.

In other words, this passage might reveal a core element for the Nietzschean philosophy, corresponding to the combination of two tasks of the orator: to be able to inspire passions, or affects, on his audience and to be a master of them. For that, prerequisites are a knowledge of the human soul and — using very accurate words — a consciousness of the effects a specific "discourse" will have on the audience, or we could say here, the readers. Only if Nietzsche reserves for himself an actual knowledge of the effect his discourse has on his readership can he claim that the three treatises of the *Genealogy* are the "most uncanny things" [*das Unheimlichste*] in terms of expression [*Ausdruck*], intention [*Absicht*], and the art of surprise [*Kunst der Überraschung*] — which he admits to inducing in his readership.[353] As I suggest, Nietzsche's genealogy encompasses these two tasks: to reserve, primarily for himself, knowledge regarding the psychological structures of the agents and have as its aim, not as a descriptive exposition concerning the actual origins of morality as a system, but the arousal of the agent's affective world, through genealogical narratives on the emergence of moral values composed of a series of rhetorical means, as "artistic means

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[351] R, p. 99.
[352] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[353] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

of speaking". As I discuss in Part III, the affective response of the reading public is the starting target of genealogy. At a second level, the affective response partakes in activating the critical attitude of the reading public towards contents and forms of knowledge, towards the emergence and development of moral values that genealogy itself presents. Other than that, this passage might be the ground for the explication of the relationship between genealogy's psychological and rhetorical reading. I return to that issue in Chapter 6 of the thesis.

Considering and placing these early notes at the core of the Nietzschean philosophy elevates the rhetoric from a mere decorative technique to a core element of his philosophy. Later in this part, I consider the objections to this contentious reading and construct answers towards them. For the moment, it is worth noting, however, that if this hypothesis is correct, it will also become transparent why Nietzsche expresses philosophical ideas as a poet. His genealogy, in this respect, exploits artistic means of speaking and fiction, and therefore belongs to the artistic discourse as we will see in Chapter 9, not as a garnishment that could be discarded but as its predominant modus *operandi*.[354]

4.2. Two examples of Nietzsche's rhetorical technique: metaphors and contradictions

Various commentators recognise the use of rhetorical means by Nietzsche. For example, Nehamas claims "a traditional rhetorical trope", "a feature that remains remarkably constant from the time of *The Birth of Tragedy* to that of *Ecce Homo*" is "the figure of exaggeration or hyperbole".[355] Saar also recognises "hyperbole and exaggerating gesture" as prominent features of the Nietzschean rhetorical style.[356]

Nehamas suggests the effect hyperbole has is emotionally intense in the readership, as it is a "feature of his writing" that

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[354] Regarding Nietzsche's rhetorical technique, see for example: Janaway, *Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit; Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit.; Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit.; Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit.; Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit.

[355] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 22.

[356] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 239.

attracts a certain kind of reader to him, repels another, and causes still a third to alternate between comprehension and blankness, between exhilaration and despair, and so ultimately to pass him by.[357]

Along the same lines, Saar affirms hyperbole's relationship to the readership's affective constitution. As he notices, hyperbole "should be read […] as an attempt to directly relate to the affective constitution of its readers".[358]

In this chapter, I discuss two other rhetorical means that Nietzsche employs in his philosophy, in general, and genealogy, in particular, metaphors and contradictions as two examples of Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy, in the sense of "artistic means of speaking", which, as hyperbole, aim to relate to the affective constitution of their readers.

4.2.1. The use of metaphor in Nietzsche's genealogy

Gemes notes that Nietzsche "is the philosopher who, more than most, uses metaphor as a marker of significance".[359] What is metaphor, according to Nietzsche? And why is it a "marker of significance"? In the early lecture notes on Rhetoric, there is a dual conception of metaphor, corresponding to the dual conception of rhetoric: on the one hand, as the transference of an image to a word, and, on the other hand, as a rhetorical trope, in the sense of a conscious application of artistic means of speaking. Regarding the first sense, that of the impossibility of the attribution of a signified to a signifier, we read:

> In sum: the tropes are not just occasionally added to words but constitute their most proper nature. It makes no sense to speak of a "proper meaning" which is carried over to something else only in special cases. There is just as little distinction between actual words and tropes as there is between straightforward speech and rhetorical figures. What is usually called language is actually all figuration.[360]

Therefore, metaphors are *inherently embedded in language.* In that sense, metaphor is conceived not as a rhetorical-artistic trope but more generally as the impossibility of

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[357] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 22.
[358] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 310.
[359] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves", op. cit., p. 8.
[360] R, p. 123.

total correspondence between the signified and the signifier, a position repeated in *On Truth and Lies in an Nonmoral Sense.*

However, we cannot avoid recognising that apart from this use of metaphor, for which the word "transference" would probably be better, Nietzsche also supports the "artistic" use of metaphor within the realm of rhetoric. As he states in the early lecture notes, "metaphor is the carrying over of a word whose usual meaning is something else".[361] In that sense, metaphor is a tool, a trope of rhetoric as a "true *art* of speaking" [*einer wirklichen Redekunst*] which aims to "inspire passion [*die Leidenschaften seiner Hoerer zu erregen*] in the audience".[362] The center of attention shifts. From the impossibility of an absolute correspondence between the signifier and the signified, metaphor now corresponds to the artistic dimension of the orator.

I will bring as a clarifying example the narrative of the death of God, which permeates as a foundation Nietzsche's genealogy, indicating a collapse in the belief in the unconditional validity of moral values. When Nietzsche was writing, it was a common assumption among European intellectuals to believe that moral concepts would acquire a rational foundation independent of religious beliefs. Nietzsche considered this belief naïve — after all, we read in the *Genealogy* that even our most secularised value, the value of truth, is a continuation of the religious belief in "God".[363] Nietzsche, rather than presenting a literal argument to support his view, used rhetorical skills to articulate it and invoke, as I claim, a critical attitude in his readership on the matter. Therefore, he proclaimed that "God is dead",[364] and, as a result of that event, because "this faith has been undermined," everything "built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it [*auf ihm gebaut, an ihn gelehnt, in ihn hineingewachsen war*]" will be destroyed, including "the whole of our European morality",[365] indicating an intense linkage among religious commitments and the supposedly secularised values. The intense images created through this particular narrative ("Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: 'I seek God! I seek God!' — As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one.

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[361] R, p. 124.
[362] R, p. 98-99.
[363] GM III 25.
[364] GS 108, 125, 343.
[365] GS 343.

Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? — Thus they yelled and laughed.") and the emphasis on the use of the first person ("I seek God! I seek God!", "Whither is God?" […] "I will tell you. *We have killed him* — you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns?") intensify the artistic character, of this particular metaphor. Hence, here, God's death does indeed function as a rhetorical metaphor in the second sense.[366] According to the early lecture notes,

> [t]he *tropes*, the non-literal significations [*uneigentlichen Bezeichnungen*], are considered to be the most artistic means of rhetoric […] The second form of the *tropus* is the metaphor. It does not produce new words but gives a new meaning to them.[367]

In this direction, we could also interpret, for example, the narrative on the master-slave moralities. Here, things are a bit more complicated when it comes to perceiving the two moralities as metaphors. The basic hermeneutical approach wants the moralities in question to literally denote *historical* periods that have *actually* taken place in history. Given the multitude of historical inaccuracies and ambiguities in Nietzsche's narrative, it would be more plausible to reject such a conception. For example, as Gemes notices, Nietzsche

> in talking of the nobles in *Genealogy*'s first essay, without any forewarning, he shifts from a frame of reference focused on ancient Greece to a frame of reference focused on ancient Rome.[368]

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[366] See also Owen's detailed analysis on the metaphor of God's death in Owen, D. (2007). *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*. McGill-Queen's Press, p. 52-58.
[367] R, p. 108.
[368] Gemes, "Strangers to ourselves […]", op. cit., p. 22. Gemes also notes the following:
>> Notoriously, the first essay of the *Genealogy* leaves the reader in some confusion about who exactly are the bearers of master morality referred to in the text. In much of the text, especially the early sections, it seems Nietzsche has the Greeks in mind. His first explicit mention of a particular nobility is that of Greek nobility in section 5, and his characterisation in section 10 of the nobles, as self-affirming and merely condescendingly pitying to the slaves, is presented solely with reference to Greek nobility. Section 11, which stresses the recklessness and life affirming nature of the nobles, contains references to Pericles, the Athenians, Hesiod, and Homer. Indeed, Romans only get sustained mention in section 16, the penultimate section of

Williams, in these respects, notes

> there are some vaguely situated masters and slaves; then an historical change, which has something to do with Jews or Christians; there is a process which culminates perhaps in the Reformation, perhaps in Kant. It has been going on for two thousand years.[369]

Along the same lines, Saar argues that the narrative regarding the master-slave morality is metaphorical, denoting the power dynamics forming moral systems. He notices that "Nietzsche in his own description raises doubts about the real existence of these quasi ideal-typical entities", while the moment of the slave revolt is "highly creative".[370] According to him, the genealogical "scenarios" Nietzsche invents are full of "imaginative metaphors" that belong to "Nietzsche's artful and excessive use of rhetoric, his conscious strategy of simplification and allegorization".[371] That tactic is, at the same time, an indicator that the historical reading of genealogy presents difficulties, as Nietzsche provides "theoretical points in the form of fictive historical scenes".[372]

That is, Nietzsche devises this particular schema so that it works as follows: readers, most likely, begin to identify with masters and their morality, rejecting the morality of slaves. In the process of finding the origin of moral values and beliefs, however, we are confronted with "reality", that wants us to be descendants and continuity of the slaves. An example of that is the late-formulated Nietzschean position, within the *Genealogy*, that as long as we remain attached to the unconditional value of truth, we are ultimately no exception to, but a continuation of the ascetic ideal.[373]

In this respect, fiction — the "event" of God's death — and historical inaccuracies and ambiguities can be read as a conscious choice on Nietzsche's part to use artistic means of speaking. What is the effect of Nietzsche's choice to use various

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the first essay. By contrast, the Jewish slaves of ressentiment, who are presumably more connected to the Romans than the Greeks, are given substantial mention as early as section 7. The early juxtaposition between Jewish slaves and Greek masters is confusing since, of course, it was the Romans who were eventually, on Nietzsche's account, conquered by the Jews through their conversion to Christianity." See, Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves…", op. cit., p. 2.

[369] Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy,* op. cit., p. 37.
[370] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 308-309. See, BGE 186, 195, 202; GM I 7, 10–14; III 13–15.
[371] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 308.
[372] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 308.
[373] GM III 25.

metaphors in his narrative? At least they shall aim for a minimum affective response from readers — probably a feeling of bewilderment or uncanniness that will arouse *mistrust* towards this metaphorical use of language. The crucial question is, why?

One possible response concerning Nietzsche's use of metaphors as an artistic means of speaking is to answer, something already supported by the secondary literature, that it is merely a decoration that enhances the affective responses of the readers but is not necessary to Nietzsche's philosophy: Nietzsche could have said the same things entirely literally. Therefore, according to Katsafanas, Nietzsche's rhetorical style is not constitutive because he could have expressed what he says in more literal terms.[374] In analogous terms, Aumann states: "[t]he pivotal question is not whether our emotions ever play a role in the knowledge acquisition process, but whether they ever play a necessary role. In other words, do they enable us to grasp truths we could not otherwise grasp?",[375] and deny the element of necessity for comprehension. I will return to this topic later in Chapter 6.1.2. For now, I will simply note that two reasons support the position that Nietzsche's rhetorical style is constitutive to his genealogy and the critique it generates: relationship between affects and knowledge (Chapter 4.2.3.) and the idea that art is perhaps the only discourse detached from the ascetic ideal, thus offering the foundation for activating *critique* in his readers (Chapter 9).

4.2.2. Contradictions and their position in the Nietzschean polemic strategy: the case of the existence and non-existence of facts

Another element of Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy could be the "negating dipoles" or contradictions he constructs. Nietzsche seems to deny the validity of fundamental concepts such as freedom of the will,[376] the autonomy of the subject,[377] and the existence of facts.[378] At the same time, he constructs positions that deny the above

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[374] Katsafanas, "Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's 'Genealogy', by Christopher Janaway", op. cit.

[375] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., p. 186.

[376] See, for example, D 124; TI "Four Great Errors" 7, 8.

[377] See for example, GM I 13.

[378] WP 487.

denials.[379] Therefore, contradictory dipoles are created: denial/affirmation of freedom of will, of the autonomy of the subject, of the existence of facts. Concerning the latter, in the controversial collection of aphorisms, *The Will to Power*, readers encounter the position: "No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. [*gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen*]".[380] It is a well-recognised and often misunderstood phrase, according to which Nietzsche is credited with the enigmatic and philosophically problematic position on the non-existence of facts. On the other hand, it is evident Nietzsche accepts the existence of facts. A relevant example is GM III 13. There, Nietzsche, discussing the ascetic ideal, recognises:

> [t]he fact that, as history tells us, this ideal could rule man and become powerful to the extent that it did, especially everywhere where the civilization and taming of man took place, reveals a major fact [*Thatsache*], the *sickliness* of the type of man who has lived up till now, at least of the tamed man, the physiological struggle of man with death (to be more exact: with disgust at life, with exhaustion and with the wish for the 'end').[381]

In this respect, the pathology accompanying the ascetic ideal is recognised as a fact which denotes a denial of life, both in the sense of the undermining of our bodily existence and in the preference for a different, transcendent world from the one we live in. In this chapter, by carefully examining the position of the non-existence of facts — — in relation to Nietzsche's recognition in other places that there are facts — and commenting on it as an example, I construe the function of such contradictions in the Nietzschean corpus, incorporating them into his rhetorical technique.

The denial of the existence of facts — at least at first sight — raises several questions. Is the "fact" non-existent? What would that mean? What is the status of interpretation and its relation to the fact? Is the interpretation introduced in such terms as to amount to an absolute relativism that removes from the facts any cognitive significance? In that sense, it would be premature to ascribe to Nietzsche a position of absolute relativism. A way to deal with this issue is to incorporate it in Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy. If the position "there are no facts, only interpretations" is taken

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[379] For the discussion on the freedom of the will, see, for example, GM II 2; on the autonomous subject GM II 2; on the existence of facts D, 42, 43 77, 574; GM II 16, III 13, III 16.
[380] WP 481.
[381] GM III 13.

literally, (i) the polemic underlying Nietzsche's corpus is downplayed or completely overlooked and at the same time, (ii) it is accepted that Nietzsche's work is fundamentally governed by inconsistency since fundamental contradictions remain unexplained or are perceived as accidental. These two key aspects might help to construct answers to the above questions and clarify misunderstandings.

Starting from the topic of polemic, its neglect or downgrading as a fundamental methodological tool constitutes a flawed practice. It is already well accepted by the secondary literature,[382] and based on textual evidence from the texts, Nietzsche expresses determinate positions in which he explicitly opposes dominant philosophical or non-philosophical assumptions of the 19th century, criticising them. For example, he criticises the rejection of corporeality, instincts, and drives on the altar of the deification of intellect, mind, and ideas,[383] or, respectively — to make the issue under consideration even clearer — it turns against the idea of pure "objectivity", which seeks to describe an object accurately, being detached from its bearer.[384]

On this basis, a fundamental hermeneutic approach concerning Nietzsche is to explore and discover his aim when one attempts to interpret a given passage of his texts. The philosophical position Nietzsche aims to combat essentially defines the construction of his narrative. And in that sense, "each interpretation" even Nietzsche's himself, "is essentially value laden and polemical, [...] even dispassionate argument is a special case of such polemics".[385] This identification has considerable implications for the overall interpretation of Nietzsche's work and the reflection on the issue under consideration. If one treats his thunderous denials as absolute literalisms, and indeed as such, i.e. unrelated to other positions, one is led to problematic conclusions such as "Nietzsche rejects the will to truth" or "Nietzsche rejects the existence of facts".

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[382] I agree with Ken Gemes' analysis, as presented in Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit, p. 1. See, also Gemes, K., "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth", op. cit., p. 62. Jessica Berry radicalises the view that Nietzsche does not expresses "diachronic truths", by claiming he does not advance *any* positive view. According to her, his "method is entirely critical, that it defeats speculative philosophy but advances no positive views". See Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 96. While this perspective appears to have some grounding in Nietzsche's works, I argue that it falls short in explaining his emphasis on advocating for life and health. Nietzsche's advocacy for life and health, and his call for a critique of values represent positive views of his philosophy.
[383] D 42, 43; GS P2.
[384] GM III 12.
[385] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 19.

If one considers the distinctive polemical character of the Nietzschean corpus,[386] the absoluteness of these denials, and therefore, the contradiction to which they lead, is tempered and placed in a defined framework that even serves a specific purpose, the weakening of the opposing positions. For example, Nietzsche opposes the will to the truth when it leads to an ascetic-type disavowal of our bodily nature, our passions, drives and emotions.[387] Similarly, he renounces positivism which proposes the constitution of "truths" without agents or "objectivity" without interest.[388] This is where a closer reading of the aphorism in question, often quoted incompletely, leads us. In its entirety it reads as follows:

> Against positivism, which halts at phenomena — "There are only *facts*" — I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing.
>
> "Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. — Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.
>
> In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. — "Perspectivism."
>
> It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.[389]

As this aphorism suggests, Nietzsche's critique is not directed against facts in general, let alone their existence, but against the positivist position on the absolute autonomy of the fact from interpretation. The critique of positivism, at the same time, does not imply that any interpretation of an event is equally correct. A careful reading of the

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[386] Characteristically, the subtitle of his main work on genealogy is "A Polemic"[*Eine Streitschrift*].
[387] GM III 27.
[388] GM III 12.
[389] WP 481.

Nietzschean corpus shows that not only does he accept that some interpretations may be better than others, but indeed he insists on that.[390] In other words, on closer examination, it becomes clear that what Nietzsche rejects is the existence of "facts" as understood by positivists — a rejection that amounts to less than a rejection of any way of distinguishing between what is and is not in different situations. The movement towards a deconstruction of a specific position would form the "content" of the Nietzschean strategy.

In regard to the second point, that of the assumption of the incoherence or inconsistency of the Nietzschean work in the case of a literal reading of the denial of the existence of facts under the weight of interpretation, a tool could be useful to collapse this position. The device is to situate denials, such as the non-existence of facts, in the general appropriate climate and prism of the operation of opposing dipoles, or contradictions, in Nietzsche's work. I suggest that rather than perceiving these oppositional schemas as "inconsistencies" or evidence of the "incoherence" of Nietzschean positions, it would be legitimate to include them in his rhetorical strategy. Might these dipoles constitute disguised perspectives that activate the feeling of uncanniness and therefore place readers in a position of *mistrust* towards these very contradictions or *doubt* from which they are called upon to make judgements about these oppositional claims? There are at least two reasons to support this interpretation. Firstly, understanding these dipoles as intentionally disguised perspectives that place readers in a position of doubt from which they are called upon to make judgements about these opposing claims weakens any claim regarding incoherency or inconsistency of the Nietzschean work. Secondly, this understanding of the function of contradictions is in line with the affect-knowledge relationship, which I discuss in the next chapter. For now, it would be sufficient to say that contradictions might be perceived as rhetorical-artistic weapons that position the reading audience to an uncomfortable or, as Ken Gemes has put it, "uncanny" position, emotionally speaking. After all, Nietzsche reveals this methodological strategy not only when describing the three essays composing his *Genealogy* as the most uncanny things ever written,[391] but also when admitting that "everything contradictory and antithetical" has a "power of attraction

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[390] GS 2, 337; WP 2, 55
[391] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

[*Anziehungskraft*]".[392] In other words, contradictions are not proof of randomness or inconsistency but a rhetorical tool serving the aim of the potential affective displacement of the readers.[393] Thus, the problematic nature of the issue under consideration, namely the "existence" and "non-existence" of facts, which, otherwise, can only be read as inconsistency or nonsense, is dropped, strengthening Nietzschean work both in terms of substance and form.

Given the above, I claim Nietzsche's rhetorical technique, including metaphors as rhetorical tropes, as a conscious application of artistic means of speaking, and shocking contradictions, which arouse the readership's affective world is a constitutive aspect of his philosophy. If that hypothesis is correct, there is also a consistency with the centrality of affects-knowledge relationship, which I will examine right now.

4.3. Nietzsche's affective knowledge

The function of metaphors, historical inaccuracies and contradictions as examples of Nietzsche's rhetorical style are supported and explained by his position on the interdependence of affect and knowledge, beliefs, and judgements. One pivotal position of Nietzsche's philosophy, in the realm of his interest in psychological structures of the agents, is undermining the conscious self while claiming that the unconscious world, or even better said, a totality of drives, constitutes agency. We can read this *undermining* of the conscious self of the agents in two ways. On the one hand, on a purely theoretical level, Nietzsche engages in psychological observations concerning the affective structure of subjects and its relation to the production of beliefs, judgements and knowledge in general, as seen in Part I of the thesis. Nietzsche, in that sense, undermines the *concept* of the self as conscious self is epiphenomenal. On the other hand, this *undermining* of the conscious self takes place on a *practical* level. That is, Nietzsche is interested, *in practice*, in undermining the conscious realm of his readers, in lowering their defenses to activate in them a critical stance towards forms and objects of knowledge, even towards contents and forms of knowledge presented by

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[392] GM P 4.
[393] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit., p. 1, 19-21.

his genealogical narratives themselves. In that sense, Nietzsche undermines the *operation* of the conscious self of the reading audience. Through this prism, an emphasis on the practicality is prominent, an emphasis which is explicitly expressed in *Gay Science* as following:

> Have we perhaps unlearned this fear too much? Today all of us are believers in the senses, we philosophers of the present and the future, *not* in theory but in praxis, in practice.[394]

These two approaches to the conscious self's undermining are based on Nietzsche's position that knowledge and affects are intertwined. What exactly are the affects? The German term Nietzsche uses is "Affekt", the etymology of which means a violent movement of the mind, excitement, intensity, desire, longing, borrowed from Latin *affectus,* which means a "state of mind, emotion, passion, desire". It is then related to the Latin *afficere*, meaning "to put in a mood, to excite". The concept was Germanised by Zesen in 1671 as *Gemütsbewegung*. Since the mid-19th century, it has denoted, in German, something of the order of emotion.

Returning to the Nietzschean use of the term, Janaway, focusing on the above aphorism, claims that affects, being "inclinations and aversions of some kind […], ways in which we feel",[395] are "enabling and expanding knowledge".[396] They include, at least, the following: "anger, fear, love, hatred, hope, envy, revenge, lust, jealousy, irascibility, exuberance, calmness, self-satisfaction, self-humiliation, self-crucifixion, power-lust, greed, suspicion, malice, cruelty, contempt, despair, triumph, feeling of looking down on, feeling of a superior glance towards others, desire to justify oneself in the eyes of others, demand for respect, feelings of laziness, feeling of command and brooding over bad deeds".[397] In other words, under the umbrella of "affective" can be placed our whole instinctive or emotional life — in terms of classical rhetoric, this would be called "passion", from which affect derives etymologically. Nietzsche uses

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[394] GS 372.
[395] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op.cit., p. 205-206.
[396] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op.cit., p. 205.
[397] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 206. Janaway is referring to BGE 19, 23, 187, 192, 203; GM I 10,13, II 11, III 15, 20.

the term *Leidenschaften* (passions) himself in the same context and sense that he uses the terms drives, affects, and emotions.[398]

Nietzsche imports into the discussion the position that the intellect is not by itself responsible for "our spirit's activity", for the processes of the spirit, within which resides the production of knowledge, beliefs and judgements. Even more, it is "a certain behavior of the instincts towards one another". In that sense, our unconscious universe, where drives constantly operate, participate in knowledge's production. One of the many aphorisms containing this thought is GS 333:

> Before knowledge [*ein Erkennen*] is possible each of these instincts [*Trieben*] must first have presented its one-sided view of the thing or event; after this comes the fight of these one-sided views, and occasionally this results in a mean, one grows calm, one finds all three sides right, and there is a kind of justice and a contract; […] we suppose that *intelligere* must be something conciliatory, just, and good — something that stands essentially opposed to the instincts, *while it is actually nothing but a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another* [*während es nur ein gewisses Verhalten der Triebe zu einander ist*]. For the longest time conscious thought was considered thought itself. Only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt. […] *Conscious* thinking, especially that of the philosopher, is the least vigorous and therefore also the relatively mildest and calmest form of thinking; and thus precisely philosophers are most apt to be led astray about the nature of knowledge [*die Natur des Erkennens*].[399]

Nietzsche, in this regard, argues that much of our knowledge derives from our unconscious world in which affects operate. In GM III 12, it is explicit that our knowledge will be complete only if more affects are allowed "to speak for a matter".[400] We read:

> […] to see differently, and to *want* to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 'objectivity' – the latter

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[398] TI "Morality as Anti-nature" 1. The context here is similar to the usage of terms like "affects", which are devalued by the dominant discourse in favor of reason. This devaluation has adverse effects on life.
[399] GS 333.
[400] GM III 12.

understood not as 'contemplation [*Anschauung*] without interest' (which is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity), but as *having in our power* the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons': we can use the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge [*der Affekt-Interpretationen für die Erkenntniss*] […]. There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival 'knowing'; the *more* affects [*Affekte*] we are able to put into words about a thing, the *more* eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity'. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions [*Affekte*] without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to *castrate* the intellect?[401]

Nietzsche's reference point here is the knowledge without interest against which he is turning. Russell, in *The Problems of Philosophy,* writes:

> The true philosophic contemplation […] finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object. […] By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge — knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain.[402]

Therefore, Nietzsche does not write in a vacuum but instead his ideas are constructed in the realm of polemic. Against the idea that knowledge is valuable insofar as it is "impersonal", and "purely contemplative", the Nietzschean perspective proposes that knowledge is related to affects, and this should be recognised. As Berry nicely puts it, when analysing GM III 12, "just as there is no visual experience that is unconditioned by the perceiver's point of view, neither will there be any knowledge unconditioned by

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[401] GM III 12.
[402] Russell B. (1956). *Logic and Knowledge*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

the epistemic peculiarities of the subject".[403] How are we to understand these epistemic peculiarities? Except that there is no "view from nowhere",[404] we can also perceive these epistemic peculiarities as denoting that there is no view without the involvement of our affects.

Affects also play a role in our beliefs, judgements and values formation. According to Owen, from *Daybreak* and on:

> Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy shifts to accommodate the fact that he now sees that the persuasive problem posed for his project of re-evaluation is that our relationship to our moral values is not simply an epistemic issue but also, and in some respects more basically, an affective one.[405]

Therefore, "it is our moral feelings, rather than our moral beliefs, that are the proximal causes of our moral actions and reactions — and that our system of moral feelings can persist in the absence of the system of beliefs that gave rise to this affective structuring of our drives".[406] In GS 335, where Nietzsche addresses his readers in the second person singular — a feature that could also be evidence of a rhetorical strategic —, we are being told:

> Your judgment [*Urtheil*] "this is right" has a prehistory in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences [*in deinen Trieben, Neigungen, Abneigungen, Erfahrungen und Nicht-Erfahrungen*]. "*How* did it originate there?" you must it ask, and then also: "What is that impels me to listen to it?".[407]

Analogously, we read in the *Will to Power*:

> What is the meaning of the act of evaluation itself? Does it point back or down to another, metaphysical world? (As Kant still believed, who belongs *before* the great historical movement.) In short: where did it originate? Or did it not 'originate'? — Answer: moral evaluation is an *exegesis*, a way of interpreting. The exegesis itself is a symptom of certain physiological conditions, likewise

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[403] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 116.
[404] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 116.
[405] Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 49.
[406] Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 48. This interpretation is supported, for example, by D 32, 35, 38, 99.
[407] GS 335.

of a particular spiritual level of prevalent judgments: Who interprets? — Our affects.[408]

Our moral beliefs, judgements and valuations, which emerge to a large extent unconsciously,[409] trace back to our affective life. Or, more clearly, our instinctual or emotional life — I put these two under the umbrella of "affective" — form our moral beliefs, judgements, and valuations. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche goes even further to say that "even morality is just *a sign language of the affects* [*kurz, die Moralen sind auch nur eine Zeichensprache der Affekte*]".[410]

Following the textual evidence, and considering Nietzsche's interest in the human psyche, affects are presented as necessary and indispensable elements in the process of knowledge, belief and judgement production. Regarding the relationship between values-judgements-beliefs and knowledge, in BGE 2, where Nietzsche sarcastically discusses the idea that the things of "higher values" must originate from other things of a "high value", we locate an explicit reference on the topic. We read:

> This way of judging [*Diese Art zu urtheilen*] typifies the prejudices by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: this type of valuation [*diese Art von Werthschätzungen*] lies behind all their logical procedures. From these "beliefs" [*Glauben*] they try to acquire their "knowledge" [*Wissen*], to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as "the truth" [*die Wahrheit*].[411]

Beliefs, judgements and valuations trace "behind all […] logical procedures", and from these they are arbitrarily led themselves to a supposed "knowledge" of the "truth". Therefore, it would be plausible to ask: *What* kind of impact does an affect have on a belief, judgement, or knowledge? And *how* does this impact take place? For instance, if I do not like apples, does it mean eating them is "wrong"? Or if I am angry with my friend who forgot our meeting, does that mean forgetting a meeting is morally reprehensible?

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[408] WP 254.
[409] BGE 191.
[410] BGE 187.
[411] BGE 2.

Nietzsche repeatedly refers to the problem of who we are,[412] an issue with unequivocal psychological nuances. His influence on Freud is being discussed in secondary literature and recognised for the right reasons.[413] Although I do not have the time here to delve into this relationship, an example from the Freudian theory would be useful to illuminate the process by which a moral belief or judgement, a knowledge regarding a moral value, can be affected by the affective life of the agents, which, I think, is explanatory of Nietzsche's position on the affects-knowledge/beliefs/judgements relationship. This example is the Freudian theory on the ontogenesis of guilt.

In Freudian theory, three agencies [*Instanzen*] constitute the structure of the human mind, which form the so-called tripartite model; id, ego and super-ego. Id [*das Es*] consists of an unconscious agency, which is the locus of all individual's drives and desires.[414] Ego is an individual's conscious faculty which is responsible for the organisation of a person's mental processes. The super-ego is a superior faculty in the human mind, which includes and represents the totality of norms — the Law —to which an individual shall adhere.

Crucial for Freud's concept of super-ego is guilt, characterised as "the most important problem in the development of civilization".[415] In *Civilization and its Discontents,* Freud states that the sense of guilt is "existent before the super-ego, and therefore, before the conscience, too".[416] In this primary level, the sense of guilt

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[412] See, for example, GS P 1, 335; GM P 1.

[413] In 1900, Freud writes to Flies, "I have just acquired Nietzsche, in whom I hope to find words for much that remains mute in me, but have not opened him yet". (Masson, J. M. (1985) (ed.). *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*: Harvard University Press: London. p. 398). After this letter, Freud continuously denied that he had read Nietzsche. However, he directly refers to Nietzsche at least three times, in the *Ego and the Id*, in the *Interpretation of Dreams* and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. Many scholars stress similarities between him and Nietzsche, particularly their comprehension of drives, sublimation, and the unconscious. Some scholars also point out the intricate relationship between Freud's Super-ego (*Uber-Ich)* and Nietzsche's bad conscience, emphasising *Genealogy* II 16.
    Among others, see Gemes, K. (2009). "Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 38, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, pp. 38-59; Berthold-Bond, D. (1991). "Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and the Unconscious." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series,* 5 (3), Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, pp. 193-213; Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 173.

[414] Ellenberger, among others, suggests that Freud has taken the concept of the id from Nietzsche. See, Ellenberger, H. F. (1994). *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. London: Fontana Press, p. 516.

[415] Freud, S. (1962). *Civilization and its Discontents*. Strachey, J. (trans.), New York: W.W. Norton and Company, p. 81.

[416] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* op. cit., p. 83. In the Freudian theory, conscience is included in the Superego as its function.

emerges from the existing tension between an act of the Ego and the external authority. However, the rule must be perceived as morally good or just, and the act diverging from this rule, being opposed to the rule, must be perceived as morally bad or wrong for tension between them to exist. In its turn, this presupposes that the normative concepts of "good", "bad", "just", and "unjust" have already been given content in one's mind. Freud is explicit in that it is impossible to discover the origins of the meaning of the above terms by searching merely in the prehistory of human evolution. On the contrary, the concepts of moral goodness and moral badness take their meaning in a very personal context, in the individual's life — in Nietzschean terms we would say in individual's affective life. According to Freud, these concepts acquire their normative nuances as they are derived from one's *fear* of the potential loss of love and, specifically, from the child's fear of the loss of the love of its parent. So, a belief concerning morality is reduced to an unconscious process of the order of emotion. Individuals, in a very early stage of their lives, will evaluate an action or even an intention as bad in case it will have, as a potential consequence, the loss of love — and protection — of the loved one. A child, according to Freud, does not only fear the potential loss of love but that the forbidden action or thought may result in a punishment by the loved subject or protector.[417]

As Freud puts it,

> [a]t the beginning, therefore, what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with loss of love. For fear of that loss, one must avoid it. This, too, is the reason why it makes little difference whether one has already done the bad thing or only intends to do it.[418]

Freud interestingly calls this state of mind, meaning the feelings of fear or threat concerning a potential loss of love, "bad conscience" [*schlechtes Gewissen*].[419] He continues by saying that in this stage, this phenomenon does not deserve this name

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[417] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* op. cit., p. 71. The same view is supported in the *New Introductory Lectures*, where Freud states that "[p]arental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love and are bound to be feared on their own account". See, Freud, S. (1964). *New Introductory Lectures*. S.E., Vol. 22, London: The Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 62.
[418] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* op. cit., p. 81.
[419] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* op. cit.

because "the sense of guilt is only a fear of loss of love".[420] Apart from an analogy with the Nietzschean bad conscience, probably formed associatively in the minds of the readers of this text, the importance of this example is that it shows how it is possible an affect, or to put it more accurately, a sequence of affects has an impact on the formulation of a moral judgement (love towards the desired object → anger towards the authority, forbidding the access of the object → fear of loss of love → fear of punishment → abandonment of the object and formulation of the moral judgement that desiring the object would be "morally bad"). To respond to the question of what exactly this impact is, we could say that affects affect the formulation of the judgement because of the play in the series of instances that lead to that judgement. The ego "decides" the abandonment of the object because a series of affects precede the rational final decision. In the above example, I decide that eating apples is morally wrong because a chain of affects was in play and not because there is something in the order of a priori rationality or a diving order that commanded the prohibition of apple eating. In the end, I reached the knowledge that apple eating is bad. Thus, that is an exegesis of why knowledge and affects are intertwined.

Of course, the differences between the two thinkers are undeniable. For example, Freud clearly aims at the foundation of a science of the human psyche, an aim we cannot project to Nietzsche. That corresponds to a decisive differentiating line between the two thinkers concerning how they introduce the concept of knowledge in their works. However, exactly because Nietzsche's affect-knowledge relationship might seem abstract and incoherent, I think that bringing an example from the Freudian theory indeed highlights the role of affective world of the agents regarding the production of knowledge, beliefs and judgements. The advantage of reading the two thinkers in the same constellation is its explanatory role for the Nietzschean affective knowledge. In other words, the example of the Freudian ontogenesis of guilt highlights, in scientific terms, how our affective world plays an important role in the construction of our moral beliefs, judgement and knowledge.

The rational extension of the above, which at the same time is important for the scope of this thesis and the Nietzschean scholarship in general, is that affects and knowledge are not intertwined *only* at the level of the constitution of the relevant

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[420] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* op. cit., p. 72.

beliefs, judgements, and knowledge. It is plausible they will also entangle at the level of the deconstruction of the relevant beliefs and judgements concerning the moral values or their modification. Indeed, based on this scheme, the rhetorical interpretation of the genealogy becomes even more plausible: the readers of Nietzsche will not be able to *criticise* their beliefs and judgements concerning moral values through a rational process alone insofar as, to a large extent at their core, these beliefs and judgements are affectively constructed. On the contrary, the rhetorical capacity of the Nietzschean corpus may put the readers in a place from which their affective world will be moved as psychoanalysis or art does. I will return to this issue in Chapter 9.

However, a brief comment would be useful here. A common human experience example is viewing a work of art. When, for instance, I watch Strindberg's *Dream Play*, why do I cry when I see the collapse of a relationship between two people, based on specific value choices or conflicts? Maybe my critical attitude towards the collapse of one of my relationships, which I avoid doing, on a daily level, is activated in me. And, therefore, I begin to question the values I have incorporated as my personal truths, through my affective engagement with the aesthetic phenomenon I encounter. In that context, it has been argued that a kind of "knowledge claim we can make about art concerns what we know or believe to be an appropriate or warranted emotional response to the artwork. We often believe that works of art are only properly understood if we have a certain kind of emotional response to them.".[421] Although the epistemology of art is not the subject of this thesis, it is at least worth asking as an open question whether affective knowledge conceals any claims regarding the epistemology of art. For example, what is the value of art for knowledge? What kind of knowledge is produced? Can art provide the field for the emergence of knowledge that purely philosophical-scientific discourse alone is insufficient? Without the time to develop this question in this doctoral thesis, this remark is nevertheless worth making. According to the rhetorical reading of genealogy (with the psychological embodied in it), genealogy is constituted within the artistic field, being itself an aesthetic phenomenon with which the reader comes into contact. Under that interpretation, Nietzsche's purpose is to stimulate the affective world of his readership to bring about a critical attitude towards the value of values and, ultimately, the possibility of some form of self-understanding.

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[421] Worth, S. E. (2003). "Art and Epistemology." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. As found in: https://iep.utm.edu/art-and-epistemology/

In that sense, the Nietzschean philosophy is a model that inscribes itself in the aforementioned questions concerning the epistemology of art. As we will see in Part III of this thesis, art seems to have some priority in activating critique. Thus, the relation of affective knowledge for the construction and deconstruction of the latter is, I argue, the first justificatory basis for this priority of artistic over scientific-philosophical discourse.

Chapter 5: The rhetorical reading of Nietzsche's genealogy

What is then the genealogy offered by Nietzsche? My position is that instead of understanding genealogy as a historical reconstruction of events as they *actually happened*, leading to a fixed knowledge of how morality came about, another — and possibly more plausible interpretation — would be a rhetorical reading of genealogy, with a psychological reading included in it. A rhetorical reading of genealogy highlights the latter as a *mechanism* offering new interpretations on the emergence and development of moral values and the relevant beliefs and judgements. The narratives this new interpretation invents, at the level of their essence, are necessarily related to the positions they want to dislodge (which reflects the polemical aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy), while, in the level of their form, they are imbued by Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy, constituted by artistic means of speaking.

As I argued in my analysis of the psychological reading, Nietzsche is not content to formulate interpretations of the psychological structures of the agents. In the context of his use of the first-person plural or second person singular, he forms a series of questions, such as "How did *we* come to feel and think in *these* ways of ours?"[422] or "But why do you *listen* to the voice of your conscience?". He then invites the readers to understand "*the manner in which moral judgements have originated*" [*überhaupt jemals moralische Urtheile entstanden sind*], a process which will result in the spoiler of the impact of moral terms such as "conscience" and "duty" would have on them.[423] Apart from the hypothesis that such questions serve as occasions to establish positions on the psychological history of the subjectivity, they can also be conceived as questions with rhetorical capacity, meaning with a capacity to activate to his audience their passions, or, to put it in Nietzschean terms, their affective world.

According to this reading, the genealogy offered by Nietzsche is a *mélange* of literal (historical) and figurative (mythical) narratives concerning the generation and evolution of moral values, aiming, on a first level, to the stimulation of the readership's affects. That is related to undermining the conscious self, discussed above, namely, not

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[422] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 11.
[423] GS 335.

in theoretical terms but on a *practical* level, by appealing to the actual affective world of the reading audience. As discussed earlier, essential elements of Nietzschean methodology are the emphasis on style, the frequent use of metaphors and contradictions as a rhetorical technique and the constitution of the view that the production process of judgements and beliefs is imbued with the play of affects. While a historical reading of genealogy or a purely psychological one would not be in line with the above elements of the Nietzschean philosophy, a rhetorical reading of genealogy is perfectly compatible.

Thus, the advantages of this reading are the following. Firstly, it evades or weakens the importance of the fact that Nietzsche uses the historical fallacies and indeterminacies and fictitious events in his historical narrative. It also explains the use of rhetorical tropes, as artistic means of speaking, and Nietzsche's insistence that his *Genealogy* is perhaps the uncanniest thing written regarding intention, expression, and the art of surprise. Thirdly, it incorporates and makes sense of his position on affective knowledge. According to this view, genealogy functions at provoking an affective response from the readers and not providing them with the knowledge of the "real" history of the circumstances under which moral values emerged. The awakening of the agents' affective world, as we will see in Part III of the thesis, is necessary to the possibility of the activation of *critique* in his readership.

5.1. Fictive elements falling into Nietzsche's genealogy

Reginster notes, "Nietzsche's actual genealogical practice hardly heeds his own call for patient historical investigation".[424] On the contrary, he even uses "fictional allusions", and thus, Nietzsche's "actual" genealogy "combine fictional narrative with some historical documentation".[425] Along the same lines, Saar, recognising the mixture of historical and fictional elements in the Nietzschean genealogy, argues for example that

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[424] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 35.
[425] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*", op. cit., p. 35. See also, Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 11.

"of course, consciousness did not only evolve right out of social practices of punishment and the holding accountable of creditors".[426]

Let's examine some "historical" examples that Nietzsche brings to his development of the genesis and evolution of moral values to reflect on their historical validity. We should bear in mind that while some examples actually happened in history prima facie, the historical inaccuracy and ambiguity that characterise many of Nietzsche's historical descriptions indicate the fictional element he imports into his genealogy. The first one concerns *Genealogy*'s first Treatise on the genealogy of good, bad, and evil and the position of the "slave revolt" in it. As Janaway indicates, "when Nietzsche diagnoses the psychological origins of Christian values, we start in a Greek world reminiscent of the Homeric age but are sometimes among early Christian sects and the Roman Empire, at other times somewhere vague in the history of Judaism, and so on".[427] In other words, Nietzsche does not precisely place the genesis of moral values in a specific time and space. So, he presents different places and time periods as the origin of the same moral value. Analogous "temporal displacements" are found in his narratives on the sovereign individual and the modern philosopher. As Gemes[428] rightly notes, what Nietzsche calls "the sovereign individual" appears first as something already achieved,[429] then as a possible man of the future.[430] Similarly, the modern philosopher is firstly presented as one who has thrown off the mask of the religious,[431] and then as a person who still adheres to the ascetic ideal and in fact is nothing more than another manifestation of it.[432] Analogously, regarding the employment of fiction in his genealogical narratives, in the *Genealogy*, he recognises the Assassins as "the free spirits", therefore, as something that already existed. On the other hand, in the Preface to *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche admits that he *invented* the "free spirits", which might arrive in the future.[433] He explicitly states these are nothing but a *fiction*

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[426] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 309.

[427] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 11. Analogously, Gemes notes, Nietzsche, "[…] in talking of the nobles in the first essay the text, without any forewarning, shifts from a frame of reference focused on ancient Greece to a frame of reference focused on ancient Rome". Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit., p. 22.

[428] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit.

[429] GM II 2.

[430] GM II 2.

[431] GM III 10.

[432] GM III 24.

[433] HAH P 2.

he constructed for himself, he "*invented*" for himself "as compensation for the friends" he lacked.[434] On first sight, it seems as if Nietzsche is *mistaken* or bewildered as he is using the historical facts in an indeterminate or fictitious way.

Of course, not everything Nietzsche says is fictitious, but his "actual" genealogy "combines fictional narratives with some historical documentation"[435] — an example of the latter would be GM II 5, in which Nietzsche writes: "as in Egypt, where the corpse of a debtor found no peace from the creditor even in the grave — and this peace meant a lot precisely to the Egyptians".[436] Another example of accurate historical documentation, would be the description of the relationship between the Christian Crusades and the Assassins.[437] As seen above, Saar claims the aim of this strategy is to produce some "reality effect",[438] while in the early lecture notes on Rhetoric, Nietzsche makes the comment that for an orator to be persuasive, he must include fictional and actual elements in his narrative to have an affective impact on his audience. In that sense, even the description of actual historical events might be included and serving itself his rhetorical strategic. As we read in the early lecture notes on Rhetoric:

> The art [*Kunst*] of the orator is to never allow artificiality to become noticeable:[439] hence, the characteristic style which, however, is all the more a product of the highest art [*ein Produkt der hochsten Kunst ist*], just like the "naturalness" of the good actor. [...] through art, through an interchange of persons, and through a prudence which hovers over them, he finds and turns to his advantage what the most eloquent lawyer of each person and each party, namely egoism, only is able to discover. It is an exchange of egos, as with the dramatist. Goethe claims that, in Sophocles, all publicly appearing persons are the best orators, for when each has spoken, one always has the impression that his cause was the most just and the best. It is precisely the force of the

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[434] HAH P 2.

[435] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 35. The co-existence of historical and mythological elements in Nietzsche's genealogy is supported also by Williams. See, Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*, op. cit.

[436] GM II 5.

[437] GM III 24.

[438] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 309.

[439] Interestingly, the same happens with art in general. The artists aim to provoke the delusion of "natural" through their works of art.

characteristic style, through which Sophocles distinguished himself after he had come to maturity, according to his own testimony.[440]

We shall make some comments here. Firstly, that rhetoric is perceived by Nietzsche as belonging to the artistic discourse. Secondly, if Nietzsche follows his position presented here, then it is explicated why it is so difficult to distinguish between his fictitious narratives or actual documentation. It is plausible that his aim was not to "allow artificiality to become noticeable". A last comment regarding this passage is that the alternation of "I" at the level of dramaturgy partially confirms Richardson's reading of the "typology of individuals" in the Nietzschean corpus, as presented above. That is to say that the act of rhetoric which is engaged in an "exchange of egos" resembles Nietzsche's tactic of the exchange of different types of persons in his narrative, each of whom is the bearer of a specific discourse (the ascetic priest, the master, the sovereign individual, the slave, etc.). According to Richardson, Nietzsche's types of people are analogous to "types of directed behavior".[441] Richardson's reading then recognises the "metaphoric" use of the types of persons, in the rhetorical sense of the metaphor presented above, that "metaphor also appears in the designation of the genus; the genus, in the grammatical sense, is a luxury of language and pure metaphor".[442]

Janaway's discussion on Nietzsche's use of the term "real history" [*wirkliche Historie*] is a considerable contribution. He argues, based on the meaning of the "actual happening" of GM II 22, that:

> To do 'real history' […] is to explain the origins of our present-day attitudes by *reconstructing* the operation of a multiplicity of mental states, acts, drives, and mechanisms located in past human beings — *though not specific datable human beings*, but rather human beings *conceived* in generic fashion by a kind of *projective reconstruction* of how a certain psychological type would act and feel in a certain dynamic of power-relations and cultural inheritances.[443]

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[440] R, p. 114. Already from these early lecture notes, we can notice Nietzsche's emphasis on the artistic dimension of the rhetorical speech. In that sense, as I will claim in the last part of the thesis, the rhetorical strategy of Nietzsche might be perceived as "artistic" in a broader sense regarding its form.
[441] Richardson, *Nietzsche's System*, op. cit., p. 52.
[442] R, p. 108.
[443] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 44. *Italics* are my emphasis.

What emerges from here? When Nietzsche speaks about "real history", or what "actually" happened, he means the opposite, that is: how we could project the idea of actuality. We read in the second *Untimely Meditation*:

> To determine this degree, and through it the limit beyond which the past must be forgotten if it is not to become the gravedigger of the present, one would have to know precisely how great the *plastic power* [*die plastische Kraft*] of a man, a people or a culture is. I mean the power distinctively to grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself.[444]

Interestingly, the term of the "plastic power" [*plastische Kraft*] is also attributed to the orator as his "practice",[445] which, as we saw, is the "highest art" to artistically present something fictional as natural to increase the eloquence of his discourse.[446] Thus, what is important is not the real description of the past events, but the transformation, assimilation or reshaping of past forms from a perspective focusing on the actual presentation to the readers. A reading of history, in other words, that, as seen in Part I of the thesis, is in line with the Nietzschean undermining of history as an objective description of the actual happening of events and, as we will discuss in Part III of the thesis, with his undermining of the state of fixed knowledge.

And that leads to the question: If not describing the historical moral past as what actually happened, in what sense is genealogy affirmative? I find accurate Hoy's claim that "genealogy need not be affirmative in the sense of asserting specific substantive doctrines but in the sense of being heuristically feasible".[447] To put it differently, genealogy need not be affirmative in asserting specific substantive doctrines or events but in presenting a heuristic and plausible account regarding moral beliefs, judgements, and values through discovering the conditions under which the moral values were born,

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[444] HL, p. 10.
[445] The full passage is:
> The characteristic style is the proper domain of the art of the orator: here he practices a free *plastic* art; the language is his material which has already been prepared. Here, he is an imitative artist; he speaks like an actor who plays a role unfamiliar to him or in an unfamiliar situation.

R., p. 113.
[446] R., p. 113-114.
[447] Hoy, "Nietzsche and Hume on Genealogical Method", op. cit., p. 21.

modified, and evolved. What kind of discovery is this? Maybe "invention" or "creation" is a better word choice.[448] In D 119, the Nietzschean reader encounters the thought:

> What then are our experiences [*Erlebnisse*]? Much *more* that which we put into them than that which they already contain! Or must we go so far as to say: in themselves they contain nothing? To experience is to invent [*Erleben ist ein Erdichten*]?[449]

If experience is an invention, then the discovery of it will necessarily be, at least to some extent, a second-order invention. What does Nietzsche mean, therefore, when, in the *Genealogy,* he calls for "virtually *discovering* [*entdecken*]" "[t]he vast, distant and hidden land of morality — of morality as it really existed and was really lived [*der wirklich dagewesenen, wirklich gelebten Moral*]"?[450] Two illuminating examples regarding this kind of discovery might be Nietzsche's predecessor, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Nietzsche's reader, Michele Foucault. Rousseau, in the Second Discourse, *On the Origin of Inequality*, writes:

> Let us begin therefore by setting aside all the facts, because they do not touch upon the question. One must not take the investigations that can be carried out on this subject for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings, more appropriate for clearing up the nature of things than for showing their true origin.[451]

In a similar way, Foucault, while discussing his interpretation of genealogy, claims:

> Archaeology is no doubt a machine, but why a miraculous machine, a machine that critiques, a machine that interrogates certain power relations, a machine that possesses a liberating function, or at least, ought to. To the extent that we attribute a liberating function to poetry, I would find it beautiful if archaeology were *poetry*, even if I don't want to claim that it actually is. I don't remember in what context Deleuze said that I am a poet, but I suppose what he meant by

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[448] The Nietzschean preference for "invention" over "discovery" is also acknowledged by Nehamas when he addresses the question of "becoming who we are". See, Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 188.
[449] D 119.
[450] GM P 7.
[451] Rousseau, J.-J. (1992). *Discours sur l' origine et les fondements de l' inegalité parmis les hommes.* Paris: Flammarion, p. 169.

that is that *my discourse does not attempt to follow the same laws of verification as those that govern the science of history, in the strict sense of the term, insofar as that science aims only at truth and would like to say what happened* […]. I would say much more pragmatically that my machine is very good, *not because it offers and describes a model of a past event but insofar as it succeeds in describing a model of a past event which allows us to free ourselves from that event*.[452]

Hence, genealogy offers a new interpretation (including fictive and actual elements) of an event, which may retrieve us from our labyrinth of the harmful interpretation we already have — we will shortly see how. In that sense, "[t]he factual is irrelevant",[453] or at least almost irrelevant. What is important is to construct plausible hypotheses regarding the genealogy of moral values. The limit between the discovery of the origins of values, beliefs, and judgements and the invention of them is fluid. Rather than confirming the adequacy of our present self-descriptions and the coherence of our practices, genealogy makes us more intelligible to ourselves by showing us the inadequacy of our present self-understandings and practices. It does so by giving an interpretation of how such an inadequacy could have come about which will awake our affects.[454]

5.2. Genealogy's Intention

What is *Genealogy*'s intention? Thus, what is the intention of the particular genealogies Nietzsche introduces regarding the emergence of moral values? According to the historical reading presented in Part I, Nietzsche aims to provide his readers with *knowledge* concerning the origin of moral values as described in his corpus. In other words, to provide a new interpretation of what truly exists or existed. He attempts, for example, to establish as truth the origin of the value of goodness from its opposite, the emergence of conscience from the instinct of aggression, and the derivation of the feeling of guilt from juridical relations and instincts of the agents. This position would not explain why "expression" and "the art of surprise" are core elements of his

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[452] My translation of Foucault, M. (2003). *Die Wahrheit und die juristischen Formen*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. *Italics* are mine.
[453] Guay, "Genealogy as Immanent Critique…", op. cit., p. 174.
[454] Hoy, "Nietzsche and Hume on Genealogical Method", op. cit., p. 31.

genealogy, why he uses fictitious narratives blended with historical documentation and would contradict Nietzsche's anti-systematic positions regarding history, as seen in Part I, and knowledge, as a fixed state, as we will see in Part III.

It would also raise the question: Could Nietzsche be so naïve that albeit he urges us to discover the "real history" of morality, he then uses the historical facts in a fallacious, and indeterminate, or even a contradictory and metaphorical way, as we saw in Chapter 4.2? I claim that this probably is neither a matter of naïvety nor one of inconsistency but is serving his rhetorical strategy. In *Ecce Homo* we read that:

> With regard to expression [*Ausdruck*], intention [*Absicht*], and the art of surprise [*Kunst der Überraschung*], the three essays, that make up this *Genealogy* are perhaps the most uncanny [*das Unheimlichste*] things written so far.[455]

Nietzsche's work does not limit itself at the aim of offering an argument, or in the case of the genealogy at reconstructing the historical facts as they happened, but also gives detail to the expression, and the art of surprise, qualities that provoke an affective response from his readers. As seen above, that is a necessary move as "the persuasive problem posed for his project of re-evaluation is that our relationship to our moral values is not simply an epistemic issue but also, and in some respects more basically, an affective one".[456] The mixture of reality with fiction, which produces a "reality effect", is related to Nietzsche's rhetorical strategy that aims to engage his readership affectively.[457]

Therefore, Nietzsche's intention purpose is not to *describe* the true origin of the moral values, beliefs, and judgements, i.e. in a empiricist sense, or to construct a new scientific truth or system (as other philosophers do, such as Hegel in his *Science of Logic* or Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*) but to create a narrative, to *invent* a new interpretation regarding the genealogy of moral values, using the appropriate rhetorical-artistic techniques, which not, inscribed in his, will undermine the validity of the opposite positions, but also induce, at least on a first level, an affective response in his

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[455] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[456] Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 49.
[457] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 309.

readers.[458] There is even his testimony that the seduction of the readers is his purpose, when writing that:

> A powerful seduction fights on our behalf, the most powerful that there has ever been — the seduction of truth — "Truth"? Who has forced this word on me? But I repudiate it; but I disdain this proud word: no, we do not need even this: we shall conquer and come to power even without truth. The spell that fights on our behalf, the eye of Venus that charms and blinds even our opponents, *is the magic of the extreme*, the seduction that everything extreme exercises: we immoralists — we are the most extreme.[459]

Nietzsche's aim is seduction through the relevant art of surprise and the style, which Gemes characterises as "extreme rhetoric".[460] The underlying position here is the link between the affects of the readers and the activation of the possibility of critique in them concerning their moral beliefs, judgements, and values, as we will discuss in Part III. Genealogy's intention to influence readers' affects is also in line with Nietzsche's suggestion of the priority of the drives over reason,[461] which we examined above, and his aim to *undermine the operation* of his readership's conscious self.

As we saw, according to this view, affects perform a central role in our belief, judgement, and knowledge formation in the realm of morality. According to Nietzsche, when I call something "good", I do so because it influences me on an affective level, or I call the other thing "right" because the idea of rightness emerged through my psychological prehistory, which is directed to a large extent by the play of affects, often unconscious and unknown to me.[462] Furthermore, considering the position on the role of affects in forming beliefs and judgements, it is plausible that changing or rejecting these positions is not possible by appealing exclusively to the rationality of the agents. Instead, influence on agents at the affective level seems necessary, which in turn is potentially likely to lead to a shift at the purely intellectual level. Given these, I think it

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[458] See, for example, Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p.48-50.
[459] WP 749.
[460] Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth", op. cit., p. 48.
[461] For example, D 109, or GS 333.
[462] GS 335.

is plausible to claim that genealogy's intention is, in its beginnings, to create an emotional reaction in the audience.

Nietzschean scholarship acknowledges this line of interpretation, that the intention of genealogy is to stimulate the affective world of Nietzsche's readership. Gemes, for example, claims "Nietzsche uses ideas as weapons. He uses ideas not as means of describing but as tools for affecting change".[463] In his turn, Martin Saar is one of the scholars who presents a detailed analysis of this idea. Saar reads the Nietzschean genealogy "as an attempt to directly relate to the affective constitution of its readers".[464] According to him, the appeal to the affective constitution of the readership is achieved through the rhetorical finesse of genealogy. The rhetorical virtuosity consists of Nietzsche's construction of narratives, which contain historical and fictional elements that address the formation of the subjectivity of the agents. These narratives invite the reading public to recognise themselves in them on the one hand and, on the other hand, create in them a kind of estrangement regarding their very selves. The effect of estrangement is achieved through the realisation that:

> the subjects in question are always already influenced and determined by powers and forces so far unseen, that subjects, as it were, are "implicated" in power.[465]

According to Saar, through genealogy, of which the rhetorical style of its composition is constitutive, affects are stimulated in the agents because of their identification with the forms of subjectivity emerging from the Nietzschean narrative. Saar continues that the "aim of genealogical writing is exactly to raise affects *and to stir up doubts and questions* about the present form of subjectivity".[466] I will return to the emergence of doubt by the Nietzschean genealogy in Part III of this work. At this point, I will adhere to the shaking up of the affective world through genealogy, turning to Nietzsche himself.

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[463] Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth", op. cit., p. 62.
[464] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 310.
[465] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 311.
[466] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 311. *Italics* are my emphasis.

Nietzsche urges readers to be able to be "both profoundly wounded and profoundly delighted" by his *Genealogy*.[467] How does he manage that? Let's make an experiment. Nietzsche presents this regarding the genealogy of the feeling of guilt:

> What actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself, but the senselessness of suffering.[468]

And then,

> For every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress […] 'I suffer: someone or other must be guilty' — and every sick sheep thinks the same. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, says to him, 'Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, you yourself alone *are to blame for yourself*'.[469]

Of course, this is a small example, but it is enough for our purposes. Let's wonder what feelings the readers acquire by reading these lines. Could they be helpful concerning the awakening of their affective world and the potential activation of a critical attitude regarding what they believed about guilt? And does this relocation happen because of the rational exegesis of the *actual* origin of guilt or because of the arousal of our affective world? Considering the use of history, the use of rhetorical devices and the position on the affective knowledge, it seems that within the specific — i.e. the Nietzschean — method, what weighs heavily is how the genealogical narrative itself *affects* the readers.

In this case, the function of the conscious self is undermined by Nietzsche's direct second-person address to his readership, by placing his audience in the position of the sufferer from which the ascetic priest accuses him, and even more so by the discomfort caused by Nietzsche's very use of the language he chooses. We, his reading public, are "sheep", and as "sheep", we obey a voice, that of the ascetic priest (in Freudian terms, we might say of a severe superego), and we attribute the pain we feel in our inherent guilt. We see, therefore, an example of the Nietzschean *undermining* of the conscious self in practice, as discussed above, through his genealogy. As we saw in

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[467] GM P 8.
[468] GM II 7.
[469] GM III 15.

more detail in Chapter 3.2., following the genealogy of conscience, we are confronted with the position that because we entered civilization, we all necessarily suffer. We belong, in other words, to the "sufferers" to whom the ascetic priest refers. The use of the metaphor of "sheep" as a means of devaluation, the simultaneous "encounter" with the ascetic priest that suggests the grid of power relations in which we are formed as subjects, and the use of the second person in repetition has some affective impact — or at least aims at, whether this is anger, discomfort, wonder, even mockery towards the narrative itself.

This idea of the personal (affective) attachment to the creation of moral beliefs and judgements is also a part of Nietzsche's critique towards Rée, in that the latter "is wedded to a conception of cool, detached scientific discovery and does not personalize his enquiry".[470] According to Janaway, "each of us should be asking, 'How did my attachment to the ideal of an impersonal, affect-free search for truth emerge? And 'What implies me to follow that ideal?' and be looking for the answers in our inclination and aversions and their cultural prehistory".[471] Exactly as the task of the orator described in Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, genealogy's purpose could be to provide new narratives, in the scope of Nietzsche's *polemic*, concerning the situation and the context in which our moral values emerged, developed, and changed. Therefore, by following Nietzsche's narrative on the emergence of our moral values and beliefs unfolding, we undergo an emotional reaction which potentially leads us to introspect and *question* our moral values, beliefs, judgement and their value. In that sense, Nietzsche is not "a young rhetorician" [472] only at the stage of "On Truth and Lie", as Berry notes, but throughout his entire career.

Maybe then Nietzsche's genealogy works like that: it provides new narratives, mixing historical and fictional elements, that, through rhetorical means, would awaken the affective world of the readers, which in turn will create the possibility to criticise the validity and the value of their moral beliefs, judgements and values. Or, to put it in Nietzsche's words, his genealogical method might awaken the power of the readers by "transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what

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[470] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit. p. 12.
[471] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 43.
[472] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 66.

is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself".[473] Now the question is: would an absence of the rhetorical elements make Nietzsche's narrative less effective or would it render its outcome *impossible*? The question about the importance of the reader's affective response is related to objections raised about the significance of the Nietzschean rhetorical style. In this context, I progress by discussing the objections to the rhetorical reading, proceeded by objections to the psychological reading, presented in Part I.

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[473] HL, p. 10.

Chapter 6: The Psychological and the Rhetorical Reading: objections and relationship

In this chapter, I present some central objections to the psychological and the rhetorical reading and construct answers. Through responding to the objections, the plausibility of my reading becomes prominent and highlights the coherence of the Nietzschean corpus. Then, I address the issue of the relationship between the two readings presented above: the psychological and the rhetorical. At the end of this chapter, I argue in favour of an interpretative line that attempts to link these two readings, suggesting they are complementary.

6.1. Objections

6.1.1. Objections to the psychological reading: applicability and contradictions

Although the reading of genealogy as an investigation of the emergence of moral beliefs, judgements, and values and their relationship with human psychological structures is sensible and much accepted by the secondary literature, meaning the psychological reading, there are some main weaknesses one cannot overlook. Firstly, there is the objection based on the genetic fallacy. Why might the knowledge, for example, of the way conscience and guilt emerged lead to questioning of the normative elements linked to them? How could it lead to an examination of the value of moral values? The second main objection concerns an internal contradiction with Nietzsche's purposes, which this reading contains. If Nietzsche aims to expose the true origins of the psychological faculties linked with the emergence of moral beliefs, judgements, and values, isn't this movement contradictory with his anti-positivist and anti-grounding positions concerning new scientific truths?[474]

I start with the latter issue and deal with the former afterwards. Indeed, Nietzsche continuously defends an anti-systematic position concerning philosophy and

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[474] In her exploration of Nietzsche's connection to sceptics, Berry acknowledges the same objection and wonders: "How can Skeptical epochē, especially if it is as radical as I have been suggesting, possibly be compatible with the successful practice of moral psychology?" (Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 96). While she addresses this inquiry through Hume's objection to Pyrrhonism, I suggest Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric provide an answer to this issue, recognising psychological knowledge as a crucial component for orator's practice.

the production of scientific knowledge. How could systematic psychology be compatible with his anti-systematic intentions and the use of figurative language? We could respond by arguing that Nietzsche's aim was *not* to construct a new, literal exegesis of the emerging psychological structures and the relevant values. However, from our later knowledge of the theoretical and clinical practices, we know that what he describes has validity.

The number of references and the accuracy and precision of the descriptions of the psychological structures of the agents Nietzsche provides lead to the demand for another explanation. It is in this context, moreover, where Nietzsche repeatedly calls himself a "psychologist" in his works.[475] I think a stronger answer lies in his unpublished notes on Rhetoric. In his early lecture notes on Rhetoric, Nietzsche, states that there are two elements of a successful orator: firstly, the task of invoking passions in his readers and, as a prerequisite of it, an understanding of the way the human psyche functions and the effect each type of discourse would have in their soul [I call this thesis, **Thesis I**].[476]

Therefore, the following reading is probably more robust. Nietzsche's genealogy refers to the interrogation of the value of moral values. For that to be realised it is necessary to have knowledge [*ein Kenntiss*] of "the context and conditions under which these values were born, developed and modified".[477] Suppose the rhetorical reading of genealogy is tenable and thus intends to the readers' affective response to what is written and then to the activation of their critical thought. In that case, Nietzsche's genealogy operates from within a rhetorical position. [I call this thesis, **Thesis II**]. The question is: What about the psychological interpretation? If Nietzsche, in his genealogy, operates from the position of the orator [**Thesis II**] and at the same time accepts [**Thesis I**] that a competent orator requires knowledge of the psychological structures of the agents, then indeed his psychological interpretation is not an accidental and unimportant interpretation or line of reasoning but expresses an almost systematic conception of the human psyche Nietzsche has. While Nietzsche's primary objective is not to formulate or present a "theory" of the psyche or mind, it appears he does so, at least to some extent. However, he employs this as an essential element of his rhetorical

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[475] See, for example: BGE 196; GM III 20; TI 35.
[476] R, p. 99.
[477] GM P 6.

strategy. That echoes the connection made in *Ecce Homo* between Nietzsche's self-identification as a "psychologist" and the uncanny impact he acknowledges his genealogical narratives elicit through his rhetorical artistry.[478] Furthermore, as we saw above when comparing Nietzsche with Freud, the former, while interested in psychological structures and phenomena, often remains abstract regarding *how* these psychological structures function. For example, Nietzsche claims that our affective world forms knowledge, beliefs, and judgements, but he never delves into details regarding the exact nature of this influence. Considering the above, it is plausible to claim that his intention was primarily to retain for himself any "knowledge" regarding psychological structures and present it only secondarily, often in an indeterminate way. So, the latter of these objections is resolvable.

The first objection, though, persists. Indeed, providing literal knowledge about how moral values emerge on a psychological level does not seem sufficient to lead to a *critique* of the value of values. Nietzsche is explicit. GS 345, where the idea of genetic fallacy is presented, namely that the origins of an object are explanatory regarding its value, is illuminating regarding the question of the adequacy of the psychological reading of genealogy for critique. We read:

> But the value of a command "thou shalt" is still fundamentally different from and independent of such opinions about it and the weeds of error that may have overgrown it. […] Even if a morality has grown out of an error, the realization of this fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value. […] Thus nobody up to now has examined the value of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality; and the first step would be —for once to *question* [*in Frage stellt*] it. Well then. Precisely this is our task. —[479]

Along the same lines, in WP 254, we read:

> The inquiry into the *origin of our evaluations* and tables of the good is in absolutely no way identical with a critique of them, as is so often believed: even though the insight into some *pudenda origo* certainly brings with it *a feeling* of

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[478] EH, "The Genealogy of Morality".
[479] GS 345.

a diminution in value of the thing that originated thus and prepares the way to a critical mood and attitude toward it.[480]

Therefore, it is openly stated by Nietzsche in this respect that a genealogical description of the circumstances out of which moral values were born is *insufficient* for the *intended critique*, for the task "to question" the value of values.

This objection can be addressed through the perspective of a rhetorical reading, suggesting that Nietzsche's aim is not to provide definitive knowledge of the actual origin of values. Instead, he frames genealogy as a rhetorical-artistic phenomenon designed to engage the affective realm of his readers on a first level. Furthermore, any valid psychological observations are not sufficient conditions by themselves to achieve the intended outcome of the genealogy. Rather, they serve as means to that end — either through Nietzsche's understanding of the psychological structures of the agents and the effects his discourse will have on them or through the readers' identification with the genealogical narratives presented. This identification is facilitated by the psychological component, which enhances the ease of such identification.

6.1.2. Objections on the rhetorical reading: irrelevancy and ineffectiveness

I will now examine a first possible objection to the rhetorical reading and aim to provide an answer. It is sensible to object that if Nietzsche's aim is merely an affective reaction from the readers through rhetorical techniques, then the content he uses is irrelevant. In other words, if the whole genealogy ultimately aims at the readers' affective engagement, then could Nietzsche have used any other content beyond what he uses to influence them? The ultimate consequence would be that the content he chooses for his narrative makes no difference and is non-important. Instead of suggesting, for example, that the feeling of guilt is composed of the elements he describes (debtor-creditor relationship, human drive to give meaning to objects, the power dynamics the ascetic priest exercises), he could have brought any other origins in their place.

This objection is answered relatively easily. Nietzsche does not write in a vacuum. Or, as Gemes has noted, when one interprets Nietzsche's passages, it is important to understand "what his target is".[481] Each element of the origins of the moral

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[480] WP 254.

[481] Gemes, K. (2009). "Janaway on Perspectivism." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 17 *(*1), p. 101.

values, beliefs, or judgements he chooses to include in his schema relates to something specific or a position of a specific philosopher he seeks to combat. Thus, the content of his narrative is necessarily linked to the positions he opposes. Taking the example of guilt again, firstly, he wants to combat the view that guilt emerges from a divergence with the voice of God within us and is ontologically grounded. On the contrary, he claims it arises (1) from something very worldly (the guilt justification) on a psychological level, which (2) is linked to a socio-historical context (i.e. the guilt-debt relationship). At the same time, wanting to show that the faith we have in the goodness of the representatives of Christianity is flawed, and that morality is formed in terms of power-relations, he counters (3) that it is precisely the notion of guilt that the representative of Christianity, the priest, exploits as a tool of desecration. Therefore, the content is not irrelevant but contains those necessary qualities which internally contradict the dominant positions about moral values, beliefs, and judgements of the 19th century. Thus, in the example of guilt, guilt as flowing from human expulsion from the divine world, ascribed to an entirely earthly entity, the human body, is socio-historically shaped and even exploited for self-interest by the representative of Christianity.

A stronger objection concerning this reading is the question of its effectiveness. The criticisers of this method usually make the claim that affects are incapable of effectively relocating the readers from their moral beliefs, and judgements regarding values and their value. Katsafanas, for example, criticises Janaway's reading of Nietzsche that "unless one becomes affectively engaged by Nietzsche's style, one cannot attain truths about the causal history of one's moral evaluations",[482] characterising his philosophical position as "bold".[483] In other words, he rejects the necessity of the affective influence of Nietzsche's writings, or to put it in his words, that "style" has a "constitutive role".[484] He suggests that Janaway claims that for Nietzsche to understand a moral value, I must identify with the feeling that created it. To do so, Nietzsche designs a narrative that will permit the reader to identify with the value-creating feeling and thus understand the origin of the moral value. According to

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[482] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, op. cit., p. 48.
[483] Katsafanas, "Beyond Selflessness […]", op. cit., p. 554
[484] Katsafanas, "Beyond Selflessness […]", op. cit., p. 556.

Katsafanas, this position does not seem to work, as "the single most important affect involved in the explanation of modern morality is ressentiment".[485] And he continues:

> It follows that I must consciously feel *ressentiment* in order to understand Nietzsche's explanation of modern morality. But the *Genealogy* hardly seems designed to activate *ressentiment* in its readers; on the contrary, it encourages disgust with, and contempt for, those who are motivated by *ressentiment*. These are not the affects that play a role in Nietzsche's story of why I hold my moral beliefs.[486]

Even if we agree with this position here — although it is in question if *Genealogy*'s readers feel ressentiment or not — I think another interpretation of the awakening of the affective world in readers would be more plausible. Why should ressentiment, as the main affect of forming moral beliefs, be the only affect aroused in the readers? In other words, a stronger interpretation would be that the affective response relates not only to the feelings or emotions described *in* the narrative but to those aroused *by* the narrative. As I argued in Chapter 4.3., Nietzsche does not aim to undermine the conscious self exclusively *as a concept* on a theoretical level. He simultaneously aims to undermine the *operation* of the conscious self of his readership *in practice*. Allison, in that direction, notes:

> Perhaps more than any other philosopher who readily comes to mind, Nietzsche writes exclusively for you. Not at you, but for you. For you, the reader. Only you. At least this is the feeling one often has when reading him.[487]

Similarly, Stern observes:

> [a]nyone who has read even a few pages of Nietzsche's writings will remember attending to the arguments on the page with a curious double feeling, noting a sort of *changeant* effect. A most exhilarating impression of immense intellectual energy [...] goes hand in hand with embarrassment bordering on

[485] Katsafanas, "Beyond Selflessness […]", op. cit., p. 555.
[486] Katsafanas, "Beyond Selflessness […]", op. cit., p. 555.
[487] Allison, David B. (2000). *Reading the New Nietzsche : The Birth of Tragedy, the Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and on the Genealogy of Morals*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, p. vii.

irritation, perhaps something akin to that feeling experienced by Ritschl and many of Nietzsche's later friends.[488]

Stern continues that this "*changeant* effect" emerges from Nietzsche's "notorious opinions on certain topics" and from the fact that "value judgements […] are a constant mode of Nietzsche's writing".[489] Apart from Nietzsche's "opinion" that we humans enjoy suffering, and our problem with it consists of its meaninglessness, which shocks us, the style of Nietzschean writing also affects our affective constitution. That is, Nietzsche does not express himself scientifically and neutrally. Instead, as discussed above, taking the position of the ascetic priest and addressing his readership in the second person, degrades us, calling us "sheep" for accepting that we are guilty of a "foolish" reason, for the urge to make sense, even if it is ultimately accidental, of the pain we feel. For example, when the reader of Nietzsche's works encounters the thought that the feeling of guilt corresponds to a human inclination to give meaning or justify, the affective response that will emerge might be crucial. Returning to a previously discussed paradigm concerning the exploitation of our inherent need to ascribe meaning to our suffering by the ascetic priest, the initial affect I experience when reading about the intertwining of guilt with the necessity of meaning is wonder, followed by surprise. Subsequently, upon reading about the ascetic priest's manipulation of my need, I likely feel irritation or anger. This irritation is further intensified by Nietzsche's positioning of me, the reader, in the degrading role of the "sick sheep", passively accepting the interpretations of an external authority, in this case, the ascetic priest. Through this interaction alone, the Nietzschean narrative evokes a profound affective response.

Of course, I do not claim all readers of Nietzsche will feel the same emotions; some will probably not even be able to "delve" emotionally into his narrative and eventually be affected by it, although, as seen, it is widely recognised by the secondary literature the "shocking" effect Nietzsche's writings have on our affective and intellectual constitution.[490] However, the achievement of his readers' affective engagement with what he writes is not an absolute condition for the validity of the thesis

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[488] Stern, "Nietzsche's Aesthetics", op. cit., p. 214.
[489] Stern, "Nietzsche's Aesthetics", op. cit., p. 214.
[490] See, for example, Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy, the Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and on the Genealogy of Morals*, op. cit.; Stern, "Nietzsche's Aesthetics", op. cit., p. 214; Babich, "The genealogy of morals and right reading: On the Nietzschean aphorism and the art of the polemic", op. cit., p. 182; Gemes, "Strangers to ourselves […]", op. cit., p. 1.

under consideration. The *possibility* of influencing is sufficient. I claim that without the necessary rhetorical style, an affective engagement, to which Nietzsche aims, would be impossible. Probably what Reginster calls the *functional* awakening of the reader, which according to him constitutes genealogy's aim and explains the coexistence of historical and fictional elements,[491] could be read under this light.

Aumann is another Nietzsche scholar who, in turn, downgrades the significance of the rhetorical elements in Nietzsche's writings and their effect on eliciting an affective response from the readers.[492] As he says, "[t]he pivotal question is not whether our emotions ever play a role in the knowledge acquisition process, but whether they ever play a necessary role. In other words, do they enable us to grasp truths we could not otherwise grasp?".[493] He answers to this question negatively. To argue that the emotional response of readers is not necessary for knowledge, he establishes a distinction. This distinction concerns understanding a truth autonomously — on one's own —, and understanding it heteronomously — that is, having it supplied ready-made by someone else. In his words, "[i]t may show that feeling emotions are indispensable for arriving at certain truths on one's own. But it does not prove that feeling emotions is necessary for understanding those truths".[494]

To elucidate this position, he provides an example by analogy, involving a telescope. Likening the telescope to our emotions as "tools of discovery", he argues that while we can access truths through the telescope, such as the existence of a particular planet, we can then communicate these truths to others who do not possess a telescope. Indeed, we can convey reliable knowledge to them heteronomously. He concludes:

> Applying the analogy, there may be truths none of us would know unless one
> of us consulted his or her emotions. But it does not follow that each of us must
> consult his or her emotions in order to understand these truths. We could learn

[491] Reginster, *The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit., p. 35.
[492] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., pp. 182-195.
[493] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., p. 186.
[494] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., p. 187.

about them from others, provided the chain of testimony eventually stretched back to an emotionally attuned individual.[495]

There are at least four flaws in Aumann's analysis. Firstly, Aumann distinguishes between "arriving" at some truths and "understanding" them. However, within Nietzschean analysis, the boundaries of this distinction are blurred. Even if we accept that such a distinction is reasonable, the "arrival" at the respective truths still constitutes a prerequisite for any "understanding" of them — an arrival necessarily mediated by emotions. Therefore, emotions are essential for the "understanding" of the ultimate truths.

In *Genealogy*'s synopsis in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche explicitly contends that due to the intentions behind the three Treatises, their artistry in surprise, and their expressive power, truths will *gradually* emerge, mediated through the emotion of the "uncanny" that these Treatises provoke.[496] Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4.3, Nietzsche ascribes a pivotal role to our emotions — or, to put it otherwise, affects — in the formation of knowledge, judgements, and beliefs. While he may not provide a detailed scientific methodology for how precisely affects influence the process of knowledge production — since such is not his aim — ignoring the presence of this perspective within the Nietzschean corpus constitutes a significant oversight. That is especially pertinent considering the synopsis of *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo*, where the emotion — or affect — of the "uncanny" play a crucial role in comprehending the "truths" articulated at the end of each Treatise.

Secondly, Aumann disregards the personal element that Nietzsche emphasises. Nietzsche's task is to understand how our values emerged and developed in order to question their value and, consequently, acquire "knowledge" regarding the value of the values we embody. It is a challenging task, as we understand ourselves through the values we incorporate, which have assumed a status of truth within us. It is much more difficult to recognise that what I consider "good" or "right" may be unfounded and re-evaluate the values on which I base my life than to learn, for instance, that the Earth revolves around the Sun. In the latter case, knowledge has no personal cost. By contrast,

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[495] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit.
[496] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

the former type of knowledge — as the understanding of the value each value I embody has for my life and, in that sense, an engagement with an inquiry regarding them — potentially entails a tremendous risk, as it requires me to understand and deconstruct myself and my life as I have known it up to now.

Nietzsche aims to inspire an investment in the inquiry into how values emerge and develop and what value they have for *our* lives. Although this inquiry concerns issues anyone could understand, it requires a personal and affective investment. That makes it explicable why Aumann's claim is mistaken. GS 319 is a characteristic example. We read:

> One sort of honesty has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind: They have never made their experiences [*Erlebnissen*] a matter of conscience for knowledge [*eine Gewissenssache der Erkenntniss*]. "What did I really experience? [*Was habe ich eigentlich erlebt?*] What happened in me and around me? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?'[497]

Knowledge in this context concerns *my* experience, which I experienced, necessarily, in the first person singular. In this case, any understanding is mediated by my reflection on my own experiences, linked to my affective world. That explains Nietzsche's assertion that his readers must be truly hurt by his works to understand him.[498] It also underscores his aim to find agents "who approached morality in this personal way and who knew morality as a problem, and this problem as" their "own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion".[499]

Thirdly, Aumann completely disregards Nietzsche's rhetorical style and, by extension, the significance of literature by asserting that if someone were to tell me these truths "straightforwardly", it would be easy for me to understand them. The flaw in Aumann's argument lies in his failure to consider that sometimes when agents are "straightforwardly" told "the solutions they need", they might not only be incapable of understanding these truths but might also find them catastrophic. On the contrary, Gemes characteristically and accurately notes that Nietzsche, "[l]ike a clever

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[497] GS 319.
[498] GM P 8.
[499] GS 345.

psychoanalyst, he knows that a direct approach will merely awaken the patient's reader's defences and provoke a reflex denial and a refusal to countenance his message".[500] Thus, the claim that one would understand if someone "straightforwardly told the solutions they need" presents certain difficulties,[501] especially in Nietzsche's case. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth "can be a hidden will to death",[502] and humans "may bleed to death from knowledge of truth".[503] Therefore, sometimes "truths" need concealments as countermeasures.

I discuss the relationship between the knowledge of truth and the need for masquerade for health and life at length in Chapter 9. Briefly, according to Nietzsche, sometimes knowledge of certain truths is impossible for agents to bear — hence, the pattern of deception is fundamental to his *Genealogy* —[504] or intolerable. Therefore, the direct transmission of knowledge can become impossible or even intolerable, especially regarding delicate issues such as the value of the values agents embody, which are necessarily linked to the formation of their subjectivity.

A particularly fitting example that illustrates these three issues — the affective element in understanding, the personal element and the straightforward communication of truths — is that of Oedipus. In his quest to find the man who killed Laius and brought the plague to Thebes, he declares, "I will come to the beginning, and the truth in the light I will reveal".[505] Oedipus is confronted by the oracle Tiresias, who explicitly announces that he is the murderer of Laius, his father, and consequently the new husband of his mother, Iocasta.[506] Oedipus reacts dismissively to this direct knowledge of the truth.[507] The rejection of truth's knowledge is repeated until late in the plot of the tragedy when he finally reaches the right emotional state. Only then can he assemble the evidence concerning the facts and discover the truth on his own when he is ready.

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[500] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit., p. 3.
[501] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., p. 187.
[502] GS 344.
[503] HAH I 109.
[504] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[505] Sophocles (1885). *Oedipus The King*. Morshead, E. D. A. (trans.), London: Macmillan and Co, v. 132.
[506] Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*, op. cit., v. 350-354· 362.
[507] Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*, op. cit., v. 354-355· 363.

The same principle applies to psychoanalysis. The analyst never transfers knowledge to the patient "straightforwardly" but allows the patient to discover or even construct her truth for herself. Indeed, only in this way can unconscious desires or forgotten truths emerge, enabling the patient to know or invent herself. These two examples, one from art and one from psychoanalysis, indicate that (i) Knowledge gained through intuitive life may be stronger than knowledge conveyed consciously, especially regarding truths about the self. (ii) When someone tells me something about *my* own constitution or *my* moral values, it is most likely I would not be able to understand it without delving into the issue on my own. (iii) If such truth is expressed "straightforwardly", it might be impossible for me to arrive, let alone to understand it, if I am not *ready* to hear it.

Aumann, in his analysis, makes a fourth flaw, concerning the identification he erroneously establishes between the methods and aims of Nietzsche and Janaway. The point is not only to prove whether or not affects are necessary for cognition but also to regard the framework on which such a reading is based, namely Nietzschean philosophy. Indeed, in his attempt to respond to Janaway, he confuses Nietzsche's purposes with those of Janaway, making a logical leap. He writes the following:

> Despite his praise for Nietzsche's poetic style, Janaway writes in a stereotypical academic fashion. His prose is dispassionate, impersonal, and generally devoid of literary trappings. Accordingly, when we read his book, it engages us on a purely intellectual level. It does not arouse our emotions. […] For instance, he says, "*our* current moral concepts are *ex post facto* rationalizations of *our . . .* inherited feelings" and "*we* have inherited an affective allegiance to what counted as good in the conceptual scheme of slave morality." If Janaway's account of the relationship between emotion and cognition were entirely correct, these lines should be hard for us to comprehend. His writing style should render us cold and dispassionate. It should lead us to ignore our own emotional states. Consequently, we should be unable to locate or identify the emotions he is talking about in the quoted passage. And so we should be confused or perplexed by what he is trying to say. However, that is not what happens. Our attempts to grasp the meaning of the lines from Janaway's commentary do not encounter serious difficulties. Indeed, no matter how

dispassionately we proceed, it is fairly easy to comprehend what he says. Thus, although there is something right about Janaway's analysis of dispassionate readers, his claim that they cannot understand truths about their own emotions appears wrongheaded.[508]

It is a great leap and eventually a mistake. Nietzsche, I argue, uses his rhetorical-artistic style to shift us to an affective level so that the critique becomes possible. Janaway, by contrast, is not writing from Nietzsche's perspective; he is not engaging in rhetoric but is composing a scientific approach to the method of genealogy. Hence the object of the two is different, which is what Aumann does not seem to distinguish. Beyond that, it does not follow from anywhere that Janaway asserts that all knowledge needs an affective engagement but that according to the Nietzschean philosophy, knowledge presupposes an affective engagement.

To close this section, the rhetorical reading of the genealogy does not mean that reading Nietzsche will *necessarily* lead to an affective engagement of the readers and then, as we will see, to an activation of their critical attitude towards the value of their values. However, if a critique is to be activated, the affective engagement is a precondition for its effectiveness. Also, it seems that, according to Nietzsche, the critique of the values is *impossible* merely in the realm of scientific discourse, among other reasons, because of its detachment from the affects, as I discuss in Chapter 9 of the thesis.

6.2. The relationship between the two readings

I move on to one last comment, concerning the relationship of the rhetorical to the psychological reading, and conclude with it the chapter. Saar, without discussing the specific readings of the genealogy, unwittingly offers a reply to this query. He claims Nietzsche's aim is for the reader "to understand him-or herself as the subject and object of those very processes of subjectivation that are being recounted", [509] which would amount to the psychological reading discussed above, as a reading regarding the history of subjectivity. Saar goes on then to claim that this movement is "essentially

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[508] Aumann, "Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", op. cit., pp. 190-191.
[509] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 239.

rhetorical",[510] in that it directly addresses the readership regarding the constitution of their subjectivity as it is "affected by the story as it is addressed by it".[511] In this sense, therefore, Nietzsche's choice to address the formation of moral values and the corresponding beliefs in psychological terms (for example, emphasis on the formation of conscience and guilt, reduction of value judgements to affects and drives) is itself a rhetorical trick, in the sense of deliberately identifying the reading public with the Nietzschean narrative. Therefore, the complementarity of the two readings becomes evident: for the effective influence on his readership, Nietzsche uses psychological narratives as rhetorical tools.

The relationship of the two readings is also reciprocal. Not only does the psychological reading of genealogy have rhetorical power through the process of the audience's identification, but also the rhetorical reading includes the psychological one as its internal presupposition. As I suggested earlier, the following passage from the early lecture notes on Rhetoric might respond to the question: "From which position does Nietzsche function?". Additionally, it provides evidence for the relationship between the two readings, which is a relationship of internal consistency. To repeat it, we read:

> He [the orator] should set himself in possession of that which is true in order to have command of what is probable as well, so that he is able to deceive his audience. Then, it is required that he know how to inspire the passions of his audience, and to be master of them by this means. To that end, he must have accurate knowledge of the human soul and be acquainted with the effects of all forms of discourse upon the human mind. The development of *a true art of speaking*, therefore, presupposes a very profound and extensive education.[512]

If Nietzsche provides genealogical narratives about the emergence and function of psychological structures and the related values, using the rhetorical devices discussed above — metaphors, contradictions, historical inaccuracies and fictitious elements in combination with the description of actual events — then he operates from a position akin to the orator described in this passage. Therefore, it is plausible to claim that the

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[510] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 239.
[511] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 239.
[512] R, p. 99. *Italics* are my emphasis.

early lecture notes on Rhetoric, particularly the passage mentioned, offer a methodological tool for understanding the entirety of Nietzsche's work and the genealogy developed in it.

The complementarity of the two readings is also supported by Nietzsche's description in *Ecce Homo* of what he accomplishes in *Genealogy*. He posits that the three Treatises composing *Genealogy* are among the "most uncanny things" ever written regarding "expression, intention, and the art of surprise",[513] explicitly referring to his rhetorical-artistic style. According to Nietzsche, these "three crucial preparatory works" are written by a "psychologist" aiming "for a revaluation of all values",[514] affirming, therefore, at least some knowledge regarding the psychological structure of the agents. This not only establishes a connection between Nietzsche's comprehension of human psychology, his rhetorical-artistic strategy, and the effect of uncanniness generated by his genealogy creates but also links these aspects to the critical outcome of the genealogy, namely the revaluation of all values. Therefore, also from this passage, it is plausible to contend that to achieve the impact of his rhetorical style — stimulating affective responses in readers — a profound comprehension of their psychology and potential impact of specific *discourse* will have on them is essential. What is expressed in *Ecce Homo* by a single self-reference as a "psychologist" is clarified in the lectures on rhetoric as having "accurate knowledge of the human soul and" acquaintance "with the effects of all forms of discourse upon the human mind".

This approach leads to the view that the two readings of the genealogy — aiming for an affective engagement of the readers and assuming Nietzsche's insight into the psychological structures of the agents, along with a keen of the impact of his discourse on readers — are internally connected and function simultaneously.

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[513] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[514] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

Part III

Genealogy, Knowledge, Critique

To stand in the midst [...] of this whole marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and the rapture of such questioning [...] that is what I feel to be contemptible.

— GS 2

In any case I hate everything that merely instructs me

without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.

— Goethe

David Owen remarks in his article, "Nietzsche, Re-evaluation and the Turn to Genealogy", that "if we can get clear about Nietzsche's *reasons* for turning to genealogy, we will be well-placed to understand what this *mode* of enquiry is intended to accomplish".[515] I argued above that the Nietzschean genealogy aims at the activation of the affective world of the audience. Is this its sole purpose? If we answered positively, we would completely disregard Nietzsche's writing that his genealogy consists in a kind of knowledge regarding the emergence of moral values, which appears as a prerequisite for the *critique* of their value. This last part of the thesis aims at exploring: the kind of knowledge offered and produced by Nietzschean genealogy (i), the kind of critique produced by Nietzsche's genealogy (ii), the field which makes possible the activation of the intended critique (iii) and their relation to Nietzsche's demand for health and affirmation of life (iv).

The rhetorical reading of genealogy, as exposed above, reads the genealogies of values and the relevant moral beliefs, and judgements, as constructions Nietzsche composes, which formally consist of rhetorical-artistic devices, two of which are metaphors and contradictions. In that sense, the Nietzschean genealogy, rather than

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[515] Owen, D. (2003). "Nietzsche, Re-evaluation and the Turn to Genealogy." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 11 (3), pp. 249–272, p. 249. *Italics* are my emphasis.

being a *descriptive* narrative, is itself a rhetorical narrative, composed of fictitious and actual elements and rhetorical-artistic means, which aims to an affective engagement of the audience. If genealogy does not offer a fixed knowledge of the *actual* way of emergence of moral values, then what is its outcome and what are we going to do with GM P 6, that for critique to emerge we need a "knowledge" of the conditions of emergence and development of moral values? Nietzsche expresses reservations regarding fixed knowledge: that it is incompatible with life, reduces its complex and earthly character, affirming an "other world", and stems from a psychological urge of the agents for stability and control. At the same time, he stresses the value of knowledge as a process of an open-ended, sceptical inquiry. In this light, the knowledge which GM P 6 refers to can be understood as an interpretation by Nietzsche himself constructs, composed of actual and fictional elements, which aim to produce a specific critical effect on their recipients: an affective response and the activation of critique. That, in turn, might lead to a second level of knowledge, pertinent to the readership itself, namely the personal knowledge that each reader will arrive at, concerning how their values have been shaped and what value they have for their lives, a kind of knowledge, however, that I will not discuss in this thesis.

The reading of the genealogy presented in this thesis has two further implications. Firstly, it addresses what kind of critique emerges from the Nietzschean genealogy. I interpret critique as the *In-Frage-Stellung*, or "critique as putting into question, or as a way of problematizing something",[516] as it is consistent with the evidence from Nietzsche's works.[517] The critique thus pertains (1) to what Nietzsche constructs, as well as (2) to what he aims to elicit in his audience. For instance, when Nietzsche constructs the genealogy of conscience concerning the internalisation of the instinct of aggression and the legal relationship between debtor and creditor, he is not trying to convince us of a new position. Instead, he problematising the opposing position and aims to weaken it — that conscience is either the voice of God within us or the dictates of an *a priori* Reason. At the same time, he seeks to *activate a critical attitude to his audience* towards *the narratives he* presents in his genealogy, his "or anybody else's".[518] In that sense, his genealogy might be read as an *artistic-aesthetic*

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[516] Geuss, R. (2002). "Genealogy as Critique." *European Journal of Philosophy,* 10 (2), pp. 209–215, p. 211.

[517] GS 307, 345; GM P 5, P 6.

[518] GM P 5.

phenomenon,[519] a mechanism producing "a schooling in suspicion". Secondly, I claim that the activation of this *critical attitude* and engagement with it, as thematised in the quality of *mistrust* and its peers, becomes *possible* in the artistic realm due to the rhetorical/artistic tools Nietzsche employs. Critique's connection to the artistic discourse is due (1) to the activation of the affective world of his readership, as seen in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, (2) it reflects an inherent presupposition of the possibility of critique — a detachment from the scientific discourse, and therefore from the unquestioned value of truth, and (3) it renders "very unpleasant" truths regarding our values more bearable through their concealment.

In this approach, knowledge as open-ended inquiry and critique serve as antidotes to nihilism,[520] expressing Nietzsche's attempt to enhance health and life. Furthermore, the interpretation offered here presents a novel perspective on Nietzschean scholarship by highlighting the indispensable relationship between the activation of critique and artistical discourse.

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[519] I borrow the term "aesthetic phenomenon" from Gardner. By the term "aesthetic phenomenon", Gardner refers to "works of art and/or states of feeling held to incorporate philosophical cognition". He uses this term to emphasise the broadness of the meaning of "aesthetic", including the sense of objects that we can perceive with our senses. If it is plausible genealogy fits within the realm of art, in terms of content (coexistence of fictitious and actual elements regarding the creation of values), form (constitution by artistic-rhetorical means, such as metaphors, and contradictions), and intention (affective engagement of the reading public), and at the same time leads to some kind of knowledge, even if this is the commitment to an open-ended inquiry, and critical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge, then we can characterise it as an aesthetic phenomenon.
See, Gardner, S. (2007). "Philosophical aestheticism." In Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of continental philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
On Nietzsche's Aestheticism see also Gardner, S. (2013). "Nietzsche's Philosophical Aestheticism". In John Richardson & Ken Gemes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*. Oxford: Oxford Academic.
[520] By nihilism here, I refer to the condition of those to whom Nietzsche refers in the concluding aphorism of the *Genealogy*. These are the bearers of

> this hatred of the human, and even more of the animalistic, even more of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from appearance, transience, growth, death, wishing, longing itself – all that means, let us dare to grasp it, a *will to nothingness*, an aversion to life […].

See, GM III 28. See, also BGE 10.

Chapter 7: The generativity of moral values

All the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again;

the sea, our sea, lies open again;

perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea".

— GS 343

Nietzsche explicitly opposes the notion that moral values are inherent to nature, divine command, or emerge from an a priori and abstract rationality. In his genealogy, there is a moment where a form of fixed knowledge emerges: moral values are constituted by a different origin than previously believed. The key question arises: If Nietzsche is not primarily concerned with establishing fixed knowledge regarding the genesis of values, what is the purpose of his explicit stance on the generativity of moral values, suggesting they are not inherent to the world but are generated through specific historico-social circumstances? Secondary literature delves into this topic. Nehamas, for instance, explains that Nietzsche's genealogy demonstrates the contingent nature of institutions and in that sense "it creates the possibility of altering them".[521] Saar further clarifies that if it can be made *plausible* that neither the form nor the content of morality is given per se but are rather contingent products of historical processes and interpretive struggles, *their legitimacy becomes fragile*.[522] By contrasting the naturalist moral perspective with one of generativity, Nietzsche constructs a "conceptual itinerary from necessity via contingency to relative or hypothetical freedom as possibility". Emphasising the generative aspect of moral values allows for the potential of change, and in that sense the Nietzschean genealogy "opens up" the space "for that which might be otherwise because it is as it is now only because a certain power is in play".[523] As Guay puts it, one of the features of the Nietzschean genealogy is that it reveals "that human identity is collective and in particular historical: being oneself involves *relations* to a broader community".[524] Gemes, in his turn, notes that Nietzsche's historicisation of Christianity strips its dictates of eternal status.[525]

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[521] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 112.
[522] Saar, M. (2007), *Genealogie als Kritik. Geschichte und Theorie des Subjekts nach Nietzsche und Foucault*. Frankfurt and New York, p. 12, 155-157. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[523] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 237.
[524] Guay, "Genealogy as Immanent Critique…", op. cit., p. 169. Italics are *my* emphasis.
[525] Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth", op. cit., p. 58.

The polemical nature asserting the generativity of moral values is emphasised by all authors. The focus on how moral values, beliefs and judgements are constituted challenges any notion of their inherent or a priori existence, prompting readers to reconsider the values they hold and subject them to reevaluation. Nietzsche adamantly stresses the historical context of moral values, even though his methodology cannot be strictly characterised as historical, as elucidated in Parts I and II of the thesis. In the context of a rhetorical analysis, outlined in Part II, Nietzsche refrains from claiming to provide definitive knowledge on the origins, evolution, and modifications of moral values. His genealogical models, replete with historical inaccuracies, ambiguities, metaphors and contradictions, do not lead to a direct attainment of truth. However, his central argument posits that moral values are not inherent, universal, or eternal but rather generated. This perspective challenges theories that uphold the intrinsic nature of moral values. It is essential to clarify that by historicisation, I do not mean that Nietzsche offers the actual history of moral values, judgements, and beliefs; instead, he constructs genealogical narratives that blend historical and fictional elements to render them plausible, to enhance them with the "reality effect" mentioned above.

A characteristic example of the generativity of moral values is BGE 2, where Nietzsche states:

> "How *could* anything originate out of its opposite? […] Such origins are impossible, and people who dream about such things are fools —at best. Things of the highest value must have another, separate origin *of their own*, — they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire."[526]

Nietzsche, therefore, rejects this hermeneutical approach, arguing that:

> This way of judging typifies the prejudices by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: this type of valuation lies behind all their logical procedures. From these "beliefs" they try to acquire their "knowledge" ["*Wissen*"], to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as "the truth."[527]

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[526] BGE 2.
[527] BGE 2.

And he concludes that "perhaps", these things of a "higher value" are in fact nothing more than their opposite.[528] Besides, already in P6 of the *Genealogy*, the fact that Nietzsche refers to the conditions of birth and alteration of moral values presupposes the assumption of their generativity.

In Part I, we examined two examples — conscience and guilt — whose genealogy unveil their origins, confirming the recognition of the historicity of moral values, beliefs and judgements from an unexpected or even opposing origin than previously assumed. Nietzsche challenges the conventional notion that guilt arises from original sin and is inherent in human nature. Instead, he posits that guilt emerges socio-historically, stemming from the human agents' instinct to attribute meaning to things, the dynamics of debtor-creditor relationships, and the interpretation of the ascetic priest. Likewise, Nietzsche rejects the divine origin of conscience, proposing it has undergone significant transformations throughout history. In its beginnings, conscience is described as an internalised instinct, the internalised instinct of aggression, following the entrance into civilization and the prohibition of the free expression of this instinct. Individuals, driven by a fundamental psychological need to assign meaning and causes to their experiences, use guilt as a tool to interpret their sense of meaningless suffering. This progression leads to the evolution of conscience from a primal form of aggressiveness to an awareness of guilt. This type of conscience sublimates into another kind of conscience, that of intellectual conscience, which, in its turn will gain self-consciousness, will realise its driving force — the will to truth — as a problem.[529]

From this point, a "split" is observed in the genealogy of conscience. On the one hand, the intellectual conscience is created, following the path of transition from "Christian conscience" to "scientific conscience", synonymous with the intellectual. On the other hand, it seems that "bad conscience" is simultaneously the original version of conscience in general. The latter is based on the summary of *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo*, in which Nietzsche explicitly mentions that conscience has its roots in the internalisation of aggression (that is, "bad conscience *in its beginnings*").[530] Although it is tempting to consider intellectual conscience and conscience in general as different phases of the same concept (with conscience being the final form), GS 335 prevents us

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[528] BGE 2.
[529] GM III 27.
[530] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

from doing so, since there intellectual conscience appears as a conscience "behind our conscience", which not everyone possesses.[531] The two terms, therefore, are differentiated. This very ambiguity that Nietzschean genealogy itself creates can be read not as some naïvety on Nietzsche's part but instead as an implicit construction with a specific function within Nietzschean genealogy, the activation of our affective world and the subsequent stimulation in us of a certain *mistrust* of the Nietzschean narrative itself.

Regarding the generativity of moral values, an intriguing aspect emerges as conscience is not only portrayed as something "lowly", something *human, all too human*, rooted in bodily instincts, by Nietzsche but goes a step further. Even intellectual conscience, ostensibly detached from any theological influences, eventually reverts to religious origins. This highlights Nietzsche's argument that the seemingly secularised values prevalent in the 19th century are, in essence, are imbued with theological underpinnings. Consequently, they stem from and embody origins that differ from conventional perceptions. In his exploration of the ascetic ideal in the Third Treatise of his *Genealogy*, Nietzsche poses a poignant question: "Where is the *counterpart* to this closed system of will, goal and interpretation?",[532] meaning the will, goal and interpretation formed by Christian morality. He caustically responds the following:

> But I am told it is *not* lacking, not only has it fought a long, successful fight with that ideal, but it has already mastered that ideal in all essentials: all our modern *science* is witness to that, — modern science which, as a genuine philosophy of reality, obviously believes only in itself, obviously possesses the courage to be itself, the will to be itself, and has hitherto got by well enough without God, the beyond and the virtues of denial.[533]

Those advocating that position, that science is the ascetic ideal's *counterpart*, are nothing more than "rabble-rousers" and "bad musicians" whose voices "do *not* come

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[531] GS 335.
[532] GM III 23.
[533] GM III 23.

from the depths, the abyss of scientific conscience does *not* speak for them".[534] What happens is:

> [p]recisely the opposite of what they are declaring here is the truth: science today has absolutely *no* faith in itself, let alone in an ideal *above* it, — and where it is still passion, love, fire, *suffering*, it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latter's own *most recent and noble manifestation*.[535]

What does the whole story of this development mean? Not only that the moral values of Christian morality derive from inferior roots, but also the supposedly secularised values of the 19th century are essentially expressions of theological values. Why? Nietzsche is explicit. The bearers of the secularised values of the 19th century are "these 'no'-sayers and outsiders of today, those who are absolute in one thing, […] these hard, strict, abstinent, heroic minds who make up the glory of our time, all these pale atheists, Antichrists, immoralists, nihilists, these sceptics, ephectics, *hectics* of the mind [*des Geistes*], […] these last idealists of knowledge in whom, alone, intellectual conscience dwells and is embodied these days […] these 'free, *very* free spirits'",[536] while they think they are "all as liberated as possible from the ascetic ideal",[537] and therefore by the relevant values, they are in fact still captivated by it and by the values it bears and expresses, as they still believe in truth as the ultimate value. In that sense, science, and religion "both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth can*not* be assessed or criticized), and this makes them both *necessarily* allies".[538]

This development unfolds on two distinct levels. Firstly, Nietzsche's genealogical approach implies that moral values are socially and historically constituted, illustrating that conscience, for instance, does not represent that divine voice within us. This acknowledgment coincides with the metaphorical concept of "God's death", which appears before "a group of atheists".[539] Or, as expressed in the *Gay Science*,

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[534] GM III 23.
[535] GM III 23.
[536] GM III 24.
[537] GM III 24.
[538] GM III 25. During the 19th century, the term "science" encompassed what we would classify today as the "humanities" or "social sciences", including philosophy.
[539] GS 125.

Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and governance of a god; interpreting history in honor of some divine reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world order and ultimate moral purposes; interpreting one's own experiences as pious people have long enough interpreted theirs, as if everything were providential, a hint, designed and ordained for the sake of the salvation of the soul — that is *all* over now, that has man's conscience *against* it [...].[540]

Secondly, Nietzsche's genealogy reveals that secular values originate in the ascetic ideal. This realisation underscores the historical underpinnings of moral values, indicating these values stem from a different, perhaps opposing, source. Therefore, Nietzschean genealogy not only challenges the traditional understanding of moral values but also highlights the interconnectedness of seemingly disparate elements, such as science and the ascetic ideal.

Nietzsche then wonders if there is even one "opponent" of the ascetic ideal who remains detached from the Christian-infused values. He refers to these individuals as the "*counter-idealists*", the "unbelievers", and the 'free, *very* free spirits',[541] suggesting that they are also not freed from the play of moral oppositions as "this ideal is quite simply their ideal as well, they themselves represent it nowadays [...] they themselves are its most intellectualized product". This phenomenon, as observed, emerges due to their unwavering belief in truth.[542] Consequently, Nietzsche observes that science, encompassing both natural and unnatural, the latter identified with the self-critique of knowledge,[543] is intertwined with the ascetic ideal as they "are still on the same foundation [...] both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth can*not* be assessed or criticized), and this makes them both *necessarily* allies, — so that, if they must be fought, they can only be fought and called into question together".[544]

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[540] GS 357.

[541] GM III 23.

[542] GM III 24.

[543] GM III 25: "[A]ll science, natural as well as *unnatural* [*unnatürliche*] – this is the name I would give to the self-critique of knowledge [*die Erkenntniss-Selbstkritik*]".

[544] GM III 25. The idea of convergence of science and church is also expressed in the second *Untimely Meditation*, where we read that "[w]hat earlier one gave to the church one now gives, even if more sparingly, to science". See, HL, p. 45.

Hence, it appears that not only our beliefs and judgement about the origins of moral values are subject to misinterpretation, but even more significantly, our most secularised attribute, our "will to truth", is described as originating from the ascetic ideal,[545] normatively bounded by Christian morality. In Nietzsche's view, detailed in GS 344, the insistence on the will to truth entails an unwavering commitment to avoid deception and implies no alternative to the proposition: I will not deceive, not even myself. And with that, we stand on moral ground. This intertwining of morality with epistemology suggests that a failure to act in alignment with the will to truth, succumbing to deceit, raises moral suspicion.[546]

Nietzsche's exposition on the normative primacy of the will to truth posits that although seemingly secular, it is ultimately a continuation of Christian belief in an unchanging divine truth beyond critique. With the advent of the Enlightenment, the elimination of God has led to truth being deified. We have substituted God with truth and now we enjoy the glow of truth, which we have elevated to a supreme value, believed to elevate humanity. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the will to truth is Christianity in disguise. "Truth is your new God", Nietzsche tells us. In the end, we secular thinkers — atheists and amoralists — still take "the flame" of our thinking from this faith once kindled by the Christian God, thus demonstrating "we are still pious". As Gemes notes, this is "the most striking" claim Nietzsche makes in his *Genealogy*.[547] The use of the term *striking* in Gemes' assessment is intriguing, as the verb *strike* implies both *hitting* and *affecting*. We could probably process this Nietzschean thesis about the conjunction of the will for truth with the ascetic ideal precisely as a shock,[548] a striking revelation that initiates *doubt* and *mistrust*, embodied within the lens of the historicity of values, rather as an established truth.

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[545] GM III 24, 25, 27.
[546] GS 344.
[547] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit., p. 1.
[548] In that direction, Nehamas writes "Nietzsche was undoubtedly eager shock". See, Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature,* op. cit., p. 142.

Chapter 8: Knowledge as a fixed state or as an open-ended inquiry?

As soon as you explain something, the opposite begins to form within you. Everyone knows this, yet they continue to explain, fearing that something will happen and they will die if they stop explaining. Fearing that they will die, they explain.

— Christos Vakalopoulos, *The Horizon Line*

There might even be puritanical fanatics of conscience who would rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something. But this is nihilism, and symptomatic of a desperate soul in a state of deadly exhaustion, however brave such virtuous posturing may appear. With stronger, livelier thinkers, however, thinkers who still have a thirst for life, things look different.

— BGE 10

The emphasis on the generativity of moral values, consequently, yields a specific rhetorical-critical impact: it undermines the opposing notion of fixed and inherent moral values, persuading the audience that changing their values is *possible*, as they are not inherently derived from nature or divinity. However, what about the knowledge to which Nietzsche refers in *Genealogy*'s Preface? We read as follows:

> […] but whoever pauses over the question and *learns* [*lernt*] to ask, will find what I found: — that a vast new panorama opens up for him, a possibility [*Möglichkeit*] makes him giddy, mistrust, suspicion and fear [*Art Misstrauen, Argwohn, Furcht*] of every kind spring up, belief [*der Glaube*] in morality, all morality, wavers, — finally, a new demand becomes articulate. So let us give voice to this *new demand*: we need a *critique* of moral values*, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined* — and so we need to know [*eine Kenntniss*] about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed, and changed.[549]

That is one of the few descriptive references Nietzsche provides regarding his genealogy. It can be interpreted in two main ways. The first construes Nietzschean genealogy as a form of *knowledge* — as the existence of a fixed *state* of knowing a

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[549] GM P 6.

proposition or having a justified true belief,[550] of the actual origin and development of the values, beliefs and judgements that correspond to those values. In this interpretation, Nietzsche's account of the genealogy of values is perceived as a definitive truth to be internalised by the audience. However, such an interpretation confronts the constraints outlined in Part I of this thesis, including Nietzsche's explicit critical stance towards history as a descriptive enterprise of the actual emergence of the objects and his critical stance towards fixed knowledge, which we will elaborate further in Chapter 8.1.

An alternative reading suggests a more creative interpretation. Here, the knowledge Nietzsche alludes involves the construction of a series of hypotheses aimed at challenging opposing views, enabling critique. This nuanced understanding of knowledge as an integral component of genealogy aligns with Nietzsche's critique of fixed knowledge and his emphasis on the value of open-ended inquiry over concrete conclusions.

In this section, we will explore Nietzsche's objections to fixed knowledge and examine the type of knowledge that aligns with his philosophy.

8.1. The rejection of a fixed knowledge, of knowledge as a *state*

As previously mentioned, knowledge is traditionally understood, from a philosophical standpoint, as the *state* of knowing a proposition or holding a justified true belief. However, Nietzsche finds fault with the prevailing concept of knowledge as a fixed state that philosophical or scientific in general discourse ought to pursue. He often challenges the notion of fixed knowledge or truths, contending that knowledge produced about an object merely results from coincidental cause and effect. Analogously, according to the *Will to Power* 481, knowledge as a permanent "state" is diminished to a "taking possession of things".[551] He also manifests his mistrust

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[550] Of course, this is now a disputed analysis of knowledge, but the systematic epistemology is not the purpose of this thesis.
[551] WP 481.

regarding ["*Ich misstraue*"] "all systematizers"[552] and claims that "the will to a system is a lack of integrity".[553]

The Nietzschean scholarship recognises Nietzsche's aversion to fixed knowledge. Allison notes Nietzsche aims at "no great revelations, no absolute knowledge, no timeless, leaden certainties",[554] a view shared with Gemes, who emphasises that Nietzsche is uninterested in universal truths.[555] Müller-Lauter argues that Nietzsche deems fixed knowledge impossible, as fixation falls short of capturing the elusive nature of reality, and, in that sense "what the will to truth seeks to grasp constantly escapes".[556] Nehamas, in his turn, referring to GS 354, rightly writes "Nietzsche is mixing together the notions of knowledge, belief and imagination".[557] He, therefore, highlights Nietzsche intertwines knowledge, beliefs and imagination, thereby underscoring the absence of fixed truths in Nietzsche's approach. These interpreters acknowledge Nietzsche's critique of propositional knowledge in terms of possessing fixed truths or justified true beliefs, recognising the misalignment of his approach with such knowledge, and justifiably so.

There are four pivotal aspects to Nietzsche's critique of fixed knowledge. Firstly, as an "advocate of all impermanence",[558] Nietzsche censures fixed knowledge due to its denial of life's impermanence. Secondly, fixed knowledge entails a demand for certainty, reducing multiplicity to a unity, which is incompatible with life's nature. Thirdly, the pursuit of fixed knowledge, this tendency to render something known negates sensuality, affirming another world than the one we live in. For all the above reasons, fixed knowledge is a sign of degradation, and, therefore, nihilism. Nietzsche provides, fourthly, an explanation regarding our need to knowledge, making again a psychological claim.

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[552] TI "Arrows" 26.
[553] TI "Arrows" 26.
[554] Allison, David B. *Reading the New Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy, the Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and on the Genealogy of Morals*, op. cit., p. vii.
[555] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit. See also Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 53-54.
[556] Müller-Lauter, W. (1971). *Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*. Parent, D., J. (trans.), Urbana and Chicago: University of Ilinois Press, p. 61.
[557] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 54.
[558] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 176.

Beginning with the fourth element, Nietzsche criticises fixed knowledge as stemming from a psychological need of the agents, resulting in "arbitrary" truths. Fixed knowledge aligns with the "*demand for certainty*", defined as "[t]he demand that one *wants* by all means that something should be firm".[559] This "*desire for certainty*" [*Verlangen nach Gewissheit*] is depicted as an "*instinct of weakness*".[560] Within our quest for fixed knowledge lies a drive to control objects, akin to the mentioned guilt; there is a psychological urge for humans to assert dominance over the unfamiliar. When seeking the source of our will to truth,[561] Nietzsche argues that our desire to render something known emanates from our need to bring order to the world, rendering the unfamiliar familiar and instiling a sense of control. By knowing, we no longer let ourselves "be carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions".[562] As is often the case in Nietzschean philosophy, Nietzsche explains the formation of a fixed knowledge about things by tracing it back to a human psychological need. Therefore, the questions "What is it that the common people take for knowledge? What do they want when they want 'knowledge'?" have as their answer the following: "Nothing more than this: Something strange is to be reduced to something *familiar* [*Bekanntes*]".[563] And then continues, by explicitly addressing his readership and states:

> Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the *instinct of fear* [*der Instinkt der Furcht*] that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?[564]

In the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche reaffirms the notion that knowledge as a state originates from the psychological need of the agents to be in control. We read:

> Familiarizing something unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfying, and produces a feeling of power as well. Unfamiliar things are dangerous, anxiety-provoking, upsetting, the primary instinct is to *get rid* of these painful states.

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[559] GS 374.
[560] GS 347.
[561] TL, p. 84.
[562] TL, p. 84.
[563] GS 355.
[564] GS 355. In that sense, we read in *Daybreak* that moral man's "sense of truth" is a "sense of security". See, D 26.

First principle: any explanation is better than none […] the first idea that can familiarize the unfamiliar feels good enough to be 'considered true'.[565]

The text suggests that rendering the unfamiliar familiar is comforting and empowering. Any explanation, no matter how flawed, is embraced to combat uncertainty. This echoes the position articulated in *Beyond Good and Evil* that some "fanatics of conscience" prefer an assured nothing than an uncertain something,[566] or the one addressed in the *Genealogy*, the choice of any meaning to balance the meaninglessness of existence.[567]

Turning back to *On Truth and Lies*, Nietzsche portrays the traditional Western philosopher of the 19th century as one who prioritises Reason and Concepts as the pillars of thought. The philosopher is sketched in this light, both eloquently and accurately, when we encounter the following thought:

The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining any happiness for himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest possible freedom from pain [....]. He wears no quivering and changeable human face, but, as it were, a mask with dignified, symmetrical features. He does not cry; he does not even alter his voice.[568]

And this raises a legitimate question. Even if this is the case, namely that knowledge as a state is ultimately a construct that satisfies some unconscious or conscious need of ours, where lies the problem? The remaining passage of *On Truth and Lies* is illuminating:

When a real storm cloud thunders above him, he wraps himself in his cloak, and with slow steps he walks from beneath it.[569]

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[565] TI "The Four Great Errors" 5.
[566] BGE 10.
[567] GM II 7, III 15.
[568] TL, p. 91.
[569] TL, p. 91. In this direction, in HL, p. 29, we read that the individual guided by reason "becomes timid and unsure and may no longer believe in himself: he sinks [...] into the heaped up chaos of knowledge which fails to have an external effect, of teaching which does not become life. If we regard their outside we notice how the expulsion of the instincts by history has almost transformed men into downright abstractions and shadows: no one dare to show his person, but masks himself as an educated man, as scholar, a poet, a politician".

One way to interpret the concluding sentence of this passage suggests that knowledge as a fixed state and the science that drives it are fundamentally opposed to life. Here, life is understood in its simplest form — defined by the intricate human drive system and sensuality, affirming this innate constitution. Nietzsche underscores this sentiment explicitly when he states that individuals driven by concepts and abstractions are typically weaker, their "most basic desire is for an end to the war"[570] they are, therefore seeking an end to their internal conflict and would "rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something [*auf ein sicheres Nichts als auf ein ungewisses Etwas*]".[571] Consequently, those who bear fixed knowledge are self-deceptive, donning a figurative mask and disregarding the inner conflict intrinsic to their being for the sake of perceived security. This behaviour, rooted in a need for stability and singular identity, leads them astray, ultimately resulting in their downfall when faced with life's complexities beyond their control. In essence, fixed knowledge, in its attempt to grasp the ungraspable, betrays the essence of life.

This interpretation aligns with Müller-Lauter's observation that "fixation is inadequate to reality", and, in that sense "what the will to truth seeks to grasp constantly escapes".[572] Fixed knowledge tries to define what constantly escapes and therefore contradicts life. In line with the insights found in the *Gay Science*, the pursuit of fixed truths is likened to an act of faith, continuously attempting to contain that which perpetually eludes capture in reality. As Nietzsche states, some

> […] erroneous articles of faith, which were passed on by inheritance further and
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> further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species,
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> are for example: that there are enduring things; that there are identical things;

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[570] BGE 200.

[571] BGE 10. The thought that fixed knowledge is directed against life is present already from *Daybreak*. See, for example, D 43: To abstract oneself from sensory perception, to exalt oneself to contemplation of abstractions — that was at one time actually felt as *exaltation:* we can no longer quite enter into this feeling. To revel in pallid images of words and things, to sport with such invisible, inaudible, impalpable beings, was, out of contempt for the sensorily tangible, seductive and evil world, felt as a life in another *higher* world. 'These *abstracta* are certainly not seductive, but they can offer us guidance!' with that one lifted oneself upwards.

[572] Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 61.

that there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in and of itself.[573]

Furthermore, fixed knowledge is in discord with life's multiplicity. In that sense, something known is, also, an expression of existence's degradation, as it removes part of life's complexity. Therefore, the pursuit of singularity, the elusive one truth we strive to comprehend, aligns with Nietzsche's idea of fixation. An illustrative instance of Nietzsche's scepticism towards that kind of knowledge is GS 373, where we read:

> What? Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this — reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematicians? Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its *rich ambiguity* [*seines vieldeutigen Charakters*]: this is a dictate of good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence [*Geschmack der Ehrfurcht*] for everything that lies beyond your horizon.[574]

Therefore, Nietzsche critiques knowledge as a state since it reduces the manifold character of the objects to oneness, which he believes turns against life itself. In section 344 of *Gay Science*, Nietzsche contrasts the relentless pursuit of truth with life, on the basis that "life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous *polytropoi*".[575] The term "polytropoi" refers to individuals with various cunning strategies, a concept linked to Odysseus from Homer's *Odyssey*. Derived from the Greek "πολύτροπος", it combines "πολύς" (many) and the verb "τρέπω" (to turn), highlighting a multifaceted approach. The aphorism indicates that life embodies versatility, contradicting the rigid pursuit of truth and its inclination towards singularity.

The final reason for fixed knowledge's rejection is that the latter, as it exists in the 19th century, opposes sensuality. By postulating and affirming another world [*eine andre Welt*] from the one we live in, it negates the reality we inhabit, effectively denying "this world, our world" [*unsre Welt*].[576] According to the *Genealogy*, those who identify as "free spirits", supposedly liberated from the ascetic ideal, are portrayed

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[573] GS 110.
[574] GS 373.
[575] GS 344.
[576] GS 344.

as its mere byproducts, as they have their "faith in truth" and are "more rigid and more absolute than anyone else". Nietzsche notes that this trait is also evident in philosophers, whose intellect reflects a desire to remain static in the face of facts — an attitude he relates to asceticism and a rejection of sensuality.[577]

Nietzsche's critique of fixed knowledge of truth extends beyond its removal of life's "*rich ambiguity*", negation of the impermanence of life, and origins in unprocessed psychological motives. It signifies an endorsement and expression of the ascetic ideal and therefore neglects life's sensual component.

Turning again to BGE 10 is helpful. After claiming that the "puritanical fanatics of conscience […] would rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something",[578] Nietzsche continues:

> But this is nihilism, and symptomatic of a desperate soul in a state of deadly exhaustion [*Anzeichen einer verzweifelnden sterbensmüden Seele*], however brave such virtuous posturing may appear. With stronger, livelier thinkers, however, thinkers who still have a thirst for life, things look different.[579]

These "puritanical fanatics of conscience" deceive themselves by opting for a fixed knowledge attained through an unwavering pursuit of "rationality at any cost", which Nietzsche associates with decadence[580] and, in his terms, nihilism. The term nihilism here pertains to the individuals in BGE 10, namely the metaphysicians, who prioritise rationality in their quest for definitive knowledge while disregarding their instinctual core. They prefer to perceive the world and themselves as something else than what it is, abstracting from their humanhood and bodily constitution, and, therefore, "*affirm another world* than the world of life, nature, and history".[581]

Nietzsche's stance on the incongruence between life and fixed knowledge is consistent with his earlier works. For example, in the second *Untimely Meditations*, we read that "the scholar, the man of science" is one who "stands aside from life to know it unobstructedly", to observe it without obstruction. These agents affirm a

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[577] GM III 24.
[578] BGE 10.
[579] BGE 10.
[580] TI "The Problem of Socrates" 11.
[581] GS 344.

transcendental or otherworldly world, negating the one in which they exist. Instead of assessing the value of knowledge in relation to life, they claim they "discover" new faculties, as, for example, Kant did with the introduction of the synthetic *a priori* judgements[582] — a need that stems from their desire for certainty, which, as seen, denotes the desire to gain control over the objects. Motivated by an unexamined need for absolute control, they devote themselves to developing stable philosophical-scientific knowledge through the construction of concepts, thereby losing touch with their selves.[583] Nietzsche includes these individuals in the same category as those mentioned in the concluding aphorism of *Genealogy*. These are the bearers of

> this hatred of the human, and even more of the animalistic, even more of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from appearance, transience, growth, death, wishing, longing itself — all that means, let us dare to grasp it, a *will to nothingness*, an aversion to life [...].[584]

The conception of nihilism, as Nietzsche portrays it, involves a rejection of all things "animalistic" or "bodily", in favour of promoting the supremacy of thought, reason, and spirit. This theme recurs in *Gay Science*, where Nietzsche suggests the dominant philosophical discourse integrates this attitude towards life. We read:

> Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some *finale*, some final state of some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher. The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective ideal, purely spiritual goes to frightening lengths — and often I have asked myself whether, taking a large

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[582] BGE 11.

[583] The detachment from oneself echoes Nietzsche's frequent observation regarding the lack of "self-knowledge". This notion is aptly illustrated in GM P 1, where Nietzsche contends:

> We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers [*Wir sind uns unbekannt, wir Erkennenden, wir selbst uns selbst*]: and with good reason. We have never looked for ourselves, —so how are we ever supposed to *find* ourselves?

The diagnosis of insufficient self-understanding is not a new one in Nietzsche's works. It resonates in earlier writings as well. For example, references can be found in *Daybreak* 18, 115 and *The Gay Science* P 1, 335.

[584] GM III 28.

view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding of the body.*[585]

The contrast is evident: Fixed knowledge, with its insistence on certainties and aversion of ambiguities, ultimately turns against life, and in that sense is nihilistic. Similarly, Nietzsche asserts the ascetic ideal denotes "a will to the end", representing a form of decadence.[586] The ideas expressed in *Beyond Good and Evil* 10 reflect the penultimate paragraph of the second *Untimely Meditation*: the bearer of a fixed knowledge, of a *finale*, "a final state of some sort", eventually becomes disabled in the storm's arrival, when faced with life's unpredictability. Therefore, we can understand Nietzsche's view that nihilism is synonymous with illness and arises as a result of, or in parallel to, fixed forms of knowledge.

Even worse, this attitude towards knowledge, leads to a stagnation of thought and the impossibility of critique, an inability to question prevailing beliefs. As Berry puts it:

> Nietzsche, too, notices that "a matter that has become clear to us ceases to concern us" (BGE 80) and that "ridiculously crude" answers put "even a ridiculously crude ban on us: thou shalt not think!" (EH 'Clever' 1).[587]

In Berry's words, "this kind of attitude, as Nietzsche is at pains to demonstrate, is nihilism and a sign of battle fatigue, hardly characteristic of the kind of 'carefree, mocking, violent warrior' that 'wisdom' wants us".[588] The inclination towards embracing fixed knowledge over a dynamic and evolving understanding, characterised by ongoing inquiry, is akin to choosing the certainty of nothing over the uncertainty of something. That is highlighted in GS 347, where Nietzsche unveils what lies beneath the facade of positivistic systems. We read:

> Actually, what is steaming around all of these positivistic systems is the vapor of a certain pessimistic gloom, something that smells of weariness, fatalism, disappointment, and fear of new disappointments.[589]

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[585] GS P 2.
[586] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[587] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 35.
[588] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 147.
[589] GS 347.

Notably, Nietzsche warns that once we claim absolute certainty and assert "we know", we metaphorically kill the subject of our inquiry. In that sense, Nietzsche writes in the *Twilight of the Idols*:

> For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only mummified concepts; nothing real makes it through their hands alive. They kill and stuff the things they worship [...].[590]

Berry's observation highlights that the "will to truth" or the pursuit of truth targeted in *On Truth and Lie* represents a nihilistic inclination manifested by individuals seeking respite through an end to (intellectual) conflict.[591] Indeed, Nietzsche claims that "[a]n issue that has been resolved stops mattering to us"[592] and eventually leads to a ridiculously crude ban on us: "thou shalt not think!".[593]

So how can it be consistent on the one hand to state positions such as the above and on the other hand to claim to present a *knowledge* of the conditions under which moral values were born and evolved? The rhetorical interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy offers insights into reconciling this apparent paradox. In other words, the kind of *knowledge* that is produced by Nietzsche's genealogy is in direct and necessary conjunction with the way the Nietzschean genealogy is *read*. To recall the rhetorical reading of genealogy, as illustrated in Part II of the thesis, is the interpretative approach that the genealogy presents concrete models composed of actual and fictitious elements. Instead of merely describing the actual historical conditions within which moral values were created and modified, it also invents models with liberating force. That liberating force consists of the polemical undermining of the opposing positions without, however, establishing an affirmative position, while at the same time, it consists of activating the affective world of the reading audience. Two further questions arise. Does Nietzsche, through his genealogy, content himself with the affective stimulation of his readership? Second, if the knowledge produced does not have claims that the traditional notion of fixed knowledge would have had, namely the transmission of justified true beliefs, what kind of knowledge is produced from it, if any?

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[590] TI "Reason in Philosophy" 1.
[591] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., 55.
[592] BGE 80.
[593] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., 55.

8.2. The process of knowing as an open-ended inquiry

We can now move on to respond to the question: what kind of knowledge Nietzsche aspires if not a fixed knowledge? Berry's discussion on Nietzsche and scepticism sheds light on this perspective as she posits scepticism as a foundational element in Nietzsche's philosophy, warranting specific attention and elucidation.[594] What Berry highlights in her discussion on Nietzsche and scepticism, which is pertinent to the scope of this thesis and with which I concur and wish to underscore in this chapter, is that Nietzsche views knowledge as a dynamic, open-ended process of inquiry rather than a fixed state.

To contextualise her contribution, starting her investigation from Nietzsche's early work, she claims that there is "a positive assessment of ancient skepticism that persisted throughout his productive career".[595] Her general goal is to clarify Nietzsche's position on scepticism by employing Pyrrhonism as a framework for comprehending his philosophical endeavors.[596] Indeed, Nietzsche's admiration for sceptics is evident in his characterisation of them as exemplars of intellectual integrity, contrasting them favourably with other figures in the history of philosophy[597] — here is evident the affinity of intellectual activity of a skeptic with what Nietzsche calls "intellectual integrity", which, as we have seen in Part I of this thesis, is another name for "intellectual conscience" and which is usually accompanied by terms denoting a sceptical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge such as "mistrust", "disbelief" or "doubt". Analogously, in A 54, we read: "great spirits are skeptics. Zarathustra is a skeptic. The vigor, the freedom that comes from the strength and super-strength of spirit proves itself through skepticism. Where basic issues about value or lack of value are concerned, people with convictions do not come into consideration. Convictions are prisons".[598] He suggests that scepticism enhances activity and, therefore, life and health, a stark contrast to the confinements of conviction.

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[594] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 4.
[595] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 5.
[596] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 5.
[597] A 12. See also GS 344. On the other hand, Mitcheson, responds to Berry with an illuminating article which also highlights the differences between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonism. See, Mitcheson, K. (2016). "Scepticism and self-transformation in Nietzsche —on the uses and disadvantages of a comparison to Pyrrhonian scepticism," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy.*
[598] A 54.

The analysis has a firm orientation concerning knowledge in Nietzsche's case. As Berry observes,

> there is good evidence for attributing to Nietzsche a familiarity with the principal sources of Greek skepticism and some interest in Greek skeptical thought, both in his early years as a classics scholar and toward the end of his career, although, as I shall argue, the best evidence we have in addition to this is Nietzsche's own attitude toward knowledge and toward the practice of philosophy.[599]

We can reasonably argue Nietzsche's attitude towards knowledge underscores a dynamic and continuous process of inquiry rather than a static acquisition of fixed truths. Interestingly, Nietzsche writes in GM III 9: "but we have to become daily more deserving of being questioned, more *deserving* of asking questions, more deserving — of living?"[600]

> Berry draws attention to the preservation of openness, pointing the notion of "inquiry" in Nietzsche's philosophy. She writes:

> Nietzsche touches on that original Greek meaning of skeptikos ('inquirer'); the moment one ceases to inquire into things, to seek and to experiment, one ceases to be a Skeptic in the original sense. Where one accepts an explanation, there one puts an end to inquiry.[601]

Indeed, after criticising a fixed knowledge as being associated with nihilism and disease,[602] Nietzsche champions the process of knowing as an open-ended inquiry, as an indication and driving force of health and as a means for it. In this sense, he may, in his genealogy, in contrast to Paul Ree's genealogy, indeed "replace the improbable [*Unwahrscheinlichen*] with the more probable [*Wahrscheinlichere*] and in some circumstances […] replace one error with another [*unter Umständen an Stelle eines Irrthums einen andern*]".[603] This phrase may be interpreted as one "error" being replaced by another "error" in the sense that what Nietzsche proposes is not "right", in

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[599] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 29.
[600] GM III 9.
[601] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 96.
[602] See, for example BGE 2 and GM III 26.
[603] GM P 4.

the sense of a fixed propositional knowledge, but rather a series of hypotheses put together to challenge the agents to continue engaging to an open-ended inquiry.[604] Under that light, we can also interpret Gemes' valuable distinction between active and passive knowledge, that there is "[t]he notion of knowledge as a means of withdrawal rather than engagement with the world".[605] Fixed knowledge is a means of withdrawal, while the process of knowing as an open-ended inquiry is indication of the engagement with the world. Indeed, Nietzsche writes:

> What is familiar is what we are used to; and what we are used to is most difficult to "know" — that is to see as a problem; that is, to see as strange, as distant, as "outside us!" [*das Gewohnte ist am schwersten zu „erkennen", das heisst als Problem zu sehen, das heisst als fremd, als fern, als „ausser uns" zu sehn*].[606]

In the above passage Nietzsche makes the paradoxical claim that *to know is its opposite, namely, to see something as problem*, to problematise everything known to us — exactly as the will to truth "become conscious of itself *as a problem* in us —[607] to raise questions about it, to deal and *stay in the realm of uncertainty*. After all, in the second *Untimely Meditation*, he writes: "Moreover I hate everything which merely instructs me without *increasing or directly quickening my activity*".[608] That is far from the conception of knowledge as a *state*. GM III 25 is also evidence of the priority of knowing as a process over knowledge as a state. We read:

> (Xaver Doudan on one occasion speaks of the ravages caused by *'l' habitude* d'admirer *l' inintelligible au lieu de rester tout simplement dans l'inconnu'*; he thinks the ancients avoided this.) Suppose that everything man 'knows' does not satisfy his desires but instead contradicts them and arouses horror, what a divine excuse it is to be permitted to lay the guilt for this at the door of 'knowing' rather than 'wishing'! . . . 'There is no knowing [*Es giebt kein Erkennen*]: *consequently* – there is a God': what a new *elegantia syllogismi*! What a *triumph* for the ascetic ideal!–[609]

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[604] GS 344.
[605] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood", op. cit., p. 10.
[606] GS 355.
[607] GM III 27.
[608] HL, p. 7. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[609] GM III 25.

Apart from the priority of knowing as an open-ended inquiry, this aphorism implies something else: in the absence of knowing as an ongoing inquiry, the ascetic ideal prevails, acting counter to life. Nietzsche, on the contrary, advocates the openness of knowing, as the openness of questioning, of investigating. In that sense, the first aphorism of *Gay Science*'s fifth book declares "the sea, *our* sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea".[610] It is not accidental, that the open-sea as an indicator of inquiring, which is ascribed to the "daring of the lover of knowledge [*Wagniss des Erkennenden*]", is related to the event of God's death and of the quality of *mistrust*, as standing critically towards contents and forms of knowledge. Moreover, in the same aphorism, Nietzsche refers to the few, "the *suspicion* [*Argwohn*] in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough" for the spectacle of God's death, which turn "some ancient and profound trust [...] into doubt".[611] Therefore, we can deduce that the open sea is related to inquiry, to the process of knowing as standing critically towards knowledge, which emerges with the death of God. This development signifies a liberation from theological constraints that inhibit critical scrutiny of established truths.

There are at least three noteworthy indicators of Nietzsche favouring knowledge as an open-ended inquiring. The first significant indicator of the priority of process of inquiry over the state of knowledge, which is related to Nietzsche's philological past, is his choice of language when mentioning knowledge, particularly focusing on signifiers that convey a sense of an open-ended inquiry rather than a fixed state. These are either signifiers in infinitive form or consist of more words that together indicate a *tendency towards* knowledge. For instance, in GS 110, the "striving for the true" or the "impulse for truth", both denoting *der Trieb zur Wahrheit*, which also is "a life-preserving power",[612] and thus an antidote to nihilistic tendencies. Nietzsche, in the Preface of the *Genealogy*, names "the only thing proper for a philosopher", which is "the fundamental will to knowledge" [*Grundwillen der Erkenntniss*].[613] He also refers to it as the "passion of knowledge" [*Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss*][614] or "the drive to knowledge" [*Trieb zur Erkenntniss*],[615] underscoring the psychological underpinning

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[610] GS 343.
[611] GS 343.
[612] GS 110. See also GS 324, where "the seeker for knowledge" handles life as an experiment.
[613] GM P 2.
[614] For example, GS 107, 123, 249; BGE 210.
[615] BGE 6.

of our quest for knowledge, since our *tendency towards* knowledge traces to some will, instinct, drive or passion.

Regarding grammatical choices, in GM III 12, Nietzsche employs the verb *erkennen*, within the pivotal aphorism on perspectival knowledge. Similarly, in BGE 211, he describes "true philosophers" as those who embody a form of "knowing" [*Erkennen*] which "is creating" and "legislating", at the same time.[616] Han-Pile aptly notes the "processual" nature of the verbal forms Nietzsche employs.[617] All these grammatical choices are indicators of an understanding of knowledge *as a process* rather than as a state. It is in this vein that Berry mentions that Nietzsche, "quite clearly views himself too as a *pursuer* of knowledge — in fact, as a restless and relentless investigator and experimenter".[618]

The second indicator highlighting Nietzsche's preference for knowledge as an open-ended inquiry centres around the enigmatic topic of the perspectival knowledge. For example, in *Genealogy* III 12, knowledge is intricately linked to the sight, to different viewpoints, as exemplified by the phrase "to see differently and to *want* to see differently" [*einmal anders sehn, anders-sehn-w o l l e n*] . Nietzsche considers it useful — alongside the affective interpretations — for knowledge.[619] In what sense? In the sense that we might consider the other perspectives than ours, which are unlimited. Nietzsche urges that "as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute reversals of familiar perspectives and valuations with which the mind has raged against itself for far too long".[620] Nietzsche advocates for an acknowledgment that "knowledge takes place in the struggle of conflicting interpretations", as articulated by van Tongeren.[621] This ongoing struggle signifies that knowledge is a continual process, as the flux of conflicting interpretations ensures that knowledge remains dynamic and ever-evolving.

Why does Nietzsche's point about accounting the different perspectives around an object, particularly concerning our moral values and their value, support the view of

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[616] BGE 211.
[617] Han-Pile, B. (2002). "'The Doing is Everything': A Middle-voiced Reading of Agency in Nietzsche." *Inquiry,* 63 (1), pp. 42-64, p. 44.
[618] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 54. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[619] GM III 12.
[620] GM III 12.
[621] Van Tongeren, Paul J. M. (2000). *Reinterpreting Modern Culture – An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, p. 168.

understanding knowledge as a continuous process rather than a fixed state? Perspectives are endless, as are the associated reinterpretations, which evolve over time in response to socio-historical influences. Significant examples can be found in GS 344 and GM II 12. In GS 344, we read:

> In science convictions [*die Ueberzeugungen*] have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good reason. Only when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses, of a provisional experimental point of view [*eines vorläufigen Versuchs-Standpunktes*], of a regulative fiction [*einer regulativen Fiktion*], they may be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge [*des Reichs der Erkenntniss*] — though always with the restriction that — they remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust.[622]

In line with the above, what is of value in the realm of knowledge is the constant questioning of established positions and treating them as assumptions. This *critical attitude* towards the convictions in question involves situating them in an *experimental point of view*, recognising them as evolving perspectives rather than fixed certainties. Regarding GM II 12, Nietzsche indicates the error of conflating the function or utility of an object at a certain point in its history with the cause of its creation, that is, the relation of our knowledge of the utility of an object to that of the cause of its creation. He describes a continual process of reinterpretation and repurposing, where everything in existence undergoes a cycle of reinterpretation, adjustment, and transformation by forces that supersede them. This constant process of re-evaluation ultimately obscures or erases their former meanings and purposes, as

> anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of *overpowering*, *dominating*, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former 'meaning' [*Sinn*] and 'purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.[623]

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[622] GS 344.
[623] GM II 12.

Given this perpetual cycle of reinterpretation driven by power dynamics, knowledge cannot exist in a fixed state. Linking this thought to the aforementioned aphorism about the "reduction" of convictions, namely firmly held beliefs, to perspectives, knowledge as a process reflects a gaze that, depending on the position from which one looks, what one knows is necessarily different. Viewing knowledge primarily as a process aligns with the recurring metaphor of the gaze, symbolising an ongoing inquiry. Similar to how the gaze is fluid and dynamic, knowledge can be regarded as a ceaseless quest that unveils new mysteries and puzzles rather than leading to definitive truths.

In that direction, the relevant references to the *bearers* of knowledge support the precedence of the process over the state of knowledge, being the third indicator of the understanding of knowledge as a process of an open-ended inquiry rather than as a state of holding firm and justified beliefs. Nietzsche refers to the agents of this kind of knowledge as "a new breed of philosophers" which "is approaching" — similar to the "free spirits" he invented, but "could one day exist", who he sees them "*coming*, slowly, slowly",[624] representing a future possibility rather than a current reality, much like the slow emergence of a "*new* truth visible between thick clouds", the result of his *Genealogy*.[625] These are the philosophers, "the born guessers of riddles",[626] who "*want* to remain riddles in some respect" and "the philosophers of the future might have the right (and perhaps also the wrong) to be described *as those who attempt* [*Versucher*]",[627] thus echoing the idea of *Gay Science* about seeing and treating ourselves as "experiments and guinea pigs" [*Experimente und Versuchs-Thiere*].[628]

Applying this perspective to the genealogy of moral values and their value, individuals are shaped by the values they embody, often perceiving these values as truths that define their subjectivity, as "the condition of their existence". However, since the self is not static but an ongoing process, influenced by historical evolution and shifting perspectives, individuals may adhere to different values at various stages of life. This fluidity of values necessitates reflective self-examination to avoid becoming entrenched in outdated beliefs that may contradict their evolving selves. For example, I may be twenty-five years old and believe that it is "good" to marry in a religious

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[624] HAH P 2.
[625] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[626] GS 343.
[627] BGE 42.
[628] GS 319.

marriage, whereas, based on my experiences, when I am thirty-five, I may reject such a value. If I am unable to reflect on the significance that such a value has for my life and how it has been grounded in me as a form of genuine self-understanding, then I may remain attached to my former value and thus turn against who I am at thirty-five.

The German term *Versuchs-Thiere,* including the German word *Versuch*, captures the essence of experimentation and attempt. Once more, the process is related to health, as "living *experimentally*", "being allowed to offer itself to adventure" is a sign of "the *great* health".[629] These are the autonomous spirits who "would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining" themselves "on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses". These are the *free spirits* "par excellence".[630] It is further worth noting at this point the characteristic rhetorical pattern of indeterminacy in this passage. Nietzsche refers to some philosophers of the future who are approaching without telling us who and what they are. But he does tell us that these philosophers are interested in keeping riddles active and experimenting. Put another way, *they engage in an open-ended inquiry*, they have the possibility to stand critically towards contents and form of knowledge, even towards themselves. Considering the present development in Part II about the function of genealogy as activating the affective world of readers, we might say that in this case, Nietzsche, in referring to these future and undefined philosophers, ultimately speaks of his readers, invoking their affective world by seeking their unconscious identification with the model of free spirits he constructs.

Apart from the above three reasons indicating the prioritisation of knowing as a process over knowledge as a fixed state, arises the question why does knowing take precedence in terms of value? According to Nietzsche, this investment in an open-ended inquiry is crucial for the enhancement of life and health, as is often the case in his philosophy. The criterion for evaluating knowledge is external and revolves around its contribution to the flourishing of life and the promotion of health. What is crucial is not the rigid definition of the essence of the objects — for example of art, of morality, of

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[629] HAH P 4.
[630] GS 347.

knowledge, of history — but rather an open-ended inquiry regarding their *value* for life and health.[631]

In his words, "what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but something else — let us say, health, future, growth, power, life",[632] the normative elements of Nietzschean philosophy. As such, the *process* of open-ended inquiry serves both as an indicator and a catalyst of health. In other words, knowing as a *process* belongs to health's territory and promotes the latter. Notably, Nietzsche directly associates the notion of process to health, emphasising that "the *great health*" is not merely a static condition one possesses "but also acquires *continually*".[633] Or, in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche affirms

> the eternal joy of Becoming itself […]. The affirmation of flux *and destruction*, the decisive element in a Dionysian philosophy, the yea-saying to contradiction and strife, the notion of *Becoming*, along with the radical rejection of even the concept, "Being".[634]

In the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche associates health with a minimal repression of instincts. Critiquing the belief in reason's superiority over instincts, he employs sarcasm to highlight the idea that prioritising rationality at the expense of instincts is detrimental. He sarcastically remarks "You have to be clever, clear, and bright at any cost: any concession to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downwards*...".[635] To this downfall, which is "just a sickness […] and in no way a return to 'virtue', to 'health', to happiness" leads the "rationality at any cost, a cold, bright, cautious, conscious life without instinct, opposed to instinct". He asserts: "To *have* to fight the instincts — that is the formula for decadence: as long as life is *ascending*, happiness is equal to instinct".[636]

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[631] BGE 11.
[632] GS P 2.
[633] GS 382. *Italics* are my emphasis. Berry's analysis is accurate here that health, as knowledge, in the Nietzschean corpus is not a "static state" but rather a process. In her words, health and knowledge "require active maintenance by restless inquirers and investigators who do not "remain stuck" to any persons or ideas (BGE 41) and who remain free of the "prisons" of conviction (A 54). See, Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 139.
[634] EH "The Birth of Tragedy". On Nietzsche's valorisation of becoming of being see also GS 357.
[635] TI "The Problem of Socrates" 11.
[636] TI "The Problem of Socrates" 11.

Of course, the fight against the instincts, or against the passions is intertwined with their linkage to spirit, which Nietzsche calls their "spiritualization".[637] Nietzsche continues that even worse than the spiritualisation is the church's practice of *castration*:

> The church combats the passions by cutting them off in every sense: its technique, its 'cure', is *castration* [*Castratismus*]. It never asks: 'how can a desire be spiritualized, beautified, deified?' — it has always laid the weight of its discipline on eradication (of sensuality, of pride, of greed, of the thirst to dominate and exact revenge). — But attacking the root of the passions [*Leidenschaften*] means attacking the root of life: the practices of the church are *hostile to life...*[638]

The association between this aphorism and GM III 12 is notable in the context of castration. Referring back to the aphorism on the affect-knowledge relationship, Nietzsche characterises also "castration" the elimination of the will and the turning off "of all emotions" [*Affekte*].[639] The intriguing point here is that the repression of instincts, in this case, leads to the castration of the intellect. We could, therefore, argue that Nietzsche is claiming in this respect that the castration of the intellect results from a kind of knowledge that is directed against instinctive life and thus against health. As we have seen above, this kind of knowledge is a fixed knowledge which, on the one hand, affirms a world other than the one in which we live, a transcendent and metaphysical world, and, on the other hand, prevents the very process of knowing, in the sense of an open-ended inquiry. By advocating for a shift towards thinking differently, Nietzsche implores individuals to break free from rigid, dogmatic patterns of thought and embrace a more open-ended and critically engaged approach to understanding values and their value.

To summarise until here, the outcome of Nietzsche's genealogy could not be a fixed knowledge of the origin of moral values. Such a fixed knowledge would be incompatible with the narrative's fictitious elements, historical inconsistencies, and rhetorical means, as explored in Part II of the thesis. Nietzsche's aspiration to provide a fixed knowledge regarding the emergence of moral values would also be incompatible with his claims regarding the traditional understanding of knowledge. Does that mean that knowledge has no position in his genealogy? On the contrary, it has, but as a series

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[637] TI "Morality as Anti-nature" 1.
[638] TI "Morality as Anti-nature" 1.
[639] GM III 12.

of hypotheses imbued with polemical force, which will initiate — apart from the activation of the affects discussed in Part II — a continuous process of questioning and open-ended inquiry, akin to an "open sea", where new possibilities and perspectives unfold. There is a transformative effect underscoring the dynamic and destabilising nature of Nietzsche's genealogy, emphasising the power of continual questioning and critical engagement in shaping one's understanding of values and their value.

Chapter 9: Critique (in its beginnings) as *Misstrauen* activated in the artistic realm

Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth:
The tree of knowledge is not that of life.

— Lord Byron, *Manfred*

The ultimate purpose of genealogy is a critique of the value of values. Two difficulties arise. Firstly, as we have seen, there is the issue of genetic fallacy. As Nietzsche points out, knowing the historically different origins of moral values or how our moral beliefs and judgements are constituted within the psychological domain becomes insufficient for the *critique* of the value of those moral values. Secondly, there are limitations within purely scientific discourse when it comes to criticising the value of truth. In the closing aphorisms of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche's readers encounter a twist: even our uttermost enlightened element, our will to truth, remains trapped within the Christian realm. Consequently, even in the realm of scientific discourse, there persists "the faith in a *metaphysical* value, a *value as such* of truth".[640] Thus, philosophical-scientific discourse (to which Nietzsche himself allegedly belongs) is ultimately based on the metaphysical value, the value of truth.[641] In this sense, scientific discourse shares "the same faith" with the ascetic ideal "that truth can*not* be assessed or criticized".[642]

We can perceive the term "truth" in a triple sense: as a metaphysical normative principle,[643] as the ordinary sense of truth: what we *take* to be true regarding who we

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[640] GM III 24.
[641] GM III 24, III 27.
[642] GM III 25.
[643] GM III 25.

are — including our values,[644] and as the "truths" which are "becoming audible in the distance", that the Nietzschean genealogy reveals.[645]

According to GM III 25, scientific-philosophical discourse is deemed inadequate for the critique of the value of truth in the first sense. Truth, understood as the supreme value, takes normative priority: I am not allowed to deceive, not even myself. Simultaneously, I argue that scientific discourse, being literal and explicit as it is, is also inadequate for the critique of the value of values in general. Since agents recognise the values they embody as "truths" and as conditions of their existence, it is difficult to engage in their questioning, as this would threaten and possibly undermine the stability and sense of control that, as we have seen above, seek. These three notions of the term "truth" are intertwined. Scientific-philosophical discourse, bound by the metaphysical normative value of truth, does not allow any deception. However, the *possibility* of a critique of values — the inquiry into the value of the values agents embody as their "truths" — presupposes, as I argue, aesthetic countermeasures that provide concealments to the "very unpleasant truths" revealed by Nietzsche's genealogy. That is something scientific-philosophical discourse does not allow due to its commitment to the metaphysical value of truth. Hence, we are in a stalemate: genealogy, if taken literally as the process that leads to the actual knowledge "about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed",[646] is insufficient to lead to the intended critique.

I claim the rhetorical reading of genealogy solves this problem, rendering critique possible. According to that reading, Nietzschean genealogy, as an "aesthetic phenomenon", incorporates fictional elements and rhetorical-artistic devices such as metaphors and contradictions. Its aim is, on a first level, to induce an affective engagement of the reading audience, much like a work of art.[647] In that sense, Nietzschean genealogy leaves us more ambivalent about its content and results in a sense of unfamiliarity, confusion and difficulty in understanding. This ambivalence fosters a mistrust towards the genealogical narratives Nietzsche presents, activating the intended critique in Nietzsche's audience. Therefore, Nietzschean genealogy invites its

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[644] GS 335.
[645] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[646] GM P 6.
[647] See on that topic Chapter 4.3. on Nietzsche's affective knowledge.

readers to engage in an open-ended inquiry, starting with the activation of critique towards its own content and form. In that sense, genealogy is ultimately critical, not just in the sense of Nietzsche's own critique of moral values, but also because constituted artistically, escapes the limits of Western philosophical thought, the attachment to the unconditional value of truth and offers a new tool: the *Infragestellung* that emerges through the artistic.

In this chapter, I further develop the idea that genealogy's product is, in its beginnings, the activation of the affective world of its audience, by claiming that his affective engagement leads to the activation of critique. I propose two hypotheses. Firstly, I consider the term *mistrust* and its equivalents as denoting critique's activation through the Nietzschean genealogy. Secondly, I explain why artistic discourse renders critique possible.

9.1. Mistrust as critique *in its beginnings*

When Gemes discusses the repetition of the term "mirror", he notes: "[t]he repetition is also a clear marker of the importance Nietzsche attaches to this theme".[648] We can plausibly suggest that, in general, repetition is a marker of importance in Nietzsche's work.

In this context, the repetition of the term "mistrust" [*Misstrauen*] should not go unnoticed.[649] Of course, once again, the play of the signifiers is integral to Nietzsche's rhetorical-artistic style. Just as the term "intellectual conscience" transforms into "honesty" or "intellectual integrity", as discussed in Part I of the thesis, the quality of *mistrust* — the quality of standing critically concerning the respective truth pretensions that knowledge claims carry —[650] takes other names, such as *disbelief* [*Unglauben*], *doubt* [*Zweifel*] or *suspicion* [*Verdacht* or *Argwohn*], which also repeat themselves through Nietzsche's works. These terms collectively denote a critical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge. Nietzsche links these signifiers with the critical

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[648] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves", op. cit., p. 8.
[649] For example, D 88, 103, 130, 206, 266, 278, 375, 407; GS 96, 110, 152, 214, 375; BGE 12, 31, 34, 53, 88, 154, 192, 201, 202, 204, 206, 232, 260, 269, 281, 295; GM P6, I 1, I 11, II 7, III 10, III 20, III 24, III 27; A 43.
[650] GS 344; BGE P.

attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge, when equating *Argwohn* with "a scepticism [*Skepsis*] which dug deeper and deeper".[651] In that sense, according to Blondel, Nietzsche "substitutes mistrust and suspicion for 'critique'".[652] However, I reckon "thematisation" is more appropriate than "substitution". Mistrust and the corresponding signifiers indicate the initiation of critique towards objects — specifically, the critique of values and their value.

A plethora of aphorisms underscore the significance and the positive valuation that Nietzsche reserves for these qualities. Citing as examples some of the central ones, in BGE 10 Nietzsche is in favour of the fact that:

> There is a mistrust [*Misstrauen*] of these modern ideas here, there is a disbelief [*Unglauben*] in everything built yesterday and today.[653]

Or, Nietzsche, referring to the impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself, criticises the metaphysicians in that "even the most cautious of them" never "start doubting [*zweifeln*] right here at the threshold, where it is actually needed the most — even though they had vowed to themselves '*de omnibus dubitandum*'".[654] Analogously, in GS 343, the opening aphorism of *Gay Science*'s fifth book, there are few, "the *suspicion* [*Argwohn*] in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough" for the spectacle of God's death, which turns "some ancient and profound trust [...] into doubt [*Zweifel*]". These agents are also the daring *lovers* of knowledge, thus emphasising not only Nietzsche's fondness for the process of knowing but also the close relationship between doubt and open-ended inquiry.[655] In this aphorism, we once again encounter the correlation between knowledge and the gaze — a knowledge that acquires value within the realm of suspicion. The more one mistrusts, the more one engages in the activity of an open-ended inquiry. For knowing to remain active, the quality of mistrust concerning the objects under consideration needs to be stimulated and maintained active. In the same spirit, in GM III 24, we read:

> We 'knowers [*Erkennenden*]' are positively mistrustful of any kind of believers; our mistrust [*Misstrauen*] has gradually trained us to conclude the opposite to

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[651] GM P 5.
[652] Blondel, "The Question of Genealogy", op. cit., p. 307.
[653] BGE 10.
[654] BGE 2.
[655] GS 343.

what was formerly concluded: namely, to presuppose, wherever the strength of a belief becomes prominent, a certain weakness, even *improbability* of proof. Even we do not deny that faith 'brings salvation': *precisely for that reason* we deny that faith *proves* anything, — a strong faith which brings salvation is grounds for suspicion [*Verdacht*] of the object of its faith, it does not establish truth, it establishes a certain probability — of *deception*.[656]

Turning back to GS 344, which Nietzsche also references in GM III 24, he claims that we should treat our beliefs *endlessly* with mistrust [*Misstrauen*]. Only in this way can beliefs and convictions "be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge". As he writes:

> In science convictions [*die Ueberzeugungen*] have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good reason. Only when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses [*einer Hypothese*], of a provisional experimental point of view [*eines vorläufigen Versuchs-Standpunktes*], of a regulative fiction, they may be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge [*Erkenntniss*] — though always with the restriction that they remain under police supervision [*Aufsicht*], under the police of mistrust [*Misstrauens*].[657]

Interestingly, the same approach — according to Nietzsche — should be applied to ourselves, treating us as "scientific experiments".[658] Along the same lines, Nietzsche advocates for placing "question-marks" after our "favorite slogans and favorite doctrines", and even after ourselves, suggesting that the question mark "might contain more truth than all the solemn gestures and trump cards laid before accusers and courts of law".[659]

This attribution of a belief to a hypothesis, treating it as an experimental way of thinking within a framework of mistrust, intertwines with commitment to a non-dogmatic inquiry. In this sense, any stable knowledge or truth claims are temporary, as they always remain under the supervision of mistrust.

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[656] GM III 24.
[657] GS 344.
[658] GS 319.
[659] BGE 25.

In the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche opposes *Misstrauen* (mistrust) to the will to systematise. He writes: "I distrust [*misstraue*] all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity [*Rechtschaffenheit*]".[660] This highlights the eclectic affinities between mistrust and intellectual conscience. Similarly, in GS 346, Nietzsche renders philosophy analogous to mistrust, noting, "[t]he more mistrust, the more philosophy [*So viel Misstrauen, so viel Philosophie*]".[661] Furthermore, the sixth aphorism from the Preface to the *Genealogy* is also illuminating in this respect, as it presents mistrust and suspicion as necessary elements for scrutinising moral beliefs. When these qualities "spring up, belief in morality, all morality, wavers".[662] Similarly, when discussing the "new philosophers" — or the Nietzschean audience — they are described as "curious to a fault, researchers to the point of cruelty, with unmindful fingers for the incomprehensible".[663]

The evaluating superiority that Nietzsche attributes to mistrust and the relevant signifiers is evident in their role in promoting life and health. Mistrust and the relevant signifiers are weapons against fixed knowledge which, as seen above, expresses "a tremendous collapse and *disease of the will*",[664] thus serving as a defence against nihilism. In that context, doubt [*Zweifel*] emerges as a significant tool — and which, according to Nietzsche is regarded by the Christian morality as "sin" — for challenging certainty and established beliefs. We read:

> *Doubt as sin.* — Christianity has done its utmost to close the circle and declared even doubt to be sin. One is supposed to be cast into belief without reason, by a miracle, and from then on to swim in it as in the brightest and least ambiguous of elements: even a glance towards land, even the thought that one perhaps exists for something else as well as swimming, even the slightest impulse of our amphibious nature — is sin! And notice that all this means that the foundation of belief and all reflection on its origin is likewise excluded as sinful. What is wanted are blindness and intoxication and an eternal song over the waves in which reason has drowned![665]

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[660] TI 26.
[661] GS 346.
[662] GM P 6.
[663] BGE 44.
[664] GS 347.
[665] D 89.

Analogously, the ascetic ideal triumphs, as the kernel of Christianity, when "[t]here is no knowing", and "*consequently* — there is a God".[666] In this framework, according to Nietzsche, Christian morality regards as sin not only the original sin in the theological sense but also the act of doubt and the process of critical thinking. In contrast to Christianity's rejection of doubt, which is an expression of nihilism, Nietzsche advocates the process of an open-ended inquiry, as indicative of and promoting health. Nietzsche's advocacy for continuous inquiry, initiated by mistrust, is highlighted in GS 347, where he writes:

> Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a *freedom* of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the *free spirit* par excellence.[667]

Following this line of thought, Berry notes, "[i]f dogmatism is pathological, the capacity for doubt is indicative of health".[668] Indeed, doubt — and any relevant signifiers — indicate health and are presuppositions of it, as antidotes to nihilism. Nietzsche is straightforward:

> Objections, minor infidelities, cheerful mistrust [*das fröhliche Misstrauen*], a delight in mockery — these are symptoms of health. Everything unconditional belongs to pathology.[669]

Beyond acknowledging the activation of critique implied by terms such as "mistrust" and their equivalents and the evaluative primacy he attributes to them for their contribution to the enhancement of life and health, Nietzsche discerns that these qualities of the critical stance towards objects directly emanate from his writings.

In the Preface of *Human, All Too Human*, written between the publishing of *Beyond Good and Evil* in 1886 and *Genealogy* in 1887, Nietzsche asserts that no one "emerges" from his writings, "without a kind of reserve and mistrust even in regard to morality".[670] He writes his writings: "have been called a schooling in suspicion [*eine Schule des Verdachts*]",[671] an opinion he affirms, when testifying that indeed no one

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[666] GM III 25.
[667] GS 347.
[668] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 174.
[669] BGE 154. See also TI "The Problem of Socrates" 10.
[670] HAH P 1.
[671] HAH P 1.

"has ever before looked into the world with an equally profound degree of suspicion" [*dass jemals Jemand mit einem gleich tiefen Verdachte in die Welt gesehn hat*].[672] In *Genealogy*, he goes one step further by recognising that the readers, encountering the narratives of the Nietzschean genealogy, learn to activate doubt as critical thinking. This cultivated critical thinking can be used against the value of moral values. Nietzsche is explicit that up until his *Genealogy* "nobody has had"[673] doubt [*Zweifel*] regarding the promotion of a value over another. In that sense, Janaway rightly notes:

> Nietzsche is hailed by wide consensus as a 'master of suspicion' of equal stature with Marx and Freud: he has taught us not to trust our ingrained assumptions about value, selfhood, history, and philosophy, and given us an unparalleled exhibition of the kind of psychological probing that can unsettle them. This very art of self-suspicion is arguably among Nietzsche's greatest gifts to philosophy, if not the greatest. […] His critique of morality produces not so much a body of doctrine held up for us to believe, as a sharp and versatile working tool that can detach us from accustomed attitudes, enabling us to grasp the psychology and history that underlie them, and to assess their potential worth to us in the present and future.[674]

Much more than the formulation of a new theory about the origin of morality or even the undermining of positions "opposed" to it, Nietzschean genealogy is as such a mechanism for eliciting critique against itself. In light of this analysis, it is plausible to argue that Nietzsche not only explores mistrust and the relevant signifiers as components of critique as critical attitude promoting health and life but also intentionally and literally constructs a machine for the activation of critique *in practice*.

9.2. Artistic discourse and the *possibility* of critique

Every philosophy, every art
may be regarded as a healing and helping appliance
in the service of growing and struggling life.

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[672] HAH P 1.
[673] GM P 6.
[674] Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy,* op. cit., p. 250.

In the opening paragraph of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* we read the following:

> Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank, and of having nothing to do: once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or conversations in it, "and what the use of a book," thought Alice, "without pictures or conversations?".[675]

Perhaps Nietzsche himself could have posed such a question, albeit in a slightly altered manner: "What is the use of a book that does not stimulate the affective world of its readers?". Nietzsche constructs genealogical narratives that stir our affects by engaging us with the unfamiliar and surprising, even challenging us to grasp their essence. Is the affective engagement of the reading public the sole reason for Nietzsche's use of the rhetorical-artistic devices we discussed in Part II? Not exclusively. I posit that employing such methods, integrating genealogy into the realm of art, aligns with Nietzsche's rejection of using scientific discourse for critiquing the value of truth. Additionally, it serves to activate in his readers Nietzsche's envisioned critique of the value of values.

Here, it is necessary to repeat how we can understand the term "truth" and its connection to the value of values. Firstly, there is "truth" as outlined in GM III 25, which stands immune to critique due to the association of the scientific discourse with the religious element. This truth normatively guides the agents, commanding, "do not deceive, not even your self".

Secondly, truth can be viewed through a more worldly and human lens, as that we take to be true regarding ourselves, including our values. In this perspective, values are perceived as *our personal* "truths", shaping and expressing our self-conception and subjectivity. The correlation between these "truths" and values becomes apparent, as the values we embrace constitute some truths of our own. Indeed, Nietzsche himself acknowledges this when he refers to our embedded "truths" as the "values" we adopt.[676] As Nietzsche states in *Beyond Good and Evil*, "the ingrained tartuffery of

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[675] Carroll, L. *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. The Millenium Fulcrum Edition 3.0p. 1-2.
[676] BGE 211.

morals […] is now part of our 'flesh and blood'".[677] While, in the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche addresses his readership and claims that they listen to their conscience,

> […] due to the fact that what you call your duty has up to this point brought you sustenance and honors — and you consider it "right" because it appears to you as your own "condition of existence".[678]

Hence, moral values manifest as truths that are significant to us, shaping our genuine self-understanding, and defining the condition of our existence.

Thirdly, there are the "truths" Nietzsche's genealogy reveals regarding our values, which are "very unpleasant" and become "increasingly audible in the distance".[679] These truths are unpleasant, among other reasons, because they undermine our accepted "truths" regarding the values we incorporate — for instance, that compassion is a good quality or that behind our conscience lies pure Reason.

These three notions of "truth" are interconnected. Scientific and philosophical discourse, constrained by the value of truth as its metaphysical foundation, rejects any form of deceit. However, the potential for problematising the value of moral values individuals embrace as their personal "truths" necessitates addressing hidden aspects regarding these values, which Nietzsche reveals as the "truths" behind our "truths". These truths, because they are unpleasant or even catastrophic, can be faced only through aesthetic countermeasures. The artistic discourse addresses a gap that the scientific-philosophical discourse overlooks because of its commitment to truth.

Nietzsche, who identifies himself as an "artist", [680] underscores in his work the limitations of purely scientific discourse in achieving, or at least effectively leading to, the "critique" [*Kritique*] of "the value of truth [*Wahrheit*]".[681] In the first sense discussed earlier, scientific discourse proves insufficient for the critique of the value of truth, seen as the unchallenged foundation of our existence, urging agents to proclaim:

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[677] BGE 24.
[678] GS 335.
[679] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[680] GS 369.
[681] GM III 24.

"I will not deceive, not even myself".[682] Nietzsche emphasises this point when he writes:

> Its relationship to the ascetic ideal is certainly not yet inherently antagonistic; indeed, it is much more the case, in general, that it still represents the driving force in the inner evolution of that ideal […] both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth can*not* be assessed or criticized) [*richtiger: auf dem gleichen Glauben an die Unabschätzbarkeit, Unkritisirbarkeit der Wahrheit*], and this makes them both *necessarily* allies […].[683]

This aphorism denotes the "fundamental asceticism of all modern philosophy",[684] embodied by those Nietzsche identifies as the "connoisseurs [*Kunstkenner*]" in the second *Untimely Meditation*. The agents "wish to eliminate art altogether; they give the appearance of physicians while their real intention is to dispense poisons".[685] Similarly, within modern scientific thought, the modern "sceptics" unknowingly align with the ascetic ideal, which is ultimately own their ideal.[686] One might object that Nietzsche, in that aphorism, uses the first-person plural ("we"), including himself among the "knowers of today", the "godless anti-metaphysicians", who, like the (modern) sceptics, rest on the unconditional value of truth, and, therefore, "still take" their

> fire from the blaze set alight by a faith thousands of years old, that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato's faith, that God is truth, that truth is *divine*.[687]

Indeed, it is plausible to read the above as an indication Nietzsche includes himself among the bearers of scientific discourse. However, by subjecting himself to criticism, he does not necessarily diminish his critique of modern sceptics; rather, he reinforces it. To the extent that he, too, depends on and operates within the scientific field, he is a prisoner of the ascetic ideal and, therefore, of the value of truth. Thereby, Nietzsche acknowledges the limitations of Western philosophical thought regarding the possibility of critique, within which he includes modern scepticism. Critique seems

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[682] GS 344.
[683] GM III 25.
[684] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 12.
[685] HL, p. 18.
[686] GM III 24.
[687] GM III 24.

impossible due to the belief in the unconditional value of truth, which scientific reason presupposes.

It is in a parenthesis in GM III 25, the second parenthesis after the one in which the *impossibility* of critique in the realm of science is diagnosed, where Nietzsche positions art as a counterweight to the inadequacy of science to disengage itself from the self-evidence of the value of truth and therefore *render the intended critique possible*:

> *Art* [*die Kunst*], let me say at the outset, since I shall deal with this at length some day, —art, in which lying *sanctifies* itself and the *will to deception* has good conscience on its side, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than science is.[688]

Nehamas, in his exploration of Nietzsche's critique of the value of truth, poses some questions, such as whether it is possible for someone to undertake the task of the critique of the value of truth, "in the name of anything other than the will to truth itself". If it is not possible, then the Nietzschean genealogy is "revealed asceticism itself".[689] This quandary can be addressed through two key perspectives. Firstly, the critique of the value of truth is positioned not in the name of truth but rather in the name of life and health.[690] Secondly, the critique of truth is inherently unattainable within scientific-philosophical discourse precisely because in this field truth is posited as the unexamined ultimate value. In contrast, the realm of art is detached from truth, characterised by the prevalence of illusion or deception.

Drawing from GM III 25, genealogy is dissociated from the value of truth as it transcends the confines of philosophical/scientific discourse, finding its place within the rhetorical/artistic realm, being itself an artistic phenomenon, a literary product. An in that sense, indeed art "still occupies a place at the very center"[691] of Nietzsche's thought in his *Genealogy*. Two successive questions arise. Firstly, what does art mean in this context? Secondly, what role does art play within this framework? From the

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[688] GM III 25.
[689] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 132.
[690] GS P 2; BGE 11.
[691] Ridley, A. (1998). *Nietzsche's Conscience. Six Character Studies from the "Genealogy"*. New York: Cornell University Press.

combination of these responses, we can deduce why art might be perceived as an opponent of the ascetic ideal. Furthermore, artistic discourse might also be the proper field of the activation of critique of the values in general, to which genealogy aims.

What does art mean? Nietzsche makes self-references as an artist,[692] gives a great emphasis on style[693] and constantly admires artists. For instance, in the second *Untimely Meditation*, Nietzsche praises those "strong artistic spirits, namely [...] those who alone are capable of learning truly, that is, for the sake of life, from that history and of putting what they have learned into higher practice".[694] Moreover, he explicitly favors Stendhal over Kant, on the grounds of "his being an *artist*".[695] At the same time he proclaims his "effort to distinguish his practice from what he considers the practice of philosophers so far".[696] He also clarifies that "only if history can bear being transformed into a work of art, that is, to become a pure art form, may it perhaps preserve instincts or even rouse them".[697]

It seems appropriate to interpret the term "art" in a broader and more heuristic manner, encompassing Nietzsche's rhetorical style of writing, as explored in the previous chapters, as "a conscious application of artistic means of speaking".[698] This interpretation could also extend to the "art of reading [*das Lesen als Kunst*]",[699] reflecting the importance Nietzsche gives to the right interpretation of his works. In an aphorism from the early *Human, All Too Human*, we read:

> Books which teach one to dance — There are writers who, by representing the
> impossible as possible and speaking of morality and genius as though both were
> merely a matter of wanting them, a mere whim and caprice, evoke a feeling of

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[692] GS P 4.

[693] For example, in the early *Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, Nietzsche criticises the modern Germans because they reject the form as non-important, emphasising on the content. We read "The sense of form is rejected by them with veritable irony —one has, after all, *the sense of content*: they are, after all, the famous people of inwardness". See, HL, p. 26. This schism between inner (content) and outer (form) leads to a lack of integrity and, therefore, to health degradation.

[694] HL, p. 18. Regarding Nietzsche's admiration of artists, see also Huddleston, A. (2015). "Nietzsche's aesthetics". Philosophy Compass 15 (11), pp. 1-10, p. 5.

[695] Ridley, A. (2007). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art.* Abingdon: Routledge, p. 120. On Stendhal's superiority over Schopenhauer, see Ridley, A. (1998). *Nietzsche's Conscience. Six Character Studies from the "Genealogy"*. New York: Cornell University Press, p. 89.

[696] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 21.

[697] HL, p. 39.

[698] R, p. 106.

[699] GM P 8. See, also, the relevant passage from the *Antichrist*: "Philology should be understood here in a very general sense, as the art of reading well [...]". A 52.

high-spirited freedom, as though man were standing on tiptoe and compelled to dance for sheer joy.[700]

Is Nietzsche one of the writers who write "books which teach one to dance"? Considering the discussions in Part II of the present thesis on rhetoric and the new modes of thinking and feeling that Nietzsche deems necessary, it is plausible to argue that Nietzsche positions himself as a writer whose texts teach us to dance. This is because his works themselves belong to the realm of art, presenting as aesthetic phenomena. Mitcheson notices "[t]he art of Nietzsche's own writing itself contributes to the exploration of a new method of truth", without, however, elaborating more on this thought.[701] Ridley acknowledges the deliberate artistry of Nietzsche's style, when stating that not only *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which "is intended to be a work of art" but "the style and construction of all of his books is self-consciously artistic to a degree approached only, perhaps, among philosophers, by Plato and the early Wittgenstein". Ridley also recognises that "throughout his life Nietzsche regarded himself as a serious composer, despite the evidence of his actual compositions to the contrary — and we have a quick sketch of the most *art-fixated* of all of the major philosophers".[702] Allison notes that Nietzsche uses artistic devices to "to induce the reader to come to an understanding of his philosophical works, his reflections, indeed, of his very temperament and character".[703] Nehamas advocates Nietzsche depends "on literary and artistic models for understanding the world",[704] and that "coming in terms with his style is essential to understand him at all",[705] as "Nietzsche is one of those writers whose philosophy evaporates when detached from its literary qualities".[706] Along the same lines, according to Saar, "it is in terms of style, rhetoric and form that genealogies go to the limits of this (the historical) discourse […] the stylistic form of this writing is not external to what is to be expressed in it or to its content".[707] These scholars underscore

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[700] HAH I 206. Concerning the methodological issue of the continuity of the Nietzschean works or the "positivistic turn" of the 1870s, I am following Berry in that "given the continuity between "On Truth and Lie" and *Human, All Too Human* in terms of their sceptical orientation, there is no fundamental shift in Nietzsche's work in the 1870s. See, Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 70.

[701] Mitcheson, K. (2015). "The experiment of incorporating unbounded truth". In Bamford, R. (ed.), *Nietzsche's Free Spirit Philosophy*, Rowman and Littlefield International, pp. 139-156, p. 7.

[702] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 1. *Italics* are my emphasis.

[703] Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche* […], op. cit., p. x.

[704] Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, op. cit., p. 194.

[705] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 13.

[706] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 13

[707] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy, History, Power and the Self", op. cit., p. 308.

that Nietzsche's philosophy is inextricably linked to its artistic expression, with form and style being pivotal to its significance and influence. In that context, genealogy, under the rhetorical reading discussed above, is an aesthetic phenomenon since, at the level of content, it incorporates fictional and actual events and various historical inaccuracies; at the level of form, it is composed of rhetorical-artistic devices, such as metaphors and contradictions, that render the narrative ambiguous and confusing; and at the level of intention, it seeks the affective response of the audience, by delving into their affective and, to a large extent, unconscious realms, as discussed in Part II.

At this point, I should make a digression. This digression concerns the perception of art in *Human, All Too Human*, and the at least apparent epistemological priority of science. It is impossible not to mention the case of *Human, All Too Human*, as regards the place of art in the Nietzschean corpus in general. It is, not without evidence, observed from the secondary scholarship that in the case of this work, there seems to be a shift in Nietzsche both in terms of science and art. That shift in Nietzsche's perspective, often described as a "positivist period",[708] showcases Nietzsche's optimism towards the relationship between science and knowledge, particularly emphasising science's connection to life and health.[709] At the same time, he diagnoses art's inadequacy to approach deeper "truths".[710] What art does is merely "soothe and heal […] only provisionally, only for a moment; they even hinder men from working for a real improvement in their conditions by suspending and discharging in a palliative way the very passion which impels the discontented to action".[711] The problem here is that "[t]he more a man inclines towards reinterpretation", which is where art, religion or metaphysical philosophy lead, "the less attention he will give to the cause of the ill and to doing away with it".[712] On the contrary, science is efficient since it "can get at the underlying causes of suffering".[713]

However, this is a transient shift in his position since, from the *Gay Science* onwards, Nietzsche reverts to his critique of science and his privileging of art as the

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[708] See on that matter, Schacht, R. (1996). Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xv–xvi; Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., chapter 2.
[709] HAH I 16, I 128.
[710] HAH I 148, I 164.
[711] HAH I 148.
[712] HAH I 108.
[713] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 43.

pre-eminent field of the possibility of critique. Characteristically, Ridley mentions of Nietzsche's above formulation regarding the epistemological superiority of science to art that it "is perhaps the least Nietzschean thought that Nietzsche ever had".[714] Indeed, this is how it is. It is difficult, if not impossible, that we can integrate Nietzsche's thoughts on the appropriateness of science versus art in promoting health, as reflected in *Human, All Too Human*, in a continuum with the discussions of both the *Gay Science*, and the works of the later period and the early *Birth of Tragedy*.

On first sight, it is, therefore, explicit that in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche undermines, if not rejects the epistemological value of art. How do we address this contradiction? We can classify the *Human, All Too Human*, in a category of its own from the rest of the Nietzschean corpus, as does the majority of Nietzschean scholarship. Alternatively, we can contextualise Nietzsche's views on art within this work as part of a polemical context. If we move with suspicion regarding this "positivist turn" and pay a little more attention to both the form of *Human, All Too Human* and the context in which it is written, we may be able to discern a continuity in Nietzsche's thought, as well as a weakening of the rigour of the positions on the epistemological priority of science.

The context of Nietzsche's writing during the creation of *Human, All Too Human* is crucial to understanding his views of that period. Then, Nietzsche is perhaps at the most critical juncture in his relationship with Wagner and by extension with Romanticism.[715] In the context of this disengagement and recalling the discussion of the rhetorical force of the Nietzschean discourse developed above, one would not be surprised if Nietzsche expresses positions that would *reduce the force of the opposing ones without necessarily endorsing them* himself. It is reasonable for the epistemological priority of science over art to be among them. That alone, of course, is not a strong enough argument. However, despite the apparent rejection of art to the content of *Human, All Too Human*, there is an implicit endorsement of art intertwined within the text itself. This is particularly evident in the formal structure of the book. The book in which Nietzsche's strongest positions in favour of science in terms of knowledge are supposedly expressed is formally constituted by a set of aphorisms. It is the first time in Nietzsche's writing until then that he experiments with the aphoristic

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[714] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 43.
[715] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 46.

form. Ridley observes: "we find him beginning to experiment with the aphoristic style, setting out his thought in numbered sections ranging in length from a single sentence to a substantial paragraph".[716] Babich, when discussing Nietzsche's use of aphoristic style, points out:

> The aphorism as self-contained, as self-referring, as something that can and should be read over and over (accordingly a word that can be carried beyond the text), has to be read both in itself and against itself. As a word, aphorism has the roots, as Liddell and Scott remind us, $\alpha\varphi$-/$\alpha\pi$- from, off, away; $\delta\rho\iota\zeta\omega$: to divide, to set apart, separate as a boundary.[717]

The artisticallity of the aphoristic style leads to or consists of "the doubling of the aphoristic stylizing of this text" which "turns the reader's conviction against the reader himself or herself".[718] Kaufmann, in his turn, notes

> The aphorism, because of its discontinuous character, disseminates meaning; it is an appeal to a pluralism of interpretations and to their renewal: nothing is immortal except movement.[719]

Analogously, according to Mitcheson, the aphoristic style Nietzsche introduces in *Human, All Too Human* coincides with the "openness of thoughts" Nietzsche recognises as a characteristic of poets.[720] According to the above, the form of Nietzsche's work — as artistic and not purely scientific (be it philology, philosophy, or psychology) — inextricably captures the epistemological value of art. Aphoristic form seems to belong to the artistic realm for another reason, because of its incompleteness, which, according to Nietzsche, activates imagination and effectiveness. Nietzsche, in *Human, All Too Human*, explains the importance of the incomplete and its relation to the imagination and effectiveness:

> *The effectiveness of the incomplete*. — Just as figures in relief produce so strong an impression on the imagination because they are as it were on the point of stepping out of the wall but have suddenly been brought to a halt, so the relief-

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[716] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 35.
[717] See a detailed discussion on the topic in Babich, B. (2006). *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger*. Albany: State University Press of New York, pp. 19-35, p. 33.
[718] Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers* [...], op. cit., pp. 33-34.
[719] Kaufmann, *Nietzsche and Metaphor,* op. cit., p. 168.
[720] Mitcheson, "The experiment of incorporating unbounded truth", op. cit., p. 7.

like, incomplete presentation of an idea, of a whole philosophy, is sometimes more effective than its exhaustive realization: more is left for the beholder to do, he is impelled to continue working on that which appears before him so strongly etched in light and shadow, to think it through to the end, and to overcome even that constraint which has hitherto prevented it from stepping forth fully formed.[721]

Analogously, in HAH I 207, Nietzsche writes:

Uncompleted thoughts. — Just as it is not only adulthood but youth and childhood too that possess value in *themselves* and not merely as bridges and thoroughfares, so incomplete thoughts also have their value. That is why one must not torment a poet with subtle exegesis but content oneself with the uncertainty of his horizon, as though the way to many thoughts still lay open. Let one stand on the threshold; let one wait as at the excavation of a treasure: it is as though a lucky find of profound import were about to made. The poet anticipates something of the joy of the thinker at the discovery of a vital idea and makes us desire it, so that we snatch at it; he, however, flutters by past our heads, displaying the loveliest butterfly-wings —and yet he eludes us.[722]

It becomes explicit that in the incomplete aphoristic form, Nietzsche assumes the role of a poet who deliberately does not complete his thought to engage the imagination of his audience. This lingering of the readers at the limit, in addition to activating their imagination or their affective world, as we have seen above, also has the function of activating a kind of doubt about what Nietzsche himself writes. Reading an aphorism very often gives rise to more questions than we had before we read it. In this way, Nietzsche is, in effect, familiarising us with a mistrust of contents and forms of knowledge.

Closing this digression, functioning within the artistic field is internal to the Nietzschean genealogy as a precondition of the possibility of critique due to art's detachment from the value of truth. The value of art, and hence of genealogy as an

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[721] HAH I 178.
[722] HAH I 207.

aesthetic phenomenon, consists in its detachment from the value of truth as a precondition for the possibility of critique. Nietzsche, composing his genealogy artistically, using the rhetorical-artistic means discussed in Part II (metaphors, contradictions, coexistence of fiction with history), escapes the purely scientific discourse and the difficulties accompanying it. Discerning the acceptance of the unconditioned value of truth as the nadir to which the critique of Western philosophical thought reaches, he advances artistic discourse as a better field for *critique's activation*. Interestingly, Geuss remarks the following:

> How can I escape the jurisdiction of such processes of justification, or assume a position outside or beyond this realm? One possibility is the utopian activation of fantasy and imagination. If I compose some utopian novel or utopian piece of theatre, then I do not necessarily have to get involved in a discussion of knowledge claims and their justification etc. Aristophanes's play 'The Birds' (Aves) is not a systematic or scientific work but a Nietzschean 'turning away' from the contemporary reality of Athenian life. This is a way of 'thinking differently' (*penser autrement*), though it is one whose practical implications are very hard to determine.[723]

Reversing, therefore, Geuss' statement, Nietzsche, by entering into an artistic discourse, is probably freed from the shackles of scientific discourse, i.e. from the shackles of the ascetic ideal, and, most importantly, from the imperative of not deception.

The position that art might be an anti-ideal of the ascetic ideal and, therefore, the appropriate field of critique is supported also in *Ecce Homo*, where Nietzsche explicitly states, in his commentary on the *Genealogy*, that there was no opponent of the ascetic ideal until the appearance of his *Zarathustra*.[724] When viewed alongside the interpretation provided here, especially considering that *Zarathustra* was indeed aiming to be a work of art, Nietzsche's statement can be understood as another indication that art is the proper domain for critique's activation. Art, as the artistic discourse, in this case, has no decorative significance but is instead constitutive of the Nietzschean genealogy. Thus, in addition to the activation of the affects to which a rhetorical

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[723] Geuss, "Genealogy as Critique", op. cit., p. 210.
[724] EH "Genealogy of Morality".

discourse leads, the choice of "artistic means of speaking" finds its justificatory basis also in a reason intrinsic to the purpose of the Nietzschean genealogy, namely the detachment from the unexamined value of truth.

I contend that art serves not only as the appropriate domain for the critique of the value of truth due to its detachment from the unconditional nature of truth; it also serves as the adequate arena for the activation of the critique of the values *we* embrace as fundamental "truths" to our existence. Why is art more suitable than scientific discourse for the activation of the critique in question? Art proves to be a more fitting domain for critique due to its ability to engage readers affectively and its liberation from the constraints of truth, thereby enabling deception and disguise that, in turn, facilitates critical analysis. Gardner's observation about the epistemological significance of aesthetics is relevant here. According to him, the epistemological significance of aesthetics for Nietzsche does not lie in its ability to approach some metaphysical truths that are inaccessible to scientific discourse. Instead, it is founded "practically or axiologically",[725] which is also linked to a "necessity of representation".[726] I propose that we can understand the practical or axiological foundation of the epistemological significance of aesthetics, and more specifically of the artistic field, because the latter offers the stimulation of the recipients' affective world and the disguise it provides to the objects under examination — in this case, the "unpleasant truths" regarding our values we perceive as the conditions our existence — makes the latter possible to confront.

Therefore, the first reason lies in the activation of the readership's affective world, extensively discussed in Part II of the thesis. To recap briefly, it seems that Nietzsche, already from his early lectures on Rhetoric, posits that the agents' knowledge, values, and beliefs are influenced by their affective world. In the light of the interpretation offered in this thesis, readers' affects are activated precisely because Nietzschean philosophy, and genealogy in particular, are presented as aesthetic phenomena. What in the early lectures notes on Rhetoric seemed to be an observation by Nietzsche concerning the position of orators and the aim of activating the passions of the audience, eventually becomes an internal element of his philosophy and his

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[725] Gardner, "Nietzsche's Philosophical Aestheticism", op. cit., p. 618.
[726] Gardner, "Nietzsche's Philosophical Aestheticism, op. cit., p. 604.

genealogy specifically, taking a clear central place in the *Genealogy*, since it becomes the pre-eminent field of the possibility of critique.

In that sense, Nietzschean philosophy lays the groundwork for exploring the epistemology of art. Probably unintentionally, Nietzsche's assertion touches on the epistemic value of art, as artistic discourse is the sphere for affective arousal, a condition alien to the scientific domain. Nietzsche explicitly ties affects to the formation of knowledge, judgements, and convictions, leading to the central question: "How can I know through art?", suggesting "art and affect in certain of their forms are *philosophically cognitive*".[727] Although Nietzsche does not elucidate *how* affects influence our knowledge, judgements, and beliefs, he *affirms their role* in this shaping process. While scientific discourse may not directly impact affects, art does so, fostering the potential for critique's activation.

If my hypothesis that mistrust and the relevant signifiers denote critique in its beginnings is plausible, the argument regarding critique's connection to affects becomes more compelling. Saar notices that genealogies, such as Nietzsche's, "told with the intention to induce doubt and self-reflection" their readers[728], "raise affects and to stir up doubts and questions"[729] on its audience. Therefore, he implies, without analysing it, a relationship between affects and "doubts and questions". Nietzsche explicitly connects the emergence of critique with the arousal of affects and therefore with the artistic discourse. Characteristically, the ones who arouse *mistrust* and are considered as "the only one type of real enemy" of the ascetic ideal are the *artists*, the "comedians" of the ascetic ideal. [730] Additionally, as we have seen in the previous chapter, mistrust is used interchangeably with other terms, among which is the term "suspicion". In a characteristic passage from *Human, All, Too Human*, Nietzsche associates the emergence of suspicion with the awakening of the affective world of the agents. Unlike the philosophical-scientific discourse, which may not provoke the necessary stimulation, artistic discourse engages the affects and produces certain shifts,

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[727] Gardner, S. (2007). "Philosophical Aestheticism." In Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of continental philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 76.
[728] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 295.
[729] Saar, "Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self", op. cit., p. 311.
[730] GM III 27.

such as the emergence of suspicion and, therefore, the beginning of a critical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge. We read:

> The great liberation comes for those who are thus fettered suddenly, like the shock of an earthquake: the youthful soul is all at once convulsed, torn loose, torn away — it itself does not know what is happening. A drive and impulse rules and masters it like a command; a will and desire awakens [*erwacht*] to go off, anywhere, at any cost; a vehement dangerous curiosity [*Neugierde*] for an undiscovered world flames and flickers in all its senses.[731]

This sudden awakening of the affects — including drives, impulses, wills and desires — follows a "sudden terror and suspicion [*ein plötzlicher Schrecken und Argwohn*] of what it loves".[732] The formulation "for what it loves" is linked to similar formulations referred to earlier, suggesting the deep attachment to certain values as our truths and the need for agents to remain attached to them. So, for example, agents embody values as "truths",[733] perceive values as part of their "flesh and blood",[734] and understand them as a "condition of existence".[735] Following the Nietzschean view of the psychological urge of agents to commit themselves to a firm knowledge of certain inalienable truths out of their fear of the unknown and the absence of control, in this case, what they *love* is precisely this stability, or, better, the semblance of stability. Against this, the Nietzschean genealogy as an artistic phenomenon activates critique. That is also a plausible an account of the "art of surprise" discussed in Part II of this thesis, as presented both in the lecture notes on Rhetoric and in the recapitulation of *Genealogy*, as depicted in *Ecce Homo*. Here, we observe a direct correlation between the artistic realm and the surprise that the Nietzschean genealogy offers, the activation of the agents' affective world and the emergence of suspicion as a critical attitude towards contents and forms of knowledge, and specifically in Nietzsche's case, values and their value.

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[731] HAH P 3.
[732] HAH P 3.
[733] BGE 211.
[734] BGE 24.
[735] GS 335.

The second reason regarding the progression of the artistic field as more suitable for the intended critique over the purely philosophical one emerges in the *Genealogy*, emphasising the intelligibility that art provides precisely due to its elements of disguise, concealment, and deception. Babich appropriately underscores that "the question of 'truth and lie' […] concerns the relation between art and knowledge",[736] highlighting how art's pretense (the "lie") guides us toward knowledge (the "truth") regarding our values. Art, "in which lying *sanctifies* itself and the *will to deception* has good conscience on its side",[737] by presenting content as something other than what it is, renders it more intelligible, achieving understanding at a lower cost.

Regarding disguise as the form of art, Nietzsche suggests treating morality as a "comedy [*die Komödie*]",[738] "invent a new twist and possible outcome [*eine neue Verwicklung und Möglichkeit entdeckt*]" for it,[739] positioning himself as an artist, as one of those "comedians" [*die Komödianten*] of the ascetic morality, who "arouse mistrust [*sie wecken Misstrauen*]",[740] and maybe one of the "*philosophical parodists* [*philosophischen Parodisten*]",[741] who lead to an "ironical consciousness".[742] The choice of the word "comedy", as in understanding Nietzsche's call to treat morality as

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[736] Babich, B. E. (1999). "Truth, Art and Life: Nietzsche, Epistemology, Philosophy of Life." In Babich, B. (ed.), *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Nietzsche and the Sciences II*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 4.

[737] GM III 25.

[738] For the use of the term "comedy", see also this passage from the early *The Birth of Tragedy* (5):

> The entire comedy of art [*Kunstkomödie*] is neither performed for our betterment or education nor are we the true authors of this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art –for it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally *justified* – while of course our consciousness of our own significance hardly differs from that which the soldiers painted on canvas have of the battle represented on it. Thus all our knowledge of art [*Kunstwissen*] is basically quite illusory, because as knowing beings we are not one and identical with that being which, as the sole author and spectator of this comedy of art, prepares a perpetual entertainment for itself. Only insofar as the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world, does he know anything of the eternal essence of art; for in this state … he is at once subject and object, at once poet, actor and spectator.

[739] GM P 7. See, also, Nietzsche's letter to Paul Rée, in August 1882. He wrote: "Is *The Gay Science* in your hands — *the most personal* of all my books? Considering that everything very personal is essentially *comical*, I really anticipate a 'gay' effect. —Do read *Sanctus Januarius* in context! There my private morality will be found together, as the sum of the conditions of *my* existence which prescribe an *ought* only if I *want myself*." Nietzsche, F.; Rée, P.; Salomé, L. (1971). *Die Dokumente ihrer Begegnung*. Ernst Pfeiffer (ed.), Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, p. 224.

[740] GM III 27. Nehamas affirms this position when stating that "Nietzsche tries to be such a comedian". By that he means Nietzsche is "a moral perspectivist". See, Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 133-137. On the contrary, I interpret the term at face value and argue that Nietzsche, as an artist, deliberately evokes mistrust due to his involvement in the realm of art.

[741] HL, p. 50.

[742] HL, p. 50.

"comedy", highlights the exhibition of masquerade upon which theatre as such rests. As Nietzsche states in the Preface of the *Gay Science*, the art we need "is another kind of art", which as he explains is "a mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a pure flame, licks into unclouded skies".[743] Therefore, art serves as a catalyst for the instigating critique precisely because it conceals. In that sense, it is detached from the value of truth, allowing for the unveiling of harsh truths related to the values embedded in our existence — enabling these truths to come to the surface through the process of critique. When a person engages in critiquing values, a reassessment is likely to follow, subtly challenging their self-understanding. The emerging truths, often challenging to confront, necessitate disguise to facilitate the activation of critique. Nehamas mentions Nietzsche's admiration of the ancient Greeks because they invented ancient Greek tragedy as a mechanism to veil the unbearable truths and makes them audible to its audience.[744] Nietzsche actualises what he admires when constructing his genealogy as a similar mechanism: by veiling uncomfortable truths through the artistic means, it functions as a catalyst for the activation of critique.

In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche unveils this methodological strategy regarding his *Genealogy*. We read:

> Each time a beginning that is *meant* to mislead, cool, scientific, ironic, purposely foreground, purposely keeping one in suspense. Gradually more unrest; scattered summer lightning; very unpleasant truths making themselves heard from afar with dull rumbling sounds — until finally a *tempo feroce* is attained in which everything rushes forward with tremendous tension. In conclusion each time amid utterly horrible detonations a *new* truth visible between thick clouds.[745]

Analogously, Nietzsche writes in the *Gay Science*:

> The clouds that veil these peaks have to lift for once so that we see them glowing in the sun. Not only do we have to stand in precisely the right spot in order to

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[743] GS P 4. The reference to clouds and the possible relationship with *Ecce Homo* is interesting. Here, art appears as a flame licking the cloudless skies, whereas in EH, "a *new* truth becomes visible between thick clouds". EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

[744] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature,* op. cit., p. 119.

[745] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

see this, but the unveiling must have been accomplished by our own soul as if because it needed some external expression [*Ausdruckes*] and parable, as if it were a matter of having something to hold on to and retain control of itself. […] But what does unveil itself for us, *unveils itself for us once* only [*das enthüllt sich uns Ein Mal*].[746]

The metaphors found in GS 339 and an eclectic affinity between the term "expression" here and the meaning Nietzsche assigns to expression in *Ecce Homo* regarding his *Genealogy* are appropriate to the argument I formulate. I suggest viewing the peaks as the truths regarding the values we embody, the clouds as denoting our unexamined approach to these "conditions of our existence", and the sunlight uncovering and examining them as reflecting the process of critique. Furthermore, this process must occur from the reader's soul (i.e. by engaging the reader's affective world), and its precondition is a specific expression and parable — the metaphors and artistic-rhetorical devices Nietzsche employs. Hence, to question our values, we need an allegory, which essentially involves a form of transformation — and an affective engagement with it. In this context, we can discern a trace of deception as a methodological instrument in Nietzsche's genealogy.

Therefore, Nietzsche identifies the motif of deception as a motif of his *Genealogy*. What he writes ultimately refers not to what he seems to mean but to something else. In other words, something is concealed and progressively emerges to the surface, hence Nietzsche "foregrounded art as illusion".[747] Through this lens, as deeper truths remain veiled behind the facade of artistic discourse, the "practical implications" of this *penser autrement* to which Geuss refers[748] are not so "difficult to determine". We read:

> We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to believe this. Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and "know" everything.[749]

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[746] GS 339.
[747] Babich, B. "Nietzsche's 'Aesthetic Science.'" *AESTHETIC LITERACY*, 1 (29), p. 143.
[748] Geuss, "Genealogy as Critique", op. cit., p. 210.
[749] GS P 4.

For that reason, for what is direct — through scientific or philosophical discourse — might be unbearable, or even catastrophic for the agents, and in that sense will to truth "can be a hidden will to death",[750] and humans "may bleed to death from knowledge of truth".[751] Artistic discourse enables a critique, which in the scientific realm alone seems impossible, not only due to its detachment from the unconditional value of truth and the awakening of our affective world but also, and perhaps more importantly, due to the *possibility of truth regarding our values* to be handled because it presents itself as something else, because it transfigures to something else. What is concealed each time varies. An illuminating example of what is concealed is highlighted by Gemes. When analysing *Ecce Homo*'s section on *Genealogy*, he suggests that Nietzsche employs references to our ancestors to speak for us. According to Gemes, Nietzsche adopts this strategy because if he spoke for us directly, we would not be able to hear him. Thus, he sets up the ruse that he is supposedly speaking about our ancestors and, thus, we are persuaded to listen to him and eventually understand something about ourselves.[752] Once again, regarding the form, Nietzsche chooses to exploit a *pretense*, namely that he is talking about our ancestors, to talk about us. The actual content is disguised to enhance its accessibility to us. The implicit assumption is that, in general, *what is expressed explicitly and directly often becomes incomprehensible to its recipient.* As Nietzsche states, "this art of transfiguration *is* philosophy" [*diese Kunst der Transfiguration ist eben Philosophie*].[753] Therefore, when he writes in *Genealogy*'s Preface "it will be a while before my writings are 'readable'",[754] the word "readable" is likely enclosed in quotation marks to signify that his intention is not just for readers to merely read the text but perceive it as work of art. Art then is an internal presupposition of the Nietzschean critique, as it arouses the affective world of his readership and conceals what is unbearable to be heard.

In fact, the Nietzschean scholarship implicitly addresses the relationship between the artistic field and critique. For example, Berry posits that "it is a misconception, though a common one, to think that doubt must necessarily be

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[750] GS 344.
[751] HAH I 109.
[752] Gemes, "Strangers to Ourselves", op. cit., p. 3.
[753] GS P 3.
[754] GM P 8.

motivated by reasons",[755] implicitly accepting that doubt can be motivated by something other than reasons, such as, for example, the affective constitution of the agents. Nehamas, when discussing Nietzsche's choice to include rhetorical tropes in his writing, or, to put it more correctly, to constitute his writing by rhetorical tropes, among which is hyperbole, notices that one rationale for such a choice "is the *complicated reaction* involved in critical or uncritical discipleship, which is produced by Nietzsche's uncanny ability to captivate totally at least part of his audience".[756] In this way, he asserts that the artistic structure of Nietzsche's work leads the readership to a complicated reaction, which I claim is plausible to read as an apprenticeship in critique.

Saar further contends that any interpretation of genealogy as a critical method must consider genealogy's form,[757] linking the rhetorical-artistic structure with the emergence of critical thinking. According to Mitcheson, in *Human, All Too Human*, where "Nietzsche is seeking examples of methodology that show the way for free spirited inquiry", art is one of the means to which he "finds inspiration".[758] These readings approach the relation of critique with the form of the Nietzschean genealogy without explaining how exactly it functions. In this respect, I argue that a plausible approach regarding the form-critique relationship is the one presented above, namely that genealogy, belonging to the artistic realm, activates critique in its readership because of the affective engagement it produces and the concealments it offers.

Three final remarks are worth making on this occasion. Firstly, the critique that Nietzsche requests in the Preface to the *Genealogy* is not only addressed as a theoretical demand but occurs *in practice*. Saar advocates "the critique is only performed or enacted, it becomes an act, a performance of critique, only in the concrete act of description".[759] According to him, Nietzsche constructs a historiciced narrative of the constitution of subjectivity through relations of power, which is critical as the Nietzschean audience is confronted with a new, alienating narrative of what it means

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[755] Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 91. While, in principle, I agree with Berry's approach, there are points of disagreement. My main difference with Berry is that she, sticking to the sceptical tradition and specifically the Pyrrhonists, claims Nietzsche aims to a "suspension of judgement". (Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,* op. cit., p. 112). I, on the other hand, claim that Nietzsche aims at the creation of the necessary circumstances under which a new way of judging will eventually emerge.
[756] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 24. *Italics* are my emphasis.
[757] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 238.
[758] Mitcheson, "The experiment of incorporating unbounded truth", op. cit., p. 6.
[759] Saar, "Genealogy and Subjectivity", op. cit., p. 238.

to be a subject. I argue that, above and beyond this, Nietzschean genealogy is critical in practice as it activates questioning regarding the narratives its presents, and ultimately regarding the value of moral values. It is indeed an act, a performance of critique, a knowing to deal with forms and contents of knowledge with mistrust, activated through the artistic realm.

The second observation is that art is suitable for *activating* critique. That does not imply that artistic discourse alone is sufficient for the critique. On the contrary, the immediacy provided by artistic discourse will accompany a mediation the scientific-philosophical discourse offers. We thus return to the relationship between mistrust and intellectual conscience, as that capacity of human beings to judge based on evidence for and against the position being judged, in this case, the values in question and their value. To arrive at a complete critique of the value of moral values, to which Nietzsche aims, we need a combination of artistic and scientific discourse. This entails the necessity of sparking doubt within us, which arises from Nietzschean genealogy itself as an artistic product, as an unmediated and unfiltered moment. After this moment, we engage in the rational reflection on our moral values and the value they ultimately have for our lives.

The third observation concerns the role of genealogy in the promotion of health and life. The contemporary Nietzschean scholarship acknowledges Nietzsche's interest in health and life. Mitcheson focuses on how the unconscious is brought to the surface[760] and on the "therapeutic role" of Nietzsche's scepticism "in that it is in some sense aimed at making us healthy or curing a sickness",[761] while Ansell-Pearson discusses Nietzsche's interest in health and life through the scope of self-cultivation,[762] and Ure explores the relation of a recovery from illness with the narcissistic aim for first-experienced unity of the child with the world.[763] In the present thesis, I argue that genealogy, interwoven with the artistic field, is subsumed within the Nietzschean

[760] Mitcheson, K. (2015). "Techniques of Self-Knowledge in Nietzsche and Freud." *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 46 (3), Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, pp. 328-348.
[761] Mitcheson, K. (2016). "Scepticism and self-transformation in Nietzsche —on the uses and disadvantages of a comparison to Pyrrhonian scepticism." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, p. 8-9.
[762] Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011). "Beyond compassion: on Nietzsche's moral therapy in *Dawn*." *Continental Philosophy Review*, 44, p. 179–204.
[763] Ure, M. (2008). *Nietzsche's therapy: Self-cultivation in the middle works*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

interest in health and life's promotion, as it enables critique's activation and fosters an engagement to an open-ended inquiry.

Nehamas is right to note that "No one has managed to bring life closer to literature than he did",[764] as, according to Nietzsche, "we possess art lest we perish of the truth",[765] and "art saves" us, "and through art — life".[766] In that sense, according to Ridley, "[w]ith the exception of a brief period in the late 1870s, then, a constant in Nietzsche's position is that the truth, or certain truths, are impossible to face up to squarely, and that they call for aesthetic countermeasures".[767] Mitcheson, in her turn, poses the question: "What could it mean, however, to fully incorporate a truth that serves to question the errors that we have previously incorporated as part of our existence?",[768] inscribing it to Nietzsche's general formulation regarding the "challenge as the question of how we can incorporate the truth".[769] These scholars emphasise the difficulty critique faces in activating itself through a direct discourse without disguise and art's significance for health and life. Agents construct their lives based on various genuine psychological needs, one of which and indeed an important one, is, as we have seen, the need to have a feeling of control over objects and themselves. Therefore, the unmediated activation of critique is, at best, rendered impossible due to the agents' defences. At worst, it may become damaging, as they will be forced to re-evaluate the "values" they have hitherto embodied as "truths", without being ready for that.

Genealogy in the artistic discourse is related to health and life as by silencing what it actually refers to, by hiding it, it makes it perceptible to the reading audience. To clarify the relationship between truth, art, genealogy, critique, and health, it would be helpful to reflect on the characterisation of Dionysus as the "god of darkness".[770] The Dionysian not only denotes the realm of truth but also indicates the perils this realm reserves for truth seekers. In this way, the Apollonian, as both the phenomenal and the luminous, creates an illusion *necessary* for the truth behind it to be heard *gradually*. Correspondingly, Nietzsche's genealogy, as an aesthetic phenomenon, renders critique

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[764] Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, op. cit., p. 198.
[765] WP 822. See also the passage from *Ecce Homo* mentioned above. EH "The Genealogy of Morality".
[766] BT, p. 7.
[767] Ridley, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art*, op. cit., p. 6.
[768] Mitcheson, "The experiment of incorporating unbounded truth", op. cit., p. 6.
[769] Mitcheson, "The experiment of incorporating unbounded truth", op. cit., p. 3; GS 110; KSA 9, 11[141].
[770] EH "The Genealogy of Morality".

bearable for us, in a parallel way that as an "aesthetic phenomenon existence is still *bearable* for us".[771]

Finally, it is worth emphasising the word "gradually". The knowledge of the truth should emerge gradually, in small doses, as Nietzsche suggests already in *Daybreak*, where he advocates for small doses for a change to be "as profound as it can be".[772] He also stresses the importance of gradualness in the revelation of truth in the summary he offers in *Ecce Homo*, writing that the truth heard at the end of his methodology is revealed "gradually" and in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where truth — and also the detachment from it — shall not emerge "*too soon*".[773] The gradual revelation of truth promotes health and life.

Let's consider a visual metaphor. Suppose there is a room with open balcony doors, where the outside world, bathed in sunlight, symbolises truth. A curtain, mediating between the room and the balcony, hides the outside world and symbolises genealogy as an aesthetic phenomenon. Inside the room is an agent. Periodically, a breeze lifts the curtain slightly, allowing the agent to glimpse and *gradually* see what lies beyond. This breeze represents the *function of art* in *activating* critique. When the agent is ready, she will rise and pull back the curtain, encountering the outside, bathed in sunlight, the truth. This act symbolises accomplished critique. Until then, the curtain permits the agent to gradually *activate* critical thinking without being "blinded" by the truth which follows it. Nietzsche, like artists, uses his genealogy to place truths "so that they partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of architectural perspectives".[774]

The activation of critique presupposes a specific attitude towards truth, even if the latter is transient, and thus makes it potentially dangerous in a double sense. Firstly, we will be called upon to disengage ourselves from truths established for us, which might be valuable for our lives to be functional. Nietzsche writes in an aphorism from the *Gay Science*, entitled "In favor of criticism", *Zu Gunsten der Kritik*, addressing his audience:

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[771] GS 107.
[772] D 534.
[773] BGE 59.
[774] GS 299.

Now something that you formerly loved as a truth or probability strikes you as an error; […] But perhaps this error was as necessary for you then, when you were still a different person — you are always a different person — as are all your present "truths", being a skin, as it were, that concealed and covered a great deal that you were not yet permitted to see. […] When we criticize something, this is no arbitrary and impersonal event; it is, at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm — something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet. — This is said in favor of criticism [*Diess zu Gunsten der Kritik*].[775]

The Nietzschean position is evident in this regard that sometimes what we accept as "truths", including the values we embrace, probably have some functional value for ourselves. Yet they are so strongly embedded in us that we may not allow ourselves to see them for what they are. Thus, we need the appropriate protection, which the disguise of the Nietzschean genealogy provides, and the relevant time to be in a position to activate our critical attitude towards them. Secondly, by initiating our critical stance, we will invest in the contingent emergence of some "very unpleasant" truth or even unbearable to hear.

Critique and art, in this regard, are intertwined and work in favour of life and health. Art provides the necessary disguise and appropriate amount of time to approach in time truths that, if confronted prematurely, would have disastrous consequences for us. Critique is possible within the artistic realm by engaging our affective world, and because this realm allows us the necessary time to detach from our previous values and gradually approach "very unpleasant" truths. If such truths were revealed too early, before we were ready, they could have disastrous effects on our lives and health. Interestingly, the Greek etymological root of ωραίος (beautiful, pretty), in its ancient sense, means that which is timely and appropriate. Similarly, truth becomes bearable — and, in that sense, beautiful — when it arrives at the right moment.

Thus, a concealed way of activating critical thinking through their reaction to the Nietzschean genealogy, i.e. within the artistic field, allows agents to "measure",

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[775] GS 307.

unconsciously, the extent to which they can bear to listen to the truths at stake. In fact, this is ultimately the measure of the value of truth, how much truth an agent can eventually bear. Nietzsche notices:

> How much truth can a spirit *tolerate*, how much truth is it willing to *risk*? This increasingly became the real measure of value for me … [E]very step forward in knowledge comes from *courage*, from harshness towards yourself.[776]

To summarise, considering the above analysis, it is plausible to read genealogy as a quasi-artistic method, activating the critique of values. The reason why this method is at least more effective would consist, as seen, firstly, in reawakening the affective world of the readers — as opposed to "feelings" that have "cooled down", a situation to which scientific discourse leads.[777] Art, on the contrary, arouses "the old emotions",[778] activating mistrust, doubt and suspicion towards its narratives, therefore activating critique towards the value of values. Secondly, artistic discourse, disengaged from the metaphysical normative value of truth, does not prioritise the value of truth at any cost, enabling deception. Therefore, it conceals "very unpleasant" truths and make them gradually heard at distance, *rendering critique possible*. In that sense, it is a more effective way of activating the process of disengagement from a belief, judgement, or value. Through affective engagement and a sequence of transformations, concealments, and silences the Nietzschean genealogy provide, embedded in the artistic discourse, one arrives at the point from which Nietzsche starts: the question of the value of values. However, one now perceives this question in a new light — under the light of mistrust, of critique, of *Infragestellung* — produced by the Nietzschean genealogical narratives through the activation of our affective world. As Eliot puts it:

> We shall not cease from exploration/ And the end of all our exploring/ Will be to arrive where we started/ And know the place for the first time.
>
> Through the unknown, remembered gate/ When the last of earth left to discover/ Is that which was the beginning;

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[776] EH P 3.

[777] GM III 25. Janaway, in this respect, highlights Nietzsche's recognises science's "failure of affective engagement". See, Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy,* op. cit., p. 39.

[778] HAH I 147.

The source of the longest river/ The voice of the hidden waterfall/ And the children in the apple-tree.

Not known, because not looked for/ But heard, half-heard, in the stillness/ Between two waves of the sea.[779]

[779] Elliot, T.S. (1643). "Little Gidding." *Four Quartets*, New York: Harcourt.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis addressed three fundamental questions: (1) Is genealogy identical to history? (2) If genealogy is not identical to history, what is an alternative interpretation? (3) What types of knowledge and critique arise from it? By exploring these questions, the thesis aimed to present a critical understanding of genealogy and the types of knowledge and critique that emerge from it. Throughout the thesis, the following conclusions emerged:

(1) Genealogy's equation with history faces challenges due to Nietzsche's use of historical inconsistencies, fictitious narratives, and selectivity, mainly referring to the agents' psychological prehistory and its relation to the emergence of moral values — a position bolstered by his discussion on history in his second *Untimely Meditation*.

(2) A more plausible reading of genealogy would be that genealogy constructs models of the emergence of moral values by incorporating fictitious and actual historical events, employing various rhetorical-artistic devices such as metaphors and contradictions, and intending to an affective engagement of Nietzsche's readership.

(3) As for the kinds of knowledge and critique emerging from the genealogy, it is plausible to suggest that Nietzschean genealogy advances knowledge as an open-ended inquiry rather than a fixed state. Concerning critique, genealogy, except its undermining function regarding traditional positions on the emergence of moral values, such as the notion that conscience is the voice of God or the dictates of Reason, produces a critique *in practice*. By genealogy's rhetorical-artistic nature, it ultimately engages the readership's affective world, produces mistrust towards the narratives it presents and provides aesthetic countermeasures for the "unpleasant truths", enabling critique. In that sense, genealogy, knowledge, and critique emerging from it are inscribed in Nietzsche's enterprise of life's and health's promotion, reflecting his announcement that his philosophy stems from his will "to health, to life".

Part I (Chapters 1 to 3) initiated genealogy's exploration. I began by scrutinising the fundamental characteristics of Nietzsche's genealogy, positioning it as an antithesis to other genealogical methodologies. I then explored two possible interpretations: the historical and the psychological. Additionally, I

discussed Nietzsche's two paradigmatic examples of genealogy: guilt and (intellectual) conscience.

More specifically, Chapter 1, taking as a starting point Geuss' analysis, emphasised the main elements that distinguish genealogy from pedigree-type research, highlighting the delegitimising character it has as its aim. Apart from the delegitimising character of the objects under consideration that genealogy aims at, two other features are fundamental. Firstly, the root of the object in question is not one but many, and secondly, things we now consider having value, have not always had the value we attribute to them.

Chapter 2 examined the historical reading of genealogy, namely that the Nietzschean genealogy is a reconstruction of the *actual* historical circumstances that led to the creation of moral values. Such a reading would equate Nietzsche's genealogy with the historical research of the 19th century, as, for example, reflected by Ranke. Given Nietzsche's selectivity, use of historical inconsistencies, and suspicion of history as scientific, meaning as an objective account of events as they occurred, the historical reading seems inadequate, an analysis that is both motivated by and consistent with his treatment of the subject in the second *Untimely Meditation*. There, Nietzsche advocates history insofar as it is helpful for the affirmation of life. I suggested two crucial elements to understanding history's function and impact on the affirmation of life: the necessity of the unhistorical sense and the plastic power of agents. The psychological, almost psychoanalytical, connotations of this work are clear. History has value for life as it relates to the agents' psychological — individual and collective — prehistory. Nietzsche invites the latter to live unhistorically when necessary, that is, when they need to release themselves, even if only temporarily, from the chain of their past, when they cannot bear to face it head-on, and when they can, to activate their plastic power to reinterpret past events in favour of the affirmation of life.

Therefore, a more consistent way to read genealogy as "history" is in the light of psychological interpretation. Nietzsche describes the emergence of psychological structures and the relevant moral values, beliefs, and judgements. Although he does formulate and present psychological hypotheses about the psychological structures of agents and their relation to values, I have contended that this is not his *primary* objective for two reasons. Firstly, we can interpret this presented knowledge as a

precondition *for* eliciting an affective response in his audience essential for critique. Secondly, Nietzsche admits that while understanding how psychological structures and relevant moral values are formed is significant, it is insufficient for critiquing their value. An additional parameter of the psychological reading is that Nietzsche invites his readers to ask themselves personally about their reasons for committing to specific values. In other words, he invites his readers to stand critically towards the value of their values. The question is: *how exactly does this invitation take place*?

Before answering this question, Chapter 3 provided two examples of the Nietzschean genealogy: the genealogies of guilt and (intellectual) conscience. In that context, I highlighted the polemical character and the psychological nuances and explications accompanying them. Regarding guilt, Nietzsche rejects the perception that it traces back to original sin and is inherent in human nature. On the contrary, guilt arises socio-historically and refers to the "instinct" of the agents to assign meaning to objects, the legal relationship between debtor and creditor, and the power dynamics exercised by the ascetic priest as Christianity's representative. Analogously, Nietzsche rejects the divine origin of conscience. By contrast, conscience has a long history of transformations behind it. Starting from the "lowly" form of bad conscience, conscience *in its beginnings* is nothing more than the internalised instinct of aggressiveness, following the entrance into civilization and the prohibition of the free expression of this instinct. Individuals suffer from the meaningless pain they experience and thus "use" guilt to interpret their pain. In this direction, not only bad conscience develops from mere aggressiveness to the consciousness of guilt, but under the guise of sin, it acquires the form of the Christian conscience. While Nietzsche explicitly refers in *Ecce Homo* to the internalisation of aggression as the foremost origin of conscience in general and states that conscience has behind it a series of transformations, he does not clearly outline what this sequence of transformations is, causing doubt and scepticism among his readers towards his narrative.

According to Nietzsche's commentators, but at the same time by the textual interpretation of his works, bad conscience is transformed into another kind of conscience, called "intellectual conscience", a "higher" form of conscience, which only the "free, *very* free spirits possess", while the great majority of people lack. While it's easy to view intellectual conscience and general conscience as different phases of the same concept (with general "conscience" being the ultimate form), GS 335 advises

against this. In GS 335, intellectual conscience is portrayed as a "conscience behind our conscience," not possessed by everyone. Hence, the two terms are distinct. This ambiguity in Nietzsche's genealogy is not an oversight but might perceived as constructed intentionally to serve a specific purpose: to activate our affective responses and instil a degree of scepticism towards Nietzsche's narrative. Intellectual conscience denotes agents' ability to rationally examine their values, beliefs and judgements based on evidence and urges them to strive for the truth.

Part II (Chapters 4 to 6) presented the rhetorical reading of Nietzsche's genealogy, meaning that genealogy, rather than aiming at a *literal* description of the *actual* historical events that led to the genesis and development of the moral values and corresponding beliefs and judgements of the agents, offers new interpretations — which include actual and fictional elements — of the circumstances under which moral values emerged. I also highlighted genealogy's constitution by various rhetorical means — such as metaphors and contradictions — and its intention to arouse the affective world of Nietzsche's readers.

Chapter 4 examined three preliminary issues for the rhetorical reading: Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, the use of metaphors and contradictions as artistic-rhetorical means and the affective knowledge. By investigating Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric, I highlighted a possible import of these fragments beyond their discussion on language. I argued that the early lecture notes on Rhetoric respond to the question: "From which position does Nietzsche function?". In other words, they provide information about how Nietzsche performs and, specifically, the modus he constructs in his genealogical method. As I have shown, a plausible answer based on these notes would be from the position of an orator. As he writes there, orators aim to "inspire passions" in their audience and, for that reason, must have a good knowledge of the agents' psychological structures and the effect every specific type of discourse will have on them. For that means, orators *use artistic means of speaking*. I argued that by considering what Nietzsche says there and putting him into the position of an orator, various elements of his philosophy make sense, such as the rhetorical style of his writings, including metaphors and contradictions, the combination of fictitious and historical elements in his genealogical inquiry of the moral values, and the

importance of the affects for knowledge's formulation. In that sense, we can observe a continuity between his later views and his early lecture notes on Rhetoric.

Then, I illustrated Nietzsche's use of metaphors and contradictions. Concerning the former, I discussed the dual conception of metaphor in the Nietzschean early lectures notes on Rhetoric, as the literal transference of an image to a word and a deliberate application of *artistic means of speaking*. By highlighting the significance of the latter kind of metaphor in the economy of Nietzsche's genealogy, I related its use with a potential affective outcome on Nietzsche's readers and its critical effect due to the concealment it offers as an artistic means. I then explored Nietzsche's choice to use contradictions, concentrating on the example of the existence and the non-existence of facts. I have argued that contradictory positions such as this if taken literally rather than as rhetorical techniques, render Nietzsche's work absurd, naive, and superficial as they highlight an inherent inconsistency in his positions. Instead, by placing them within Nietzsche's polemic and acknowledging *their shocking effect* on his audience, they are rendered coherent and valuable devices employed to undermine opposite positions and, more importantly, to create the necessary affective environment for a *critical attitude* to emerge.

I have also emphasised the importance of Nietzsche's position on the relation between affects and knowledge for this perspective. In the context of the undermining (both theoretically and practically) of the conscious self, Nietzsche claims that affects shape our beliefs and judgements, i.e. our knowledge about moral values. I observed that while Nietzsche advocates this position on the affective world of the agents shaping their knowledge, judgements, and beliefs, he does not explain *how* this shaping takes place. The non-analytical presentation of this position is not paradoxical when one considers his non-systematic stances. That further supports the argument that the description, from a psychological perspective, of the genealogy of moral values is not his ultimate goal. While his concerns include understanding the psychological frameworks of individuals to grasp how his rhetoric influences them, the detailed *exposition* of these structures is not the principal preoccupation of his genealogy. Subsequently, I presented the case of guilt ontogenesis by Freud. This citation served a twofold purpose. Firstly, it provided an example illustrating how affects can shape our knowledge, moral judgements, beliefs, and values. Secondly, it underscored the

contrast between Nietzsche's and Freud's approaches. The former does not mainly seek to offer a scientific explanation of the origin of psychological structures and their relationship with the production of moral values, judgements, and beliefs. Conversely, the latter serves as a clear exemplar of how a systematic scientific theory explains the genesis of psychological structures and moral judgements, beliefs, and values stemming from them.

However, the position that the formation of our knowledge, judgements, and beliefs by affects takes place in some way (albeit abstract) remains robust, even in light of Nietzsche's non-systematic treatment of the subject. In this context, I have argued that not only do affects shape our beliefs, judgements and thus our knowledge around values, but it is plausible to think that their problematising and reshaping (in Nietzschean terms: "re-evaluating") them requires activation of our affective world. In that sense, the rhetorical style, which uses metaphors, contradictions and various fictitious elements and therefore equals an artistic style, is a constitutive element of Nietzsche's genealogy. In other words, a literal philosophical exposition of the actual conditions and circumstances under which the (moral) values grew up, developed and changed would be inconsistent with the central Nietzschean position that our affective world shapes our moral beliefs and judgements.

Chapter 5 presented the rhetorical reading of genealogy. The chapter added to the previous analysis on Nietzsche's use of rhetorical–artistic means, such as metaphors and contradictions ——, emphasised the historical inaccuracies Nietzsche employs in his works as fictional elements, highlighted other fictional elements he invents, such as the existence of "free spirits" and his rhetorical tricks, such as the constant invitation to examine ourselves through a series of rhetorical questions directed towards his audience. It also highlighted genealogy's intention as producing an affective response in the reading audience.

Chapter 6 addressed the objections to the psychological and the rhetorical reading and the relationship between the two readings. Concerning the psychological reading, firstly, there is the objection of genetic fallacy, Nietzsche himself admits. The knowledge regarding the agents' psychological structures and the formation of moral values is insufficient for the intended critique, namely, to question the value of moral values. The second objection concerns an internal contradiction with Nietzsche's

purposes this reading contains. If Nietzsche aims to expose us to the *actual* origins of moral values, beliefs, and judgements, isn't this movement contradictory with his anti-grounding positions concerning new truths? As shown, the psychological reading alone is insufficient to support any discussion of a formation of a critique of the value of moral values, which is the matter.

Analogously, the rhetorical reading is exposed to objections, which are the irrelevancy of the content and the ineffectiveness of activating the audience's affects. I responded to the first objection, considering that Nietzsche does not write in a vacuum but constructs a polemic towards some grounded positions on the nature of moral values. Regarding the second objection on effectiveness, I exposed Katsafanas' and Aumann's objections and constructed answers to them. In sum, I claimed the rhetorical reading of the genealogy does not mean that it will necessarily lead to an effective relocation of the readers concerning their moral beliefs, judgements, and values. However, if the critique of the value of values is to be activated, affective engagement is a precondition for any effectiveness, a position enhanced by my reading on Part III, in that critique, according to Nietzsche, is impossible merely in the scientific realm. While the efficacy may be subject to debate, this interpretation aligns with the correlation between affect and knowledge proposed by Nietzsche.

Regarding the relationship between these two readings, I argue that they are complementary. On the one hand, the presentation of psychological structures elicits a reaction of identification from the audience with the content that genealogy describes, which has rhetorical power. On the other hand, this complementarity is supported by Nietzsche's early lectures on Rhetoric, which stipulate that to evoke an affective response from the audience, the orator must possess knowledge of the psychological structures of the agents and understand the influence his speech exerts on them.

I emphasised the striking similarity between these notes and the summary of *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo*. There, Nietzsche acknowledges that as a "psychologist" — as one who understands the psychological functions of the agents and the impact his discourse will have on them — he creates a sense of the uncanny through expression, intention, and surprise in his audience, all for "reevaluating values". The affinities between this acknowledgement and the function of the orator are evident.

Part III (Chapters 7 to 9) continued by examining the question emerged: If Nietzsche's genealogy does not aim to describe the *actual* genesis and evolution of moral values, what is the outcome of the Nietzschean genealogy regarding knowledge and critique? Is it restricted to constructing narratives that activate the affective world of the readership? Such a one-sided answer would be wrong as it would leave unexplained genealogy's relationship to knowledge and critique and diminish genealogy's value.

In that light, Chapter 7 delved into Nietzsche's explicit rejection of fixed morality rooted in nature, divine commandments, or abstract reason. Through his genealogical lens, Nietzsche unveils that moral values do not possess the origins traditionally assumed but stem from diverse sources. Then emerged the question: what is Nietzsche's intent in asserting moral values' historicity or generativity? I claimed that his emphasis on the generative nature of moral values signifies the Nietzschean genealogy's capacity to evoke scepticism and introspection toward established narratives: moral values are potentially changeable because they are historico-social products. The assertion regarding the generativity of moral values unfolds with a distinctive rhetorical and critical significance: it challenges the entrenched belief in natural or immutable moral values, compelling the audience to contemplate the potential for value transformation, given that these values do not inherently stem from nature or divine sources. Also, the chapter presented Nietzsche's detection of theological underpinnings within secular values: even scientific discourse traces back to theological origins, as it substitutes Truth for God — a development coherent with intellectual conscience's Christian origins. This observation not only has a *shocking* effect on the readership but also extends to Nietzsche's methodology. Nietzsche's genealogy must be detached from the ascetic ideal and, therefore, the pure scientific-philosophical reason and the unconditional value of truth to prompt a critique of values.

Chapter 8 addressed the issue of knowledge emerging from the Nietzschean genealogy. Firstly, it discussed Nietzsche's hesitations regarding knowledge as a fixed state of knowing or having justified true beliefs. His critique of fixed knowledge encompasses four fundamental aspects. Firstly, as a proponent of impermanence, he criticises fixed knowledge for its rejection of life's impermanence. Secondly, fixed knowledge demands certainty, which reduces the inherent multiplicity of existence to

a simplistic unity, conflicting with life's "polytropos" character. Thirdly, the quest for fixed knowledge denies sensuality and affirms an otherworldly realm rather than the world we inhabit. For these reasons, Nietzsche posits this kind of knowledge as discordant with life, a symptom of degeneration and nihilism. Lastly, he offers a psychological explanation for our compulsion towards fixed knowledge, originating from agents' innate desire for security and dominance.

The chapter then proceeded to explore the kind of knowledge Nietzsche aspires to. Drawing on Berry's analysis of Nietzsche and scepticism, I elucidated that Nietzsche conceives knowledge as a dynamic, open-ended inquiry rather than a static, fixed state. Within this context, the knowledge advocated in GM P 6 is depicted as an interpretation crafted by Nietzsche, leveraging rhetorical potency, designed to evoke a specific critical response from its recipients: an affective reaction and the stimulation of critical thinking. Nietzsche's favour for knowledge as an open-ended inquiry is evident in several ways. Firstly, his language, influenced by his philological background, often uses infinitive forms — for example, he prefers using the word "Erkennen" rather than "die Erkenntnis" — or phrases that suggest a continuous pursuit of knowing rather than a fixed state. Secondly, perspectival knowledge highlights the limitless perspectives and evolving interpretations influenced by socio-historical contexts, emphasising the dynamic character of knowledge. Thirdly, Nietzsche's descriptions of philosophers as "born guessers of riddles" who embrace mystery and continuous questioning further underscore this process-oriented understanding. This emphasis on the process of inquiry over fixed knowledge is related to the enhancement of life and health it offers.

Finally, Chapter 9 addressed the critique emerging from the Nietzschean genealogy under the rhetorical reading presented above and the field in which the activation of the critique is possible. Considering GM P 6, GS 307, and GS 345, it was shown it is plausible to interpret the critique that genealogy aims for as initially posing questions and subsequently examining the value of moral values. In that sense, the critique is intended to *be actively performed by his readers in practice*, not merely enacted by Nietzsche. Moreover, I argued this critique is thematised through the combination of two terms: "mistrust" (as the activation of critique) and "intellectual conscience" (as the culmination of critique through the rational process of validating our views depending on evidence and arguments). Akin to his exploration of affective

knowledge, Nietzsche's elaborations on "mistrust" are not merely theoretical considerations but practical exercises in critical thinking that the Nietzschean genealogical narratives produce through an affective response from the readers towards the narratives themselves. Namely, genealogy activates the critique of the value of values, which agents incorporate as their "truths".

I then commented on the term "truth", and I claimed we might understand it in three ways: firstly, as a metaphysical normative principle, which dictates: "I shall not deceive, not even myself"; secondly, as the truths the ordinary person believes regarding values, such for example, that compassion is a good value; and thirdly, as the "truths" regarding the latter truths, which Nietzsche unveils, for instance, that compassion is also involved and developed in power dynamics or that our enjoyment of cruelty lies behind conscience, which dictates our most moral values. According to GM III 25, scientific-philosophical discourse, sharing its foundation with theological discourse, is inadequate for critiquing the value of truth in the metaphysical sense, as it assumes its unconditional nature. Truth as the highest value demands normative priority: I must not deceive, not even myself. I argued that beyond the inability to critique the value of truth, scientific discourse, due to its literal and explicit nature, is also inadequate for critiquing the value of values. We recognise the values we embody as truths, crucial to our existence, making it difficult to question and reevaluate them without threatening our sense of stability and control. By facing the "truths" the Nietzschean genealogy unveils, the value of our dearest values stands on trembling ground. These three notions of "truth" are intertwined. Scientific discourse, constrained by the metaphysical value of truth, forbids any form of deception. However, to critique values and their value, we need the concealments that aesthetic approaches offer to be in a position to face "unpleasant truths" regarding our "truths", which scientific discourse cannot provide due to its commitment to the metaphysical value of truth. Thus genealogy, when taken literally as the pursuit of actual knowledge about the conditions and circumstances under which values arose and evolved, cannot lead to the intended critique for these reasons.

I advocated it is plausible to read the rhetorical reading of genealogy as capable of resolving this problem, making critique possible. In this interpretation, Nietzschean genealogy is a literary and "aesthetic phenomenon", incorporating fictional elements

and rhetorical-artistic devices like metaphors and contradictions. It engages readers affectively, akin to a work of art. This engagement creates ambivalence about the content, leading to unfamiliarity and confusion, which fosters mistrust towards the genealogical narratives while providing the necessary "aesthetic countermeasures" for the "slow" emergence of "unpleasant truths" regarding our moral values. Genealogy is ultimately critical, not only in terms of Nietzsche's critique of moral values, but also because it transcends the limits of Western philosophical thought and the unconditional value of truth, offering a new tool for critical engagement: the questioning, or *Infragestellung*, that arises through the artistic.

In concluding this thesis, I would like to highlight three issues that I found particularly interesting and worthy of further research. The first concerns the role of Nietzsche's early lecture notes on Rhetoric in his later philosophy. If Nietzsche indeed incorporates the methodology of the orator, then not only his psychological inquiries are explained as methodological tools of his genealogy, as depicted in the *Genealogy*'s analysis in *Ecce Homo*, but rhetorical devices, as a conscious choice of artistic means of speaking, also become a fundamental modus operandi for him.

Secondly, I was intrigued by the idea that Nietzsche is genuinely interested in activating critique in practice among his readers, embedding this endeavour within a broader movement of "learning to think". Under the reading offered in the thesis, Nietzsche advances a "Think for yourself, think differently", a process activated by his genealogy — an exercise corresponding to Zarathustra's words "This is *my* way: where is yours?"[780] In that sense, the meaning of "*Vademecum-Vadetecums*" of the seventh poem opening the *Gay Science*, is now explicable.[781] As Kaufmann notes, *Vademecum* means "a manual or guidebook" and taken literally the "go with me". On the other hand, *Vadetecum* means "go with yourself".[782] Following the above interpretation, Nietzsche's genealogy activates a critique that has as its essence the questions: "What value is there in such and such a moral stance?" or "what is the value of such and such knowledge?", and "how much truth I can bear?", aligning with the otherwise

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[780] Z, "On the Spirit of Gravity", 2.
[781] The complete passage is:
Lured by my style and tendency,
you follow and come after me?
Follow your own self faithfully
—take time— and thus you follow me.
[782] See footnote n. 3 in the *Gay Science*, p. 43.

paradoxical opening of genealogy that "We are unknown to ourselves, we who knowers".[783]

Thirdly, if the claim that genealogy is formed as an aesthetic phenomenon, initiating knowledge as an open-ended inquiry and critique is plausible, we can interpret genealogy as a manual regarding art's epistemological or critical value. Even if Nietzsche's intention was not that, assumptions such as the significance of affects for the production of knowledge, judgements, and beliefs, the realisation of the necessity of aesthetic countermeasures for the gradual emergence of hard truths, and the inadequacy of scientific discourse for the project of critique due to its attachment to a metaphysical normativity of truth can be considered elements that precisely relate to questions such as: "What is the significance of art for the production of knowledge?", "What kind of knowledge can I approach through Art?" and "Why is art sometimes more suitable than scientific-philosophical discourse for the emergence of critical thinking towards things?". But clearly, these questions await further exploration in another project, somewhere in the "sea, *our* sea" which "lies open again".

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[783] GM P 1.

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