Making valuations with the priority heuristic
Making valuations with the priority heuristic
The priority heuristic is a lexicographic semi-order for choosing between gambles. It has merits such as predicting, out-of-sample, people's majority choice more accurately than benchmarks such as prospect theory, having been axiomatized, and logically implying major violations of expected utility theory. The heuristic has shortcomings too, such as failing to account for individual differences and intricate choice patterns, and predicting less accurately than various model ensembles and neural networks in some environments. This note focuses on an important purported shortcoming of the heuristic, that it cannot produce valuations of gambles. I point out that the certainty equivalent of a gamble for the priority heuristic is known and suggest that this fact can be used to enhance the scope of the heuristic. Indeed, by making simple auxiliary assumptions and calculations, I demonstrate that the priority heuristic can explain the Saint Petersburg paradox and the equity premium puzzle, and to do so arguably more parsimoniously and plausibly than standard approaches.
Cognitive models, Decision theory, Information processing
Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos V.
b97c23d9-8b24-4225-8da4-be7ac2a14fba
December 2024
Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos V.
b97c23d9-8b24-4225-8da4-be7ac2a14fba
Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos V.
(2024)
Making valuations with the priority heuristic.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 123, [102883].
(doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2024.102883).
Abstract
The priority heuristic is a lexicographic semi-order for choosing between gambles. It has merits such as predicting, out-of-sample, people's majority choice more accurately than benchmarks such as prospect theory, having been axiomatized, and logically implying major violations of expected utility theory. The heuristic has shortcomings too, such as failing to account for individual differences and intricate choice patterns, and predicting less accurately than various model ensembles and neural networks in some environments. This note focuses on an important purported shortcoming of the heuristic, that it cannot produce valuations of gambles. I point out that the certainty equivalent of a gamble for the priority heuristic is known and suggest that this fact can be used to enhance the scope of the heuristic. Indeed, by making simple auxiliary assumptions and calculations, I demonstrate that the priority heuristic can explain the Saint Petersburg paradox and the equity premium puzzle, and to do so arguably more parsimoniously and plausibly than standard approaches.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: December 2024
Additional Information:
Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author
Keywords:
Cognitive models, Decision theory, Information processing
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 494204
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/494204
ISSN: 0022-2496
PURE UUID: a5d82bba-0ef5-4451-abd6-605ed00109c7
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 30 Sep 2024 14:38
Last modified: 01 Oct 2024 01:53
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics